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Northrop Frye 2003 Collected Works - Modern-Culture University of Toronto Press
Northrop Frye 2003 Collected Works - Modern-Culture University of Toronto Press
VOLUME 11
Editorial Committee
General Editor
Alvin A. Lee
Associate Editor
Jean O'Grady
Editors
Joseph Adamson
Robert D. Denham
Michael Dolzani
A.C. Hamilton
David Staines
Advisers
Robert Brandeis
Paul Gooch
Eva Kushner
Jane Millgate
Ron Schoeffel
Clara Thomas
Jane Widdicombe
Northrop Frye on
Modern Culture
VOLUME 11
U N I V E R S I T Y OF T O R O N T O PRESS
Toronto Buffalo London
www.utppublishing.com
© Victoria University, University of Toronto and Jan Gorak
(preface, introduction, annotation) 2003
Printed in Canada
ISBN 08020-3696-1
This volume has been published with the assistance of a grant from
Victoria University.
Preface
xi
Credits
xv
Abbreviations
xvii
Introduction
xix
The Arts
2 Current Opera: A Housecleaning
73
3 Ballet Russe
76
vi Contents
18 On Book Reviewing
123
19 Academy without Walls
126
20 Communications
234
21 The Renaissance of Books
140
22 Violence and Television
156
23 Introduction to Art and Reality
167
33 Gandhi
209
34 Ernst Jiinger's On the Marble Cliffs
211
35 Dr. Kinsey and the Dream Censor
215
36 Cardinal Mindszenty
220
37 The Two Camps
222
Notes
331
Emendations
381
Index
383
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Preface
Acknowledgments
Simon and Schuster, Inc. for the reply to a questionnaire, from Authors
Take Sides on Vietnam: Two Questions on the War in Vietnam Answered by
the Authors of Several Nations, ed. Cecil Woolf and John Bagguley (1967).
© Copyright 1967 by Simon and Schuster.
University of Toronto Magazine for "The Quality of Life in the '705," from
the University of Toronto Graduate (1971).
xvi Credits
With the exception of the items listed above, all works are printed cour-
tesy of the Estate of Northrop Frye/ Victoria University.
Abbreviations
Northrop Frye liked to reflect that he was born in 1912 into a world
where the King of England was also the Emperor of India, and lived
long enough to see a Hollywood actor installed in the White House in
1981. The works collected in this volume have a similarly impressive
temporal span: the earliest appeared in 1933, the year of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's inauguration and the legalization of Joyce's Ulysses by the
U.S. Supreme Court; the latest dates from 1986, as the beginning of the
Iran-Contra scandal surfaced and Wole Soyinka became the first African
Nobel Laureate in Literature. So Frye's commitment to writing about
twentieth-century art, culture, and politics was no transitory one. He
maintained it simultaneously with his emergence as a major Romantic
scholar in Fearful Symmetry (1947) and as a synoptic and "scientific" lit-
erary theorist in Anatomy of Criticism (1957). Because Frye achieved such
eminence in the latter activities, the former have for many readers van-
ished from the picture, leaving only "the anaesthetic critic" of Frederick
Crews or the depoliticized neo-Aristotelian of revisionist legend.1 From
the writings on politics and art brought together in these pages we can
assemble a very different Frye, a Frye intensely concerned with the
opportunities for thoughtful critical intervention in the national life
available to a Canadian intellectual in the 19305, a Frye keen to partici-
pate in the transformation of Toronto from a colonial outpost to a
sophisticated cosmopolitan centre. They also show us a Frye unfailingly
loyal to the ideal of "cooperation" so significant to twentieth-century
Canadian life.
These essays fall into three main groups. The first group extends from
xx Introduction
or Spengler release to the artists's "will to power" but also against the
"countercommunication" structures erected by media entrepreneurs
like Rupert Murdoch and Ted Turner. If these are not Frye's most charis-
matic contributions to criticism, they are the logical and moral fulfilment
of the ideological commitment Frye made early in his career to Canadian
cooperative socialism and his commitment to the power of the imagina-
tion to construct a world not reducible to conventional wisdom.
II Constructive Criticism
Frye's own rapid ascent up the educational ladder registers how far
this program of educational expansion and spiritual enrichment had
already translated into upward mobility for a talented minority. Yet his
is a restless mind, perpetually suspicious of the monopolist tendencies
the institutionalized imagination possesses. If we compare the views put
forward by Matthew Arnold in Culture and Anarchy in 1869 with those
Frye expresses nearly a century later, the grounds of his suspicion will
become clearer. Arnold looks to culture as "a centre of authority" in an
industrial, class-conscious, and faction-ridden Victorian England. He
sees culture as an impersonal "idea of perfection . . . an inward condition
of the mind and spirit." Arnold is careful to temper this Romantic
inwardness with the educational, literary, and administrative activities
of a Victorian state defined in terms of "the nation in its collective and
corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for general advan-
tage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider
than that of individuals."4 If Arnold's program can be understood as
synecdochic for the nineteenth-century effort to expand educational
opportunity and political enlightenment, then it is also representative of
the Victorian fear of inwardness unregulated by institutional restraint.
This is something that it did not take Frye long to recognize. In his
first critical book Fearful Symmetry, he remarks that Blake's
For Frye, Arnold's program remained too mired in the Victorian respect-
ability and common sense it purported to despise. The network of insti-
tutions that Arnold took for granted made his dissent from Victorian
values too comfortable and complacent. For Frye, Arnold had elevated
the local manners of his Rugby and Oxford into those of culture as a
whole. At the beginning of Anatomy of Criticism, Frye pounces on
Introduction xxiii
it is Arnold who is the provincial. Ruskin has learned his trade from the
great iconological tradition which comes down through Classical and Bibli-
cal scholarship into Dante and Spenser, both of whom he had studied care-
fully, and which is incorporated in the medieval cathedrals he had pored
over in such detail. Arnold is assuming, as a universal law of nature, cer-
tain "plain sense" critical axioms which were hardly heard of before Dry-
den's time and which can assuredly not survive the age of Freud and Jung
and Frazer and Cassirer. (AC, id)
theory is not enough to produce great art. It is only one side of the story
and the other side is some objective world in which the theory can lose
itself, find itself, dissolve itself. Call it what you will. The place for theory in
the finished work is that of the skylark that loses itself in the blue, heard
but not seen, forgotten yet flooding the air with melody. In many of these
modern paintings the theory sits on the fence and croaks. Or it just stares at
you coldly, which is still worse.9
For well over twenty years, Fairley regularly attempted to convince his
readers of the fusion of imaginative power and passionate social con-
cern he found in Joseph Conrad, O.M. Doughty, and Hugh MacDi-
armid, but which he found strangely wanting in much modern art. He
attempted to embody these qualities in his own creative work, which
ranged from a Lawrentian playlet on the fishermen of coastal Yorkshire
to lyrics reminiscent of Blake's sketches in their visionary simplicity.
Frye's debts to Eric Havelock, who joined Victoria College as a
teacher of Classics in 1929 and whose commentaries on everyday events
in Toronto and the larger direction of world politics appeared in the
Forum throughout the 19305, are more difficult to evaluate. At first
xxviii Introduction
IV Frye's Beginnings
with our most benignly Utopian desires. In the political world of the
19303, Frye sees only natural depravity actualized on the theatre of
world politics. The cyclic structures of drama and art, on the other hand,
hint at the self-renewing powers of humanity. Unlike Eliot, the Southern
Agrarians, or the contributors to F.R. Lea vis's Scrutiny, Frye does not see
"the organic society" as demarcating the sole horizons for any valid cul-
tural projections. He knows that Canada's existence is inseparable from
the expansive energies that forged Blake and the industrial revolution
alike. Frye's is a world where the imagined cities of Plato, the green
world of Shakespeare, and the cartoon fantasies of Disney can exist on a
common axis, as so many signals of a permanent hope for a renewed
society.
By the late 19305, North American intellectuals estranged by Eliot
were looking for deliverance in quite different directions. To this group,
Edmund Wilson embodied a powerful alternative to Eliot's example.
The publication of After Strange Gods in 1934 crowned Wilson's own dis-
enchantment with Eliot's leadership. Only a year later, Wilson jour-
neyed to Odessa to begin his quest to redefine the relationship between
politics and letters. In a trail-blazing essay on "Marxism and Literature"
(t-937) f Wilson argued that "in practising and prizing literature, we must
not be unaware of the first efforts of the human spirit to transcend litera-
ture itself."14 Throughout this period, in such essays as "Flaubert's Poli-
tics" and "A.E. Housman" (1937), Wilson showed how nineteenth- and
twentieth-century artists repeatedly arrived at the very brink of imagin-
ing the extinction of the existing social and political order but stopped
short of supplying any vision of a new society. After a battery of prelim-
inary sketches published in The New Republic, Wilson's blueprint for
this transformed society, To the Finland Station—arguably the last great
nineteenth-century historical novel—appeared in 1940.
Wilson welcomed Russian Communism as the logical terminus of a
rational, scientific, progressive, bourgeois nineteenth-century Europe.
For this ultimate fulfilment of humanity's emancipation, he looked to
Michelet, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the heroes of To the Finland Station,
whom he fused in a kind of Balzacian comedie humaine. With its pan-
oramic sweep and clearly-defined dramatic conflicts, Wilson's version
of "the modern century" wrestled the responsibility for progress from a
bourgeoisie that had lost its way. The torch of the future passed to men
of action, not artist-dreamers.
Frye could hardly have viewed the emancipation Wilson delivered as
Introduction xxxiii
century social thinkers had done—is to overlook how many such sym-
bolic encounters proceed successfully in a single day.
P.M. Cornford's From Religion to Philosophy (1912) and The Origin of
Attic Comedy (1914)—whose influence Frye's work frequently acknowl-
edges—taught him how culture shapes the way people think, regulating
and ordering the exchange of symbols into a structure that in turn is
actualized in a system of social performances, obligations, celebrations,
and crises. Cornford plotted the categories of Greek thought, penetrat-
ing the distinct and specific meanings that "tragedy" or "history" took
on for its citizens. He showed how the Greeks deployed images from the
natural and cultural world in their religious speculation. At the end of
the road that stretches from Plato's cave to the Platonic republic come
the communities the people of antiquity inhabited and—most important
of all for Frye's theory of culture—that they wanted to inhabit. These
were the communities they celebrated in the festivals and rituals Corn-
ford saw as the origins of Greek literary genres.
In effect, Frye puts the contributions of Durkheim and Cornford to
two main purposes. First of all, he shifts the syntax of cultural criticism
from the indicative (these are the symbols and images we circulate in
such-and-such a society, these are the symbols that circulated in one
such canonical culture) and the imperative (these are the symbols we
must use in such-and-such a society) to the optative (this is the kind of
society we hope for and these are the kinds of symbols we use to trans-
mit our hopes). Second, he strings the images of a culture into episodes
within a larger plot: what we hope will happen is not always what hap-
pens, and our fears, no less than our hopes, control our stock of images
and our narrative structures.
When Frye inspects how these symbols and structures operate inside
literary genres and institutions—as in the festivals of ancient Greece or
medieval Europe—he sees them as charged with the great moments of
hope and fear for a society, as vehicles for entertaining speculation
about polls and cosmos that are tabooed in the larger state. Unlike Eliot or
Leavis, Frye does not think this image-making power can only operate
in certain closed societies. Two of the most compelling essays in this col-
lection, "The Great Charlie" (no. 10,1941) and "The Eternal Tramp" (no.
17, 1947), locate this power as alive and well in a commercial cinema
designed to entertain the industrial masses. Frye's Chaplin functions as
an emissary for a turbulent American comic dissidence. To Chaplin,
"the man who is really part of his social group is only half a man" (101).
xxxvi Introduction
The world we see and live in, and most of the world we have made,
belongs to the alienated and absurd world of the tiger. But in all our efforts
to imagine or realize a better society, some shadow falls across it of the
child's innocent vision of the impossible created world that makes human
sense. If we can no longer feel that this world was once created for us by a
divine parent, we still must feel, more intensely than ever, that it is the
world we ought to be creating, and that whatever may be divine in our des-
tiny or nature is connected with its creation. (68-9)
When Frye's critical career began, one of the principal challenges artists
and intellectuals faced was that of constructing a usable past, of select-
ing from a now infinitely expandable legacy imagined as a "museum
without walls." This museum housed all the monuments and experi-
ments considered most valuable for a talented minority. By contrast,
Frye's later work, written at a time of mounting tension between the
warring nuclear empires of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., acknowledges the
imperative to argue on behalf of an absorbable future for a whole com-
munity. The postwar world is, as Frye submits in the closing pages of
Introduction xliii
The Modern Century, the world of the tiger, where predatory appetites
and destructive tendencies have free rein. It is also a world where in the
West, at any rate, the tiger has disguised itself as the gift-horse, offering
goods, services, and leisure for all who are able to afford to tune in to its
continuous barrage of electronically produced counter-communication.
A surfeit of aggression and desire faces the contemporary citizen at
every turn. What can the humanities offer as a more tolerable version of
society?
One of Frye's toughest assignments is to maintain the intellectual
momentum for the project of cooperation in a period of affluence, infla-
tion, and limitless but well-concealed potential for destruction. In the
19305, as Mussolini and Hitler rose to power and unemployment figures
and hunger marches lengthened, apologists for the Utopian imperative
had a fairly captive audience for their message. These are not the condi-
tions Frye faced in the last thirty years of his life, however, as a manage-
rial society disguises market conditions as Utopia itself. How can Frye's
continued commitment to the values of Canadian cooperation maintain
its persuasive power even as its institutional presence fades from
national politics? What answers has Frye to the challenge of American
ideology as it saturates Canadian airwaves?
Frye's arguments for cooperation rest on four main pillars. The first
strand of Frye's critique comes with his analysis of society as it is, an
analysis that emphasizes the psychological and social destructiveness of
the order managerial society tries to persuade us at every moment to
take for granted. Second, Frye makes a quiet but unwavering restate-
ment of the value possessed by traditional means of communication—
books, images, and works of art. Third, Frye reconceptualizes the social
function of the images and narratives dispersed through such agencies,
stringing them together into a larger narrative of "the world man is try-
ing to build out of nature" and of the identity crises he encounters every
day in the neurotic order he is encouraged to accept as natural. Fourth,
Frye recasts the university not as an elite finishing school or factory for
knowledge production, but as a site for the preservation, construction,
performance, interpretation, and transmission of the alternative social
realities that can rescue human society from alienation.
One of Frye's few ventures into the orthodox history of ideas, "Tenets
of Modern Culture" (no. 42, 1950), recognizes the dominance of the
United States in modern civilization and the consequent dominance of
American social thinking in the world. Too bad, then, that for Frye,
xliv Introduction
The "rubbish left over from previous human constructs" (167) includes,
most dangerously of all, the eagerness to use new technology to recycle
old dramas of prohibition and revenge previously transmitted in "laws
.. . myths and stories about the traditional gods and heroes, magical for-
mulas, proverbs, and the like" (321).
Yet Frye continues to insist on the liberating potential of myth and
narrative. In their recurring images and stories, Frye finds traces of
latent affinities between culture and nature. He notes in them a property
he calls "concern," but emphasizes that concern itself may either lock
groups together in the defence of their identity ("This is a story about
the purity of the Teutonic race and about the threat you Jews present to
it") or may look beyond immediate realities to the "myths of deliver-
ance" Frye finds in Measure for Measure and Monsieur Verdoux. Unlike
Frank Kermode in The Genesis of Secrecy (1979), Frye does not attach this
alternative layer of meaning to any occult properties in the stories them-
selves, nor does he entrust it to the custodianship of an interpretative
community. (Frye's mistrust of experts and elites is one of the most con-
stant and most appealing features of his cultural criticism.) The distinc-
tive feature of narrative for Frye rests in its capacity for transformation,
exemplified in the metamorphosis that takes Monsieur Verdoux, against
all odds, from crime story to indictment of the world-as-it-is, and that,
xlvi Introduction
The written expository treatise looks at first sight like a dictatorial mono-
logue, but this is a misunderstanding. Nothing of the hypnotic rhetoric of
speech to a present audience is left in it: the author is forced, by the nature
of his medium, to put all his cards on the table, to take his reader into his
confidence, to appeal to nothing but the evidence of the argument itself.
And so, however often it may fail in meeting the standards prescribed by
its own physical shape, the expository or thesis-book remains the normal
Introduction xlvii
unit of impersonal social vision, and the normal medium by which commu-
nication draws us together into a community. (154-5)
These assumptions are incentives to increase the artist's talent; but the
conditions of reading, composition, and performance hardly validate
such claims. In fact, late twentieth-century works like Michel Butor's
Passing Time (1961) or Don DeLillo's Mao 2 (1991) jettison altogether
claims to better their predecessors and acknowledge rather that they can
only "mean" anything in relation to a stream of antecedent narratives.
More and more contemporary fiction rests on the cooperation of its
readers to situate it in an ocean of narrative as a precondition for under-
standing its own distinctive properties.
The potential for chaos in these conditions does not escape Frye. It is
at this point that the central institutional importance of the university
moves to the centre of his cultural analysis. Frye's university is the pro-
duction centre for new art and the largest and most disinterested preser-
vation archive for the art of the past. Organizationally, it can function as
a theatre for the production of mind at work through its exhibitions and
readings, its interdisciplinary forays, and its commitment to lifelong
learning. The university is where individuals can, in an age of panic,
learn the patience necessary for the steady construction of creative skill
and critical judgment that Frye still sees as the only sure means of
human fulfilment.
Frye's last works seize the idiom of the time at a stage of his life when
he might easily have rejected it. He imagines the late twentieth-century
xlviii Introduction
The Whidden Lectures were established in 1954 by E.C. Fox, B.A., LL.D.,
of Toronto, the senior member of the Board of Governors, to honour the
memory of a former Chancellor of McMaster University.
The Reverend Dr. Howard P. Whidden, D.D., LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S.C.,
was a man of striking appearance, unusual dignity, deep Christian convic-
tion, and ready tolerance. Born in 1871 in Antigonish, Nova Scotia, where
his family had settled in 1761 after three-quarters of a century's residence
in New England, he attended universities in both Canada (Acadia and
McMaster) and the United States (Chicago), and also served as a minister
of Baptist churches in both countries (in Ontario, Manitoba, and Ohio).
From 1913 to 1923 he was President of Brandon College, Manitoba, then
an affiliate of McMaster University, and for part of that period (1917-21)
he represented Brandon as a member of Parliament in the Canadian House
of Commons at Ottawa. He was appointed administrative head (Chancel-
lor) of McMaster University in 1923 and in 1930 became, in a manner of
4 The Modern Century
speaking, its second founder when he directed its transfer from Toronto,
where it had been established since 1887, to Hamilton. His broad educa-
tional outlook and effective leadership resulted in the University's bur-
geoning greatly in its new location, and Dr. Whidden was able to retire in
1941 with the comforting conviction that he had built both wisely and
well. He died in Toronto in 1952.
The selection of a Canadian scholar to be the Whidden Lecturer in 1967,
the year of Canada's centennial, was inevitable. And that the choice should
fall on H. Northrop Frye, the first person ever to be named by the Univer-
sity of Toronto as its University Professor, was almost equally inevitable.
His reputation as one of the most significant of contemporary literary crit-
ics is worldwide and securely established. It is a cause for pride to academic
circles in his native country that he should be the subject of a special vol-
ume, issued by the Columbia University Press just over a year ago. A
graduate of Toronto and Merton College, Oxford, he made his mark some
twenty years ago with a penetrating study of William Blake, Fearful Sym-
metry; and since that time a steady stream of books and articles from his
pen has made his name one of the most familiar and most respected wher-
ever the study of English letters is seriously pursued. He has lectured in
scores of universities throughout the English-speaking world and has
received honorary doctorates from many of them.
For the 1967 Whidden Lectures he chose as his theme The Modern
Century, the century in which, as the saying goes, Canada came of age.
He did not restrict his vision, however, to the literary and creative activi-
ties that have occurred in this country over the past one hundred years.
Rather, he attempted to relate Canadian developments to those of the
world as a whole- and it was a stimulating and exciting exercise to
accompany him as his purview ranged over other countries, other conti-
nents, and other cultures. That the perspective of the many hundreds who
had the privilege of hearing him was deepened and broadened, there is not
the slightest doubt.
McMaster University is now very pleased to publish the lectures in book
form so that an even wider audience may share in the rewarding experience
of learning the views of a distinguished Canadian on man's spiritual and
intellectual adventures since 1867.
Frye judged these to have been among his best delivered and best received public
lectures. Four pages of typescript notes concerning the French translation clar-
ify some, of Frye's dense allusions and emphases in this work and these have
City of the End of Things 5
been drawn upon where appropriate for explanatory comment (see NFF, 1988,
box 62, file i).
Author's Note
The operation of giving the Whidden Lectures for 1967 was made pleas-
ant and memorable by the hospitality of McMaster University and my
many friends there. To them, as well as to the extraordinarily attentive
and responsive audience, I feel deeply grateful.
I am indebted to the Canada Council for a grant which enabled me to
work on this and other projects, and to Mrs. Jessie Jackson for her prep-
aration of the manuscript.
The lectures were delivered in the centenary year of Canada's Con-
federation, and were originally intended to be Canadian in subject mat-
ter. I felt, however, that I had really said all I had to say about Canadian
culture for some time, with the help of about forty colleagues, in the
"Conclusion" to the recently published Literary History of Canada: Cana-
dian Literature in English (1965). Hence the shift of theme to a wider con-
text. I have tried to make my Canadian references as explicit as possible,
for the benefit of non-Canadian readers, but have not invariably suc-
ceeded. For example, the titles of the three lectures are titles of poems by
well-known Canadian poets: respectively, Archibald Lampman, Irving
Lay ton, and Emile Nelligan.1
N.F.
Victoria College in the
University of Toronto
January 1967
relatively small country in a very big world. One most reassuring qual-
ity in Canadians, and the one which, I find, chiefly makes them liked
and respected abroad, when they are, is a certain unpretentiousness, a
cheerful willingness to concede the immense importance of the non-
Canadian part of the human race. It is appropriate to a Canadian audi-
ence, then, to put our centenary into some kind of perspective. For the
majority of people in North America, the most important thing that hap-
pened in 1867 was the purchase of Alaska from Russia by the United
States. For the majority of people in the orbit of British traditions, the
most important thing that happened in 1867 was the passing of the Sec-
ond Reform Bill, the measure that Disraeli called "a leap in the dark,"2
but which was really the first major effort to make the Mother of Parlia-
ments represent the people instead of an oligarchy. For a great number,
very probably the majority, of people in the world today, the most
important thing that happened in 1867, anywhere, was the publication
of the first volume of Das Kapital by Karl Marx, the only part of the book
actually published by Marx himself. It was this event, of course, that
helped among other things to make the purchase of Alaska so signifi-
cant: another example of the principle that life imitates literature,3 in the
broad sense, and not the other way round. There is a still bigger majority
to be considered, the majority of the dead. In the year 1867 Thomas
Hardy wrote a poem called 1967* in which he remarks that the best
thing he can say about that year is the fact that he is not going to live to
see it.
My own primary interests are in literary and educational culture.
What I should like to discuss with you here is not Canadian culture in
itself, but the context of that culture in the world of the last century. One
reason for my wanting to talk about the world that Canada is in rather
than about Canada is that I should like to bypass some common
assumptions about Canadian culture which we are bound to hear
repeated a good deal in the course of this year. There is, for instance, the
assumption that Canada has, in its progress from colony to nation,
grown and matured like an individual: that to be colonial means to be
immature,5 and to be national means to be grown up. A colony or a
province, we are told, produced a naive, imitative, and prudish culture;
now we have become a nation, we should start producing sophisticated,
original, and spontaneous culture. (I dislike using "sophisticated" in an
approving sense, but it does seem to be an accepted term for a kind of
knowledgeability that responds to culture with the minimum of anxi-
City of the End of Things 7
important about the last century, in this country, is not that we have
been a nation for a hundred years, but that we have had a hundred years
in which to make the transition from a prenational to a postnational con-
sciousness. The so-called emergent nations, such countries as Nigeria or
Indonesia,9 have not been so fortunate: for them, the tensions of federal-
ism and separatism, of middle-class and working-class interests, of
xenophobia and adjustment to the larger world, have all come in one
great rush. Canada has—so far—been able to avoid both this kind of
chaos and the violence that goes with the development of a vast imperial
complex like the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. The Canadian sense of propor-
tion that I mentioned is especially valuable now, as helping us to adopt
an attitude consistent with the world it is actually in. My present task, I
think, is neither to eulogize nor to elegize Canadian nationality, neither
to celebrate its survival nor to lament its passage,10 but to consider what
kinds of social context are appropriate for a world in which the nation is
rapidly ceasing to be the real defining unit of society.
We begin, then, with the conception of a "modern" world, which
began to take shape a century ago and now provides the context for
Canadian existence, and consequently for our Centennial. A century ago
Canada was a nation in the world, but not wholly of it: the major cul-
tural and political developments of Western Europe, still the main cen-
tre of the historical stage, were little known or understood in Canada,
and the Canadian reaction even to such closer events as the American
Civil War was largely negative. Today, Canada is too much a part of the
world to be thought of as a nation in it. We have our undefended border
with the United States, so celebrated in Canadian oratory, only because
it is not a real boundary line at all: the real boundary line, one of the
most heavily defended in the world, runs through the north of the coun-
try, separating a bourgeois sphere of control from a Marxist one.
Culturally, the primary fact about the modern world, or at least about
our "Western" and "democratic" part of it, is that it is probably the first
civilization in history that has attempted to study itself objectively, to
become aware of the presuppositions underlying its behaviour, to
understand its relation to previous history, and to see whether its future
could in some measure be controlled by its own will. This self-con-
sciousness has created a sharp cultural dialectic in society, an intellec-
tual antagonism between two mental attitudes. On one side are those
who struggle for an active and conscious relation to their time, who
study what is happening in the world, survey the conditions of life that
City of the End of Things 9
seem most likely to occur, and try to acquire some sense of what can be
done to build up from those conditions a way of life that is at least
self-respecting. On the other side are those who adopt a passive and
negative attitude, responding to the daily news and similar stimuli,
aware of what is going on but making no effort to understand either the
underlying causes or the future possibilities. The theatre of this conflict
in attitudes is formed by the creative and the communicating arts. The
creative arts are almost entirely on the active side: they mean nothing, or
infinitely less, to a passive response. The subject matter of contemporary
literature being its own time, the passive and uncritical attitude is seen
as its most dangerous enemy. Many aspects of contemporary litera-
ture—its ironic tone, its emphasis on anxiety and absurdity, its queasy
apocalyptic forebodings—derive from this situation.
The communicating arts, including the so-called mass media, are a
mixture of things. Some of them are arts in their own right, like the film.
Some are or include different techniques of presenting the arts we
already have, like television. Some are not arts, but present analogies to
techniques in the arts which the arts may enrich themselves by employ-
ing, as the newspaper may influence collage in painting or the field
theory of composition in poetry. Some are applied arts, where the
appeal is no longer disinterested, as it normally is in the creative arts
proper. Thus propaganda is an interested use of the literary techniques
of rhetoric. As usual, there are deficiencies in vocabulary: there are no
words that really convey the intellectual and moral contrast of the active
and passive attitudes to culture. The phrase "mass culture"11 conveys
emotional overtones of passivity: it suggests someone eating peanuts at
a baseball game, and thereby contrasting himself to someone eating
canapes at the opening of a sculpture exhibition. The trouble with this
picture is that the former is probably part of a better educated audience,
in the sense that he is likely to know more about baseball than his coun-
terpart knows about sculpture. Hence his attitude to his chosen area of
culture may well be the more active of the two. And just as there can be
an active response to mass culture, so there can be passive responses to
the highbrow arts. These range from, Why can't the artist make his work
mean something to the ordinary man? to the significant syntax of the
student's question, Why is this considered a good poem? The words
"advertising" and "propaganda" come closest to suggesting a commu-
nication deliberately imposed and passively received. They represent
respectively the communicating interests of the two major areas of soci-
io The Modern Century
ety, the economic and the political. Recently these two conceptions have
begun to merge into the single category of "public relations."12
One very obvious feature of our age is the speeding up of process: it is
an age of revolution and metamorphosis, where one lives through
changes that formerly took centuries in a matter of a few years. In a
world where dynasties rise and fall at much the same rate as women's
hemlines, the dynasty and the hemline look much alike in importance,
and get much the same amount of featuring in the news. Thus the pro-
gression of events is two-dimensional, a child's drawing reflecting an
eye that observes without seeing depth, and even the effort to see depth
has still to deal with the whole surface. Some new groupings result: for
example, what used to be called the trivial or ephemeral takes on a func-
tion of symbolizing the significant. A new art of divination or augury has
developed, in which the underlying trends of the contemporary world
are interpreted by vogues and fashions in dress, speech, or entertain-
ment. Thus if there appears a vogue for white lipstick among certain
groups of young women, that may represent a new impersonality in sex-
ual relationship, a parody of white supremacy, the dramatization of a
death-wish, or the social projection of the clown archetype. Any number
may play, but the game is a somewhat self-defeating one, without much
power of sustaining its own interest. For even the effort to identify
something in the passing show has the effect of dating it, as whatever is
sufficiently formed to be recognized has already receded into the past.
It is not surprising if some people should be frustrated by the effort to
keep riding up and down the manic-depressive roller-coaster of fashion,
of what's in and what's out, what is u and what non-u, what is hip and
what is square, what is corny and what is camp.13 There are perhaps not
as many of these unhappy people as our newspapers and magazines
suggest there are: in any case, what is important is not this group, if it
exists, but the general sense, in our society, of the panic of change. The
variety of things that occur in the world, combined with the relentless
continuity of their appearance day after day, impress us with the sense
of a process going by a little too fast for our minds to focus on anything
in it.
Some time ago, the department of English in a Canadian university
decided to offer a course in twentieth-century poetry. It was discovered
that there were two attitudes in the department towards that subject:
there were those who felt that twentieth-century poetry had begun with
Eliot's The Waste Land in 1922, and those who felt that most of the best of
City of the End of Things 11
it had already been written by that time. There also appeared to be some
correlation between these two views and the age groups of those who
held them. Finally a compromise was reached: two courses were of-
fered, one called Modern Poetry and the other Contemporary Poetry.
But even the contemporary course would need now to be supplemented
by a third course in the postcontemporary, and perhaps a fourth in cur-
rent happenings.14 In the pictorial arts the fashion parade of "isms" is
much faster: I hear of painters, even in Canada, who have frantically
changed their styles completely three or four times in a few years, as col-
lectors demanded first abstract expressionism, then pop art, then por-
nography, then hard-edge, selling off their previous purchases as soon
as the new vogue took hold. There is a medieval legend of the Wild
Hunt, in which souls of the dead had to keep marching to nowhere all
day and all night at top speed. Anyone who dropped out of line from
exhaustion instantly crumbled to dust. This seems a parable of a type of
consciousness frequent in the modern world, obsessed by a compulsion
to keep up, reduced to despair by the steadily increasing speed of the
total movement. It is a type of consciousness which I shall call the alien-
ation of progress.
Alienation and progress are two central elements in the mythology of
our day, and both words have been extensively used and misused. The
conception of alienation15 was originally a religious one, and perhaps
that is still the context in which it makes most sense. In religion, the per-
son aware of sin feels alienated, not necessarily from society, but from
the presence of God, and it is in this feeling of alienation that the reli-
gious life begins. The conception is clearest in evangelical thinkers in the
Lutheran tradition like Bunyan, who see alienation of this kind as the
beginning of a psychological revolution.16 Once one becomes aware of
being in sin and under the wrath of God, one realizes that one's master
is the devil, the prince of this world, and that treason and rebellion
against this master is the first requirement of the new life.
A secularized use of the idea appears in the early work of Marx,
where alienation describes the feeling of the worker who is cheated out
of most of the fruit of his labour by exploitation. He is unable to partici-
pate in society to the extent that, as a worker, he should, because his sta-
tus in society has been artificially degraded. In this context the alienated
are those who have been dispossessed by their masters, and who there-
fore recognize their masters as their enemies, as Christian did Apol-
lyon.17 In our day those who are alienated in Marx's sense are, for
12 The Modern Century
keeps the conscious and critical part of the mind very near to the break-
ing point of hysteria. The mind on the verge of breakdown is infinitely
suggestible, as Pavlov demonstrated,20 and the forces of advertising and
propaganda move in without any real opposition from the critical intel-
ligence.
These agencies act in much the same way that, in Paradise Lost, Milton
depicts Satan acting on Eve. All that poor Eve was consciously aware of
was the fact that a hitherto silent snake was talking to her. Her con-
sciousness being fascinated by something outrageous, everything that
Satan had to suggest got through its guard and fell into what we should
call her subconscious. Later, when faced with a necessity of making a
free choice, she found nothing inside her to direct the choice except
Satan's arguments, which she perforce had to take as her own, the more
readily in that she did not realize how they had got there. Similarly, the
technique of advertising and propaganda is to stun and demoralize the
critical consciousness with statements too absurd or extreme to be dealt
with seriously by it. In the mind that is too frightened or credulous or
childish to want to deal with the world at all, they move in past the con-
sciousness and set up their structures unopposed.
What they create in such a mind is not necessarily acceptance, but
dependence on their versions of reality. Advertising implies an econ-
omy which has some independence from the political structure, and as
long as this independence exists, advertising can be taken as a kind of
ironic game. Like other forms of irony, it says what it does not wholly
mean, but nobody is obliged to believe its statements literally. Hence it
creates an illusion of detachment and mental superiority even when one
is obeying its exhortations. When doing Christmas shopping, there is
hardly one of us who would not, if stopped by an interviewer, say that
of course he didn't hold with all this commercializing of Christmas. The
same is to some extent true of propaganda as long as the issues are not
deeply serious. The curiously divided reaction to the Centennial—a
mixture of the sentimental, the apprehensive, and the sardonic—is an
example. But in more serious matters, such as the Vietnam war, the
effects of passivity are more subtly demoralizing. The tendency is to
accept the propaganda bromide rather than the human truths involved,
not merely because it is more comfortable, but because it gives the illu-
sion of taking a practical and activist attitude as opposed to mere
hand-wringing. When propaganda cuts off all other sources of informa-
tion, rejecting it, for a concerned and responsible citizen, would not only
14 The Modern Century
isolate him from his social world, but isolate him so completely as to
destroy his self-respect. Hence even propaganda based on the big lie, as
when an American or Chinese politician tries to get rid of a rival by call-
ing him a Communist or a bourgeois counter-revolutionary, can estab-
lish itself and command assent if it makes more noise than the denial of
the charge. The epigram that it is impossible to fool all the people all the
time may be consoling, but is not much more.
What eventually happens I may describe in a figure borrowed from
those interminable railway journeys that are so familiar to Canadians, at
least of my generation. As one's eyes are passively pulled along a rap-
idly moving landscape, it turns darker and one begins to realize that
many of the objects that appear to be outside are actually reflections of
what is in the carriage. As it becomes entirely dark one enters a narcis-
sistic world, where, except for a few lights here and there, we can see
only the reflection of where we are. A little study of the working of
advertising and propaganda in the modern world, with their magic-lan-
tern techniques of projected images, will show us how successful they
are in creating a world of pure illusion. The illusion of the world itself is
reinforced by the more explicit illusions of movies and television, and
the imitation world of sports. It is significant that a breakdown in illu-
sion, as when a baseball game or a television program is proved to have
been "fixed," is more emotionally disturbing than proof of crime or cor-
ruption in the actual world. It is true that not all illusion is a bad thing:
elections, for example, would hardly arouse enough interest to keep a
democracy functioning unless they were assimilated to sporting events,
and unless the pseudo-issues were taken as real issues. Similarly the
advantages of winning the game of space ships and moon landings may
be illusory, but the illusion is better than spending the money involved
on preparations for war. Then again, when illusion has been skilfully
built up, as it is for instance by such agencies as the Reader's Digest, it
includes the illusion of keeping abreast of contemporary thought and
events, and can only be recognized as illusion by its effects, or rather by
the absence of any effects, in social action.
Democracy is a mixture of majority rule and minority right, and the
minority which most clearly has a right is the minority of those who try
to resist a passive response, and thereby risk the resentment of those
who regard them as trying to be undemocratically superior. I am speak-
ing however not so much of two groups of people as of two mental atti-
tudes, both of which may exist in the same mind. The prison of illusion
City of the End of Things 15
holds all of us: the first important step is to be aware of it as illusion, and
as a prison. The right of free criticism is immensely important, and the
habitually worried and anxious attitude of the more responsible citizen
has a significance out of proportion to its frequency. But the alienation
of progress operates on him too, in a different way. He finds, in the first
place, his response of concern becoming a stock response.21 Many of us
have had the experience of beginning to read a journal of critical com-
ment, tuning ourselves in to the appropriate state of anxiety, and then
noticing that we have in error picked up an issue of several months
back. In the split second of adjustment we become aware of a conven-
tionalized or voluntarily assumed response. I am not deprecating the
response: I am trying to describe a cultural condition. But any conven-
tionalized or habitual response is subject in the course of time to the
pressure of becoming automatic. As I write this, an official communique
about education arrives in the mail, and I read: "If we are to keep pace
with the swiftly moving developments of our time, we must strive for
ever higher standards in every field of endeavour.... No informed per-
son is unaware of the tremendous effort that [it] will take to meet the
demands that the years ahead will produce. Yet we are also aware that
the general well-being of our nation is dependent on our ability to meet
the challenge."
One would say that it was impossible to write flatter cliches and plati-
tudes, and the effect of cliche and platitude ought to be soothing. So it is,
and yet every word is soaked in the metaphors of a gasping panic, as
though the author had placed a large bet on a contender in a race who
was, like Hamlet, fat and scant of breath [5.2.287]. The conscious appeal
is to the concerned and intelligent citizen who ought to take an interest
in what his public servants are trying to do. A less conscious motive is to
prepare him for an increase in taxes. But the combination of urgency in
the rhetoric and of dullness in the expression of it is, or would be if we
were not so familiar with it, very strange. Something has happened
to atrophy one's responses when the most soporific words one can use
are such words as "challenge," "crisis," "demand," and "endeavour."22
Even the most genuinely concerned and critical mind finds itself becom-
ing drowsy in its darkening carriage. And not only so, but the very abil-
ity to recognize the cliche works against one's sense of full participation.
Self-awareness thus operates like a drug, stimulating one's sense of
responsibility while weakening the will to express it.
The conception of progress grew up in the nineteenth century around
16 The Modern Century
a number of images and ideas.23 The basis of the conception is the fact
that science, in contrast to the arts, develops and advances, with the
work of each generation adding to that of its predecessor. Science bears
the practical fruit of technology, and technology has created, in the mod-
ern world, a new consciousness of time. Man has doubtless always expe-
rienced time in the same way, dragged backwards from a receding past
into an unknown future. But the quickening of the pace of news, with
telegraph and submarine cable, helped to dramatize a sense of a world
in visible motion, with every day bringing new scenes and episodes of a
passing show. It was as though the ticking of a clock had become not
merely audible but obsessive, like the telltale heart in Poe. The first reac-
tions to the new sensation—for it was more of a sensation than a concep-
tion—were exhilarating, as all swift movement is for a time. The prestige
of the myth of progress developed a number of value-assumptions: the
dynamic is better than the static, process better than product, the organic
and vital better than the mechanical and fixed, and so on. We still have
these value-assumptions, and no doubt they are useful, though like
other assumptions we should be aware that we have them. And yet
there was an underlying tendency to alienation in the conception of
progress itself. In swift movement we are dependent on a vehicle and
not on ourselves, and the proportion of exhilaration to apprehensiveness
depends on whether we are driving it or merely riding in it. All progres-
sive machines turn out to be things ridden in, with an unknown driver.
Whatever is progressive develops a certain autonomy, and the reac-
tions to it consequently divide: some feel that it will bring about vast
improvements in life by itself, others are more concerned with the loss of
human control over it. An example of such a progressive machine was
the self-regulating market of laissez-faire. The late Karl Polanyi has
described, in The Great Transformation, how this market dominated the
political and economic structure of Western Europe, breaking down the
sense of national identity and replacing it with a uniform contractual
relationship of management and labour. The autonomous market took
out a ninety-nine year lease on the world from 1815 to 1914, and kept
"peace" for the whole of that time. By peace I mean the kind of peace
that we have had ourselves since 1945: practically continuous warfare
somewhere or other, but with no single war becoming large enough to
destroy the overall economic structure, or the major political structures
dependent on it. And yet what the autonomous market created in mod-
ern consciousness was, even when optimistic, the feeling that Polanyi
City of the End of Things 17
our historical situation with earlier periods, especially that of the Roman
Empire, and his point that our technology could be part of a decline as
easily as it could be part of an advance, are conceptions that we all
accept now, whether we realize it or not, as something which is insepa-
rably part of our perspective.
The progressive belief suffered a rude set-back in America in the
crash of 1929; it was adopted by the Soviet Union as part of its revolu-
tionary world view, but is gradually fading out even there, much as the
expectation of the end of the world faded out of early Christian thought.
In our day the Utopia has been succeeded by what is being called, by
analogy, the "dystopia," the nightmare of the future. H.G. Wells is a
good example of a writer who built all his hopes around the myth of
progress, in which the role of saviour was played by a self-evolving sci-
ence. His last publication, however, Mind at the End of its Tether (1940),
carried all the furious bitterness of an outraged idealism. Orwell's 1984
is a better-known dystopia, and perhaps comes as close as any book to
being the definitive Inferno of our time. It is a particularly searching
study because of the way in which it illustrates how so many aspects of
culture, including science, technology, history, and language, would
operate in their demonic or perverted forms. The conception of progress
took off originally from eighteenth-century discussions about the natu-
ral society, where the progressive view was urged by Bolingbroke and
Rousseau and the opposite one by Swift and Burke. According to Rous-
seau, the natural and reasonable society of the future was buried under-
neath the accumulated injustices and absurdities of civilization, and all
man had to do was to release it by revolution. Writers of our day have
mostly reverted to the view of Swift's Gulliver's Travels, that slavery is to
man at least as natural a state as freedom: this is the central insight of
one of the most penetrating stories of our time, William Golding's Lord
of the Flies, and is certainly implied, if not expressed, in Aldous Huxley's
Brave New World and many similar works.
It is natural that many people should turn from the vision of such a
world to some illusion or distracting fiction that seems to afford a more
intelligible environment. Nationalism is or can be a distracting fiction of
this kind. The nation, economically considered, is a form of private
enterprise, a competing business in the world's market; hence, for most
people, nationality comes to their attention chiefly through inconve-
nience—customs duties, income taxes, and the like. But it also may pro-
vide some sense of a protected place. It can't happen here,35 we may say,
24 The Modern Century
deliberately forgetting that the distinction between here and there has
ceased to exist. It is significant that intense nationalism or regionalism
today is a product either of resistance to or of disillusionment with
progress. Progress, when optimistic, always promises some form of exo-
dus from history as we know it, some emergence onto a new plateau of
life. Thus the Marxist revolution promised deliverance from history as
history had previously been, a series of class struggles. But just as there
are neurotic individuals who cannot get beyond some blocking point in
their emotional past, so there are neurotic social groups who feel a com-
pulsion to return to a previous point in history, as Mississippi keeps
fighting the Civil War over again, and some separatists in Quebec the
British Conquest.
However, one wonders whether, in an emergency, this compulsion to
return to the same point, the compulsion of Quixote to fight over again
the battles he found in his books, is not universal in our world. In ordi-
nary life, the democratic and Communist societies see each other as dys-
topias, their inhabitants hysterical and brainwashed by propaganda,
identifying their future with what is really their destruction. Perhaps
both sides, as Blake would say, become what they behold [Jerusalem, pi.
44,1. 32]: in any case seeing tendencies to tyranny only on the other side
is mere hypocrisy. The Nuremberg trials laid down the principle that
man remains a free agent even in the worst of tyrannies, and is not only
morally but legally responsible for resisting orders that outrage the con-
science of mankind. The Americans took an active part in prosecuting
these trials, but when America itself stumbled into the lemming-march
horror of Vietnam the principle was forgotten and the same excuses and
defiances reappeared.
All the social nightmares of our day seem to focus on some unending
and inescapable form of mob rule. The most permanent kind of mob
rule is not anarchy, nor is it the dictatorship that regularizes anarchy,
nor even the imposed police state depicted by Orwell. It is rather the
self-policing state, the society incapable of formulating an articulate crit-
icism of itself and of developing a will to act in its light. This is a condi-
tion that we are closer to, on this continent, than we are to dictatorship.
In such a society the conception of progress would reappear as a don-
key's carrot, as the new freedom we shall have as soon as some regretta-
ble temporary necessity is out of the way. No one would notice that the
necessities never come to an end, because the communications media
would have destroyed the memory.
City of the End of Things 25
which detaches him even further from time, for, he says, "the blind
have no notion of time."36
The other play is Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woo//? The title of
this play is echoed from the Depression song, "Who's afraid of the big
bad wolf?" where the "wolf" was a specific fear of unemployment. I
began this talk by saying that the modern century was the first to study
itself objectively, and that this has created an opposition between the
active mind that struggles for reality and the passive mind that prefers
to remain in an illusion. Art, culture, the imagination, are on the side of
reality and activity: Virginia Woolf, chosen because of the sound of her
last name, represents this side, and the characters are "afraid" of her
because they cannot live without illusion. The two men in the play are a
historian and a scientist, facing the past and the future, both impotent in
the present. "When people can't abide things as they are," says the histo-
rian George, "when they can't abide the present, they do one of two
things .. . either they turn to a contemplation of the past, as I have done,
or they set about to ... alter the future."37 But nobody in the play does
either. George can murder his imaginary child, but the destruction of
illusion does not bring him reality, for the only reality in his life was con-
tained in the illusion which he denied.
I have tried to indicate the outlines of the picture that contemporary
imagination has drawn of its world, a jigsaw-puzzle picture in which the
Canada of 1967 is one of the pieces. It is a picture mainly of disillusion-
ment and fear, and helps to explain why our feelings about our Centen-
nial are more uneasy than they are jubilant. In the twentieth century
most anniversaries, including the annual disseminating neurosis of
Christmas, are touched with foreboding. I noticed this early in life, for
my twenty-first birthday was spent at the Chicago World's Fair of 1933,
entitled "A Century of Progress," where the crowds were much more
preoccupied with worrying about the Depression than with celebrating
what had led to it. And yet this picture, as I have tried also to explain, is
the picture that the contemporary imagination draws of itself in a mir-
ror. Looking into the mirror is the active mind which struggles for con-
sistency and continuity of outlook, which preserves its memory of its
past and clarifies its view of the present. Staring back at it is the frozen
reflection of that mind, which has lost its sense of continuity by project-
ing it on some mechanical social process, and has found that it has also
lost its dignity, its freedom, its creative power, and its sense of the
present, with nothing left except a fearful apprehension of the future.
Improved Binoculars 27
The mind in the mirror, like the characters in Beckett, cannot move on
its own initiative. But the more repugnant we find this reflection, the
less likely we are to make the error of Narcissus, and identify ourselves
with it. I want now to discuss the active role that the arts, more particu-
larly literature, have taken in forming the contemporary imagination,
which has given us this picture. The picture itself reflects anxiety, and as
long as man is capable of anxiety he is capable of passing through it to a
genuine human destiny.
II Improved Binoculars
1867 this movement had entered on a second phase, continuous with but
distinguishable from its predecessor, and this begins the modern cen-
tury properly speaking. The thinkers Darwin and Marx, and later Freud
and Frazer, the writers Rimbaud, Flaubert, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche,
the Impressionist painters and their successors, belong to it.
During the whole of the last century, there has naturally been the
most frantic resistance to "modern" culture, for both the highbrow arts
and the popular ones, though for different reasons, have a powerful
capacity to stir up guilt feelings, personal insecurities, and class resent-
ments. The Nazis called the modern style a Jewish conspiracy, the Jews
being for them the symbols of a racism without a national boundary.
The Communist hierarchy calls it an imperialistic conspiracy, and par-
ticularly attacks the "formalism" which it asserts symbolizes the ideol-
ogy of a decadent class. One may suspect from such things as the
Sinyavsky-Daniel trial38 that the periodic "thaws" in the Soviet Union
are mainly a device to determine where the really dangerous threats to
the bureaucracy are coming from, but even so they show something of
the tremendous pressure building up against the barriers of official stu-
pidity and panic, which may eventually break through them. Chinese
resistance is still militant, though of course the cultural traditions there
are different. Hysterical people in the democracies, in their turn, call the
modern style a Communist conspiracy; in Canada it is often called
Americanization. It is true that many aspects of modern culture, espe-
cially popular culture, are of American origin, like jazz, but America is a
province conquered by the international modern much more than it is
a source of it.
In literature, the international character of the modern style has been
partly disguised by difference in language. Just as we seem to be moving
into a world in which we meet the same kind of things everywhere,
from hydro installations to Beatle haircuts, so we seem to be moving into
a world in which English will become either the first or the second lan-
guage of practically everybody. But of course it does not follow that
English or any other language will become a world literary language.
The last hundred years have also been a period in which many minority
languages have been maintained, revived, or in some cases practically
invented, by an intense regional patriotism. Hebrew, Norwegian, Flem-
ish, Irish, and French in Canada are examples. The prestige of such
movements is one of several elements that have helped to shape a com-
mon view which is the opposite of the one I am advancing here. Culture,
Improved Binoculars 29
out foreign influences on vocabulary and syntax, at least for a time. Even
in Australia, I understand, there has been a group of poets devoted to
putting as many native Australian words into their poems as possible.42
A late echo of this tendency is the anti-/ow0/43 campaign in French Can-
ada, the effort to set up European French as a standard of correctness
against the normal linguistic developments which tend to Anglicize and
Americanize French-Canadian speech. Outside literature, resistance to
the modern style has very little if anything to put in its place. Approved
Nazi painting and approved Communist fiction can only fall back on
idioms derived from the art before 1867, on worn-out Romantic and Vic-
torian formulas which can no longer be used with their original energy
and conviction. If we compare T.S. Eliot's theories about decentralized
culture with his own poetry and the quality of his influence, both of
which are completely international, it is clear that the theories are
merely something dreamed up, and have no relation to any cultural
facts.
It is of course true that a coherent environment is a cultural necessity.
And many of the world's great cultural developments do seem to have
been assisted by some kind of local resistance to imperial expansion. The
catalyser of ancient Greek culture was clearly the successful battle for
independence by a province on the fringes of what was essentially, in its
civilization, a Persian world. Hebrew culture drew a similar strength
from its resistance to Egyptian and Mesopotamian imperialism. Elizabe-
than England and seventeenth-century Holland were provincial rebels
against the centralizing forces of the Papacy and the Hapsburg Empire;
Germany in the Napoleonic period and, on a smaller scale, Ireland at the
turn of this century joined a cultural efflorescence to a political resis-
tance. In our day similar movements are going on, though more con-
fined to the cultural area. The liberalizing of Communist culture is much
more likely to start in Poland44 or Hungary than in the Soviet Union, and
Mexico has maintained a remarkable cultural independence of its north-
ern neighbour. The feeling that Canada in this respect has left undone
what it ought to have done45 amounts to a national neurosis. But what I
have described is not a social law: it is merely something that often hap-
pens, and just as often fails to happen. And even if it were a social law,
there are many elements in Canada's situation that would make the
applying of it to Canada a false analogy.
Even apart from this, however, there is still the question, Where does
the seed come from that grows up in these localities of provincial resis-
Improved Binoculars 31
lar patterns of Byzantine leap out with a clean and vital flame. The cycle
of culture has turned once more, and once again it is the stylized that is
the emancipating force. Of course there is always a central place for a
realism which is not stupid, which continues to sharpen our vision of the
world and the society that are actually there. But the exhilarating sense
of energy in great formalism is so strong that modern realism tends to
express itself in formalist conventions. In Brueghel's Slaughter of the Inno-
cents a conventional religious subject is located in a realistic landscape
that recalls the terror and misery of sixteenth-century Flanders; in Pic-
asso's Guernica54 the terror and misery of twentieth-century Spain is
expressed with the stylizing intensity of a religious primitivism.
In literature there is a change from Romantic to modern around 1867
that is in some respects even sharper and more dramatic than the shift
from Impressionism to Cezanne. At the beginning of the Romantic
period around 1800, an increased energy of propulsion had begun to
make itself felt, an energy that often suggests something mechanical.
When the eighteenth-century American composer Billings developed
contrapuntal hymn settings which he called "fuguing-tunes," he re-
marked that they would be "more than twenty times as powerful as the
old slow tunes."55 The quantitative comparison, the engineering meta-
phor, the emphasis on speed and power, indicate a new kind of sensibil-
ity already present in pre-Revolutionary and pre-industrial America.
Much greater music than his is touched by the same feeling: the finale of
Mozart's Linz Symphony in C is based on the bodily rhythm of the
dance, but the finale of the Beethoven Rasoumovsky Quartet in the
same key foreshadows the world of the express train. Bernard Shaw
compares the finale of Beethoven's Opus 106 to the dance of atoms in
the molecule, whatever that sounds like.56 A similar propulsive move-
ment makes itself felt in those greatly misunderstood poems of Words-
worth, The Idiot Boy, Peter Bell, The Waggoner, where we also have
references to "flying boats" and the like, and in many poems of Shelley,
where again some of the characters seem to be operating private hydro-
planes, like the Witch of Atlas. This sense of the exhilaration of mechan-
ical movement continues into the modern period, especially in the
Italian Futurist movement around the time of the First World War. In
fact the modern is often popularly supposed to be primarily a matter of
"streamlining,"57 of suggesting in furniture and building, as well as in
the formal arts themselves, the clean, spare, economical, functional lines
of a swiftly moving vehicle.
36 The Modern Century
down into a tangle of meaningless lines. But the modern century has to
take this parable of the chef d'oeuvre inconnu [unknown masterpiece]
seriously, for the lines are not meaningless if they record the painter's
involvement with his subject and also demand ours. Malraux67 has
remarked how much the sketch, the sense of something rapidly blocked
out and left incomplete, seems to us the index of an artist's vitality. The
same principles hold for poetry, even to the extent that a poet today can
get more money out of selling his manuscript excreta to libraries than he
can out of royalties on the published volume. Dramatists try to break up
the hypnotic illusion of the play by various devices that suggest a dra-
matic process in formation, such as introducing stagehands or prompt-
ers, or breaking down the distinction between actor and role. Such
devices are regarded by Brecht as a creative form of alienation, giving
the audience a closer view of imaginative reality by chopping holes in
the rhetorical facade.68 Novelists adopt similar devices to break the
story-teller's spell on the reader: thus Gide's The Counterfeiters is a story
about a novelist writing a novel called The Counterfeiters. Readers of
Canadian literature may see similar tendencies in Reaney's Listen to the
Wind or Leonard Cohen's Beautiful Losers.69
The tendency to prefer the imperfect work engaged in history to the
perfected masterpiece that pulls away from time is closely related to
another tendency which also originates in the opposition to passive
anti-art. Advertising and propaganda are interested arts, arts with ulte-
rior motives. Behind them is a course of action which they end by
exhorting one to follow. A good deal of literature has followed the same
pattern (e.g., The Pilgrim's Progress, Self-Help by Samuel Smiles) and still
does. But as a rule the work of art as such is disinterested: there is noth-
ing beyond itself to which it points as the fulfilment of itself. In modern
painting and poetry, especially in the last two decades, there has been a
good deal of emphasis not only on this disinterested and self-containing
aspect of the arts, but of attack on those tendencies within the arts them-
selves that seem to lead us passively on from one thing to another. A
detective story is a good example of this donkey's-carrot writing: we
begin it to find out what we are told on the last page. Writing with this
structure is teleological: it contains a hidden purpose, and we read on to
discover what that purpose is.
Many modern poets, with William Carlos Williams70 at their head,
regard such concealing of a hidden design as gimmick-writing: for them,
the image, the scene, the thing presented, the immediate experience, is
40 The Modern Century
the reality that the arts are concerned with, and to go beyond this is to
risk dishonesty. The theory of the modern style in poetry is set out in the
letters of Rimbaud known as the lettres du voyant, with their insistence
that the genuine poet sees directly, in contrast to the rhetorician who
talks about what he sees. The same kind of emphasis has been common
in painting for a long time: music has been affected by it more recently,
but perhaps more radically than any other art. Classical music, up to
quite recent times, has been intensely teleological: in symphonies from
Haydn to Brahms we feel strongly how the end of a movement is implied
in the beginning, and how we are led towards it step by step. In much
contemporary music, both electronic and conventional, the emphasis is
on the immediate sense impression of sound: the music is not going any-
where; it may even be proceeding by chance, as in some of the experi-
ments of John Cage.71 The ear is not thrown forward into the future, to
hear a theme being worked out or a discord resolved: it is kept sternly in
the present moment. This conception of the unit of experience as a thing
in itself is of course an intensely impersonal attitude to art: the writer
(and similarly with the other arts) is doing all he can to avoid the sense of
impressing himself on his reader by suggesting meaning or form or pur-
pose beyond what is presented. In this conception of chosisme,72 as it is
sometimes called, it is not simply continuity, but significance or meaning
itself, which has been handed over to the reader.
One may see in most of these modern tendencies a good deal of dis-
trust in the rational consciousness as the main area of communication in
the arts. Modern art is irrational in many respects, but it is important to
see why and in what ways it is. We spoke of advertising and propa-
ganda as stunning or demoralizing the critical consciousness in order to
move past it and set up their structures in the rest of the mind. There is
clearly no point in setting the artists to defend a Maginot line73 that has
already been outflanked: the artist has to move directly back into the
attacked area, and set up his own structures there instead. Hence the
various Freud-inspired movements, like surrealism, which communi-
cate on a normally repressed level; hence too the great variety of modern
developments of fantasy and articulated dream, where there is no iden-
tity, and where the world is like that of Milton's chaos, with things form-
ing and disappearing by chance and melting into other things. In Kafka,
for example, the event, the ordinary unit of a story, is replaced by the
psychological event, and the social and other significances of what is
happening are allegories of these psychological events. The primary
Improved Binoculars 41
emphasis is on the mental attitude that makes the events possible. Thus
The Castle is presented as a kind of anxiety nightmare, yet a theological
allegory of God's dealings with man and a political allegory of the
police state run in counterpoint with it.
I am not trying to suggest that all these modern tendencies form part
of a single consistent pattern: far from it. All that they have in common
is an imaginative opposition to the anti-arts of persuasion and exhorta-
tion. The obvious question to ask is, of course: granted that the arts in
the modern world are full of antagonism to the anti-arts, granted that
they parody them in all sorts of clever ways, granted that they encour-
age an active instead of a passive response, does this really make them
socially effective? In a world resounding every day with the triumphs of
slanted news and brainwashed politics, what can poetry and painting
do, tortoises in a race with hares? This question is one of the most pow-
erful arguments of our enemy the accuser. We are constantly learning
from the alienation of progress that merely trying to clarify one's mind
is useless and selfish, because the individual counts for so little in soci-
ety. Marxism, with its carefully planned agenda of revolution, provides
the most complete answer to the question, "What then must we do?"74
The democracies provide more limited and piecemeal forms of social
activism, demonstrations, sit-ins, teach-ins, protest marches, petitions,
and the like, partly (if one may say so with all due sympathy and
respect) as gestures of homage to the superior effectiveness to be found
in the world of public relations and controversies. Similarly, the artist
often feels an impulse to guarantee his vision by his life, and hence we
find the pattern of antagonism of art to anti-art repeated in an antago-
nism of artist to society.
In political thought there is a useful fiction known as the social con-
tract, the sense that man enters into a certain social context by the act of
getting born. In earlier contract theories, like that of Hobbes, the con-
tract was thought of as universal, binding everyone without exception.
From Rousseau on there is more of a tendency to divide people into
those who accept and defend the existing social contract because they
benefit from it, and the people who are excluded from most of its bene-
fits, and so feel no obligation, or much less, to it. As everyone knows,
Marx defined the excluded body as the proletariat or workers, and saw
it as the means to a reconstituted society. Those who accept and are
loyal to the social contract are known consistently, throughout the
whole period, as the bourgeoisie or middle class, otherwise known, in
42 The Modern Century
is the society of those who will not throw all their energies into the end-
less vacuum suction of imperialist hysteria and of consuming consumer
goods ["Conclusion"]. Huck Finn, drifting down the great river with
Jim and preferring hell with Jim to the white slave-owner's heaven [The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, chap. 31], is a similar figure, one of the
bums, hoboes, and social outcasts who reach a deeper level of commu-
nity than the rest of us. This outcast or hobo figure is the hero of most of
the Chaplin films; he also finds a congenial haven in comic strips. The
juvenile delinquent or emotionally disturbed adolescent may in some
contexts be one of his contemporary equivalents, like the narrator of The
Catcher in the Rye. Sympathy for the youth who sees no moral difference
between delinquency and conformity still inspires such Utopian works
as Paul Goodman's Growing Up Absurd.76 An earlier and very remark-
able Canadian work of this anarchist kind is Frederick Philip Grove's
A Search for America, where the America that the narrator searches for
is again the submerged community that only the outcast experiences.
This form of proletariat has recently combined with another tradition
of very different origin. One distinctively modern element in our cul-
ture, introduced in the main by the Romantic movement, is the concep-
tion of the serious writer, who is in a prophetic relation to society, and
consequently in opposition to it. It is no longer sufficient to say, as Sam-
uel Johnson did, that they who live to please must please to live:77 the
serious writer is committed to saying what may not and probably will
not please, even if he hopes to please enough, on a different level of
pleasure, to be able to live also. With Baudelaire and his successors this
antagonism to society becomes a way of life, usually called Bohemian,
the antagonism being expressed partly in the oversimplifying phrase,
epater le bourgeois [getting the middle class's back up]. More accurately,
the artist explores forbidden or disapproved modes of life in both imag-
ination and experience. The square, the man who lives by the social con-
tract, takes the public appearance of society to be, for him, its reality.
Hence his obsessive tendency to appear in public clean, clothed, sober,
and accompanied by his wife. The artist may symbolize a more in-
tensely imaginative community through dirt or slovenliness, lousifying
himself as much as possible, as Rimbaud remarked, or through more
openly acknowledged forms of sexual relationship outside marriage.
Drugs and narcotics have been associated with the arts for a long time,
but took on a new intensity and relevance to the creative process with
the Romantic movement. The bourgeois view that the appearance of
44 The Modern Century
society is its reality is of course based on illusion, and we have seen how
a breakdown in illusion is often more disturbing than genuine dangers.
Similarly, long hair in young men or pictures portraying a consenting
sex act may stir up deeper social anxieties than actual delinquency or
rape.
The combination of Bohemian and hobo traditions in the beat, hip,
and other disaffected movements of our time seems to be part of an
unconscious effort to define a social proletariat in Freudian instead of
Marxist terms. Such groups find, or say they find, that a withdrawal
from the social establishment is a necessary step in freeing them from
repression and in releasing their creative energies. Creation is close to
the sexual instinct, and it is in their attitude to sex that the two groups
collide most violently, as each regards the other's views of sex as
obscene. The Freudian proletarian sees established society as a repres-
sive anxiety structure/8 the basis of which is the effort to control the sex-
ual impulse and restrict it to predictable forms of expression. His
emphasis on the sexual aspect of life, his intense awareness of the role of
the thwarted sexual drive in the cruelties and fears of organized society,
make him quite as much a moralist as his opponent, though his moral
aim is of course to weaken the anxiety structure by the shock tactics of
"bad" words, pornography, or the publicizing of sexual perversions and
deviations. The collision of youth and age is more openly involved in
this kind of movement than elsewhere. In a society dominated by the
alienation of progress, the young, whose lives are thrown forward to the
future, achieve a curious kind of moral advantage, as though the contin-
ued survival of anyone whose life is mainly in the past required some
form of justification. Certain other elements in this social movement,
such as the growth of confessional and self-analysing groups, show
some parallels with Marxist techniques.
The picaresque heroes of Kerouac are "Dharma bums," social outcasts
with serious social and even religious ideals.79 Their environment is the
squalid and seedy urban one, the city that is steadily devouring the
countryside, yet in their repudiation of everything structured and orga-
nized in it they struggle for an innocence that is almost pastoral. They
seek a kinship with the nature which, like them, has been repressed,
almost obliterated, by organized society. In two writers who have
strongly influenced this Freudian proletariat movement, Henry Miller
and D.H. Lawrence, pastoralism is a central theme. In the nineteenth
century the relation of country to city was often thought of, in writers
Improved Binoculars 45
who had begun to hate and fear the rise of a metropolitan civilization, as
a relation of innocence to experience, of the healthy natural virtues of
the country corrupted by the feverish excitements of the town. This
myth produced a good deal of nineteenth-century literature and social
propaganda, ranging in value from Wordsworth's Michael to temper-
ance melodramas. The pronouncements on drinking and sexual mores
made by those in our society who are most spectacularly not with it, like
many members of the lower clergy and the higher judiciary, are still
often inspired by such visions of a virtuous rustic daring to be a Daniel
in a wicked Babylon [Daniel 7-12].
A number of other writers who continued the tradition of eight-
eenth-century primitivism also nurtured a tangled garden of metaphors
about the need for being "rooted in the soil," as part of a similar opposi-
tion to the metropolitan development of society. This form of nostalgic de
la boue80 was a strong influence on nineteenth-century fiction (Jean
Giono, Knut Hamsun),81 though the ponderous prose lyrics it tended to
specialize in are largely forgotten now. It is an attitude with a naturally
strong bias toward racism, and in this form it entered into the volkisch
developments in Germany which lay behind much of Nazism. Nine-
teenth-century French Canada also had its propagandists for the motto
emparons-nous du sol,82 idealizing the simple peasant bound to his land
and his ancestral faith, a picture with a strong resemblance to Millet's
Angelus, of which the most famous expression is Maria Chapdelaine.83
There were similar movements elsewhere in America, like the Southern
agrarian movement of a generation ago.84 In Miller and Lawrence this
pastoral theme is less sentimentalized and more closely connected with
the more deeply traditional elements of the pastoral: spontaneity in
human relations, especially sexual relations; the stimulus to creative
power that is gained from a simpler society, less obsessed by satisfying
imaginary wants; and, at least in Lawrence, a sense of identity with
nature of great delicacy and precision.
The pastoral withdrawal from bourgeois values merges insensibly
into another, the sense of the artist as belonging to an elite or neo-aristoc-
racy. The origin of this attitude is the feeling that in a world full of the
panic of change, the artist's role is to make himself a symbol of tradition,
a sentinel or witness to the genuine continuity in human life, like the
London churches in The Waste Land. In religion this attitude expresses
itself, as a rule, in adherence or conversion to the Catholic Church. Here
it is often the Church as a symbol of authority or tradition that is the
46 The Modern Century
are traditional metaphors, and new patrons come to the brothel and con-
tinue the games. The chief of police, the only one with any real social
power, is worried because he is not a traditional metaphor, and nobody
comes to the brothel to imitate him. Finally, however, one such patron
does turn up: the leader of the revolution. There is a good deal more in
the play, but this account will perhaps indicate how penetrating it is as a
sadist vision of society.
All these antisocial attitudes in modern culture are, broadly speaking,
reactionary. That is, their sense of antagonism to existing society is what
is primary, and it is much clearer and more definite than any alternative
social ideal. Hugh MacDiarmid, supporting both Communism and Scot-
tish nationalism, and Dos Passes, moving from a simple radicalism to a
simple conservatism, are random examples among writers of what
sometimes seems a dissent for its own sake. Wherever we turn, we are
made aware of the fact that society is a repressive anxiety structure, and
that creative power comes from a part of the mind that resists repression
but is not in itself moral or rational. In Vladimir Nabokov's novel, Pale
Fire, a gentle, wistful, rather touching pastoral poem falls into the hands
of a lunatic who proceeds to "annotate" it with a wild paranoid fantasy
about his own adventures as a prince in some European state during a
revolution. Poem and commentary have nothing to do with each other,
and perhaps that is the only point the book makes. But the title, taken
from Shakespeare's Timon of Athens [4.3.438], suggests a certain allegory
of the relation of art to the wish-fulfilment fantasies that keep bucking
and plunging underneath it. Such forces are in all of us, and are strong
enough to destroy the world if they are not controlled through release
instead of repression. In my last lecture I want to talk about the way in
which the creative arts are absorbed into society through education.
Meanwhile we may notice that the real basis for the opposition of artist
and society is the fact that not merely communications media and public
relations, but the whole structure of society itself, is an anti-art, an old
and worn-out creation that needs to be created anew.
The modern world began with the Industrial Revolution and the Indus-
trial Revolution set up an economic structure beside the political one
which was really a rival form of society. Industry had often enough
taken the form of an organization distinct from the state, but never
Clair de lune intellectuel 49
before in history did man have so strong a feeling of living under two
social orders as he did in the period of laissez-faire. The separation
could not, of course, last indefinitely, because the economic social order
had so revolutionary an effect on the political one. Explicitly in Marx-
ism, and more tentatively in the democracies, all society eventually
comes to be thought of as consisting functionally only of workers or pro-
ducers. Marxism moves in the direction of a final or once-for-all revolu-
tion in which the productive society becomes the only society; in the
democracies the nonproductive groups, or leisure classes, gradually
become socially unfunctional. In both types of society, however, there
are, in addition to the workers and their directors, a large group who
exist to explain, manifest, encourage, rationalize, and promote the vari-
ous forms of production. In Marxist societies, those in this second group
are known as party workers; in the democracies, especially in North
America, they are thought of as advertisers and educators.
It seems clear that even with the heavy handicap of defence budgets,
even with the assistance given to those parts of the world which are
committed to the West but are otherwise unfortunate, the productive
power of American and other advanced democracies has become so
overefficient that it can continue to function only by various feather-
bedding93 devices. One device, of the type satirized in Parkinson's Law,94
is the subsidizing of employment; another, of the type lamented in The
Feminine Mystique,95 is the effort to encourage as many as possible of the
female half of the population to devote themselves to becoming
full-time consumers. But these devices do not conceal the fact that lei-
sure is growing so rapidly, both in the amount of time and the number
of people it affects, as to be a social complex equal in importance to
employment itself.
Thus the technological revolution is becoming more and more an
educational rather than an industrial phenomenon. For education is the
positive aspect of leisure. As long as we think of society, in nine-
teenth-century terms, as essentially productive, leisure is only spare
time, usually filled up with various forms of distraction, and a "leisure
class," which has nothing but spare time, is only a class of parasites. But
as soon as we realize that leisure is as genuine and important an aspect
of everyone's life as remunerative work, leisure becomes something that
also demands discipline and responsibility. Distraction, of the kind one
sees on highways and beaches at holiday weekends, is not leisure but a
running away from leisure, a refusal to face the test of one's inner
5O The Modern Century
Fifty years ago it could be said that the university and the creative art-
ist were at opposite ends of the cultural spectrum. The university, on its
humanistic side, ran a critical and scholarly establishment concerned
with the past, and related itself to the present by translating the values of
the past into contemporary middle-class values. Anyone interested in
painting or writing was likely to drop out of school as soon as it had
wasted the legal amount of his time and devote himself to living precar-
iously by his wits. I spent a dinner talking to such a (Canadian) writer
recently: he told me of how he had left school at grade ten and eventually
established himself as a writer, of how his life since had been financially
difficult, even despairing at times, but redeemed by the excitement of an
unexpected sale, or, more genuinely, by occasional gleams of satisfaction
over a creative job well done. A century ago this would have been a
familiar type of story, but while I listened with interest and respect,
because I knew his work and admired it, I felt that I was hearing one of
the last legends of a vanishing species, of a way of life that was going and
would not return.
For in the last few decades the leisure structure has become much
more integrated. The university's interest in contemporary culture is
now practically obsessive, nor is its relation to it confined to mere inter-
est. More and more of the established artists are on its teaching staff,
and more and more of the younger rebels are their undergraduate stu-
dents. While serving on a committee for awarding fellowships to Cana-
dian writers, I noticed that practically all the serious English candidates
were employed by universities and practically all the French ones by the
National Film Board or the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. What
cultural differences this implied I do not know, but for both groups
some professional connection with the leisure structure was so regular
as to amount practically to a closed shop. When the beatnik movement
began about ten years ago, it seemed as though an anti-academic, even
anti-intellectual tendency was consolidating around a new kind of cul-
tural experience. It attracted certain types of expression, such as the
improvising swing ensembles and their derivatives, which had tradi-
tionally been well outside the orbit of higher education. But the academ-
ics got interested in them too, and vice versa.
The nineteenth-century artist was typically a loner: even in the twenti-
eth he was often the last stand of laissez-faire, resisting every kind of
social mediation between himself and his public. It is still often asserted
that he ought to continue to be so, and should avoid the seductions of
56 The Modern Century
university posts and foundation grants. The social facts of yesterday are
the cliches of today. But he is now in a world where such agencies as the
Canada Council102 represent a growing concern on the part of society
with the leisure structure. This has affected all aspects of the arts: we
may note particularly the changes in genre. Some arts, like music and
drama, are ensemble performances for audience; others, like the novel
and the easel painting, are individualized. In an intensely individual-
ized era like the Victorian age, the novel goes up and the drama goes
down. Up until quite recently, the creative person, say in literature, was
typically one who "wanted to write," and what he wanted to write was
usually poetry or fiction. He might dream of rivalling Shakespeare, but
he would be unlikely to want Shakespeare's job of a busy actor-manager
in a profit-sharing corporation. It looks as though creative interests were
shifting again to the dramatic: it is Pinter and Albee and Beckett on the
stage, Bergman and Fellini and others in film, who seem to be making
cultural history today, as the novelists were making it a century ago. The
creative undergraduate tends less to bring his sheaf of poems to his
instructor, and tends more to ask his advice about where he can get
financial assistance, private or foundational, as a result of having gone
broke with a film-making or dramatic venture. This may be a temporary
vogue, but I think not, and of course it is obvious how this kind of cre-
ative interest immediately involves the artist in the social aspects of the
leisure structure. (Psychotherapy, so profoundly connected with the
contemporary imagination, has recently changed its emphasis from nar-
rative and confessional techniques to dramatic ones,103 which is perhaps
another aspect of the same cultural trend.)
In my earlier talks I spoke of the modern imagination as resisting the
pressure of advertising and propaganda, which assume and try to bring
about a passive response. Advertising and propaganda come respec-
tively from the economic and the political structures, and I touched on
the neurosis in modern life which springs from the feeling that these
structures are not worth loyalty. For all our dislike of the word "totali-
tarian,"104 we have to recognize that there is a profound and genuine, if
ultimately specious, appeal in any form of social activity which prom-
ises to expand into a complete way of life, engaging all aspects of one's
interests and providing fulfilment for one's cultural, spiritual, and intel-
lectual as well as social needs. A generation ago many people plunged
into radical politics in the hope of finding a total program of this kind,
but all forms of politics, including the radical form, seem sooner or later
Clair de lune intellectuel 57
rade" has for most of us a rather sinister and frigid sound. Fraternity is
perhaps the ideal that the leisure structure has to contribute to society. A
society of students, scholars, and artists is a society of neighbours, in the
genuinely religious sense of that word. That is, our neighbour is not, or
not necessarily, the person in the same national or ethnical or class
group with ourselves, but may be a "good Samaritan" or person to
whom we are linked by deeper bonds than nationality or racism or class
solidarity can any longer provide. These are bonds of intellect and imag-
ination as well as of love and good will. The neighbour of a scientist is
another scientist working on similar lines, perhaps in a different conti-
nent; the neighbour of a novelist writing about Mississippi is (as
Faulkner indicated in his Nobel Prize speech)106 anybody anywhere
who can respond to his work. The fact that feuds among scholars and
artists are about as bitter as feuds ever get will doubtless make for some
distinction between theory and practice.
It is a peculiarity of North America today that culture is absorbed into
society mainly through the university classroom. Such a dependence of
contemporary culture on the educational system, rather than on a self-
acquired social education supplementing the academic one, is much less
true of Europe. This seems to imply, perhaps correctly, a higher degree
of maturity in European society, in this respect at least. When I speak of
the North American university's interest in contemporary culture as
obsessive I am speaking of a degree of interest that I somewhat regret: it
might be better if the university confined itself to supplying the histori-
cal dimension of its culture. But the students dictate a great deal of the
teaching program of the university, though they seldom realize it, and
students of the humanities appear to regard the study of the contempo-
rary or near-contemporary as the most liberalizing element of a liberal
education. My notion is that the trend is for the European pattern to fall
in with the North American one rather than the other way round, but
my observations do not depend on such a prediction.
Whatever the eventual relation of teaching and culture, the academic
and the creative aspects of contemporary society have certainly come
together within the last generation or so, and their future destinies, so
far as one can see into the future, appear to be closely linked. This
accounts for a feature of our cultural life which seems more paradoxical
than it is. The university classroom is concerned with "liberal" educa-
tion, and liberal education is liberal in every sense of the word: it eman-
cipates, it is tolerant, it assimilates the learning process to a social idea.
Clair de lune intellectuel 59
primitive myths were stories, mainly stories about gods, and their units
were physical images. In more highly structured societies they develop
in two different but related directions. In the first place, they develop
into literature as we know it, first into folk tales and legends of heroes,
thence into the conventional plots of fiction and metaphors of poetry. In
the second place, they become conceptualized, and become the inform-
ing principles of historical and philosophical thought, as the myth of fall
becomes the informing idea of Gibbon's history of Rome, or the myth of
the sleeping beauty Rousseau's buried society of nature and reason. My
first lecture dealt primarily with mythology in this sense, particularly
with the so-called existential myths.
It seems to me that there have been two primary mythological con-
structions in Western culture. One was the vast synthesis that institu-
tional Christianity made of its Biblical and Aristotelian sources. This
myth is at its clearest in the Middle Ages, but it persisted for centuries
later, and much of its structure, though greatly weakened by the
advance of science, was still standing in the eighteenth century itself.
The other is the modern mythology that began when the modern world
did, in the later eighteenth century, but reached its more specifically
modern shape a century later, and a century before now.
The older mythology was one that stressed two things in particular:
the subject-object relation and the use of reason. Man was a subject con-
fronting a nature set over against him. Both man and nature were crea-
tures of God, and were united by that fact. There were no gods in nature:
if man looked into the powers of nature to find such gods they would
soon turn into devils. What he should look at nature for is the evidence
of purpose and design which it shows as a complementary creation
of God, and the reason can grasp this sense of design. The rational ap-
proach to nature was thus superior to the empirical and experimental
approach to it, and the sciences that were most deductive and closest to
mathematics were those that were first developed. Of all sciences,
astronomy is the most dependent on the subject-object relationship, and
in the Middle Ages particularly, astronomy was the science par excel-
lence, the one science that a learned medieval poet, such as Dante or
Chaucer, would be assumed to know.
In the premodern myth man's ultimate origin was of God, and his
chief end was to draw closer to God. Even more important, the social
discipline which raised him above the rest of creation was a divine ordi-
nance. Law was of God; the forms of human civilization, the city and the
Clair de lune intellectuel 61
garden, were imitations of divine models, for God planted the garden of
Eden and had established his city before man was created; the ultimate
human community was not in this world, but in a heaven closer to the
divine presence. Philosophers recognized that the ordinary categories of
the mind, such as our perception of time and space, might not be ade-
quate at a purely spiritual level. It was possible, for example, that a spir-
itual body, such as an angel, did not occupy space or travel in space at
all. The unfortunate wretch who attempted to put this question into a
lively and memorable form by asking how many angels could stand on
the point of a pin has become a byword for pedantic stupidity, a terrible
warning to all instructors who try to make a technical subject interest-
ing. But as far as popular belief and poetic imagery were concerned, the
spiritual world was thought of as essentially another objective environ-
ment, to be described in symbols—city, temple, garden, streets—
derived from human life, though the myth taught that human life had
been derived from them. This mythology, relating as it did both man
and nature to God, was a total one, so complete and far-reaching that an
alternative world picture was practically unthinkable. This is the real
significance of Voltaire's familiar epigram, that if God did not exist it
would be necessary to invent him, which was, in his day, a much more
serious remark than it sounds.107 One could, theoretically, be an atheist;
but even an atheist would find God blocking his way on all sides: he
would meet the hypothesis of God in history, in philosophy, in psychol-
ogy, in astronomy. As for morality, its standards were so completely
assimilated to religious sanctions that even a century ago it was impos-
sible for many people to believe that nonreligious man could have any
moral integrity at all.
In the eighteenth century there began to grow, slowly but irresistibly,
the conviction that man had created his own civilization. This meant not
merely that he was responsible for it—he had always been that—but
that its forms of city and garden and design, of law and social discipline
and education, even, ultimately, of morals and religion, were of human
origin and human creation. This new feeling crystallized around Rous-
seau in the eighteenth century, and the assumptions underlying the
American and French Revolutions were relatively new assumptions.
Liberty was no longer, as it had been for Milton, something that God
gives and that man resists: it was something that most men want and
that those who have a stake in slavery invoke their gods to prevent them
from getting. Law was no longer, as it had been for Hooker, the reflec-
62 The Modern Century
tion of divine order in human life, but in large part the reflection of class
privilege in property rights. Art and culture were no longer, as they had
been for the age of Shakespeare, the ornaments of social discipline: they
took on a prophetic importance as portraying the forms of civilization
that man had created. The Romantic movement brought in the concep-
tion of the "serious" artist, setting his face against society to follow his
art, from which the modern antagonism of the artist to society that I dis-
cussed earlier has descended.
A major principle of the older mythology was the correspondence of
human reason with the design and purpose in nature which it perceives.
This correspondence was still accepted even after God had dwindled
into a deistic first cause, a necessary hypothesis and nothing more. The
modern movement, properly speaking, began when Darwin finally
shattered the old teleological conception of nature as reflecting an intel-
ligent purpose. From then on design in nature has been increasingly
interpreted by science as a product of a self-developing nature. The
older view of design survives vestigially, as when religion tells us that
some acts are "contrary to nature." But contemporary science, which
is professionally concerned with nature, does not see in the ancient
mother-goddess the Wisdom which was the bride of a superhuman cre-
ator. What it sees rather is a confused old beldame who has got where
she has through a remarkable obstinacy in adhering to trial and error—
mostly error—procedures. The rational design that nature reflects is in
the human mind only. An example of the kind of thinking that Darwin
has made impossible for the modern mind is, "If the Lord had intended
us to fly, he'd have given us wings." The conception of natural functions
as related to a personal and creative intention is no longer in our pur-
view.
Modern mythology, at least with us, is naturally not as well unified as
the earlier one, but it does possess some unity nonetheless. It reaches us
on two main levels. There is a social mythology, which we learn through
conversation and the contacts of family, teachers, and neighbours,
which is reinforced by the mass media, newspapers, television, and
movies, and which is based fundamentally on cliche and stock response.
In the United States, elementary education, at least before the Sputnik
revolution of 1957,108 consisted very largely of acquiring a stock-
response mythology known as the American way of life. Canadian
elementary teaching has been less obsessed by social mythology, as its
children do not require the indoctrination that citizens of a great world
Clair de lune intellectuel 63
power do, but it has its own kind, as in fact do all societies in all ages.
Social mythology in our day is a faint parody of the Christian mythol-
ogy which preceded it. "Things were simpler in the old days; the world
has unaccountably lost its innocence since we were children. I just live
to get out of this rat race for a bit and go somewhere where I can get
away from it all. Yet there is a bracing atmosphere in competition and
we may hope to see consumer goods enjoyed by all members of our
society after we abolish poverty. The world is threatened with grave
dangers from foreigners, perhaps with total destruction; yet if we dedi-
cate ourselves anew to the tasks which lie before us we may preserve
our way of life for generations yet unborn." One recognizes the familiar
outlines of paradise myths, fall myths, exodus-from-Egypt myths, pas-
toral myths, apocalypse myths.
The first great modern novelist is usually taken to be Flaubert, whose
last and unfinished work, Bouvard et Pecuchet, included, as part of its
scheme, a "Dictionary of Accepted Ideas." In recent years there has been
a phenomenal growth of books which are written from within one of the
social sciences, but are actually read as social satires. Anyone can think
of a dozen titles: The Lonely Crowd, The Affluent Society, The Organization
Man, The Academic Market-Place, The Status Seekers, The Insolent Chariots,
The Hidden Persuaders, Games People Play. This last one breaks the rhythm
of the conventional titles: a stock phrase preceded by the inside-knowl-
edge suggestion of the definite article. Not all of these are good books,
but they all deal with subjects about which good books ought to be writ-
ten. The importance of this form of literary fiction, for that is what it is,
is that it studies society from the point of view of its popular or cliche
mythology, its accepted ideas. It is bound to have a revolutionary
impact on other fiction by making novelists and dramatists more aware
of the symbolic and ritual basis of social behaviour.
A more complicated mythology emerges in general education and lib-
eral arts courses, where we become aware of the immense importance of
the thinkers who have helped to shape our mythology: Rousseau, Marx,
Freud, the existentialists, and others whose importance depends on
what versions of it we take most seriously. In addition to the art and
scholarship which is specialized and works with limited objectives,
there is a wide variety of "idea books," books that survey the intellectual
world, or a large section of it, from a certain comprehensive point of
view. On the bookshelves of my study in front of me as I write I see
works of history: Spengler's Decline of the West, Toynbee's A Study of His-
64 The Modern Century
painting, the conception used is not identical with the biological theory:
it is only a mythological analogy of that theory. How significant the
analogy is has still to be determined, as a separate problem. Naturally
science has immense relevance to the myth of concern, especially when
it manifests an ability to destroy or to improve human existence—in
some areas, such as genetics, it is not always easy to distinguish the two
things. But it is a primary function of the myth of concern to judge the
effects of science on human life in its own terms. This is what good
mythological works written by scientists, such as the books of Edding-
ton and Jeans110 and Sherrington, help us to do. When a mythologist
attempts to show that the conceptions of science support or prove his
vision, he weakens his power of resistance to science.
What I am describing is a liberal or "open" mythology, of the sort
appropriate to a democracy. I call it a structure, but it is often so fluid
that the solid metaphor of structure hardly applies to it at all. Each man
has his own version of it, conditioned by what he knows best, and in fact
he will probably adopt several differing versions in the course of his life.
Myths are seldom if ever actual hypotheses that can be verified or
refuted;111 that is not their function: they are coordinating or integrating
ideas. Hence, though good mythological books are usually written by
competent scholars, the mythology of concern is something different
from actual scholarship, and is subordinate to it. Any verified fact or
definitely refuted theory may alter the whole mythological structure at
any time, and must be allowed to do so. Yet there are certain assump-
tions which give mythology some social unity and make discussion,
argument, and communication possible. It is not addressed directly to
belief: it is rather a reservoir of possibilities of belief. It is the area of free
discussion which Mill, in his essay On Liberty, felt to be the genuine par-
liament of man and the safeguard of social freedom as a whole. It is the
"culture" that Matthew Arnold opposed to the anarchy of doing as one
likes,112 the check on social and political activism. For activism, however
well motivated, is always based on rationalized stock response. Beliefs
and convictions and courses of action come out of an open mythology,
but when such courses are decided on, the area of discussion is not
closed off. No idea is anything more than a half-truth unless it contains
its own opposite, and is expanded by its own denial or qualification.
An open mythology of this kind is very different from a closed one,
which is a structure of belief. There are two aspects of belief, theoretical
and practical. Theoretical belief is a creed, a statement of what a man
66 The Modern Century
eval culture and would like to see some kind of "return" to it. Some are
people who can readily imagine themselves as belonging to the kind of
elite that a closed myth would produce. Some are sincere believers in
democracy who feel that democracy is at a disadvantage in not having a
clear and unquestioned program of its beliefs. But democracy can
hardly function with a closed myth, and books of the type I have men-
tioned as contributions to our mythology, however illuminating and
helpful, cannot, in a free society, be given any authority beyond what
they earn by their own merits. That is, an open mythology has no canon.
Similarly, there can be no general elite in a democratic society: in a
democracy everybody belongs to some kind of elite, which derives from
its social function a particular knowledge or skill that no other group
has.
The earlier closed mythology of the Western world was a religion,
and the emergence of an open mythology has brought about a cultural
crisis which is at bottom a religious crisis. Traditionally, there are two
elements in religion, considered as such apart from a definite faith. One
is the primitive element of religio, the collection of duties, rituals, and
observances which are binding on all members of a community. In this
sense Marxism and the American way of life are religions. The other is
the sense of a transcendence of the ordinary categories of human experi-
ence, a transcendence normally expressed by the words "infinite" and
"eternal." As a structure of belief, religion is greatly weakened; it has no
secular power to back it up, and its mandates affect far fewer people,
and those far less completely, than a century ago. What is significant is
not so much the losing of faith as the losing of guilt feelings about losing
it. Religion tends increasingly to make its primary impact, not as a sys-
tem of taught and learned belief, but as an imaginative structure which,
whether "true" or not, has imaginative consistency and imaginative
informing power. In other words, it makes its essential appeal as myth
or possible truth, and whatever belief it attracts follows from that.
This means that the arts, which address the imagination, have, ever
since the Romantic movement, acquired increasingly the role of the
agents through which religion is understood and appreciated. The arts
have taken on a prophetic function in society, never more of one than
when the artist pretends to deprecate such a role, as, for instance, T.S.
Eliot did. It is sometimes said that the arts, especially poetry, have
become a "substitute" for religion,"7 but this makes no sense. The arts
contain no objects of worship or belief, nor do they constitute (except
68 The Modern Century
in, and most of the world we have made, belongs to the alienated and
absurd world of the tiger. But in all our efforts to imagine or realize a
better society, some shadow falls across it of the child's innocent vision
of the impossible created world that makes human sense. If we can no
longer feel that this world was once created for us by a divine parent,
we still must feel, more intensely than ever, that it is the world we ought
to be creating, and that whatever may be divine in our destiny or nature
is connected with its creation. The loss of faith in such a world is cen-
trally a religious problem, but it has a political dimension as well, and
one which includes the question we have been revolving around all
through: What is it, in society, to which we really owe loyalty? The ques-
tion is not easy to answer in Canada. We are alienated from our econ-
omy in Marx's sense, as we own relatively little of it ourselves; our
governments are democratic: that is, they are what Nietzsche calls "all
too human." We have few ready-made symbols of loyalty: a flag per-
functorily designed by a committee, a national anthem with its patent
pending, an imported Queen.119 But we may be looking in the wrong
direction.
I referred earlier to Grove's A Search for America, where the narrator
keeps looking for the genuine America buried underneath the America
of hustling capitalism which occupies the same place. This buried
America is an ideal that emerges in Thoreau, Whitman, and the person-
ality of Lincoln. All nations have such a buried or uncreated ideal, the
lost world of the lamb and the child, and no nation has been more preoc-
cupied with it than Canada. The painting of Tom Thomson and Emily
Carr, and later of Riopelle and Borduas,120 is an exploring, probing
painting, tearing apart the physical world to see what lies beyond or
through it. Canadian literature even at its most articulate, in the poetry
of Pratt, with its sense of the corruption at the heart of achievement, or
of Nelligan with its sense of unfulfilled clarity, a reach exceeding the
grasp,121 or in the puzzled and indignant novels of Grove,122 seems con-
stantly to be trying to understand something that eludes it, frustrated by
a sense that there is something to be found that has not been found,
something to be heard that the world is too noisy to let us hear. One of
the derivations proposed for the word "Canada" is a Portuguese phrase
meaning "nobody here." The etymology of the word "Utopia" is very
similar, and perhaps the real Canada is an ideal with nobody in it. The
Canada to which we really do owe loyalty is the Canada that we have
failed to create. In a year bound to be full of discussions of our identity, I
70 The Modern Century
should like to suggest that our identity, like the real identity of all
nations, is the one that we have failed to achieve. It is expressed in our
culture, but not attained in our life, just as Blake's new Jerusalem to be
built in England's green and pleasant land [Milton, Preface, 1. 16] is no
less a genuine ideal for not having been built there. What there is left of
the Canadian nation may well be destroyed by the kind of sectarian
bickering which is so much more interesting to many people than genu-
ine human life. But, as we enter a second century contemplating a world
where power and success express themselves so much in stentorian
lying, hypnotized leadership, and panic-stricken suppression of free-
dom and criticism, the uncreated identity of Canada may be after all not
so bad a heritage to take with us.
The Arts
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2
Current Opera:
A Housecleaning
October 1935
rigeur throughout the seventeenth century, and in fact provides the basic
form for Handel and Gliick. If Handel was dissatisfied with the opera, it
was not because he rebelled against the operatic convention, but simply
because it was not concentrated enough for him to impose his mas-
sive designs on it. His genius expanded into the oratorio, which is not
less conventionalized than the opera but far more so. After his time a
century-long duel was fought between the traditions of German coun-
terpoint and of Italian melody, a conflict resolved only by Mozart, which
had for its chief incidents the row between Handel and Bononcini, the
Gliick-Piccini opera fight in Paris, the triumph of Rossini in Vienna, the
establishment of the Italian comedie larmoyante in the nineteenth century,
its destruction by Wagner, and the belated attempts of Puccini and his
colleagues to cling to Wagner's coat-tails.2 All the energy which the
great Germans expended on incorporating the opera into the tradition of
systematic music did not, however, succeed in affecting the Italian
model to any extent, and attempts to revitalize it now can have only an
eccentric interest. The Italian operatic tradition has lived long, but it is
not the less dead for having died hard. The impact of the Russian ballet
annihilated what was left of it at once; a single touch of the immense
strength and discipline of conventionalized art was enough to sweep the
facile virtuosity of the Pattis and Carusos into limbo.3
We have said that it is necessary to conventionalize the opera to avoid
the absurdity and incongruity which the sensitive listener is bound to
feel: every work of art asks a suspension of judgment from us, but the
serious opera asks too much. But of course where the appeal is comic,
where the incongruous becomes artistically valuable, this objection dis-
appears. For if we conventionalize the opera in any direction, we imme-
diately get something that is not an opera, however excellent an oratorio
or ballet it may be. Therefore when Mozart's unerring instinct brought
the opera to its highest pitch of perfection and established it as an art
form in its own right, it appeared as comedy. For high tragedy in musi-
cal drama seems difficult to reconcile with the loose and florid construc-
tion of opera: it needs massed choruses undisturbed by the broken lights
of the stage. Tragedy, in short, belongs to the oratorio; the opera is
comic, seldom succeeding with anything more serious than pathos.
Madame Butterfly is typical of a large number of entirely unconvincing
melodramas. Owing to the difficulty of getting a genuinely sympathetic
audience, there is no form more easily parodied than the opera: the
whole English tradition, from Gay to Dame Ethyl Smyth, has run not
Current Opera: A Housecleaning 75
From Acta Victoriana, 60 (December 1935): 4-6. Reprinted in RW, 4-7. Ser-
gei Diaghilev launched the emigre Ballet Russe in Paris in 1909. In its earliest
phase the company owed much of its reputation for innovation to the close con-
nection to Russian composer Igor Stravinsky that Frye describes here, and to an
outstanding company whose members included Vladimir Nijinsky and Leonide
Massine. Diaghilev's sudden death in 1929 led to the creation of a variety of
Ballets Russes companies, who often, as in the performance Frye witnessed in
Toronto, performed the work of more traditional national composers alongside
their more innovative successors.
The ballet, like all forms of drama, demands the divided attention of
sight and hearing, which sometimes makes for mixed feelings on the part
of its audience. In my own case there was a marked contrast between the
effect of the stage performance on the one hand, and the succession of
unpleasant noises made by a rather scarecrow orchestra on the other,
which seemed to have tuned its kettledrum to the music of another
sphere altogether. The night I went—Thursday—two of the ballets were
Tschaikowsky and one Rimsky-Korsakov, which provided another con-
trast between the suave, jog-trot waltz rhythms of nineteenth-century
dance music and the whirling spirals, piercing lines, and sharp colours of
the stage settings, a contrast which the intermediate dancing did not fully
resolve. My obstinate refusal to see in Tschaikowsky's Fifth Symphony a
musical representation of the conflict of man and Destiny is perhaps an
irrelevant point. And perhaps not. Tschaikowsky provided worse pro-
grams than that for other works, in order to cover up his deficiencies in
command of musical form: one can always see the easy-going slapdash
Ballet Russe 77
amateur under the most solemn passages in his music, just as one can
always see the incredibly skilful technician under the most delicate and
spontaneous passages of Mozart. Music such as Tschaikowsky's, how-
ever pleasant it may be in itself, does not meet the demands of the art
form of the ballet.
Let me explain. If a tired businessman is dragged, first to an opera,
then to a ballet, his reaction will probably be in favour of the latter. If he
tried to rationalize his preference, he would no doubt say that, in the
first place, it was more pleasant to look at human bodies, specifically
female bodies, that were organisms of grace and suppleness and rhythm
than to contemplate the masses of soggy porridge the average prima
donna packs around her vocal chords; that, in the second place, there
was something moving and happening all the time, instead of having a
lot of people standing around with their mouths open; that, in the third
place, while in both art forms people perform a number of complicated
actions for largely unintelligible reasons, in the ballet they are more
obviously following the music, so that the tired businessman, without a
foreign language, does not feel so much that he is being cheated out of
half the show.
What these impressions boil down to is this. In a ballet it is the rhythm
of the music that is projected across the footlights; in an opera it is the
melody. Now rhythm is the fundamental organizing force of music;
music is an art that moves in time, and while it is possible to examine it
in terms of pattern, such an examination entails abstraction from perfor-
mance. Melody in music exists solely in a contrapuntal and rhythmic
context, and has a completely relative function. All music has melody,
doubtless, but to think of music in terms of it is to reduce music to pat-
tern. Consequently it is no mean technical feat to organize an opera
rhythmically and prevent it from breaking up into a disjointed series of
elaborate harmonized tunes. Wagner's development of recitative and
his theory of "endless melody"1 result from his recognition of this diffi-
culty, but his approach is rather a negative one, owing largely to the fact
that when the Romantics destroyed the strict forms of the great contra-
puntal traditions the inner rhythmic vitality that held the operas of
Gliick and Mozart together was greatly weakened. But the ballet, being
a projection of the rhythm in music, while it demands a higher standard
from the composer, will respond far more readily to one who can meet
that standard. Because of its immense energy and its concentration and
economy of form, it meets, as no other art form in drama has yet done,
78 The Arts
always been associated; they both developed out of the dance, both were
originally ritual arts and have frequently been allied with religion.1 They
go up when society feels itself secure and cooperative; they go down
in an era of individualism. Sixteenth-century England, for instance, pro-
duced an amazing development in music and drama: in nineteenth-
century England both arts practically disappeared. To pass to the more
specific form of musical drama, we find that the pre-industrial eighteenth
century gave us the oratorios of Bach and Handel and the operas of Gliick
and Mozart; but in the long century and a half of subjective art which fol-
lowed the one important contribution, that of Wagner, was the most
highly individualized achievement, and therefore more a destruction
than a development of musical drama.
Consequently if we are passing from anarchic individualism to a more
strongly unified society, we shall assuredly get more music, more
drama, and consequently more musical drama. Today the oratorio is
dead and the opera apparently moribund, but we seem to be getting an
extremely lively and genuinely new art form in the ballet. And the ballet
possesses all the symptoms of healthy art postulated above. For its pro-
duction it demands, not a charlatan chewing his nails in a garret, but a
group of workmen in music, drama, and choreography who have grad-
uated from apprenticeship, a school of dancers, and an integrated tradi-
tion of performance. It is definitely a conventionalized and symbolic art
form, depending on a stylizing of gesture and pantomime, and aided
rather than rendered meaningless by the use of masks and traditional
costume. By its use of gesticulation it leaves room for farce, satire, melo-
drama, propaganda—everything that goes home to a large unselected
audience. It unites music and drama on the common basis out of which,
we have said, they both developed—the dance. Its rise, therefore, adum-
brates future social developments in a way that no political prophecy
could do. Its ramifications, connecting up, via Russia, with Oriental
drama, indicate that the Eurasian tendencies which have become so
prominent in painting and music will find a focus in the ballet as well.
So far the ballet has gone through a period of transition. It has used
incidental music not originally intended for it, and the greatest of the
composers treating it seriously as an art form—Stravinsky—has been
temperamentally unsuited to it, for though he clearly recognizes, and
has explicitly stated, the necessity of impersonality and convention, his
own style tends toward the vehement spluttering of Wagner or
Tschaikowsky rather than the more objective balance required. Behind
The Jooss Ballet 81
ture, is a poor medium for him, and his one essay in the form disinte-
grates in performance, while his writing for the piano, an unmistakably
rhythmical instrument, is sonorously arid.
The same Romantic qualities are evident in his treatment of the sonata
form. The classical sonata is inherently dramatic, dependent on strong
contrast in movements and themes. Delius's more lyrical approach usu-
ally gets rid of the movement contrast by welding the sonata into one
movement, while his thematic development presents a uniformly flow-
ing movement of successive ideas which are neither new themes nor
variations of old ones. When this pattern is combined with the repeti-
tion and restatement of themes which the sonata form itself demands,
the result—especially evident in the violincello sonata and the string
quartet—is apt to be monotonous, reminding one of a late Beethoven
quartet without the struggling propulsion, or, more frequently, of a sort
of jellied Schubert.
With Delius this harmonic approach is merely a convention justified
by the music: he does not vociferate it as a dogma, like Schonberg or
Scriabin.3 His deficiencies in chamber music result from the choice of an
unfavourable medium, not from incompetence. The chorus and the
orchestra give him an additional variety of ''colour" in timbre, and a
fuller emancipation from a hampering classical tradition. The massive
serenity and balance of his best choral and orchestral work is a striking
contrast with the restless moodiness of his chamber music. The expan-
sion of the medium allows his creative will freer play. For Delius is a true
Romantic in his subjectivity. Debussy has a pictorial interest in music as
well, but he does not lack rhythmic vitality; in consequence, his pictorial
tone poems are far more objective. His clouds, gardens, raindrops, and
so on are, like Blake's, "men seen afar";4 they seem to express their own
natures in sound. Delius takes the point of view rather of the contemplat-
ing spectator, and so powerful is the domination of a single mood that an
impression of unity is retained in spite of all the vagaries of unrepeated
themes. This is why his music is so frequently described as rhapsodic.
All of which is thoroughly consistent with Delius's own character: he
has always been known as an individualist, taking no part in the
rough-and-tumble world of professional music, owing allegiance to no
school. But even here he is profoundly typical of culture. For the Ro-
mantic assertion of will that followed the Industrial Revolution devel-
oped a spiritual loneliness in the artists of the nineteenth century which
drove many to eccentricity and a few to insanity. A pervading attitude
of isolation in a hostile universe brought about a kind of revised pagan
86 The Arts
religion, which shows itself in three easily recognized aspects. The arro-
gant will-to-power doctrine of Nietzsche caricatured in Fascism today is
an example of one aspect; Whitman's ecstatic absorption in nature illus-
trates another; and the languor and sensuousness of the Swinburnian
school of English poetry is a good instance of the third. Delius, as thor-
oughgoing a pagan as one could wish to find, has touched all three
points. In his great Mass of Life he sets Nietzsche to music; in his Sea Drift
he sets Whitman; in his Songs of Sunset he even condescends to Dow-
son's revoltingly sticky Cynara.5 One hardly needs a not too successful
Pagan Requiem to summarize the evidence. Delius's paganism is honest
enough, with none of the hankering for a cloudily catholic religion
which inspires the theosophies of Hoist and Cyril Scott,6 and, like most
paganism, it is centred on an ideal of physical dignity. In the stately
chord progressions of the choral and orchestral works which culminate
in such tremendous climaxes, we get the will-to-power side of this; in
the dreamy relaxation of the symphonic poems, we get the more purely
sensuous side; in his consistently pictorial approach, we get the "nature
mysticism" of it. He cannot be said to be free from the spiritual elephan-
tiasis which is also in Elgar, Hoist, and Vaughan Williams, but his
expression of it is less portentous. One has to set him beside someone
like Cesar Franck to understand the limitations of his attitude. In Delius,
whether he repeats his themes or not, the ultimate unity is one of mood;
the organizing force of his music is the expression of an emotional
impulse. In Franck, as we are carried along the constant evolution and
transformation of ideas, we are conscious of entering into an objective
structural unity. If one likes antithetical jingles, one might say that
Delius's music is the mental expression of physical energy, and Franck's
the physical expression of mental energy.
Most of those who have written on Delius have known him personally,
and Delius seems to have been well worth knowing. In consequence, his
undoubted sincerity and nobility of character have tended to make criti-
cism of his music rather partial. When this passes, his importance will, I
am forced to think, become increasingly historical. Composers are now
impatient with the long harmonic lethargy of Romantic music, and the
twinges of contrapuntal conscience which have so sorely afflicted
Stravinsky, Schonberg, and even Antheil7 in recent years may indicate
that contemporary music is doing a certain amount of noisy yawning and
stretching preparatory to getting up and going somewhere.
6
Three-Cornered Revival
at Headington
28 October 1936
From Isis, 28 October 1936,14. Signed JR (by Canadian Rhodes Scholar Joseph
Reid), but written by Frye (see NFHK, 2:614). Based on a story by Faith Bald-
win, Wife vs. Secretary was a Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer production directed by
Clarence Brown.
Music and drama are the two great group art forms; that is, they are
ensemble performances before audiences. They have a common origin
in religious ritual.1 All primitive tribes, emerging from a stage of human
sacrifice and cannibal communion, develop a number of dances and
songs which to them are the expression of worship. The two principles
on which these dances and songs are based are rhythm and mimicry,
the sources of music and drama respectively. As music and drama
evolve into art forms, they retain for a long time something of their sac-
erdotal, other-world associations. Greek music and Greek drama were
both closely connected with Greek religion. In the Middle Ages music
was composed by monks and regulated by theologians; and from the
special choir music at Christmas and Easter services comes the whole
medieval drama, which was essentially an acting out of Christian
mythology.
Music and drama, then, come down to us haunted by primitive fears
of an uncanny and hostile world, by a primitive shuddering delight in
seeing murder and torture, by primitive lusts and emotional hysteria. In
proportion as they develop into art forms, music and drama work this
off and turn it into more civilized sublimations. Drama did this in nearly
all the great civilizations, ancient and modern: Aristotle called the subli-
mating effects of tragic drama pity and terror [Poetics, i449b]. But music
Music and the Savage Breast 89
are by far the more important. For the circus, the big show of flags and
salutes and marching men with a thumping, sandbagging musical
rhythm organizing it, is absolutely essential to tyranny and social reac-
tion today. As long as one exists the other will. As long as people can get
lumps in their throats and go shivery all over when they see uniforms
and hear a brass band, so long will mass wars and totalitarian states last,
whatever they call the causes they appeal to.
And yet musical drama has had a glorious record in the arts. All great
ages of drama have been aided by music: Greek drama had its chorus,
Elizabethan drama its songs, the Chinese drama of the Sung dynasty,5
which is still acted in Toronto, has its orchestra. Similarly, the great age
of music has been aided by drama. When the art of music reaches its cul-
mination in the eighteenth century with Bach and Mozart, Bach brings
the tragic form of the oratorio to its highest development in the St. Mat-
thew Passion (a form strikingly similar to Greek tragedy), and Mozart
does the same for the comic form of the opera.
The only other musician equal in genius to these two, setting Bee-
thoven aside as an instrumental composer, is Wagner. For Wagner's bit-
terest enemies, among whom I include myself, cannot deny that in sheer
ability to write music he gets top ranking. But in Wagner's musical dra-
mas we begin to see where the reactionary circus of today comes from.
Wagner's art form represents a tremendous individual conquest over
both music and drama, and in consequence (it is a consequence) he
makes a religion of megalomania. It is a point of honour with that
religion, not only to be anti-Christian, but to go straight back to the
primeval elements of the German soul, or, in less technical language, to
re-establish in modern Germany the war dance and fertility rites the
Germans indulged in before they became civilized. Hitler is an avowed
disciple of Wagner, and that fact is not accidental. He could find nothing
to his taste in a Christian such as Bach, or a peaceful Austrian sceptic
such as Mozart.
In proportion as society becomes more cooperative, musical drama,
the central group art form, will become more popular. We have seen that
if the growth of social cooperation leads only to the brutal and degrad-
ing tyranny of the totaltarian state, popular musical drama will lead
only to the incessant flogging of the higher feelings by the lower,
induced by military bands and erotic jazz orchestras. But there are other
forces at work, trying to make this growth of cooperation lead to a more
efficient, sane, and peaceful civilization. Can they make any use of musi-
Music and the Savage Breast 91
cal drama? Can the art form of Aeschylus, Shakespeare, Bach, and
Mozart be made popular, and help them to fight their battle for sanity?
I think so. There are two media through which it could be done. One
is the ballet. I have expressed my ideas about the ballet before in this
magazine [nos. 3-4], and need not repeat them, other than to say that, as
the ballet unites music and drama on the basis of the dance out of which
they both evolved, as it demands an immense cooperative organization
and the long apprenticeship so essential to sane and normal art, as it
integrates gesture with the drama and needs a background of vivid and
pungent painting, it could easily be the most highly developed and
intellectually concentrated art form of the twentieth century. This would
not make it immediately popular, in spite of its power to convey farce
and caricature, but would make it politically very significant. The other
is, of course, the cinema. There is no better index to the general level of
civilization in a country today than the quality of its cinemas. Holly-
wood has given a free hand to two authentic geniuses, Charlie Chaplin
and Walt Disney, and it is obvious in their pictures how close we are to
ballet and pantomime techniques, and how nearly the music comes to
organizing every movement of the dramatic action.
Yes, I've seen Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. Yes, I told you all that
stuff about Wagner and Greek philosophy just to lead up to it. I'm sorry,
but—you remember that it started to rain when Snow White dropped
dead, and that she remained in her glass coffin through autumn and
winter, and came back to life in the spring when her lover kissed her?
Well, that's what most of those primitive rituals were about—the spirit
of life and growth that died when the year died, and rose again at the
year's rebirth. They meant more than just rape and murder. They were
cursed with that, and we are born under that curse, but we and our chil-
dren don't have to keep on applauding gangsters and allowing them to
tear us to pieces with bombshells to the end of time. If Winter comes,
can Spring be far behind?6
8
Men As Trees Walking1
October 1938
The art exhibition at the CNE, an unusually good one all round, in-
cluded the first Canadian showing of representative surrealist pictures.2
Apparently the idea was that the show would be a refresher for the
jaded throats of our fashionable artistic nonentities and professional
screamers, hoarse with the lunacy of the Group of Seven3 and the hid-
eous obscenity of a picture of a naked wench. But, as that kind of stunt,
the show was a pleasant failure. People came in crowds: some, it is true,
to make the automatic comments and objections which perhaps even a
surrealist painter could have anticipated, but most because they were
genuinely curious and amused. Those who knew something about pic-
tures saw in front of them, in painting after painting, a technical pre-
cision which leaves many very clever Canadians, untrained in the
millennium-old European tradition of accurate drawing and colouring,
miles down the road. The surrealists can hardly be charlatans if they can
paint like that, they felt. Those who knew nothing about pictures and
cared less spluttered or giggled hysterically, but practically every pic-
ture held them with its glittering eye and had its will.4 Something was
happening to them inside which made them giggle and splutter. Most
of the rest simply asked, quite intelligently and honestly, What's it all
about?
This article is less an answer to the question than an attempt to restate
Men As Trees Walking 93
it. After the Great War the disintegration of European culture impressed
artists so much that a number of them made an artistic creed of chaos.
Art is form and synthesis, but art in so incoherent a world as ours can
only be an art stuck together out of odds and ends. So arose the move-
ment called Dadaism, an art of putting things together at random to
"evoke oracular responses,"5 as one devotee put it, from the unusual
patterns afforded by their combination. An artist would go for a walk
and come back littered with rubbish which he would patiently glue
together—this kind of assembling is called montage or collage. Very
soon the Dadaist movement was hit by Freud's earlier and cruder the-
ory of the soul as a libido struggling for self-expression but censored
and distorted by the respectable ego or conscious mind. The libido cre-
ates dreams, and the Dadaists turned to it as the sole source of creative
energy remaining to man in the modern world. They laboured to sum-
mon the authentic dream image from their midriffs and smite it straight
into the midriffs of their public, if they had a public in mind at all.
Dreams, they felt, had an immediate, vivid communication denied to
the censored consciousness. And as dreams are the unrepressed fears,
lusts, and hates of the essential man, the Dadaists, who of course inher-
ited the whole tradition of sadism and the "romantic agony"6 of the
nineteenth century, set forth in their pictures an All Hallows Eve of
demoniac horror and obscenity. Not that it was all deadly serious—the
odd or unexpected is always funny, and the public is quite justified in
laughing at it. Max Ernst's Burning Woman7 is not far from the comic-
strip Olive Oyl.
All of which was very healthy for both art and culture. But psychol-
ogy passed from the demons to the gods. Freud shared the limelight
with both Jung and the new researches into the primitive mind carried
on by anthropology. Painters began to realize that the subconscious
speaks a universal and intelligible language, a language of symbols no
doubt, but a language from which all existing languages, all myths of all
religions, and all the effective imagery of art, are derived. So the
destructive anarchism of the Dadaists passes into the synthetic move-
ment of surrealism. Its central idea remains in Tanguy's The Question-
ing,8 in which a litter of half-formed objects is set against a blank
background.
At first, then, surrealism reflected the Freudian theory of the split in
human consciousness, the antagonism of libido and ego. One can see a
rather feeble example of this in Dawson's Blue Mouth of Paradise,9 in
94 The Arts
tie lectures in the idealist dogma that the mind creates the world, like
Penrose's Human Frame,13 in which the figure holds a bit of blue sky in
her hand (this is of course impossible to see in our illustration), or Dali's
Great Dreamer, in which a human face is superimposed on a procession
that looks like an allegory of history. Surrealism is perhaps more conge-
nial to Spaniards and Germans, whose traditions are more favourable to
synthetic and symbolic thinking, than to Frenchmen or Americans. The
Germans, who have given us Klee and Kandinsky/4 will probably make
the most important contributions to its future development as soon as
they lynch their gangster parasites.
Yet surely, in a balanced mind, the critical consciousness is the
interpreter of the symbols produced by the creative imagination, and
symbolic art in consequence has to strike a medium between the unin-
telligible chaos of private associative patterns and the dead conventions
imposed by a Philistine religion. For this reason, surrealist art is certain
to develop in the direction of more explicit and fundamental symbol-
ism, from which consistent commentaries can be more easily inferred;
one thinks of the development of the highbrow classical allegories of the
Renaissance, now forgotten, into the art of Botticelli and Mantegna.15
Revolutionary painting today, at any rate in the hands of such a master
as Orozco/6 depends upon this communal symbolism, and in such a
picture as Dali's Autumnal Cannibalism, deeply felt and universally
shared feelings about the autumn as a time both of the maturity and of
the dying of the world and its connection with the approaching butch-
ery of the human race, perhaps as a necessary prelude to its rebirth, are
what appear on canvas. How far the surrealists can go in their apocalyp-
tic attempt to make the human mind create a new heaven and a new
earth [Revelation 21:1], no one can say. But it's worth trying.
9
K.R. Srinavasa lyengar's
Lytton Strachey
December 1940
This book has obvious defects: its ideas are commonplace, its style indif-
ferent (though it improves greatly after its rather Babu opening),1 and it
hardly supersedes Boas.2 But it does bring back the memory of that
"peculiar age," the first decade of the twenty-year truce. In 1919 E.T.
Raymond said that, the old men having bungled the young into a war,
the young would run things for the future.3 But the young men were
dead, and the foolish old men doddered on, and culture was taken over
by a group of highly talented dons. What they produced, naturally, was
brilliant, ephemeral and parasitic, orchidaceous and fungoid; fine poets
wrote in allusion and epigraph, good novelists dealt in allegory or with
a cadaverous and crepuscular "higlif." They loved the eighteenth cen-
tury and they cursed their ghostly father, Matthew Arnold, but towards
their own time they were quizzical, pragmatic, and very annoyed with
the obscenity laws. Such a soil could, like the mud of the Nile, only pro-
duce something equivocal, something not-quite.
Strachey is one of the best of these dons. His "Portraits in Miniature"
display the irony of a Chekhov, who, through some defect in creative
power, has turned to memory instead of imagination, to history instead
of drama. The studies of Victoria and Elizabeth have a documentary
K.R. Srinivasa's Lytton Strachey 97
cial monopoly in Hollywood, which has hurt both the movie and the
arts outside it. At present writers are brought up and forgotten about
just as inventions are, and for the same reasons; the supercolossal com-
plex inherited from the 19205 has pandered to a waning hope that the
Age of Tinsel will sometime return. The audience often lags behind the
movie: it never occurs to anybody, for instance, to listen to the incidental
music, and it is cheaper to use chunks of the Unfinished Symphony than
to pay a good musician to write an intelligent sound track, as the French
and sometimes the Russians do.
Outside the movies, the analysis of emotion in poetry, of society in the
novel, of the subconscious in surrealism, becomes increasingly clinical
and antiseptic as more popular forms of nostalgia and grousing and
morbidity are reeled off in the theatres. The preoccupation with the
means rather than the ends of expression, with words, cadences, geomet-
rical patterns, and mental processes rather than with ideas and subject
matter, is an infallible sign of decadence, and points to a lack of integra-
tion between modern art and modern life. The cinema should take the
lead in any such integration. The thought of the salary paid to Madeleine
Carroll3 has encouraged many a pretty girl to look prettier; and a poet
might find his Muse a much less pimpled and constipated lady if he
thought the movies could make an intelligent use of a good poet.
The movies suffer, of course, from a corresponding decadence: they,
too, put the emphasis on the means, on beautiful actors and showy sets.
But the director is growing in box-office prestige and a surprisingly
large number of films do attain to a considerable unity and relevance of
detail. This is partly because the movie is capable of the greatest concen-
tration of any art form in human history. The possibilities of combining
photographic, musical, and dramatic rhythms leave all preceding arts
behind in their infinity. Music accompanying silent business can turn it
into a scene de ballet: a camera travelling around a dialogue can give it a
weird fourth-dimensional symbolism: the crudest slapstick can use a
repeating pattern of scene or gesture as essential to it as blood and sleep-
lessness to Macbeth or the Siegfried motif to The Ring. When a real
genius controls the production of a movie, things should happen.
Back in the old silent days, when the average commercial film had the
artistic appeal of a streetcar ad, Charlie Chaplin was turning out a series
of grotesque little ballets, with every movement and gesture as eloquent
as the lines of a sculptor's drawing. The public did not laugh because it
was amused: it thought it was being amused because it laughed, with the
ioo The Arts
power makes its victim not superhuman but subhuman: "a brunet ruling
a blond world." When Hinkel explains that he is shaved in a room under
the ballroom with a glass ceiling, it sounds like a very corny gag, but it is
quite consistent with his scurrying up curtains, mangling nuts and
bananas, and dashing about in the futile restlessness of a monkey. Hinkel
may not be the historical Hitler, but he is, perhaps, the great modern
Satan Hugo and Gide and Baudelaire longed to see, though he would
have disappointed them, as Satan always does. Opposite Hinkel is the
inarticulate, anonymous, spluttering Jewish barber, who hardly speaks
until a voice speaks through him, and with that voice the picture ends.
How anyone can imagine that it could have any other end is beyond me.
One of the minor triumphs of the picture is Commander Schultz, the
perfect Quixote type of our age, the man who tries to fight Hitler with a
complete set of Hitler's ideas in his head. With his schoolboyish attempt
to pit melodrama and adventure and secret societies and "Lombard sac-
rifices" against the Hinkel machine, with his maudlin Teutonic reveries
about apple blossoms and bright-eyed maidens in a garden when he is
flying upside-down in his plane (one of the most brilliant touches in the
picture) Chaplin shows, without wasting a syllable, both why Nazism
began with Germans and why mere patriotism, in Germany or outside
it, will never ruffle a hair of Hitler's forelock.
Apart from the expression on the great white tank that follows Charlie
into Austria and the superb shaving ballet to Brahms's dance, there is lit-
tle made of the mechanical mass hypnotism of the Nazi state. This is
rather a pity, considering what the cinema can do along this line, but
Chaplin's choice was deliberate: in the "review" of armed forces before
Hinkel and Napaloni we never see a machine, but only the grimacing
figures in the box. He lets the singsong howls of Hinkel's wonderful
speeches do the rest, along with that curious rhythmic beat that holds
every Chaplin film together but is difficult to define, except for obvious
repetitions like the circulating of dishes in the ordeal scene and of chairs
just before the final speech.
How long does celluloid last? Other pictures go: Reynolds's are fad-
ing, Apelles' destroyed.9 Giotto's, it is true, look as though they had
been painted yesterday, but then they probably have been. If films can
survive indefinitely our grandchildren will probably ask some very
awkward questions if we didn't see the great Chaplin masterpieces
when they were new, or did see them and missed the point. They won't
care about the Russian campaign.
11
Reflections at a Movie
October 1942
Was it not that quaint old forgotten author, Karl Marx, who said that
new instruments of production are the causes of cultural changes? At
any rate the movie and its ally, the radio, have made a very considerable
one. Fifteen years ago, when movies were silent and the radio a squall-
ing infant, Calvin Coolidge was in the White House.1 This gentleman,
never having anything to say, seldom opened his mouth, and when he
did open it a noise like the cry of the great bronzed grackle in the mating
season emerged. This inability to talk was one of his chief political
assets, for he lived at a time when a president was merely an idol carried
in the processions of big business. In those days fluent and ready speech
was associated with high-pressure salesmen, and rhetoric in conse-
quence distrusted: even patriots did not take the Fourth of July orator
very seriously. Today the uvula is mightier than the tank: Churchill's
and Roosevelt's speeches have been major military operations, and in
former years an alleged cancer on Hitler's throat gleamed like the Star of
Bethlehem to exasperated democrats. Rhetoric and oratory are back
again to stay, and the radio and the movie have brought them back.
All over Canada, and America, of course, the old regime still lingers.
Children are taught to read and write, but the manner of speech is left to
original sin. To the average Canadian or American, cultivating an accent
means cultivating an English accent, and anyone who does that is a
sissy, a snob, and a hypocrite. The fact that it is far better to cultivate an
English accent than not to cultivate an accent at all is quite lost on him.
104 The Arts
this state of things cannot survive the era of the sound track and the
radio play, and our more interesting poets are slowly abandoning the
subtle shuffle of Rozinante for the bucking of Bucephalus.5
The moral for Canadians is quite simple. Fifteen years is not a long
time, geologically speaking, and with increased practice in listening to
the sounds and rhythms of speech, we may in another fifteen years
begin to find out what our language is. Canadians speak American.
There is no Canadian accent or idiom, at least none common to all nine
provinces, and British English, apart from a few cloistral schools, is as
foreign to Canadians as Erse.6 Official documents still require "our"
spellings and schoolteachers still insist that whenever there is a differ-
ence of usage the English form is the right one, if we can only remember
which it is. (Check your guess on "schedule" with the dictionary.) But
none of this has the slightest effect on the spoken language. A school-
teacher is often not aware that she makes no attempt to speak the lan-
guage she teaches, and would be quite capable of saying, "Now
tomorrow we will go on to the lesson on shall and will, as I would like
to finish it by Friday." The various people who sound off about the dan-
ger of Americanizing our speech always make their protests in the pur-
est American, and a Daughter of the Empire7 would have arrived at a
fantastic pitch of imperialism before she would say petrol for gas or
wireless for radio. Now this simple fact, instantly obvious to any Cana-
dian, has not yet, with a few honourable exceptions, been digested by
Canadian writers. Most of our poets give up the problem of language
entirely and retreat into the lyric, where they can write in poetic diction
to their heart's content. I open Marjorie Pickthall at random and my eye
falls on the word "byre."8 No Canadian farmer calls his cowshed a byre;
why should a Canadian poet avoid the usage of her own country? And
if a Canadian novel or short story happens to be dull or commonplace, it
is often so not from a lack of imagination, but from a lack of courage and
confidence in taking hold of the language.
The radio and the movie are dramatic forms, and the drama is simply
integrated rhetoric: one of its chief functions is to bring together the spo-
ken and written language in some sort of unity. There will always be a
certain looseness in speech and a certain convention in writing, but the
wide gap between standard American and what Mencken calls the "vul-
gate"9 is decadent, and partly the result of a dead theatre. Movie actors
and radio speakers from Roosevelt down will have to take the lead in
establishing a normal speech which is free and colloquial and at the
106 The Arts
same time good enough to be a basis for writing. This involves the larger
problem, one of the most important of our postwar reconstruction jobs,
of establishing cultural standards which are not based either on class
distinctions, as in Britain, or on an intellectual minority, which is our
problem. This latter is the cause of the unnatural union of slovenly
speech and free education. The American vulgate speaker does not say
"throwed" because no one has told him that "threw" is the accepted
form. He says "throwed" because he knows damn well that "threw" is
the accepted form. Nine-tenths of "bad" grammar is a deliberate and
conscious (or half-conscious or subconscious or unconscious, whatever
your private psychological myth may be) variation of a known standard.
The variation does not always originate directly, of course, with the user
of it, but it is in his background. He feels that a consistent use of stan-
dard speech, while it would certainly be "talking good grammar,"
would also be stilted and formal; it would sound stuck-up and make his
friends nervous.
The standard of correctness, then, is established by a small group,
written down in grammars, taught at school and university, and evaded
by a working majority of speakers. This is an impossible situation: rights
and wrongs in speech should be established by general usage. But gen-
eral usage at present seems to have little ambition beyond altering a tac-
itly accepted standard. The use of "throwed" for "threw" does not mean
that ordinary speech tends to change strong verbs into weak ones: if
standard speech requires "dived" the vulgate will have "dove." Toronto
streetcar conductors almost always announce Elm Street as "ellum," but
I heard one, directly after doing so, pronounce "borrowed" as "bor'd,"
showing phonetically the reverse tendency. If standard speech calls for
"I began" and "I've begun," the vulgate will have "I begun" and "I've
began." Wherever there is a feeling of cultural inferiority there will be
this parody of accepted forms: Huckleberry Finn says "skiff" and "raft";
Jim says "skift" and "raff." A grocery clerk once said to me, "it doesn't
make any difference," and then at once corrected himself to, "it don't
make no difference." He felt that the latter form was more pungent and
direct, and he may well have been right. But this antithesis of "correct"
speech and effective speech evidently should be overcome as far as pos-
sible. The movies, and even to some extent the radio, are doing this in
their own way. The boys and girls who want to model their lives on
their movie heroes will at any rate have to listen to them talk. Their
voices, if not actually pleasant, are at least intelligible, which is a good
Reflections at a Movie 107
Now that I have got it down there, that title seems a rather derisive chal-
lenge, like an ostrich egg in a henhouse. In the first place, there is a dis-
couraging text for all music critics from the Book of Ecclesiasticus [32:4]:
"Pour not out talk where there is a performance of music, and display
not thy wisdom out of season." In the second place, a casual layman,
who cannot even follow movie reviews which talk about pan shots and
fade-ins, and who never worked up the courage to see Gone with the
Wind or Fantasia or Mrs. Miniver, is hardly the person to spot Significant
Trends. But the subject of music in the movies has been so little treated
(the only good book on the subject I have seen is Oscar Levant's A Smat-
tering of Ignorance) that perhaps even vague and ill-documented remarks
about it may have some point.
Music has been used as a background for movies ever since the latter
were first made; since then, the movie proper has developed amazingly,
but the incidental music has kept pace with it only just enough not to be
completely incongruous. In early days a scarecrow orchestra sat in the
pit and sawed off popular songs, keeping a wary eye on the screen so
that the traps man could tonk something when the clown hit his head,
or the bass fiddler slither the strings when a woman tore her dress or got
kissed. Gradually attempts were made at more appropriate commentar-
ies. I can remember when I was about fourteen seeing a book called
Motion Picture Moods, assembled by one Rapee,1 in which the various
emotions and scenes depicted in movies were listed alphabetically and
given appropriate music from some standard composer. There were
Music in the Movies 109
Chopin Nocturnes and Grieg Idylls for Love and Romance, and various
allegro agitatos for Excitement and Fire. The first entry, Aeroplane, had
a slice of Mendelssohn's Rondo Capriccioso, then my stock piece. I
could never understand why, possibly because as I played it it sounded
more like a tank charge. With talking pictures, of course, Hollywood
took over the performance of the music itself, which, pace the Musicians'
Union, was a good thing. But Hollywood still thinks of music as "sound
effects," and music is about the only Hollywood Cinderella still without
a success story. There is a considerable gap in intelligence and interest
between, say, Frankenstein and Citizen Kane, and the music in the latter
case ought to show a corresponding superiority in the shivering of tim-
bres. But the music for both sounds much alike—the same endless drum
rolls, the same tired trombones sliding from solemn burp to gloomy
blop. That curious feeling of reincarnation, of Having Been Through All
This Before, that assails one so frequently at movies, owes a great deal to
the stereotyped music.
Two reasons have been assigned for the neglect of music: one, that
nobody, from producer to ultimate consumer, ever by any chance listens
to it; and the other, that the movie is a realistic art which the use of
music disorganizes. The first point, though true, is an effect rather than
a cause; the second, though obsolescent, deserves a brief comment.
Still photography, apart from portraiture, is a more epigrammatic art
than painting, and is more dependent than painting on the picturesque.
No matter how carefully composed, it usually retains some suggestion
of a found subject, a random impression which happens to be typical of
a large number of others. This is doubtless the reason why photogra-
phers display so marked a tendency to corny allegory, of the kind that
labels a picture of a little girl "Springtime" or "Age of Innocence." And
what is true of still photography is even more true of the movie. The
camera's business is not to trace the action indiscriminately, but to pick
out the salient and representative details. Thus, to illustrate the fact that
a man has just died, you may show a telephone ringing without being
answered, or a hand relaxing, or a dog barking, without showing the
man at all. This is not realism; it is symbolism. A stage play may be, up
to a point, realistic: but once you photograph it you have conventional-
ized it as much as if you had put the dialogue into blank verse. In the
opening scene of Romeo and Juliet there is a continuously ascending
series of Montagues and Capulets: first the servants, then Tybalt and
Benvolio, then the heads of the houses, and finally the Prince. In the
no The Arts
movie version2 the camera darts all over the market place, giving one
quick shot after another, in an associative but not a logical order. The
play presents the brawl as a single visual pattern: the movie gives a
series of symbols of it. Years ago, in a very indifferent Harold Lloyd3 pic-
ture, the hero undertook to bounce a spoon into a glass with another
spoon. As long as he was unsuccessful in the story he failed to do this
trick: when his enterprises worked out to a happy ending he did it with
a flourish. That was, of course, a pure if somewhat crude piece of sym-
bolism, and it would have been impossible without a camera. The more
intelligent the moviegoer, the more he appreciates this kind of thing,
and the more he will be attracted, not by the name of the star, but by that
of a witty and resourceful director.
Therefore, a continuous use of musical symbolism is in complete
accord with the whole structure of the movie. The movie demands a
running musical commentary, like the Chinese drama: it is not so well
adapted, like the Elizabethan, for the incidental dance or song. The cam-
era gets restless during a song and acquires a nervous habit of peering
into the singer's molar cavities which is painful and embarrassing to
watch. The talents of Romberg, Gershwin, Kern, and Berlin4 are very
considerable ones, but they are stage and not screen talents. In fact, the
whole of dance-based contemporary music, whether jazz, swing, or
popular song, is ill-suited to the movie and has had little influence on it.
Practically all of it is bound to a remorseless slogging treadmill rhythm,
from the wittiest Duke Ellington or the subtlest blues down to the silliest
stop-the-wop war song. Syncopation, incidentally, does not vary this
beat; it accentuates it.
This is not saying that the popular song or dance has no place in a
movie, but that it should have a subordinate place in a unified musical
pattern. This pattern should be symbolically related to the movie with-
out being program music. That is, it should be based on certain recur-
ring themes which, like the leitmotifs of a Wagner opera, are associated
with certain characters or symbols in the picture. That is what Chaplin
does, or at any rate did in Modern Times, and what Chaplin is doing
today other directors will be overdoing tomorrow. Quotations from
standard music would be a minor feature of this. I did not, as I have
indicated, see Fantasia, but I gather that the treatment of the Pastoral
Symphony was a bit heavy-handed compared to the delicate reference
to it at the opening of the superb Farmyard Symphony, just before all the
animals got to work on the Verdi Miserere. Often a director will develop
Music in the Movies 111
Review of Modern Music: The Story of Music in Our Time, by Max Graf
(New York: Philosophical Library, ca. 1946). From the "Briefly Noted" section
of Canadian Forum, 26 (November 1946): 190.
Not much use to anyone with a serious interest in the subject, as the
author seems almost incapable of referring to music except in terms of
metaphors and similes from other arts; but it mentions a good many
names and contains a number of cultural pep-talks which might provide
some frame of reference to a beginner in music "appreciation," what-
ever that is. The general line of approach is Bruckner-Mahler Viennese.1
14
Abner Dean's It's a Long
Way to Heaven
November 1946
Review of It's a Long Way to Heaven, by Abner Dean (New York and Tor-
onto: Farrar and Rinehart, 1945). From the "Briefly Noted" section of Cana-
dian Forum, 26 (November 1946): 190. This brief review maintains Frye's
momentum in the investigation of popular, antirealist art forms.
Review of The Art of Russia, edited with a preface by Helen Rubissow (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1946). From Canadian Forum, 26 (December
1946): 213.
Review of The Innocent Eye, by Herbert Read (London: Faber and Faber,
1946). From Canadian Forum, 27 (August 1947): 119. Sir Herbert Read,
born in Yorkshire to a dairy-farming family, was an infantry officer in World
War I, and subsequently one of the most indefatigable promoters of avant-garde
art in the English-speaking world. His many works include Naked Warriors
(1919), The Green Child (1945), and Contemporary British Art (1951).
Autobiography is, like blank verse, very easy to write and very hard to
write well. Mr. Read writes well, especially in the early part of his remi-
niscence, which reads at times like a prose version of Wordsworth's Pre-
lude. This is natural for a critic who strives to be, in contrast to T.S. Eliot,
anarchist in politics, Romantic in literature, and agnostic in religion.1 He
is perhaps an anarchist only in the sense in which we are all anarchists,
wanting the society that interferes least with individual freedom.
Romanticism he defines as belief "in the immediacy of expression, in the
automatism of inspiration, in the creative nature of even poetic evolu-
tion" [78-9], which has made him among other things a spokesman of
surrealism.2 His religious position is cloudier, and I think confused by
Kierkegaard's statement of the religious and aesthetic positions as an
"either/or" dilemma. I should say at a venture that further examination
of the Taoism he refers to would reveal something more interesting than
agnosticism. But any autobiography is apt to sound pretty tentative
unless its author is much nearer to being dead than Mr. Read is.
17
The Eternal Tramp
December 1947
From Here and Now, i, no. 2 (December 1947): 8-11. Reprinted in RW, 28-
34. Typescript in NFF, 1991, box 38, file 3.
goes through his routine with Hitler's glazed eyes, glancing at his
watch as Hitler would consult an astrologer, rising to a crisis of action
as Hitler would seize the historic hour. And his downfall is not due to
the cleverness of society so much as to the fact that he wakes out of his
hypnotic trance, reverts to normal, and becomes again the real tramp,
the sane social misfit, unable to act because deprived of motives for
doing so.
Nobody really catches him. From society's point of view the story of
Verdoux is a detective thriller, and the detective does get on his trail. But
the whole smug banal convention of the detective story, with its crimi-
nal murder at one end balanced by a judicial murder at the other, its glo-
rification of the man-hunter, and its elaborate pretence that the social
order develops logical machinery to catch every rebel against it,
explodes at the moment that the detective accepts Verdoux's poisoned
drink. Again, the film opens on a hideous squabbling family that sup-
plies Verdoux with one of his victims, and this family, a symbol of social
claustrophobia, does close in at the end. Nevertheless the social ven-
geance that traps Verdoux comes from Verdoux himself. He deliberately
walks into the prison because he has finally realized that he has never
escaped from what it represents.
We are told that another turn of the social machine, a financial crash
that wiped him out, was what brought him to his senses. But the real
awakener is his realization that the machine does not operate as a
machine, much less as a social order, because it is out of control, and
therefore it operates as blind chance. Luck is no respecter of persons,
and even a vulgar and selfish fool like the Martha Raye5 character (her
name of course is Bonheur, but a pun on bonne heure, underlining the
subtle timing element, occurs in the dialogue), simply because she is
born lucky, has more of the predestined accuracy of the sleepwalker
than he, with all his agility. Her shattering mindless laugh, which regu-
larly recurs through a wedding party, is certainly a voice of doom, yet it
is a laugh with no pleasure (which is, like Blake's tear, an intellectual
thing) [Jerusalem, pi. 52,1. 25], no triumph and no cry for vengeance, but
is more like the noise the iceberg made when the Titanic hit it. Again, the
girl-tramp whom Verdoux was going to poison as an experiment is dis-
missed with a theatrical remark about her corrupting him into goodness,
transforming Satan into an angel of light. He turns the girl's luck; he
waves his hand and makes her rich—for she goes to the arms of a muni-
tions manufacturer.
The Eternal Tramp 121
the really innocent victim, like Christ refusing the vinegar sponge [Mark
15:36!. "I've never tasted rum," he says, and Everyman, with his foul life
and his immortal soul, drains the communion cup with its new drink,
and goes out to be caught in a machine once more, full of hope because
this time the machine will overreach itself and set him free.
18
On Book Reviewing
June 1949
From Here and Now, 2 (June 1949): 19-20. Frye's remarks, along with those
of Malcolm Ross and F.R. Scott, were introduced by a note from the editor
explaining that "the following three articles constitute the result of a question-
naire which we sent to Mr. Frye, Mr. Ross, and Mr. Scott. We do not doubt
that all our readers' questions will not be answered here and for this we are
solely to blame. However, insofar as the subject is inexhaustible, we hope that
our authors have provided sufficient impetus for further discussion." Readers of
this volume will note Frye's reference to criticism as "the science of literature"
and his controversial views on the precritical nature of the value judgment.
of literature.2 Even bad reviewers, however, have their uses for the
author, if none for the reader: they correct his perspective. The author
knows not only what he means, but what he intended to mean, what he
thought of on the way toward saying it, and what overtones of meaning
he wants to be picked up. Thus he unconsciously creates in his mind an
ideal reader who is really a double of himself. The reviewer always
turns out to be someone else, and so his perceptions will seem unexpect-
edly gross and dull. But even if he is stupid or malicious, the author
must learn that a regrettably large proportion of his public is also stupid
and malicious. Yet I think it possible to be too quick in assuming that the
reviewer has sold his soul to Satan the accuser. So vain an animal is
man,3 that if he writes a book he regards anything said in his favour as
the least the fool could have said, whereas any animadversion is apt to
make him feel like a Hamlet watching the dumb show of a damned
smiling villain dropping poison into a sleeping public's ear [3.2.260,
stage direction]. If I may speak both as a reviewer and as one who has
been reviewed, I think that usually a reviewer's failures are only occa-
sional breakdowns in the exacting discipline of his craft.
19
Academy without Walls1
May 1961
to tell the artist that whatever he is doing he is doing it all wrong, and
ought to "return" to something they regard as more satisfactory. The
trouble is that the artist does not have all that freedom of choice, once his
initial choice (and even that may not be a choice)8 has been made. He
can paint or write or compose only what takes shape in his mind: he can-
not will to become a different kind of artist. It is possible in a totalitarian
society, and it might be possible in this one, to lay down certain
approved norms that all artists must conform to, and to ensure that no
one who does not have the specific talents required will ever get to be an
artist. But that would not make realists out of artists; it would merely
mean that a very different and much less genuinely creative group of
people were taking over the arts.
The contemporary artist is dependent neither on patronage nor on
popularity, but on something in between. Because his work is increas-
ingly regarded as an academic and scholarly activity, he depends on rec-
ognition by critics, reviewers, directors of museums and art galleries,
members of the advisory boards of councils and wealthy foundations,
university administrators who employ him as a summer teacher or resi-
dent artist—almost entirely a community of scholars. The artist may dis-
like this situation, or pretend to do so. He may dream of appealing to the
general public over the heads of such scholars: he may attack them as
unimaginative, culturally sterile, parasitic, prissy, and hidebound: he
may fall into cliches of nineteenth-century Romanticism about the cre-
ator's virility and the critic's lack of it. We find this in the work of the
writer who produces, for middlebrow magazines, the kind of highly
conventionalized essay about his view of the modern world that is
designed to give the impression of a writer writing like a writer. Or the
artist may have been brought up to think of the academic as the opposite
of the creative, and be genuinely bewildered by a world in which they
have become the same thing. Nevertheless, scholars are the public on
whom the artist must make his first impression, and from his point of
view he could hardly do better. Advisory committees and the like are as
a rule liberal to a fault: they know how many mistakes have been made
in the past, and are not anxious to repeat them; they do not require con-
ventional morality or subservient behaviour; they expect the artist to
take the odd nervous bite out of the hand that feeds him. There are
exceptions, but they are far fewer than when Samuel Johnson could list
the hazards of the mental life as: "Toil, Envy, Want, the Patron, and the
Jail" [The Vanity of Human Wishes, 1.160]. For many a modern artist, sup-
Academy without Walls 131
hearing that nothing else can give, a way of living in society in which
the imagination takes its proper central place. Just as the sciences show
us the physical world of nature, so the arts show us the human world
that man is trying to build out of nature. And, without moralizing, the
arts gradually lead us to separate the vision of the world we want to live
in from the world that we hate and reject, the ideals of beauty from the
horrors portrayed by art when it is in the mood that we call ironic. All
genuine art leads up to this separation, and that is why it is an educating
force.
Our present society is not predestined to go onward and upward,
whether with the arts or without them. We are trying to marshal all the
resources of culture and intellect we have in order to struggle with the
problems that our civilization has created. We have outside us nations
with different political philosophies, and we think of them as dangers,
or even as enemies. But our more dangerous enemies, so far, are within.
I spoke a moment ago of the difference between a mob and a democratic
society. Our effective enemies are not foreign propagandists, but the
hucksters and hidden persuaders and segregators and censors and hys-
terical witch-hunters and all the rest of the black guard who can only
live as parasites on a gullible and misinformed mob. Yet the only really
permanent way to turn society into a mob is to debase the arts: to turn
literature into slanted news, painting into billboard advertising, music
into caterwauling transistor sets, architecture into mean streets. As an
educator, the artist today has a revolutionary role to play of an impor-
tance of which no nineteenth-century Bohemian in a Paris garret ever
dreamed. He has powerful friends as well as enemies, for in his commit-
ment to his art he has the fundamental good will of society on his side.
20
Communications
9 July 1970
suspect that the world one hundred years from now will be much more
like the world today than the experts suggest.
Plato was much concerned with the revolution brought about by writ-
ing in his day. He felt that the oral tradition was done for, and that the
poets, the great rememberers, were on their way out as teachers, and
would have to give place to the writing philosophers. But Plato's
Socrates, of all people, was unlikely to overlook the ironic side of this. In
the Phaedrus we are told that the Egyptian god Thoth invented writing,
and explained to all the other gods how greatly his invention would
transform the memory [2740-2753]. The other gods looked down their
noses and said that on the contrary it would only destroy the memory.
Thoth and his critics were talking about different kinds of memory, so
they couldn't get any further. The deadlock between the enthusiasm of a
technological expert and a public digging in its heels to resist him has
never been more clearly stated.
All the mass media have a close connection with the centres of social
authority, and reflect their anxieties. In socialist countries they reflect
the anxiety of the political Establishment to retain power; in the United
States they reflect the anxiety of the economic Establishment to keep
production running. In either case communication is a one-way street.
Wherever we turn, there is that same implacable voice, unctuous,
caressing, inhumanly complacent, selling us food, cars, political leaders,
culture, contemporary issues, and remedies against the migraine we get
from listening to it. It is not just the voice we hear that haunts us, but the
voice that goes on echoing in our minds, forming our habits of speech,
our processes of thought.
If people did not resent this they would not be human, and all the
nightmares about society turning into an insect state would come true.
My hair prickles when I hear advertisers talk of a television set simply
as a means of reaching their market. It so seldom occurs to them that a
television set might be their market's way of looking at them, and that
the market might conceivably not like what it sees. If the viewer is black
and sees a white society gorging itself on luxuries and privileges, the
results can be explosive. But this is only a special case of a general social
resentment against being always treated as an object to be stimulated.
As with erotic stimulation, or should I say as with other forms of erotic
stimulation, there is a large element of mechanical and involuntary
response, for all the resentment. The harder it is to escape, the more
quickly the resentment turns to panic, and it seems clear that a great
136 The Arts
deal of the shouting and smashing and looting and burning of our time
comes from this panic. Many other things are best understood as forms
of resentment, or at least resistance, to mass communication, such as the
rock music which wraps up its listeners in an impermeable cloak of
noise. I often wonder, too, how far the users of drugs have been affected
by a feeling that they have been cheated out of genuinely new sensory
impressions by the mass media.
More important is the political resistance. When I read articles on sat-
ellite broadcasting and the like I am often told, with a teacher's glassy
smile, that the increase in the range of broadcasting will lead to far
greater international understanding, because very soon now we can
have all the problems of Tanzania or Paraguay brought to us by touch-
ing a button, and won't that be nice? One answer from the public which
is remarkably loud and clear is that they don't want all those people in
their living room. If the world is becoming a global village, it will also
take on the features of real village life, including cliques, lifelong feuds,
and impassable social barriers. In spirit I agree with the optimists: it is
the destiny of man to unite rather than divide, and as a Canadian I have
little sympathy with separatism,1 which seems to me a mean and
squalid philosophy. But I can hardly ignore the fact that separatism is
the strongest political force yet thrown up by the age of television.
The direction of most of the technological developments of our time
has been towards greater introversion. The automobile, the passenger
aeroplane, the movie, the television set, the multistorey block, are all
much more introverted than their predecessors. The result is increased
alienation and a decline in the sense of festivity, the sense of pleasure in
belonging to a community. Even our one technically festive season,
Christmas, is an introverted German Romantic affair, based on a myth of
retreat into the cave of a big Dickensian cuddly family of a type that
hardly exists. The one advantage of an introverted situation is privacy;
but for us the growing introversion goes along with a steady decrease in
privacy. This means that the psychological conditions of life, whatever
the physical conditions, become increasingly like those of life in a
prison, where there is no privacy and yet no real community. In this sit-
uation the easy defences of introversion, such as apathy or cynicism, are
no defences at all.
We hear of meetings broken up and speakers howled down by orga-
nized gangs; we try to phone from a tube station and find the telephone
torn out; we read of hijacked planes and of bombs in letter boxes; hood-
Communications 137
lums go berserk in summer resorts and adolescents scream all the words
they know that used to be called obscene. We realize that these acts are
in too consistent a pattern to be mere destructiveness, and yet they are
too irresponsible to be serious revolutionary tactics, though they may be
rationalized as such. However silly or vicious they may be, they are acts
of counter-communication, acts noisy enough or outrageous enough to
shout down that voice and spit at that image, if only for a few moments.
But hysterical violence is self-defeating, not merely because it is violence
but because, as counter-communication, it can only provoke more
of what it attacks. Every outbreak of violence releases more floods
of alarm, understanding, deep reservations, comment in perspective,
denunciation, concern, sympathy, analysis, and reasoned argument.
Violence, however long it lasts, can only go around in the circles of lost
direction. There is a vaguely Freudian notion that there is something
therapeutic in releasing inhibitions; but it is clear that releasing inhibi-
tions is just as compulsive, repetitive, and hysterical an operation as the
repressing of them.2
To go back to Plato and the god Thoth's invention: an oral culture,
before writing develops, is heavily dependent on individual memory.
This means that the teachers are often poets, because verse is the easiest
verbal pattern to remember. With writing, and eventually printing, con-
tinuous prose develops. With prose, philosophy changes from aphorism
and proverb to a continuous argument organized by logic and dialectic,
and history to a continuous narrative. Such metaphors as "the pursuit of
knowledge" are based on the sense of the planned and systematic con-
quest of reality which writing makes possible. In our day the electronic
media of film, radio, and television have brought about a revival of the
oral culture that we had before writing, and many of the social charac-
teristics of a preliterate society are reappearing in ours. The poet, for
example, finds himself again before a listening audience, when he can
use topical or even ephemeral themes: he does not have to retreat from
society and write for posterity.
One common interpretation of this fact, strongly influenced by Mar-
shall McLuhan, is that print represents a "linear"3 and timebound
approach to reality, and that the electronic media, by reviving the oral
tradition, have brought in a new "simultaneous" or mosaic form of un-
derstanding. Contemporary unrest, in this view, is part of an attempt to
adjust to a new situation and break away from the domination of print.
This view is popular among American educators, because it makes for
138 The Arts
they adjourn for a cabinet meeting, for a preliterate society cannot get
politically past the stage of a closed council with its oral deliberations. It
is true that when we come to heaven there is another harangue and
another listening audience. But there is one important difference: God is
thinking of writing a book, and is outlining the plot to the angels.
The domination of print in Western society, then, has not simply
made possible the technical and engineering efficiency of that society, as
McLuhan emphasizes. It has also created all the conditions of freedom
within that society: democratic government, universal education, toler-
ance of dissent, and (because the book individualizes its audience) the
sense of the importance of privacy, leisure, and freedom of movement.
What the oral media have brought in is, by itself, anarchist in its social
affinities.
It has often been pointed out that the electronic media revive many of
the primitive and tribal conditions of a preliterate culture, but there is
no fate in such matters, no necessity to go around the circle of history
again. Democracy and book culture are interdependent, and the rise of
oral and visual media represents, not a new order to adjust to, but a sub-
ordinate order to be contained.4
21
The Renaissance of Books
15 November 1973
I suppose one may spend one's whole life with books, without thinking
particularly about the different kinds of emotional impact that books
The Renaissance of Books 141
may have, not only because of what they are, but because of what they
symbolize or dramatize in society. I can trace in my own earlier life sev-
eral kinds of such symbolic influence. There had been a clergyman in
our family, and the bookcases in our house included several shelves of
portly theological tomes in black bindings. These were professional
books, of course, and their equivalents would have been, and still would
be, found in other such homes. But on a child they gave an effect of
immense and definitive authority, of summing up the learning and wis-
dom of the ages. They appealed to that primitive area of response before
reading was a general skill in society, when "gramarye" meant magic,
when there were few Prosperos and many Calibans to say of them:
Remember
First to possess his books; for without them
He's but a sot, as I am; nor hath not
One spirit to command.... Burn but his books. [The Tempest, 3.2.91-5]
And yet when I was old enough to begin to try to use these books
myself, I became aware of another important principle connected with
books: the principle of the mortality of knowledge. Apart from two
which I am still using, a Cruden's Concordance to the Bible and a Jose-
phus, there was hardly a statement in any of these volumes which had
not become demonstrably false, meaningless, or obsolete. I remember
opening a huge commentary on the first page, the introduction to Gene-
sis, and reading there: "Nothing is more certain than that this book was
written by Moses." Alas, I already knew that if there was one thing
more uncertain than the authorship of Genesis, it was the existence of
Moses. The black bindings were appropriate: the books were coffins of
dead knowledge. Their impressiveness as physical objects was gro-
tesquely inconsistent with the speed at which scholarship moves, and it
was clear that books ought to have a very different sort of appearance if
they are to symbolize the fact that genuine knowledge is always in a
state of flux.
In the same house there were sets of Scott and Dickens, and sets of
lesser writers as well, for in those days even a bestselling novelist with a
temporary vogue might achieve a collected edition in twenty volumes.
There were also poets—Elizabeth Browning, Longfellow, Whittier—
bound up in some repulsive substance that at the least hint of sustained
use began to split, crack, and come off on the fingers. Sinclair Lewis in
Main Street refers to the "unread-looking sets" of authors in the homes
142 The Arts
of Gopher Prairie,1 and doubtless many such sets were unread. But
being read may not have been their only, perhaps not even their pri-
mary, social function. I still possess a set of The World's Best Essays,
bound in red leather and illustrated by steel engraving portraits of the
authors. I hesitate to give it away, because it really is an extraordinary
collection: I could hardly have believed that so much of Baudelaire,2 for
example, was so available to North American homes around 1910. But
the physical conditions of the set make it difficult to read, and almost
impossible to use.
I am not trying to characterize the reading habits, or nonreading hab-
its, of an earlier generation: I am trying to illustrate the symbolic impact
of certain types of books in middle-class households up to about 1920.
As physical objects, such books assumed the role of a cultural monu-
ment, representatives of the authority of tradition. They are well evoked
in an early poem of T.S. Eliot:
However, this poem is also about a girl who smoked and danced the
modern dances, implying that even Matthew and Waldo may not have
been altogether with it, at least not in that physical form. The word "gla-
zen," meaning, of course, that they were in formally designed bookcases
with glass covers, indicates that, whether they were read or not, being
looked at when they were not being read was an integral part of their
function and value.
I went to Toronto for my university training, and Toronto, in the 19305,
still had a good deal of the British midland town about it, including a
number of second-hand bookshops. Here was a quite different kind of
emotional appeal connected with books. I should put this statement in
the plural, for many emotions clustered around the second-hand book-
shop. One was the emotion of nostalgia, on finding the favourite books of
one's earlier life. Alexander Woollcott has an essay about a woman who
discovered on a Paris bookstall the identical copy of a book she had pos-
sessed as a child: he speaks of this experience as "catching nature in the
act of rhyming."3 Then there was the reflection on the vanity of human
wishes, in coming, say, upon a book by an unknown author with a sad
little inscription on the flyleaf presenting it to a friend. More central, of
The Renaissance of Books 143
course, was the excitement of the treasure hunt. This could be literal and
commercial, the rare exhilaration of carrying out from under the book-
seller's nose something that was more valuable than he realized. But that
was for experts: as a rule, one was content with the feeling that the book
itself might be a hidden treasure, an unlocked word-hoard. This feeling,
however often disappointed, is quite as primitive and essential as the
impression of magical authority, already mentioned. Such shops have
now largely disappeared from Toronto, as from other cities: even the for-
lorn books that used to go the rounds of church rummage sales have
been bought up by librarians of new universities, at least in enough
quantity to remove them from the orbit of the book-searcher's interest.
The second-hand bookshop however represents something irreplaceable
in one's literary experience, and it is bound to revive sooner or later, if
only as an aspect of the junk-antique business.
I was in London, on my way to Oxford as a student, when Penguins
began to appear. At that time they were sixpence apiece, and could be
got out of slot machines. They were aggressively advertised, at least for
British mores at that time: I remember an advertisement contrasting a
new Penguin with a battered and dog-eared copy of a book from a pub-
lic library, with the caption: "You don't know who had it last."4 I did
realize that this reflection on public libraries had some social signifi-
cance, the public libraries being so major an influence on the book mar-
ket throughout the nineteenth century, able to exert collateral forms of
pressure like censorship. But I did not realize that I was seeing the birth
of something like a revolution. After all, why should it have been one?
Why should putting out books in brightly coloured soft covers, with the
pages glued instead of sewn, be an important cultural change? It is
surely not comparable with other physical changes in the history of the
verbal arts, such as the change from scroll to codex around the begin-
ning of the Christian era, to say nothing of the invention of the printing
press itself.
The reason, I think, is once again the fact that books are significant not
only for what they are but for what they dramatize or symbolize in soci-
ety by their appearance. The paperback was partly a reaction to the
book as cultural monument, and by being that it helped to dramatize the
importance of the book as an intellectual tool. It suggested a higher
degree of expendability, and so acknowledged the mutability of scholar-
ship and literary taste. The psychological effect of studying such a work
as Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in paperback seems to me to be quite
144 The Arts
different from studying the same book in a hard cover. And by drama-
tizing the book as intellectual tool, the paperback also dramatized the
extraordinary effectiveness of the book, the fact that, familiar and unob-
trusive as it is, the book is one of the most efficient technological instru-
ments ever developed in human history.
There are signs, naturally enough, that the paperback vogue is waning
and that it will come to dominate the book world less exclusively in the
future. One has to see it in its proper context, as one of several revolu-
tions in verbal media. Others are the development of photocopying and
the immense growth of facsimile reprints: I should add to this also what
seems to me to be an unprecedented increase in the volume and range of
translation. All these are part of the same cultural expansion that has
produced reproductions in paintings and recordings of music, and like
them they have greatly expanded the range of possible influence on con-
temporary culture. Just as any freshman in a conservatory may learn
from records more about pre-Mozartian music than Mozart himself ever
knew, so any student in a small college may have access, potentially, to a
range of materials formerly available only in the biggest libraries. Even
when books are produced in the scale and size of the cultural monu-
ment, they show the effects of these revolutions. An example is the type
of book usually called, rather deprecatingly, the coffee-table book. This
is normally a collection of photographs of pictures or buildings, and is
designed, not to stand on shelves with an army of unalterable law, but to
lie down enticingly and alone, like a mistress.
Paperbacks and photocopied materials reflect also a major change in
the academic perspective. As an undergraduate I was taught philoso-
phy by G.S. Brett, a scholar greatly admired by his students, and most
deservedly so, for his vast learning. He was the author of a History of
Psychology, still a standard work on the subject; he had no degree except
an Oxford M.A., and was Dean of the Graduate School, a task he took
with little seriousness because he thought graduate research was mostly
a lot of nonsense. He represented a generation of scholars whose life
work was expressed by a single major book, or a very restricted canon
of such books.5 But even in his last teaching years, the cataract of
papers, offprints, and other manifestations of the publish-or-perish
fetish in academic life had begun, as a part of the cultural change of
which the paperback and the reprint are other symbols. Philosophers
like AJ. Ayer began mounting attacks on metaphysics,6 partly, I think,
because metaphysics represented the structural aspect of philosophy,
The Renaissance of Books 145
the aspect which made large books possible. In their wake came the
"productive scholars" of a new school, who tended to be suspicious of
all books that were not collections of brief papers. Robert Musil, in The
Man without Qualities, surveys the situation with his usual double-
edged irony:
I have always been very touched by the preface to the third and last
volume of Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology. This was a work on which
Tillich had spent many years, because, he says, he had always wanted to
write a systematic theology. I can think of no better reason for writing
anything, but the ambition itself was typical of a certain period of cul-
ture. By the time he reached his last volume the fashion in theology had
changed, the younger intellectuals had turned to much more simplistic
versions of existentialism than the one that he held, and he was being
told on all sides that the phrase "systematic theology" no longer made
any sense, in fact was a contradiction in terms.
Similar changes naturally affected literature itself, especially poetry,
which up to about 1950 symbolized a good deal of cultural authority
whether it was read or not. When we speak of such nineteenth-century
poets as Longfellow as "popular," we are using the term in a somewhat
retrospective sense: Longfellow was widely read, but he was also a
scholarly poet, and most of those who read him felt that they were
engaging in a fairly highbrow enterprise. Even writers of inspirational
doggerel might be regarded, on a popular level, with the kind of awe
implied in another phrase from Lewis's Main Street: "they say he writes
real poetry."8 The great poets of the first half of this century—Eliot,
Yeats, Pound—had the somewhat aloof authority conferred by their
erudition, even though they often felt the pull of the desire to be genu-
146 The Arts
inely popular. We have the Eliot of Sanskrit quotations and the Eliot of
practical cats; we have the Yeats of Rosicrucian symbolism and the Yeats
of the luminously simple ballads in the Last Poems. Allen Ginsberg's
Howl is usually taken as the turning point towards a neo-Romantic
poetry which has been popular in a way hardly known to previous gen-
erations. Much of this poetry has turned back to the primitive oral tradi-
tion of folk song, with the formulaic units, topical allusions, musical
accompaniment, and public presentation that go with that tradition.
The changes in prose fiction are even more significant from our
present point of view. In Canada, as in many other communities, there
lingered for a long time the myth of "the great Canadian novel," the
hope that somebody some day would produce a novel in Canada as
monumental as War and Peace. The word "the" implies that whoever did
it would do it only once, but, even so, the achievement would have a
redemptive force for the whole Canadian community: the authority of
such a work would confer authority on the society that produced it. This
means, among other things, that a monumental novel reflects a rela-
tively coherent social order, as the Victorian three-decker, the book one
could live inside of, manifested the prestige of Victorian society. Even
Tolstoy's Russia, despite our hindsight, afforded a good deal of stability
to the novelist of this kind. Hence the most highly regarded novels, in
the period up to say 1940, were predominantly realistic, for realism had
the dignity and the moral force that goes with the ability to study and
interpret a civilization. Such realism was central to what F.R. Lea vis calls
"the great tradition," which he studies, in a book with that title, in
George Eliot, Joseph Conrad, and Henry James.
However, when empires start building walls around themselves it is a
sign that their power is declining, and "the great tradition" is now not
much more than a tradition. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings came out in the
mid-1950s, to the accompaniment of a chorus of readers saying "of
course I can't read fantasy," usually with an air of conscious virtue. The
success of Tolkien's book, however, indicated a change of taste parallel
to the post-Ginsberg change in poetry, towards the romantic, the fantas-
tic, and the mythopoeic. Science fiction, which is really a form of philo-
sophical romance, has taken on a new importance, and the mythical
elements in Pynchon or Vonnegut do not revolve around a realistic cen-
tre, as they do in Ulysses. Romance, fantasy, and mythopoeia are the
inescapable forms for a society which no longer believes in its own per-
manence or continuity. I know several writers who acquired early in life
The Renaissance of Books 147
M. Zola sits down to give us a picture of the Second Empire. Who cares for
the Second Empire now? It is out of date. Life goes faster than Realism, but
Romanticism is always in front of Life.9
literature in the same way that they are related to actual life. We ask an
actor to put on a good show, not to tell the truth, and when, say, a sena-
tor remarks approvingly that the president was very "believable" in his
last interview, he reflects the confusion of standards. Such a confusion
returns us to the Machiavellian principle of pure appearance, the basis
of what we now call propaganda. It is not important that the prince
should be virtuous; it is important only that he should seem so. Such an
attitude is imaginative in a perverted sense. Literature is phenomenal: it
presents reality entirely through appearance, but in "real life" what is
"real" is normally hidden or disguised by the appearance. In trying to
get out of the bind that this imitation of literature by life gets us into, we
have to return to the book, or at least to the verbal documents of which
books form a major part.
Newspapers and the electronic media have carried much further a
tendency which was begun by the book: the tendency to break down the
distinction between private and social experience. It always was true
that poetry, for example, could never become the exclusive possession of
one person in the way that an easel painting could be. Wherever there is
a literature, there is a community of shared imaginative experience; and
yet, wherever there are books, there is the opposite tendency of individ-
ualizing the audience. When society still contained a number of illiter-
ates, or habitual nonreaders, a village community, say, would form
around a man who could read aloud to them the news, or what passed
for news, and current literature. A certain amount of Richardson in the
eighteenth century, even of Dickens in the nineteenth, was transmitted
in this way. But of course in proportion as the ability to read increased,
the audience of hearers decreased. In Elizabethan times there were sev-
eral popular theatres, but the fateful action taken by Ben Jonson in 1616,
of publishing his plays in a book, and so suggesting that one could stay
home to read the play instead of risking catching the plague in an audi-
ence, began an erosion of the public theatre that by Victorian times had
threatened to remove drama from serious literature altogether. Similarly
with religion: although Protestants insisted on public attendance at
church as strongly as Catholics, their simultaneous insistence on the
supreme authority of a sacred book did much to advance the decay of
church attendance which is still with us. The concert hall has met similar
difficulties with the recording of music. In the age of television it is a
common experience to attend a public function and then go home to get
on television a more comprehensive and comprehensible view of what
The Renaissance of Books 151
one has just been engaged in. So what is the comparative value of the
two experiences?
Traditionally, the individual is thought of as having a primary duty to
support the institutions of society. The permanence and continuity
of church, court, lawcourt, political party, classroom, even, in lesser
degree, of theatre and concert hall and museum, give dignity and
importance to the individual's life by representing something older and
longer lasting than he is. Hence the feeling of obligation about many
forms of public attendance. The kind of development we have been trac-
ing, from the earliest books to television, reverses this tendency by
increasing the range of private life. It is significant again that the impact
of television in the late 19605 carried with it a cult of nearly anarchic
individualism. Yet the individual, qua individual, can hardly get much
beyond the spectacular perspective on public life which makes it poten-
tially a series of theatrical events. There must be some other form of
activity that enables us to get closer to what underlies these spectacular
representations.
The permanence of social institutions is often symbolized by public
monuments, buildings, statues, and the like, built for the astonishment
of posterity out of stone or metal. There is of course a lurking irony in
such productions of the kind crystallized in Shelley's Ozymandias son-
net: anything that can be set up can be knocked down, and doubtless
will be sooner or later. The history of verbal documents is rather differ-
ent, even though they too can become monumental, as we saw. There is
a dramatic episode in the Book of Jeremiah, in the Old Testament, where
Jeremiah's secretary Jehudi is reading from the prophet's scroll, to the
king, a prophecy consisting largely of denunciations of the royal policy.
At the end of every paragraph or so the exasperated king cuts off the
read portion of the scroll with a knife and throws it into the fire [Jere-
miah 36:20-32]. This must have been a papyrus scroll: parchment or vel-
lum, besides being probably beyond the prophet's financial means,
would have been tough enough to spoil the king's gesture. The king's
palace disappeared totally in a few years, but the Book of Jeremiah,
entrusted to the most fragile and combustible substance produced in the
ancient world, remains in reasonably good shape. The vitality of words
written on papyrus, as compared with the hugest monuments of peren-
nial brass, has perhaps some analogy to the fact that life, precarious and
easily snuffed out as it is, is still at least as strong a force as death.
In our own civilization, as explained earlier, information changes
152 The Arts
quickly and needs more fluid media, and paperbacks, talked and taped
books, interview books, printouts, microfiche, and documents coded for
feeding into computers are all parts of the result. So are the great moun-
tains of photocopied papers, which among other things have thrown the
copyright law into a complete chaos. But by doing so, photocopied
materials have illustrated the importance of a moral issue connected
with the verbal arts which is even more important than copyright.
In a primitive society, where there is no general dissemination of the
ability to read or write, the poet becomes the teacher of the community.
The reason is that a society without writing depends a great deal on
memory, and the poet is better able to remember than other men
because he can hitch things into verse, and verse is easier to remember
than any prose arrangement of words. In such a society there is of course
no sense of the poet's having exclusive possession of his material, any
more than any other teacher would have. Later, the conception of litera-
ture develops as a body of great traditional themes held in common.
Chaucer, Shakespeare, the writers of Greek tragedy, all draw their mate-
rials from well-known sources, and their assumption is: this story may
have often been told, but I'm telling it better, so you won't need to refer
to any other versions except mine. Gradually literature became assimi-
lated to the conditions of the capitalistic market: the individual author's
work had to be sufficiently distinct for him to patent it and prevent oth-
ers from appropriating it. The right of an individual author to benefit
from the marketing of his work is of course an unquestioned moral prin-
ciple, and is likely to remain one. Still, copyright, or the private posses-
sion of literary work for the purposes of making a living from it, is not
the primary moral principle connected with literature, or the verbal arts
generally. That primary principle is rather the principle of public access
to the work.
I think once more of the Old Testament. We are told that during the
repairing of the Temple in Jerusalem, a "book of the law" was discov-
ered and brought to King Josiah:
And . .. when the king had heard the words of the book of the law,... he
rent his clothes. And the king commanded . . . saying, Go ye, enquire of the
Lord for me, and for the people, and for all Judah, concerning the words of
this book that is found; for great is the wrath of the Lord that is kindled
against us, because our fathers have not hearkened unto the words of this
book. [2 Kings 22:11-13]
The Renaissance of Books 153
confronting us, those of ecology, the energy crisis, the curtailing of natu-
ral resources, the exterminating of animal and plant species, are the
result of inheriting several centuries of systematic violence against
nature. As for human society, violence is built into that on various lev-
els. Wherever there are great inequalities of wealth and privilege, there
is at least indirect violence, and the tremendous productivity of the
United States, the major part of the North American civilization to
which we belong, has been built up by a social activity that has included
slavery, lynchings, the bad men of the Wild West, free fights with eyes
gouged out, beatings of union organizers, and the more carefully legal-
ized violence of the "robber barons" who built up such immense for-
tunes, some of which have become charitable foundations subsidizing
studies in violence. In an expanding society like nineteenth-century
America, violence flourished on the social or economic frontier; as the
continent became socially consolidated, much of this violence was
forced underground and became increasingly antisocial. Apart from
outright crime, which is now a business like any other, there are many
activities which are still legal but are morally wrong. When a broad-
caster and a sponsor conspire to produce a socially irresponsible pro-
gram, that is in itself a violent situation, and has to be recognized as
such. In Canada, where we began with a military conquest and held
down the northwest by a police force, most of the violence has been
repressive, or law-and-order, violence. That is one reason why Cana-
dian-produced television is quieter than American television, and why
we take regulatory bodies like the CRTC so much for granted.
I am somewhat disturbed by the fact that the opposite of "violent"
seems always to be "nonviolent," as though violence were a positive
thing and we had nothing to put against it except a negation. Wherever
there is one human being there is a very considerable output of mental
and physical energy, and wherever there is more than one human being
those energies are going to conflict. It seems to me that violence, as we
have been using the word here, is misapplied energy:1 it is to energy
what prostitution is to sexual love. As such, it really is a negative force,
and controlling violence would be the way to set human energy free for
its proper tasks.
Controlling violence means, first of all, raising the level of society. The
people who produce and sell socially irresponsible programs are think-
ing of their viewers as a mob rather than a community. The mob is the
lowest form of community: it is a completely homogeneous society
158 The Arts
organized for hatred, and will not remain a mob long unless it can find
someone to beat up, or, failing that, something to smash. When a televi-
sion program depicts someone being slowly beaten to death, the pri-
mary appeal is, "Look at this: isn't it fun?" As soon as anyone begins to
object that this may be a wrong kind of fun, the violence is immediately
rationalized, and turns self-righteous. All rationalized violence has
much the same argument, the argument behind all fights on school play-
grounds: he started it. That is, whenever violence is rationalized it is
asserted to be counter-violence. Somebody else did something first, and
we have to resist it. That is true of the violence of capital punishment; it
is true of the violence of Palestinian terrorists.2 Fictional violence, how-
ever, may be rationalized more simply as a refusal to take a positive atti-
tude in a violent world, that is, this is what we're all involved in,
whether we like it or not—and so on. But the real reason, as Mr. Kotcheff
remarked, is simply lack of imagination:3 depicting violence is easy,
quick, and profitable. It is easy partly because violence is a mechanical
form of human energy: so mechanical that it can even be quantified or
classified as "heavy" or "light." As a mechanical cause producing a
mechanical response, violence never accomplishes anything: the pendu-
lum of aggression and counter-aggression simply goes on swinging all
through history.
To discuss such a question seriously we have to get away from what I
think of as the whodunit fallacy. Many people think they are being prac-
tical about social problems when they think they have located a cause.
We wouldn't have inflation if it weren't for the profit motive in making
munitions; and so on. But every such located cause turns out eventually
to be one more symptom of the problem, and not a cause at all. Mr.
Garth Jowett's paper outlined a history of disapproval of popular arts as
causes of a great number of social evils.4 First there were dime novels
and penny dreadfuls; then there were movies, then comic books, and
now television. One can always find some evidence for such arguments,
but the evidence is seldom conclusive because of the "predisposed" ele-
ment so often mentioned at this conference. Some people are always
looking for something to trigger them to violence, and such stimuli are
not hard to come by in any society. This is not an argument for dismiss-
ing the seriousness of the social effects of violent television programs, as
so many of their producers say; it is merely an argument against regard-
ing television violence as the cause of social violence. For as soon as a
cause is thought to be located, the next step is "take it away; censor it;
Violence and Television 159
ban it." This would be a logical inference if the cause diagnosis were
sound, but it isn't; there are too many causes. Censorship is itself a vio-
lent, or counterviolent, solution: it assumes that you've caught the real
villain and are justified in doing what you like to him, which is precisely
the fallacy of violence itself.
We should be careful, therefore, not to go the way of the past, when
our forebears tried to cure alcoholism by the law of Prohibition, or sex-
ual excesses by censoring books.5 One can see in such measures vestiges
of middle-class prejudice, and nervousness about what people might do
without supervision. Prohibition was partly an attempt to impose a
middle-class work ethic on the whole of society; prudery was partly a
middle-class reaction to the fact that sex was something available to
ordinary people, who really shouldn't be allowed to have it. Such mea-
sures turn what could otherwise be quite genuine problems into empty
anxiety or pseudo-problems; they always focus on token anxiety sym-
bols, like four-letter words, and they generally end in overcompensa-
tion. That is, after a generation of Prohibition North American society
has become as boozy a society as the world has ever seen, and after a
century or so of the most frantic prudery about sex, it has become—well,
you can finish that sentence for yourselves.
When newspapermen say that a democracy must have a free press,
what they mean is "we want to run this paper ourselves." But behind
that there may be a quite genuine belief that running the paper them-
selves would make for a freer society than external control would do,
and the belief may well be right. In any case I sympathize with the low
threshold against censorship demonstrated here: some of the liveliest
moments of discussion came when someone on a panel would say, "I
am entirely opposed to censorship and repressive legislation," and three
people would jump up and say, "what do you mean by talking about
censorship and repressive legislation?" But not many people are really
defending censorship here: Mr. Lawrence says that the CRTC has no
power to censor programs, and I for one would not stay on the Commis-
sion for ten minutes if I thought it was seeking such powers. Regula-
tions are easy to pass, but equally easy to evade; Mr. Les Brown6 has
reminded us of the vast industrial inertia bound up with the status quo,
which can make any amount of regulation impotent. The only real justi-
fication for violence is self-defence, and of course society has a right to
self-defence as well as the individual. But censorship and attempt at reg-
ulation are circular, following the dreary round of "how do we prevent
160 The Arts
the growing disrespect for law? Well, pass a law against it." One diffi-
culty here is that the law ultimately can never catch the right people.
Even a professional hired killer is less dangerous to society than the man
who hires him, and the drug addict who murders in quest of a fix is still
less dangerous than the man who controls the heroin supply.
There is really no way to circumvent the laborious, frustrating, illogi-
cal procedures of democracy. Producers of irresponsible programs, like
producers of motor cars which are death traps, will not improve what
they are doing, so long as it is profitable, until they are forced to do so by
the general pressure of society. Society as a whole includes all the regu-
latory agencies in government, religious groups, minority groups,
groups of concerned citizens, and the people of integrity in the business
itself. Any one of these may represent a very partial interest, but out of
the whole conflict we get some sense of society as a structure, a society
as far as it can get from the homogeneous mob. Something of that was
beginning to emerge from the Pastore hearings,7 and I am seeing it
emerging from this symposium as well.
At the same time, I think nearly everyone here feels that violence
on television constitutes a genuine problem, and is not an anxiety or
pseudo-problem. It may have some of the characteristics of anxiety
problems: there is the same desire to protect the weakest members of the
community, which means the children—fifty years ago it would have
been women and children—and there is nervousness over the fact that
we can't control access to a television set as we can to a public theatre.
The authority of parents is all we have to depend on, and in many—per-
haps most—North American households that is not good enough. But
Mr. Liebert8 and others have, I think, convinced us that something much
more tangible than anxiety is involved. It is always possible to say to a
social scientist that there may be methodological errors in his research
and that he should go back and do some more research, but that's only
stalling: the problem exists and it's here. As such, it is primarily an edu-
cational problem. By education I mean the structuring of experience that
goes on every moment of our waking lives, not merely schooling, which
is a very small, though certainly very central, part of education.9 Much
of it, further, falls into my own area of literary education. No medium of
communication can convey anything directly except sounds, verbal or
musical, and images, and the communication of words is as important
here as it is anywhere.
We have to start with the peculiar characteristics of television as a
Violence and Television 161
A small child knows that he can be hurt, mentally and physically; but
it takes him much longer19 to understand that others can be hurt too,
and that it matters whether they are or not. In all scenes of violence there
is the choice of identifying either with the agent or with the victim of
violence.20 The "natural" or easiest tendency is to identify with the
agent: this is primarily what is wrong with the wrong kind of television
program. The path of genuine education has to go through identification
with the victim. In Christianity, as M. Cote remarked,21 the centre of vio-
lence is the Crucifixion, and Christians are directed to focus their atten-
tion on a victim of mob violence. This would be equally true of Juda-
ism, with its long and terrible history of anti-Semitism; it is also true of
Classical culture. Plato's Republic is written around the question of why
it is better to suffer than to inflict injustice.22 The focusing of interest on
the victim is a common civilizing element in all our major cultural
traditions.
In literature, the difference between identifying with the agent and
with the victim provides a basis for distinguishing what are called melo-
drama and tragedy. In melodrama we are expected to take the "right"
side, to applaud the hero and hiss the villain, it being much more clearly
established in melodrama than it ever is in actual life which is which.
Melodrama appeals to the element of mob violence in us, the self-
righteous sense that we know the good guys from the bad guys, the "law
and order" rationalizations that are growing so rapidly in society today,
as the panic engendered by so much crime develops a vigilante complex
among us. But it is significant that melodrama is something we don't
take very seriously. Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus is a melodrama, and
a very instructive one. In this play the villain kidnaps the hero's two
sons, and says he will kill them unless the hero chops off his hand and
sends it to him. The hero does so—on the stage, of course—but the villain
doublecrosses him and kills the sons anyway. However, the hero gets his
deposit back: the villain sends him his hand, along with his sons' two
heads. Then there is the question of getting all this meat off the stage: the
hero takes both heads in one hand by their hair, but finds he hasn't any
other hand with which to carry his other hand, if you follow me, and so
turns to the heroine, who carries it off in her mouth, because she has had
both hands cut off and her tongue cut out in a previous caper. Finally the
villain, who is black, is caught and sentenced to be buried alive up to his
neck. His response is melodramatically most satisfactory: he wishes only
that he had been able to do ten thousand more evil deeds.23
Violence and Television 165
the effect on public opinion was, on the whole, good in the sense that the
American public came to hate the war, instead of becoming complacent
about or inured to it. In a world like ours, horrifying things will happen
practically every day from now into the foreseeable future. Newsmen in
all media have a duty to report violence when it occurs; novelists and
dramatists have a duty to present imaginative forms of it. For an audi-
ence of concerned, serious, active viewers, this is a part of reality, and
we can fight violence in the street with better courage and hope if the
violence on the screen is on our side.
23
Introduction to Art and Reality
1986
From Art and Reality: A Casebook of Concern, ed. Robin Blaser and Robert
Dunham (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1986), 1-5. Frye's words introduce a collec-
tion of papers given at the Art and Reality Conference at Simon Fraser Univer-
sity, Vancouver, British Columbia, 28 April 1983.
The following collection of essays is not so much about art and reality as
about art and society. It deals with the perennial question of how the
arts, which are seldom if ever popular in their higher manifestations,
may be incorporated into society and on what terms. Mr. Irwin, who
leads off, says that discussions of reality always turn immediately into
discussions of meaning.1 He is on solid philosophical ground here:
"reality" is a question-begging word, perhaps not a legitimate philo-
sophical term at all, and we have to find a context for it. Meaning is
established by context, and for the arts that means primarily a social
context. Nine-tenths of what we call reality is not some ineluctably exist-
ing group of objects or conditions "out there": it is rather the rubbish left
over from previous human constructs. The modern artist's struggles
with the elements of his own art are his private business and in some
aspects the business of criticism, but his obvious and public struggles
are with a civic environment laid out by developers and the motor car,
with bureaucracies staffed by people with a strong tendency to give top
priority to holding their own jobs, with a public indoctrinated by mass
media gossip. It is not surprising that among the most "realistic" of the
contributors to this volume (Fortier, Luft, Hull, Straight) are administra-
tors who have had experience in probing our human environment
for relatively soft spots. The main theme discussed, then, is the relation
168 The Arts
of the arts to what M. Germain's lively and witty paper calls "cultural
charity."2
Every human society sets up a distinctive form of culture with distinc-
tive assumptions about itself and its relation to the world. In early or
primitive societies there is a strong sense of concern, of the importance
that everyone should believe or act alike, and either accept the common
assumptions of the society or say they do. This kind of concern domi-
nated our own culture during the Middle Ages, and it has revived today
in totalitarian states, where the arts are required to be an answering cho-
rus to the political assumptions of those in power. The situation in the
Soviet Union and China differs from that in Europe and North America
in that the latter societies have a political ideal called "democracy,"
which is of infinitely greater importance than the economic system as far
as cultural life is concerned. Artists in our own society think very little
about living under capitalism, and seldom feel any loyalty to capitalism
as such: the democratic ideal is what matters.
Democracy in the Western world comes at the end of a long process of
social maturing, complicating, and pluralizing. After a time a general
undifferentiated social concern becomes aware of special bodies of
thought and skill forming within it that set up different standards of truth
and authority. In the seventeenth century, astronomy began to advance a
heliocentric view of the solar system when society as a whole was still
concerned to cling to a geocentric one. Such heliocentric supporters as
Galileo and Bruno3 became aware of a conflict between two kinds of
authority, the authority of society as a whole and the authority of their sci-
ence, and consequently they also became aware of a conflict of loyalties.
It is not so difficult to see this conflict in the sciences, because of the
kind of verification that science appeals to. It is more difficult to realize
that serious artists and writers also belong to bodies of culture with a
distinctive discipline, a distinctive authority, and a distinctive claim on
the loyalty of their members (see particularly Irwin and Mays).4 In our
day, totalitarian societies simply deny, as a matter of dogma, that litera-
ture and the arts have any authority beyond what the concerns of those
in power want. In Marxism (I am not speaking of what Marxist intellec-
tuals working in democratic countries may say, but of what Marxism
itself does when it comes to power), artists and writers have the social
function of promoting socialist ideology; otherwise they become the
kind of neurotic, self-indulgent, romantic, etc. artists and writers that
infest bourgeois countries.
Introduction to Art and Reality 169
the absence of any genuine authority. They do not, I think, get to the
point of establishing a case for the arts in the contemporary world to
present to someone not already alerted to their importance, but they do
suggest that the anxiety bred by the lack of such a case may drive us
harder in pursuit of one.
Politics, History, and Society
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24
Pro Patria Mori
April 1933
From Acta Victoriana, 57 (April 1933): 31-2. When Frye wrote this article, he
was the editor of Acta.
people, mad with the last desperation of fear, to calm themselves sud-
denly and then hurl themselves in front of a Juggernaut with exactly
the same fanaticism, in obedience to the high priests of the army and
the state. Bright uniforms, a thumping rhythmic music, impassioned
speeches from hundreds of recruiting sergeants, including the heads of
educational and governmental institutions, blazing posters, a frothing
press, all scream the ideal of "King and Country." To say that this is not
an appeal to intelligence would be putting it mildly. No state would
dare to attempt conscription on the perfectly reasonable excuse that the
interests of the nation demanded a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf
or some trade concessions in the West Indies. Still less would it appeal
to the decency and humanity of individuals, as the maxim quoted above
does. This frenzy of what used to be called religious enthusiasm, this
courage of the berserk or the priests of Baal [i Kings 18:28-9], is all that
King and Country stand for. Even this began to falter under the grim
hideousness of the late war, and the expedient was taken of adopting
the slogan of a "war to end war."5 Just how much this phrase meant
President Wilson6 soon found. War appeals to young men, because it is
fundamentally auto-eroticism. That is why the reaction of the press to
the attitude of students has been concentrated on emphasizing their
youth and immaturity. We will leave psychologists to examine just how
much hatred and envy of youth is concentrated in that reaction. We
merely point to the fact that the confidence they express in our respond-
ing to another war springs, not from an attitude of despairing horror, as
it ought, but from one signified by a wide and toothsome grin. Our task
just now is to show that "King and Country" represents the screaming
of the professional patriot who is a criminal in peace time, and more of a
nuisance than a Hindenburg Line7 in war, as any Englishman who had
anything to do with the late war can tell you. No Christian objects to
dying for his friends, or even for a great cause, as a martyr or witness.
But to assume that the call to arms of "Your King and Country need
you" is imperative upon the highest ideals of humanity is an insult to
the King and a sneer at the Country.
Duke et decorum est pro patria mori.8 The propaganda of the war was
ample evidence that if the Horatian line as it stands is true, it would
be equally true without the pro patria. The abridged form, perhaps, con-
tains all the wisdom of the ages. But no Christian can believe that, and
very few non-Christians are ready in cold blood to act upon its logical
inference.
25
Wyndham Lewis: Anti-Spenglerian
June 1936
The recent death of Oswald Spengler [8 May 1936] raises the issue of
how far the influence of that thinker has penetrated into the English-
speaking world. The Decline of the West is a book often used and seldom
referred to, frequently quoted and rarely acknowledged. Its theses have
become inseparable from our present modes of thinking: the theory of
the organic growth of cultures, the maturation of our own and its histor-
ical parallelism with the Roman Empire, the distinction between culture
Wyndham Lewis: Anti-Spenglerian 179
and civilization; all this is as much taken for granted today as the libido
or the dinosaur. But few people who parrot these ideas have any notion
of their source, and as of course no "pessimist" can possibly be left
unanswered, many of those who have read Spengler have attacked him.
Of these attacks, probably the most important in English is that in
Wyndham Lewis's Time and Western Man, and an analysis of Wyndham
Lewis's thought will provide an excellent opportunity for seeing how
unwelcome and yet how irresistible the arguments of an original thinker
can be.
Wyndham Lewis was one of the group of experimental writers who
appeared just before the war, his most notable ally being Ezra Pound.1
The war, in which he served, interrupted his career at the beginning, but
by 1919 he had established himself as novelist, painter, and polemical
writer. After several years of silence, he produced a treatise on political
theory, The Art of Being Ruled, following it by its literary and philosophi-
cal complement, Time and Western Man. From these two books his other
long treatises radiate as more specialized applications of his attitude.
The Industrial Revolution, says Lewis, ushered in a new form of soci-
ety. Industrial technique entails incredibly rapid movement and devel-
opment, which produces a society accustomed to regard incessant
metamorphosis as normal. This stereotype of thought Lewis calls "revo-
lutionary," and its most direct symbol is the advertisement. The Art of
Being Ruled is devoted to showing that the imminent collapse of this
form of society will result in something more stable and permanent,
probably an economic world order governed by dictatorships, as ruling
is the work of a professional ruler, not of a population in general. In
1931 Lewis singled out Hitler as a symptom of this Caesarean birth.
The democratic form of society depends for its stability on the cre-
ation of stereotypes of mass thinking, mass entertainment, mass action.
It depends, in other words, on a wholesale vulgarizing of the creative
activity of art, the speculative activity of philosophy, the exploring
activity of science. Industry vulgarizes science: man believes himself to
be living in a scientific age because he can play with toys like radios and
automobiles, which he could not have acquired without science; and it
is only in this "popular mechanics" form that science really reaches him.
Politics vulgarizes philosophy: Darwin's thesis of the survival of the
fit becomes the excuse for mass murder; Spengler presses philosoph-
ical concepts into a counsel of a reactionary fatalism. So the ordinary
man gets hold of philosophy only in the forms of social stereotypes.
180 Politics, History, and Society
When Lewis comes to deal with Spengler in Time and Western Man, it
is noteworthy that, in spite of his abusive tirade, he is not primarily con-
cerned with the objective truth or falsehood of Spengler's theory of the
organic growth of cultures. He says:
To say that I disagree with Spengler would be absurd. You cannot agree or
disagree with such people as that: you can merely point out a few of the
probable reasons for the most eccentric of their spasms, and if you have
patience—as I have—classify them. That, I think, I have done enough. [297
(pt. 2, chap. 2)]
This is of considerable significance. How does one find out the reasons
for other people's spasms, and on what principles does one classify
them?
Lewis attacks Spengler, not as an individual, but as a symptom of a
cultural consciousness. The whole importance of Lewis as a thinker lies
precisely in his perception of the unity of that cultural consciousness
(or, as Pareto calls it, a "psychic state")-2 The underlying postulate of
Lewis's argument, which he takes so completely for granted that he
does not bother to formulate it, is that a given society produces the phi-
losophy, art, literature, politics, and religion appropriate to it. Lewis
apparently denies this as a general principle. But the whole first part of
Time and Western Man assumes the interconnection of the time philoso-
phies of Bergson and Spengler, the will-to-power attitudes of Sorel,
Marinetti, and Nietzsche, the stream of consciousness technique of
Proust, Joyce, and Stein, the political development of imperialism and
nationalism leading to Fascism, and more superficial phenomena like
Charlie Chaplin and Anita Loos. He says, of course: "This essay is
among other things the assertion of a belief in the finest type of mind,
which lifts the creative impulse into an absolute region free of Spengle-
rian 'history' or politics" [148 (Preface to bk. 2)].
But Lewis has never treated a single great literary figure in this abso-
lute way; everyone he has ever dealt with has been examined from the
cultural-consciousness point of view. And of course it is precisely the
thesis of a cultural consciousness, to which everything contemporane-
ous in a given society is related, that forms the basic doctrine of Speng-
ler. One might suppose Shakespeare to represent "the finest type of
mind," but I have never seen a book on Shakespeare more concerned to
represent him as a historical and political phenomenon than Lewis's
study of him in The Lion and the Fox. Lewis might, of course, protest that
182 Politics, History, and Society
his whole point is that the nineteenth century never produced any really
great or "absolute" art; that it was because of the "vulgarization" engen-
dered by democracy that art got mixed up with politics and so became a
historical phenomenon. Tackled on the score of The Lion and the Fox, he
might extend this principle to our "semi-barbaric" Western culture (he
assumes, of course, the existence of a Western culture), which he regards
as far less civilized than the Chinese. But as every one of Lewis's dia-
tribes is in some way concerned with that very culture, what price the
following syllogism: all Lewis's critical books are concerned with the
analysis of the cultural consciousness of the Western world, mainly dur-
ing its last hundred years or so, which is treated both as a unity and as
an organic growth; Spengler's work is a general view of history based on
the same postulates; therefore all of Lewis's critical work is a special
application of the Spenglerian dialectic. What Epicurus was to Lucretius,
what Aquinas was to Dante, what, perhaps, Montaigne was to Shake-
speare, that Spengler is to Wyndham Lewis. Lewis's whole thinking is
dominated by Spenglerian concepts. The introduction to his preposter-
ous book, The Dithyrambic Spectator, is based on Spengler's theory of
craft-art in late civilization. His references to the "adolescence" of the
Elizabethans as compared with our senile child-cult and to the "Roman
brutality" of contemporary sport echo Spengler. His denunciations of
Bohemia are pure Spengler: that both novels are Spenglerian satires is
immediately obvious to anyone who has read both authors. His theory
of the emergence of the philosopher-ruler, worked out in The Art of Being
Ruled, is Spengler's theory of the rise of Caesarism. His book on Hitler is
in octave counterpoint to The Hour of Decision. His attack on Impression-
istic painting as having deserted a plastic for a musical ideal is unintelli-
gible without its context in Spengler. And so on. In The Lion and the Fox,
Lewis speaks of Frederick the Great, who, himself the most perfect disci-
ple of Machiavelli in history, composed a bitter philippic against him,
which was exactly what Machiavelli would have advised him to do.
Similarly, Lewis examines Spengler, in Time and Western Man, as a his-
torical and political phenomenon evolved by the cultural consciousness
that also produced Bergson in philosophy, Proust in literature, Einstein
in science, Picasso in painting, which is precisely according to Spengler's
own instructions.
Thus, Lewis's foreshortened perspective and his parenthetic repudia-
tions of the very thesis he is advancing give him an air of being more
commonsense and practical than Spengler, and of course he makes easy
Wyndham Lewis: Anti-Spenglerian 183
Strasser.1 No one can be equally sympathetic with all these groups, but
in the last century English culture has received contributions from Jews
(Disraeli), Catholics (Newman), Protestants (Browning), Freemasons
(Burns), homosexuals (Wilde), and spokesmen of potential English
Nazism (Carlyle). Obviously there has been considerable anarchy in
English culture, a hopelessly inconsistent inclusiveness about it, and
that large inconsistency is the basis of democracy. For it implies the
acceptance and practice of the scientific attitude on the part of the people
as a whole: the inductive suspending of judgment until enough, not only
of facts and discoveries and techniques, but of viewpoints and theories
and gospels and quack panaceas, are in, before changing the direction of
social development. Opposed to this is the crusading religious tempera-
ment of the dictatorships working with a partial and premature cultural
synthesis. Out of this inclusiveness of outlook springs everything else
we associate with democracy, and it is on that basis that democratic
countries rest their claim to be more highly civilized.
What is true of science and scholarship is of course true of the arts.
The dictator is less dependent on popular opinion than the democratic
leader and is therefore far more dependent on popular prejudice: it is
not Churchill or Roosevelt but Mussolini who must pose for cameras
and kiss the shuddering babies and generally advertise himself like a
toothpaste to retain public favour. Similarly the art that emerges under
the cultural anarchy of democracy may be subtle, obscure, highbrow,
and experimental, and if a good deal of art at any time is not so, the cul-
tural achievement of the country is on a Woolworth level. But art under
dictatorship seldom dares to be anything but mediocre and obvious.
This is least true of music, for music is difficult to censor, and may well
be the entering wedge of civilization in the two leading dictatorships.
But crude, gaudy realism of painting and pompous broken-down classi-
cism of architecture in both countries has been foreshadowing the
Soviet-Nazi pact for years.
The notion that democracy depends on economic rather than cultural
laissez-faire has made a good many people rather confused about it and
inclined to believe that it is nothing but a rationalizing of oligarchy. This
idea is sedulously fostered by Nazi propagandists. Another source of
confusion lies in the division between national and international loyal-
ties, which, as we said at the beginning, is the underlying paradox of this
whole conflict. Common to all three systems is the tendency to world-
wide expansion we generally call imperialism: common to all three also
War on the Cultural Front 187
From Ada Victoriana, 67 (October 1942): 12-14, 23. NFF, 1991, box 24,
notebook 17 contains Frye's handwritten draft for this article. There are very
few changes from handwritten draft to published article. The most significant of
these have been indicated in the endnotes.
San Gemignano
We are on our way from Siena to Florence, and decide to stop at San
Gemignano. That's a little town on top of a hill full of enormous sky-
scraping towers the nobles used to build and shoot at each other from.
We say good-bye to a cheerful little clerk we've been talking to on the
train: he took English as his second language at school, and fed us
remarks like "I am happy to go without Italy," meaning he would like to
get out of the country, while we exchanged Italian almost as bad. The
place is called Poggibonsi, which we know only from a couplet I found
once in Browning:
We look around for a shifty priest, and find nothing less than a bishop,
which we take as a good omen. Then we get the bus, crowded with chat-
tering Italians, and wind slowly up and up an enormously long hill. We
glance at the people around us, reflecting that the Italians are a very
convenient people for the Nazis to deal with: as long as they are friendly
they can remember about the Nordic Lombards, and if that friendship
Two Italian Sketches 189
cools they can bring up the subject of Etruscans. Up and up we go, pass-
ing women washing clothes in a brook and drying them on hedges,
passing vineyards and olive trees, passing dusty donkeys and the
downhill bus.
Some of our friends have objected to our taking a holiday in a Fascist
country, feeling that we ought to spend our handful of vacation money
in those noble, generous, brave-spirited, free republics, Great Britain
and France. Well, perhaps. Certainly at Siena, where we had an air-raid
practice and a blackout, we began to get restive at being in an officially
hostile country with the papers all hermetically sealed against news. "La
politica non e serena," as our landlady said. But surely away up on this
mountain, breathing this free mountain air (one of the voices of liberty,
according to Wordsworth, who ought to have known),2 we can forget
about Mussolini for a few hours.
When we get there we find, however, that the town has been made
into a "national monument" and Mussolini's plug-ugly sourpuss is
plastered all over it. His epigrams, too. For every conspicuous piece of
white wall in Italy is covered with mottoes in black letters from his
speeches and obiter dicta—the successor to the obsolete art of fresco-
painting. One of them says, with disarming simplicity, "Mussolini is
always right." "The olive tree has gentle and soft leaves, but its wood is
harsh and rough," says another more cryptically. "War is to man what
maternity is to woman," says a third. "The best way to preserve peace is
to prepare for war," says a fourth, and it looks just as silly in Italian as it
does in English. Another one of the few not of Mussolini's authorship
reads: "Duce! We await your orders." Up here they present us with "We
shoot straight."
One of these, "The nation should be as strong as the army and the
army as strong as the nation," reminds us how Italy is taxed to the back
teeth for her army and how oddly all this gathering of pearls from swine
contrasts with the miserable poverty of the town, a poverty as patient
and humble as that poor old donkey. But is it so odd? Peasant feeds sol-
dier and soldier kicks peasant—that was the Roman arrangement, so
why not now, when the grandeur of Rome is revived and the national
emblem once more is a whip?
Well, where shall we start? The cathedral, I suppose. The big attraction
there is a chapel full of Ghirlandaio,3 one of the stuffier of the Florentine
stuffed shirts. That can wait: the nave is full of Sienese frescoes, and as
there's very little fresco at Siena itself, we'd better start with these.
190 Politics, History, and Society
you look at the picture. And that's all. The Crucifixion is the end: there's
no hint of anything beyond the fainting virgin, the absent disciples, the
tortured God, and that symmetrical design of animated iron.
Ghirlandaio can go to hell: we've got to get that bus. "We shoot
straight," bellows Mussolini after us. No—wait a minute—my Italian is
pretty shaky—it's future: "We shall shoot straight."
Venice
Venice does exist, gondolas and palaces and canals and everything, and
as we settle into the steamboat and hear an American crack the death-
less joke about every house sitting on its piles, we like it. It's a brilliant
day, though, and the sun is unkind to Venice: the palaces badly need
repair, and the canals reek with a subtle but very unpleasant smell. A
sinister mass of green slime clings to every building, and as the wash of
the steamboat reaches it, lifts and waves gently. How long can these
buildings stand that wash, asks the same tourist. No one knows.
No, the best part of Venice is at night, floating through the little
canals in a gondola, with the queer lighting and the bridges and the
waterstairs. Venice in the days of its glory—where the devil is the man
going? Oh, yes, somebody caterwauling in another gondola over there.
"E molto interessante, la serenata," says the gondolier. One of their rack-
ets. We don't want it, thanks, but it takes a lot of splutter to get him
detoured.
We spend money at Venice: everything is very much higher here. All
buildings charge admission three to seven times what other towns
charge. The food is bad, for the first time in Italy; later we find in Verona
that Venetian food is a standing joke. I got royally gypped—not just
shortchanged, but gypped—today, also for the first time in Italy. They
charge admission to churches; they charge extra to show you anything
starred in Baedeker, who unfortunately loves the town; and there's a
Veronese show here carefully spread over five buildings with enormous
(for Italy) admission prices for each. These are microscopic things, but
you're sensitive to money when you're travelling, and after a few days
they begin to generate movement, like steam molecules.
What does it live on, this quiet World's Fair of a town? There are no
industries here. "What does this town live on?" I ask Mike. "Suckers,"
answers Mike, drowning his cigarette. That's certainly the atmosphere:
everybody pounces on you to sell you something, and a blond like me
192 Politics, History, and Society
feels as self-conscious as Lady Godiva on St. Mark's Piazza. Now that its
paint has worn off, old Venice sits and dreams and reaches out for
money, like a hermit.
But was it really different in the days of its glory? I read something
about this town once that explained what I'm feeling about it, but I can't
just place it. Wasn't it a sort of clearing house for the Orient, a banking
centre? Did it ever produce anything? Wasn't it always built on pure
money, without any commodity basis for the money? Something like
that, I think, though my economics are not very expert.
That would explain a lot of Venetian art. These fantastic buildings like
the Doge's Palace with their unreal and abstract decoration: they have
nothing functional about them, like cathedrals or grain elevators, noth-
ing that takes root in a soil—there isn't any soil—or has any relation to
living, somehow. The painting's the same. Veronese shows Venice as a
huge blonde bawd getting rained on by a torrent of gold, and that would
be all right to the Venetians. They knew that money creates and sustains
and moves all things: money would therefore be worthy of perfectly sin-
cere worship. It doesn't matter whether their painters are stupid louts
like Veronese or not. Tintoretto with a ponderous St. Mark flying
through the air like Superman, Carpaccio with his ten thousand virgins
being martyred—they were real painters even if they were paid by the
square yard, but there's something vulgar about them you can't get
around.8 And as there was never anything but money in the town, there
could be nobody but bourgeois in it: no sort of class opposition and no
real aristocracy. If only these people had been Jews. What a source of
comfort and consolation they'd be to anti-Semites! That reminds me, I
read a poem of T.S. Eliot on Venice which tried feebly to blame it all on
the Jews anyhow.9
Jews . . . Oh, The Merchant of Venice, of course. That's what I've read.
Have you ever noticed how much money there is in that play? It's all
about Antonio's merchandise and his bargain with Shylock and Shy-
lock's bond and equitable judgment and the relative value of gold and
silver and lead caskets and the worth of promises and rings and wives
and revenges. Even the stars are beautiful because they look like guin-
eas. That would explain Shylock, who is neither a villain Jew nor a per-
secuted hero, but a money-maker making money faster than Christians,
who decide to gang up on him.10 . . . Hey, you, you can't go home yet.
We're paying for an hour, and it's only forty-five minutes. We compared
watches when we started, remember?
Two Italian Sketches 193
No, I'm not giving you all that fifty-lire note and it's no good touching
your cap. You owe us five lire change. Well, if you haven't any change
you can bloody well get some.
When we go to the railway station the next morning it's draped in
swastikas, because Dr. Goebbels, who has an axis to grind, is arriving to
open a movie theatre. In Padua we read that he was greeted by gondo-
liers on his arrival. "You wan' guide? You wan' pos' card? You wan'
feelthy peecture?" Sure he wants them. He wants everything he can
get.11 He may even want a book we saw on the station bookstall, L'Arte
di Conquistar gli Amid, by Dale Carnegie.12
28
G.M. Young's Basic
May 1944
Review of Basic, by G.M. Young (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1943). This was
Tract 62 of the Society for Pure English. This society, founded in 1919 by Rob-
ert Bridges, recognized the expansion of English into a world language, but
feared that this expansion would dissolve the links that tied contemporary
usage to what Bridges called "the finest literary language in the world." As a
solution to the responsibilities and perils presented by this expansion, Bridges
urged the Society's members to lobby for scientific reform, to monitor journalis-
tic usage closely, and to maintain close supervision of worldwide variations in
the use of the English language. The Society's membership included art histo-
rian Kenneth Clark, medievalist Kenneth Sisam, and philologist Logan Pearsall
Smith. From Canadian Forum, 24 (May 1944): 47.
Review of The Meeting of East and West, by F.S.C. Northrop (New York:
Macmillan, 1947). From the "Turning New Leaves" section in Canadian
Forum, 26 (March 194.7): 281-2. Reprinted as "Total Identification" in
NFCL, 107-10. F.S.C. Northrop was Master of Silliman College and Sterling
Professor of Philosophy and Law at Yale University.
Review of The Scot in History, by Wallace Notestein (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 194.6). From Canadian Forum, 27 (July 1947): 96.
and a new Russian one which is just beginning. Apart from these culture
growths, human life presents a mere continuity of existence without
shape or significance. Primitive societies and exhausted ones alike "have
no history."
When one culture follows another in time, Spengler says, it does not
really learn from its predecessor, and thus there is no general progress in
history. When two cultures conflict, the more aggressive one may stunt
and dwarf the other, producing what Spengler calls a "pseudomorpho-
sis" [DW, 2:243]. Classical civilization did this to Magian culture, and
Western civilization is doing it now to Russia. But no Westerner can ever
understand what goes on in a Classical or Indian mind: he can only
guess at it by seeing how all the products of the other culture fit into a
consistent mental pattern which is not his. This overall pattern can be
grasped, not, of course, through abstract propositions, but through sym-
bols. Classical culture lives in a "pure present": it has nothing of our
sense of time and history: it thinks of architecture as a columnar mass, of
tragedy as stylized attitude, of sculpture as bodily form, of mathematics
as integral numbers and enclosed spaces, of music as a relation of single
notes, of diplomacy as personal contact. Western culture is characterized
by a feeling for the infinite: it thinks of architecture as a soaring struc-
tural energy, of tragedy as an analysis of character, of sculpture as a
struggle with material, of mathematics as variable function, of music as
counterpoint, of diplomacy as cabinet decisions used as long-range
weapons. Magian culture is full of domes, caverns, sacred books, and
esoteric traditions; Russian culture expresses a "denial of height" both in
its squat architecture and in its social communism, and so on.
A good deal even of this is German Romanticism at its corniest, and
some more sinister features are involved. We should, Spengler thinks,
accept the character of our age and not sigh for a vanished past or a Uto-
pian future which (Toynbee agrees) is the shadow of a tired mind. We
can think up new variations of the arts, but new organic developments
are no longer possible, and we should leave them to misfits and get on
with our big wars and dictatorships . . . . Was the Rome of the Caesars,
the Rome of Virgil and Horace and Ovid and Catullus, really interested
solely in aqueducts and brass hats? Don't interrupt the professor. The
author of Spengler's next book, The Hour of Decision, is just another Nazi
stumblebum. But his thesis has bitten deeply into us: we are all Spengle-
rians to some extent, and if the enemy has any ammunition that we can
capture, we should fire it back at the enemy.
Toynbee and Spengler 205
Much of Toynbee's book, especially the first three volumes, reads like
an improved version of Spengler backed up by a far greater knowledge
of history. He also isolates the "civilization" or "society" as the unit
of historical study. The first three volumes trace the "genesis" and
"growth" of these societies, and the next three "decline" and "disinte-
gration," though in volume 4 he avoids the "decline" (Untergang) of
Spengler's title and adopts "breakdown" instead. Spengler's six or eight
civilizations are all included in a much fuller survey of twenty-one. The
main improvement on Spengler comes in the role assigned the proletar-
iat in the last stage. To Spengler the proletariat is nothing but a rabble:
Toynbee sees that an internal proletariat (the exploited members of the
society) and an external one (the barbarian nomads outside) combine to
form a "universal Church" which becomes at once the coffin of the old
society and the womb of a new one, so that a real spiritual progress from
one society to another can occur. For reasons too complicated to exam-
ine here, this gives Christianity a far more satisfactory historical expla-
nation than Spengler gives it.
At the beginning of volume 4 there comes a crisis in Toynbee's argu-
ment, the question of the cause of decline, which involves a direct exam-
ination of Spengler. But he fails to pass this crisis, and all the rest of his
book has the air of a dodged issue. He fires off two very damp squibs at
Spengler. First he calls him a "fatalist," which is irrelevant: to predict the
death of every living organism may be tactlessness, but it is not fatalism.
Then he complains that Spengler uses a metaphor as though it were a
fact. But A Study of History, organized throughout on such figures as
"nemesis of creativity," "withdrawal and return," "schism and palin-
genesia," is a rather glassy house from which to throw this stone. As we
have seen, an intuitive response based on an imaginative grasp of the
symbolic significance of certain data is demanded by Toynbee as well as
Spengler. Toynbee's real answer is that civilization is not an organism.
An organism has a lifespan predetermined from the start; a civilization
is a way of social life initiated by an environmental challenge and de-
pendent for its continuity on maintaining a social will and judgment
sufficient to meet further challenges. If it collapses, there is always a
definable and at one time avoidable cause.
Spengler's evidence for the organic nature of culture is of a kind
which Toynbee shows himself much less skilful in handling. If, says
Spengler, we study the growth of painting from Giotto to Rembrandt,
we can see, in its development of interest in landscape, realistic portrai-
206 Politics, History, and Society
There are many places where he does not even see that a prior philo-
sophical problem is involved. Thus, his survey of the causes of break-
down itself breaks down through ignoring the question of what
constitutes a historical cause. Pascal says that if Cleopatra's nose had
been an inch longer it would have changed the world's history.5 Speng-
ler says that different characters might have replaced Antony and
Cleopatra, different battles might have been fought, and the course of
historical events superficially quite different, but the fundamental rela-
tionship of a moribund Egyptian culture, an aging Classical one, and a
nascent Syrian one would still have been there. This distinction between
history and chronicle is one of the profoundest of Spengler's insights.
The distinction disappears in Toynbee, and in consequence he takes us
back to the old "practical" view of history as a chaotic sequence of lucky
and unlucky accidents, a roulette game in which a gambler's luck may
hold if he figures out a system to beat the laws of chance.
Both Spengler and Toynbee talk about Marx as though he were a
second-rate thinker: the Nazi calls him a Jew and the English liberal a
German Jew. But I suspect that Marx is holding the nutcracker that the
reader of both Toynbee and Spengler wants. New instruments of pro-
duction change the whole character of a society; and the technique for
producing new instruments of production at will brought in by the
Industrial Revolution has changed the whole character of history. There
is now a completely new factor in the situation which cannot be wholly
absorbed into a dialectic of separate "civilizations," important as that is.
The question whether Western civilization will survive or collapse is out
of date, like the same question about the British Empire, for the world is
trying to outgrow the whole conception of "a" civilization and has
reached a different kind of problem altogether. Because the Industrial
Revolution started in the West, its transformation of the world has
looked like the expansion of Western society, and in fact has partly been
that, but something else is also happening. The factors which are the
same all over the world, such as the exploitation of labour, have always
been, if not less important, at any rate less powerful in history than con-
flicts of civilizations. Now they are more important, and growing in
power. Toynbee feels that world peace now is essentially a question of
getting the five surviving civilizations to live together in spite of their
traditional differences in outlook. But this is the old league of sovereign
nations again, the balance-of-power fallacies revised to rationalize the
new set-up of national "blocs." The conception of United Civilizations,
208 Politics, History, and Society
like the conception of United Nations, is pretty, but it isn't the real
thing.6
A Study of History is already something of a museum piece. Volumes 4
to 6 were the product of the 19305, that horrible period of impotent
democracy and rampant Fascism, and their general tone of hoping
against hope that as much as possible of the status quo will "survive"
reflects what we all felt then. Now we have the atom bomb and
Russo-American imperialism before us, but some years have elapsed in
war work since the completion of volume 6, and perhaps a fresh start
will bring a fresh energy. The great synthesis of Marx and Spengler has
yet to be written, but so has half of Toynbee's book.
33
Gandhi
March 1948
could he be so reverenced in an India that was working out all its prob-
lems with no reference whatever to the power of nonviolence? Some of
his followers tried to make him into a god, and though he would have
preferred assassination to that, it is hard to see how he could have
avoided being pushed, along with Lenin and Sun Yat-sen,1 into the
modern pantheon of legendary heroes, infallible and impotent, who can
be invoked to endorse any kind of action, however at variance with their
teachings. The combination of saintliness and political shrewdness is by
no means rare in history, but as the former quality is childlike (in the
best sense) and the latter adult, the political saint as a rule seems to cre-
ate the sort of situation in which he himself becomes an anachronism.
Smaller and tougher people succeed him, who persuade themselves that
they are more mature because they have lost their innocence.
34
Ernst Junger's On the Marble Cliffs
March 1948
Review of On the Marble Cliffs, by Ernst Junger, trans. Stuart Hood (Guild-
ford: John Lehmann, 1947). From the "Turning New Leaves" section in Cana-
dian Forum, 27 (March 1948): 283. Reprinted in RW, 291-4.
Ernst Junger was one of the German intellectuals who shouted for years
about the affirming power of blood and race as opposed to the critical
negations of reason, about the sensuous ecstasy of war and the way that
life is fulfilled by heroic death, and about the sacred duty of transform-
ing nationalism into a religion and of having no gods but the state.
However, after the Nazis had finally got the crusade started, even
Junger decided he had had enough, and in 1939 published a dreamy
and fantastic allegory which is at the same time a bitterly disillusioned
anti-Nazi satire. That such a book could have appeared at all in Nazi
Germany gives it, of course, a good deal of curiosity value, though I do
not feel that it is a really significant example of what a totalitarian state
does to literature.
The allegory is intentionally vague and ambiguous, and many
details of it are not clear to me yet, but I cannot think that the allegori-
cal form was adopted merely to obscure the anti-Nazi aspect of the
meaning, which in any case it hardly does. It is hopeless for a writer
under a tyranny to try to devise a way of getting past a stupid censor
to an intelligent public. Either his book is suppressed or its meaning
fails to get across: the censor is never stupid enough and the public
never intelligent enough to provide any escape from that dilemma.
Jiinger's book appeared because from the Nazi point of view his record
was good, and because the general context of its anti-Nazi sentiments
212 Politics, History, and Society
those who are interested in the doublings and windings of the post-Nazi
German conscience; unless, to be sure, you can get to a revival of Chap-
lin's The Great Dictator. If that is possible, go and study the role of Com-
mander Schultz in that picture, and you will learn from it all you ever
need to know about the psychology of anti-Nazi Nazis.
35
Dr. Kinsey and the Dream Censor
July 1948
The first volume of the Kinsey report is now in the hands of the Ameri-
can and Canadian public, and has been very well received: readers of
this magazine will remember Professor Ketchum's brilliant review of it
in a recent issue.1 Following close on this comes a caterwaul to have it
banned in Canada, which, in view of our various hole-and-corner sys-
tems of censorship, could succeed. In any case, it reopens the whole
question of censorship.2 The anvil chorus this time is said by the press to
be supported by a doctor who is president of the National Health
League of Canada, which must be an error, as anyone in such a position
would appreciate the value of the book. To urge that the sale and distri-
bution of the book be restricted is defensible, though in my opinion mis-
taken; but to call the book itself immoral, as is very freely done, is to
show unconsciously how badly such a study is needed.
Censorship and democracy don't mix, and there is no argument in
216 Politics, History, and Society
From Canadian Forum, 28 (March 1949): 267. Reprinted in RW, 387-8. The
case of Hungarian prelate Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty received international
attention following his arrest by the Communist government on a charge of
treason in 1948 and his conviction the following year.
Communists appear to know much more about torture than the Nazis
ever did, and to understand how to handle a man so that no external
signs of torture can be discovered, while the whole soul and body
within have been so destroyed that there is no will power left to resist
any suggestion. It is unnecessary to labour the point that torture and jus-
tice cannot exist side by side. Third, there is the whole conception of a
trial as a publicity stunt, as propaganda for the government, which
turns the procedure into a ritual of human sacrifice, based on the princi-
ple that, as Caiaphas said at the trial of Christ, "it is expedient. . . that
one man should die for the people" [John 11:50]. This evil thing is com-
ing over here, and while it has of course not touched the courts yet, it is
present in the Thomas committee hearings and other forms of extralegal
action.2
37
The Two Camps
April 1949
The world situation from the Russian point of view is something like
this. Wars are caused ultimately by economic rivalries among nations.
All nations except Communist ones are class societies, which must
either preserve their class system through exploitation, search for colo-
nial markets, and eventually armed conflicts, or have their class system
destroyed by a revolution leading to a classless society. Thus the only
possible way to achieve world peace is first to achieve a worldwide rev-
olution. There can be no hope for peace as long as a major capitalist
power remains in the world. Fortunately the situation is developing
beautifully along Marxist lines. The U.S.S.R. holds the centre of the larg-
est land mass in the world; it holds all Eastern Europe, and can put
Western Europe in its pocket whenever it likes. The most important
political event just now is the revolt of Asia,1 and Communism is able to
exploit that, whereas America is forced to try to prop up reactionary and
The Two Camps 223
corrupt governments that are done for anyway. China is already in the
Communist camp. The revolt of Africa has not yet come, but it is cer-
tainly coming, and the Communists will similarly be in a position to
exploit that. There is no use tackling America directly: she is far too
strong, she has the atomic bomb, and a more effective way to wage war
with her is to curtail her export markets until, faced with the impossible
contradiction between a shrinking market and an expanding economy,
she blows up.
The American point of view, if the Americans can be said to have a
consistent point of view, is that the world is now in the same position as
America herself was in in 1861. We are faced with the idea of the Union,
a Union which has in practice hardly any existence at all. Yet the idea is
there, and must be preserved. The Union must essentially be a union of
free peoples, and it cannot exist half slave and half free. It is thus pri-
marily a union of good will, and may contain many economic systems.
The one thing it cannot tolerate is the right of secession on the part of a
group of confederate states pledged to maintain a slave economy such
as Americans believe the Russian economy to be. And America will, if
absolutely necessary, fight to preserve the idea of Union against the
right of secession.
Anyone who keeps on hoping that Russia can be brought to see the
democratic point of view, or is maintaining a theoretical Marxism
against her own essential convictions, or will somehow manage to do
something else than try to achieve a worldwide Marxist revolution, is in
precisely the same position as those who fifteen years ago refused to
read Mein Kampf and insisted that sooner or later Hitler could be
brought to see reason. And if the issue is now between democracy and
Communism, it follows that every blow against democracy aids Com-
munism, including those struck by Americans themselves in an effort to
preserve democracy. Marxist dialectic says that everyone must ulti-
mately be a Communist or an anti-Communist, and Marxists not only
expect but want those who are not Communists to be anti-Communists.
Every offence to civil liberties in America and Canada today which is
carried out in the name of democracy is following in the wake of the two
men who have done most to aid Communism since Lenin—Hitler and
Chiang Kai-shek.2
38
Law and Disorder
July 1949
Both writers agree that there are three major views of history, the
Classical, the Christian, and the modern. The Classical view was that
history is a series of cycles: the same things happen over and over (or at
any rate the same kind of thing does), empires rise and decline and give
place to other empires, and no one can look for anything in history but
change and decay. The wise man, from the Classical point of view,
would do well to cut loose from history altogether, and cultivate the life
of reason, which is timeless and not subject to change.
This pessimistic view of history is, Dr. Niebuhr argues, an oversimpli-
fied identification of history with nature, and tends increasingly to iden-
tify the salvation of the soul with a withdrawal from contemporary
reality. It was overthrown by Christianity, because Christianity's central
doctrine is the coming of God to the world at a certain time in history. It
was partly because Christianity could give a religious meaning to his-
tory, while pagan philosophy could not, that Christianity conquered the
intellectual world during the fall of the Roman Empire. (The evidence
for this is set out in the late Charles Cochrane's book, Christianity and
Classical Culture, one of the finest scholarly studies ever written by a
Canadian.)3
The Christian sense that there is meaning in history beyond just an
endless series of cycles gave birth to the modern theory of progress.4
This theory is at the opposite pole from the Classical one: it finds a
redeeming force within history itself, and thinks that man should
become wholly absorbed in it. Both writers agree that the doctrine of
progress, like the cyclic view, is inconsistent with Christianity, but Dr.
Niebuhr devotes more attention to it. He gives some very melancholy
quotations from apologists of progress which indicate that nearly all
nonreligious modern views of history, whether bourgeois or Commu-
nist, liberal or reactionary, are attempts to cheer ourselves up by saying
that while most human problems are still unsolved, nevertheless man is
going on and on and up and up to greater and better things. Just what
these things are depends on the taste of the theorizer. Some people say
that we're improving generally because we're getting more individual
freedom; others say it's because we're getting more social order. Some
say that the advance of science will fix everything, others that a change
in our economy will do it. The discovery of evolution in biology gave a
lot of people a vague idea that science had now proved that there is
progress in history—a notion that Dr. Niebuhr correctly identifies as
"social Darwinism."
228 Politics, History, and Society
The people he disagrees with make up quite a large company, and after
reading that the Catholics are wrong because they absolutize the church,
the Lutherans wrong because they believe in a rule of saints, the modern
liberals wrong because they are infected with progressivism, one begins
to reflect rather irritatedly that everybody seems to be out of step but
our Reinhold. It is possible to attack human complacency to the verge of
being complacent oneself in refuting it, and Dr. Niebuhr often does not
do full justice to the intensity and power of some of the modern thinkers
he refers to: Marx, for instance, or Nietzsche.
It seems to me possible to say much more about a Christian philoso-
phy of history than either writer does say. The modern cyclic theories of
Vico and Spengler, and to a lesser extent Toynbee, are very different
from the old Classical view of the cycle. And it is too simple to say that
St. Augustine refuted all cyclic views of history merely because he ridi-
culed the Classical one. It is possible to look at St. Augustine in another
way, and find in his City of God a conception of the recurrent rise and
decline of civilizations as central to his whole idea of the thing which
stands over against the City of God, the civitas terrena or earthly city. The
fall of the Roman Empire was the immediate occasion for, and the most
impressive proof of, St. Augustine's thesis that anything man can erect
will fall down sooner or later. In all human institutions, then, there is a
rotary movement of rise and fall which goes back to the original fall of
man. The affinity of this rhythm of growth and decay to that of the natu-
ral world, with its yearly vegetable cycle of death and revival, is the
basis for the Vico-Spengler conception of history as showing a series of
"civilizations" or "cultures" which behave more or less like natural
organisms and go through much the same phases of growth, matura-
tion, and decline. It is also possible that behind this organic rhythm,
which it seems to me certainly does exist in history, there may be an evo-
lutionary one, and, without vulgarizing this into a theory of progress,
we may perhaps see in the Industrial Revolution the beginning of some-
thing that makes us, in the words of Wyndham Lewis, the cavemen of a
new mental era.5
However, as far as they go Drs. Niebuhr and Lowith are sound
enough. The serpent in Eden told Adam that if he would take a few bites
out of the apple of the tree of knowledge, he would become like the
gods, and know clearly what good and evil were. When Adam listened
to this, he got into trouble. Adam's descendants, we are told, once
decided to get together and build a big tower that would reach heaven,
Two Books on Christianity and History 231
but before they finished it they found that they were no longer speaking
the same language [Genesis 11:9]. The preachers of progress have been
handing out similar advice, and planning similar projects, for well over
a century, and with much the same result. There are many today who,
looking at the world before them, feel vaguely that this was where they
came in, but don't know how to get out of the dark theatre and back to
the sidewalks of a real city. All Drs. Niebuhr and Lowith have tried to
do is to indicate a possible exit.
40
Nothing to Fear but Fear
November 1949
For some months now the American immigration authorities have been
busily defending our otherwise undefended border. A number of labour
leaders, students, and unfrocked Communists have been held up,
turned back, or refused visas, and on a principle of chance well known
to duck-hunters, they have even managed to bag a few authentic mem-
bers of the Labour-Progressive Party. The recent refusal of visas to Pro-
fessor Shortliffe of Queen's and Professor Barker Fairley of Toronto,1
amounting in at least the latter case to permanent exclusion, has brought
the matter more into the open. As practically every Canadian has
friends or relatives in the States, Canadian protest has been somewhat
muffled. When made, it has usually been carefully qualified by two
points: first, that it is intelligible that the U.S.A. should want to exclude
people with a vocation for overthrowing its government by force; and
second, that as a sovereign nation it has a perfect right to exclude whom
it likes.
Well, so it has, but its officials need not be so contemptuous of the
national sovereignty of Canada, which, even if smaller, is quite as highly
civilized, and quite as interested in democracy. It is an insult to Canada
to have American authorities in charge of Canadian immigration who
do not know the elementary facts of Canadian political life, and who
cannot distinguish a Communist from a social-democrat. Earlier in the
summer a prominent CCF leader had some difficulty in getting a visa
because he had been called a Communist in a Trestrail pamphlet.2 But
Nothing to Fear but Fear 233
But in an atmosphere of real fear and real suspicion the police must
become both more efficient and more tolerant if they are to be of any
use in defending democracy. Otherwise, they will be not only unjust to
individuals, but dangerous to their own community. The caprice of
immigration officials is only a small part of the widespread dither
engendered by the loyalty purges and all the other processes of trial by
slander and prosecution by hearsay. Insecurity, distrust, and a feeling
that an emergency situation demands arbitrary measures are, as every-
one must know who has not completely lost his head, the elements that
make a dictatorship strong and a democracy weak. The worst enemy of
the American people could wish for nothing better than this kind of
hysteria.
In so energetic a country as America a lot of steam bubbles off the sur-
face, and those who do not look below the surface get some very curious
notions about the American character. Those who know Americans
well—and Canadians do know them well—know them to be a people of
great courage and high morale, with a deep love of freedom, a solid
sense of humour, and inexhaustible reserves of generosity and hospital-
ity. These qualities are, at the moment, not being adequately represented
by the quaking sentries on the world's least dangerous frontier.
41
The Ideal of Democracy
7 February 1950
(angst) drives men mad. But unless Christians devote their energies to
transforming society as though the Communists were otherwise right,
the Source of Christian charity will remain unsatisfied.
[Modern] Literature
From the invention of the alphabet to our own day, the only major tech-
nological advance directly affecting literature has been the printing
press. Now, however, the changes brought about by movies, radio, and
television, to name only the more conspicuous agents, have made our
own age one of unparalleled transmutation of cultural values. Even the
conceptions of "book" and "author" are undergoing change. A modern
bestseller has only a temporary incarnation as a book between its initial
appearance as a magazine serial and its ultimate appearance as a movie.
In the making of a movie the role of the author, or "word man," is a
minor and often a negligible one. Many of the conventional categories of
literature—novel, essay, poem, and the like—are becoming inorganic
extensions of tradition. In studying, say, drama in Canada, we must take
account of radio drama (which ranges from Lister Sinclair's "Socrates"3
to soap opera), revues (e.g., "Spring Thaw"),4 pantomime and mono-
logue (Fridolin),5 and the influence of films and television, as well as the
more conventional stage plays.
Among the good effects of these technological changes we may
reckon the new prestige which radio and movie alike have given to the
spoken word. The revival of oratory, the change from the era of the
silent Coolidge to the era of the eloquent Roosevelt, is the most striking
example of this; but the beneficial effects of the new media on drama
and even on poetry (which by 1900 had got so badly bogged down in the
printed page that it had nearly lost its connection with vigorous rhyth-
mical speech) cannot be questioned. The results, which range from the
sporadic efforts to revive poetic drama down to the use of choral read-
ing in primary education, are still tentative, but healthily experimental.
The bad effects are more obvious, and one hopes that they are more
temporary. The commercial sponsorship of radio programs (partly
counteracted in Canada by a publicly owned broadcasting commission)
and the complete commercialization of the Hollywood film industry are
alike fatal to independent and original creative effort. The successful
magazines, the so-called "slicks," which print popular fiction and some-
times a very little poetry, are, for all practical purposes, retail advertis-
The Church and Modern Culture 241
ing journals. The greater part of American book business is now in the
hands of three or four vast publishing combines, each with its own
reprint trade, its own book-of-the-month scheme for dumping ephem-
eral rubbish on a bewildered public, and its own advertising machinery
for ballyhooing the latest purveyor of erotica into a rival of Balzac and
Tolstoy.
The Grip of Commerce
In this situation religion seems to offer a new hope to the author, and an
increase in the importance of religion is a very real fact in contemporary
culture. In poetry, for instance, there has been nothing like the outburst
of technical experiment that followed the previous war: it seems as
though our poets were more interested in finding something to say than
in finding new ways to say it. The stock secular themes of poetry—the
beauty of nature, the power of sexual passion, even the cruelty and
injustice of society—seem to be handled with an increasing detachment,
as though the themes themselves were felt to be spiritually exhausted.
On the other hand, we have the great popularity of religious themes,
besides the Anglo-Catholic influence emanating from Eliot, the Barthian
influence emanating from Auden, and the Roman Catholic influence
emanating from Claudel and Peguy. All this seems to be due, not to acci-
dent or fashion, much less to any desire to escape to a better world, but
to a growing sense that the whole point of poetry is that God and man
meet in a Logos.
In fiction the abrupt decline of the classical novel, the pure study of
character, is hardly realized even yet, but the form that rose with the
middle class in the eighteenth century is rapidly disappearing with that
class. The author who writes a novel primarily because he has a story to
tell is now a rare bird; our best "novelists," if the word is still applicable,
have themes rather than stories, and their approach is allegorical rather
than realistic. We have the explicitly religious allegory of Charles Wil-
liams and C.S. Lewis,7 the socially significant allegory, including the
melodramas which deal with the labour unrest and race prejudice, and
the historical allegory, where the characters illustrate the author's phi-
losophy of history. The great rise to popularity of the thriller (the French
The Church and Modern Culture 243
An unsigned editorial from Canadian Forum, 30 (June 1950): 52. This and
the next piece were identified as Frye's by Robert D. Denham in the course of
his work on Frye's 1950 Diary (see D, 353).
time. A lot of other things are true too; but that does not prevent these
things from being equally true.
Hence the enormous propaganda value that Dr. Endicott, Dean
Johnson, and Father Duffy4 have for the Communists. They suggest that
their adherence to the party line is the result of a Christian longing for
peace; they rouse nostalgic memories of the 19305 and the mirage of a
"Popular Front"5 of all lovers of freedom against brutal tyrants; and
they exploit the very natural distrust that many people have for anti-
Communist smear campaigns. They can create a mass rally in a big
auditorium where the Communists in their own name could not raise a
dozen people beyond their own members. Hoodlums who break up
their meetings add immeasurably to their prestige. And their influence
can do nothing but expand and increase in the power vacuum created
by the democratic apathy and sense of frustration about an approaching
atom-bomb war. We shall have to find better arguments for peace than
the facile demonstration that those who advocate the peace of a world-
wide Communist dictatorship are Communists.
44
Caution or Dither?
July 1950
The modern world derives its form primarily from the vast social
change which began in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and
which we may call the Industrial Revolution, from its most conspicuous
feature. This change, like every other, was at once old and new: unique
and yet in some degree a repetition of the pattern of previous events.
The repetitive aspect of it is worked out most fully in Spengler's Decline
of the West. Spengler sees history as a series of quasi-organic develop-
ments or "cultures," which are at first agricultural and feudal, then
urban and oligarchic, and finally become industrial and totalitarian. The
last stage is one of huge cities, nomadic population, profiteering and
dictatorships, mass wars, the impoverishing of agriculture and the
exhaustion of the arts, and the growth of technology. The only hope for
such an epoch is in a nation strong enough to place it under martial law.
Classical culture, according to Spengler, went into this phase in its
Roman period, and Western culture reached the same stage at the time
of Napoleon. We are now at the stage corresponding to the Classical
Punic Wars, with the centres of growing world empires struggling for
mastery, and the Rome of the future will be whatever nation has enough
Trends in Modern Culture 249
by a minority who cannot be any better than they are. Yet that is the tra-
ditional inference, and democratic sentiment was quite right to reject it.
However, it is gradually becoming clearer that the real principle of
democracy is not "faith in human nature," but the limitation of human
power. The nauseous adulation of dictators is the feature of totalitarian
life most shocking to a democrat, and this kind of adulation is the narcis-
sism of the mob. The position of general leadership, in contrast to the
position of specific responsibility, is always a projection of a mob's
unconditioned will, and means that man has begun to worship himself.
The view that man is by nature good does not lead to a very good-
natured view of man, and a satiric humour, based on a cheerful accep-
tance of human depravity as a fundamental social postulate, is one of
the most reassuring features of American life.
Democracy is normally thought of as progressive, and its goals are
evidently very similar in some respects to the goals of Marxism: a class-
less society consisting entirely of workers, and a self-controlling admin-
istrative structure replacing the old "state," or government by rulers.
Democracy is, however, trying to replace the Marxist proletarian dicta-
torship with a transitional phase of its own which we may call the open
class society, in which class distinctions exist, but are founded on equal-
ity of opportunity rather than on hereditary or caste privilege. All
thoughtful democrats agree that the main threat to democracy from
within arises, not from disparities of wealth, but from disparities of
opportunity. Antidemocratic activity consists in trying to put class dis-
tinctions on some permanent basis. We find this in, for instance, discrim-
ination against Negroes and other minority groups, and in the kind of
paternalism that industrialists with the worst labour records so often
favour. Thus democracy attempts to contain its class conflict, and pre-
vent the separating tendencies—oligarchy and pressure-group organi-
zation—from making a breach of the social contract. From the demo-
cratic point of view, Fascism is an oligarchic conspiracy against the
open-class system, deriving its real power from the big oligarchs and its
mass support from would-be oligarchs, the "independent" (i.e., unsuc-
cessful) entrepreneurs. Communism is the corresponding conspiracy at
the other end, addressing itself to those most likely to feel that society in
its present form will permanently exclude them from its benefits. In
many places (southern Italy, for example) Communist propaganda is so
solidly based on facts that only reforms of equal radicalism are likely to
make much headway against it. In the more prosperous America it may
Trends in Modern Culture 253
which democracy can develop towards its next stage is far more impor-
tant than any differences about the means adopted.
At present, both Communism and democracy promise eventually to
eradicate the major sources of human tyranny and of needless human
misery, Communism through proletarian dictatorship and revolution,
democracy through equality of opportunity and reform. Each claims
that the other is powerless to evolve from its present phase. Obvious as
it sounds, there is yet some point in saying that we have nothing to gain
from losing to Communism. It could be argued that Communism is an
international revolution, and that its reckless cruelty, its venomous
hatred, and the unceasing cannonade of its lies will automatically stop
when the whole world becomes Communist. A little study of the rela-
tions of Russia with other Communist countries makes it clear, however,
that in a completely Communist world there would be as much war, as
sharp boundaries, and as constant suspicion and intrigue as ever. The
terrible clarity of this fact has wiped out nearly all the intellectual sym-
pathy with Communism in the democracies. If the struggle with Com-
munism reaches the stage of a third world war, that war, like its
predecessor, will have, to begin with, a right and a wrong side. The right
side—ours—will derive its Tightness, not from the value of what it fights
for, but from the evil of what it fights against. War only destroys, and
there is no good in war except in the destruction of evil. At the end of a
war there is no good ready to replace the evil, but only a disorganized
situation that a surviving power may be able to take some advantage of,
if it is not too exhausted and has any idea what to do. Whether there is
major war or not, therefore, there is no hope for us either in defeat or in
victory, but only in a constructive act of social evolution, which, if made
in time, may avoid war, and, if not made in time, will in any case be the
only means of ending war with a peace instead of a mere truce. If
democracy attains the next stage of its evolution, it may soon gain con-
trol of the world without a major war. All other roads lead to totalitari-
anism, which is the art of prolonging a wartime situation.
Contemporary Deism
and are continuing to drift, away from their earlier religious moorings,
not always through indifference, but very often because they feel that a
secular life is the most mature, civilized, and serious form of the kind of
Christian liberty offered them by Protestantism. Between the secularists
and the churches are those who regard religion as a kind of palladium
that it might be unlucky to throw away, or feel that religion has a place
as a loyal conservative opposition, checking the overconfidence of
human progress with reminders that all is not yet well.
It is obvious that American Deism is an easy-going and tolerant ver-
sion of dialectic materialism. The Leninist form of the latter creed asserts
that a superhuman hypothesis can never be anything but a symbol of a
permanent governing or ruling-class principle, and hence as long as the
idea "God" exists, it will be the rallying point of all those who shrink
from a classless society. In itself, this doctrine is merely clarified human-
ism, and helps to explain why Marxism during the 19305 had an influ-
ence in the democracies so vastly greater than its popularity. Even many
clergymen at that time maintained that the Russians were Gentiles
doing by nature the things contained in the law. The Communist influ-
ence has vanished because of political rivalry and because Communism
failed to be as tolerant as Deism, not because the established church of
America has modified its views.
Protestantism has been so profoundly influenced by Deism that it is
now in many quarters almost the exact opposite of a church based on the
doctrine of justification by faith. There have been several attempts to
combine the two traditions, of which the Unitarian movement of the
nineteenth century was perhaps the most ambitious. Within recent
years, however, a small minority of Protestants have, largely under
European influence, begun to make more articulate objections to it, and
to point out that Deism really amounts to saying: a few more bites out of
the fruits of the tree of knowledge and morality, and we shall be as gods.
Hence we are now hearing a great deal about the dilemma of modern
man, and of how the events of the last two decades have proved that
optimistic humanism is a house built on sands [Matthew 7:26]. But
Deism is a resilient belief, and a few panicky desertions will not weaken
it. It is also a hopeful, liberal, and active belief, and the truth of the reli-
gious case against it is less in the propositions religion makes than in the
extent to which religion can comprehend Deism, and so expand and
emancipate it.
We have not yet brought into focus the strongest point in Deism, the
Trends in Modern Culture 257
one that commands all its real loyalty, and inspires the belief that it is
the true faith of democracy. This is liberalism, the doctrine that society
cannot attain freedom except by individualizing its culture. It is only
when the individual is enabled to form an individual synthesis of ideas,
beliefs, and tastes that a principle of freedom is established in society,
and this alone distinguishes a people from a mob. A mob always has a
leader, but a people is a larger human body in which there are no lead-
ers or followers, but only individuals acting as functions of the group.
Tolerance of disagreement and criticism among such individuals is nec-
essary, not because uniform truth is nonexistent or unattainable, but
because the mind is finite and passionate. We have tried to suggest
above that Communism isolates the secular element in Deism, and that
when it does so, liberalism instantly disappears. It seems to follow that
the existence of liberalism in any society has a lot to do with the toler-
ated presence of the religious perspective.
Protestantism was an important influence on liberal theory, and the
role it ascribes to the individual is in many respects analogous. In Prot-
estantism the individual does not work out his own theology, but tries
to listen to the Word with his own ears. The attempt to listen signifies,
on his part, a desire to become permanently attached to another com-
munity. This community is the City of God, the vision of which the
churches struggle to represent. Belonging to it does not detach one from
one's social function, nor does it project itself as a social class: the "rule
of the elect" is an illusion. In liberal theory we have a similar process on
the cultural level. The individual does not really "form his own opin-
ions," as the saying is, but tries to understand the disciplines of truth
with his own intelligence, and so to join another community. This com-
munity of searchers for truth is what the universities struggle to repre-
sent. Such a community again has no class affinities: the "rule of the
elite" is another illusion. Outside these realms is the double community
of actual society, the community of production and the community of
distraction, the world of work and the world of amusements and hob-
bies, of gossip and complaint. This latter world is important, but it is not
a free world: the most cynical tyrannies assume that man shall not live
by bread alone [Luke 4:4], but by circuses.5 Conscience, principle, criti-
cism, experiment, and all other elements of liberalism can only exist
within the spiritual or the intellectual communities.
The word "liberal" implies a disinterested pursuit of truth as its own
end, in contrast to the attempt to manipulate it or press it into the ser-
258 Politics, History, and Society
fortified citadel, in the world but not of it, which only rigorously scruti-
nized souls are allowed to enter. Locke's "ideas" are a trading stock
accumulated and exchanged by individuals: nobody has any to begin
with, but one may collect and save them, put them out at interest, and
insist on their being "clear and distinct," of full weight and sound value.
One can see the same principle at work in all the major world outlooks
traced in this book. The chain of being in medieval thought is clearly
the intellectual form of a culture organized on a feudal economy and a
hierarchic church. The political structure changes to the Renaissance
absolute prince, the enlightened despot or Roi Soleil, and philosophy
changes, with Descartes, to a dualism in which the enlightened con-
scious mind is exalted to a superior world, and the rest of nature follows
it in a state of mechanized hypnotism. Our period begins when revolu-
tions are shaking the world, and the conscious mind is deciding in con-
sequence that perhaps it is not so much like the sun in the sky as like a
boat on a perilous sea.7
This change began as soon as Kant distinguished the world as an
object of conscious knowledge from the world in itself, and led on into
the Romantic movement, in which, in nearly all branches of culture, the
conscious mind is seen as deriving its strength from a subconscious real-
ity greater than itself. Hence the importance of suggestion and evocation
in Romantic art, of the surrender of conscious intelligence to spontane-
ous mythopoeia. After Schopenhauer, this subconscious world becomes
evil, sinister, and yet immensely powerful, and visions of nightmarish
terror begin increasingly to creep into the arts. No matter where we turn
in the culture of the immediate past, the same picture meets us, a picture
reminding us less of the harassed boat than of the young lady of the lim-
erick who smiled as she rode on a tiger.8 In Schopenhauer the world of
conscious idea thus rides on a cruel (except that it is unconscious) and
inexorable world of will with the whole power of nature behind it. In
Freud, the conscious mind attempts, with very partial success, to hold in
check a mighty libidinous desire. In Darwin, the conscious mind is the
sport of an unconscious evolutionary force. In Marx, civilization is the
attempt of a dwindling minority to keep a vastly stronger majority away
from its privileges. In liberal thought, freedom is the possession of integ-
rity by a small group constantly threatened by a mob. In Kierkegaard,
the consciousness of existence rests on a vast shapeless "dread" as big
and real as life and death together. There is hardly a corner of modern
thought where we do not find some image of a beleaguered custodian of
Trends in Modern Culture 261
In the summer of 1918, when Germany and Austria were just on the
point of collapse, a book appeared called The Decline of the West, by
Oswald Spengler. Oswald Spengler was nobody in particular, which
was a serious handicap in Germany, where scholars are as carefully
ranked as army officers. More accurately, he was a high school teacher
who had thrown up his job in 1910 in order to write, whose health was
so bad he was never called up for war service, and who was so poor he
could hardly buy food and clothes, much less books. So his book had
been refused by all the best publishers, and was brought out in a small
edition. Within a year it was one of the most widely read and discussed
books in Europe, and Spengler began to revise and expand it. In 1923
the final two-volume edition was complete. Three years later it had sold
100,000 copies in German, and an English translation was begun by C.F.
Atkinson and published by Alfred Knopf. It's a big book. One of the
notices of this broadcast said that I was going to "weigh" Oswald
Spengler. Complete, The Decline of the West weighs four and a half
pounds on my bathroom scales.
The Decline of the West is an essay on human history that tries to take a
broader view than the usual one. The usual one is that the Hebrews,
Greeks, and Romans gave us our religion, culture, and law; that the
ancient world became the Middle Ages, the Middle Ages produced the
modern world, and the modern world produced us. Anything outside
266 Politics, History, and Society
this isn't really history. China and India had very little to do with pro-
ducing us: they just produced more Chinese and Indians, so they're not
progressive. "Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay," as
Tennyson says.1 Spengler thinks it's possible to make the same kind of
distinction in a less provincial way. If we read the history of a great civi-
lization, Spengler says, we read a story that seems to make sense: there
seems to be a shape and meaning in what happens. There are laws of
cause and effect; institutions evolve, classes rise, and conquests expand
in a logical direction. But if we try to write a history of Patagonians or
Zulus or Mongols, all we can produce is just a series of events or inci-
dents. These peoples live and die and reproduce; they trade and think
and fight just as we do; they make poems and pots and buildings. But
somehow we feel that their stories are chronicles or annals, not coherent
histories. If we compare Lapland in the eighteenth century with Lapland
in the thirteenth, there's not much difference, at least in Laplanders. But
if we compare England in the eighteenth century with England in the
thirteenth, we feel that it's five centuries older. The whole nation seems
to be moving with the same kind of inner purpose that an individual
does, through definite stages of what historians themselves call rise,
growth, decline, and fall. We get this sense of directed history in human
life, according to Spengler, when certain developments like those of a
living, maturing, and aging organism take place in it. These develop-
ments Spengler calls "cultures," and cultures are much bigger than
nations or empires. England has a history because it belongs to one of
these cultures, the "Western" culture of Europe, which has now ex-
panded over the world.
This Western culture began to grow up a thousand years ago, and
what we call the Middle Ages was its youth or springtime. Society was
then run by nobles and priests; its literature was largely about heroes
and knights errant; its economy was agricultural and feudal; its art,
especially its architecture, largely anonymous. The Renaissance was its
summer; nobles and priests gave way to princes and courtiers, the feu-
dal system to the city-state, anonymous architects to Shakespeare and
Michelangelo. By the end of the eighteenth century, in the poetry of
Goethe, the music of Mozart, the philosophy of Kant, Western culture
reached its autumn and exhausted its creative possibilities. Whatever
comes later in our arts, Spengler says, will be just repeating or living off
what has already been done. With Napoleon and his bid for world
empire Western "culture" becomes Western "civilization," and enters its
Oswald Spengler 267
final winter period. The main interest changes from art to technology,
and we enter a phase of empire-building, huge engineering feats, enor-
mous cities, and finally mass annihilation wars and dictatorships.
We can figure out our cultural age by comparing ourselves with an
earlier culture, as all cultures have roughly the same lifespan. The one
we know best is the Classical culture, which was in its spring at the time
of Homer. Here again we have a society run by nobles and priests,
where literature was heroic and economics feudal and agricultural. The
next stage came with the early philosophers like Heraclitus, on whom
Spengler wrote his doctoral thesis, and with the rise of city-states like
Athens and Sparta. With the great Greek dramas, the philosophy of
Plato and Aristotle and the last glories of Athens, Classical culture gath-
ered in its harvest. Then came Alexander the Great, who corresponds to
Napoleon in our culture. We're about a century later than Napoleon, so
we're about where Classical civilization was around two hundred years
before Christ, when the great empires, Macedonia, Rome, and Carthage,
were fighting for supremacy. What's ahead of us is something like the
Roman Empire. One of our great nations will grow to a world empire—
Spengler hopes it will be Germany. Cecil Rhodes the empire builder is
typical, Spengler says, of the kind of Caesars we'll be getting in the next
few centuries. By "the decline of the West," then, Spengler means that
our culture is getting on in years, about where a man is in his late sixties,
still vigorous, but with no more youth ahead of him.
In between the Classical culture and our own was an Arabian or Near
Eastern one. That had its spring in the time of Christ, its summer in the
Byzantine period, and its imperial world-conquering phase began with
Mohammed. This Near Eastern culture is a hard one to identify. Speng-
ler says that's because it grew up under the weight and prestige of the
older Classical culture. It got twisted out of shape and had to express
itself in Classical forms that weren't appropriate to it. Spengler calls this
deforming of a young culture by an old one a pseudomorphosis, or false
formation, and he says another one is going on now. The only young
culture in the world today is the Russian one, which is in its late spring,
or would be if it weren't getting deformed by Western influences. The
first edition of Spengler explains that the West was declining and that
Russia had more of a creative future; the second volume explains that
the Western philosophy of Communism was choking the life out of Rus-
sia's natural development. The first edition sold widely in the Soviet
Union; the second volume was banned. Besides these four cultures,
268 Politics, History, and Society
are things that get born, like babies and puppies. Consequently they will
die: that is, they will return sooner or later to the primitive life of mere
events out of which they grew. But that doesn't make Spengler a fatalist,
unless it's fatalism to say that anything that's alive gets older every year.
If a man wants to box or play the violin, how well he will do these things
will depend largely on how old he is when he starts, and the same,
according to Spengler, is true of a culture. On the other hand, most peo-
ple realize that there's a good deal of sheer chance in history: as Pascal
said, the history of Rome would have been quite different if Cleopatra's
nose had been an inch longer.2 Spengler would say that it would have
been different in its incidents, but not in its underlying form, or what he
calls its destiny. The incidents of a man's life will depend on what job he
takes, what girl he marries, what town he settles in, and much of that
will turn on chance. But nothing will alter the fact that it will be his life.
Then again, some people have believed that history moves in cycles,
and that whatever we do has been done before and will be done again.
This is both an ancient and a modern superstition, and Spengler has
often been scolded for believing in inevitable recurrence of this kind.
But Spengler has no theory of cycles at all: his cultures grow up irregu-
larly, like dandelions.
Most of the objections to Spengler are not to his real arguments, but to
his sound effects. And his sound effects are sometimes pretty hard to
take. He has all the faults of a prophetic style: harsh, dogmatic, preju-
diced, certain that history will do exactly what he says, determined to
rub his reader's nose into all the toughness and grimness of his outlook.
He has little humour, but plenty of savage and sardonic wit. And he has
a fine gift for gloomy eloquence. If it were nothing else, The Decline of the
West would still be one of the world's great Romantic poems. He's fond
of murky biological language, like calling man a "splendid beast of
prey,"3 and the imagery is of the Halloween type that we so often find in
German poets and philosophers. That is, it's full of woo-woo noises and
shivery Wagnerian whinnies about the dark goings-on of nature and
destiny.
Then again, he sees everything a culture produces as characteristic of
that culture: in other words as a symbol of it. History consequently
becomes a collection of symbols representing something that can hardly
be expressed in words at all, because the existence of a culture can't
really be proved; it can only be pointed out, and felt or intuited by the
reader, through the arrangement of the symbols. All his cultures are
270 Politics, History, and Society
ing to his charts. Here again Spengler has been his own worst enemy:
the jingoist has corrupted the prophet.
If we're going to attack Spengler's real argument we have to attack his
central assumption, or metaphor, whichever it is. The assumption is that
there are cultures, or huge social developments in history, that behave
like organisms and follow the same rhythm of birth, growth, maturity,
decline, and death that an individual goes through. We don't have to
assume that cultures are organisms, as Spengler himself does, but only
that they behave like organisms. I don't want to argue directly either for
or against Spengler on this point, only to bring up two other consider-
ations that I find very impressive—impressive enough to make me feel
that Spengler really belongs in a series on makers of modern thought.
In the first place, several other scholars in our time who have tried to
take a universal view of history have finally come up with something
very like Spengler's organic culture. The best known of these scholars is
Toynbee. Toynbee says he was fascinated by Spengler, but thought he'd
do better with a less dogmatic method. Toynbee has twenty-one civiliza-
tions against Spengler's eight, and for twenty of them he's quite happy
with Spengler's organic metaphors. They grow to maturity, they decline
into what he calls a "time of troubles," then they form empires and
eventually die out. In his analysis of these late stages I think he has some
improvements on Spengler. But the twenty-first civilization is his own,
and there he balks. Western civilization has just got to be different; he
won't be a fatalist and say that it's going to behave the way the other
twenty have done. In 1939 Toynbee said that it was too early to say
whether we've come to our time of troubles yet or not. Personally, I find
Toynbee's hopes for a last chance more woebegone than Spengler's out-
right pessimism. We may prefer Toynbee to Spengler, just as we may
prefer a more up-to-date authority to Freud or Marx. But in both its
strength and its weakness, Toynbee's work is a significant tribute to the
originality and power of Spengler, all the more significant for being a
somewhat unwilling tribute.
My second consideration is this: if we look at the thinkers who have
permanently changed the shape of human thought, such as Darwin,
Marx, Freud, or Einstein, we find, naturally, that their books are com-
plex and difficult and require years of study. Yet the central themes of
their work are of massive simplicity. Evolution, class struggle, the sub-
conscious mind, are all things that have been staring mankind in the
face for centuries. It's the ability to see what's straight in front of his
272 Politics, History, and Society
nose that marks the thinker of first-rate importance. Now what I find
most deeply convincing in Spengler is the fact that everybody really
takes his thesis for granted, even if they've never heard of Spengler,
even if they've read him and hate his guts. Everybody who thinks about
the matter at all thinks in terms of a "Western" culture; everybody
thinks of that culture as old, not young; everybody is struck by the dif-
ference between us and the Middle Ages and by the similarity between
us and the Roman Empire; everybody assumes that some crucial change
in our fortunes took place around Napoleon's time.
And at that I'm not counting the people who have a sentimental admi-
ration for medieval culture because it represents our own lost youth,
and try to imitate or revive it in our times. Nor do I count the people
who can't listen with pleasure to any music later than Mozart, or what-
ever terminal they choose. Nor the people who think that everything
produced in the nineteenth century was too awful for words. Nor the
Marxists who talk about the "decadence" of bourgeois culture, nor the
alarmists who talk about a return to a new Dark Ages. Every one of
these has a more or less muddled version of Spengler's argument as his
basis. Whether we are trying to think for ourselves, or whether we are
just repeating whatever catchwords are going around, the decline of the
West is as much a part of our mental outlook as the electron or the dino-
saur, and in that sense we are all Spenglerians today.
Still, we can't help but sympathize with the feeling that Spengler pre-
dicts too much.4 Unless a prophet has unusual sources of information,
he's well advised to stick to analysing the present instead of foretelling
the future. And Spengler wraps up too big a parcel when he tries to sug-
gest that his is the last major book that needs to be written. We can per-
haps claim for him that he's isolated a most important group of facts in
our time, facts that can only be explained by his book, or some book like
his. If so, he's an essential contributor to modern thought, and it would
be silly to ignore him. It's another thing to claim, as he does, that reading
his book will let us in on what will happen during the next few centu-
ries. Spengler says that Western man is characterized by infinite expan-
sion, which is why Western culture has spread all over the world. But
perhaps something else is happening. Perhaps our science and technol-
ogy will bring in a new phase of human life, which will supersede the
history of cultures just as the history of cultures superseded the Stone
Age. Perhaps that's the whole point about science: that it's a universal
structure of knowledge that will help mankind to break out of cul-
Oswald Spengler 273
hire-group barriers, and get rid of war by moving into a higher area of
conflict.
Spengler, naturally, thinks this is a pipe dream. He insists that one
culture can't learn from another, and that the people of Asia and Africa
have no interest in our technology except as a means of destroying us.
But Marx is a more effective prophet today in a large part of the world
than Spengler, and I suspect that one reason for this is that Marx empha-
sizes the uniformity of human nature and conditions all over the world.
Marx has his limitations too, of course, and is just as dangerous to use
for crystal-gazing. In fact many if not most of our greatest thinkers have
become great partly through exaggeration and over-emphasis. They
have thrown their whole weight behind one solid and genuine idea, and
because they are great they are limited, and have to be fitted into a
larger structure than they ever recognized. Spengler is no exception, and
it's nothing against him to say that there are more things still on earth, to
say nothing of heaven, than are dreamt of in Spengler's philosophy.5
48
Preserving Human Values
27 April 1961
reveal about what we believe. Our actions do show what our actual
beliefs are, sometimes against our will. A man may go to church on Sun-
day morning and find himself repeating an extremely impressive state-
ment of what he believes in, but by Monday evening he may have
demonstrated that his real conception of human society is a very differ-
ent one. I wonder, therefore, what the axioms and assumptions are,
which are evident by what we are doing, and in particular by what a
group of people devoted to social welfare is doing.
We find ourselves of course in a context of a world pressed between
two major philosophies in politics, and the propaganda statement of
each side leads to a complete deadlock. One side says the world is
divided between the democratic and the totalitarian state, and the other
side says it is divided between the socialist state and the tools of capital-
ist imperialism. We can get no further on that basis. We do not feel par-
ticularly as though we belong to a capitalist economy—at least it is not
something that presses in on our conscience. And similarly, Russia and
China have no conception in their own mind corresponding to the word
"totalitarian." I think if the Russians, let us say, were not issuing propa-
ganda statements, they would say that they were not living in a social-
ist state; that they were living through a proletarian revolution which
is trying to become a socialist state. And we, I think, might very well
say, not that we are living in a democracy, but that we are living in
something much more like a bourgeois oligarchy trying to become a
democracy.
In other words, our society, like theirs, is a society in a state of pro-
cess, and it is a revolutionary state proceeding towards a goal which is
in part an ideal—that is, we shall not realize all of it. As such, therefore,
democracy is not to be judged by what it does but by what it aims at in
spite of what it does. Certain principles such as the supremacy of civil
over military power, the publication of all acts of government, and the
toleration of unpopular opinion, are still principles of democracy no
matter how often they may be flouted.
I am sorry to see this sense of revolution declining in North American
society, as I think to some extent it is. It seems to me that the United
States has much less of a sense of an open class society than it had a cen-
tury ago. As we can see from the career of President Kennedy,1 Ameri-
can presidents no longer have to take the precaution to get themselves
born in log cabins.
I was a little shocked a day or so ago to find that some of my stu-
276 Politics, History, and Society
dents, after they had finished their exams, were slipping down to the
Royal York and taking strike-breaking jobs down there. For a person
who lived through the Depression, as I did, that seemed a very strange
procedure on the part of students. And yet I have to remember that their
generation has been brought up to think of labour unions as really just
one more racket, and as something to be associated with someone like
Hoffa2 rather than with any kind of social cause. And I feel for example
that if such an organization as the American Senate Committee on
Un-American Activities were called, for example, a committee on
"Counter-Revolutionary Activities," what it did would perhaps be no
less of an affront to human decency, but at least it would make more
sense from its own point of view, and perhaps it would be less inspired
to do infallibly everything that the enemies of America would want to
see it do.
I imagine that our ultimate goals are not very different from those of
our Communist rivals. I imagine that a classless society, a withering
away of the state, are our own ideals as well. For democracy, if it is a
goal and in part an ideal, is not a system of government like a republic or
a monarchy. If the United States were to adopt a Soviet system, or if it
were to swear allegiance to Queen Elizabeth as its Queen (as the Ameri-
cans do in Bernard Shaw's play The Apple Cart), that might be an unde-
sirable move, but it would not be in itself a threat to democracy. It will
be too bad, I think, if democracy suffers from a sense of fixation about its
own political machinery. It is possible that voting on grossly oversimpli-
fied issues for candidates who are controlled by political machines
rather than by their electors may be something that in time to come we
shall decide is a bit expendable. The rise of social sciences and the prolif-
eration of the civil service may mean that much in our political system
might prove an anachronism in time to come.
We should do better, I think, to think of ourselves as moving in a cer-
tain direction, a direction that I should characterize as a gradual dissolv-
ing of classes, a moving toward a society in which class barriers or class
distinctions have, as far as is humanly possible, disappeared. In doing
that, we shall discover many new important and exciting social facts.
When we discover that we do not need an aristocracy we shall discover
who our real aristocracy are. Our real aristocracy, of course, are the chil-
dren. They are the ones who are entitled to leisure, to privilege, to
expensive playgrounds, and to be supported by the rest of society. Any
of you who have handed a tip to a taxi driver have probably felt that you
Preserving Human Values 277
mummy wore when she went to a party; the lower middle-class group
said it was what mummy wore when she went to bed; and the under-
privileged group had never heard of the word at all. In other words,
what purported to be a test of intelligence was actually a test of the
father's social status. This kind of relentless self-examination to see
when we are actually falling back on class ideas instead of on demo-
cratic ones is a part of the difficulty of our lives.
I should define the conception of equality, I think, rather differently,
as the conviction that a social function is essential to every human
being's life, and that to deprive any individual of a social function is a
kind of murder. The white segregationist who spits on a Negro carrying
an antisegregation placard is of course being as silly and perverse as he
can be, as he very well knows. But I think that that is a less deadly insult
to human dignity than unemployment, that faceless, anonymous,
refusal to find any social function for an individual. It is a less deadly
insult than the black night that settles down on the elderly and the
retired when they are face to face with the fact that there is no longer
anything in society for which their contribution is of any importance. An
individual deprived of his social function is like an animal so mutilated
that he can only crawl away to die, and the assumption behind all efforts
at relief is the assumption that society has failed in its primary duty and
must fall back on some kind of secondary first aid.
If a social system such as Communism can achieve success in giving a
social function to large groups of people who did not have it, what more
is needed? We say perhaps that the system would lack liberty. A totali-
tarian society may perhaps be reminded that it can pursue equality to
the point of forgetting about liberty. A society like ours can be reminded
that we can pursue liberty to the point of forgetting about equality. But
the conception of liberty is by no means a simple one. If we think of
some of the things that we are proudest of in our society over the last
century we notice that they are things which seem to curtail individual
freedom. The advance of science, for example, has brought about mea-
sures in public health of which we thoroughly approve but which cer-
tainly do curtail, in many respects, the range and variety of human
freedom. It has brought people into a closer organization and has made
them more readily marked and identifiable. Compulsory education
again, the assumption that everybody under sixteen who is not in school
on Monday morning is a truant, is a very considerable infringement on
what we ordinarily think of as human freedom, though we have other
Preserving Human Values 279
reasons for approving of it. And social welfare itself may place many
restrictions on personal freedom on the part of many people, as some of
you may have noticed while making out your income tax recently.
Now here again there seems to be a notion, of religious origin, of
some kind of paradox in the view of the human self. We seem to be
caught in a contradictory statement. In religion the human soul is of infi-
nite worth and it is immortal; and yet the same religion seems to take
a very dim view of human nature. It talks about original sin and says
that man's efforts are worth very little. Similarly, democracy was
not founded on any maudlin enthusiasm for the common man. It was
founded on the belief in something very like the depravity of man; that
is, it was founded on the belief that serious matters like the kingdom,
the power, and the glory, are something that men are not fit to be
trusted with. The doctrine that man is by nature good is a doctrine that
does not lead to a very good-natured view of man. A rather sardonic
humour, a conviction that many of the people who serve it are probably
scoundrels, is one of the more reassuring features of North American
life, and it seems to be a view of human nature essential to a society that
gives a primary place to criticism and reform.
Religion has always taught that man has two selves. There is the self-
ish self which is worth very little and which we try to get rid of, and
then there is the genuine self, the soul that we are trying to save in reli-
gion. We feel a similar division, I think, in the secular world. If you do
casework you are aware that every human being is a "case," that his
dilemmas and problems are of a type that you have met before—people
even fall mentally ill in highly conventional ways. Yet at the same time
you are equally well aware that no human being is really a "case" and
that every human problem is unique. Similarly in society we have a con-
ception of an ordinary self, the economic man, the man whose behav-
iour is statistically predictable, the Status Seeker, the inevitable target of
the Wastemakers and Hidden Persuaders,4 a man who is gregarious but
not friendly, who lives apart from his neighbour in a state of spiritual
isolation. This aggressive or acquisitive man is a man who seems to
have very little dignity, and whose freedom hardly seems to be worth
preserving. He is the cornerstone of laissez-faire; he has nothing to do
with liberalism, for all our political parties are now running away from
laissez-faire and they differ among themselves only in their estimate of
how fast and how far they can run.
The conception of freedom, therefore, must apply to a very different
280 Politics, History, and Society
There are two contexts in which the question of mental health exists,
and they are directly opposite to one another. The first is the therapeutic
context. Here society is the norm, and the individual suffers from some
psychic disability that prevents his full social functioning. All forms of
mental illness, including the schizophrenic and the manic-depressive,
come under this category, and their antisocial actions range from com-
mitting suicide to murdering public figures.
In the other context, society as a whole is sick and paranoid, and men-
tal health can be attained only by the individual as a result of some
detachment from the hysteria around him.1 Some societies, like Nazi
Germany, are more obviously insane than others, and some are more
obviously controlled and manipulated than others. But the same princi-
ple, that the mob is always insane and that only the individual can be
sane, is always present.
Society itself, of course, cannot distinguish the mentally sick person
from the healthy person who repudiates its own sickness. The psychia-
trist, the clergyman, and all those concerned with education, have to
keep in mind the double focus. Frequently individual detachment and
284 Politics, History, and Society
neurosis are found in the same person, and many forms of rejection of
social values have themselves their neurotic aspects. Those concerned
with mental health have to be both healers and social critics, just as
architects have to be concerned both with individual buildings and with
much larger issues of technological planning.
51
The Quality of Life in the '705
14 February 1971
son.1 That is a metaphor from car-driving, and it applies to space but not
to time. In time we all face the past, and are dragged backwards into the
future. Nobody knows the future: it isn't there to be known. The past is
what we know, and it is all that we know. Those concerned with predic-
tion and forecasting, like statisticians, can deal with the future only as
the analogy of the past. Some people, of course, are more receptive to
social change than others, but when it comes to "regarding present life
as similar to the past," we are all in precisely the same boat. Further, all
of us, to some extent, fear and hate change, at least the changes that are
going to affect us. The most ferocious of radicals can only keep going as
long as he can live in the relatively stable society created by his radical-
ism: the society of those who agree with him and support his views.
Whatever else he wants to change, he never wants to change that.
The prophet, therefore, is not a person who foretells the future, but the
person who tries to get some insight into the present through his knowl-
edge of the past. As such, he has two main functions. One is to warn of
approaching disaster if certain lines of conduct are persisted in. This is
not my main concern now, because warning is already one of the verbal
heavy industries of our time. Everybody likes to warn, from terrorists to
the people who put up signs on highways reading "Prepare to meet thy
God" or "Watch for falling rock." The other function of prophecy is to
point out the opportunities available for a better life, to say, not what is
likely to happen, but what could happen. It is this aspect of the future
that I want to stress, but, of course, I have to start with the immediate
past, the world of the late 19605.
It struck me that the confident, get-with-it tone of the book I have
quoted contained an undercurrent of hysteria, and that it was a hysteria
I had heard before. I am old enough to remember the newspapers of the
spring and summer months of 1929, and how they said that very soon
the world, or the United States leading the world, would have abolished
poverty, distributed income and purchasing power, provided a final
answer to socialism, turned every citizen into a profit-making investor,
and got to Utopia by express. There has been quite a market recently for
books about the technological advances we may expect between now
and the year 2000: the ones I have seen have mostly taken a full-
speed-ahead-and-damn-the-torpedoes line. But few if any of them
seemed to realize that this attitude was a by-product of a boom period in
the economy. Society tends to move from one plateau to another, peri-
ods of rapid change being followed by periods of consolidation. My
The Quality of Life in the 'yos 287
guess is that the 19603 were a period of advance, notably in the tech-
nique of communication, and that the 19705, which begin with inflation,
unemployment, and depression, will be a period of some retrenchment.
Whether this is so or not, I can at any rate state my first principle,
which is that the future which may be technically possible is not the
future that society can absorb. In science and technology there is a good
deal of automatic advance: one discovery leads to another, and when
any given form of technology has a clear field to develop, it can do so
with extraordinary speed. Technology can improve the efficiency of
aeroplanes to a degree that outstrips the wildest dreams with which it
began. But no sooner has it done so than airline companies go broke, air-
ports get clogged up, citizens complain about sonic-boom noise, and
terrorists develop a taste for free rides to Cuba.
Over a century ago, Karl Marx said that history, up to his time, had
shown a consistent pattern of one class exploiting another, but that indus-
trial production had introduced a revolutionary process into history, and
that this was creating contradictions within the class structure of capital-
ism. We could not both have industrial production and go on playing the
same old exploiting game. So there was really a double revolutionary
process, one the development of production on an industrial basis, the
other the gaining of power over this production by society as a whole. A
generation ago, we were still arguing this point on the same assumptions.
Everybody agreed that industrial production was a revolutionary force;
everybody assumed that this force could only function by being united to
a certain kind of social system. The left wing argued that socialism was
the only possible form of this system; the right wing argued the opposite,
that leaving a good many things to private enterprise was the best way of
keeping society flexible. Neither side questioned the work ethic of pro-
duction itself; both assumed that the increasing of its efficiency was the
essential function of any social system.
After 1917, the Marxist side of this argument turned increasingly to
rationalizing everything that was happening in the Soviet Union. For
the past twenty years or so it has been fairly obvious that Soviet society
is a more conservative one than ours, and so most Marxist rhetoric has
shifted its ground to China, where the present is less known and the
future less predictable. It has become clearer, nevertheless, that the
advance of knowledge, along with the technological breakthroughs
which accompany it, is the only revolutionary force of our time, and that
changing the economic system, whatever arguments there may other-
288 Politics, History, and Society
wise be for it, is not an inseparable part of this revolution. The main
function of all economic systems whatever is to put brakes on social
change, to cushion society against too much of what is now being called
future shock.2 Capitalist and Communist societies have their rigidities
and inflexibilities in different places, but they both have them, and have
them for the same purpose. That is why all governments have such a
curious sense of priorities: why atom bombs and moon landings play so
large a role in the budgets of major powers. Such things are part of the
Great International Handicap: the tacit agreement not to rush too far or
too fast into the future.
The people who find the revolutionary mood of the late 19605 hardest
to understand, I should think, are the old-line Marxists. Old-line Marx-
ism was directed toward an end: it saw everything that happened as
part of a step by step advance toward a revolution that would put an
end to history as we have known it. Those who accepted the Marxist
analysis felt that it gave them a tremendous insight into the reality of
what was happening. All events were, in their deeper meaning, symbols
of the progress towards the final takeover. And, as Marxism regarded
theory and practice as inseparable, this analysis also gave a new mean-
ing to the lives of those who adopted it: it gave historical significance to
every strike, every demonstration, even every committee meeting they
attended.
Contemporary radicalism may use, as it often does, the same argu-
ments, the same Marxist jargon, the same tactics, the same violent
denunciations of the evils of capitalism. But, even when it calls itself
Maoist or Trotskyist, it is really an anarchism that no longer identifies
revolution with seizing control of production. There have always been
two kinds of anarchists, the peaceful kind and the violent kind. Violent
anarchism does not want to take over production so much as to smash
and sabotage it. Its tactics have the plausibility of the argument that the
one really effective way to stop a car is to aim it at a tree. The more
thoughtful anarchists differ in tactics, but not in ultimate aims. The ten-
dency of technical change is towards greater centralization, and anar-
chism is a decentralizing mode of thought. It is in the long run a doctrine
of organizing society so as to provide for the greatest possible amount of
stability and the slowest possible rate of change.
To understand this mood, we have to remember that it is really, from
its own point of view, counteranarchist. The really anarchic force, it
feels, is the productive machinery itself, which has got out of control of
The Quality of Life in the '/os 289
the balance of human society itself. I imagine that the 19705 will be
deeply concerned with these moral criteria of production.
The 19605 were also a period of becoming adjusted to new techniques
of communication, more particularly the electronic ones. It was the
McLuhan age, the age of intense preoccupation with the effect of com-
munications on society, and with the aspect of life that we call news.
Many of the worst features of the late '6os, its extravagant silliness, its
orgies of lying, its pointless terrorism and repression, revolved around
the television set and the cult of the "image." So the nature of news is the
next thing we ought to look at. I was recently reading the report of the
Senate's committee on the mass media, and came across, in the third vol-
ume, the stock question: why do the papers, and news media generally,
seem to report only bad news?5 This is, as I say, a familiar, even a
tedious question, but it raises more interesting ones, two in particular.
First, what is it that is really happening? Second, what is it that the news
media are really set up to record? I shall try to deal with the second
question first.
The greater part of our lives consists of continuity and routine. As
long as the continuity and routine are functioning, we are living in a
world of non-news. As the Senate report remarked, it is not news if the
Air Canada flight from Vancouver arrives on time with everyone safe.
News is whatever breaks into routine, and such news is of two main
kinds: events and issues. Events, things that cut across routine, are very
often the result of a breakdown in routine. That is why so large a propor-
tion of news events are disasters, and why all disaster is news. The issue
operates in the same way. Intellectually, we go on with our mental rou-
tines, repeating our ideas and prejudices as long as we meet with no
opposition. The issue breaks into this by dramatizing opposition: every-
body has to line up on one side or other of an issue. The fact that in the
mental life only the confronting issue is news is the reason for the pious
devotion of newspapers and other media to anything called "controver-
sial." Now this polarizing of attitude, lining everybody up on one side
or the other, is also what revolutionary strategy aims at doing. Thus the
news media also have, already built into them, as a necessity of their
existence, the quality of undirected revolution. The emphasis on "con-
frontation" and similar words, the obsession with the discontinuous and
unstructured, the tendency to argue automatically that whatever one
disagreed with was "out of date," show how the anarchism and the pre-
occupation with media in the late 19605 were aspects of the same thing.
The Quality of Life in the '705 291
paper given in the fall of 1968, that while nothing seemed less likely then
than a return to the introspection of the Eisenhower period, I was con-
vinced that such a return was just around the corner. At the moment we
appear to have turned such a corner: of course the mood may change
again overnight, but it may be worth mentioning my reasons for making
the statement. In the first place, technological developments during the
last two decades have tended towards greater introversion. The passen-
ger aeroplane is more introverted than the train, the high-rise apartment
more introverted than the bungalow suburb, the television set more
introverted than the neighbourhood movie, and so on. Similarly, much
radical opposition to the social ethos has taken intensely introverted
forms. The drug cults are an obvious example: rock music, which wraps
up its listeners in a completely insulating cloak of noise, is another. But
such things differ very little from the mood of society as a whole. A few
years ago the magic word which explained everything that was going on
was the word "subculture," but I doubt if there really is such a thing as a
subculture: everything the word describes has its equivalent in, or is
taken up by, the rest of society. Recently, the Canadian Radio and Televi-
sion Commission, with which I have a connection,8 has been trying to
impose standards of Canadian content on broadcasters. I expected many
broadcasters to be opposed to these regulations: what surprised me much
more was the howl of protest from so many viewers, many of whom said,
very explicitly, that it was part of the inalienable and God-given birth-
right of every free-born Canadian to listen to all the American programs
he could get his hands on. A broadcaster made a remark at a recent hear-
ing which seemed to me to throw some light on this. The viewer, he said,
is an addict. He keeps twisting the dial until he gets his fix: then he's
happy. There is much more to be said about viewers than this, but it is
true that for many people television constitutes a socially acceptable form
of drug culture. Similarly in other areas. The newspapers express a good
deal of indignation about Rochdale,9 but I should imagine that most of the
conditions complained of there—the litter, the drugs, the sexual promis-
cuity, the petty delinquencies—could be duplicated in a good many uni-
versity residences, male or female. What has happened, I think, is a
considerable decline in the capacity for community living. Perhaps the
hippies will be bellwethers here, as they have been before. A few years
ago it was they who led the cult of doing one's own thing, but now they
are turning increasingly to communes and social settlements, rather like
the Utopian projects of the nineteenth century.
The Quality of Life in the '705 293
opinion, the constant vociferating of pro and con views. Nothing deteri-
orates the character more quickly than the deliberate telling of
half-truths, where each side tries to expose the lies on the other side and
suppress the lies on its own, to denounce evils in some parts of the
world and overlook the same evils elsewhere, to put its case by shouting
down the opponent or calling the police to jail him. This is merely
another kind of drug culture: it may be exhilarating at the time, but its
only permanent result is hangover. The hangover in this case consists of
a facile and self-pitying sense of alienation.
Through all the confusion and violence of the late 19605, the thing that
anarchism most wants, the decentralizing of power and influence, has
been steadily growing. It will continue to grow through the 19705, I
think, in many areas. For example, the possibilities of cable for breaking
into the monologue of communication and giving the local community
some articulateness and sense of coherence are enormous. And as real
decentralizing grows and we get nearer to what is called participatory
democracy, the false forms of it, separatism, neo-fascism, the jockeying
of pressure groups, and all the other things that fragment the social
vision instead of diversifying it, will, I hope, begin to break off from it.
I said before that the question of what is news raises another question:
what is it that really happens? I said too that most of our lives is spent in
repetition and routine, the world of non-news. But there are two kinds
of repetition. There is the repetition of ordinary habit, three meals a day,
going to the job, driving the car, and all the continuous activities that
preserve our sense of identity. There is also the repetition of practice, as
when we learn to play the piano or memorize the alphabet or the multi-
plication table. This is directed and progressive repetition, and it is the
basis of all education. The ability to think is just as much a matter of
habit and practice as the ability to play the piano. Whenever anything
that we see, or pick up in conversation, or get as an idea, is added to and
becomes a part of an expanding body of experience, we are continuing
our education. In that sense we may say that nothing is really happening
in the world except the education of the people in it. The news gives us
another aspect of what is happening, what I called a vertical cross-sec-
tion of it. But the world the news gives us changes with bewildering
rapidity, and we can never understand why it is changing from the
news alone. We can only understand that through the continuous and
structured forms of apprehension, the forms of the arts and sciences.
Education, then, is not a preparation for real life: it is the encounter with
The Quality of Life in the '705 295
real life, and the only way in which reality can be grasped at all. Produc-
tion in society is the result of technological developments; technological
developments are the result of the advance of knowledge. The advance
of knowledge is what is really happening in the world, and the more we
direct our attention to it the more real our lives become.
I speak of the advance of knowledge, which relates mostly to science,
but of course I have a special interest in literature and the arts, whose
function is to intensify experience rather than advance it. The domi-
nance of communication media in the 19605 tended to assimilate paint-
ing, music, and literature, especially drama, to the news. They all took
the form of a sequence of movements or vogues appearing and disap-
pearing with great speed. Like other things, the arts were overproduced
and had to adopt a technique of planned obsolescence. They resembled
in this the demands for "relevance" in education, which brought a simi-
lar built-in obsolescence into university teaching. A time of "confronta-
tion" and the like is very hard on the arts for many reasons. I think of
Ralph Ellison, a highly intelligent and sensitive black writer, who pub-
lished his novel Invisible Man some time ago and worked for years on
his next one. It sounds like a most honourable career, but a friend tells
me of a student he has, a girl very involved in black power movements,
who furiously denounced Ellison's devotion to his art as "a personality
cult like Stalin's." Her view was that a black novelist should not be just
writing but writing up: he should be making novels out of news, imme-
diate issues, and crises, and helping to support the black power move-
ment by doing so. This is, of course, a variant of Stalin's own view of
"socialist realism," which in practice meant that Russian writers had to
support his regime or else. It is a view that many of the best Russian
writers today are going to jail rather than submit to.
I would hope for the 19703 a development of the arts in which they
would have recovered something of their real function of binding
together the community in time as well as space, reshaping the past and
addressing the unborn as well as the present. The arts are always a
product of leisure, leisure not in the sense of privilege but in the sense of
relaxation of panic. The free imagination cannot be hurried; it cannot be
partisan; it cannot live on simplistic half-truths; it cannot yield to the
fear of not being up-to-date. It must look at the whole of what is in front
of it, and communicate that sense of wholeness to society.
And perhaps, if the arts could recover their proper social function,
they could lead us on to the highest effort, perhaps, that the 19705 could
296 Politics, History, and Society
make. I said that I thought the 'yos were likely to be much preoccupied
with the question of the moral criteria of production. But moral criteria
cannot be separated from aesthetic ones. At a certain point the pollution
of Lake Erie or Jasper Park10 is bound to expand into a much bigger
problem, the problem of noise pollution and shape pollution, the hid-
eousness of so much of the sight and sound of contemporary civiliza-
tion. We unconsciously keep giving ourselves sedatives so that we will
not notice this hideousness, but it constantly affects and influences our
lives in all sorts of subtle ways, and the higher our sense of reality, the
more obvious its effects will be.
One of the more genuinely attractive aspects of the protest move-
ments of the late 19605 has been the insistence with which they have
raised the question "Why not?" Some time ago one of the Beatles put up
advertisements over Toronto saying "War is over—if you want it."11 It
was not perhaps a very successful enterprise, but what it said was true
enough. War is over if we want it, and so is the whole nightmare of
human folly and tyranny. It will probably not be over in the 19705, but
there is nothing in the will of God, the malice of the devil, or the uncon-
sciousness of nature to prevent it from going. What prevents it are the
bogies and demons inside us. We have been calling these demons up
pretty frequently during the past few years of confused and infantile
illusions, and they have never failed to respond to our call.12 But they
have no power except what they get from us, and certainly no power to
stop us, if we want it, from making the 19705 an era of grace, dignity,
and peace.
52
Spengler Revisited
Winter 1974
In July 1918, when the German armies were on the point of collapse, a
book appeared called Der Untergang des Abendlandes, by someone called
Oswald Spengler. I use that phrase because Spengler then was nobody
in particular, an Oberlehrer or Gymnasium teacher who had thrown up
his job in 1910 in order to write, whose health was so bad he was never
called up for military service even in the warm-body months of 1918,
and who was so poor he could hardly buy enough food or clothing,
much less books. Anonymity was a serious handicap in a country where
scholars were ranked in a quasi-military hierarchy, and Spengler's book
298 Politics, History, and Society
was refused by many publishers before being brought out in a small edi-
tion. Within a year it was one of the most widely read and discussed
books in Europe, and Spengler began to revise and expand it. He was
decoyed into other projects before he completed his masterwork, but
finally did complete it with a second volume, as long and detailed as the
first. The second volume, however, adds relatively little to the essential
argument, though it provides more documentation. In 1926 an English
translation of the first volume by C.F. Atkinson, called The Decline of the
West, was published by Alfred A. Knopf, the second volume appearing
in 1928. It is an admirable translation, with many helpful footnotes
added by the translator. In English there is an excellent study of Speng-
ler by H. Stuart Hughes (1952). It is a short book, but even so it takes in a
much wider sweep of argument than I can take here: I am concerned
only with The Decline of the West as a "revisited classic."
The philosophical framework of Spengler's argument is a Romantic
one, derived ultimately from Fichte's adaptation of Kant. The objective
world, the world that we know and perceive, the phenomenal world, is
essentially a spatial world: it is the domain of Nature explored by sci-
ence and mathematics, and so far as it is so explored, it is a mechanical
world, for when living things are seen objectively they are seen as mech-
anisms. Over against this is the world of time, organism, life, and
history. The essential reality of this world eludes the reasoner and exper-
imenter: it is to be attained rather by feeling, intuition, imaginative
insight, and, above all, by symbolism. The time in which this reality
exists is a quite different time from the mechanical or clock time of sci-
ence, which is really a dimension of space. It follows that methods ade-
quate for the study of nature are not adequate for the study of history.
The true method of studying living forms, Spengler says, is by analogy,
and his whole procedure is explicitly and avowedly analogical. The
problem is to determine what analogies in history are purely accidental,
and which ones point to the real shape of history itself. Thanks to such
works as Bernard Lonergan's Insight (i957)/ we know rather more
about the positive role of analogy in constructive thought than was gen-
erally known in 1918, and it is no longer possible to dismiss Spengler
contemptuously as "mystical" or "irrational" merely because his meth-
od is analogical. He may be, but for other reasons.
Everything that is alive shows an organic rhythm, moving through
stages of birth, growth, maturity, decline, and eventual death. If this hap-
pens to all individual men without exception, there is surely no inherent
Spengler Revisited 299
garden for the Chinese, who "wanders" in his world; the straight way
for the Egyptian, who was as obsessed by past and future life as the
Greek was careless of them; the cavern for Magian culture, expressed
architecturally as the mosque—the Pantheon in Rome being, Spengler
says, the first mosque. As Yeats remarks in his Vision, taking his cue
from Ezra Pound, Spengler probably got his cavern symbol from Frobe-
nius.2 The new Russian culture is best symbolized as a flat plane: it
expresses a "denial of height" [D W, 1:201] in both its architecture and its
Communism.3 The central symbol for the Western, or, as Spengler usu-
ally calls it, the "Faustian" culture seems to be that of a centre with radi-
ating points. Faustian culture is strongly historical in sense, with a drive
into infinite distance that makes it unique among other cultures. The
central art of Faustian man is contrapuntal music; Classical culture
expressed its sense of the pure present in its sculpture. The approaches
of the two cultures even to mathematics are quite different. Classical
man thinks of a number as a thing, a magnitude; Western man thinks of
it as a relation to other numbers.
This morphological view of history, which sees history as a plurality
of cultural developments, is, Spengler claims, an immense improvement
on the ordinary "linear" one which divides history into ancient, medi-
eval, and modern periods. Here Spengler seems to me to be on very
solid ground, at least to the extent that linear history is really, at bottom,
a vulgar and complacent assumption that we represent the inner pur-
pose of all human history. The Hebrews gave us our religion, the Greeks
our philosophy, the Romans our law, and these contributions to our
welfare descended from the Middle Ages to us. The Chinese and Indi-
ans had little to do with producing us; they only produced more Chi-
nese and Indians, so they don't really belong to history. "Better fifty
years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay," as the man says in Tennyson.4
Hegel has been often and most unfairly ridiculed for advocating a view
of history which made the Prussian state of his day its supreme achieve-
ment.5 But whenever we adopt this linear view, especially in its progres-
sive form, which asserts that the later we come in time the better we are,
we do far worse than Hegel. The linear view of history is intellectually
dead, and Spengler has had a by no means ignoble role in assisting at its
demise.
Spengler's view of history includes, however, a rather similar distinc-
tion between human life with history and human life without it. If we
study the history of one of the great cultures, we find that institutions
3O2 Politics, History, and Society
evolve, classes rise, and conquests expand in what seems a logical, but is
really an organic, way. But if we try to write a history of Patagonians or
Zulus or Mongols, we can produce only a series of events or incidents.
These people live and die and reproduce; they trade and think and fight
as we do; they make poems and pots and buildings. But their stories are
chronicles or annals, not coherent histories. Lapland in the eighteenth
century is much like Lapland in the thirteenth: we do not feel, as we feel
when we compare eighteenth-century with thirteenth-century England,
that it is five centuries older. Similarly, after a culture has completely
exhausted itself, it passes out of "history." There are, therefore, two
forms of human life: a primitive existence with the maximum of conti-
nuity and the minimum of change, and life within a growing or declin-
ing culture, which is history properly speaking.
A parallel distinction reappears within the cultural developments
themselves. People have constantly been fascinated by the degree of
accident in history, by the fact that, as Pascal says, history would have
been quite different if Cleopatra's nose had been longer.6 Spengler dis-
tinguishes what he calls destiny from incident. The incidents of a man's
life will depend on the job he takes, the woman he marries, the town he
decides to live in, and these are often determined by sheer accident. But
nothing will alter the fact that it will be his life. Cultures, too, have their
real lives as well as the incidents those lives bring to the surface. Speng-
ler does not mention Cleopatra's nose, but he does say that if Mark Ant-
ony had won the battle of Actium the shape of Magian culture would
have been much easier to recognize [DW, 2:191-2]. The incidents of
Western history would have been quite different if Harold had won at
Hastings or Napoleon at the Nile, but the same kind of history would
have appeared in other forms. A modern reader would doubtless prefer
some other word to "destiny," but the distinction itself is valid, granted
Spengler's premises. In what a culture produces, whether it is art, phi-
losophy, military strategy, or political and economic developments,
there are no accidents: everything a culture produces is equally a symbol
of that culture.
Certain stock responses to Spengler may be set aside at once. In the
first place, his view of history is not a cyclical view, even if he does use
the names of the four seasons to describe its main phases. A cyclical
theory would see a mechanical principle, like the one symbolized by
Yeats's double gyre, as controlling the life of organisms, and for Spengler
the organism is supreme: there is no superorganic mechanism. Brooks
Spengler Revisited 303
Adams's The Law of Civilization and Decay (1895), which appears to have
wrought such disaster in the impressionable mind of Ezra Pound/ does
give us a rather crude cyclical theory of history as an alternating series of
movements of aggressiveness and usury, with apparently some prefer-
ence for the former. Yeats's Vision, as just implied, is also cyclical,
because it is astrological, and therefore sees history as following the
mechanical rhythms of nature rather than the organic ones. It seems to
me that Spengler's distinction between primitive and historical existence
is the real basis of Yeats's distinction between "primary" cultures8 and
the "antithetical" ones that rise out of them, but the spirits who supplied
Yeats with his vision did not know much history.
In a way Spengler does give an illusion of a cyclical view: he knows
very little about Chinese and Indian civilizations, and relegates the pos-
sibility of other such developments in Babylonia or pre-Columbian
America to bare mentions. Fair enough: nobody expects omniscience.
But this leaves us with a series of five that do run in sequence: the Egyp-
tian, the Classical, the Magian, the Western, and the Russian. This
sequence may have its importance, as I shall suggest later, but for Speng-
ler himself cultures grow up irregularly, like dandelions. There was
no inevitability that a new Russian culture would appear in the decline
of a Western one, nor is there any carryover of contrasting character-
istics from one to the other (except in the negative and distorting
form of "pseudomorphosis"), such as a genuinely cyclical theory would
postulate.
Spengler's analogical method of course rests, not only on the analo-
gies among the cultures themselves, but on a further analogy between a
culture and an organism. It is no good saying that a culture is not an
organism, and that therefore we can throw out his whole argument. The
question whether a culture "is" an organism or not belongs to what I
call the fallacy of the unnecessary essence. It is an insoluble problem,
and insoluble problems are insoluble because they have been wrongly
formulated. The question is not whether a culture is an organism, but
whether it behaves enough like one to be studied on an organic model.
"Let the words youth, growth, maturity, decay . . . be taken at last as
objective descriptions of organic states," Spengler says. Spengler's
massed evidence for these characteristics in a variety of cultures seems
to me impressive enough to take seriously. It is no good either denounc-
ing him on the ground that his attitude is "fatalistic" or "pessimistic,"
and that one ought not to be those things. It is not fatalism to say that
304 Politics, History, and Society
one grows older every year; it is not pessimism to say that whatever is
alive will eventually die. Or if it is, it doesn't matter.
Again, I am not much worried about the "contradictions" or "ambi-
guities," which can probably be found by job-lots in Spengler's work.
Anybody can find contradictions in any long and complex argument.
Most of them are verbal only, and disappear with a little application to
the real structure of the argument itself. Most of the rest arise from the
fact that the reader's point of view differs from that of the writer, and he
is apt to project these differences into the book as inconsistencies within
it. There may remain a number of genuine contradictions which really
do erode the author's own case, and I think there are some in Spengler.
But for a book of the kind he wrote the general principle holds that if one
is in broad sympathy with what he is trying to do, no errors or contra-
dictions or exaggerations seem fatal to the general aim; if one is not in
sympathy with it, everything, however correct in itself, dissolves into
chaos.
Spengler's book is not a work of history; it is a work of historical pop-
ularization. It outlines one of the mythical shapes in which history
reaches everybody except professional historians. Spengler would not
care for the term popularization: he is proud of the length and difficulty
of his work, speaks with contempt of the popular; and of his efforts to
popularize his own thesis, such as Prussianism and Socialism (1919) or
Man and Technics (1931), the less said the better. Nevertheless, his book is
addressed to the world at large, and historians are the last people who
should be influenced by it. What Spengler has produced is a vision of
history which is very close to being a work of literature—close enough,
at least, for me to feel some appropriateness in examining it as a literary
critic. If The Decline of the West were nothing else, it would still be one of
the world's great Romantic poems. There are limits to this, of course:
Spengler had no intention of producing a work of pure imagination, nor
did he do so. A work of literature, as such, cannot be argued about or
refuted, and Spengler's book has been constantly and utterly refuted
ever since it appeared. But it won't go away, because in sixty years there
has been no alternative vision of the data it contemplates.
What seems to me most impressive about Spengler is the fact that
everybody does accept his main thesis in practice, whatever they think
or say they accept. Everybody thinks in terms of a "Western" culture to
which Europeans and Americans belong; everybody thinks of that cul-
ture as old, not young; everybody realizes that its most striking parallels
Spengler Revisited 305
are with the Roman period of Classical culture; everybody realizes that
some crucial change in our way of life took place around Napoleon's
time. At that I am not counting the people who have a sentimental
admiration for medieval culture because it represents our own lost
youth, or the people who cannot listen with pleasure to any music later
than Mozart or Beethoven, or the people who regard the nineteenth cen-
tury as a degenerate horror, or the Marxists who talk about the deca-
dence of bourgeois culture, or the alarmists who talk about a return to a
new Dark Ages, or the Hellenists who regard Latin literature as a sec-
ond-hand imitation of Greek literature. All these have a more or less
muddled version of Spengler's vision as their basis. The decline, or
aging, of the West is as much a part of our mental outlook today as the
electron or the dinosaur, and in that sense we are all Spenglerians.
Thus T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land, published in 1922, was written with-
out reference to Spengler, an author of whom Eliot would not be likely
to take an exalted view. But look at the imagery of the poem:
lem of trying to separate these two elements. We have Eliot the poet and
Eliot the snob; Pound the poet and Pound the crank; Yeats the poet and
Yeats the poseur; Lawrence the poet and Lawrence the hysteric. Further
back, Milton, Pope, Blake, Shelley, Whitman, all present aspects of
personality so distasteful to some critics that they cannot really deal
critically with their poetry at all. For somebody on the periphery of liter-
ature, like Spengler, the task of separation is still more difficult, and
requires even more patience. It does a writer no service to pretend that
the things which obstruct his imagination are not there, or, if there, can
be rationalized or explained away. In my opinion Spengler has a perma-
nent place in twentieth-century thought, but so far as his reputation is
concerned, he was often his own worst enemy, and a stupid and con-
fused Spengler is continually getting in the way of the genuine prophet
and visionary.
We may suspect, perhaps, some illegitimate motivation in Spengler's
writing, some desire to win the war on the intellectual front after being
left out of the army. It would be easy to make too much of this, but he
does say in the preface to the revised edition that he has produced what
he is "proud to call a German philosophy" ([DW, i:xiv] italics original),
although the real thesis of his book is that there are no German philoso-
phies, only Western ones. In any case, he belonged all his life to the far
right of the German political spectrum, and carried a load of the dismal
Volkisch imbecilities that played so important a part in bringing Hitler to
power. Hitler in fact represents something of a nemesis for Spengler the
prophet, even though Spengler died in 1936, before Hitler had got really
started on his lemming march. Unless he has unusual sources of infor-
mation, a prophet is well advised to stick to analysing the present
instead of foretelling the future. Spengler wanted and expected a Ger-
man leader in the Bismarckian and Prussian military tradition, and he
doubted whether this screaming lumpen-Kunstler was it. He greeted the
Nazis in a book called in English The Hour of Decision (1933), which the
Nazis, when they got around to reading it, banned from circulation. But
his general political attitude was sufficiently close to Nazism to enable
him to die in his bed.
These personal attitudes account for many of the more unattractive
elements in his rhetoric, which has all the faults of a prophetic style:
harsh, dogmatic, prejudiced, certain that history will do exactly what he
says, determined to rub his reader's nose into all the toughness and
grimness of his outlook. He has little humour, though plenty of savage
308 Politics, History, and Society
and sardonic wit, and a fine gift for gloomy eloquence. He is fond of
murky biological language, like calling man a "splendid beast of
prey,"12 and much of his imagery is Halloween imagery, full of woo-
woo noises and shivery Wagnerian whinnies about the "dark"
goings-on of nature and destiny. Thus:
With the formed state, high history also lays itself down weary to sleep.
Man becomes a plant again, adhering to the soil, dumb and enduring. The
timeless village and the "eternal" peasant reappear, begetting children and
burying seed in Mother Earth. . . . There, in the souls, world-peace, the
peace of God, the bliss of grey-haired monks and hermits, is become
actual—and there alone. It has awakened that depth in the endurance of
suffering which the historical man in the thousand years of his develop-
ment has never known. Only with the end of grand History does holy, still
Being reappear. It is a drama noble in its aimlessness, noble and aimless as
the course of the stars, the rotation of the earth, and alternance of land and
sea, of ice and virgin forest upon its face. We may marvel at it or we may
lament it—but it is there. [DW, 2:435]
According to Spengler's own thesis, a man who spends his life in seven-
teenth-century Holland belongs to the Western Baroque, whatever his
religious or racial affinities. Most of Spinoza's contemporaries called
themselves Christians, which is equally a "Magian" religion according
Spengler Revisited 309
to Spengler. But of course one never knows when such a prejudice will
come in handy. "It is something fundamental in the essence of the
Magian soul that leads the Jew, as entrepreneur and engineer, to stand
aside from the creation proper of machines and devote himself to the
business side of their production" [DW, 2:504]. This remark follows
closely on a critique of Marx. As the Nazis said, capitalism and Commu-
nism are both Jewish inventions. The biological function of women is
also a fruitful topic for dark symbolization:
It is little surprise to learn that Ibsen's Nora "is the very type of the pro-
vincial derailed by reading" [DW, 1:33]. That is, if Nora had really
responded to the Zeitgeist, and understood that she was Time and Des-
tiny, she would have done nothing so unfeminine as read books, but
would have remained illiterate, pregnant, and absorbed in her
doll-house.13
There is also the unnecessary value judgment implied in the word
"decline" itself. Strictly speaking, according to Spengler Western art is
not getting any better or worse as it changes from medieval to Renais-
sance to Baroque conventions; it is simply growing older. But Spengler
wants it to decline and exhaust its possibilities, because he wants his
contemporaries, at least the German ones, to devote themselves to the
things required by their cultural age, which for him are technological,
national socialist, and military:
I would sooner have the fine mind-begotten forms of a fast steamer, a steel
structure, a precision-lathe, the subtlety and elegance of many chemical
and optical processes, than all the pickings and stealings of present-day
"arts and crafts," architecture and painting included. I prefer one Roman
aqueduct to all Roman temples and statues . . . [DW, 1:43-4]
The Romans who built aqueducts and carried out huge massacres and
3io Politics, History, and Society
purges also produced Lucretius, Virgil, Ovid, Horace, and Catullus. Not
one of these names appears in Spengler's indexes (except Horace by
courtesy of the translator). He would say, with the Hellenists mentioned
above, that Latin poetry was an inorganic repetition of Greek poetry, but
it wasn't. But, of course, for him as for others the word "decline" is an
easy way of dismissing anything in the contemporary arts that one finds
puzzling or disturbing. When Spengler's book was published, the fash-
ionable myth was the myth of progress,14 and Spengler's evidence that
technological advance could just as easily be seen as a hardening of the
cultural arteries was useful as a counterweight. But its usefulness, like so
many other things in history, has exhausted its possibilities now that
this aspect of technology is obvious to everybody.
After all this has been said, and a great deal more that could be said
taken for granted, it is still true that very few books, in my experience,
have anything like Spengler's power to expand and exhilarate the mind.
The boldness of his leaping imagination, the kaleidoscopic patterns that
facts make when he throws them together, the sense of the whole of
human thought and culture spread out in front of one, the feeling that
the blinkers of time and space have been removed from one's inward
eyes when Greek sculptors are treated as the "contemporaries" of West-
ern composers, all make up an experience not easily duplicated. I first
encountered him as an undergraduate, and I think this is the best time to
read him, because his perspective is long-range and presbyopic, and his
specific judgments all too often wrong-headed. Some of his comparative
passages, such as his juxtaposing of colours in Western painting with
tonal effects in Western music, read almost like free association. Any
number of critics could call these comparisons absurd or mystical bal-
derdash. But Spengler has the power to challenge the reader's imagina-
tion, as critics of that type usually have not, and he will probably survive
them all even if all of them are right.
The best-known philosophy of history after Spengler, at least in
English, is that of Arnold Toynbee, whose Study of History began appear-
ing while Spengler was still alive. Toynbee has twenty-one cultures to
Spengler's seven or eight, and twenty of them follow, more or less,
Spengler's organic scheme of youth, maturity, decline (accompanied by
a "time of troubles"), and dissolution. But the twenty-first is Toynbee's
own Western culture, and that one has just got to be different: to assume
that it will go the way of the others would be "fatalism," which is what
he professes to object to in Spengler. So he develops a "challenge and
Spengler Revisited 311
Originally the keynote address at the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science annual meeting, 3 January 1981. From Science, 212, no. 4491
(10 April 1981): 127-32. Partial reprints appear as "Detachment Not Possi-
ble/' Globe and Mail, 5 January 1981, 8; "Another Look at the 'Two Cul-
tures/" Chemical and Engineering News, 59 (19 January 1981): 9;
"Scientists: Professional Detachment vs. Social Concern/' Perception, 4
(March-April 1981): 18-19. Reprinted in its entirety in OE, 153-67. The edi-
tor of Science introduced a number of subheadings, here omitted.
Lord Snow remarked that scientists "had the future in their bones" [The
Two Cultures, 11]. I take it that this is a reference to the fact that a progres-
sive element is built into scientific method, so that any freshman today
may know facts in physics or chemistry unknown to Newton or
Lavoisier. As far as knowledge is concerned, this is equally true of the
humanities: any freshman can also learn more about drama before
Shakespeare or music before Mozart than Shakespeare or Mozart ever
knew. But the arts themselves (to quote the title of a famous essay on the
subject) are not progressive.3 They have been assumed to be the orna-
ments of a highly developed civilization, and of course they are that; but
they seem to have a curious affinity too with everything that is most prim-
itive and archaic in human society. Poetry thrives on superstition and fan-
tasy; the formulas of popular fiction are the formulas of the folk tales of
preliterary cultures; the structures and stock characters of romance or
comedy have persisted with astonishingly little change in two thousand
years. Science is generally assumed to have something to do with the pur-
suit of truth, but the poet, as Aristotle pointed out [Poetics, i45ib], is not
directly concerned with truth because he says nothing in particular, and
only particular statements can be true. So while the mad scientist may be
a stock figure of popular fiction, it is perhaps significant that one of the
great characters of literature should be Don Quixote, a mad humanist try-
ing to make the world over in the pattern of his books.
This primitive quality of literature means, among other things, that
the humanist has the past in his bones: his focus of study is the classic,
the definitive masterpiece which may be many centuries old. Research
in the humanities, however new in itself, always has an aspect in which
it is more light on square one. In caricature, and to some extent occupa-
tionally as well, the humanist seems to resemble that heroic if somewhat
confused bird mentioned by Borges, who always flies backward because
he doesn't care about where he's going, only about where he's been.4
Because of the progressive element in science, questions of science
and technology are closely bound up with questions of the future of
society, and of how society is going to adjust to the discoveries and tech-
niques that have developed within it. We soon realize, however, that not
everything that is technically feasible is going to happen; what will hap-
pen is only what society is capable of absorbing. That in turn depends on
society's present situation, more particularly that of its power structures,
and its inherited habits. Any such subject as "futurology," in short, is
based on the fact that we know nothing of the future except by analogy
The Bridge of Language 317
with the past; hence the perspectives on the past, including the perspec-
tives of the historian and the humanist, are inseparable from the
future-directed concerns of science. Further, we notice that we hear
much less about future shock and the like than we did a few years ago.
One reason is that a widened horizon capable of taking in some specula-
tion about the future is a by-product of economic expansion and politi-
cal detente. Such conditions of clearing weather are not habitual to
human life, however, and before long we are back in the recessions and
political storm warnings that seem to be the normal lot of mankind.
A future-directed perspective is, in itself, very natural to the young,
but it also is dependent on what for them is a well-functioning economy.
Anyone who has taught students during the 19505 and is still teaching is
aware how their time perspective lifts during expansive periods and
how it shrinks again in times like ours. During the 19605 the "activists"
looking for revolutionary social change were mainly students of mid-
dle-class background, who seldom realized how much they had been
conditioned by the assumptions of that background. These were largely
the assumptions of American progressivism, the feeling that as their
society had been moving ahead like an express train for two centuries, it
was in the nature of the historical process for it to continue to do so,
except that it ought to speed up. The students of the 19705, and probably
of most of the 19805 as well, have been forced into an involuntary cau-
tion like that of Cardinal Newman's hymn:
It seems strange that the human race took so long to make a serious
effort to develop its science and technology. The technology of the most
advanced parts of the world in the early eighteenth century was closer to
the Neolithic age than it is to us. Even in the nineteenth century, with the
Industrial Revolution fairly started, the speed and extent of the transfor-
mation of the world that a concentrated effort at technology would make
was still beyond the most far-out imaginations. Edgar Allan Poe had
about as far-out an imagination as the century produced, and used it
partly to invent the modern forms of detective and science fiction. Yet in
his story laid in the future, Mellonta tauta (the things about to be), people
are crossing the Atlantic in balloons at a hundred miles an hour a thou-
sand years after his own time, and even the balloon in which the story is
supposed to be written falls into the Atlantic instead of landing.
The obvious answer is that for most of his history man has been pre-
occupied with small-scale social coherence. Once the essential needs of
life and survival are met for a sufficient number of people, the rest of
human energy has to be reserved for intensifying the strength of a par-
ticular social unit. We can understand the past on this point well enough
from the present, even though the social units are much bigger. Our
governments feel that if they spent as much on science and technology
as they do on armaments, they would create a political vacuum that
other powers would be prompt to fill. At present there are certain kinds
of scientific projects that only the United States or the Soviet Union can
attempt, and it is obvious that some kind of global unity and coopera-
tion is a necessary condition for the unfettered growth of science in the
future. Science and technology thus follow the great centralizing move-
ments of economics, which will eventually, we may hope, transform the
world into a global unity. The contrast with cultural developments, in
literature and the arts, is curious and striking.
The more a country's arts develop, the more they tend to decentralize,
to break down into smaller units, or, more positively, to bring increas-
ingly smaller areas into articulateness. We speak of American literature,
but a great deal of what we learn about America through its literature
we learn by adding up what Faulkner tells us about Mississippi, Robert
Frost about New Hampshire, Hemingway about expatriates in Paris or
Spain, John Steinbeck about northern California, Peter De Vries about
New York. A similar decentralizing movement has been very marked in
Canada in the last twenty years, and whatever "Canada" may mean
The Bridge of Language 319
The eighteenth century was also the age of Jenner's discovery of vaccine,
and another poem of the period begins, "Inoculation, Heavenly Maid,
descend!" But this does not seem to be the kind of thing poetry can do.
Obviously a more tactful and skilful poet would do a more convincing
job, but it is the failures that point up the real problem.
What is involved is not a matter of vocabulary or subject matter but of
the inner structure of the discipline used. If we set a poem to music, we
are putting two arts together, but each art communicates within its own
conventions: we are not merging the structures of poetry and music.
Similarly, poet and scientist may use, up to a point, the same language,
or even treat the same themes, but the structure of poetry and the struc-
ture of science remain two things. The scientist quantifies his data; the
poet, so to speak, qualifies his: he expresses its whatness, its impact on
concrete experience, and at a certain point they start going in opposite
directions. "I do not frame hypotheses," said Newton,7 meaning, I sup-
pose, that he did not take anything seriously until he had verified it. But
literature is a hypothesis from beginning to end, assuming anything and
verifying nothing.
The same principle applies to science fiction, which is a form of
romance, continuing the formulas of fantasy, Utopian vision, Utopian
satire, philosophical fiction, adventure story, and myth that have been
part of the structure of literature from the beginning. What the hero of a
science fiction story finds on a planet of Arcturus, however elaborate
and plausible the hardware that got him there, is still essentially what
heroes of earlier romances found in lost civilizations buried in Africa or
The Bridge of Language 321
Asia. The conventions of literature have to take over at some point, and
what we see, in science fiction no less than in Homer or in Dante, is, in
the title of a seventeenth-century satire set on the moon, mundus alter et
idem,8 another world, but the same world.
There are different ways in which language can be used, three of
them of particular importance. One is the descriptive way that we find
in science and everywhere else where the aim is to convey information
about an objective world. Then there is the language of transcendence
that we find in large areas of philosophy and religion, an abstract,
analogical language that expresses what by definition is really beyond
verbal expression. And there is the language of immanence, the meta-
phorical language that poetry speaks, where anything can be identified
with anything else, where natural objects can become images of human
emotions. These are different languages, which accounts for the differ-
ences in structure I speak of; but they are mutually intelligible lan-
guages, so I should like to look at their relation again from a different
point of view.
Even in the smallest social units, man does not live directly and
nakedly in nature like the animals. Human societies live within a semi-
transparent envelope that we call culture or civilization, and they see
nature only through it. Societies vary a good deal in the extent to which
their cultural assumptions distort their view of nature, but all views of
nature are conditioned by them. There are no noble savages, in the sense
of purely natural men for whom this cultural envelope has disappeared,
nor any form of human life that does not restructure the world in front
of it into some kind of human vision.
I am concerned here with the role of words in this situation. In most
societies, at least, there seem to be traditional verbal structures that are
particularly important for the members of that society, or some of its
members, to become acquainted with. Laws, including rituals and cus-
toms, are at the centre of this material; myths and stories about the tradi-
tional gods and heroes, magical formulas, proverbs, and the like also
enter into it. In some communities much of it is a secret knowledge,
sometimes imparted to boys in initiation ceremonies. In its higher devel-
opments it comes closer to what in Judaism is meant by "Torah," the
instruction of primary importance for the social identity of the student,
which includes the law, but a good many other things as well. We may
call this a structure of concern or social coherence, and it is usually a
mixture of the religious and the political. Religious concerns, Christian,
322 Politics, History, and Society
value of money, have gone out of control, the overcrowding of the earth
by the one organism too irresponsible to play the game of natural selec-
tion fairly. Long before in literature, in Blake, Ruskin, and Morris in the
nineteenth century and Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, Ezra Pound, and others in
the early twentieth, there had been a strong attack on the ugliness that
modern civilization was creating out of its surroundings. Writers looked
at the blasted and blighted outskirts of cities, at once beautiful land-
scapes buried in tombs of concrete, and felt that even if nature were the
whore that she is said to be in some of our earlier mythologies, there was
no excuse for treating her like that. This was what produced the "two
cultures" situation that Lord Snow misrepresented so grossly. For even
at its most wrongheaded this protest was not a merely aesthetic one, and
it was not a Luddite attack on science or technology as such. It was a
protest in the name of human concern for survival and freedom against
what these writers felt to be a death impulse in the human mind, an
impulse that they saw as trying to get control of science and technology.
More important, they saw the exploitation of nature to be essentially the
same evil thing as the exploitation of other men that has produced all
the slavery and tyranny of history.
Snow [The Two Cultures, chap, i] speaks of Orwell's 1984 as typical of
the humanist's wish that the future did not exist. But it is reasonable
enough to wish that that future would not exist. Man is quite capable of
producing the hell on earth that that book records: to deny or refuse to
face this is to be a far more reckless Luddite than the most reactionary of
poets. We are very near to the chronological 1984 now, and if the partic-
ular fear that Orwell's book expresses is no longer our primary one, at
least for ourselves, it is mainly because a new element has entered the
picture: the sense that human survival depends on the well-being of the
nature from which humanity has sprung. The days when a scientist
could use his scientific detachment and the artist his freedom of expres-
sion as excuses for withdrawing from this concern are long past.
At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a strong sense
that reality was divided into the subjective and the objective, and that
science was concerned only with the latter. But even in the physical sci-
ences it soon became clear that the observer himself was a part of the
scene to be observed, and of course the social sciences are entirely based
on this principle. The corresponding development has taken place in the
arts: such a movement as Abstract Expressionism in painting, for exam-
ple, does not mean that the painter has gone on an ego trip of "self
The Bridge of Language 327
Introduction
Vivian incredulously, "You don't mean to say that you seriously believe
that Life imitates Art, that Life in fact is the mirror, and Art the reality?"
Vivian replies, "Certainly I do" (30).
4 Thomas Hardy's 1967 was published in Time's Laughing-Stocks (London:
Macmillan, 1909), 53. One of a group classified as "More Love Lyrics," the
poem may arguably be judged a less pessimistic vehicle than NF remembers.
The speaker in the poem speculates that the coming century may "at its
prime" surpass "this blinkered time."
5 The Oxford (Canadian branch) edition of 1967 misleadingly printed
"mature." Reprinted editions (1969) read "immature."
6 Unfortunately, the play and its reviewer have so far not been identified.
7 A witticism at the expense of T.S. Eliot's sophisticated metropolitan comedy
The Cocktail Party (1950).
8 Percy Wyndham Lewis was born 18 November 1882 on his father's yacht,
then moored near Amherst, Nova Scotia. Lewis's Self Condemned (1954) is an
angry and despairing novel shaped by the author's wartime experience in
Toronto where, not for the first time, he swiftly alienated most of the people
he met and plunged into severe financial hardship.
9 Nigeria gained full independence from Great Britain in 1960, but was rocked
by a long fierce civil war when the Ibos of the Eastern region declared a
breakaway republic of Biafra in 1967. Indonesia gained independence from
the Netherlands in 1949, only to enjoy a chequered history that erupted in
massacres two years before NF's lectures.
10 NF's notes to the French translation indicate that this is an allusion to George
Grant's Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1965), although he adds, "I don't know if it's worth
picking up in French" (NFF, 1988, box 62, file i). Grant (1918-88) was a Cana-
dian philosopher and member of the Department of Religious Studies at
McMaster from 1961 until 1980, and chair of the department at the time NF's
lectures were delivered. See the introduction to the present volume (xxxix-
xl, xlii) for further discussion of the relationship between Grant's short, bleak
work, and MC.
11 This phrase introduces an intriguing feature of MC, namely NF's apparent
intention to represent the century in its own idiom. To achieve this end, he
packed his lectures with many words of twentieth-century origin or that
passed into common usage only in "the modern century." The second edi-
tion of the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), cited henceforth as OED, records
1939 as the earliest date for the use of the phrase "mass culture" and cites Life
magazine as its source: "The state of Texas has never been properly recog-
nized for its contributions to U.S. mass culture."
12 OED records only one instance of "public relations"—with a different
meaning—before the twentieth century.
334 Notes to pages 10-15
13 Most of these phrases are offspring of the artistic subculture of "the mod-
ern century." "Hip" and "square" are both linked to jazz subculture: the
former, first recorded in 1904, refers to someone "in the know." OED dates
"square" from 1944, offering as a definition "anyone who is not cognizant
of the beauties of true jazz." Musical culture also accounts for "corny,"
tracked by OED to Melody Maker in 1932: "The 'bounce' of the brass section
has degenerated into a definitely 'corny' and staccato style of playing."
Nancy Mitford formulated and Jessica Mitford popularized the distinction
between "U" and "non-U" for the readers of Encounter in the 19505, while
Susan Sontag enlightened readers of Partisan Review on the status of "camp"
in 1964. All these examples substantiate NF's point about the rift between
artistic subculture and the larger middle-class culture.
14 "Happenings": OED defines a happening as "a spontaneous theatrical or
pseudotheatrical entertainment," and cites Nation, 24 October 1959, as its ear-
liest usage: "The first exhibition is not of painting but is an 'event' consisting
of eighteen 'happenings' by Allan Kaprow." In 1989 Stanley Fish and Fredric
Jameson launched a series published by Duke University Press titled "Post-
contemporary Interventions." The word "postcontemporary" is not recorded
in OED.
15 See Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Fontana, 1983), 33-7, for a lexical
history of alienation that traces many of the semantic shifts NF describes here.
16 Bunyan read Luther's Commentary on Galatians as an exact diagnosis of his
own spiritual condition.
17 When Apollyon first meets Christian in the Valley of Humiliation, he claims
him as one of his subjects. Christian replies, "I was born indeed in your
Dominions, but your service was hard, and your wages such as a man could
not live on, for the Wages of Sin is death." See The Pilgrim's Progress, ed. J.B.
Wharey, rev. Roger Sharrock, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 57.
18 Stanley Kubrick's film Dr. Strangelove, Or: How I learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Bomb (1964), a famous black comedy about nuclear war, starred Peter
Sellers, George C. Scott, and Sterling Hayden. The screenplay, co-authored
by Kubrick and Terry Southern, was based on a novel by Peter George pub-
lished in the U.S. as Red Alert (first published in England under the pseu-
donym Peter Bryant with the title Two Hours to Doom) as a response to the
apocalyptic fears of the 19505.
19 The "tabloid" newspaper, compact in size and frequently demagogic in con-
tent, is regarded as the brainchild of Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord North-
cliffe. OED gives the date of entry of the word into popular usage as 1902.
20 Ivan Petrovitch Pavlov discussed the extreme vulnerability to suggestions
displayed by the neurotic personality in Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes (Lon-
don: Wishart and Dickson, 1928-47), 1:378,2:108-10.
21 For "stock response," see LA. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (Lon-
Notes to pages 15-21 335
don: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924), 202-3. See also Practical Criticism:
A Study of Literary Judgment (1929; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964),
chap. 5, "Irrelevant Associations and Stock Responses," 235-54. Richards
contrasts audience responses to poetry governed by "social suggestion" with
those produced by "genuine experience" and finds that the former are more
likely to impair understanding of poetry.
22 Cf. Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (New York: Oxford, 1967), 93-4:
"When you read, as you must almost every passing day, that ours is the
great age of crisis—technological, military, cultural—you may well simply
nod and proceed calmly to your business; for this assertion, upon which a
multitude of important books is founded, is nowadays no more surprising
than the opinion that the earth is round."
23 See J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (London: Macmillan, 1932).
24 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 33-
25 The Marquis de Condorcet's work was first published in 1794. June Barra-
clough's English translation was published as Sketch for a Historical Picture of
the Progress of the Human Mind (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955).
26 See John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, chap. 5, "A Crisis in My Mental History:
One Stage Onward."
27 T.R. Malthus argued in An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798,1803) that
poverty could not be relieved because the means of subsistence rises in
inverse proportion to the rise of population.
28 Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Media (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1964) concerns itself with these extensions of the body, seeing in them
the key to the distinctive qualities of modern culture and the inspiration for
its leading social images. A year after NF published MC, in War and Peace in
the Global Village (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), co-authored with Quentin
Fiore, McLuhan wrote, "Man is not only a robot in his private reflexes but
in his civilized behavior and in all his responses to the extensions of his
body, which we call technology. The extensions of man with their ensuing
environments, it's now fairly clear, are the principal area of manifestation of
the evolutionary process" (19). The contrast with NF's position could hardly
be more explicit.
29 NF refers to, respectively, Charles Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mai (1857),
T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land (1922), and Emile Verhaeren's Les Villes Tentacu-
laires (1895).
30 NF's immersion in Dickens was possibly a preparation for his English
Institute lecture later in 1967, subsequently published as "Dickens and
the Comedy of Humours" and collected in StS, 218-40.
31 See particularly McLuhan's The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1962) and Understanding Media. "Medium and message" are
discussed in the first chapter of Understanding Media.
336 Notes to pages 21-9
modern citizens and ethnic groups, which appear in After Strange Gods (Lon-
don: Faber and Faber, 1934), 19-21.
41 See, for example, William Morris's The Roots of the Mountains (1890), where
Morris refers to "manslayings," "sheer-rocks" and "foot-mounds" in his first
chapter.
42 NF's reference is to the Jindyworobak club, founded in 1938 by poet Rex
Ingamells, whose manifesto "Conditional Culture" spelled out the objectives
of the movement. The group, dedicated to the idea of "Australian only"
materials and content and eager to forge alliances with aboriginal culture,
issued anthologies until 1953.
43 See Jean Paul Desbiens, The Impertinences of Brother Anonymous, the English
translation of Les Insolences de Frere Untel (Canada: Les Editions de 1'homme,
1960). Joual is a popular idiom in Canadian French, used widely in rural
Quebec.
44 This comment proved to be prophetic. In September 1980, a Gdansk (Danzig)
shipyard worker called Lech Walesa formed an independent Trade Union
movement he named Solidarity. This rapidly grew to international promi-
nence and is widely regarded as one of the first major cracks in Soviet bloc
unity.
45 The words "We have left undone those things which we ought to have done,
and we have done those things which we ought not to have done, and there
is no health in us" come from "A General Confession" in The Book of Common
Prayer, 1559: The Elizabethan Prayer Book, ed. John E. Booty (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia for the Folger Shakespeare Library, 1976), 50.
46 For an early, firm statement of this viewpoint see NF's essay on "Canada and
Its Poetry" (1943). Here he attacks "the Ferdinand the Bull theory of poetry"
that "talks about a first-hand contact with life as opposed to a second-hand
contact with it through books." NF counters this theory by saying that "Prac-
tically all important poetry has been the fruit of endless study and reading"
(BG, 135-6; rpt. in the Collected Works in Northrop Frye on Canada, CW, 12
[Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003]).
47 These sentiments are to be found in George Puttenham, The Arte of English
Poesie (1589). In bk. 3, chap. 25, Puttenham contrasts the "reminiscens natu-
rall" of logic and rhetoric with the "bare imitations and worke in a forraine
subject" on show in "the painter or kervers craft." See the edition by Baxter
Hathaway (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1970), 311-12.
48 In "On Poesy or Art," Coleridge observes: "If the artist copies the mere
nature, the natura naturata, what idle rivalry!... Believe me, you must master
the essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature
in the higher sense and the soul of man." See Biographia Literaria, ed. John H.
Shawcross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907), 2:257.
49 Edouard Vuillard, French painter, draughtsman, and printmaker, was espe-
338 Notes to pages 33-5
daily known for his power to infuse mystery and suggestiveness into mun-
dane interiors. He was admired by French poet Stephane Mallarme.
50 The theory of "socialist realism," which NF grapples with so often in this col-
lection, was presented initially by Lenin and promoted even more fervently
by Stalin. The aim, to harness art to the task of social reconstruction, in prac-
tice left little room for the kind of art NF sees as most worthwhile.
51 Sam Hunter, Modern American Painting and Sculpture (New York: Dell, 1959),
126-7, derives the term "ashcan school" from an American version of the
battle of realisms as outlined by NF in this chapter. The protagonists were
"the eight," a group that included Arthur Davies, William Glackens, Robert
Henri, Everett Shinn, Ernest Lawson, George B. Luks, Maurice Prendergast,
and John Sloan. Their foes were the Leftist critics of Masses. Hunter quotes
the criticism of Art Young, then Masses' art director, who protested that "The
five dissenting artists want to run pictures of ash cans and girls hitching up
their skirts in Horatio Street—regardless of ideas—and without title."
52 The artistic wing of the U.S. Works Progress [later Work Projects] Adminis-
tration (1935-43) was actually administered by various branches of the
Federal Arts Project, the Federal Writers' Project, etc.
53 These and other artistic movements subsequently mentioned by NF in this
chapter are outlined economically in Tony Richardson and Nikos Stangos,
Concepts of Modern Art (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
54 NF's immediate predecessor as Whidden Lecturer, Anthony Blunt, devoted
his lectures to the genesis of Picasso's painting in 1966. His efforts were sub-
sequently published as Picasso's "Guernica" (London and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969). This painting had great personal significance for NF.
In November 1938 he reported to Helen Frye that he had seen it in London
along with "studies of bulls, murdered horses, and weeping men and
women" Picasso made as preparatory sketches and studies for the work. At
this point NF admitted, "I couldn't have got much out of the picture itself
without them," although he recognized that "It's the best contemporary
work I've ever seen, I'm quite sure of that" (NFHK, 2:811). A month later NF
sent Helen a postcard of the painting.
55 See William Billings: Three Fuguing Tunes for Four Part Mixed Chorus, ed.
Clarence Dickinson (New York: Mercury Music, 1940), 2.
56 George Bernard Shaw's preface to Back to Methuselah notes: "Beethoven never
heard of radio-activity nor of electrons dancing in dances of inconceivable
energy; but pray can anyone explain the last movement of his Hammerkla-
vier Sonata, Opus 106, otherwise than as a musical picture of these whirling
electrons?" See Bernard Shaw, Collected Plays with Their Prefaces (New York:
Dodd Mead, 1975), 6:334.
57 OED defines streamlining as "to remodel on smooth, uncluttered lines" and
dates this usage from 1935.
Notes to pages 36-8 339
67 See Andre Malraux, The Voices of Silence (New York: Doubleday, 1953), where
Malraux distinguishes between the sketch as "working study" and the sketch
that "records the artist's direct, 'raw' expression." The latter Malraux contro-
versially considers "an end in itself" (109-10).
68 See particularly Brecht's essay "Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting," in
Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), 91-9.
69 At the time NF spoke, James Reaney's Listen to the Wind had been performed
in London and Hamilton, but not in Toronto. In 1972 Talonbooks of Vancou-
ver published the play. Leonard Cohen's Beautiful Losers was published in
1966 by McClelland and Stewart.
70 The preface to bk. i of William Carlos Williams's Paterson (New York: New
Directions, 1946) begins:
To make a start,
out of particulars
and make them general, rolling
up the sum, by defective means—
In "The Delineaments of the Giants," also from Paterson, Williams utters his
famous maxim, "No ideas but in things."
71 John Cage's experiments with dice, the Chinese / Ching manual, his random
noise experiments, and the pure silence of 4' 33" (1952), all made his aleatory
music a talking-point for lecturers on artistic experiment and the fate of the
avant-garde in this period.
72 Chosisme is a narrative technique that rejects as outmoded humanism the
notion of any necessary link—sympathetic, cognitive, or other—between
human beings and the environments, social or natural, in which they find
themselves. See Alain Robbe-Grillet, Towards a New Novel (1963,1965), which
sees the downfall of bourgeois society imminent in the resistance mounted
by practitioners of the nouveau roman to this kind of order. The same author's
The Erasers (1953,1964) parodies and ultimately destroys the conventions of
detective fiction.
73 The Maginot Line, named in honour of its sponsor, French Minister of War
Andre Maginot, extended from the Swiss to the Belgian borders in an effort
to protect the territories of Alsace-Lorraine returned to France after the First
World War. However, the Germans entered France through Belgium in
1940.
74 Lenin asked this question most trenchantly in his pamphlet What is to be
Done? (1902), the title of which was taken from a novel published in 1864 by
Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky.
75 See The God that Failed, ed. Richard Grossman (New York: Harper and Row,
1950), for several "confessional" accounts by Andre Gide, Arthur Koestler,
Ignazio Silone, Richard Wright, and others of the growing disillusionment
Notes to pages 43-6 341
idea of God and to remove its poison"). See Maurras, Romantisme et Revolu-
tion (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1922), 274. My thanks to Ian Singer
for this reference.
86 See T.S. Eliot, preface to For Launcelot Andreives: Essays on Style and Order
(London: Faber and Gwyer, 1927), vii. NF overlooks Eliot's efforts to align
himself also with American efforts at neo-orthodoxy, like those made by Paul
Elmer More and Irving Babbitt, to rejuvenate a conservative or "neohuman-
ist" revival in North America.
87 Eliot, Burnt Norton, 1. 23.
88 This quotation is not quite accurate: Yeats reports Johnson as saying, "I wish
those people who deny the eternity of punishment could realize their
unspeakable vulgarity" (W.B. Yeats, Autobiographies [London: Macmillan,
1955], 223).
89 An allusion, as NF's notes to the French translation of MC make clear, to
Thomas Mann's novel The Holy Sinner, published in German in 1951
(English translation, 1952).
90 Stavrogin appears in Dostoevsky's The Possessed; Lafcadio in Gide's Les Caves
du Vatican, sometimes translated as Lafcadio's Adventures; Camus's protago-
nist in L'Etranger is named Merseault.
91 Norman Mailer's Advertisements for Myself (London: Panther Books, 1968)
devotes pt. 4 to "Hipsters" and contains Mailer's infamous apologia for vio-
lence as existential self-definition in "The White Negro." Leroi Jones's Dutch-
man, The Toilet, and The Slave (1964) all dramatize the issues NF describes in
this passage (Jones subsequently took the name Imamu Imiri Baraka). They
also mark a significant episode in the representation of black Americans in
American culture as agents of violent retribution rather than as dignified
victims. See also Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (1968).
92 Jean Genet, The Balcony (New York: Grove Press, 1960), 33.
93 OED records the Bulletin Bureau of Business Research's definition of
"feather-bedding" as "getting pay for work not done" in 1921 as its earliest
usage.
94 See C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administra-
tion (1957).
95 See Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963).
96 See Juvenal, Satires, 10.81, for the reference to "bread and circuses."
97 In his lecture "The Lesser Arts," first given as "The Decorative Arts," 12 April
1877, and published as a pamphlet a year later, Morris refers to the huge
industry "comprising the crafts of house-building, painting, joinery and car-
pentry, smiths' work, pottery and glass-making, weaving, and many others."
Ideally, such activities would be designed to foster ties between human
beings and their material environment; but in nineteenth-century society,
Morris argues, they are too often left to exploitative industrialists and care-
Notes to pages 53-7 343
less workmen. See Political Writings of William Morris, ed. A.L. Morton (New
York: International Publishers, 1973), 31-56, especially p. 32.
98 Dutch painter and theosophist Piet Mondrian exerted great influence over
industrial and decorative artists from the 19305, even among those who did
not share his austere, geometrical abstract goals—partly driven by his theo-
sophical beliefs—for the art of painting.
99 Andre Malraux coined the expression "museum without walls" and used it
as the title for pt. i of The Voices of Silence (New York: Doubleday, 1953),
11-128.
100 See Wyndham Lewis, Paleface (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), 103.
Lewis in fact uses the phrase "cavemen of the new mental wilderness."
101 The Quebec chansons have a distinct identity. Strong preservation efforts
began with Ernest Gagnon's Chansons Populaires du Canada (1865). Gilles
Vigneault was born in Quebec and made his debut as a chansonnier in Mon-
treal in 1960. Although favoured by separatists, he emphasizes the craft and
emotion that go into his work, not its political allegiances.
102 The Canada Council, an independent agency, was created by an act of Par-
liament in October 1957 following recommendations by the Massey Com-
mission. Its first full-time chairman was Brooke Claxton and its aim was "to
foster and promote the study and enjoyment of, and the production of
works in, the arts, humanities and social sciences." It administers grants
and fellowships and derives funds from three main sources: i) an annual
grant made by the Canadian government, ii) an endowment established
when the Council was created, and iii) private funds willed or donated to
the Council. In 1977, many of the Council's responsibilities for the funding
of research in the humanities and social sciences were transferred to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC),
which was founded by an act of Parliament in that year.
103 "Psychotherapy" is another word coined during "the modern century."
OED records 1923 as its first usage and cites the London Daily Mail as its
source. In his description of dramatic analogues for psychotherapy NF may
have been thinking of the work of Canadian-born sociologist Ervin Goff-
man, whose The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) enjoyed great pop-
ular esteem and used a dramaturgical perspective as its theoretical basis.
104 OED attributes the earliest usage of "totalitarian" to B.S. Carter in a com-
ment made in 1926 on the rise of fascism in Italy. NF's own reference point
is Hannah Arendt's The Origin of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace,
1951). His comment on "our dislike of the word 'totalitarian'" may have
been provoked by the title given to Arendt's work by its British publishers:
The Burden of Our Time (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1951).
105 In "A Word About America," Arnold remarks, "The Americans . . . have
liberty; they have, too, over and above what we have, they have an excellent
344 Notes to pages 58-66
121 See Robert Browning, Andrea Del Sarto, 11. 97-8: "Ah, but a man's reach
should exceed his grasp, / Or what's a heaven for?"
122 Edwin John Pratt (1882-1964), NF's teacher and subsequently his colleague
at Victoria College, was the author of learned, expansive poems, including
The Witches' Brew (1925) and The Titanic (1935). German-born Philip Grove
(1879-1948) was the author of several important novels about the harsh-
ness of life in Canada, including The Master of the Mill (1944) and In Search
of Myself (1946). See also Search for America (1927). For Emile Nelligan,
see n. i, above.
tory strain in modern art. In the first two chapters of MC, he discusses this at
length as a standing rebuke to what is referred to in no. 2 as the "ermine and
diamond pseudo-culture" (75), which he here recognizes as an inescapable
feature of the artistic scene in the twentieth century.
3. Ballet Russe
5. Frederick Delius
1 The edge of the page of the photocopy of the article, acquired courtesy of
Robert D. Denham, is cut off here, and a replacement could not be obtained.
2 In this film, first known as Bombshell (1933), Jean Harlow played a manipu-
lated, edgy star whose life strongly resembled the actress's own.
i See no. 4, n. i.
Notes to pages 89-93 349
1 The title of the article is taken from the Biblical story of the blind man who,
recovering his sight in a miracle performed by Jesus, said, "I see men as trees,
walking" (Mark 8:24). I am grateful to Jean O'Grady for this reference.
2 Robert Denham describes the significance of the CNE [Canadian National
Exhibition] in the national life at this time in NFHK, 1:61.
3 The Group of Seven, Canada's earliest experimental group of painters, were
based in Toronto. Their inspiration was the landscape of northern Ontario,
and they were championed in the Canadian Forum by Barker Fairley. The
seven painters were Frank Carmichael, Lawren Harris, A.Y. Jackson, Frank
Johnston, Arthur Lismer, J.E.H. MacDonald, and Fred Varley.
4 See Samuel Taylor Coleridge's The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, 11. 5,13, for
references to the "glittering eye" of the mariner.
5 In A Short History of Surrealism (London: Cobden-Sanderson, 1936), David
Gascoyne declares that "surrealism possesses its devotee like the voice of the
ancient oracles" (66).
6 See Mario Praz's The Romantic Agony (London: Oxford, 1933), for extensive
examples of the imagery of pain, suffering, violence, and sadism in European
Romantic literature.
7 German-born artist Max Ernst played a leading role in launching the Dada
and Surrealist movements. His interest in the comic book and "collage nov-
35O Notes to pages 93-5
1 Calvin Coolidge, the thirtieth president of the U.S., occupied the White
House from 1923 to 1929. He was renowned for his taciturnity. The first talk-
ing picture, Warner Brothers' The Jazz Singer, starring Al Jolson, was released
in October 1927.
2 The preface of W.M. Thayer's From Log Cabin to White House (1882) re-
hearses the log cabin childhoods of presidents Abraham Lincoln and
James Garfield.
Notes to pages 104-7 353
3 Gerard Manley Hopkins's sonnet To R.B. describes "the roll, the rise, the
carol, the creation."
4 Amy Lowell was an American poet, biographer of Keats, and promoter of
the the Imagist movement. Between 1915 and 1917 she edited three Imagist
anthologies, leading Ezra Pound, who had launched the movement with Des
Imagistes in 1914, to rename the movement Amygism. Edgar Lee Masters is
best known as the author of the Spoon River Anthology (1915), a book-length
collection of mordant epitaphs voiced by the occupants of a cemetery in rural
Illinois.
5 These are the very different mounts of Don Quixote and Alexander the
Great.
6 "Erse" is the name given by Lowland Scots to the language of the West High-
lands, but is also sometimes used more generally for Irish Gaelic.
7 Founded in Montreal in 1900, the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire
(IODE) was created to encourage a body of women committed to further-
ing Britain and British imperialism, primarily through education and the
schools. The Order was active in both world wars; also in immigration, pub-
lic health, and child welfare. With the waning of British influence in Canada
membership has declined but the organization still has more than 9000 mem-
bers in more than 400 branches across the country, active mainly in educa-
tional and cultural activities. I am grateful to Alvin Lee for this reference.
8 Here NF courted trouble and found it. Two months later James Muir, a
Canadian civil servant, wrote to the Canadian Forum protesting against NF's
assumptions about "the universality of cowshed," championing the Cana-
dian credentials of "byre," and concluding that "to gibe at Marjorie Pickthall
. . . must be offensive to a vast number of Canadian people." NF apologized
and withdrew his comment, although at the same time he repeated his claim
that Ms. Pickthall was an exotic and derivative poet, unable to see rural Can-
ada with the direct vision Robert Frost brought to his poems of rural New
England. See Canadian Forum, 22 (December 1942): 274.
9 In his famous essay "Lardner," reprinted in Prejudices, 5th ser. ([New York:
Knopf, 1926], 49-56), H.L. Mencken praises American humorist Ring
Lardner by declaring, "I doubt that anyone who has not given close and
deliberate attention to the American vulgate will ever realize how magnifi-
cently Lardner handles it" (51). The fourth edition of Mencken's The Ameri-
can Language, "corrected, enlarged, and rewritten" (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1936), contains a lengthy discussion of "the American vulgate" in chap. 9,
"The American Common Speech."
10 NF's reference is to Sir Winston Churchill's celebrated comments to the
House of Commons about the war effort: "I would say to the House, as I
have said to those who have joined this Government: 'I have nothing to offer
but blood, toil, tears, and sweat.'" See Hansard, 13 May 1940, col. 1502.
354 Notes to pages 108-14
1 In his preface to For Lancelot Andrewes: Essays on Style and Order (London:
Faber and Gwyer, 1927), T.S. Eliot controversially declared himself to be
"classicist in literature, royalist in politics, and anglo-catholic in religion"
(vii).
2 Herbert Read's volume Surrealism (1936) includes his own proselytizing
introduction on behalf of the surrealist movement, together with contribu-
tions by Andre Breton, Hugh Sykes Davies, Paul Eluard, and Georges
Hugnet.
1 One reason for the identification of Chaplin with Communism may lie in his
speeches and actions during the period following the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor in December 1941. At large meetings throughout the summer
and fall of 1942, Chaplin spoke of his sympathy for the Russian people, and
hinted at greater involvement with left-wing political organizations targeted
by American authorities. See the artist's own bewildered but revealing dis-
cussion in Charles Chaplin, My Autobiography (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1964), chap. 26.
2 The U.S.'s entry into World War II followed the Japanese air attack on Pearl
Harbor of 7 December 1941 that left approximately 2,300 Americans dead.
3 George Mosse's Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third
Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966), supplies the following Nazi
grace:
Fiihrer, my Fiihrer, bequeathed to me by the Lord,
Protect and preserve me as long as I live!
Thou hast rescued Germany from deepest distress,
I thank thee today for my daily bread. (241)
4 Frank Capra's Arsenic and Old Lace (1944) starred Cary Grant, Priscilla Lane,
Raymond Massey, and Peter Lorre.
5 Actress, singer, and comedienne Martha Raye was well known for rambunc-
tious roles.
1 NF's title alludes to Andre Malraux's "museum without walls" in The Voices
of Silence. See no. i, n. 99.
2 The Haida, an Indian population indigenous to the coast of the Pacific
Northwest, particularly British Columbia, are famous for the art displayed in
their masks, totem poles, dwellings, and canoes.
3 Tachism, a European movement in abstract art, dated from the 19405 and
19505. The term entered into common usage among art critics in 1952 with
the publication of Michel Tapie's Un art autre (1952). The "otherness" of
tachism lies in the search for living rhythms expressed through the medium
of paint.
4 Plain chant (often one word) is, according to both the Oxford Encyclopedic Dic-
tionary and the New Oxford Companion to Music, the same thing as plainsong.
Plainsong is traditional church music in medieval modes and free rhythm
depending on accentuation of the words, sung in unison, with a single line of
vocal melody taken for the liturgy, as in "Gregorian" chant, after Pope Greg-
ory the Great (d. 604). Gregory probably standardized the various schools of
chant then in use. It was Pepin, King of the Franks, however, who in the
eighth century enthusiastically composed plain chant.
5 See no. 18, n. i.
6 Samuel Butler, Erewhon (New York: Modern Library, 1955), 126. NF's quota-
tion from Butler is not quite accurate. The original reads: "it must be born
anew and grow up from infancy as a new thing, working out its own salva-
tion from effort to effort in all fear and trembling."
7 NF refers to a controversial series of seven articles written by Harold Greer
for the Toronto Globe and Mail between Monday, 27 March 1961, and Tues-
day, 4 April 1961. In a familiar argument, Greer pointed to the gap in taste
between the taxpayers subsidizing art and the artists producing it. Greer's
Notes to pages 130-7 357
20. Communications
4 In his broadcast, NF included this closing sentence: "For a long time the
tolerance of Hyde Park oratory was taken to be a symbol of the maturity of
British society: now that Hyde Park oratory has become visible as well as
audible, and has entered our cars, our homes, our beds, and our dreams, the
ability to contain it becomes a much more serious test."
1 Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1920), 52 (chap.
4, sec. 4).
2 NF may have overestimated the amount of Baudelaire available in the ten
volumes of The World's Best Essays, ed. David Brewer (St. Louis: P.P. Kaiser,
1900). The collection contains translations of just three prose poems by
Charles Baudelaire, The Gallant Marksman, At Twilight, and The Clock. A brief
and discerning introductory section defends the poet against the charges of
decadence levelled against him by Tolstoy.
3 Alexander Woollcott's Reunion in Paris, described as a "true story" by its
author, has been collected by Joseph Hennessey in The Portable Woollcott
(New York: Viking Press, 1946), 58-61. NF has slightly misquoted the ending,
in which Woollcott refers to occasions in our lives "when we thus catch life in
the very act of rhyming" (61).
4 The first Penguins appeared in July 1935. The firm's official historians em-
phasize the low-key, amateur nature of the advertising methods employed
by the founder of the operation, Allen Lane. Consequently, they pay no
attention to the "hard sell" feature of the firm's operations described by NF.
See W.E. Williams, The Penguin Story (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books,
1956) and J.E. Morpurgo, King Penguin (London: Hutchinson, 1979).
5 NF's comments arguably underplay Brett's versatility. He was also the first
editor of UTQ [University of Toronto Quarterly], and the author of "Shelley's
Relation to Berkeley and Drummond," in Studies in English by Members of
University College, compiled by Malcolm W. Wallace (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1931), 170-202.
6 Ayer made his most famous assault on metaphysics in Language, Truth, and
Logic (1936).
7 Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities (New York: Coward-McCann, 1953),
300.
8 NF here very slightly misquotes from chap. 2, sec. 2 of Main Street: "they say
he writes regular poetry" (17).
9 These comments come from Oscar Wilde's "The Decay of Lying: An Obser-
vation," in Wilde's Intentions (New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1920), 17, 53.
10 Truman Capote based his "nonfiction novel" In Cold Blood (1966) on the mur-
der of the Clutter family in Kansas by Perry Smith and Richard Hickock.
Notes to pages 148-59 359
Norman Mailer's The Armies of the Night: History as a Novel: The Novel as His-
tory (1968) focuses on his attempts to participate in a protest march on the
Pentagon against the war in Vietnam.
11 See Edmund Burke's reference to society as "a partnership . . . between those
who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born," in
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Indi-
anapolis: Hackett, 1987), 85.
12 The Watergate hearings were televised in 1973, incriminating senior mem-
bers of President Richard Nixon's administration, including Attorney Gen-
eral John Mitchell, in burglary and phone tapping. On 9 August 1974, Nixon,
whose involvement subsequent investigation has revealed to be of major
proportions, resigned from office. In notes written on file cards contained in
NFF, 1991, box 28, file 3, NF characterizes the transcripts of the Watergate
tapes as "intolerable, interminable drivel. Seven or eight speakers, but with-
out the initials you couldn't tell one from another. A language of pure dither.
No power of choice and no leadership. Any teacher of literature and lan-
guage would feel at once that this is the enemy: this is what we have to fight.
So the same problem comes to us, as it must to every country."
1 The typescript continues, "and it has much the same relationship to genuine
energy that Playboy and the movies have to sexual love. And, consequently,
the controlling of violence is really a matter of setting energy free to its
appointed and proper tasks."
2 This speech was delivered at a time of escalating terrorist violence. One of
the most visible and appalling of these episodes occurred before dawn on
5 September 1972, when eight Palestinians entered the Israeli compound at
Olympic Village, Munich, killed two residents, and took nine hostages. They
demanded the release of two hundred Palestinians held in Israel. Twenty-
three hours later in a shootout at a Munich airport, five Palestinians, a Ger-
man policeman, and all the hostages were killed.
3 Ted Kotcheff, a director of features for the CBC with experience as a Holly-
wood director, contributed an essay called "How Can the Quality of Popular
Programming Be Improved?" to the symposium. See Symposium, 125-36.
4 Garth Jowett, then an associate professor of communication studies at
the University of Windsor, gave the first paper of the conference, "A Brief
History of Opinion on the Social Effects of Mass Media." See Symposium,
1-11.
5 In 1919 the i8th amendment established Prohibition in the United States. Fol-
lowing much violence and illegality, the 2ist amendment repealed it in 1933.
6 Les Brown, then television correspondent for the New York Times, contrib-
360 Notes to pages 160-3
18 The typescript adds, "That is, all concerned citizens should learn as soon as
possible that what they have is not a mirror on the world, but a prism." The
following paragraph begins, "Another educational operation is the educa-
tion of the emotions."
19 The typescript reads "a little while longer."
20 The typescript adds, "Consequently, it is a very important step in emotional
education whether we identify with the agent or with the victim of violence."
21 Guy Cote, a film producer with the National Film Board of Canada at that
time, did not deliver a paper, but participated in group discussion by recall-
ing "the socially positive effects" narrated in "that tale of injustice" the
Crucifixion. See Symposium, 102.
22 The typescript reads, "Everything that is civilizing in our traditions—Clas-
sical and Biblical, all comes to focus on the same point, that every develop-
ment of emotional education and character runs through that sense of
concern for the victim."
23 The new paragraph in the typescript begins, "With tragedy, the reaction is
very different. In tragedy everything is focused on the tragic hero, and the
tragic hero is a person capable of being an agent of violence who ends up a
victim of violence, and for him we feel a certain concern. We may feel that
he got what was coming to him, like Macbeth, or we may feel sympathetic
with him as we do with Romeo and Juliet. But that doesn't matter. When we
see a violent action, we are intended to pass through certain violent feelings
of our own, then emerge from them and look at what is happening as con-
cerned people, detached but not indifferent, concerned but not involved,
for or against the violence." NF then resumes at "This attitude of detached
concern..."
24 See Aristotle, Poetics, i449b.
1 Robert Irwin's "The Elements of 'Art'" is the first essay in this collection.
Irwin was at that time a painter and sculptor from Los Angeles.
2 All these contributors appeared in the section of Art and Reality dedicated to
"Patronage: The Double-Edged Sword." Andrea Hull, then Director of Pub-
lic Policy and Planning for The Australia Council, and Jean-Claude Germain,
Artistic Director of Theatre Aujourd'hui in Montreal, both delivered pa-
pers under this title, and Michael Straight, former Deputy Director for the
National Endowment for the Arts at Washington D.C., acted as respondent.
Andre Fortier, President of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada, delivered a paper "On Patronage." Uriel Luft delivered a
paper on "Arts in Society: The Economic and Business Factors."
3 Giordano Bruno, the "terrible heretic" Joyce's Stephen Dedalus in A Portrait
362 Notes to pages 168-71
of the Artist as a Young Man thought had been "terribly burned" by the Roman
Catholic Church, defended the Copernican theory in La Cena de le Ceneri (The
Ash Wednesday Supper) (1584).
4 John Bentley Mays, at that time art critic for the Toronto Globe and Mail, spoke
on "Art and Reality?" For Irwin's paper, see n. i, above.
5 This is NF's witty and rueful recognition of the popularity of Margaret
Mitchell's Gone with the Wind, published in 1936, filmed in 1939, famous ever
since, and a tribute to the commercial success of escapism even when escape
seems inconceivable.
6 John Ayto's Twentieth-Century Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
defines "back-to-basics" as "a catch phrase applied to a movement or enthu-
siasm for a return to fundamental principles, (e.g., in education), or to poli-
cies reflecting them." Ayto sees the mid-1970s and the 19805 as the peak
period for the politicization of this phrase.
7 Jorge Alberto Lozoya, professor and research fellow at El Colegio de Mexico,
delivered a paper on "Culture, Freedom and Change." The remainder of the
contributors NF mentions here comprise the members of the panel on "Art
and National Survival." David Watmough, listed as a writer and critic from
Vancouver, offered "A Vertical Viewpoint." Jean Gagne, Director-General of
the Quebec Institute for Research on Culture, spoke on "Art and National
Survival: A View from Quebec." John Hirsch, Artistic Director, Stratford Fes-
tival, Ontario, served as respondent to the panelists.
8 Jan van der Marck, Director of the Centre for the Fine Arts in Metropolitan
County, Miami, Florida, spoke on "Museum Strategies: Sisyphus or Lysis-
trata?"
9 Sisyphus was in Greek mythology the most cunning of men, able to outwit
deities and even Death with repeated success. However, the punishment
devised for him by the gods required him to repeatedly roll a rock up a hill,
only to have it roll back down again as it reached the summit. His myth has
thus become a byword for futile labour.
10 Prem Kirpal, Founder-President of the Institute of Cultural Relations and De-
velopment Studies in New Delhi, India, spoke on "Arts and Internationalism."
11 UNESCO is an acronym for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, founded in 1946. The League of Nations, formed after
World War I with the intention of promoting world peace and international
security, has passed into English usage as the locus dassicus of good inten-
tions blasted by political machinations.
12 Carl Oglesby's paper was titled "Art and the Apocalypse." Oglesby, a writer
and activist from Cambridge, Mass., was a leading member of the Students
for a Democratic Society. D. Paul Schafer, a Canadian cultural adviser based
in Toronto, spoke on "The Cultural Interpretation of History: Beacon of the
Future."
Notes to pages 175-7 3^3
1 This famous Oxford Union debate took place 9 February 1933, when a pro-
posal that "This house will under no circumstances fight for King and Coun-
try" was carried by a substantial majority of the membership present at the
meeting. The British popular press subsequently denounced this as a victory
for the "sexual indeterminates of Oxford." Yet student response throughout
the Empire was sympathetic, and in the final session of Victoria College's
Debating Parliament the same motion passed by a majority of six, triggering
derisive and patronizing responses from the local press. See also Norm
Knight's "For King and Country," Ada Victoriana, 57 (April 1933): 39, and
Arthur R. Cragg's "Young Men in Their Teens Have Queer Notions," Acta
Victoriana, 57 (May 1933): 19-22.
2 A variation on the Victoria College motto abeunt studia in mores, i.e., "studies
are moulded into habits" (Ovid, Heroides, 15.83). The Rowland version might
be rendered as "studies trail off into follies." Henry Edgar (Hank) Rowland
was an active and energetic contemporary of NF's at Victoria College.
3 Lytton Strachey's public opposition to the Military Service bill of January
1916 brought him before a draft board on 7 March 1916, where he declared
that his opposition to conscription was "not based on religious belief, but
upon moral considerations." Although Strachey was subsequently exempted
from service on medical grounds on 10 April, by the end of May 1917 he was
re-examined, medically reclassified, and subsequently ordered to report to
the board every six months.
4 J.A. Hobson's The Psychology of Jingoism (1901) and The German Panic (1913)
are valuable studies of the relationship between media ownership, opinion
formation, and the role of manufactured hysteria in the modern state.
5 Hansard, 11 November 1918, col. 2463, records Lloyd George's announce-
ment of "an end to all wars." An earlier possible derivation for this phrase is
H.G. Wells's The War That Will End War (1914). In 1934, Wells told Liberty
Magazine that "I launched the phrase The War to End War' and that was not
the least of my crimes."
6 Woodrow Wilson, president of the United States from 1913 to 1921, entered
World War I as late as 1917 with the expressed hope of making the world
"safe for democracy." He conducted peace negotiations in the same spirit,
but is widely felt to have been out-manoeuvred by French premier Georges
Clemenceau and British prime minister Lloyd George. His hopes for a
League of Nations that would further the cause of world peace were stymied
when the U.S. itself did not join the organization.
7 The Hindenburg line was the ninety-mile line the German commander Paul
von Hindenburg formed on the Western Front. From March 1917 to Septem-
ber 1918 it proved impossible to dislodge German troops from this position.
364 Notes to pages 177-90
8 "It is sweet and glorious to die for one's country" (Horace, Odes, 3.2.13).
1 Ezra Pound contributed poetry and prose to the two issues of Lewis's fre-
netic Blast (1914-15) and made many energetic efforts to find him financial
support and to promote his work. Their relationship understandably cooled
following the appearance of Lewis's typically patronizing comments about
him in Time and Western Man. See Time and Western Man, bk. i, chap. 9, "Ezra
Pound, etc."
2 Vilfredo Pareto's discussion of these "mental states" is in vol. i of Mind and
Society (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935), pars. 172-6.
3 John Gawsworth, author of the enthusiastic and belle-lettristic Apes, Japes,
and Hitlerism: A Study and Bibliography of Wyndham Lewis (London: Unicorn
Press, 1932), claimed Lewis "ground Spengler's pretensions to powder" (31-
2). (John Gawsworth is the pseudonym of Terence Ian Fytton Armstrong.)
1 Otto Strasser was a German politician and author who joined the Nazi Party
in 1925, but subsequently broke with Hitler. Following his exile in 1933 he
lived in Vienna, Prague, Zurich, and Paris. He published Germany Tomorrow
in 1940, and in the same year fled to Canada.
2 Zollverein, a customs union that abolished tariffs between German states. By
1854 it included most German states. It proved to be a crucial agent in Prus-
sia's hegemony over Austria, and subsequently of Germany's unification.
an independent painter in 1389. His fresco series Roman Gods and Heroes and
Cardinal and Political Virtues (1413-14) are exemplary efforts in the Renais-
sance tradition of civic humanism.
5 In Chaucer (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), chap. 9, "The Moral of the
Story," G.K. Chesterton observes that "Medieval philosophy and culture,
with all the crimes and errors of its exponents, was always seeking equilib-
rium. It can be seen in every line of its rhythmic and balanced art; in every
sentence of its carefully qualified and self-questioning philosophy" (277).
6 Bartolo di Fredi produced innovative altar designs that combined realistic
surfaces with mystical meanings. His Trinity for the altarpiece of S. Dom-
enico, Siena, is his most famous work. Bernhard Berenson's "The Central
Italian Painters," in The Italian Painters of the Renaissance (1930) (Glasgow:
Collins, 1966), sees Taddeo di Bartolo, Barna, and Bartolo di Fredi as repre-
sentative of a Sienese art that had reached its peak, and would "never again
. . . receive that replenishment of force without which art is doomed to dwin-
dle away" (127).
7 According to Ghiberti's I Commentari and the first edition of Vasari's Lives
(1550), Barna (da Siena), a Sienese painter, painted many Old and New Tes-
tament scenes in Tuscany. Vasari's second edition of the Lives (1568) refers
only to New Testament scenes in the San Gemignano church. The slender-
ness of documentation referring to any single artist and the stylistic variety
of the frescoes has led modern art historians to posit collaborative produc-
tion rather than the work of a single hand.
8 Veronese was born in Verona but worked in Venice from mid-century. His
extravagant, ornamental paintings were frequently considered excessive by
the more orthodox institutions which commissioned them. Among the gen-
eration of artists in Venice who emerged after Titian's death, Tintoretto vied
with Veronese for public esteem. His paintings, like Veronese's, exhibit some
liking for the unexpected and even grotesque. Carpaccio is most famous for
his two cycles of saints' lives, Scenes from the Life of Saint Ursula and Scenes
from the Lives of Saint George and Saint Jerome. His love for crowded detail and
fantasy features in both works.
9 NF is referring to T.S. Eliot's Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar. In
this poem, Bleistein is described as "Chicago Semite Viennese" (1. 16). Cf.
also:
. . . On the Rialto once.
The rats are underneath the piles.
The Jew is underneath the lot.
Money in furs.... (11. 21-4)
10 NF's handwritten version adds, "And of course they hate him because he
won't be a hypocrite and pretend to believe in anything beyond trading and
keeping bargains."
366 Notes to pages 193-8
11 NF initially closed his essay with the harsher comment that "They under-
stand each other, wop and rat. Anti-red ant, not degenerate stuff—has a real
place in the New Germany's Dept. of Propaganda. Germany has accelerated
her production of cannon, and the doctore must stimulate the output of
fodder."
12 NF refers to the Italian translation of Dale Carnegie's How to Make Friends and
Influence People (Milan: V. Bompiani, 1938).
i The Cambridge linguist C.K. Ogden invented Basic English between 1925
and 1927, hoping that its total vocabulary of 850 words would operate as an
"auxiliary international language" able to ease everyday communication
across the globe. In the 19405, however, LA. Richards, convinced that the
threat to world peace derived from problems in communication, took the
lead in a renewed crusade for the adoption of Basic English as a world
language. See Richards's "reconstruction book" Basic English and Its Uses
(1943)-
1 NF's title alludes to Sir Francis Bacon's essay "Of Revenge." In his Essays: or
Counsels, Civil and Moral (1625), Bacon states that "Revenge is a kind of wild
justice; which the more man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it
out" (Essays [London: J.M. Dent, 1906], 13).
2 The Soviet judge I.T. Nikitchenko dissented from the verdicts of acquittal for
three of the defendants—Hans Fritzsche, Hjamar Schacht, and Franz Von
Papen—and from the decision to stop short of asserting the criminality of the
German General Staff and High Command. He also called for the defendant
Rudolf Hess to be executed.
3 Of Streicher, Airey Neave, remembering the trial in On Trial at Nuremberg
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), wrote: "Streicher represented the most revolt-
ing aspects of Nazism. He was the true anti-semite who delighted in the
destruction of synagogues, the burning of shops, and beatings in the streets.
Without him and his followers, who whipped up racial fury, Hitler could
never have carried out the Final Solution" (88).
society, and culture, the shaping spirit that informs them, is one familiar to
late eighteenth-century thought, but is sharpened to an extreme degree in
Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West, where each stands for a radically
opposite phase of human history. It seems likely that NF had Spengler's
work in mind when he made this distinction.
3 Northrop's essay appeared in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 56 (November
1941): 1-17. It undertakes a comparative study of models in Newtonian
mechanics and economic theory, concluding that no economic model so far
devised can predict the future operations of a complex, dynamic system of
market behaviour. Of course, as NF's review points out, such conclusions
hardly advance the case for centralized economic planning along Soviet
lines.
continue the war effort and not to make a separate peace grouped these
states together as "the United Nations."
33. Gandhi
i Sun Yat-sen was a Chinese revolutionary leader who overthrew the C'hing
dynasty and formed the Chinese republic in 1912. Influenced by Karl Marx,
his forging of the Three People's Principles of nationalism, democracy, and
the people's livelihood led to his heroic reputation as the founder of modern
China.
1 John Davidson Ketchum, who reviewed the Kinsey report for the Forum (see
Canadian Forum, 28 [May 1948]: 44-5), was editor of the Canadian Journal of
Psychology between 1953 and 1958 and a professor of psychology at the Uni-
versity of Toronto.
2 NF continued to worry about the anomaly of the continuing existence of cen-
sorship in a civilized democracy. In "Culture and the National Will," an
address delivered at Carleton University in Ottawa in 1957, he lamented to
his audience that "Canada, like all other countries, has laws of book censor-
ship no serious student of literature can have the slightest respect for" (NFF,
1991, box 38, file 2).
3 In 1950, a subsection was added to Section 207 of the Criminal Code of Can-
ada making it an offence to publish or distribute "crime comics."
4 NF discusses the censorship of Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County in
"Undemocratic Censorship," Canadian Forum, 26 (July 1946): 76. James T. Far-
rell protests against Canadian censorship and the banning of his novel Ber-
nard Clare in "Canada Bans Another Book," Canadian Forum, 26 (November
1946): 176-8.
5 On its publication in 1944, Kathleen Winsor's historical novel Forever Amber
was greeted by A.D.H. Smith in the Saturday Review of Literature, 14 October
1944, as "the bawdiest novel I have read in years."
2 J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey was chair of the constantly vigilant Senate
Committee on Un-American Activities from 1947.
1 As early as 1946, Liu Shao-chi had spoken of "a Chinese or Asiatic form
of Marxism" ripe for export throughout all Asia. After the declaration of
China as a People's Republic six months after NF's article was written in
October 1949, the whole of Southeast Asia was considered vulnerable to
Communist takeover. A month later, Mao—to the considerable dismay of
the Western powers—made his way to Moscow for a dialogue with
Stalin.
2 Chiang Kai-shek's ascent to the presidency of Nationalist China, Taiwan, in
1950 owed much to U.S. aid. At that time, the U.S. government hoped to
overturn the Communist government of China.
i Karl Lowith was in fact a philosopher of Jewish origin, who had left Ger-
many in 1934 as Nazi control over the universities tightened. When NF
wrote, he may have thought Lowith would continue in his appointment at
the Hartford Theological Seminary, but 1949 was the year of his move to the
370 Notes to pages 226-32
1 Barker Fairley was the author of Goethe as Revealed in His Poetry (1932) and
A Study of Goethe (1947) as well as translator of Goethe's Selected Poems
(1954) and Faust (1970). Fairley was also a poet, the first literary editor of
the Canadian Forum, and an enthusiastic supporter of the Group of Seven.
See also Introduction, xxvi-xxvii, xxix. Stephen Endicott's Rebel out of China
reports that Mrs. Margaret Fairley had a much stronger interest in Marxism
than her husband. She was in fact a member of the Labour Progressive
Party. Professor Glen Shortliffe's work includes his Cornell doctoral thesis
The Socialist Novel before Naturalism (1939) and (co-authored with Edouard
Sonet) Review of Standard French (1954). Stephen Endicott suggests that
Shortliffe's greatest crime against the state may have been driving Hewlett
Johnson from Malton airport to Hamilton (Rebel out of China [Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1980], 274). Dr. Hewlett Johnson, known as the
"Red Dean" of Canterbury, was from 1938 a champion of the Communist
state and Marxist ideas and the author of The Socialist Sixth of the World
(1939).
2 Burdick Anderson Trestrail, an American-born millionaire and entrepre-
neur, published a series of apocalyptic postwar pamphlets against the trend
toward "statism" and government control. Trestrail used the methods and
vocabulary of tabloid journalism to make his point, as his Is Democracy in
Canada Doomed? (Toronto: Public Information Association, 1949) demon-
strates. (Thanks to the staff at the Northrop Frye Centre for information on
Trestrail and a sample of his work.)
Notes to pages 236-42 371
1 See the abridged edition of Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1947), 230-40, 421-5, 460-5, for further discussion
of "creative minorities."
2 OED offers 1941 as its earliest entry for "welfare state," and cites William
Temple's Citizen and Churchman. Temple observes that modern citizens have
moved from the "conception of the Power-State . . . to that of the Welfare-
State."
and fantasy. Lewis dedicated his A Preface to Paradise Lost (1942), an impor-
tant document in the twentieth-century Milton controversy, to Williams. Wil-
liams described his own fictional works as "metaphysical thrillers." They
include War in Heaven (1930) and Descent into Hell (1937). Lewis's allegorical
works include, among others, his scientific trilogy, comprising Out of the
Silent Planet (1938), Perelandra (1939), and That Hideous Strength (1945).
1 In the spring of 1950, the World Council of Peace, formed a year before in
Paris, made an international delegation to Moscow to call for arms reduction
and the outlawing of nuclear weapons. Its members included Chinese-born
James Endicott, chair of the Canadian Peace Congress, former missionary for
the United Church in China, and self-styled Christian Marxist.
2 Lester Pearson was at that time the Canadian Minister of External Affairs
and a Liberal MP. Major J.W. Coldwell was House Leader of the CCF. They
responded unfavourably to Endicott's overtures. Pearson, a former student,
teacher, and chancellor at Victoria College, became prime minister of Canada
in 1963.
3 This was the second visit of Dr. Hewlett Johnson (see no. 40, n. i), and it
brought an audience of three thousand to Massey Hall in Toronto. Efforts at
intimidation were made at his meetings and public denunciation of his char-
acter and political affiliations were common on both his visits. Norman Pen-
ner's analysis of the Canadian Peace Congress in Canadian Communism: The
Stalin Years and Beyond (Toronto: Methuen, 1988), 226-7, corroborates NF's
assertions about Communist influence over the movement.
4 NF appears to be referring to Clarence Eugene Duffy, author of Christian
Democracy: End of the Conquest and Death Knell of Capitalism (1936), and fre-
quent contributor to Catholic Worker (1937-).
5 Proposed by the Communist International in 1935, the Popular Front was a
political alliance of left-wing parties against dictatorships in the light of the
Fascist threat. A Popular Front government formed in Spain in 1936 soon met
brutal nationalist opposition led by General Franco. NF's use of the phrase
appears to recall the currents of militant sympathy for the Socialist cause
among young Western intellectuals in the 19305 and to indicate the changing
political climate of contemporary society.
i Robert Schuman, then foreign minister in the fourth French Republic, pro-
jected a plan for a European Coal and Steel Committee in 1950 that was real-
ized two years later. This economic union of six European nations proved to
Notes to pages 246-60 373
1 In Romans 12:6 St. Paul observes, "Having then gifts differing according to
the grace that is given to us, whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to
the proportion of faith." The Greek reading "kata ten analogian tes pisteos"
translates as "analogy of faith."
2 Spengler's third book according to H. Stuart Hughes's Oswald Spengler: A
Critical Estimate (1952). Decline of the West (1918,1923) and Man and Technics
(1931) preceded it.
3 For a more extensive discussion of the relationship between the leadership
structure of Russian Communism and that of Counter-Reformation Roman
Catholicism, see NF's "Turning New Leaves" column in Canadian Forum, 26
(December 1946): 211-12. In these pages NF reviews George Orwell's Animal
Farm.
4 See James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (1942).
5 Juvenal, Satires, 10.81, refers to the famed "bread and circuses" necessary to
keep the plebeians docile.
6 See no. i, n. 34.
7 See NF's essay "The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanti-
cism," in StS, 200-17, where NF explores the relationship between chialistic
sacred imagery and radical political ideas.
8 NF refers to the well-known limerick:
There was a young lady of Niger
Who smiled as she rode on a tiger.
They returned from the ride
With the lady inside
And the smile on the face of the tiger.
374 Notes to pages 262-73
1 Queen Victoria was invested with the title Empress of India in 1876.
2 A sequel to pressures described in this article occurred in 1954, when the
British government signed an agreement with the Egyptians to evacuate their
troops from the nation's Suez Canal base.
3 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Heritage
Press, 1946), 1:151-2.
4 The Unknown Soldier is the body of a British soldier who died in France dur-
ing World War I. The body was randomly chosen by a blindfolded officer
from a number of unidentifiable corpses and symbolically "buried among
the Kings" at Westminster Abbey on 11 November 1920. The implication
appears to be that NF sees the monarchy as remote from narrower political
considerations.
5 Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's postwar campaign against Communism spe-
cialized in public disgrace, innuendo, and the fueling of suspicion of a vast
conspiracy against the American way of life. The condemnation of the Senate
in 1954 began his rapid descent from power. Georgy Maksimilianovich
Malenkov, whose administrative and political skills raised him to favour
with Stalin, was, as NF wrote, at the apex of his career as a reforming Soviet
politician. Although he was prime minister between 1953 and 1955, Malen-
kov's rivalry with Nikita Khrushchev and their gradual estrangement forced
his resignation in 1955.
6 Following the publication of his anti-Lutheran work Assertio Septem Sacra-
mentorum in 1521, Henry VIII was given the title Defender of the Faith by
Pope Leo X. By 1534, he had moved the country outside papal jurisdiction
altogether and had assumed the title of "supreme head" of the English
church.
1 Rebecca West shared NF's long memory and his sentiments, and noted that
it was "a great pity" that "before Vietnam nobody troubled to remember
Nuremberg." See her foreword to Airey Neave, On Trial at Nuremberg (Bos-
ton: Little Brown, 1978), 5-9.
2 Historians see the Monroe Doctrine, declared 2 December 1823, not only as a
bid to erect a "keep out" notice to European powers with designs on the
Americas, but also as a claim on behalf of U.S. sovereignty in the region. NF's
application of the doctrine implies that the U.S. should practise a similar pol-
icy of nonintervention outside its own borders.
i Compare NF's position on the pathological society with that taken by Thom-
as Szasz in The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) or R.D. Laing and A. Esterson in
Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964).
people have their heads turned sideways," in The Idea File of Harold Adams
Innis, ed. William Christian (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 18.
2 See Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (1970).
3 Charles Wilson, president of General Motors from 1941 to 1953, is credited
with coining this phrase.
4 The threat of what Rosemary Donegan, in Spadina Avenue (Vancouver and
Toronto: Douglas and Mclntyre, 1985), calls "a concrete and asphalt weapon
aimed at the heart of downtown" (30) was averted when the provincial gov-
ernment stopped construction in 1971.
5 NF refers to The Uncertain Mirror: Report of the Special Senate Committee on
Mass Media, 3 vols. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).
6 See William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in Writings, 1902-1910
(New York: Library of America, 1987), 1281-93.
7 As U.S. astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed and walked on
the moon on 20 July 1969, President Richard Nixon, speaking by telephone,
told them, "For one priceless moment in the whole history of man all the peo-
ple on this earth are truly one."
8 The Canadian Radio and Television Commission (CRTC) was created in
1968; it was renamed the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunica-
tions Commission in 1976. NF worked as a part-time commissioner for the
CRTC, viewing television programs and writing reports on them for the
Commission's research department, from 1968 until April 1976. For a more
detailed description of NF's work for the Commission and his articles and
reviews written for it, see LS, xxvi, 266-301.
9 Rochdale College was founded and run by a cooperative from September
1958 until May 1975. Funding for the building, located at 341 Bloor St. W.
on the northern edge of the University of Toronto campus, came from the
federal government under the National Housing Act, through the Central
Mortgage and Housing Corporation. The college, which was not part of the
University of Toronto, became a "hippie" haven with unstructured educa-
tional programs and few regulations. I am grateful to Barbara McDonald for
this reference.
10 Both threatened by pollution in the 19605, and both outstanding sites of natu-
ral beauty. NF's comments emphasize that pollution extends to the western
and eastern extremities of the country.
11 NF is referring to John Lennon's Christmas 1970 release Happy Christmas
(War Is Over). Lennon himself paid for a billboard on Yonge St. that pro-
claimed this message to the citizens of Toronto.
12 NF's words are an adjustment of the exchange between Glendower and
Hotspur in Henry IV, Part 1,3.1.52-4. When Owen Glendower boasts that,
"I can call spirits from the vasty deep," Hotspur rejoins:
Why, so can I, or so can any man,
But will they come when you do call for them?
Notes to pages 298-309 377
14 For a history of the development of the myth of progress, see no. 39 and n. 4,
above. See also MC, chap, i (11,15-19), above.
15 The typescript reads "obsession."
16 Trofim Denisovic Lysenko, a biologist and agriculturalist, was the czar of
Soviet biology. On 7 August 1948, in a speech delivered to the Lenin Acad-
emy of Agricultural Sciences on "The Situation in Biological Science,"
Lysenko denounced the theory of modern genetics and proposed a "theory
of acquired characters" that harmonized much more unthreateningly with
Stalinist and Marxist canons than any predecessor. Much of Lysenko's pres-
tige did not survive Stalin's death.
17 The typescript reads "Relativity theory. He is evidently not sure ..."
18 The typescript reads "which will" rather than "it can."
19 The typescript reads "situation" rather than "perspective."
1 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1959).
2 Snow gave the Rede Lecture at Cambridge in 1959 and his lecture appeared
in book form in that same year. Snow compared the students of the humani-
ties to the machine-breaking Luddites of the Industrial Revolution on the
grounds that they, too, feared the future that science and technology was
bringing to humanity. F.R. Leavis's "Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P.
Snow" (Spectator, 9 March 1962, 297-303) chose to reopen the topic of the
relationship between scientific and literary culture and to disagree violently
with Snow's arguments. Lea vis also made an extremely harsh assessment of
the intelligence exhibited in Snow's fiction, commenting that "as a novelist,
Snow doesn't exist; he doesn't begin to exist. He can't be said to know what a
novel is. The nonentity is apparent on every page of his fictions" (299). The
controversy, and the lengthy correspondence in The Spectator contributed by
supporters of the two combatants, still ranks as a high point of acrimony in
the history of postwar criticism in English. Leavis's discussion subsequently
appeared as a book, Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1962), and Snow weighed in with The Two Cultures and a
Second Look: An Expanded Version of The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolu-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
3 See William Hazlitt, "Why the Arts Are not Progressive?—A Fragment," in
The Complete Works of William Hazlitt (London and Toronto: Dent, 1930),
4:160-4.
4 NF is referring to the "goofus bird" of Jorges Luis Borges's The Book of
Imaginary Beings (1969). See the chapter titled "Fauna of the United States"
([Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1974], 69).
Notes to pages 317-27 379
5 NF is quoting from John Henry Newman's The Hymn of a Perplexed Soul, 11.
5-6 (1833), commonly known as "Lead, Kindly Light.".
6 NF's source is Sir Richard Blackmore, Creation, bk. 2,11. 636-7.
7 In a General Scholium added to a second edition of Principia, Sir Isaac New-
ton announced that "hypotheses non fingo" adding that "Quicquid enim ex
phaenomenis non deducitur, Hypothesis vocanda est; & hypotheses, seu
Metaphysicae, seu Physicae, seu Qualitatum Occultarum, seu Mechanicae, in
Philosophia Experimentali locum non habent." ("I do not frame hypothe-
ses . . . . Whatever cannot be deduced from the phenomena must be called
hypotheses, and whether they be metaphysical, physical, concerning the
occult properties, or mechanical, hypotheses have no place in experimental
philosophy.") See Isaac Newton, Opera Quae Extant Omnia (Stuttgart: Fried-
rich Fromann, 1964), 3:174. However, Alexander Koyre has argued that the
proper translation is "I do not feign hypotheses."
8 The satire Mundus Alter et Idem (1605) was written by Joseph Hall (1574-
1656), the self-styled "first English satirist," who subsequently became
Bishop of Exeter and Norwich. A translation appeared in 1609.
9 In Solitude and Society (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1938), Berdyaev complains
that "the philosopher's position is never secure; he can never be sure of his
independence" (11). Berdyaev protests throughout his work at the pressure
which groups exert on independent thinking.
10 An allusion to stanzas 3 and 5 of Tennyson's poem The Charge of the Light
Brigade.
11 See Zeus Rants, in Lucian, vol. 2, ed. and trans. A.M. Harmon (London:
William Heinemann, 1915), 101-9.
12 NF's Late Notebooks indicate his great interest in Pynchon's baroque novel
Gravity's Rainbow, published in 1973. NF thought the book one of the few
works of literature to deal seriously with the relationship between art and
creative paranoia. See LN, 1:124, 381, 385,402. See also DG, 17-18, and DV,
25-6, or NFR, 185-6.
13 For Einstein's "cryptic and mystical utterances," sample his Cosmic Religion
with Other Opinions and Aphorisms (New York: Covici Friede, 1931), esp.
"On Science," 97-103.
14 Werner Heisenberg's Physics and Beyond (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)
reports that Einstein and Bohr thrashed out their arguments most ferociously
over hotel breakfasts during the Solvay Congress held in Brussels in the fall
of 1927. Einstein clung tenaciously to his view that "God does not throw
dice" before planning the physical universe, while the more sceptical Bohr
replied, "Nor is it our business to prescribe to God how He should run the
world" (81).
This page intentionally left blank
Emendations
page/line
6/33-4 to be immature for to be mature (as in NFF, 1988, box 16, file 11134)
23/14 Mind at the End for The Mind at the End
29/26-7 Notes towards the Definition for Notes toward a Definition
46/20-2 organizing ideas of religion—original sin, Incarnation, a personal
power of evil, and the like—as for organizing ideas of religion,
original sin, Incarnation, a personal power of evil, and the like, as
64/2 Being and Nothingness for Being and Nothing
65/28 essay On Liberty for Essay on Liberty
74/10 Gluck-Piccini for Gluck-Puccini
74/14 Germans expended on for Germans bent on
74/31 appeared for appears
74/35 serious than for serious that
74/23 Tschaikowsky's for his
83/23 advantage for advantages
90/39 sane for saner
91/16 a free hand to two authentic geniuses for two authentic geniuses a
free hand
93/28 with both Jung and for both with Jung and
94/31 socialist realism for social realism
96/12-13 E.T. Raymond for Ernest Raymond
102/34 destroyed. Giotto's for destroyed, Giotto's
109/10 latter for later
111/15 than tuttis for that tuttis
114/17 "socialist realism" for "social realism"
123/23 of the book reviewer for of the book reviewers
148/15 Armies of the Night for Armies in the Night (as in SM)
152/34 when the king had heard for when the king heard (AV)
382 Emendations
Anxiety, 12-13, 18, 22, 25, 27, 172 Arts and sciences (as subjects of
Apelles (4th century B.C.)/ 102 study), 324-5
Apocalypse: aesthetic, 53; in history, Ashcan school, 34
238-9 Asia, 22; communist revolt of, 222
Aquinas, St. Thomas (1225-74), i&2 Assassination, 209-10
Archaeology, 53 Astronomy, 168; in the Middle Ages,
Arendt, Hannah (1906-75): The Ori- 60
gins of Totalitarianism (1951), 64 Atheism, 61, 101
Aria form, 84 Athens, Periclean, 29
Aristocracy, children as, 276 Atkinson, C(harles) F(rancis) (b.
Aristophanes (ca. 448-388 B.C.), 116 1880), 265
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), 60, 123; Poet- Atomic bomb, 208, 223, 228, 245, 250,
ics, 88, 128, 316 325
Arms race, 171 Attlee, Clement Richard, ist Earl
Arnold, Matthew (1844-88), 96, 142; (1883-1967), 246
Culture and Anarchy, xxi, 65 Auden, W(ystan) H(ugh) (1907-73),
Artist, the, 79; and audience, 38; con- 38, 183, 242; The Fall of Rome (1947),
temporary, 126-7, 130-1; as crimi- 305; For the Time Being (1944), 305
nal, 46-8, 121-2; and museums, 52; Audience: agency of, 166; in the mod-
as neighbour, 58; in the nineteenth ern age, 163
century, 85; sells out, 132; and soci- Augustine, St. (A.D. 354-430): City of
ety, 41-2, 62; struggles of, 167; and God (A.D. 412-27), 229-30
tradition, 45-6; 128-9; and the uni- Austen, Jane (1775-1817), 27;
versity, 55-6 Northanger Abbey (1818), 147
Arts: creative, 9, 26; authority of, 169; Australia, 30
autonomy of, 31; concern and style Author, the, 240. See also Novelist;
in, 323; cooperative, 90-1; decen- Writer
tralizing tendencies of, 318-19; Authority, two kinds of, 168-9
emancipating force of, 34-5; and Autobiography, 115
the First World War, 93; freedom Automobile, 21, 136, 160, 167; evil of,
of, 128-9; function of, 295; imper- 289
fect versus masterpiece in, 38-9; Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules (1910-89),
and labour, 42; and laissez-faire, 144-5
186; and leisure structure, 52-5;
mechanization of, 35-7; minor, 53; Babel, Isaak Emmanuelovich (1894-
and nature, 127-8, 133; primitive, I94i)/ 34
316; as prophetic, 62, 67; response Bach, Johann Sebastian (1685-1750),
to, 21; and society, 79-80, 132-3, 80, 84, 91; as Christian, 90; as peas-
167-72; Spengler's view of, 270; ant, 83; St. Matthew Passion (1729),
and tradition, 45-6, 127-8; vision 90
of, 281. See also Contemporary art; Ballads, oral, 54
Modern art Ballet, 76-8; as cooperative art, 91; as
Index 385
new art form, 80-2; Russian, 74, 78, Blackmore, Sir Richard (1655-1729):
81 Creation, 320
Ballet Russe, 76-8 Blake, William (1757-1827), 54, 85,
Balzac, Honore de (1799-1856), chef 171; innocence and experience in,
d'oeuvre inconnu, 38-9 68; new Jerusalem of, 70; on tyr-
Barna da Siena (fl. ca. 1350), 190 anny, 24; Jerusalem (1804-20), 120;
Bartolo di Fredi (ca. 1330-1410), 190 The Lamb (1789), 68; The Mental
Baseball, 9, 14 Traveller (i8oo?-4), 54; The Tyger
Basile, Jean (1932-92), 161 (1794), 68
Baudelaire, Charles Pierre (1821-67), Blond Bombshell (film) (1933), 87
19, 27, 54, 102, 142; his antagonism Body, mechanical extension of, 19
to society, 43 Boer War, 262
Beatle(s): haircuts, 28; in Toronto, 296 Bohemians, 43-4
Beatnik movement, 31, 44, 55, 129 Bohr, Niels (1885-1962), 327
Beckett, Samuel (1906-89), 27, 38, 56; Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Vis-
Waiting for Godot (1956), 25 count (1678-1751), 23
Beethoven, Ludwig van (1770-1827), Bononcini, Giovanni Battista (1670-
85, 90; Opus 106, 35; Symphony 1747)/ 74
No. 6 (Pastoral) (1808), no; Rasou- Book(s): and freedom, 154; God writes,
movsky Quartet (1806), 35 139; and the individual, 150; in the
Belief: defined, 274-5; and mythol- modern age, 240; NF's early, 140-2;
ogy, 65; structure of, 65-6, 67-8 reviewing, 123-5; sacred, 150, 153;
Bellamy, Edward (1850-98): Looking technological efficiency of, 144
Backward (1888), 17 Border, Canada-U.S., 8, 232
Berdyaev, Nikolai Alexandrovich Borduas, Paul-Emile (1905-60): Refus
(1874-1948): Solitude and Society Global (1948), 69
(1938), 323 Borges, Jorge Luis (1898-1986): Book
Berg, Alban (1885-1935): Wozzeck of Imaginary Beings (1969), 316
(1925), 75 Botticelli, Sandro (Alessandro Fil-
Bergman, Ingmar (b. 1918), 56 ipepi) (1444-1510), 95
Bergson, Henri (1859-1941), 181, 182; Brahms, Johannes (1833-97), 40, 102
influences Wyndham Lewis, 306 Brecht, Bertolt (1898-1956), 39, 42
Berlin, Irving (1888-1989), no Brett, George Sidney (1879-1944):
Berne, Eric (1910-70): Games People History of Psychology (1912-21), 144
Play (1964), 63 Brewer, David (1837-1910): The
Between-the-wars period, 96 World's Best Essays (1900), 142
Bevan, Aneurin (1897-1960), 247 Britain. See Great Britain
Bible, 59, 60, 153, 226 Brown, Les: "Canadian Industry
Billings, William (1746-1800), 35 Realities: Can We Do without
Bismarck, Prince Otto Edward Violence?" (1975), 159
Leopold von (1815-98): Spengler Brown, Norman O. (b. 1913): Life
on, 299, 300 against Death (1959), 64
386 Index
Browning, Elizabeth Barrett (1806- of, 105; literature of, 318-19; loyalty
62), 141 in, 69-70; and the monarchy, 263;
Browning, Robert (1812-89): Re- national status of, 7-8; and Nazism,
sponses to Challenges to Rhyme (1914), 185; novel in, 146; peace movement
188 in, 244-5; railway journeys in, 14;
Brueghel, Pieter (ca. 1525-69): Slaugh- separatism in, 136; and Spengler,
ter of the Innocents, 35 270; spy trails in, 220; television in,
Bruno, Giordano (1548-1600), 168 157; and the U.S., 232-3; writers in,
Bryn Mawr College, 233 55/ 105
Buber, Martin (1878-1965): land Thou Canada Council, 56, 132
(1923), 64 Canadian Art, 132
Bucephalus (Alexander the Great's Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
horse), 105 SeeCQC
Bunyan, John (1628-88): The Pilgrim's Canadian content, 292
Progress (1678-84), 11, 39 Canadian Forum: on censorship, 217;
Buonaparte, Napoleon (1769-1821), funding of, 132; NF edits, xx, xxxvi;
176 NF writes for, xxv-xxvi, 29
Burke, Edmund (1729-97), 23; Reflec- Canadian National Exhibition. See
tions on the Revolution in France CNE
(1790), 148 Canadian Radio-television and Tele-
Butler, Samuel (1835-1902): Erewhon communications Commission. See
(1872), 129 CRTC
Byron, George Gordon, Baron Byron Canon, the, 67
of Rochdale (1788-1824), 27, 37 Capitalism, 12, 57, 184-5, 288; and lit-
Byzantine art, 31, 34-5 erature, 152; wartime conditions of,
253
Caesar (generic), 118 Capital punishment, 158
Cage, John (1912-92), 40 Caplow, Theodore (b. 1920): The Aca-
Cain and Abel: in Beckett, 25 demic Market-Place (1958), 63
Camus, Albert (1913-60): L'Etranger Capote, Truman (1924-84): In Cold
(1941), 47, 119; La Peste (1946), 18- Blood (1966), 148
19, 325 Capra, Frank (1897-1991): Arsenic and
Canada, 50; accent in, 103; American- Old Lace (film) (1944), 119
ization of, 28, 30; Americans as seen Car. See Automobile
by, 234; censorship in, 215, 216-17; Caricature: and satire, 81
Centennial of, 8, 13, 26, 27; charac- Carlyle, Thomas (1795-1881), 36
ter of, 6; Confederation of, 5-6, Carnegie, Dale (1888-1955): How to
21; cooperation in, xix, xxvi, xliii; Win Friends and Influence People
culture of, 6-7; drama in, 240; ele- (1936), 193
mentary teaching in, 62-3; French Carpaccio, Vittore (1472-1526),
language in, 28, 30; grain elevators 192
in, 192; identity of, 69-70; language Carr, Emily (1871-1945), 69
Index
Carrel, Alexis (1873-1944): Man, the China, 184, 223; drama in, 90, no;
Unknown (1935), 228 future of, 287; modern, 237, 250;
Carroll, Madeleine (1906-87), 99 and the U.S., 13-14
Cartoons, 113 Chirico, Giorgio de (1888-1978), 94
Caruso, Enrico (1873-1921), 74 Chopin, Frederic-Francois (1810-49),
Castiglione, Baldassare (1478-1529), 109
39 Chosisme, 40
Catharsis, 165 Christ, 68; and Chaplin, 121, 122;
Catholicism, 45-6; Communism paro- power of, 261
dies, 239; and Deism, 255 Christianity, 60; and Chaplin, 101; as
CBC, 55, 240 closed mythology, 66; and Commu-
CCF, xxvi, 232-3 nism, 239-40; early, 23; and history,
Censorship, 159; and democracy, 227, 230; radical charity of, 277; and
215-17; of literature, 217-18; and violence, 164; and war, 177
the mob, 169; and sex, 218-19; as Christian mythology, 62-3, 88
violence, 159 Christmas, commercialization of, 13
Ceramics, 53 Church, the, 57; and modern culture,
Cervantes, Saavedra, Miguel de 243
(1547-1616): Don Quixote (1605-15), Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spen-
24, 116, 147, 316 cer (1874-1965), 103, 107, 186
Cezanne, Paul (1839-1906), 34, 35 Cinema: as cooperative art, 91
Chagall, Marc (1887-1985), 114 Circus, the, 89-90
Chaplin, Sir Charles (Charlie) (1889- City, the, 19-20, 60-1; as experience,
1977)/ 43/ 91/ 181; masterpieces of, 44-5; of God, 257; real, 231
98-102; NF on, xxxv-xxxvi; as Clair, Rene (1898-1981): Sous les toits
tramp, 116-22; City Lights (1931), de Paris (film) (1930), in
100, 117, 118, 119; The Gold Rush Class conflict, 252
(1925), 100, 117; The Great Dictator Claudel, Paul (1868-1955), 47, 242
(1940), 101-2, 116, 118-19, 121, 214; Cliche, 15, 18, 36, 62, 63
Modern Times (1936), 100-1, no, Clown, 116-17
118; Monsieur Verdoux (1947), 47/ CNE, 92
116, 119-22 Cochrane, Charles Norris (1889-
Charity: imaginative, xlvi; present 1945), and NF, xxiv-xxv; Christian-
value of, 259; radical, 277 ity and Classical Culture (1940), 227
Chaucer, Geoffrey (ca. 1345-1400), Cocteau, Jean (1889-1963), 47
152; The Clerk's Tale, 97 Codex, creation of, 143
Chefd'oeuvre inconnu, 38-9 Coffee table book, 144
Chesterton, G(ilbert) K(eith) (1874- Cohen, Leonard (b. 1934): Beautiful
1936): Chaucer (1925), 190 Losers (1966), 39
Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), 223, 282 Coldwell, Major James William
Children, 329; as aristocracy, 276; and (1888-1974), 244
stories, 161; and violence, 164 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor (1772-
388 Index
1834): Lyrical Ballads (1798), 54; The Contemporary culture: and the uni-
Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798), versity, 55-6, 58-9, 298
92 Contemporary literature, 9, 59. See
Comedie larmoyante, 74 also Modern literature
Comedy, 116-17; as myth of deliver- Continuity: and art, 45-6
ance, 328; in opera, 74 Continuum of life, 148-9, 161
Comic books, 217, 241 Convention: and art, 127, 128-9; in lit-
Comic strips, 43 erature, 163. See also Tradition
Commedia dell'arte, 241 Coolidge, John Calvin (1872-1933),
Commerce: and literature, 241-2 103
Commonwealth Cooperative Federa- Cooper, James Fenimore (1789-1851),
tion. See CCF 42
Commonwealth of Nations, 247; and Cooperation: and art, 90-1; in Can-
royalty, 263-4 ada, xix, xxvi, xliii
Communications media. See Mass Co-operative Commonwealth Feder-
media; Media ation. See CCF
Communication theory, 134-5 Copyright, 152
Communism, 12, 50, 184-5, 236/ 238- Cornford, F(rancis) M(acdonald)
40, 288; analogy in, 249; and Chap- (1874-1943): influence on NF, xxxv
lin, 117; collapse in America of, Cote, Guy, 164
42; culture in, 30; as dystopia, 24; Cox, Harvey (b. 1929): The Secular
persecution for, 14, 220-1, 224-5, City (1965), 64
245; and progress, 228; resists the Creation: and sex, 44
modern, 28; social good of, 277; Criminal: as artist, 46-8, 121-2
socialist realism in, 33-4; theology Criticism, 169; free, 15, 293; as science
of, 17; and war, 254; world view of, of literature, 123; as simultaneous
222-3 response, 138; and Spengler, 306;
Community, 12, 19-20, 150; loyalty Wilde begins, 147
to, 293; of readers, 138; spiritual Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658), 176
and intellectual, 257; and technol- Crown. See Monarchy; Royalty
ogy, 136-7; true, 280-1; ultimate, 61 CRTC, 157, 159, 163; and Canadian
Concern: and myth, 59, 321-2; myth- content, 292
ologies of, 63-5, 323-5; and pan- Crucifixion, 164
ic, 293; two levels of, 168-9, Cruden's Concordance, 141
171-2 Cubism, 37, 94
Condorget, Antoine Nicolas, Marquis Culture: active and passive responses
de (1743-94), 17 to, 9, 21, 26-7, 38, 153, 162-3, 169-
Conrad, Joseph (1857-1924), 146; Lord 70, 327; Canadian, 6-7; coherence
Jim (1900), 147 of, 30; as cult, 129-30; cycle of, 35;
Contemporary art, 126-7; academic, decentralized, 28-9; dialectic of, 8-
129; educational, 131, 132-3. See also 9; expansion of, 144; genuine, 243;
Modern art mass, 9, 33; and nature, 321; popu-
Index 389
lar, 31; as prophetic, 62; revolution- chism, 294; and the arts, 129, 168;
ary, 31-2, 241; and teaching, 58-9; the arts vulgarized by, 179-80; the
visionary, xlii; Western as reborn book creates, 155; and censorship,
Classical, 311-12 215-17; classless society of, 276-7;
Czechoslovakia, 184 closed myth in, 66-7; and Commu-
nism, 223, 224-5; and concern, 169;
Dadaism, 93, 94 and the depravity of man, 279; as
Dali, Salvador (1904-89), 94; Autum- dystopia, 24; and freedom, 259; the
nal Cannibalism (1936), 95; Great ideal of, 235-6; and the Kinsey re-
Dreamer, 95 port, 219; and laissez-faire, 185-6,
Dalton, Baron Hugh (1887-1962), 247 238; and the mass media, 149; and
Dance: in ballet, 78; as origin of music the police, 233-4; and the univer-
and drama, 79-80, 91 sity, 169; writing creates, 138-9
Daniel, Book of, 45 Depression, the, 26, 42, 51, 119, 276
Daniel, Yuli (Nikolai Arzhak) (1925- Descartes, Rene (1596-1650), 260
88), 34 De Sica, Vittorio (1901-74): Shoeshine
Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), 182; (film) (1946), 241
Inferno, 22, 23 Design: in nature, 60, 62; unifies the
Darwin, Charles (1809-82), 28, 62, 64, arts, 53
179, 260, 271 Destiny, genuine human, 27
Daumier, Honore (1808-78), 34 Detective fiction, 38, 39, 318
Dawson, P. Norman (b. 1902): Blue Deuteronomy, Book of, 153
Mouth of Paradise, 93-4 Devil. See Satan
Dean, Abner (b. 1910): It's a Long Way De Vries, Peter (1910-93), 318
to Heaven (1945), 113 Diaghilev, Sergei Pavlovich (1872-
Death: consciousness of, 18; -wish, 12 1929), 81
Debussy, Claude Achille (1862-1918), Dickens, Charles (1812-70), 141, 147;
84,85 and the city, 20; read aloud, 150;
Decadence in art, 99 David Copperfield (1849-50), 116
Degas, Edgar (1834-1917), 33 Dictatorship. See Totalitarianism;
Deism, American culture as, 237-8, Tyranny
254-9 Dictionary of accepted ideas, 63
Delius, Frederick (1862-1934), 83-6; Dies, Martin (1900-72), 225
Brigg Fair (1907), 83; On Hearing the Discontinuity in modern poetry, 36,
First Cuckoo in Spring (1912), 83; 38
A Mass of Life (1904), 86; Sea Drift Discordia concors, 37
(1904), 86; Songs of Sunset (1907), 86 Disney, Walt (1901-66), 91; Fantasia
Deliverance. See Emancipation; Myth (1940), 108, no; Farmyard Symphony
of deliverance (1938), no; Reluctant Dragon (1941),
Democracy, 14-15, 41, 49, 50, 57-8, 65, in; Snow White and the Seven
160, 184-5; action in, 229; aims of, Dwarfs (1937), 91
274-5; in America, 250-4; and anar- Disraeli, Benjamin (1804-81), 6
390 Index
Dos Passes, John (1896-1970), 48, 104 Einstein, Albert (1879-1955), 182, 271,
Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich 327
(1821-81), 28; Notes from Under- Eisenhower, Dwight David (1890-
ground (1864), 37; The Possessed 1969), 292
(1872), 47 Eisenstein, Sergei Mikhailovich
Dowson, Ernest (1867-1900): Non (1898-1948): Alexander Nevsky
Sum Qualis Emm Bonae Sub Regno (film) (1938), 213
Cynarae (1896), 86 Electronic media: and anarchism, 139;
Dragon: as bondage, 261 and the book, 150; and oral culture,
Drama, 56, 105, 170; and the book, 137-8; and tyranny, 153-4; and vio-
150; in Canada, 240; Elizabethan, lence, 163
82; and music, 79-80, 88-9; and the Elgar, Sir Edward (1857-1934), 86; as
news media, 162; and society, 98 patriot, 83
Dream(s), 40; and Dadaism, 93 Eliot, George (Mary Ann Evans)
Dryden, John (1631-1700): An (1819-80), 146; Daniel Deronda
Evening's Love: or The Mock Astrolo- (1876), 147; Middlemarch (1871-2),
ger (1671), 100; Aureng-Zebe (1675), 147; Romola (1862-3), *47
125 Eliot, T(homas) S(tearns) (1888-1965),
Duffy, Clarence Eugene (Father), 30, 36, 67, 127, 145-6, 242; NF on,
245 xxix-xxxii; odour of sanctity, 131-2;
Duke Ellington (1899-1974), no poet and snob, 307; as royalist, 46;
Duns Scotus, Johannes (ca. 1265- self -defined, 115; table of imagery
1308): Opus Oxoniense, 201 for, 305; Burbank with a Baedeker:
Dutch realism, 33 Bleistein with a Cigar (1919), 112,
Dystopia, 23, 24. See also Progress, 192; Cousin Nancy (1915), 142; Notes
Myth of towards the Definition of Culture
(1948), 29; The Waste Land (1921),
Ecclesiasticus, Book of, 108 10, 36, 38, 45, 46, 131-2
Eddington, Sir Arthur Stanley (1882- Elizabeth I (1533-1603), 262-3
1944), 65; The Nature of the Physical Elizabeth II (b. 1926), 69, 262-4
World (1928), 64 Elizabethan drama, 90, no
Eden, garden of, 61, 165, 230 Elizabethan England, 30. See also
Education: adult, 52; and art, 129, 131, Great Britain
132; democratic, 235-6; genuine, Ellison, Ralph (1914-94): Invisible Man
170; and leisure, 50; as leisure struc- (1952), 295
ture, 57-9; and production, 49; as Emancipation: concern of, 325-7;
real life, 294-5; and society, 51-2; myths of, 328
and the victim, 164; and violence, Emerson, Ralph Waldo (1803-82),
161; writing creates, 138 142
Egypt, 30 Encyclopedists, French, 27
Eighteenth century, 61-2, 171; natural English language, dominance of, 28
society of, 23; and primitivism, 45 Epicurus (ca. 341-271 B.C.), 182
Index 391
Equality, 57; charity the basis of, Fielding, Henry (1707-54): Joseph
277-8 Andrews (1742), 147
Erie, Lake, 296 Film. See Movies
Ernst, Max (1891-1976): The Burning Finance, conspiracies of, 46
Woman, 93 First World War, 176, 177, 180; art
Erotic, the, 218-19 after, 93; and Spengler, 297
Europe: education in, 58; imperial- Flag, Canadian, 69
ism of, 260-1; unification of, 246-7 Flanders, 35
Everyman, Chaplin as, 121, 122 Flaubert, Gustave (1821-80), 28, 97;
Evolution, analogies of, 64-5 Bouvard and Pecuchet (1881), 63;
Existentialism, 63, 145; and mythol- Madame Bovary (1856), 147
ogy, 64; as thriller, 242-3 Flemish, 28
Exodus (not the book), 24 Florence, Medicean, 29
Experience: and innocence, 44-5 Folk singing, 54
Expressionism, 180 Folk song, 146
Fool, the, 116
Fairley, Barker (1887-1986), 232, 233; Formalism, 34-5, 36; and museums,
influence on NF, xxvi-xxvii, xxix, 53; in poetry, 54
xxxi Fortier, Andre (b. 1927): "On Patron-
Fairy tales, 161 age" (1986), 167
Faith, 66; loss of, 67; royalty stands France, 22; and Germany, 246; mod-
for, 264; and truth, 259 ern, 237, 250
Fall of man, 291 Franck, Cesar Auguste (1822-90), 84,
Falstaff, 116 86
Fantasy, 40, 146, 147, 148 Frankenstein (film), 109, 241
Farmers, diction of, 105 Franklin, Benjamin (1706-90), 100
Farrell, James (1904-79): Bernard Clare Fraternity: and community, 280; and
(1946), 217 leisure structure, 57-8
Fascism, 46, 86, 176, 181, 236, 238-9; Frazer, Sir James George (1854-1941),
as oligarchy, 252 28; The Golden Bough (1907-15),
Fashion: as symbol, 10 206
Faulkner, William (1897-1962), 58, 318 Frederick II (the Great) (1712-86), 182
Fear. See Anxiety Freedom, 23, 24, 26; of the arts, 128-9;
Fellini, Federico (1920-93), 56 battles of, 154-5; and Chaplin, 117,
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814), 122; and death, 326; and democ-
298 racy, 235-6; and imagination, 53;
Fiction: and accepted ideas, 63; devel- and the individual, 293; and liberal
opment of, 146-8; in the modern education, 259; and print, 139; and
age, 242-3 the self, 278-80; and the Word, 243
Fiedler, Leslie (b. 1917): An End to Freemasonry, 254
Innocence: Essays on Culture and Pol- Free press, 154, 159
itics (1955), 64 Free verse, 129
392 Index
cism in, 212; as Rome, 300; volkisch Great Britain, 6, 50, 184; accent in, 103;
aspect of, 45 decentralization of, 29; empire of,
Gershwin, George (1898-1937), no 262; Labour Government of, 246-7;
Ghirlandaio, Domenico (di Tommaso modern, 237, 250; the monarchy in,
Bigordi) (1449-94), 189, 191 235; and war, 175-7
Ghosts: and television, 162 Great Chain of Being, 260
Gibbon, Edward (1737-94): Decline Great War. See First World War
and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776- Greece, ancient, 29, 30; drama in, 73-
88), 60, 206, 263 4; religious philosophy of, 88
Gide, Andre Paul Guillaume (1869- Greene, Graham (1904-91), 243
1951), 102; Les Caves du Vatican Grieg, Edvard (1843-1907), 84, 109
(1914), 47; The Counterfeiters (1926), Group of Seven, 92
39 Grove, Frederick Philip (1879-1948):
Ginsberg, Allen (1926-97): Howl A Search for America (1927), 43, 69
(1956), 146 Guggenheim Museum, 132
Giono, Jean (1895-1970), 45 Gutenberg syndrome, 21
Giotto (di Bondone) (ca. 1266-1337),
34, 102 Hamilton, 20
Global village, 136 Hamsun, Knut (1859-1952), 45
Gliick, Christoph Willibald (1714-87), Handel, Georg Friedrich (1685-1759),
74, 77, 80 74, 80, 84
God, 64; alienation from, n; and the Hapsburg Empire, 30
book, 139; as creator, 60-1; hypoth- Hardy, Thomas (1840-1928): 1967
esis of, 61-2; as infinite, 259; and (1867), 6
the lunatic, 101; in man, 261; in Harlequin, 116
poetry, 242 Harlow, Jean (1911-37), 87
Goebbels, Joseph (1897-1945), 193 Harmony, 89
Golding, William (1911-93): Lord of Havelock, Eric Alfred (1903-88):
the Flies (1954), 23 influence on NF, xxvii-xxix
Goodman, Paul (1911-72): Growing up Hawthorne, Nathaniel (1804-64),
Absurd (1960), 43 100
Good Samaritan, 58 Haydn, Franz Joseph (1732-1809), 40
Gorky, Maxim (1868-1936), 42 Hazlitt, William (1778-1830), 132
Gospels, the 18 Heaven, 61
Gounod, Charles (1818-93): Faust Hebrew: culture, 30; language, 28
(1859), 75 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Goya y Lucientes, Francisco Jose de (1770-1831): on history, 301-2; Phe-
(1746-1828), 34, 127 nomenology of Mind (1807), 143
Graf, Max (1873-1958): Modern Music Heliocentrism, 168
(1946), 112 Hell, 22
Grant, George (1918-88): Lament for a Hemingway, Ernest Miller (1899-
Nation (1965), xxxix 1961), 318
394 Index
Juvenal (ca. A.D. 55-127): Satires, 89 238, 251; dinosauric, 253; and sci-
ence, 169
Kafka, Franz (1883-1924): The Castle Lampman, Archibald (1861-99), 5
(1926), 40-1 Language: American, 104; of poetry,
Kandinsky, Vasily (Wassily) (1866- 319-20; purification of, 29-30; spo-
1944), 95, H4 ken, 103-7; three modes of, 321
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), 260; Lao-tzu (6th c. B.C.), 200
and Spengler, 298 Law (of God), 61-2, 321-2
Keats, John (1795-1821), 27; La Belle Lawrence, D(avid) H(erbert) (1885-
Dame sans Merci (1820), 54 1930), 46; pastoralism in, 44, 45;
Keats, John (b. 1920): The Insolent poet and hysteric, 307; The Plumed
Chariots (1958), 63 Serpent (1926), 47; Women in Love
Kern, Jerome (1885-1945), no (1920), 180
Kerouac, Jack (1922-69): The Dharma Layton, Irving (b. 1912), 5
Bums (1958), 44 League of Nations, 171
Ketchum, John Davidson (1893- Leavis, Frank Raymond (1895-1978),
1962), 215 146; attacks C.P. Snow, 315
Kierkegaard, S0ren Aabye (1813-55), Leger, Fernand (1881-1955), 37
124, 260; Either/Or (1843), 115 Leisure, 139; creates the arts, 295;
King Arthur, 312 growth of, 49-50; sphere of, xli;
Kings, Book of, 152, 177 Leisure structure, 50-1; and the arts,
Kinsey, Alfred C. (1894-1956): Sexual 52-5; and education, 57-9; loyalty
Behavior in the Human Male (1948), to, 57; and the university, 55-6
215 L'Enfant, Pierre Charles (1754-1825),
Kirpal, Prem: "Arts and Internation- 19
alism" (1986), 171 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870-1924),
Klee, Paul (1879-1940), 94, 95 114, 210, 233, 249; and deism, 255;
Knowledge: advance of, 295; coffins and movies, 98; What is to be Done?
and flux of, 141; in a democracy, (1902), 41
217; as revolutionary, 287 Levant, Oscar (1906-72), in; A Smat-
Koestler, Arthur (1905-83): Darkness tering of Ignorance (1940), 108
at Noon (1940), 229 Lewis, C(live) S(taples) (1898-1963):
Kotcheff, Ted (b. 1931): "How Can the religious allegory of, 242
Quality of Popular Programming Lewis, (Harry) Sinclair (1885-1951):
be Improved?" (1975), 158, 161, 163 Main Street (1920), 141-2, 145
Kubrick, Stanley (1928-99): Dr. Lewis, (Percy) Wyndham (1882-
Strangelove (film) (1964), 12 1957), 37; on Canada, 7; on Speng-
ler, 181-3; The Apes of God (1930),
Labour, 57; alienation of, 11; in the 180; The Art of Being Ruled (1926),
arts, 42; unions, 276 179, 182; The Dithyrambic Spectator
Laissez-faire, 16, 49, 50, 236; democ- (1931), 182; Hitler (1931), 182; The
racy as, 185-6; destroys democracy, Lion and the Fox (1927), 181-2; Men
Index 397
Marinetti, Emilio (1876-1944), 181 out, 162; and memory, 24; and the
Mark, Gospel of, 101, 122 movies, 148. See also Electronic
Marlborough, John Churchill, 1st media
Duke of (1650-1722), 176 Melodrama, 161, 164-5
Marshall Plan, 246 Melody, 82, 84; in opera, 77
Marx, Karl (1818-83), 28, 63, 69, 103, Melville, Herman (1819-91), 100;
239, 260, 271, 273, 313; on produc- Moby Dick (1851), 101
tion, 249; on the social contract, 41; Memory: destruction of, 24; and
and Spengler, 202, 207; Das Kapital verse, 152; and writing, 135
(1867), 6 Mencken, Henry Louis (1880-1956):
Marxism, 24, 41, 44, 49, 202; artists Prejudices: Fifth Series (1926), 105
under, 168; classless society of, 252; Mendelssohn (-Bartholdy), Felix
as closed mythology, 66; criticism, (1809-47), 84, 109
34; and Deism, 255, 258; the De- Mental health, 283-4
pression and, 317; on the future, Mesopotamia, 30
287-8; and leisure, 51; as religion, Messiah, totalitarian, 249
67, 185; and revolution, 222-3; sci~ Metaphor, 54
ence in, 66 Mexico, 30, 197
Massine, Leonide (1896-1979), 81 Michelangelo (Michelagniolo di
Mass media, 51; and democracy, 149; Lodovico Buonarroti) (1475-1564),
resistance to, 135-6. See also Elec- 32
tronic media; Media Middle Ages, 60, 66; culture of, 168;
Masterpiece, 316; decline of, 38-9 music and drama in, 88
Masters, Edgar Lee (1869-1950): Middle class: and the university, 55
Spoon River Anthology (1915), 104 Mill, John Stuart (1806-73), *7; On
Matthew, Gospel of, 256 Liberty (1859), 65
Maurras, Charles (1868-1952), 46 Miller, Henry (1891-1980), 44, 45
Mays, John Bentley (b. 1941): "Art Millet, Jean-Francois (1814-75): The
and Reality?" (1986), 168 Angelus (1859), 45
McCarthyism, 42, 149 Milton, John (1608-74), 61; chaos of,
McLuhan, (Herbert) Marshall (1911- 40; on music, 89; on oral society,
80): on media fallout, 162; and the 138-9
news, 290; and NF, xxxix-xli; on Mindszenty, Cardinal Jozsef (1892-
print, 137, 139, 154; and progress, 1975), 220-1
20-1; Understanding Media (1964), 64 Miro, Joan (1893-1983), 94
McMaster University, 3-5 Mirror, 26-7
Meaning: reader determines, 40; and Mitchell, Margaret (1900-49): Gone
reality, 167 with the Wind (1936), 108, 169
Mechanization, 35-7, 77-8, 118, 317; Mob rule, 24
and alienation, 292-3; autonomous, Modern age, 22-3, 26, 27-8; antisocial
288-9; and violence, 158 attitudes in, 48; the arts in, 38, 41,
Media, 20-1; and anarchism, 291; fall- 172; artists in, 126-7; audience in,
Index 399
163; ballet in, 78; begins with indus- 148; as the modern art form, 98;
trial revolution, 48-9; centre and music in, 108-11; and oratory, 240
orbit in, 128; cultural trends in, Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus (1756-
248-61; defining characteristic, 8; 91), 77, 80, 84, 90, 91, 127, 144; and
information in, 151-2; literature in, opera, 74; Symphony in C (Linz)
240-3; mythology of, 60, 62-3, 64; d783),35
pollution of, 296; speed of change Museums, 53-4; birth of, 52; without
in, 10-11, 35, 295, 317; streamlining walls, 53
of, 35; tenets of, 237-40; Third Reich Music, 56, 128, 129, 132; contempo-
parodies, 314; ugliness of, 326 rary and classical, 40; and drama,
Modern art: irrational, 40; "isms" in, 79-80, 88-9; and Germany, 74, 81;
94; militant, 38; movies in, 98; pro- language of, 83; melody in, 77; in
cess over product in, 38-9 movies, 99, 108-11; popular, 89;
Modern culture. See Contemporary and recordings, 52; rhythm in, 77-
culture; Modern age 8; and Romanticism, 84-6; and
Modern literature: anti-hero in, 37; technology, 170
discontinuity in, 36. See also Con- Musical drama, 79-80, 81, 90-1, 111.
temporary literature See also Ballet; Opera
Modern poetry. See Poetry Musil, Robert (1880-1942): The Man
Modern style. See International style; without Qualities (1930-43), 145
Modern art Mussolini, Benito (1883-1945), 118,
Modigliani, Amadeo (1884-1920), 37 186; his pug-ugly sourpuss, 189
Mohr, J.W.: "Media and Controls" Myth, 54, 63; and concern, 59, 321-2;
(1975), 161 of concern, xli-xlii, 64; contempo-
Moloch, 18 rary, 25; of deliverance, xlv-xlvi; as
MOMA (Museum of Modern Art), idea, 65. See also Mythology
132 Mythological constructions, two pri-
Monarchy: and democracy, 235; mary, 60-5
power of, 263 Mythology: Christian, 88; closed,
Mondrian, Piet (1872-1944), 53 65-7; of concern, 63-5, 323-5; mod-
Monet, Claude (1840-1926), 32 ern, 62-3; open, 65, 68; premodern,
Monroe Doctrine, 282 60-1, 62; social, 62-3; as structure,
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de (1533- 59-60, 321-2. See also Myth
92), 182 My thopoeia, 146-8
Moon landing, 291
Morris, William (1834-96), 20; on cul- Nabokov, Vladimir (1899-1977): Pale
ture, 29; "The Lesser Arts" (1878), 53 Fire (1962), 48
Moscow Peace Congress, 244 Napoleon I (Napoleon Bonaparte)
Mother goddess, 62 (1769-1821), 22, 118
Movies, 9, 14, 31, 56, 103, 105, 136; Narcissism, 14
concentrates all art forms, 99; and Narcissus, 27
literature, 104, 107; and the media, Nash, Paul (1899-1946), 94
400 Index
(i6n), 141; Timon of Athens (1607), tion in, 51-2; as repressive, 44, 48;
48; Titus Andronicus (1623), 164; The as sadistic, 46-7; and science, 22;
Winter's Tale (ca. 1610), 32 as a structure, 160; and symbols,
Shaw, George Bernard (1856-1950), xxxv; and violence, 157-8; and
35, 183; and evolution, 64 youth, 44
Shelley, Percy Bysshe (1792-1822), 54; Sonata form, 85
Ode to the West Wind (1820), 91; Sorel, Georges (1847-1922), 180, 181;
Ozymandias (1818), 151; Prometheus Reflections on Violence (1907), 66
Unbound (1820), 29; The Witch of South Africa: denies equality, 277
Atlas (1824), 35 Soviet Union, 8, 23, 28; conservative
Sherrington, Sir Charles (1857-1952), nature of, 287-8; as federation, 199;
65; Man on His Nature (1941), 64 liberalization of, 30; science in, 22
Shortliffe, Glen (b. 1913), 232, 233 Spain, 35, 184
Siena, NF visits, 189-91 Speech, manner of, 103-7
Simultaneous apprehension, 138 Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903): and
Sinclair, Lister (b. 1921): Socrates evolution, 64
(1952), 240 Spengler, Oswald (1880-1936), 179,
Slavery, 23, 61 180, 185, 230; influence on NF,
Smiles, Samuel (1812-1904): Self-Help xxxiii-xxxiv, 310; in Wyndham
(1859), 39 Lewis's Time and Western Man, 181,
Smyth, Dame Ethyl (1858-1944): The 182; as militarist manque, 307; total
Boatswain's Mate (1916), 74-5 impact of, 272; and Toynbee, 202-8;
Snow, Sir C(harles) P(ercy) (1905-80), as visionary, 268; The Decline of the
326; The Two Cultures and the Scien- West (1918-22), 22-3, 63, 178, 202-5,
tific Revolution (1959), 315-16 248-9, 265-73, 297-314; Hour of
Social contract, 41-3, 46 Decision (1934), 182, 204, 238, 249,
Socialism in Great Britain, 246-7; and 268, 307, 308; Man and Technics
the mass media, 135 (1931), 304; Prussianism and Social-
Socialist realism, 33-4, 94, 114, 295 ism (1919), 304
Social work: and the university, 274 Spiritual world, 61
Society: as anti-art, 48; and the artist, Spring Thaw (Museum Theatre pro-
41-2, 62; and the arts, 79-80, 167- duction), 240
72, 132-3; classless, 276-7; creation Stalin, Joseph (losif Vissarionovich
of a better, 69; destroys life, 119; Dzhugashvili) (1879-1953), 165,
freedom of, 154-5; future of, 316- 171, 249; purge-trials, 149, 154
17; growth of, 6-7; ideal, 17; and Stars and Stripes (flag), 237, 250
imagination, 295; and the individ- Stein, Gertrude (1874-1946), 38,
ual, 151, 259-60; introverted, 20; 181
leisure structure of, 50-1; mechani- Steinbeck, John Ernst (1902-68), 104,
zation of, 118; mob rule in, 24; and 318
nationalism, 8; natural, 23-4; new, Sterne, Laurence (1713-68): A Senti-
328; and the outcast, 43; participa- mental Journey (1767), 22
406 Index
47; fiction in, 42; imperialism of, Verdi, Giuseppe (1813-1901): Miserere
199; mass media in, 135; as oldest (1853), no
modern country, 237, 250-1; pre- Verlaine, Paul (1844-96), 36
industrial, 35; president of, 103; Verona, NF visits, 191
and progress, 228; science in, 22; Veronese, 192
sex in, 215-19; social mythology of, Verse: and memory, 152
62; Southern agrarian movement Vice, the figure of, 116
in, 45; as Utopia, 197-8, 239, 253; in Vico, Giambattista (1668-1744), 230,
Vietnam, 282; violence in, 156-7; 312
war economy of, 244-5; world view Victims of violence, 164-5
of, 223; WPA in, 114 Victoria, Queen (1819-1901), corona-
University, 50; adult education in, 52; tion of, 262
and the artist, 55-6; and the arts, Victoria College, 175
127, 129; community of, 257, 281; Victorian age, 56; and the novel, 146
and contemporary culture, 58-9, Vietnam war, 13, 24; NF opposes, 282;
127; as counter-environment, 169, on television, 165-6
171; and democracy, 169; NF imag- Vigneault, Gilles (b. 1928), 54
ines, xlvii-xlviii; and social work, Villiers de 1'Isle-Adam, Auguste de,
274; teaching in, 59; and youth, Compte (1838-89), 46
51-2 Violence: as counter-communication,
University of Toronto, NF formed by, 137; defined, 157; and education,
xxiv-xxv 161; and television, 156-66
Unknown masterpiece, 39 Violin: and melody, 84
Unknown Soldier, 263 Vision, 128; human, 321; imaginative,
U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union 328
Urban sprawl, 20 Voltaire, Francois Marie Arouet
Utilitarians, 27 (1694-1778): A I'auteur du livre des
Utopia, xliii, 22, 23, 43, 57; and the trois imposteurs, 61
atomic bomb, 228; and Canada, 69- Vonnegut, Kurt (1922), 146
70; and the Depression, 286-7; hip- Vuillard, Edouard (1868-1940): 33
pies create, 292; illusion of, 253;
U.S. as, 197-8, 239 Wagner, (Wilhelm) Richard (1813-
83), 80, no, 212; endless melody,
Vaihinger, Hans (1852-1933): Theory 77; and Hitler, 90; influences The
of "As If" (1911), 66 Waste Land, 305; and opera, 74-5;
Valery, Paul (1871-1945), 38 Ring der Niebelungen (1876), 99
Van der Marck, Jan (b. 1929): War, 175-6, 199, 244-5; as auto-eroti-
"Museum Strategies: Sisyphus or cism, 177; and capitalism, 253; good
Lysistrata?" (1986), 171 of, 254; over if we want it, 296; as
Vaughan Williams, Ralph (1872- revolution, 291
1958), 86 Warner, Rex (1905-86): The Aerodrome
Venice, NF visits, 191-3 (1941), 213
Index 409