CHAPTER FIVE Late Ottoman Occasionalists on Modern Science NAZIF MUHTAROGLU AND OZGUR KOCA g.1 Introduction In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was an enormous amount of intellectual activity in the Ottoman world. In this period, the grow- ing importation of modern sciences and Western ideas from Europe gave rise to serious philosophical debates and doctrinal differentiations among Otto- man intellectuals. Materialist and positivist ideas emerged during this period, especially associated with the new sciences imported from Europe. Orhan Akay considers Besir Fuad (1852-1887) the first Turkish positivist and iden- tifies Auguste Comte, Claude Bernard, and F. Ludwig Biichner as the main influences on Fuad’s intellectual outlook.’ Especially, Biichner’s book entitled Force and Matter (Kraft und Stoff)* had a great impact on the propagation of scientific materialism among the Ottoman elite.’ Muslim intellectuals re- sponded to these ideas and tried to differentiate modern science (fiinain-u cedide) from its materialist interpretation. Siileyman Hayri Bolay describes the intellectual activity in this period as a struggle between materialism and spiritualism. All parties in the debate seem to have accepted the significance of modern science, but differed on its philosophical interpretation. In Bolay’s understanding, materialism refers to the view that explains everything on the basis of matter and rejects appeals to the concepts of purpose, consciousness, and will. On the other hand, spiritualists held that there is a first, non-material cause who controls the universe through his will.4 In this chapter, we argue that Bolay’s classification of the parties in the debate is inadequate to under- stand the real dynamics of this debate. It ignores at least one significant strand among the so-called spiritualists, who include Ali Sedad, Hamdi Yazir, and 83OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION Said Nursi. These scholars did not only argue against materialism and uphold the existence of God, but also insisted on defending an occasionalist model of divine agency and interpreting modern science from an occasionalist point of view. Their philosophical stand cannot be simply categorized as a negative position against materialism, but should be considered a positive position providing a metaphysical basis for modern science compatible with Islam. We call these thinkers the “late Ottoman occasionalists”. The philosophical position of the late Ottoman occasionalists presents a se- rious counterexample to some widely circulated but ungrounded ideas, such as the following one: Muslim scholars in the nineteenth century embraced modern science without critically assessing its philosophical dimensions, and they were unable to offer a philosophical evaluation and interpretation of it on the basis of the Islamic worldview.’ Ibrahim Kalin’s “Three Views of Sci- ence in Islamic World” seems to be peculiarly influential in suggesting this idea. He claims that nineteenth century Muslim scholars in general were un- able to critically evaluate the philosophical dimensions of modern science, but only drew attention to the lack of an ethical dimension in science. Kalin calls this approach the “ethical view of science”, promoted by such forerun- ners of Islamic modernism as Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838/1839-1897), and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905). According to Kalin, they perceived no conflict between religion and science. The problem for them was essentially ethical. Science is a neutral tool that can be used for either good or bad. The problems that are linked to the misuse of the scientific knowledge (environ- mental crises, urban development, agricultural problems, etc.) can be solved by simply “inoculating” the body of modern science with an ethos.§ For Kalin, these scholars defended the importation of modern science by separating its ethical dimension and situating it within the framework of Is- lamic ethics. He includes Said Nursi in this group of scholars but does not refer to Ali Sedad or Hamdi Yazir at all. As we will show, this position is not tenable anymore, given the works of Ali Sedad and Hamdi Yazir. In addi- tion, Said Nursi’s work is philosophically much deeper than Kalin’s sketchy analysis. In contrast to Kalin’s interpretation, we will show that, for Nursi, the problem is not only ethical. Nursi was well aware of the tension between the fundamental philosophical assumptions of modern science as practiced in Europe and his religious worldview. Nursi attempts to provide a compre- hensive metaphysical framework in which religion and science can be inte- grated, while preserving their distinct modes of discourse and methods of inquiry. In Nursi’s opinion, modern science can be also practiced within an occasionalist framework.’ In what follows, we present the critical assessments 84LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE and occasionalist interpretations of modern science proposed by Ali Sedad, Hamdi Yazir and Said Nursi. 5.2 Ali Sedad Ali Sedad (1857-1900) is commonly known as a logician.* However, his Kavdidu’t-Tahavviilat fi Harekati’z-Zerrat (Principles of Transformation in the Motion of Particles) also shows his command of the natural sciences of nineteenth-century Europe.’ This work introduced nineteenth-century Euro- pean theories of thermodynamics and atomism to the Ottoman world, and thus, it drew the attention of some historians of science.'*Nonetheless, the philosophical dimensions of this work have not yet been appreciated in the current scholarship. In the Kavdid, Ali Sedad evaluates the philosophical foundations of modern science from an Ash‘arite point of view. This is what makes it an original intellectual work, on which we focus in this section. In the introduction to this work, Ali Sedad draws attention to the positivist and materialist interpretations of modern science that came to prevail among the Ottoman intellectuals, and argues against those who claim that modern science is incompatible with the Islamic worldview. He thinks that some new scientific ideas (i.e. thermodynamics and atomism) give external support to Ash‘arite metaphysics but pose difficulties for the cosmologies suggested by the Muslim falasifa.'' However, he clearly differentiates the status of scien- tific support from logical arguments that aim to establish articles of faith, especially the existence and nature of God. For Ali Sedad, the principles of science depend on experience, and are revisable in principle; thus, they are not necessary. The arguments of the Ash‘arites that purport to justify their theo- logical and metaphysical claims are independent of changeable principles, so they necessarily imply their conclusions, whatever current scientific theories suggest.'* Yet the current science is in agreement to a large extent with the atomist model of Ash‘arite occasionalism, in contradistinction to what the positivists and materialists claim." Ali Sedad puts forward the following theses, widely accepted in the scientif- ic circles of ninteenth-century Europe: Everything is made up various types of indivisible particles, that is, atoms. Every object we observe, from small bod- ies to large planets; and every phenomenon, including electricity, magnetism, and heat, arises out of diverse combinations, oscillations, and motions of these atoms, In the scientific context, particles and their motions explain every aspect of the world. The atoms are in constant motion, and thus they are in a different state at each moment. As a result, all observable phenomena that supervene on the constant motion of the particles are constantly renewing, 85OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION however much they appear to us to be stable. All processes and motions in the world conform to the laws of thermodynamics. The concept of energy (te’sir) plays a significant role in understanding these laws. Everything in nature has acertain amount of energy that can be measured and expressed in mathemati- cal terms. In every process, the initial energy is equal to the energy at the end, One type of energy can be transformed into another type, yet the total energy is always preserved. For example, the potential energy (kuvve) of an object at a height can transform into kinetic energy (kuvve-i miiessire) when it falls down, but its total energy is the same at every moment of this transforma- tion. Similarly, the kinetic energy of an object can transform into mechanical work, which can be expressed with a mathematical formula."* Ali Sedad sees interesting similarities between these theses and Ash‘arite occasionalism. Let us see what parallels he draws. First, modern scientific theories of atomism resemble Ash‘arite atomism in a significant respect. The observable bodies are made up of discrete entities, namely, particles moving in a vacuum. This idea rules out the falasifa’s thesis that bodies are particularized forms of prime matter, which is a continuous entity. For Ali Sedad, modern atomism supports the Ash'arite view of the nature of matter, in opposition to the view of the faldsifa. Thus, it destroys the authority of their paradigm, which informed scientific activity for a long time. However, Ali Sedad also adds that Ash‘arite atomism is different from the modern version in certain respects. The former argues that atoms are also conceptually indivisible and homogenous, whereas modern science postulates the indivisibility of various types of atoms on the basis of current experiential knowledge. Second, thermodynamics presents heat as a phenomenon supervening on the motion of particles. The faster the particles of an object move, the hotter it becomes. Absolute zero (zero degrees Kelvin) is considered to be a theoretical limit, and every particle is assumed to be in constant motion. If the particles constantly vibrate or oscillate, they are always in diverse states. As a result, the observable phenomena that supervene on the motion of particles are con- stantly renewing. For Ali Sedad, this idea parallels nicely the Ash‘arite thesis that accidents have only momentary existence and cannot endure. No single accident at a given moment is really identical with an accident at a different moment because particles have constantly renewing states. This is a crucial premise for the Ash‘arites in their arguments for the constant creation of the world and for occasionalism. Thus, Ali Sedad thinks that modern science provides an important step toward the occasionalist model of the universe.'’ While Ali Sedad upholds the idea of constant motion, he emphasizes that motion must inhere in some substrate. He rejects the view that explains 86LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE everything in the universe by reducing it to motion and the interaction of forces. Ali Sedad ascribes this view to al-Nazzam and Schelling, and thinks that it leads to pantheism. Pantheism postulates an ultimate substance and everything we observe as various modifications of this substance. Since, for Ali Sedad, motion can occur only with a substrate, all motion must inhere in an ultimate substrate if more than one substance is not postulated. He does not consider this ultimate substance to be God, because God is, by defini- tion, eternal, and is not vulnerable to change.'* This attitude clearly shows that Ali Sedad is inclined to examine metaphysical dimensions of scientific claims. What is more, Ali Sedad extends this inclination to the analysis of the con- cepts of energy and force, the laws of nature, and nature itself. He points out that these concepts are open to philosophical interpretation independent of their use in the sciences. Materialists may consider energy as real as matter, as something eternal and self-subsisting that takes various forms but remains fixed after every transformation. Some deists, on the other hand, may con- firm the self-subsistency and reality of energy and add only that energy was first created and can be destroyed by God. Yet, in this view, in between the creation and extermination of energy, there is no need for divine agency. The forces and laws of nature might be conceived as having efficient causality in relation to something. Nature can be understood as a self-subsisting whole that does not need any external causal influence. All these interpretations were in circulation in the nineteenth century, and they are in conflict with a concept of God who constantly sustains the universe. Recall that Ali Sedad draws attention to the view that holds to the in- compatibility of Islam and modern science. This view especially relies upon a materialist interpretation of modern science and presents science as inti- mately connected to materialism. As previously mentioned above, a com- mon form of this view in the nineteenth century was Biichner’s scientific materialism. In response, Ali Sedad first clearly distinguishes scientific ac- tivity from its philosophical interpretations. For example, he thinks that even the greatest scientists are far from understanding the real nature of energy. They use it only as a unifying concept in physics and as a conserved quantity that helps us calculate the.transformations of various types of motions." Second, Ali Sedad offers a philosophical interpretation of the concepts of energy, force, physical laws, and nature that is compatible with occasional- ism. In regard to energy, consider, for example, the formula mv*/2, which refers to the kinetic energy of an object with mass (7m) and velocity (v). The potential energy of this object is given by the formula (h.d), where h refers 87OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION to its height from the earth, and d refers to its weight. When this object js dropped from its position, its potential energy begins to be converted into kinetic energy. At each moment of its motion, the total energy of the ob- ject is preserved. Thus, the initial potential energy of the object is equal to the sum of its kinetic and potential energy at any given moment. We can also express this in a mathematical equation. On the basis of the unchanging quantity called “energy”, we can calculate the value of certain variables in the mathematical equation if we know others. Thus, for Ali Sedad, kinetic energy is a term that expresses the quantity of motion and helps us calculate the links between different states of objects. Energy is not something real like matter, but is an empty term used as a heuristic device to interrelate various phenomena on a mathematical basis.'* By rejecting the reality of energy, Ali Sedad offers a nominalist interpretation of energy. Similarly, force is not un- derstood as a causal capacity of an object because, for Ali Sedad, God is the only causal agent, and creatures are causally inert. Force can be treated either as a manifestation of divine power or as a term that expresses a law (kanun) about the patterns of the motions of the particles.'” Related to the concept of law, Ali Sedad considers “nature” (tabiat) as a whole phenomenon that exemplifies order in accordance with the laws God has imposed on it.** As we have seen, by interpreting the basic concepts of modern science this way, Ali Sedad tries to provide a metaphysical foundation for it, understood in occasionalist terms. Ali Sedad’s Kavaid is not only a book that presents theories of physics being developed in nineteenth-century Europe, but also a work that draws attention to the positivist and materialist package that is associated with sci- ence. In response to the philosophical interpretations of scientific theories, Ali Sedad proposes his own interpretation, which is based on Ash‘arite metaphys- ics. In this respect, to the extent of our knowledge, he is the first scholar in the Islamic world who critically evaluated the foundations of modern science and tried to situate science within a Sunni worldview. 5-3 Elmalih Hamdi Yazir Elmalih Hamdi Yazir (1878-1942) is a scholar who lived in the late Ot- toman and early Republican era and is famous for his Qur’anic exeges prepared at the request of the Turkish state. Nonetheless, his philosophical articles, including “ilhad Ne Biiyiik Cehalettir?” (“How Great an Ignorance Is Atheism?”), have not attracted much attention. However, this article is especially significant with respect to a discussion that reveals Yazir’s critical assessments of scientific materialism and his philosophical interpretations of modern science. 88LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE In this article, Hamdi Yazir criticizes the materialist interpretation of me- chanical science and offers his own occasionalist view of reality. The article starts with the following verse: And they say: “There is nothing but only our life in this world, Some of us die while others continue to live; and nothing causes us to perish but Time (the pro- cess of decline and decay).” But they have no (sure and true) knowledge about this (the real nature and meaning of life and death, and the life after it.) They merely follow their conjectures. (45:24)** Inspired by this verse, Yazir argues that people who derive materialist con- clusions from the mechanical science do not have solid justification but pro- pose mere conjectures. Thus, the first task of Yazir is to show the logical and methodical problems with their arguments.** Yazir begins by drawing attention to the asymmetry between confirming the existence of something and denying it. Denial, as he understands it, is the confirmation of the nonexistence of the thing in question. It is much more difficult to justify the nonexistence of something than to justify its existence. Consider the hypothesis that Jupiter has moons. Millions of people who argue that Jupiter has no moons, in comparison to an astronomer who argues that it has moons, are like millions of zeros multiplied together with zero as a re- sult. Observing a moon even once would be much stronger evidence than one thousand cases in which moons are not observed. Similarly, sudden jumps from the lack of evidence for the existence of God to His nonexistence do not logically imply that God does not exist.*+ Lack of evidence, at most, leads to a suspension of judgment, not to its denial. In addition, according to Yazir, considering experience and observation to be the only kinds of evidence and denying existence to God solely on the basis of the inability to observe Him are not even scientific attitudes. Science does not rely only upon observation. Yazir notes that Newton did not discover the universal law of gravitation by telescopes, but by his own insight. Yet the ma- terialists who try to support their denial of the existence of God by appealing to science ignore these significant points and show inconsistencies. Even the founders of mechanical science, such as Descartes, affirmed the existence of God, who set up the machine of the universe. However, the brute materialists, who emphasize the need for knowledge and science in order to build a simple machine, surprisingly deny the existence of a supreme intelligence, which is needed to account for the complex machine of the universe.*> What Yazir underlines here is that the common form of materialism in his time, which appealed to modern science to support itself, did not rely upon evidence and was not a logical implication of the mechanical sciences. 89OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION Apart from criticizing the logical foundations of materialism, Yazir up- holds a positive view, that is, occasionalism. He thinks that the mechanical view of the universe does not suffice to explain the spiritual realm, and holds that both material and mental realms must constantly rely upon divine power, God is the only genuine efficient cause.*¢ In order to show that the science of mechanics is compatible with occasionalism, he offers an occasionalist inter- pretation of its basic concepts. Let us see how he interprets the concepts of causality, nature, the laws of nature, and force. According to Yazir, the principle of causality (illiyet kanunu) is fundamen- tal to an understanding of the universe. This principle simply states that for any contingent being there must be a cause. We do not look for causes for every being, but only for contingent ones. Contingent beings are those that come into existence at a certain time and might not have come into existence or might have been different in some way. Since nothing comes from nothing, that which accounts for the existence of anything is an efficient cause.” In Yazir’s view, the only real efficient cause is the creator (kbdliq), namely, God. However, there are occasional causes (illet-i mutavasstta) within the universe that specify certain conditions for divine power to create certain effects. Oc- casional causes are like the electrical wires on streets through which cable cars receive electricity. As the wires themselves do not move cars, occasional causes do not have any influence on effects. Yet occasional causes and the effects associated with them are not arbitrarily created; they show certain patterns. For example, whenever hydrogen and oxygen combine in a definite proportion, water emerges. The precise combination regularly occasions the emergence of water but does not really produce it.** Regularities in the uni- verse can be expressed as “operative laws” (kavanin-i cdriye) or “laws of na- ture” (kavanin-i tabiiye) in accordance with which occasional causes and their effects take place. Yazir notes that these laws are abstractions from observed phenomena and do not have causal efficacy. God is the only causal agent; thus, these laws do not bind Him. God is the one who imposes these laws on nature. In other words, the laws of nature are the maxims and ways by which God continues to create the universe. In other words, it is God’s custom to create in this way—in Qur’anic terminology, Siinnetullab.* Similarly, nature (tabiat) is understood as the totality of the universe that has been created in an orderly way. Nature is neither a chaotic place nor a self-sufficient whole that does not rely on divine power. Nothing in nature has its own power or force.” Neither do the laws of nature have force in reference to effective causality. Force (kuvvet) in this sense must be ascribed to an agent, namely to God, since God is the only causal agent. “Force” is the term used for divine power 90LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE that is manifested in the universe, and thus it expresses a relationship between divine causality and creatures.>" Despite his emphasis on the continuous order of the universe, Yazir denies that this order is deterministic, because it relies upon Divine Will. Indeed, Divine Will manifests itself even in objects that come into existence in ac- cordance with a definite pattern. Consider, for example, oranges. Although every orange shares a pattern common to its species, each one has a unique shape and form. This is the extraordinary dimension of ordinariness.>* In this context, Yazir quotes from Ibn ‘Arabi that there is no repetition in the manifestation of divine reality. Like Ali Sedad, Yazir also draws attention to the idea that everything in the universe is in constant change, though Yazir does not relate it to thermodynamics.3+ Since the order itself is contingent and relies upon Divine Will, God may change the order and create miracles as well. Thus, miracles are possible, and there is no irrationality in believing in prophetic miracles that are transmitted to us in reliable ways.>5 In Yazir’s view, diversity in unity and constant change within order are keys to under- standing God’s creative activity. As he says, “The secret of creation is within the harmonious whole of knowledge and will, and of order and change.”3¢ In conclusion, Hamdi Yazir criticizes the materialist interpretation of sci- ence and offers an occasionalist interpretation, as does Ali Sedad, by analyz- ing the concepts of cause, force, nature, and the laws of nature. Although he makes side references to mechanical science and to its founders, such as Descartes and Newton, he does not present scientific theories in detail. Unlike Ali Sedad, Yazir relates his occasionalist interpretation of science to the Sufi thinker Ibn ‘Arabi. However, like Ali Sedad, Yazir relies upon the Ash‘arite kalam in developing his interpretation, although he does not explicitly refer to it. 5.4 Said Nursi Said Nursi (1878-1960) is another significant figure of the late Ottoman and early Turkish Republican era who dealt seriously with the materialist interpretation of modern science imported from Europe. Like Ali Sedad and Hamdi Yazir, Nursi also differentiates science from its materialist interpreta- tion and situates it within an occasionalist framework. Like Yazir, Nursi’s occasionalism integrates some ideas of the Ash‘arites and Ibn ‘Arabi.3? Fur- thermore, on the basis of the Ash‘arite kalam and the Sufi metaphysics of Ibn ‘Arabi, Nursi builds a comprehensive theological metaphysics that presents all sciences and disciplines, ranging from geometry to medicine, as various manifestations of Divine Names. Thus, Nursi integrates all sciences into his occasionalist metaphysics by relating them to the manifestations of Divine 9OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION Names. Now, let us present the significant elements of his view on sciences, and their philosophical dimensions, and examine how he integrates them into his metaphysics. Nursi holds to the basic tenets of the Ash‘arite doctrine of causality. For Nursi, God is the only true causal agent, and finite entities are devoid of causal efficacy. It is God who creates both causes and effects within the world and attaches them to each other in a self-imposed habitual pattern. Nursi writes: “[T]he All-Glorious Maker, Who is powerful over all things, has cre- ated causes, and so too does He create the effects. Through His wisdom, He ties the effect to the cause.”5* Like the Ash‘arites, Nursi maintains that the empirical continuity of causal relations does not entail a necessary connection between causes and effects.» The consistency of this relationship might be deluding, in that when the two things come together or are found together, we may suppose that the two things cause one another.*° This wrong supposition stems from our continual observations that the effect does not exist if the accustomed cause does not exist." For Nursi, this is a logical error. Observation shows only constant conjunction, not any necessary connection. Following the general conviction of the Islamic occasionalist tradition, like Ali Sedat and Hamdi Yazir, Nursi calls the set of laws describing general patterns of the processes in the world “habits of God” (Adetullab or Stin- netullah).#* What Nursi originally introduces is a distinction between seria as a moral code of conduct and seriat-i fitriyye (sharia of creation)—geriat-i kiibra (the greater shari‘a)—as a cosmological code of conduct. Concerning the latter, he says the following: ‘Through His will, He has determined a manifestation of the Greater Shari'a, the | Shari‘a of Creation, which consists of the divine laws concerning the ordering of all motion in the universe, and determined the nature of beings, which is only to be a mirror to that manifestation in things, and to be a reflection of it. And through His power, He has created the face of that nature which has received external existence, and has created things on that nature, and has mixed them one with the other. By referring to the set of laws that describe the order of the physical world as the greater sharia, Nursi means that these laws apply to larger scope, that is, to inanimate and animate beings, to conscious and non-conscious individuals. The greater sharia as a cosmological code is more comprehensive than the more common type of sharfa associated with human conduct.*+ But what exactly are “the laws of creation” (this is how “the laws of na- ture” should be called in terms of an occasionalist point of view)? Nursi 92r LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE suggests that laws are relational states (emr-i itibari), which we grasp men- tally with no corresponding extra-mental reality (viiciid-u: harici). From an epistemological perspective, these laws are heuristic mental devices for un- derstanding and interacting with the created order. However, they do not govern the world in the real sense of the word. Something that has solely mental existence cannot affect the behavior of extra-mental reality. The law- like relations that we typically think of as holding between causes and effects are actually grounded in the self-imposed habits of God’s creative acts. The attribution of a creative power to these laws, which exist as abstract math- ematical structures the most concrete existence of which is to be written on a blank paper, is an error.*5 Nursi also employs some of the concepts he borrows from Ibn ‘Arabt’s Sufi metaphysics. The laws escape direct sensual experience because they are com- ing from alem-i emr (the World of Command), where the divine command directly determines creation without a causal chain.** The quiddity of the laws that are coming from the World of Command is beyond our sensual and cog- nitive abilities. In the following passage, Nursi briefly remarks on the essence of laws and treats them as being similar to spirit [To a degree [laws of nature] resemble the spirit, and since they both issue from the World of the Divine Command and Will, with regard to their source, are toa degree appropriate for the spirit, and only lack a perceptible existence.‘ By tracing their roots back to the World of Command, Nursi aims to pres- ent the laws of creation as a basis for explanations of the physical world, but considers their real nature to be inexplicable for they are grounded only in the divine attribute of will (irade). Nursi holds that there are exceptions (siizuzdt-1 kaniiniye) to the compre- hensiveness of the laws of creation. The world is not fully determined by these laws. That is to say, this world has a stable order; however, it is contingent. The laws enable us to predict phenomena and obtain knowledge of them to acertain extent. Due to the feature of contingency, the world is ontologically open. In other words, it is dependent upon Divine Will and subject to change. Thus, the world is predictable, for Divine Will operates in a law-like man- ner. However, it is not exhaustible by means of physical laws, for it allows for a certain degree of indeterminism embedded in the warp and woof of the world, In Nursi’s world, determinism and contingency are intertwined, and thus this world exemplifies a kind of moderate determinism.s* This approach treats the world as a domain of both geometry and poetry. Why? As alluded above, Nursi’s attempt to integrate kalam and Sufi metaphysics allows him 93OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION to offer a novel approach. Nursi sees a complementary relationship between determinism and contingency from a theosophical perspective. Both deter- minism and contingency are necessary for the manifestation of Divine Names and attributes. The regularity of created phenomena is due to such attributes as majesty (celal) and wisdom (bikmet). These attributes suggest that there should be order in the processes of creation. Wisdom requires regularity be- cause knowledge is possible only if created phenomena are predictable. On the other hand, the attribute of will (irade) demands that God’s acts should not be confined by the laws of creation. This would be contrary to His free- dom. God has the power and freedom to “break the laws” (i.e. to change His self-imposed habit of creation) and to create without following a definite rule, The divine attribute of will demands to be manifested, and this is why the world remains ontologically open. Wisdom and majesty impose some kind of determination (order, predictability, law-likeness); and will and mercy (rabmet) require contingency (liberation, openness, alternative states). This dual nature makes the world a more comprehensive mirror to its creator’s Names. In Nursi’s terms: The All-Powerful and All-Knowing One, the All-Wise Maker, shows His power and His wisdom and that chance can in no way interfere in His works through the system and order His rules and practices in the universe demonstrate in the form of laws: So too, through exceptions to the laws, the wonders of His prac- tices, superficial changes, differences in individual characteristics, and changes in the times of appearance and descent, He shows His volition, will, choice, that He is the Agent with choice, and that He is under no restrictions whatsoever.” Nursi provides arguments to justify his perception of laws. Nursi’s argu- ment runs as follows: How do we explain the regularity and aesthetics in the world? Matter consists of smaller particles. The constant motion of particles displays mathematicity and aesthetics in the world. If these particles act ina consistent and law-like manner, then one has to postulate either an omnipo- tent and omniscient God who sees and governs their behavior, or God-like attributes in each particle. To clarify this point, he provides the following example. Consider that the sunlight is reflected by the surface of the sea. How do we explain this phenomenon? The existence of light can be easily explained by attributing it to the sun. This would be the most plausible and easiest explanation. If one chooses to explain the existence of light without taking the sun into account, then one would have to explain it by attributing it to the particles of the sea. This would be absurd, for in this case one would have to accept the existence of countless suns; namely, each individual being reflecting (or refracting) light 94LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE has to have the quality to produce its own light. There is a third possibility here. One can deny the existence of light. But this would be contrary to count- less experiences. There is light (mathematicity, aesthetics, beauty, morality) in this world. This is undeniable. This line of thought ends in the following conclusion: Since every individual being exists within the context of the whole order of the universe, then, if their existence is not explained by an Absolute Creator, God, then every particle, each animate and inanimate being has to be a god, that is, has to have Absolute qualities for the continuation of beau- ty, aesthetics, and order in the world. This is ultimate absurdity in Nursi’s view.° Nursi summarizes his view of nature as follows: The imaginary and insubstantial thing that Naturalists call nature, if it [is as- sumed to have] . . . an external reality, can at the very most be a work of art; it cannot be the Artist. It is an embroidery, and cannot be the Embroiderer. It is a set of decrees; it cannot be the Issuer of the decrees. It is a body of the laws of creation, and cannot be the Lawgiver. It is but a created screen to the dignity of God, and cannot be the Creator. It is passive and created, and cannot be a Creative Maker. It is a law, not a power, and cannot possess power. It is the recipient, and cannot be the source.5* Nursi shares with the tenets of Ash‘arite atomism the idea that the world consists of discrete and fragmented: atoms. What is important for Nursi is to present atoms as neutral and homogeneous loci of the manifestation of God's creative act. God creates, equips, moves, and governs atoms.s* They act according to the laws of creation, which are, as we have repeatedly said, nothing but representations of God’s habitual creation in the world. In them- selves, atoms do not own anything. Their need and poverty’ testify that they are not the source of creation. They are not the cause of orderliness and beauty. God uses these submissive loci to create new worlds continu- ously. As homogeneous and neutral beings marked by poverty and need, they cannot be the ultimate causal explanation. As darkness underlies light, the ontological poverty of each atom underlies, and thus manifests, the ex- istence and uniqueness of God through His various attributes reflected on the existence of every single atom.’+ The disproportionality between their natures (ontological insufficiency, contingency, non-consciousness, etc.) and “loads” (perfect and balanced behaviors, being a part of the perfect order and acting accordingly, etc.) they carry makes them mere expository loci of manifestation.’ The change one observes in the world is an outcome of the continuous motion and the resulting association and dissociation of these at- oms. To use his example, the realm of atoms is a “field” where God harvests new universes.5¢ 95OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION In the following passage, Nursi nicely combines the Ash‘arite analysis of causality with Ibn ‘Arabi’s emphasis on Divine Names, and proposes a signifi- cant example of the integration of kalam into Sufi metaphysics: Ie sometimes happens that in order to disallow apparent causes the ability to create and to demonstrate how far they are from this, a (Qur’anic] verse points out the aims and fruits of the effects so that it may be understood that causes are only an apparent veil. So by mentioning the aims and results, such verses show that although causes are superficially joined and adjacent to their effects, in reality there is a great distance between them. The distance from the cause to the creation of the effect is so great that the hand of the greatest causes can- not reach the creation of the most insignificant effects. Thus, it is within this long distance between cause and effect that the Divine Names rise like stars. The place of their rising is this distance. To the superficial glance mountains on the horizon appear to be joined to and contiguous with the skirts of the sky, although from the mountains to the sky is a vast distance in which the stars rise and other things are situated; so too the distance between causes and effects is such that it may be seen only with the light of the Qur’an throngh the telescope of belief.»7 Here Nursi suggests that there is always a great distance between causes and effects. Although we do not observe “horizontal gaps” between consecutive events, there is a “vertical gap” in each cause and effect relationship. The “aims” and “fruits” of the effects go beyond the capacities of their apparent cause. The aesthetics, order, beauty, and intentionality in the world demon- strate that secondary causality is just a transparent “veil” that at once hides and manifests the Divine Names. Nursi’s cosmological analyses almost always end with Divine Names be- cause, for him, they are the foundations of every science and discipline. He writes: All acainments and perfections, all learning, all progress, and all sciences, each have an elevated reality which is based on one of the Divine Names. On being based on the Name, which is concealed under numerous veils and has various manifestations and different spheres, the sciences and arts and attainments find their perfection and become reality.** If these sciences, arts, and attainments are not related to Divine Names, Nursi states, they remain incomplete and deficient shadows.” Here, Nur- si draws attention to the metaphysical foundation of each art and science. The reason why any discipline related to the world remains incomplete if its metaphysical dimension is neglected lies in the contingent character of 96LATE OTTOMAN OCCASIONALISTS AND MODERN SCIENCE the world. Since the world is contingent, due to this contingency per se, itis not independent and stable by itself. There is no guarantee that the world order will continue to hold tomorrow; there is even no guarantee that the world will exist. The sustenance of the world and the stability of its order is derived from its dependence on a noncontingent and eternal being whose at- tributes and names bestow upon it a continuous existence and order. Only by considering this metaphysical dimension of a discipline can we confidently work within that discipline, recognize its limitations, and understand it more properly. For Nursi, each discipline indicates a Divine Name. For example, the final point of engineering is to reach God’s Name of All-Just and Determiner (Ad) and to watch the manifestation of this name through the lenses of this dis- cipline. As another example, the metaphysical basis of medicine is the name of Healer (Safi). If practitioners of medicine achieve the name Healer and see the merciful manifestations of this name in the world, then they perfect their knowledge of medicine. And so on.” What Nursi tries to do is to connect all the aspects of this world to its originating source and thus to overcome the dualism between all disci- plined human activity and religion, or more specifically, the dualism be- tween science and metaphysics. In order to achieve a solid integration of science and metaphysics, Nursi puts forward the Divine Names as bridges connecting various sciences to the ultimate truth. In conclusion, on the one hand, Nursi builds his occasionalism on the basis of the Ash‘arite kalam and Sufi metaphysics and thus considers this world as a multiplicity of loci for unceasing and ever-changing manifestations of the Divine Names. On the other hand, he integrates all the sciences into this occasionalist meta- physics by treating these sciences as studies of various manifestations of the Divine Names. 5-5 Conclusion Science is subject to various philosophical interpretations. All three of the Ottoman scholars we have presented in this chapter draw attention to this and reject attempts to derive materialist conclusions from scientific activity. Instead, they offer occasionalism as a metaphysical foundation for sciences that study the world. Ali Sedad mainly relies upon the Ash‘arite kalam. Ham- di Yazir makes use of the Ash‘arite kalam to a great extent, but also relates his view to that of Ibn ‘Arabi. Said Nursi develops an original synthesis of the Ash‘arite kalam and the Sufi metaphysics of Ibn ‘Arabt and constructs a comprehensive theoretical framework in which every science can be practiced within the orbit of the relevant Divine Name. 97OCCASIONALISM IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION In this occasionalist framework, the universe remains indistinguishable from a universe as understood by naturalists. In occasionalism, different types of regularities, the constant ones such as the rise of the sun from the east ev- eryday and the probabilistic ones such as those concerning quantum phenom- ena, refer back to divine habits that secure the regularity in question in various degrees. God creates according to a self-imposed habitual pattern and does not rule over the world in an arbitrary manner. Such a universe is predictable, lawful, and regular to a certain extent. This conclusion obviously correlates with the fundamental assumptions of naturalist thinking as it pertains to pro- cesses in nature. One can, thus, follow the requirements of a method, that is, scientific method, in order to study the universe common to both occasional- ism and naturalism. Therefore, it can also be said that occasionalism escapes the God-of-the-gaps argument. If both cause and effect within the world are created by God, in the physical world there is no need for God to intervene. The question of interventionism does not even arise here, for everything is created by God. This is also significant with respect to the construction of parallel linguistic structures relating to and explaining the same natural phe- nomena from different perspectives (scientific and metaphysical) without negating each other’s legitimacy or authority. Scientific perspective concerns studying the universe in order to understand the mechanism of its working while metaphysical perspective pertains to understanding the causal source of this working mechanism. Thus, in this occasionalist framework, scientific per- spective will end up confirming the legitimacy of the metaphysical perspective by finding out the manifestations of the qualities of the creator of this world. This synthesis between the kalam and Sufi metaphysics presents an im- portant development in the history of the occasionalist tradition and offers a causal theory that proffers novel possibilities for how to consider divine action in the world without doing violence to scientific inquiry, in particular, and for how to integrate religion and science without losing their distinctive methods of discourse and inquiry, in general. The idea of a vertical gap in the cause and effect relationship allows one to find God in every point and instant of spatiotemporal reality without breaking the horizontal regularity of creational processes. In brief, the ideas of the three occasionalists we have presented invite us to look at reality from a perspective that is more complementary and integrated than that of scientism. Even after we provide the best scientific explanation for the world, it remains one big secret. The proper response to such a world is a state of bewilderment that opens a door to metaphysical knowledge. Herein scientific and metaphysical knowledge, together with religious awe, exist si- multaneously without negating or contradicting each other. 98