LabRel Cases (Set 1)
legality or constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age
1. Halaguena vs. PAL
Facts:
● Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent
Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates prior to November 22,
1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as
the sole and exclusive certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of
respondent.
● Respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the
years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.
● The provision on compulsory retirement in the CBA reads:
○ Compulsory Retirement Subject to the grooming standards
provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be
fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x.
● Petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the
aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male
counterparts.
● Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City.
● RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over the present case.
● The RTC issued a TRO on August 10, 2004,9 enjoining the respondent
for implementing Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
● The RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent or any of its agents
and representatives from further implementing Sec. 144, Part A of the
PAL-FASAP CBA pending the resolution of the case.
● Aggrieved, respondent, on October 8, 2004, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
(CA) praying that the order of the RTC, which denied its objection to
its jurisdiction, be annulled and set aside for having been issued
without and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. CA granted the petition.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners’ action challenging the
contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP.
Held:
● From the petitioners’ allegations and relief prayed for in its petition,
it is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the
PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional.
● Here, the petitioners’ primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the
annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which
allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants.
● The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
● Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of
labor tribunals.
● The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code.
Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes,
law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women,16 and the power to apply and
interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial
courts, a court of general jurisdiction. 1
● The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of
the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreement.
● Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the
employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of
action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.18 Here, the employer-
employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and
the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of
obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.
● Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by
reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a
collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the
jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and
not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
● In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in
labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms
and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the
 general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the
NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to
these agencies disappears.
2. Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
● In June 1986, plaintiff Commando Security Service Agency, Inc., and
defendant Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation entered into a
Guard Service Contract. Plaintiff provided security guards in defendant’s
banana plantation. The contract called for the payment to a guard of
P754.28 on a daily 8-hour basis and an additional P565.72 for a four hour
overtime while the shift-in-charge was to be paid P811.40 on a daily 8-hour
basis and P808.60 for the 4-hour overtime.
● Wage Orders increasing the minimum wage in 1983 were complied with by
the defendant. On June 16, 1984, Wage Order No. 5 was promulgated
directing an increase of P3.00 per day on the minimum wage of workers in
the private sector and a P5.00 increase on the ECOLA. This was followed on
November 1, 1984 by Wage Order No. 6 which further increased said
minimum wage by P3.00 on the ECOLA.
● Wage orders contain the provision::
○ In the case of contract for construction projects and for security,
janitorial and similar services, the increase in the minimum wage
and allowances rates of the workers shall be borne by the
principal or client of the construction/service contractor and the
contracts shall be deemed amended accordingly, subject to the
provisions of Sec. 3 (b) of this order (Sec. 6 and Sec. 9, Wage
Orders No. 5 and 6, respectively)
● Plaintiff demanded that its Guard Service Contract with defendant be
upgraded in compliance with Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6. Defendant refused.
● By the time of the filing of plaintiffs Complaint, the rate adjustment
payable by defendant amounted to P462, 346.25. Defendant opposed the
Complaint by raising the following defenses: (1) the rate adjustment is the
obligation of the plaintiff as employer of the security guards; (2) assuming
its liability, the sum it should pay is less in amount; and (3) the Wage
Orders violate the impairment clause of the Constitution.
● Trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue:
(1) Which court has jurisdiction over the case?
(2) Whether or not petitioner is liable to the private respondent for the wage
adjustments provided under Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 and for attorney’s
fees.
Held:
(1)
● We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the present case. It is well settled in law and
jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective
bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction.
● In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the
Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on
account of petitioner’s alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard
Service Contract.
● The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case
belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the
application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the
determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent
where no employer-employee relation exists.
(2)
● The principal (petitioner) and the contractor (respondent) are jointly and
severally liable to the employees for their wages. 2
● The joint and several liabilities of the contractor and the principal is
mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance with the provisions
therein including the minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by
virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal, on the other hand, is
made the indirect employer of the contractor’s employees to secure
payment of their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them.
● Even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the law itself
establishes one between the principal and the employees of the agency for
a limited purpose i.e. in order to ensure that the employees are paid the
wages due them.
● It is only when contractor pays the increases mandated that it can claim an
adjustment from the principal to cover the increases payable to the
security guards.
● Pursuant to the above provision, the right of reimbursement from a co-
debtor is recognized in favor of the one who paid. It will be seen that the
liability of the petitioner to reimburse the respondent only arises if and
when respondent actually pays its employees the increases granted by
Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6.
● It is not disputed that the private respondent has not actually paid the
security guards the wage increases granted under the Wage Orders in
question. Private respondent has no cause of action against petitioner to
recover the wage increases. Needless to stress, the increases in wages are
 intended for the benefit of the laborers and the contractor may not assert
a claim against the principal for salary wage adjustments that it has not
actually paid.
3. 7K Corp vs. Albarico
Facts:
● When he was dismissed on 5 April 1993, respondent Eddie Albarico
(Albarico) was a regular employee of petitioner 7K Corporation, a company
selling water purifiers.
● He started working for the company in 1990 as a salesman. Because of his
good performance, his employment was regularized. He was also
promoted several times: from salesman, he was promoted to senior sales
representative and then to acting team field supervisor.
● In 1992, he was awarded the President’s Trophy for being one of the
company’s top water purifier specialist distributors.
● In April of1993, the chief operating officer of petitioner 7K Corporation
terminated Albarico’s employment allegedly for his poor sales
performance.
● Respondent had to stop reporting for work, and he subsequently
submitted his money claims against petitioner for arbitration before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
● The issue for voluntary arbitration before the NCMB, according to the
parties’ Submission Agreement was whether respondent Albarico was
entitled to the payment of separation pay and the sales commission
reserved for him by the corporation.
● While the NCMB arbitration case was pending, respondent Albarico filed a
Complaint against Petitioner Corporation with the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal with
money claims for overtime pay, holiday compensation, commission, and
food and travelling allowances.
● The Complaint was decided by the labor arbiter in favor of respondent
Albarico.
● On appeal by petitioner, the labor arbiter’s Decision was vacated by the
NLRC for forum shopping on the part of respondent Albarico, because the
NCMB arbitration case was still pending.
● Petitioner Corporation filed its Position Paper in the NCMB arbitration
case. It denied that respondent was terminated from work, much less
illegally dismissed. The corporation claimed that he had voluntarily
stopped reporting for work after receiving a verbal reprimand for his sales
performance; hence, it was he who was guilty of abandonment of
employment.
● Almost 12 years after the filing of the NCMB case, both parties appeared in
a hearing before the NCMB. Respondent manifested that he was willing to
settle the case amicably with petitioner based on the decision of the labor
arbiter ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
backwages and attorney’s fees.
● Petitioner was only amenable to pay only the separation pay and the sales
commission according to the Submission Agreement.
● The NCMB voluntary arbitrator rendered a Decision finding petitioner
corporation liable for illegal dismissal.
● The CA affirmed the Decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error in finding that the voluntary
arbitrator properly assumed jurisdiction to decide the issue of the legality of the
dismissal of respondent as well as the latter’s entitlement to backwages, even if
neither the legality nor the entitlement was expressly claimed in the Submission
Agreement of the parties.
Held:
● Voluntary arbitrators may, by agreement of the parties, assume
jurisdiction over a termination dispute such as the present case.
● We note that even the NLRC was of the understanding that the NCMB
arbitration case sought to resolve the issue of the legality of the dismissal
of the respondent. In fact, the identity of the issue of the legality of his
dismissal, which was previously submitted to the NCMB, and later 3
submitted to the NLRC, was the basis of the latter’s finding of forum
shopping and the consequent dismissal of the case before it.
● In fact, petitioner also implicitly acknowledged this when it filed before the
NLRC its Motion to Dismiss respondent’s Complaint on the ground of
forum shopping. Thus, it is now estopped from claiming that the issue
before the NCMB does not include the issue of the legality of the dismissal
of respondent. Besides, there has to be a reason for deciding the issue of
respondent’s entitlement to separation pay.
● Hence, the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed that the core issue
behind the issue of separation pay is the legality of the dismissal of
respondent.
● Having established that the issue of the legality of dismissal of Albarico was
in fact necessarily - albeit not explicitly - included in the Submission
Agreement signed by the parties, this Court rules that the voluntary
arbitrator rightly assumed jurisdiction to decide the said issue.
● We also rule that the voluntary arbitrator may award backwages upon a
finding of illegal dismissal, even though the issue of entitlement thereto is
not explicitly claimed in the Submission Agreement. Backwages, in general,
are awarded on the ground of equity as a form of relief that restores the
income lost by the terminated employee by reason of his illegal dismissal.
 ● We rule that the voluntary arbitrator correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the issue of entitlement of respondent Albarico to backwages on the basis
of the former’s finding of illegal dismissal.
4. People's Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) vs. Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment
Facts:
● Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against
petitioner with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, non-payment
of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday
and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of
wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth.
● After the conduct of summary investigations, and after the parties
submitted their position papers, the DOLE Regional Director found
that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was
entitled to his money claims. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
Director’s Order, but failed.
● The Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
● When the matter was brought before the CA, where petitioner
claimed that it had been denied due process, it was held that
petitioner was accorded due process as it had been given the
opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction
over the matter.
● In the Decision of this Court, the CA Decision was reversed and set
aside, and the complaint against petitioner was dismissed.
● The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondent. It was held that while the
DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, this function could not be coextensive with
the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
● The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the
primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.
● From this Decision, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed a Motion
for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought to
clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE
be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. In its Comment, the
DOLE sought clarification as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and
enforcement power under the Labor Code, as amended.
Issue: May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-
employee relationship exists, and if so, to what extent?
Held:
● The prior decision of this Court in the present case accepts such
answer, but places a limitation upon the power of the DOLE, that is,
the determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be co-extensive with the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE. But even in conceding the power of
the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, the Court held that the determination of the existence of
an employer-employee relationship is still primarily within the power
of the NLRC, that any finding by the DOLE is merely preliminary.
● This conclusion must be revisited. No limitation in the law was placed
upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where
the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was
primarily held by the NLRC.
● The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRC’s
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be
disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE 4
must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-
employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or
not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
● The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide
the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence
of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s
conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The
DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same
test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same
evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC.
● If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-
employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the
exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if
the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it
appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed
in the first place.
● To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give
effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other
 labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an
existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there
is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with
the NLRC.
5. Sadol vs. Pilipinas Kao
FACTS:
● Petitioner was recruited as a laborer by private respondents Requito
Vega, Antonio Gomez and Belen Gomez, who are the owners of Vega
& Co., a private recruitment agency, with assignment at respondent
Pilipinas Kao, Inc. (PKI for brevity).
● Sometime on April 16, 1984, he was allegedly summarily dismissed.
Hence, on July 24, 1986, he filed a complaint for reinstatement and
backwages with Region X of the Department of Labor and
Employment in Cagayan de Oro City.
● On November 13, 1986, the labor arbiter ordered all parties to
submit their position papers. Only petitioner complied. On December
17, 1986, petitioner filed an urgent motion that the failure of
respondent to file their position papers is a waiver and so judgment
should be rendered in favor of petitioner. On June 26, 1987, the
labor arbiter rendered a decision ordering private respondents to
jointly and solidarity pay petitioner his separation pay.
● Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. Said respondents also appealed but it
was filed out of time.
● On August 26, 1988, the Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a
decision modifying the appealed decision in that respondent PKI was
ordered to reinstate petitioner to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and other accrued benefits and with full backwages
from the time of dismissal up to his actual reinstatement, and in case
reinstatement is impossible, payment of full backwages and separation
pay of one (1) month salary for every year of service. The appeal of
respondent was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
● The PKI allegedly received a copy of the decision of the NLRC only
on September 13, 1988. A motion for reconsideration of said decision
dated September 22, 1988 was filed by said respondent.
● On September 30, 1988, a resolution was promulgated by the same
division of the NLRC, setting aside its decision and dismissing the
case for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by
petitioner who besides questioning its findings of facts raised the
issue that said respondent's appeal having been filed out of time its
motion for reconsideration of the decision should not have been
entertained as it raised issues for the first on appeal which were not
raised before the labor arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not a party who failed to appeal from a decision of the
labor arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) within the
ten (10) day reglementary period can still participate in a separate appeal
timely interposed by the adverse party by filing a motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the NLRC on such appeal.
Held:
● The Court resolves the question in the affirmative. The rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of justice. It is only by
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration that was timely
filed that the NLRC may be able, to equitably evaluate the conflicting
versions of facts presented by the parties.
6. Ong vs. CA
Facts:
● Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Milestone Metal Manufacturing
(Milestone), which manufactures, among others, wearing apparels, belts,
and umbrellas. 5
● Sometime in May 1998, the business suffered very low sales and
productivity because of the economic crisis in the country. Hence, it
adopted a rotation scheme by reducing the workdays of its employees to
three days a week or less for an indefinite period.
● The 15 respondents filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay, damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioner.
● Petitioner claimed that 9 of the 15 respondents were not employees of
Milestone but of Protone Industrial Corporation which, however, stopped
its operation due to business losses.
● Petitioner also contended that some of the respondents were not
dismissed; rather, they refused to work after the rotation scheme was
adopted. Anent their monetary claims, petitioner presented documents
showing that he paid respondents’ minimum wage, 13th month pay,
holiday pay, and contributions to the SSS, Medicare, and Pag-Ibig Funds.
● The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding to the respondents the
aggregate amount of P1, 111,200.40 representing their wage differential,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, plus 10%
thereof as attorney’s fees.
● Further, petitioner was ordered to pay the respondents separation pay
equivalent to ½ month salary for every year of service due to the
 indefiniteness of the rotation scheme and strained relations caused by the
filing of the complaints.
● Petitioner filed with the NLRC a notice of appeal and paid the docket fees
therefor. However, instead of posting the required cash or surety bond, he
filed a motion to reduce the appeal bond.
● The NLRC, in a resolution dated April 28, 2000, denied the motion to
reduce bond and dismissed the appeal for failure to post cash or surety
bond within the reglementary period.
● Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for non-
perfection of appeal although a motion to reduce appeal bond was
seasonably filed. However, the petition was dismissed and thereafter the
motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the CA has committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the appeal of the petitioners for non-perfection, when the motion to
reduce the appeal bond was seasonably filed.
Held:
● The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law.
● The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
● Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, sets forth the rules on appeal
from the Labor Arbiter’s monetary award:
○ RT. 223. Appeal: Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter
are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any
or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. x x x
○ In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from
● The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect appeal.
● While, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure allows the
Commission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the
authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within
the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds.
● A substantial monetary award, even if it runs into millions, does not
necessarily give the employer-appellant a "meritorious case” and does not
automatically warrant a reduction of the appeal bond.
● The requirement is intended to discourage employers from using the
appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee’s
just and lawful claims.
7. Mcburnie vs. Ganzon
DOCTRINE:
● On the matter of the filing and acceptance of motions to reduce
appeal bond, as provided in Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure, the following guidelines shall be observed:
○ (a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be
entertained by the NLRC subject to the following conditions:
(1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a
reasonable amount is posted;
○ (b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion
shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash or
surety bond equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the
monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages
and attorney's fees; 6
○ (c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to
suspend the running of the 10-day reglementary period to
perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the
NLRC;
○ (d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the
motion to reduce bond and determine the final amount of
bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in
accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and
reasonable amount; and
○ (e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce
bond, or requires a bond that exceeds the amount of the
provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period
of ten 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which
to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
Facts:
● McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims against the respondents.
McBurnie claimed that he signed an employment agreement with the
company EGI as an Executive Vice-President.
● On the other hand, the respondents opposed the complaint,
contending that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest
 in and establish a company for the management of hotels and did
not intend to create an employer-employee relationship.
● LA RULING: McBurnie was illegally dismissed from employment.
● The respondents appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC. They filed their
Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an
appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00. The respondents
contended in their Motion to Reduce Bond, inter alia, that the
monetary awards of the LA were null and excessive, allegedly with
the intention of rendering them incapable of posting the necessary
appeal bond. They claimed that an award of "more than P60 Million
Pesos to a single foreigner who had no work permit and who left
the country for good one month after the purported commencement
of his employment" was a patent nullity. Furthermore, they claimed
that because of their business losses that may be attributed to an
economic crisis, they lacked the capacity to pay the bond of almost
P60 Million, or even the millions of pesos in premium required for
such bond.
● NLRC RULING: The NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond,
explaining that "in cases involving monetary award, an employer
seeking to appeal the LA’s decision to the Commission is
unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award. Thus, the NLRC required
from the respondents the posting of an additional bond in the
amount of P54,083,910.00.
● CA RULING: The CA allowed the respondents’ motion to reduce
appeal bond to P10,000,000.00 and directing the NLRC to give due
course to their appeal. The CA explained that “while Art. 223 of the
Labor Code requiring bond equivalent to the monetary award is
explicit, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, recognized as exception a motion to reduce bond upon
meritorious grounds and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award."
Issue: Is the 10 million pesos bond substantial and special meritorious
circumstance to merit reconsideration of the appeal?
Held:
● Yes. The 10 million pesos bond is substantial and a special
meritorious circumstance to merit reconsideration of the appeal.
● The present rule on the matter is Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011
NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was substantially the same provision
in effect at the time of the respondents’ appeal to the NLRC, and
which reads:
● No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award.
● Prevailing rules and jurisprudence allow the reduction of appeal bonds.
● While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this
is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond
shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount
in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant,
otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal.
● The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the
reduction of the cash bond within the 10 day reglementary period,
the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond
securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.
● If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the
reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to
reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer
within the 10-day period.
8. Lepanto Mining vs. ICAO
Facts: 7
● Private respondent Belio Icao, alleged in his complaint that he was an
employee of petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation
(LEPANTO), assigned as lead miner in its underground mine in Paco,
Mankayan, Benguet.
● On January 4, 2008, while taking a break from work, Security Guard Larry
Bulwayan and Dale Papsa-ao pulled his skullguard harness. A few minutes
later, he saw Bulwayan pick up a wrapped object at the bathing station and
gave it to his companion. The two Security Guards then invited the private
respondent to go with them at the investigation office to answer questions
regarding the wrapped object. He was then charged with highgrading or an
act of concealing, possessing or unauthorized extraction of highgrade
material without proper authority. Consequently, he was dismissed from
his work despite his vehement denial of the said charges.
● Private respondent prayed that the petitioners be held liable for illegal
dismissal, to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and benefits, and to pay his full backwages, damages and attorney’s
fees. He claimed that his dismissal from work was without just or
authorized cause since petitioners failed to prove by ample and sufficient
evidence that he stole gold bearing highgrade ores from the company
premises.
● The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on September 30, 2008, holding
petitioner and its CEO liable for illegal dismissal and ordering to pay
 respondent his full backwages and separation pay. The alleged highgrading
attributed by LCMCs security guards was found to have been fabricated;
consequently, there was no just cause for the dismissal of respondent.
● On December 8, 2008, petitioner and its CEO filed an Appearance with
Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC, instead of posting the required
appeal bond in the form of a cash bond or a surety bond. They requested
that the NLRC release the cash bond which they had posted in the separate
case, Dangiw Siggaao case, which was decided earlier in its favor, and
apply that same cash bond to their present appeal bond liability.
● NLRC dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and the latter’s CEO for non-
perfection. It found that they had failed to post the required appeal bond,
hence, declared the Labor Arbiters decision to be final and executory.
NLRC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and its
CEO.
● The CA affirmed the Order of the NLRC. According to the Cam petitioner
and the latter,s CEO lost the right to appeal.
Issue: Did the petitioner comply with the appeal bond requirement under the Labor
Code and the NLRC Rules by filing a Consolidated Motion to release cash bond it
posted in another case?
Held:
● Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, in appeals from any decision or order
of the labor arbiter, the posting of an appeal bond is required. In case of a
judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the
amount equivalent to the monetary judgment appealed from.
● The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure incorporates this requirement in Rule
VI, Section 6, which provides: In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or
the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfect only upon the posting of a bond.
● We rule that petitioner substantially complied with the mandatory
requirement of posting an appeal bond.
● First, there is no question that the appeal was filed within the 10-day
reglementary period. Except for the alleged failure to post an appeal bond,
the appeal to the NLRC was therefore in order.
● Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner an unencumbered amount of
money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC. To reiterate,
petitioner had posted a cash bond of ₱401,610.84 in the separate case
Dangiw Siggaao, which was earlier decided in its favor. Such cash bond
ought to have been released since the decision in the other case has been
already final and executory.
● Third, the cash bond in the amount of ₱401,610.84 posted in Dangiw
Siggaao is more than enough to cover the appeal bond in the amount of
₱345,879.45 required in the present case.
● Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to the spirit behind the appeal bond
requirement which is to ensure that workers will receive the money
awarded in their favor when the employers appeal eventually fails. There
was no showing at all of any attempt on the part of petitioner to evade the
posting of the appeal bond. On the contrary, petitioners move showed a
willingness to comply with the requirement. Hence, the welfare of Icao is
adequately protected.
● There is all the more reason in the present case to find that petitioner
substantially complied with the requirement. The Court will liberally apply
the rules on in very highly exceptional cases such as this, in keeping with
the dictates of justice, reason and equity.
9. Yupangco Cotton Mills vs. CA
Facts:
● Petitioner alleged that a sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission erroneously and unlawfully levied upon certain properties
which it claims as its own. 8
● Petitioner filed different petitions in both the NLRC and the regular court,
where it raised a common issue, which is that it is the owner of the
properties located in the compound and buildings of Artex Development
Corporation, which were erroneously levied upon by the sheriff of the
NLRC as a consequence of the decision rendered by the said Commission in
a labor case.
○ Third-party claim with the Labor Arbiter
○ Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the National Labor Relations
Commission
○ Petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila
○ Original petition for mandatory injunction with the NLRC
○ Complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Manila
● The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition on the
ground of forum-shopping and that petitioner’s remedy was to seek relief
from this Court.
● Petitioner argued that the reliefs sought and the issues involved in the
complaint for recovery of property and damages filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila were entirely distinct and separate from the reliefs
sought and the issues involved in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. Besides, petitioner pointed out that neither the NLRC nor
 the Labor Arbiter is empowered to adjudicate matters involving ownership
of properties.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred inruling that petitioner was guilty of forum-
shopping
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner’s accion
reinvindicatoria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.
Held:
(1)
● There was no forum shopping. There is no forum-shopping where two
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues
were raised, and two objectives were sought.
● In the case at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of
action and reliefs sought. The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter
Reyes issued a writ of execution on the property of petitioner was a labor
dispute between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the
case. The only issue petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not
the writ of execution issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against
the property of petitioner, not a party to the labor case.
● On the other hand, the accion reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the
trial court was to recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at
auction. Hence, the causes of action in these cases were different.
● For forum-shopping to exist both actions must involve the same
transactions, the same circumstances. The actions must also raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues.
(2)
● A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a
decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative
remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of
alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third
party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event
he failed in the remedy first availed of.
● Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
○ File a third-party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter,
○ And if the third-party claim is denied, the third party may appeal
the denial to the NLRC.
● Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper
action with a competent court to recover ownership of the property
illegally seized by the sheriff.
● In light of the above, the filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent
action for recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court.
And, the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of
forum shopping.
● A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property would not
constitute interference with the powers or processes of the Arbiter and
the NLRC which rendered the judgment to enforce and execute upon the
levied properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is not
subject to levy. Thus, a separate action for recovery, upon a claim and
prima facie showing of ownership by the petitioner, cannot be considered
as interference.
10. PAL vs. NLRC
Facts:
● Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were
dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3,
1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
● Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a
petition for injunction praying that PAL be prohibited from effecting the
dismissal, and after hearing, that they may be reinstated with backwage
and damages.
● The NLRC issued the injunction which was disputed by PAL contending that 9
injuntive power of the NLRC may be exercised only if the case involves or
arises from labor disputes.
Issue: Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a
complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for
injunction and issue such writ?
Held:
● The power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from “any
labor dispute” upon application by a party thereof, which application if not
granted “may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.”
● The term “labor dispute” is defined as “any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and
employees.”
● It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute
between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present
case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private
 respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed
with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.
● The jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature
and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private respondents’ petition for
injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article
218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC
or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1
of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction
only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes.
● The ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to
file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at
bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the
NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined
from enforcing its dismissal orders.

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