HO-29 - Persons and Family Relations - Legal Edge

2019 BAR REVIEW CIVIL LAW
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Handout No. 29
PERSONS
The RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death [of Wilfredo]
was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death
filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner Estrellita was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death of (her husband) Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for
any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose. Tadeo-Matias v.
Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition
that [like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench] only seeks to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.
Considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction:
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain
facts.
2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action,
there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status
to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or

Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really
become "final" as the same only confirms that existence of a prima facie or disputable
presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
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4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already
established by law.
Hence, the Supreme Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not a requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO)
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for their consideration. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic,
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
MARRIAGE
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.
It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes

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a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code can now be applied even if it is the Filipino spouse
who initiated the foreign divorce decree against his/her alien spouse. Accordingly, a Filipino
citizen has [now] the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can [We] put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the

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same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in “like circumstance as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.” Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
The foregoing notwithstanding, [We] the Court cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Also, Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Hence, since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018

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Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated
the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree - presumably the Filipino citizen - must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to
have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground
that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not
allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory.
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda.'s petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement"
obtained in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
Luzviminda Morisono v. Ryoji Morisono, et al., G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies even if Filipino spouse gave consent
to the divorce obtained by his/her alien spouse.
The issue before [Us] the Supreme Court has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of
Republic v. Manalo (Supra.), the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein.
In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted
the same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she
sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage
to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not
become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. There, the Court held that the fact that
it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. xxx The subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite
the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed
that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided
under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already

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been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Stephen I. Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 2244015, July 23, 2018
Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws.
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the
divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the
pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. Stephen I. Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 2244015, July 23, 2018
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved).
“Mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present
case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.” “Nor does failure of the parties to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons” amount to psychological incapacity. Rather,
the psychological condition should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic
marital obligations. The Court believes that the protagonists in this case are in reality simply
unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s personality differences, and have thus become
overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a
marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No.
201988, October 11, 2017

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The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable
to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive
but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court,
as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course
of the proceedings. Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code.
In this case, as petitioner Jerrysus Tilar correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to
nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the
Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage in the religious and
ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is
in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law.
Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.
Consequently, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the
RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. Tilar v. Tilar and Republic, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017

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Summary of relevant cases decided after the issuance of EO 227, involving the issue of the
effects of foreign divorce decree, as discussed in the dissenting opinion of J. Caguioa in Republic
vs. Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018):
Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
the Philippines
The divorce decree is
binding on the German
spouse pursuant to the
nationality principle.
Accordingly, the
German spouse filed
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera Divorce obtained in German spouse lacks
two (2) complaints
(G.R. No. 80116, June Germany by German standing to file the
charging Filipino
30, 1989) spouse complaints as
spouse with adultery
"offended spouse",
having obtained the
divorce decree prior to
the filing of said
complaints.
The divorce decree
cannot be recognized
in the Philippines since
Filipino husband
the Filipino wife
Divorce obtained in the invokes the divorce
obtained the same
Republic v. Iyoy United States by decree secured by his
while still a Filipino
(G.R. No. 152577, Filipino wife prior to Filipino wife as
citizen, and was, at
September 21, 2005) her naturalization as an additional ground to
such time, bound by
American citizen grant his petition for
Philippine laws on
declaration of nullity
family rights and
duties, pursuant to the
nationality principle.
The effects of the
divorce decree must be
recognized in favor of
Divorce obtained in the
Republic vs. Orbecido Filipino spouse sought the Filipino spouse
United States by
(G.R. No. 154380, enforcement of divorce pursuant to Article
naturalized American
October 5, 2005) in the Philippines 26(2) of the Family
spouse
Code. Accordingly, the
Filipino spouse should
be allowed to re-marry.
American spouse The divorce decree is
Dacasin v. Dacasin Divorce obtained in the
sought enforcement of binding on the
(G.R. No. 168785, United States by
the Joint Custody American spouse,
February 5, 2010) Filipino spouse
Agreement he had pursuant to the

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executed with his nationality principle.

former Filipino wife, Accordingly, he cannot
which bore terms be allowed to evade
contrary to those in the the same by invoking
divorce decree the terms of the Joint
Custody Agreement.
The divorce decree is
binding on the
Naturalized American
naturalized American
spouse sought
spouse, pursuant to
annulment of her
Bayot v. CA Divorce obtained in the the nationality
marriage with her
(G.R. Nos. 155635 and Dominican Republic by principle. Accordingly,
Filipino spouse through
163979, November 7, naturalized American she is left without any
a petition for
2008) spouse cause of action before
annulment filed before
the RTC, as a petition
the Regional Trial Court
for annulment
(RTC)
presupposes a
subsisting marriage.
The effect of the
divorce decree issued
pursuant to Japanese
First husband (also a law may be recognized
Japanese national) in the Philippines in
sought recognition of order to affect the
the divorce obtained status of the first
Divorce obtained in
by his Filipina wife husband, who,
Fujiki v. Marinay Japan by Filipina wife
against her second pursuant to the
(G.R. No. 196049, June against her second
husband through a nationality principle, is
26, 2013) husband, who is a
Petition for Judicial governed by Japanese
Japanese national
Recognition of Foreign law. Such recognition is
Judgment (or Decree of in line with the
Absolute Nullity of Philippines' public
Marriage) filed before policy, which
the RTC characterizes bigamous
marriages as void ab
initio.
Filipina wife sought to The case was
enforce the divorce in remanded to the CA to
the Philippines through allow Filipina wife to
Divorce jointly
Medina v. Koike a Petition for Judicial prove that the divorce
obtained in Japan by
(G.R. No. 215723, July Recognition of Foreign obtained abroad by her
Filipina wife and
27, 2016) Divorce and and her Japanese
Japanese husband
Declaration of Capacity husband is valid
to Remarry before the according to the
RTC. latter's national law.

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PROPERTY RELATIONS
There is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a
contract of surety.
No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband/wife entered
into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership. In this case, it is not apparent from the records that
respondent BDO had established the benefit to the conjugal partnership flowing from the surety
agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita. Thus, petitioner Eliseo’s claim over the subject property
lodged with the RTC Pasig is proper, with the latter correctly exercising jurisdiction thereon.
Borlongan v. Banco De Oro (formerly Equitable PCI Bank), G.R. Nos. 217617 and 218540, April
5, 2017
FAMILY HOME
Family Home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases.
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family
home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final
and executory ruling. It is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a
family home, rather, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved. Felicitas Salazar v.
Remedios Felias, G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
A family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such.
In this case, petitioner Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family
home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It is imperative that her claim must be
backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home,
(ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) [actually]
resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties
of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and

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(v) at the time of its constitution, has an actual value of not exceeding Php 300,000.00 in urban
areas, and not exceeding Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the
occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must
be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive. Felicitas Salazar v. Remedios
Felias, G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and supported
by the evidence required under the Family Code. A person who seeks to establish illegitimate
filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so via a (1) record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a (2) final judgment, or an (3) admission of legitimate filiation.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still
be established after the death of a putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent concerned. However,
petitioners (Romeo Ara and William Garcia) did not present in evidence any admissions of
filiation. An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may
be used in evidence against him. The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures
with Josefa and petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother.
They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less
ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal
Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration all
state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of
Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them. Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia v.
Dra. Fely S. Pizarro, et al., G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides: Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father xxx.
The use of the word ‘may’ in [Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his

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illegitimate father. The word ‘may’ is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children. In re: Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Births of Yuhares Jan
Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan; Barcelote vs. Republic, G.R. No.
222095, August 7, 2017
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. The use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. The
discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional
upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.
In this case, the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in
June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and
Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject
birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should
have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan”. In re: Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live
Births of Yuhares Jan Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan; Barcelote
vs. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017
It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in
all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not.
The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of
the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information
entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child. In re: Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Births of Yuhares Jan
Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan; Barcelote vs. Republic, G.R. No.
222095, August 7, 2017
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void.
In this case, the Supreme Court declares the subject birth certificates void and order their
cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring
the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the
signature of the mother in her children’s birth certificates. In re: Petition for Cancellation of

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Certificates of Live Births of Yuhares Jan Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote
Tinitigan; Barcelote vs. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017
An illegitimate child, “conceived and born outside a valid marriage,” is entitled to support.
To claim it, however, a child should have first been acknowledged by the putative parent or must
have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative parent. When “filiation
is beyond question, support shall then follow as a matter of obligation. Richelle Abella, for and
in behalf of her minor daughter, Marl Jhorylle Abella v. Policarpio Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647,
August 9, 2017
Article 201 of the Family Code states that the “amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.”
Article 202 of the Family Code adds, however, that support may be adjusted and that it “shall be
reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities
of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same”. Richelle
Abella, for and in behalf of her minor daughter, Marl Jhorylle Abella v. Policarpio Cabañero,
G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.
Accordingly, mothers (such as petitioner Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of
their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the
child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their
illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. Masbate,
et al. v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018. J. Perlas-Bernabe

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Article 213 of the Family Code provides for the so-called “tender-age presumption”, stating that
"no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest
away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. Masbate, et al. v. Relucio, G.R.
No. 235498, July 30, 2018. J. Perlas-Bernabe

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HO-29 - Persons and Family Relations - Legal Edge

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HO-29 - Persons and Family Relations - Legal Edge

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2019 BAR REVIEW CIVIL LAW

PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS Handout No. 29

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

executed with his nationality principle.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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