THE INTEREST AND OPPOSITION OF THE FRENCH MILITARY IN SATELLITE

RECONNAISSANCE FOR FRANCE: A TALK WITH A GENERAL OFFICER OF THE

FRENCH FORCES
Sébastien Matte la Faveur
Paris, France
s.matte@wanadoo.fr

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the hard days of the Cold War, lacking strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, the
United States quickly developed the first reconnaissance satellite. On 18 August 1960, less than
three years after their first satellite Explorer I (01/31/1958), they became the first country with a
space observation capability with Discoverer XIV. In the wake of the United States, the Soviet
Union got this capability less than five years after Sputnik, 26 April 1962, with the launch of their
spy satellite Zenit (Cosmos 4).

For its part, France became the third space power by launching the satellite “Astérix” on 26
November 1965. This was a logical consequence of strong efforts in the development of ballistic
missiles and the establishment of a nuclear deterrence force which was foreseen by General
Charles de Gaulle as necessary for the strategic independence of France. Since 1965, sometimes
in partnership with Europe or other countries, France achieved many great space challenges like
the Ariane launcher in 1979 and the SPOT observation satellite in 1986, the latter which invented
the concept of commercial imagery. Without a doubt, France had the technological capability to
have a reconnaissance satellite before 1980, and this would have been in keeping with the general
pattern of de Gaulle’s view. Although French military engineers started to envision the idea of a
reconnaissance satellite in the late sixties and a concrete project, SAMRO (“Satellite Militaire de
Reconnaissance Optique”) was even proposed in the late seventies, France achieved its first
reconnaissance satellite only in1995, with the launching of HELIOS I.

In March 2005, performing some research on my Ph.D. on the birth of strategic reconnaissance, I
met a main witness and actor of the SAMRO period. Now a retired general officer, this
gentleman, who asked me not to give his name, has been a specialist of intelligence and
reconnaissance since the beginning of his career. During the last ten years he spent as an officer
of the Nuclear Forces Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was the person in charge of
promoting the SAMRO project. Calling himself a “French military space prehistory veteran,” he
explains in this talk the history of the French space reconnaissance concept from the military’s
view, and why SAMRO was eventually cancelled.

2.0 THE COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

General, what was the strategic environment like at this time?

At this time, the potential enemy was the Soviet Union and their allied nations of the Warsaw
Pact. They were a very closed society and Western countries had very little information on them.
Moreover, the huge territory they covered was inaccessible to aerial surveying. Field structures
were analysed only from maps and aerial photographs seized from the Germans at the end of the
Second World War, and brought up to date by various data sources. These maps and photographs
were used as well by the Americans to make 1/500000th maps of the area located beyond the Iron

1
Curtain. Later the U.S. used high altitude U-2 reconnaissance planes and satellites. Soon
newspapers enhanced the existence and the importance of satellites. This importance became
mythic but was largely exaggerated. The performance of the observation satellites was
overestimated to hide other intelligence sources, and because technical intelligence was maybe
considered as more ethical than human intelligence (i.e. spies).

3.0 FRENCH INTEREST IN SPACE RECONNAISSANCE

When did interest in space reconnaissance appear in France?

Well, I would say the concept started arising in the 1960s. I do not remember the precise date, but
I remember having heard about such a project around 1967. We essentially needed geographic
information to improve our knowledge on the localization and on the nature of strategic targets.
We also needed to have some precise points to adjust the inertial navigation of our strategic
bomber, the Mirage IV. We were in a subordinate part interested in knowing the localization of
the SAM (surface-to-air missiles) and then ABM (anti-ballistic missile) systems. Our
“conventional” intelligence sources gave interesting but limited results. Moreover, we could not
get access to U.S. intelligence sources as easily as the British could, because France had left the
NATO integrated structures in 1966. Finally, the need for better intelligence was first expressed
by the Secrétariat des Forces Stratégiques (SFS, or Office of Strategic Forces), a branch of the
Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (SGDN), 1 and then by the section “Renseignement-
Objectifs” (“Intelligence Targets”) of the Division “Forces Nucléaires” (Nuclear Forces Division)
of the Etat-Major des Armées (EMA, or Joint Chief of Staff). All the intelligence questions
essentially concerned the Nuclear Forces. We also knew that the military engineers of the
Laboratoire de Recherches Balistiques et Aérodynamiques (LRBA, the Aerodynamics and
Ballistic Research Laboratory) 2 had started some general studies on a “Véhicule Spatial
d’Observation Photographique” (VSOP) since the beginning of the 1960s. So from a
technological point of view, we could do it, but at this time the concept was too new. The biggest
part of the Defence budget was spent on the making of our “Deterrence Force” and we simply did
not have any money to invest in some new futurist systems. It was also right that before mapping
the target, we had to have the weapon to launch at it.

So when did the concept finally emerge?

The idea of a national reconnaissance satellite began to appear, or I would say to re-appear,
among the military during the 1970s. The Chef d’Etat-Major des Armées (CEMA, or Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) of this time, Air Force General François Maurin, effectively
expressed his interest in a reconnaissance satellite around 1973. Maybe he was influenced by the
launching of the U.S. scientific observation satellite Landsat in 1972. Perhaps this was also due to
the lobbying of some big companies like Aerospatiale or Alcatel. And at this time we could after
all relax after the expensive research and development on the Nuclear Forces. The Mirage IV, the
nuclear submarine and the missiles were all operational, and we had the H-bomb. We could then
make some investments in some new systems. For three years, the Nuclear Forces Division and
the DGA pointed out the need of this reconnaissance satellite, which received the name of
SAMRO for “Satellite Militaire de Reconnaissance Optique.” The struggle was hard, because a
lot of people were not convinced of its justification, including the next CEMA, an Army General.

We must say that, at this time, the three French Chiefs of Staff were respectively defending three
expensive projects. The Navy struggled to have a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier built, which

2
eventually became the Charles de Gaulle. The Air Force was also struggling for the new Dassault
fighter, the Rafale, and the Army wanted to be equipped with the Leclerc tank of Giat Industries.

Who was appointed to promote the idea of a reconnaissance satellite?

Since the middle of the 1960s, the Nuclear Forces had been asking for some strategic surveying
means, and this office was therefore appointed to demonstrate the requirements for such a
satellite, and to determine, with the DGA, its technical requirements. To underline the importance
of a reconnaissance satellite, one major element was the criterion of national independence, the
independence of decision. De Gaulle had ordered the making of the nuclear forces for France to
be strategically independent. In the same way, we said that we were totally dependent from
American sources at an intelligence level. And could we always trust them? We enhanced the
fact that we could not be, or declared that we could not be master of our political decisions if we
could not have our own intelligence sources to appreciate the crisis and make our decisions with
full confidence. But this idea was quickly disparaged. Detractors said: “what solution do you
propose: a satellite which would not answer to tactical or operative needs? We will not have
much more decision elements. And whatever, it is not a versatile tool: to follow a crisis, the
results would be fully at random, because of darkness or bad weather.” Indeed, the probability of
watching again the same scene with good weather was low for higher latitudes, especially in
winter. It was the same for equatorial regions, because it is always raining there.

But our arguments hit the bullseye, and the file was presented to President Giscard. 3 We said that,
even if it would not exactly match all our concrete needs, the fact that a satellite existed would
show our will to become independent from the U.S. for spatial intelligence, as we were for
nuclear forces. The trend was here, and the law of military budget planning 1977-1982 eventually
prescribed supplies for the SAMRO reconnaissance satellite, and also the making of a space
telecommunications system, which became Syracuse. This was the first time that the Defence
budget proposed the military use of space.

4.0 OPPOSITION TO SPACE RECONNAISSANCE

But it seems that the new project was not very welcomed?
No, it wasn’t welcomed at all. The different Chiefs of Staff were not very happy. They were
defending their own garden, to have conventional arms. This new expensive project implied that,
for a constant Defence budget, the part of each arm should be reduced. The Nuclear Forces still
had the priority, and a lot of money was spent to make things which should never be used, such
as H-bombs or strategic missiles. And now we were asking for a satellite, which would have been
as useless! I won’t say that the military may sometimes be childish, but they need to own and use
their specific toys, something they can touch and play with. Basically, an Army soldier wants a
new tank, a sailor wants a new ship and a pilot wants a new plane. And a satellite represented a
relatively abstract machine. So, to foster this new project, the Nuclear Forces and the DGA
decided to broaden the justification of the satellite and to take into account the specific needs of
the Navy, the Army and the Air Force.

How did they manage to do that?

It was a difficult task. The Air Force and the Navy were against this project they considered
useless. For them, the SAMRO satellite was unsuitable for its mission. I still remember the note
of a senior officer in charge of logistics who wrote on the SAMRO proposal: “Avis défavorable,

3
encore un gadget coûteux” (“Unfavorable advice: an expensive gadget again”). It was surprising
but the most interested were the land forces - but they wanted the satellite to be adapted for
tactical missions. The problem was that implied a much better resolution than the one required
for strategic coverage. SAMRO was first thought to have a 10-meter resolution. It was the
minimal goal to reach. But to meet the requirements of the Army, the new satellite should have
had at least one-meter resolution, multispectral capability, and been very manoeuvrable. All of
that implied a totally different new satellite (design, payload, trajectory…). They wanted a true
reconnaissance satellite, like HELIOS, but we were only working on a mapping one.
Consequently, even the Army stopped supporting the project.

Why didn’t you try to develop a HELIOS equivalent, but with the available technology?
It would have been too expensive a project, and the technology was not here. The first Wright
Brothers’ plane was not a jet! So SAMRO remained only supported by the Nuclear Forces
Division, but with reservations. There were different lobbies in the Nuclear Forces. For instance,
the Navy officers said that they did not need a high level of precision. The submarines need
geodesic information, not cartographic information. And for bombing precision, the doctrine of
the times was “anti-city”. That meant to have a “global” strategy of deterrence by hitting the big
towns, for terror effect. This was the heritage of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki strategy. Moreover,
at this moment our arsenal was limited and probably the bombing would have been not
significant for a big country like the USSR. And because of the limited scope of the Mirage IV,
the farthest targets we could reach were all located in the western part of Russia. So, to
characterize, the doctrine said to roughly “shell” the cities. This meant that, with a circular error
probable (CEP) of 800 meters, a lethal radius of an amount of meters, we globally hit the target.
Especially as we planned to have the new M-4 missile generation, which would have been first
equipped with MRV (Multiple Re-entry Vehicles) and not MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry
Vehicles). So with a better scattering power, the only requirement was to locate the targets very
roughly.

Was there no need of visualizing the targets?

In the Nuclear Forces we wanted to do that. For us the aim of the satellite was first to locate the
targets, but also to characterize them. We wanted to know what they were for, of what material
they were built (steel, concrete), their density, their orientation etc. This kind of analysis was
important not only to choose the targets, but as well to predict the damages. These data were
necessary for strategic bombing planning, to choose the most important, the most reachable and
the less defended targets. Especially because the “anti-city” deterrence was criticized. The
Soviets had indeed developed civil defence and anti-ballistic missiles systems. Some towns like
Moscow or Leningrad had three circles of anti-aerial ground to air missiles. These systems had
shown their efficiency by shooting down Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 in 1960. The Soviets had
also developed the protection of the population by building bunkers. For instance, the Moscow
subway was built to be used as an anti-atomic bunker. Knowing these things, our question was:
what would be the efficiency of an anti-demographic bombing, which was criticized as well from
an ethical point of view? Would it not be better to select military or economic targets such as
factories, power plants, research centres? In this way, we needed a good intelligence system, first
for mapping, but also to identify and characterize the potential targets. Of course, these ideas
were expressed in the SAMRO Project draft.

5.0 STRATEGIC WARNING OF ATTACK

4
I see that in the Cold War background, the reconnaissance satellite was mainly thought to
be important to prepare a “retaliation” against the USSR. What about learning about
imminent attack against France?
Well, even if France had left NATO in 1966, we were not completely isolated. We were always
actively cooperating with our U.S. allies. If the Cold War had warmed up, and France had been
threatened, of course they would have informed us. The U.S. had a strong technical intelligence
structure, several powerful imagery satellites able to detect troop movements or missile launching,
and we knew that we could rely on them on a general point of view. But in the will of a certain
France to be a modern power with full independence of decision, we had to develop this capacity.
In the Nuclear Forces we were mainly focused on the East, but the French geopolitical status was
not only restricted in the Cold War frame. France was sometimes involved in far countries in
affairs which concerned France only, for instance in Africa. We were sometimes short of
technical intelligence, but it was critical to beg for information from the U.S. When it happened,
they made us clearly understand that they had the monopoly on space observation, and they only
sparingly showed what they wanted to. 4 Especially as France and the U.S. had diverging interests.
This is why France also needed a satellite like SAMRO.

The SAMRO Project was therefore justified. Why was it cancelled?

In fact, the people who were against SAMRO found a perfect trick: they assessed the price of the
programme not only counting the acquisition costs, but also the utilization costs for five years.
Among all the DGA projects, this was the first time this was done. So, the calculation took into
account the highest price: the first satellite and its backup to be built in case of loss of the first,
the second satellite which should have been launched three or four years after the first one, plus
the costs of the ground installations and the costs of operations, for a total of 5 billion francs in
1977. The Air Force and the Navy noted that it was the cost of 200 fighters, or four times the cost
of an aircraft carrier, but a naked one! They did not indicate that they were not counting the
weapons or the functioning expenses. So the comparison was totally distorted and it was hard to
find a place for the project in the budget. At last, the Centre de Prospective et d’Evaluation
(CPE), 5 in charge of evaluating more precisely the project, concluded that it was better to wait.
Moreover, another project arose at that time: SPOT. This civilian project had been proposed by
the Centre National des Etudes Spatiales (CNES, the National Centre for Space Studies, the
civilian French space agency) as a rival to Landsat, but was refused by the European Space
Agency (ESA) in 1976. In 1978 the French government decided to pursue the project alone,
except for a small participation by Belgium and Sweden. The CNES concluded an agreement
with the Ministry of Defence, arguing that SPOT could be a test programme for SAMRO. SPOT
was indeed very similar to SAMRO, except the protection of the data (the transmission should be
very secure with a military satellite), and protection of the satellite, for instance against laser
blinding. Finally, the civilian project SPOT was partly paid with Defence funds, and the purely
military project SAMRO was cancelled in 1982. Only a few technological studies were continued.

So can we say that SPOT “vampirized” SAMRO?

I will not say SPOT was a bad thing as an idea of a reconnaissance satellite. You know, the
military are a traditional society and they are sometimes resistant to any new technology. The
problem was therefore to promote something they did not know and to justify it. According to its
view, SPOT was a good demonstrator. When the military watched its first images, they realized
that farther than the dry numbers of resolution, it was possible to see a lot of very interesting

5
things. At the same time, and maybe because of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) praised by
President Reagan, the political power realized the outstanding importance of space for strategic
affairs. All that eventually led in 1985 to the decision to build HELIOS 6, which represents the
matured continuation of SAMRO. In fact, SAMRO was cancelled because of budget restrictions.
But in retrospect, it was the problem of the inner purpose of the satellite for the military. Only a
fraction of the French forces needed it.

Finally, a reconnaissance satellite is not really a military tool. The military need tactical
intelligence. If they are involved somewhere, it means that it is war and they can openly break
into the enemy’s airspace with planes or drones, which are far more versatile than a satellite. The
military need space systems especially for telecommunication and global positioning, which are
two tactical activities. But a reconnaissance satellite is made for strategic intelligence and it is
therefore a political tool, a power tool, more adapted to the President and the minister of Foreign
Affairs than a Defence tool adapted to the generals. Who owns this capacity of space observation
masters the information, but also the possibility of changing the diplomatic orientation of the
states which do not have it. When you check the U.S. history, you see that intelligence satellites
have been mainly developed by and for the Intelligence community (CIA, NSA, etc.) and not by
the military. The real question is: is intelligence a military activity? In the age of information,
what is sure is this is a very important consideration.

6.0 BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF FRENCH MILITARY MISSILE AND SPACE

ACTIVITIES

-1946: Establishment of the LRBA, (Laboratoire de Recherches Balistiques et Aérodynamiques)

at Vernon, Normandy, as a service of the DEFA (Direction des Etudes et Fabrication
d’Armement) to study the V-2 seized from the Germans.

-1947: Building of the CIEES (Centre Interarmées d’Expérimentation des Engins Spéciaux)
missile test site of Colomb-Béchar (Algerian Sahara).

-1950: First achieved test of a Veronique (for VERnon électrONIQUE) rocket.

-1951: Government Bourgès-Maunoury approves the development of strategic missiles.

-1954: Government Mendès France starts the French military nuclear programme.

-1958: Back in power, General de Gaulle gives priority to the creation of the French nuclear
forces.

-1959: Establishment of the SEREB (Société pour l’Etude et la Réalisation d’Engins Ballistiques)
to be the main contractor of the Strategic Nuclear Forces. The SEREB merges in 1970 with Nord-
Aviation and Sud-Aviation to form Aerospatiale. Establishment of the GEB (Groupe des Engins
Balistiques) as a government office to supervise the missile development.

-1960: (02/13) First explosion of a French A-bomb in Reggane (Algerian Sahara). The SEREB
launch the EBB (Etudes Balistiques de Base) and the making of “Pierres Précieuses” rockets
(Agate, Topaze, Rubis, Emeraude, Saphir) to acquire technology knowledge in propulsion,

6
guidance, piloting and re-entry. First law of military budget planning (1960-1964) which gives
priority to the making of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (ballistic missile, Mirage IV, nuclear
submarine, H-bomb). A part of the budget (500 MF≈ 1G€ of today) is also dedicated to study the
military use of space. (12/23) The SEREB proposes to make a satellite launcher by replacing the
Saphir warhead with a third stage.

-1961: (04/07) Establishment of the DMA (Délégation Ministérielle de l’Armement) which

replaces the DEFA to supervise the making of French arms. Attached to the DMA, the GEB
becomes first the “Département Engins,” then the “Direction des Engins” (DEn). (11/13) First
achieved test of the Agate rocket. (12/18) President de Gaulle orders the building of a civilian
launcher, Diamant, partly financed by the Ministry of Defence. Establishment of the CNES
(Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales), civilian agency to manage all French space projects.

-1963: The LRBA starts study of an observation satellite, “Véhicule Spatial d’Observation
Photographique” (VSOP).

-1965: Establishment of a Technical Service “Espace” in the DEn. (11/26): Launching of the first
French artificial satellite of 42 kg A-1 (Armées-1) nicknamed Asterix. France becomes the third
space power.

-1966: Establishment of the CSG (Centre Spatial Guyanais) at Kourou (French Guyana), to be the
European Space port. France quits NATO.

-1967: Dissolution of the Technical Service “Espace” although the DMA keeps on performing a
few studies on VSOP and provides technical and financial support to the European launcher
programme Ariane.

-1969: (06/24) First successful test of a ground to ground nuclear ballistic missile. (07/18) First
successful test of a submarine nuclear missile.

-1974: First European telecommunication satellite Symphony 1 (U.S. launching).

-1977: The DMA becomes the DGA (Delegation Générale de l’Armement). The fourth law of
military budget planning (1977-1982) gives credit for the study of a Satellite Militaire
d’Observation Optique (SAMRO) and the making of the Syracuse military telecommunication
satellite system as part of Télécom satellites. Establishment of a “espace-satellites” group in the
DTEn (ex-DEn).

-1978: CNES starts the SPOT (Système Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre) civilian
observation satellite programme.

-1979: (12/24) First successful launching of Ariane 1.

-1980: Start of the Syracuse programme.

7
-1982 : Establishment of an image interpretation centre in the ETCA (Etablissement Technique
Central de l’Armement) to analyse the LANDSAT images and train the military photo-
interpreters for future images of SPOT and SAMRO. Cancellation of SAMRO.

-1983: Establishment of the GCSM (Groupe de Coordination Spatiale Militaire), composed by

military engineers and officers, in charge of reviewing a PPSM (Plan Pluriannuel Spatial
Militaire) to plan the making of military space systems. Minister of Defense Charles Hernu
interested in developing a general military space programme called VEC (Voir-Ecouter-
Communiquer: See-Listen-Communicate).

-1984 : President Mitterrand proposes the establishment of a European space military community
at La Haye. First launching of Ariane 3. Launching of the first Syracuse I satellite Télécom 1A
(Télécom 1B: 1985, Télécom 1C: 1988).

-1985: Establishment of the GES (Groupe d’Etudes Spatiales) in the Ministry of Defence.

-1986: Start of the HELIOS military reconnaissance satellite programme. Launching of SPOT I.
Establishment in the Army of the SEDI: “Section d’Etude de Documentation et d’Images” to
exploit the SPOT images.

-1987: Start of the Syracuse II military telecommunication programme. Italy and Spain (1988)
join HELIOS programme.

-1988: First launching of Ariane 4.

-1990: The U.S. Army signs an agreement to receive SPOT images.

-1991: Launch of the first Syracuse II satellite Télécom 2A (Télécom 2B: 1992, Télécom 2C:
1995).

-1992: Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe creates the DRM (Direction du Renseignement Militaire)
as a service of the EMA to manage French military intelligence. The DRM is placed in charge of
analysing IMINT and SIGINT. It regroups all the military intelligence offices, previously spread
in the different Chiefs of Staff.

-1993: Establishment of an office of spatial affairs attached to Elysée and Matignon.

Establishment of the European Union Satellite Centre at Torrejon (Spain) dedicated to the
exploitation of strategic information derived from the analysis of earth observation space imagery.

-1994: Start of the HELIOS II imagery satellite and OSIRIS radar satellite projects with Germany.

-1995: (07/07): Launching of HELIOS IA.

-1996: Project OSIRIS becomes Project HORUS.

-1998: Germany cancels their participation in HELIOS II. France must finance the programme by
itself.

8
-1999: Launching of HELIOS IB.

-2000: Start of the Syracuse III military telecommunication programme. Cancellation of Project
HORUS.

-2004: Launching of HELIOS 2B.

Notes: French military intelligence is under the responsibility of several services. The three
major actors are :
-The DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure) is composed by the « Direction de
la Stratégie » (French strategic interests), the « Direction du Renseignement » (all sources
intelligence), the « Direction de l’Administration, the « Directions des Opérations » (special
opération), and the « Direction Technique » (SIGINT).
-The DRM (Direction du Renseignement Militaire) is in charge of SIGINT and IMINT.
-The BR (Brigade Renseignement) is composed by several specialized commandos in charge of
the setup of some HUMINT, SIGINT and HUMINT systems.

About the author:

Sébastien Matte la Faveur is a researcher of the State-Ideology-Society-Defence Institute (ESID)
of the University of Montpellier (France). He has a Master of Engineering of the Ecole
Superieure d’Optique (Orsay, France), a Master of Physics and a Master of Defence Studies,
from the University of Montpellier. Currently, Matte la Faveur is a candidate for a PhD in
Sciences, History and Defence Studies under the supervision of Profressor Jules Maurin and Dr.
Alain Dupas. His Ph.D. thesis is entitled "Developments and Impacts of Overhead
Reconnaissance During the Cold War".

1
A governmental service attached to the French Prime Minister in charge of studying security questions concerning
Defence, Intelligence and the planning of French national security.
2
A service of the DGA (Délégation Générale de l’Armement) created in 1946 at Vernon, in Normandy, to study,
adjust and test the French missiles). The DGA, which was until 1977 the DMA (Délégation Ministérielle de
l’Armement) is a branch of the French DoD in charge of studying and ordering the different arms and gear of the
French Forces.
3
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was President of French Republic between 1974 and 1981.
4
The General does not give any detail, but it seems that the U.S. were sometimes disagreeable with France as
concerning space and IMINT. For instance, in 1991, during “Desert Storm”, the U.S. had given satellites images with
a voluntarily degraded quality to the French military. This behaviour was assessed as being intolerable by the
Defence Minister of the time, Pierre Joxe, and by President Mitterrand (See Matte la Faveur, S., Entretien avec
Pierre Joxe, ESID, 2005).
5
The service of the French Ministry of Defence in charge of prospective studies on strategy. The CPE eventually
became the DAS: Direction des Affaires Stratégiques.
6
HELIOS IA was launched in 1995.