Final Masters Thesis C MCQ

中国传统文化对中华人民共和
国改革政策的影响
(申请清华大学国际关系硕士论文)
培养单位：社会科学学院
学科: 政治学
申请人：马凯龙
指导教师：赵可金副教授
二○一三年十二月
The Influence of Chinese Traditional
Thought on PRC’s Reform Policies: An
Investigation
Thesis Submitted to
Tsinghua University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of
Master of Laws
in
Political Science
by
Callum Knox McQueen
Thesis Supervisor : Professor Zhao Kejin
December,2013
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摘要
摘要
本篇论文基于中国古代哲学如何影响中国现代改革政策，研究方向源于当下硕
士专业课程的内容和精神相结合。中国的持续发展需要依靠传统道义并将其应
用于外交政策以及国家、文化的复兴中。尽管自中华人民共和国建立以来，发
生过社会和文化的剧变，但是中国古代哲学传统在中国民众生活中依旧有着微
妙却普遍的影响。
本篇论文旨在从一个社会自由主义的角度深入地探讨儒学中的“仁”与民
主公民权，以及道家思想中的“无为”与自由市场经济的相似性，其基本概念
的平行走向也可从古籍中明确得出。此论文横向讨论关于‘韬光养晦’政策，
国家认同，文化软实力，公民教育，法制与道德的一些问题，也提出先秦的哲
学家如庄子可能会如何看待这些问题。由于追溯中国传统思想在未来发展的地
位为是一个广大的研究课题，因此这篇论文参考和引用了许多国内外的学术性
期刊和具有权威性的书籍和电子材料。
此外，本研究还精心地进行了 25 次有针对性的采访和调查，参与者主要为
教授、研究生和商人。此调查综合显示孔子和老子在北京知识分子和商业社交
圈子里保有尊贵的地位。参与者都普遍认为中国有继续改革的必要，也对中国
新的领导们能否进行改革抱有比较自信的态度。
由于上文提及的概念平行走向和周围国家的范例，在此可以保守的假设，
经济现代化和公民意识发展的过程与继续弘扬和推进祖先文化精神的这两个优
先权不必存在矛盾。然而，为了同时达到这两个先决条件，领导们需要有长远
眼光、也应该发挥无为而治的睿智让内在潜力带动国家
关键词：老子无为；儒学仁和礼；庄子；自由市场；改革开放；民主公民权；韬光养晦，
为无为
I
Abstract
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Ancient

Chinese philosophy and concepts associated with China’s modern reforms, looking
forward. Despite social and cultural upheavals since the founding of the PRC, This
paper aims to draw parallels through a comparative analysis of Chinese and Western
philosophical concepts including Laotian Wuwei and free-market economics as well
as Confucian Ren and Democratic Citizenship. Careful analysis of ancient texts seems
to refute claims that Chinese culture lacks its own historical tradition to support the
transition towards a Chinese version of liberal democracy. Discussed with reference to
ancient sages including Zhuangzi are issues such as China’s low profile foreign
policy, national and cultural identity, China’s soft power, citizen education, morality
and law. Due to the breadth of related topics under investigation, a large number of
authoritative texts, scholarly journals and electronic sources of domestic and
international origin are referred to in text. A survey was conducted to draw upon the
views of 25 professors, students and businesspeople, with results showing some
continuing deference for ancient ideas, general consensus on the need for continuing
reform and some confidence that leaders will deliver this in the future.
The concluding chapters examine some of the challenges China is facing as it
pursues ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ toward a free-market economy and
democratic society. Due to conceptual parallels, and learning from the example of
other successfully reforming countries in the region, it appears China can continue on
its path of modernization at the same time as honoring the spirit of its ancestral
culture. However, this may require long-term thinking and visionary leadership at
different levels to safely negotiate the country through various upheavals.
Keywords: Taoist wuwei,, Free-market Economy, Confucian Ren & Li, Reform
&Opening up, low profile policy, soft power, national identity, Democratic
Citizenship，weiwuwei
II
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction....................................................................1
1.1 Perspectives...........................................................................................................1
1.2 Core Questions......................................................................................................2
1.3 Hypothesis.............................................................................................................2
1.4 Methodology...........................................................................................................3
1.5 Structure.................................................................................................................6
Chapter 2: Literature Review- Political philosophies of China’s
Ancient Sages.................................................................................9
2.1 Historical Background: The Zhou Dynasty.............................................................9
2.2 Pre-Qin Dynasty Schools of Thought...................................................................10
2.3 Key Concept ‘Dao’ （道）or ‘The Way’................................................................11
2.3.1 General Meanings................................................................................................ 11
2.3.2 Different kinds of Dao........................................................................................... 11
2.3.3 Origins of Dao....................................................................................................... 12
2.3.4 Pursuing Dao........................................................................................................ 12
2.4 Key Concept ‘De’ （德） or ‘virtue’.....................................................................13
2.5 Key Concept: The Heart/Mind (心).......................................................................14
2.6 Key Concept: Moral Education and Self-Cultivation............................................15
2.7 Key Concept: The Mandate of Heaven................................................................16
2.8 Early Chinese Administrative Systems and Debates...........................................17
2.8.1 The 3 departments and 6 ministries.....................................................................17
2.8.2 Salt and Iron debate............................................................................................. 18
2.9 Modern views from international sources on the role of Chinese culture in
China’s reform............................................................................................................19
2.9.1 The relevance of culture....................................................................................... 19
2.9.2 Chinese culture and political reform.....................................................................20
2.9.3 Chinese Culture and economic reform.................................................................21
2.9.4 Chinese Enterprise Management.........................................................................21
2.9.5 Post- Qin dynasty historical factors in China’s development trajectory.................22
2.9.6 Intellectual Battlegrounds....................................................................................24
2.10 Modern views from Chinese sources on the role of Chinese culture in China’s
reform.........................................................................................................................26
2.10.1 Taoism and economic reform.............................................................................26
2.10.2 Confucianism and Political Reform.....................................................................31
Chapter 3:Wuwei and ‘Invisible Hand’ of the Free-Market............34

Table of Contents
3.1 Conceptual Metaphors.........................................................................................34
3.2 Definitions of wuwei.............................................................................................34
3.3 The Invisible Hand...............................................................................................35
3.4 Free-Market economics in the Daodejing............................................................36
3.4.1 Effortless Action................................................................................................... 36
3.4.2 Intrinsically responsive market and ‘Pivot’ of The Way.........................................37
3.5 Wuwei as Market Equilibrium...............................................................................39
3.6. Relationship between Political and Economic Development..............................40
3.6.1 Packaging Reforms............................................................................................... 40
3.6.2 Political and Economic Origins of wuwei in China.................................................40
3.6.3 Western Views and Modern Examples of wuwei in China....................................42
3.7. Apparent Paradoxes of wuwei............................................................................43
3.8 ‘Weiwuwei’...........................................................................................................44
3.9 Why can Wuwei work today?...............................................................................45
3.10 Wuwei and China’s economic reform trajectory.................................................46
Chapter 4: Aspirational Confucianism and Educated Democracy.49

4.1 Confucius’s Aspirations........................................................................................49
4.1.1 Confucius the Democrat?..................................................................................... 49
4.1.2 Anti-authoritarian Confucius................................................................................50
4.1.3 Confucius and open debate.................................................................................. 50
4.1.4 Confucius on ‘Participating in Government’.........................................................51
4.1.5 Confucian Civility.................................................................................................. 51
4.1.6 Confucian concepts ‘Li’ and ‘Ren’.........................................................................52
4.2 ‘Li’ and the Rule of Law........................................................................................53
4.2.1 Definitions of Key Concepts..................................................................................53
4.2.2 ‘Li’ in a Rule-of-Law context..................................................................................54
4.3. Old and New Definitions of Citizenship...............................................................55
4.4 Ren and Citizenship.............................................................................................57
4.6 The Future of Political Confucianism in China.....................................................59
Chapter 5: Sustainability of Taoguangyanghui: How should China
relate to the world?.......................................................................62

5.1 Background to Taoguangyanghui........................................................................62
5.2 Defining Interests.................................................................................................63
5.3 Increasing calls for more assertive global policy.................................................64
5.4 Taoist and Confucian Foreign Policy....................................................................65
5.5 Informal vs. Formal Diplomacy............................................................................67
5.6 South-East Asia: China’s essential Backyard......................................................67
5.7 Overall Strategies for the future...........................................................................69
Chapter 6: Interview Results and Analysis....................................71

6.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................71
Table of Contents
6.1.1 Survey conducted by Tianjin Shi in 1993...............................................................71
6.1.2 Survey Background............................................................................................... 72
6.1.3 Interview Method and Respondents....................................................................74
6.2 Analysis of Responses.........................................................................................74
6.3 Anecdotal quotes..................................................................................................76
6.4 Conclusions..........................................................................................................78
Chapter 7: Policy Implications for China.......................................80

7.1 Taoism and Confucianism: Contradictions or Compromise?...............................80
7.2 Implications for Political and Economic Policies..................................................81
7.2.1 Incremental Reforms............................................................................................ 81
7.2.2 A new era of economic reforms: wuwei is The Way.............................................82
7.3 Implications for China’s Social and Cultural Policies...........................................83
7.3.1 Cultural Policy Implications................................................................................... 83
7.3.2 Intellectual-Common People Divide.....................................................................84
7.3.3 Official Status for Ancient Books...........................................................................86
7.3.4 Open Society and Meritocracy.............................................................................86
7.4 Nationalism and Racism......................................................................................87
7.5 Cross Cultural Communication............................................................................89
7.6 Education.............................................................................................................90
7.6.1 Citizenship Education...........................................................................................90
7.6.2 Education for a Creative China.............................................................................. 91
7.7 Parallelisms in History and Philosophy................................................................93
Chapter 8: Conclusions.................................................................95
8.1 The current situation............................................................................................95
8.2 Perspectives.........................................................................................................96
8.3 Benefits of Retaining Traditional Cultural Elements in Political System..............97
8.4 Leadership in China.............................................................................................99
8.4.1 Responsibilities of a Leader..................................................................................99
8.4.2 Challenging times ahead....................................................................................100
8.5 Social Philosophy Dilemma: To Depend on Morality or Law? Rule of Law or Rule
by People?...............................................................................................................101
8.6 Global consciousness and integration...............................................................103
8.7 Further Research...............................................................................................105
8.8 Predictions.........................................................................................................106
Acknowledgements:.................................................................................................109
REFERENCES............................................................................110
Appendices.................................................................................119
Appendix 1: Model for Effective Cross-Cultural communication:.................................119
Appendix 2a) and 2b): Free Market equilibrium and ‘The way of Heaven’..................120
Appendix 3: Benefits of a Wu-wei Approach to Education:.........................................121
Table of Contents
Appendix 4: Public-Private Land distribution during Zhou dynasty..............................121
Appendix 5: Ancient Cultural forms of related Chinese characters:.............................122
Appendix 6: Wittgenstein’s ‘duckrabbit’- Illustrates cognitive factors in perception....126
Appendix 7: Chart of the Evolution of wowed and the Libaniusian model..................127
Appendix 8: Advantages and Disadvantages of maintaining taoguangyanghui strategy:
.................................................................................................................................... 127
Appendix 9: Interview Questions................................................................................128
Appendix 10: Statistical Analysis of Interview Results.................................................130
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Perspectives
Studying International Relations involves analyzing the ‘bigger picture’ perspective on

world affairs in relation to worldly day-to-day practical events. It implies an attempt to
understand the subtle movements of contradictory forces and the role not only of
politics, but of culture, religion, geography and other factors. As Essential Readings in
Comparative Politics states ‘speculation is the soul of the social sciences’①. As Stanley
Hoffman states, ‘Students of international relations face two missions. They must try to
understand what goes on by taking an inventory of current goods and disentangling the
threads of present networks. But the fear of confusing the empirical with the normative
should not prevent them from writing as political philosophers at a time when many
philosophers are extending their conceptions of just society to international relations’ ②.
For example, while information technologies are currently allowing national
governments to increase monitoring and control of their citizens, transnational crime
groups are using the same technologies to expand networks to allow them to undermine
the sovereignty of nation-states. The interdependent world system we live in is
transforming at a very rapid rate, with the Chinese polity and population widely
acknowledged as making a major, potentially decisive contribution. Greater flux and
upheaval in the future is also expected by many. Amid this context and as a person who
has travelled, lived and worked in a total of 28 countries (mostly in Asia), I see the
world of International Relations not as a world of abstract theories (though these may
facilitate understanding), but as a world made up of human beings whose identities are
constantly, even sub-consciously, shaped by the cultural, historical, philosophical and
religious environment that surrounds them. Cultural factors also shape peoples self-
identity which becomes the lens determining how people go about satisfying their basic
economic needs. As Lawrence E. Harrison quoted in his introduction to the authoritative
book, Culture Matters ‘Culture is the mother, institutions are the children’ ③. Thus while
avoiding cultural determinism, inquisitive students should learn to understand the
processes through which people’s perceptions are formed and identify major factors at
work in different cultural environments. Chinese culture being a world-shaping
phenomenon, especially in the context of China’s global rise and associated reforms, I
therefore chose a combination of these topics for further study.
①
Patrick O’Neil & Ronald Rogowski (eds.), Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, p.11
②
Ibid, p.441
③
Lawrence. E. Harrison and Samuel. P. Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress,
p.xxviii
The purpose of this paper is to explore the topic of the role of Chinese culture in
China’s reform process and to attempt a comparative analysis of two concepts from
China’s ancient culture with two concepts conventionally considered essential to the
process of modernization. Further, I wish to make some observations on the
philosophical implications of such linkages and offer some predictions regarding their
potential to play an influential role in shaping China’s future development process.
1.2 Core Questions
The core questions I’m seeking to answer include

 What implications do the parallels between Chinese traditional thinking, democratic
ideals and modern economic success have for future indigenous political/economic
reform policies of China?
 In particular, how can Laozi’s concept of ‘wuwei’ be compared to classical theories
of free-market economics (i.e. ‘invisible hand’)?
 And how can Confucian concepts of ‘ren’ and ‘li’ are compared to theories of
democratization and the rule of law? How can his idea of social harmony help
promote ‘educated democracy’ in China?
 What other predictions might be made for China’s future reform based upon her
cultural and historical record?
1.3 Hypothesis
Presumptions and predictions established before undertaking this study include:

 Economic growth in China is increasing people’s expectations in terms of
governance procedures and prompting their considered reflection on issues of
identity, community and trust.
 Due to the many social and political upheavals experienced in China since the
latter part of the 20th century, and to the rapid rate of economic growth experienced
since 1978, there are many possible scenarios in terms of the direction that China’s
future will take, but it‘s almost certain that China’s traditional culture will continue
to play a larger and larger role.
 The international environment that affects China has been shaped by successive
waves of democratization, with principles universal suffrage, once established,
extremely difficult to reverse (see appendix 1 and 2). Free trade and open markets
have also become key principles in international affairs, supported by important
interest groups and contributing to economic development that brings poverty
alleviation and new economic opportunities around the world according to the
principle of ‘comparative advantage’.
 Due to cultural and philosophical exchange over the millennia, e.g. along the Silk
Road to Rome during the Han dynasty and following the epic voyages of Chinese
Admiral Zheng He, and including Chinese cultural influences that entered Europe
prior to and during the renaissance, there is bound to be some similar features in
economic and political philosophy which can be explored for the purpose of
building new syntheses.
 An open-minded interpretation of important Chinese cultural norms in light of
those well-established concepts of democracy and economic liberalism is likely to
be able to identity parallels and common concepts that may emerge as a healthy
compromise between competing economic and political philosophies in the 21st
Century.
 Dialogue and open discussion is essential to allowing new philosophical syntheses
to emerge and thereby assisting in the alleviation of growing contradictions and
reducing the potential for destructive conflict.
1.4 Methodology
This paper relies on a method beginning with extensive background research on the
topic of Chinese culture and China’s reform via printed texts, scholarly articles and
internet resources. At the same time, the academic literature assigned and studied as
part of the one year of coursework undertaken during the first part of this master’s
degree in 2011-2012 was drawn upon more deeply. Also, the Autumn semester of 2012
class of the Law School of Tsinghua University called ‘Yellow Emperor Anti-Entropic
Rule of Law and Principle’ which explored themes from ancient (and more recent)
Chinese history in the context of China’s legal and governance reforms, was a relevant
field of study. This was followed by more focused readings of core texts relating to the
teachings of Confucius, Laozi, and other sages, as well as texts such as The Zhuangzi
and texts dealing with Chinese culture from a western perspective. I sought out
references to specific concepts like ‘wuwei’, ‘li’ and ‘ren’.
The most important single text I’ve referred to regarding wuwei, written by
Edward Slingerland, is Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual
Ideal in Early China. This appears to be the only extant book published in English
written specially on the topic of wuwei. The text by Phillip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van
Norden (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, was highly useful as a
concise and authoritative coverage of most of the major thinkers of the Pre-Qin period
and their philosophies. Thomas Cleary’s two works- The Essential Confucius and The
Essential Tao were also key texts in interpreting the Chinese classics. Geling Shan’s
work Zhuangzi: Dancing with the World is a important for its elucidation of the concept
tong ( 通 ) or ‘through-ness’. I’ve also researched the influence of Eastern, especially
Confucian thought on the Enlightenment which began in Europe in the 16 th and 17th
centuries. J.J Clarke’s Oriental Enlightenment was a rich source of material on that
subject. On the subject of Democratization in Confucian Societies, Robert P. Weller
(Alternate Civilities), as well as Francis Fukayama and the Australian A.T Nuyen’s
papers on the topic of conceptual sharing between Confucianism and Democracy were
also useful and insightful reference materials①.
As regards political reform and democratization in China, Yu Keping (Director,
China center for comparative Politics and Economics)②, Yu Liu and Dingding Chen’s③
well-argued and evidenced articles helped me to extrapolate current trends into future
predictions. On economic reform and growth in China and its relationship to free-
market economics, Huang Yasheng’s analysis of the role of Town and Village
Enterprises (TVE’s) also contained significant historical observations. I’ve also looked
upon the social philosophy of Charles Taylor, Soren Kierkegaard, Tim
Soutphommasane, Max Weber and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Daniel
Bell, professor here at Tsinghua University has also published several important books
comparing and contrasting Western and Asian norms (East Meets West: Human Rights
and Democracy in East Asia) and (along with Jiang Qing) exploring possible methods
of successfully integrating more democratic elements and procedures into the mainland
Chinese polity (China’s New Confucianism). Many other scholarly journals were also
referred to on the topics of citizenship, cultural identity, nationalism, public protest and
soft power. It is assumed that the influence of China’s traditional culture on her reform
policies travel through at least two channels (1) via the personal choices of leading
policy makers whom favor policies in-line with cultural and historical norms and (2) In
response to the demands and expectations of average citizens.
Throughout the period of research, the writer’s basic fluency in Chinese language
was used to search for Chinese source materials, especially when none is available in
English, and communicated with many local Chinese people from various walks of life,
asking for their views on Chinese traditional culture and expectations for the future.
During the second half of my thesis year formal interviews with various associates
including students, businesspeople, professors and civil servants were conducted. The
format of the interview was relatively open, applying the qualitative research method
with the aim of encouraging participants to elaborate openly on personal views and
experiences broadly related to the subject matter. Quantitative elements were integrated
by asking respondents to answer multiple choice questions about their expectations for
future reform and the relative importance of problems and issues related to
development. Most interviews (including all those interviews conducted in Chinese)
were recorded on an mp3 device for later review and consideration. Approximately half
of these interviews were conducted in the form of remote surveys, with participants
responding to questions in written form via email. All questions were written in both
English and Chinese and participants were given the option of responding in either
language. Some chose a combination of both. In conducting these interviews best-
①
A.T Nuyen, Confucianism and the Idea of Citizenship, Asian Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2002
②
Yu Keping, Democracy in China: Challenge or Opportunity? from:
http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/democracyinchina.pdf
③
Yu Liu and Dingding Chen, Why China Will Democratize, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2012
practice procedure were attempted to be followed in terms of not giving any sign of
personal preferences when asking questions, simply nodding and waiting for
interviewees to elaborate their own ideas. It’s possible, as one professor pointed out, that
the nature of the questions themselves may have pre-disposed respondents toward a
certain kind of answer, but the writer is confident that, after observing people’s differing
reactions to the questions and their diversity of responses, that if there was any
prejudicial effect at all, it was only minimal at best.
The final stage in compiling this paper was to selectively bring sources together,
attempting to identify the most important core issues for China’s future development
and how these may be affected by traditional Chinese culture. In doing so, I’ve had to
acknowledge that the national culture of no country, China included, is pre-fixed but
rather is constantly evolving and it is such evolution which also gives the opportunity
for renewal. So, in these final stages I’ve sought to imagine a reconciliation of the old
and the new, as well as the domestic and international factors that are shaping China and
will continue to shape her in the future. As a guest in China it is my duty to be
respectful and objective, but I also have had to remind myself of where I come from and
the values I necessarily bring along to the table as part of that.
1.5 Structure
This paper, in progressing from generality to specifics, begins with a literature

review (Chapter 2) describing key cultural concepts from Chinese history, focusing on
the Pre-Qin Dynasty period when most of the major schools of Chinese philosophical
thought (prominently among them Confucianism and Daoism) emerged, and briefly
examining how some of these concepts are interpreted in today’s economic and political
world. Among the competing schools of thought, certain key concepts can be traced that
appear to point towards an even more ancient tradition that was most probably passed
down orally among a select few of adherents (e.g. imperial librarians). This seeks to
elaborate upon the meaning and function of those concepts and some of the schools of
thought that helped spread them, before turning to the general topic of the path of
education and self-cultivation which all those schools advocated in different forms and
apparent paradoxes therein. Finally, matters related to practical concerns of governance
are addressed, including the principles of imperial succession (Mandate of Heaven) and
the general structure and various responsibilities assigned to different departments of
traditional administrative systems that arose during the Han Dynasty following the
‘golden age’ of the ‘hundred schools contend’ and then the purges of the short-lived Qin
Dynasty.
Chapters 3 and 4 belong to the category of literature review. Chapter 3 examines
theoretical linkages between the wuwei concept which is fundamental to many Pre-Qin
teachings and the more modern concept of free-market economics which was first given
currency by Adam Smith and elaborated upon during the 20th Century by Frederick Von
Hayek. In making this comparison, I draw most extensively from the Daodejing, but
also make use of other sources such as the Zhuangzi. Modern political economy is a
complex and broad field which is highly contested, so I’ve attempted to simplify by
restricting the material covered to only classic definitions of market economics and
associated principles such as demand and supply, market equilibrium, comparative
advantage etc. Where appropriate I’ve also made use of several more recent concepts
such as ‘moral hazard’. In the context of China’s reform program, I examine the relative
efficacy of economic reforms, with particular reference to the enabling growth reforms
of the 1980’s such as Town and Village Enterprises and the Household Responsibility
System. The final part of this chapter contains an analysis applying the ‘weiwuwei’
concept to China’s current international political and economic environment to raise the
question of what benevolent justification there may be for continued government
interference in China’s economy.
Chapter 4 shifts to the question of links between Confucianism and Democratic
norms. These are broken down into Confucian concepts ‘li’ and ‘ren’ and their
corresponding relationships to the concepts of Rule of Law (including electoral
procedures) and Democratic Citizenship. Quotes are taken from The Analects of
Confucius to argue that, according to an aspirational interpretation of Confucius, and
with an understanding of the limitations of the times in which he lived, there’s strong
evidence to suggest that if he was placed in the circumstances of today, he would see
democratizing changes as the right way to go for China’s future polity. Further evidence
for the compatibility of Confucianism and Democracy is found from the evidence of
Confucian influence on the thinking of prominent philosophes in Europe prior to the
French Revolution. The last part of this chapter takes the example of successful
democratization in Taiwan and other Asian polity’s to reinforce the harmony of concepts
and aspirations when democracy arrives in Confucian societies. In this chapter I also
make an assessment of the so-called ‘Yu-Dan Phenomenon’ and what it might be able to
tell us about social divisions in Chinese society today and possible future directions of
public interaction with the ideas of Confucius.
Chapter 5, added after feedback from a number of professors, moves on to the
question China’s Taoguangyanghui Foreign Policy principle and its traditional culture.
Placing this question in the context of the international environment and China’s foreign
policy record since the establishment of the PRC, I examine China’s relations with
several key countries from the key region of South-East Asia, before attempting to
assess the relative efficacy of the taoguangyanghui principle and whether it should, on
balance, be maintained into the future.
Chapter 6 is dedicated to analysis of my interview results. Key issues that were
commonly raised by participants are examined and their general perspectives reviewed,
with specific examinations reserved for some of the more interesting and controversial
comments made. Statistical evidence provided after compilation of the data show a
relatively optimistic view of China’s future was common among respondents, but this
optimism was tempered by caution due to the relative unpredictability of the precise
nature of future reforms.
Chapter 7 deals with policy recommendations in the field of education, religion

and philosophy, culture, media and offers some general warnings about possible
dangerous social trends. Specifically this chapter draws upon the social philosophy of
Habermas. It further addresses cross-cultural communication policies, nationalism and
racism and puts forward an alternative theory of cross-cultural communication to avoid
criticisms based on ‘paternalism’ and cultural chauvinism.
The concluding chapter 8 attempts to tie together all the strands that were woven in
the preceding chapters to present a coherent picture of these major cultural factors and
their influence on China’s ongoing development. The question of what kinds of reform
formulations may be most suitable in the economic and political, as well as social,
educational and other arena’s are raised and addressed briefly. Finally the writer present
predictions based not only on this research but also four years of living and travelling in
China, surveying the atmosphere and talking to Chinese people about the cultural, social
and political issues that affect their lives.
Chapter 2: Literature Review- Political philosophies of China’s Ancient Sages
Chapter 2: Literature Review- Political philosophies of

China’s Ancient Sages
2.1 Historical Background: The Zhou Dynasty
The Zhou dynasty, which unleashed a flourishing of new schools of thought, was
an internationalist one, it saw no limits to the potential for wise sage rulers to extend
their domains over new lands and people, and the competition between states at that
time spurned the emergence of new thoughts and governance strategies as clever people
competed to advise the rulers of states on methods of securing and expanding their
domains. Confucius once said “The Zhou Dynasty took its lessons from the Xia and Yin
(dynasties preceding it), resulting in a highly civilized culture. I follow Zhou.” ① The
governing method which Confucius put forward to renew the Zhou involved seeing the
world as one community(tianxiaweigong 天下为公).
The Eastern Zhou Dynasty was the golden age of Chinese philosophy:
One Hundred Schools of Thought flourished as rival lords and rulers patronized
traveling scholars who studied at private institutions like Qi's Jixia Academy. Nine
Schools emerged ahead of the others, including Confucianism (as interpreted
by Mencius etc.), Taoism, Mohism, Legalism, Agriculturalism, Diplomatists, Logicians,
Militarists (e.g. Sun Tzu) and Naturalists (e.g. Yang Zhu). The first three of these
schools went on to receive imperial patronage in later dynasties, meanwhile doctrines
from each mutually influenced each other and Chinese society in a multitude of ways ②.
The Zhou dynasty also witnessed the height of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the
Iron Age in China, as well as advances in sea navigation made possible by detailed
knowledge of astronomical patterns.
2.2 Pre-Qin Dynasty Schools of Thought
During this Pre-Qin era, a great flourishing of philosophical thought occurred

amidst an atmosphere of relatively free and open debate, intellectual discourse
developed richly, while the world of ideas was fiercely competitive and curious people
chose in large numbers to study under various masters, according to their personal
appeal and the persuasiveness of their arguments. This tradition, carried out at
institutions like the Jixi academy, led to the ‘formal’ establishment, categorization and
①
The Analects (3:15), quoted in Thomas Cleary, The Essential Confucius, p.67
②
Ebrey, Patricia Buckley; Walthall, Anne; Palais, James B. (2006), East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History
literal elucidation of the belief systems we call ‘Chinese culture’. The spread of these
teachings was facilitated by the unification of China in 221 BC, and since then these
ideas have been an important motivating factor for Chinese people and officials, and a
source of ‘soft power’ in China’s relations with the world. They have helped facilitate
the maintenance and sustainability of China as a unified and potent political force for
the past two thousand years and more. The influence of the Confucian school also led to
the establishment of a meritocratic system of competitive examinations inaugurated in
165BC①. Other developments in Chinese politics, art, as well as social and economic
life were also undoubtedly influenced by the freshly created literal paradigms of
Confucianism, Mohism, Taoism, and Naturalism. A well-known philosopher from that
period is Zhuangzi. According to some American academics, ‘If all the Chinese poets,
painters and writers where queried and asked to name one book of their favorite
reading, the nomination would certainly go to Chuang Tzu’ ②. Records state that
Zhuangzi worked as a small businessman making shoes and refused to enter the
government service. Due to the relative historical remoteness of this period, it should be
noted that there remains contention over original patrimony and precise chronological
development of ideas. New archaeological discoveries are to this day continually
shedding light on our understanding of that period.
2.3 Key Concept ‘Dao’ （道）or ‘The Way’
2.3.1 General Meanings
In Chinese philosophy, ‘Dao’ is a fundamental concept signifying the correct or

divine way. It has numerous meanings depending on the context used. The
Chinese Hanyu Da Zidian dictionary defines thirty nine meanings for dào 道 as in way
or path and six for dǎo 道 i.e. to guide or lead"③ Dao is used symbolically in the sense
of 'way' as the 'right' or 'proper' way of existence, or to mean continual practices of
spiritual attainment or ‘coming into being’. It can even mean a state of enlightenment or
spiritual perfection reached as the outcome of such practices. It can be used more
loosely to mean 'doctrine' or 'principle', or even the verb ‘to speak’.
①
DerkBodde, Chinese Ideas in the West, 2005 Columbia University
②
Geling Shan, Zhuangzi: Dancing with the World, back cover
③
Hanyu Da Zidian 漢語大字典 (1989), pp. 3864–3866
2.3.2 Different kinds of Dao
‘There are many paths to the summit’ is one saying which has relation to Dao and
the path of spiritual attainment. In Confucianism, dao signifies a morally correct path of
behavioral refinement. The Dao, or Way, of Confucius may be described as 'Truth'.
References from Confucius in The Analects include, 'In guiding a state of a thousand
chariots, approach your duties with reverence and be trustworthy in speech’, and also
'Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will
stay out of trouble but have no sense of shame.’ In Daoism, Dao is more all-
encompassing, including the ever-changing natural environment and associated
underlying principle (Absolute Dao) which can be only intuitively, not literally
understood. Taoists view life and death as phases of Absolute Dao and advocate living
in a way closer to conformity with essential nature. ①Religious Taoism and
Confucianism also use explicitly moral/ethical arguments regarding proper behavior②.
2.3.3 Origins of Dao
Tao as a metaphysical concept originated with Laozi, and is associated with the

teachings belonging to the ‘Huang-Lao’( 黄老 ) tradition and the ‘Kingly Way’ ( 王
道）later giving rise to a religion (daojiao 道教) and philosophy (daojia 道家) which
together have one name in English- Taoism. LAozi explains in the Daodejing that Dao
isn’t a 'thing' but rather the ‘primordial essence’ or natural order of the universe. This
idea of Dao was later adopted in Confucianism and Buddhism throughout East Asia.
Dao is thus "eternally nameless”③, distinguishable from countless 'named' things
considered its manifestations. In Taoism, Confucianism, and Chinese Buddhism, the
purpose of spiritual practice is 'becoming one with the dao' or harmonizing one's will
with Nature to achieve 'effortless action' (wuwei). Achieving this level requires
meditation techniques and moral practices that facilitate the accumulation of De (see
next section).
2.3.4 Pursuing Dao
Although it cannot be described, practitioners believe that Dao can be known or

experienced intuitively, and its principles (discerned from Nature) can be followed or
practiced. Tao is connected with concepts of yin and yang, where every action
①
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/dao
②
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tao
③
Thomas Cleary, The Essential Tao, p.29
inevitably creates counter-actions (similar to Newton’s number three law of motion) as

manifestations of Tao, and practice usually involves accepting, conforming to or
working with these natural developments. Dao is a Chinese concept that differs
importantly from western (Aristotelian) outlooks. Rather than being static and atomized,
it’s an active and holistic conception of Nature. The way of heaven can be seen to be
ruthless i.e. ‘no leaf is spared because of its beauty, no flower because of its fragrance’
when autumn comes. The Way of Man implies procreation, and certain Taoist sexual
practices are similar to tantric schools in India. In the sense of being ‘the way the
universe works’, Dao can be considered something akin to ‘God’ in the abstract and
philosophical sense.① Fu-kuei-tzu says “the only resort is the existence of the Way that
is its own basis and its own root’ ②. This ‘root’ represents an ‘original cause’ that can
hardly be avoided in any comprehensive analysis of worldly affairs.
2.4 Key Concept ‘De’ （德） or ‘virtue’
De is often translated as "inherent character; inner power; integrity", in Taoism as

"moral character; virtue; morality", while in Confucianism and other contexts it means
"quality; virtue" or "merit; virtuous deeds". According to Arthur Wiley, ‘It means, so to
speak, the stock of credit at any moment that a man has at the bank of fortune. Such a
stock is of course built-up partly by the correct carrying out of ritual; but primarily by
securing favorable omens’③. The Linguist Peter A. Bloomberg writes mysteriously ‘the
term originated in the mytho-magical period when te as conceived as a kind of manna-
like potency in substances, things, and human beings that made them true to their
essence and allowed them to influence other entities. It was imagined as a kind of
permeating electric charge, waxing or waning in accordance with some mysterious law,
and capable of being transmitted from one generation to another.’④
De’s importance to Confucianism is illustrated by it occurring forty times in The
Analects. For example, Confucius said: "He who exercises government by means of his
virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars
turn towards it."⑤Later in the Analects it is stated "The virtuous will certainly have
something to say, but those who have something to say are not necessarily virtuous” ⑥
Both Mencius and Confucius made the following statement about a person universally
lauded but whose virtue is fake- "The 'conventional townsman' is a thief of virtue." ⑦One
should also the following actions which cause a loss in virtue 1) "To apprehend the Tao
①
Arthur Waley,The way and its power: a study of the Dao De Jing and its place in Chinese thought (Grove Press,
1958)
②
③
Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao TeChing and its Place in Chinese Thought, 1958
④
Selected Works of Peter A. Boodberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 26-40
⑤
The Analects(2:1)
⑥
Ibid (14.5)
⑦
Ibid (17:13) and Mencius (7B:37)
and lecture on it before actualization is to throw away your accumulation of virtue." ①

and 2) "Having virtue and not cultivating it; studying and not sifting; hearing what is
just and not following; not being able to change wrongdoing: these are the things that
make me uncomfortable."②
The Zhongyong ( 中庸 ) or Doctrine of the Mean, another classic Confucian text,
cites de often as well, calling upon it twenty two times, but another sage, Zhuangzi uses
de the most (in a longer book), 191 times. Of these references, many praise Daoist
‘integrity’ or ‘inner power’, while some mock Confucianist and Mohist "virtue" in its
more contrived sense. Warnings are offered in texts against those who would steal
virtue, known as daozhizei ( 道之贼 ), who can be identified when none dare oppose
them. De was central in Daoist cosmology, and the Zhuangzi frequently equates it
with dao (道) "the Way" and tian (天) or "heaven". Chapter 12 - "Heaven and Earth",
illustrates an enigmatic Zhuangzian theory of the universe:
“In the Great Beginning, there was nonbeing; there was no being, no name. Out of
it arose one; there was one, but it had no form. Things got hold of it and came to life,
and it was called Virtue…Out of the flow and flux, things were born, and as they grew
they developed distinctive shapes; these were called forms…each with its own
characteristics and limitations, and this was called the inborn nature. If the nature is
trained, you may return to Virtue, and Virtue at its highest peak is identical with the
Beginning. Being identical, you will be empty; being empty, you will be great... This is
called Dark Virtue. Rude and unwitting, you take part in the Great
Submission”③...”Moving among the ten thousand things- this is Virtue...Superiors
governing the men below them: that is called administration. Ability finding trained
expression: that is called skill. Skill is subsumed in administration; administration in
duty; duty in Virtue; Virtue in the Way; and the Way in Heaven. Therefore it is said,
those who shepherded the world in ancient times were without desire and the world was
satisfied, without action and the ten thousand things were transformed".④
2.5 Key Concept: The Heart/Mind (心)
In the Book of Poetry, the earliest collection of Chinese folk and royal songs, heart
(xin) is situated at the center of emotions and sentiments, expressing grief, sorrow,
disappointment, or tranquility and calm. Elsewhere in the same text, xin functions as the
source of intellect and understanding. It is seen as so important that Benjamin I.
Schwartz remarks: “The very fact that heart is itself the center of will, emotion, desire,
and intellect (both “rational” and intuitive) means that it will itself become the center of
much contention in all the discussion concerning the relationship among all these
①
The Analects (17:14)
②
The Analects (7:3)
③
Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Columbia University Press, 1968, Ch.12, p.125
④
Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Columbia University Press, 1968, Ch.12, p.126-7
‘faculties’.”① Although heart/mind is not greatly elaborated upon in The Analects of

Confucius, it subsequently gained currency during the Warring States period, with
contrasting formulations of the role of heart/mind emerging from sages such as
Mencius, Xunzi and Zhuangzi. It is highly developed by Mencius, for whom one’s xin
can be seen as dependent upon one’s quid or essence.②
2.6 Key Concept: Moral Education and Self-Cultivation
In traditional Chinese Philosophy, the student was involved in an ‘active’ form of

learning such as that the distinction may be made between ‘studying’ (the Western
method) and ‘doing’ philosophy (the Chinese method)③ . Nowadays the distinction is
not as clear-cut, due to mutual influences- especially Western influences on Chinese
education. But in ancient times emphasis in Chinese philosophy was on Self-
Cultivation. This process- if properly pursued- was supposed to help the student to
transcend the conventional subjective/objective divide④. Confucius, for example,
emphasized the need for study and thinking to go together, saying that one without the
other was pointless. In more enigmatic teachings of Mencius and Zhuangzi, something
akin to genuine ‘objectivity’ (not its pretense) can be reached through a (sometimes
protracted) internal engagement with the subjective via internal self-exploration and
examination. Mozi and Xunzi’s teachings are generally more dependent on external
measures. But, as Edward Slingerland points out, even the more ‘externalist’
philosophers such as Mozi and Xunzi feel the need to appropriate ‘internalist’
metaphors to supplements their arguments. Although it is also true that the more
‘internalist’ sages also feel the need to supplement their arguments with ‘externalist’
metaphors. Despite these efforts, a number of basic apparent paradoxes remain, such as
the tension between sudden realization and gradual accumulation of learning. Mencius
(seen as an inspiration for China’s foreign policy) is the most hopeful sage because he
feels that virtually everyone can be saved if they only get in touch with their innate
goodness. Self-cultivation in the Confucian tradition is pursued not ultimately for
personal benefit, but for ordering the world and thereby helping to save others. ⑤ This is
reiterated in the Daodejing.⑥
①
Schwartz, Benjamin I. 1985. The World of Thought in Ancient China, p.185
②
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-wei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.154-5
③
Stephen C. Angle, Chinese Philosophers and Global Philosophy, Wesleyan University, Sept 2005
④
⑤
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.66
⑥
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p. 107
2.7 Key Concept: The Mandate of Heaven
Tianming, or ‘The Mandate of Heaven’, became an important source of legitimacy

for rulers beginning with the Zhou Dynasty and also a check on their behavior. It
include four mains principles; The right to rule China is granted by Heaven, There can
be only one legitimate ruler of China, The right to rule is based on the virtue of the ruler
and his performance as a steward for Heaven, The right to rule may be passed down
from father to son (subject to the other three conditions). These principles mean rulers
have incentives to invest in the well-being of subjects. It also means that rulers fear
rebellion, either because they believe in active intervention from Heaven, or because
they know that mis-rule will justify those who would attempt to overthrow them. Once
the Mandate is lost, the will of Heaven with regards to a successor will be determined
only through the workings of imponderable forces of human history.
One of China’s oldest books, The Book of Odes (also known as the Book of Songs),
dating between 1000-600BC states, "Before the rulers of the Yin (Shang) dynasty lost
the support of the people, they could have been counterparts of Heaven. Take heed of
the Yin dynasty. It’s not easy to keep the Mandate of Heaven." ① This story exemplifies
the core principle of the mandate of Heaven concept- that is-when rulers maintain
the support of the people, they are able to keep control of the country, but if and when
they lose the support of the people, they will definitely lose the country as well. To
inspire loyalty among his subjects, the ruler must first be watchful over his own virtue. I
he builds up and stores his virtue, he’ll bring the people with him. Then, if he has the
people with him, he can have the territory. And if he has the territory, he has access to
its wealth for whatever he sees fit. Virtue is the root cause, while wealth is the branch
result. If a ruler gets this (virtue) cause and (legitimacy) effect pattern mixed up, this
will create disaster and he’ll compete with the people in thieving from each other. On
economic matters it was said that if wealth accumulates in the ruler's hand, people
will scatter away; but if wealth is scattered among the people, they’ll gather round the
ruler. In the "Announcement of K'ang" it is said, "The Mandate of Heaven is not fixed
or unchangeable." The good ruler gets it and the bad ruler loses it②.
2.8 Early Chinese Administrative Systems and Debates
2.8.1 The 3 departments and 6 ministries
After the establishment of the Qin dynasty, the government of China was
①
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/classic_of_odes_king_wen.pdf
②
http://www.rjbaker.com/RJBDup/great_learning.htm
administered under a ‘3 lords and 9 ministries’ system. Then, after the Western Han
dynasty, a structure consisting of ‘3 departments and 6 ministries’ was brought into
effect. The three departments were the Secretariat ( 中書省 ), the Department of State
Affairs (尚書省), and the Chancellery (門下省), while the six ministries referred to the
Ministry for Personnel (吏部, appointments, merit ratings, promotions, and demotions
of officials), Revenue (戶部, gathering census data, collecting taxes, and handling state
revenues), Rites (禮部, state ceremonies, rituals, sacrifices, priestly registers, reception
of envoys and imperial examinations①), Works (工部, government construction projects
and hiring of artisans and laborers), Justice (刑部, judicial and penal processes) and War
( 兵部 ,issuing of military ranks, maintenance of military facilities, equipment, and
weapons). Meanwhile, beneath each ministry were many "Sī" (司), bodies in charge of
administering matters at the grass-roots level②. From this we can see that in those times,
a number of the responsibilities taken up by governments today, such as education and
health, were left to people’s private concerns, thereby also reducing the tax burden. We
may speculate that few of the ancient sages would have advocated government taking
on a management role in such concerns- even though many of them emphasized the
importance of education and good health- it appears that it simply did not occur to the
sages in the context of historical events that setting up state structures to administer
those areas would have desirable results.
2.8.2 Salt and Iron debate
During the course of Chinese civilization, a great variety of political and economic
policy formulations have been pursued by various leaders, with mixed results. During
Chinese history, debates on political strategy weren’t couched in terms of left vs. right
wing paradigms as they are often today. Rather, debates tended to be viewed in terms of
the specific political exigencies of the era in question, with reference to historic
precedents. Although debates in ancient times were apparently less ideological than
today, policies were still sometimes taken to extremes (as a result of poor leadership),
thereby resulting in suffering among the people and subsequent threats to the
sustainability of the ruling dynasty. An early debate, which took place in the court of the
Western Han Emperor Zhao in 81 BCE, exemplifies the policy positions and
justifications taken by scholars and government interest groups in relation to the
question of organized interference in the economy.
Also known as the ‘Discourses on Salt and Iron’, the Salt and Iron Debate is an
intriguing early debate between advocates of government economic intervention and
those favoring more free markets, similar in some ways to debates between liberals and
statists that still frequently occur today. During the debate, interestingly it was the
‘literati’, made up of around 60 Confucian reformists, who favored the historical
①
Robert P. Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan, p.26
②
Li, Konghuai (2007). History of Administrative Systems in Ancient China (in Chinese)
‘wuwei’ approach to economic governance①, while the ‘modernists’ or ‘legalists’-

represented by officials in charge of the treasury - sought to maintain the interventionist
policies that had been introduced by the previous Emperor Wu. The debate, structured
formally around statements and rebuttals, extended for over two days and a broad range
of learning and argumentative techniques were employed by both sides. The most
important of the policies being debated were the state monopolies on iron and
salt.②These policies as well as liquor, transportation and retail monopolies, were
established to fund wars with the Xiongu, a confederation of nomadic tribes from
Central Asia③. Confucian debaters held a familial, egalitarian, empathetic view toward
‘the Xiongnu other’- even calling them brothers. They argued that the domestic costs of
the interventionist policy in terms of corruption among merchants and officials, and the
adverse impact on people’s livelihoods associated with market distortion were
unjustifiable. These scholars were confident in the power of ritual to transcend ethnic
differences and transform even their enemies. In contrast, the officials harbored an
ethnocentric view toward non-Han people (even portraying them as irrational
animals④), and argued that fund-raising through government monopolies was necessary
to counter the existential threat presented by these nomadic neighboring tribes.
The debate is a reminder that no matter how much public life has seemed to
change over the centuries, many of the issues surrounding people’s lives are the same.
Debates with themes of external threats, vested interest groups and rhetorical tricks very
similar to this one still happen every day around the world. It’s also an early indication
of the widespread support among learned scholars for a ‘wuwei’ approach to economics
which is seen to be more beneficial to the people, more in line with the prescriptions of
li(ritual) and more equitable in the long-term.
2.9 Modern views from international sources on the role of
Chinese culture in China’s reform
2.9.1 The relevance of culture
‘Culture is difficult to deal with both politically and emotionally. It is also difficult to
①
Wagner, Donald B. (2001). The State and the Iron Industry in Han China. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian
Studies Publishing
②
Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition,, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), p. 360-363
③
Xiaoye You, Building Empire through Argumentation: Debating Salt and Iron in Western Han
China, College English, Volume 72, Number 4, March 2010
④
Ibid, p.376
deal with intellectually because there are problems of definition and measurement and
because cause-and-effect relationships between culture and other variables like policies,
institutions, and economic development run in both directions’ ①. David Landes, writing
in the text Culture Matters (chapter 1) says ‘respect the altar of every belief… to bring
them without their religion is to bring them without the agent that makes them what
they are’②. Later in the same book (chapter 8), Francis Fukayama, writing about social
capital, explains that ‘Culture helps people distinguish cooperators from cheaters, as
well as in transmitting behavioral rules that make action within a community more
predictable.’③A classic text on the role of culture in politics, Democracy in America by
Alexis De Tocqueville, is known for emphasizing culture, or, “habits of the heart”, as
important as law and politics in determining the overall direction and stability of a
society.’ John Stuart Mill’s review hailed it as “the beginning of a new era in the
scientific study of politics.”④De Tocqueville himself writes in his introduction to above
book ‘The first of the duties… is to educate democracy, to reawaken, if possible, its
religious beliefs; to purify its morals; to mold its actions… A new science of politics is
needed for a new world.’⑤
In China however, especially since the era of Lu Xun, there has been some
skepticism about the value of Confucian traditions. Even the national hero Su Yat Sen
( 孙中山 )is known to have at times decried them for playing a major role in keeping
China backward.⑥On the other hand, Tu Wei-ming points out that ‘cultural traditions
continue to exert powerful influences in the modernizing process’ and “Asian Values”
such as ‘sympathy, distributive justice, duty consciousness, ritual, public spiritedness
and group orientation are also universalizable modern values.’⑦Furthermore, Chinese
culture is not a static structure, but a ‘dynamic, constantly changing landscape’⑧.Tu also
makes the point that ‘the roles of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and the Chinese
communities in Southeast Asia should not be underestimated.’⑨
2.9.2 Chinese culture and political reform
Democratization theory asserts that economic development tends to give rise to social
and cultural conditions under which democracy becomes increasingly likely to emerge
and survive. According to Ronald Inglehart, authoritarian rulers of some Asian societies
have argued that the distinctive “Asian Values” of these societies make them unsuitable
①
p.xxxii
②
Chapter 1 (by David Landes), p.12
③
Ibid, p.110
④
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Abridged Edition by Scott A. Sandage, 2007, page. x
⑤
⑥
chapter authored by Nathan Glazer, p.225
⑦
ibid, Chapter 19 (by Tu Wei-ming), p.264-65
⑧
Wei-mingTu, Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center, Daedalus, Vol.120, No.2, Spring 1991, p.4
⑨
Ibid, p.9
for Democracy (e.g. Lee Kwan Yew, 1994). Evidence from the evolution of Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan to democracy, however, seem to contradict this statement.
These regimes (plus Malaysia) all liberalized the economy, the legal system, and rights
of worship and travel, and then, decades later, held free elections’ ①.In the context of
China today, the ruling Chinese communist elite appear committed to maintaining one-
party rule, and if they retain control of the military they will probably be able to enforce
their preferences’. But Chinese people also show a predisposition toward democracy
that is inconsistent with China’s very low ranking on the Freedom House ratings,
meaning that ‘Confucian societies may be readier for democracy than is generally
believed’②.
2.9.3 Chinese Culture and economic reform
Dwight H. Perkins quotes Max Weber who wrote in the early 20th century that “the
Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the
Japanese, of assimilating capitalism which has technically and economically been fully
developed in the modern culture area.”③The Taoist orientation ‘has made the Chinese
very appreciative of the character and structure of markets. Markets are not a theoretical
abstraction for Chinese but are vivid and dynamic realities.④Meanwhile, Nathan Glazer
questions the role that Confucianism as-such has played in Asian economic success by
pointing out ‘A typical Confucian gentleman in the past would have shown open disdain
for menial labor’⑤. In the same vein, in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics,
Fareed Zakaria points out that ‘The key to Singapore’s success is Lee Kwan Yew, not
Confucius’, then puts forward an alternative reading of Weber ‘Max Weber argued that
Confucian-based cultures discouraged all the attributes necessary for success in
capitalism⑥. So according to many highly regarded researchers, Confucianism may not
be a decisive factor in China’s economic success; therefore explanation must be sought
with other factors – for example Taoism and wuwei.
2.9.4 Chinese Enterprise Management
According to Tim Wright, writing on the spiritual heritage of Chinese Capitalism, in the
past, ‘Chinese management (on a microeconomic level) tended to be bureaucratic rather
than entrepreneurial’ and ‘there was a relative absence of the entrepreneurial spirit
①
Chapter 1 (by David Landes), p.218
②
, Lawrence. E. Harrison and Samuel. P. Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress,
Chapter 7 (by Ronald Inglehart), p.95
③
Dwight Perkins writing in Ibid, p.248
④
Ibid,p.250
⑤
Nathan Glazer writing in Ibid, p.225
⑥
among those who led the industrialization effort of the late Qing’ period. ①
Implementation of late 20th century reform policies led to renewed interest in economic
management e.g.to overcome the inefficiency and lack of incentive associated with
China’s socialist enterprises by instilling values such as market consciousness and
customer service orientation. As argued by Xu Dingxin, the central idea of ancient
Chinese management thought has been ‘zhi’ or control, while Chen Bingfu outlines
areas such as systems thought, game theory, psychology and recruitment criteria where
traditional management methods have something to offer the contemporary world. ② The
method of picking able men is regarded as originating from Confucian teachings, and
another scholarly article from Shanghai in the mid 1980s linked Japans success to its
human-centered (ren 仁 ) management③. Activation of the propaganda potential of
historic or literary figures from the past has also been a central feature of much
academic writing in China. I would speculate that the ‘zhi’ management style described
above corresponds more with Confucian values than with those of Taoism.
2.9.5 Post- Qin dynasty historical factors in China’s
development trajectory
Qin Hui, history professor at Tsinghua University, while critical of ‘cultural

determinism’, has said ‘history… provides a solid explanatory framework for the
empirical phenomenon.’ That’s why to understand the role of Chinese philosophy on
China’s economy today, we must also examine the agricultural past which it both
reflected and affected. G. William Skinner, reflecting on The Structure of Chinese
History, indicates geographic and meteorological factors, in conjunction with political
and economic factors, have been decisive during Chinas history. He encourages the
reader to ‘think of Chinese history as having a hierarchical structure that parallels and
expresses the on-the-ground hierarchy of local and regional systems.’ ④ Later he guides
‘a history of the civilizational whole must rest on comprehension and reconciliation of
the distinct but contingently interrelated histories of its component parts’ ⑤, in this case,
Confucianism and Taoism. Skinner states ‘the path-breaking advances in technology in
China in general (came) before the unitary imperial system completed its consolidation
into the ultimate form it attained from the Ming period on.’ ⑥The same may also be said
①
Tim Wright, ‘The Spiritual Heritage of Chinese Capitalism’, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.19/20
(Jan-Jul 1988), pp.194
②
Ibid, p.209
③
Ibid, p.210 quoting Fang Yanming, 儒家的传统思想与日本的经济发展
④
G. William Skinner, Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.44,
No.2 (Feb. 1985), p.287
⑤
ibid, p.289
⑥
Anthony M. Tang, China’s Agricultural Legacy, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.28, No.1 (Oct
1979), p.10
of major philosophical breakthroughs (with Wang Yangming as the last major

Confucian reformer). This observation seems to suggest an inverse relation between the
level of political centralization and creativity in society.
China’s Agricultural Legacy relates a record which reveals a tradition of ‘Peasant-
cultivators’ (as opposed to laborers, serfs and indentured workers) who will "will turn
sand into gold” when given investment opportunities and efficient incentives ①. As Kent
G. Deng explains ‘the typical figure in Chinese country life (was) the landholding
peasant…for at least the last millennium, Chinese agriculture has been dominated by a
large number of free, small-scale farmers, working under a system of private land
ownership.’② The peasantry, not the state, played a central role in determining China’s
path③. However others sources point to a large population of tenant serfs during the
prosperous early Song period when market developments made the Chinese peasant into
“a class of adaptable, rational, profit-oriented petty-entrepreneurs” ④. Whatever the
precise balance between free farmers and tenants serfs, China flourished under this
system for hundreds of years, until the coming of the industrial revolution put her at a
disadvantage.
Theda Skocpol, in reviewing the rural conditions in China prior to the 20 th Century
notes ‘Chinese peasants…did not live in their own village communities clearly apart
from landlords.’ – ‘The Chinese peasant… was a member of two communities: his
village and the marketing system to which his village belonged… An important feature
of the larger market community was its elaborate system of stratification…‘normal
traditional Chinese agrarian-class relations were significantly commercialized’
⑤
Elizabeth Perry discusses the role of peasantry in instituting social changes in more
recent times, noting ‘peasants played a key role in initiating the reform process.’ ⑥These
sources seem to suggest that, due to a historical level of relative freedom and self-
reliance, many Chinese peasants have a natural talent for identifying low-hanging fruit.
This is also illustrated by the great success of the Town and Village enterprises (TVEs)
that helped to kick-start the reform process during the early 1980s.What relationship
this down-to-earth practicality of Chinese peasants could have with Taoist traditions are
discussed more in subsequent chapters.
①
ibid, p.8
②
Kent G. Deng, A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History, The Economic History Review,
New Series, Vol. 53,No.1(Feb 2000), p.4
③
Kent G. Deng, A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History, The Economic History Review,
New Series, Vol. 53,No.1(Feb 2000), p. 22
④
Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, reviewed in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol.7, No.1
(Summer, 1976), p.134
⑤
Patrick O’Neil & Ronald Rogowski (eds.), Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, p.473-74
⑥
Elizabeth J. Perry, Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State- Society Relations, The China Quarterly, No.139
(Sep, 1994), p.705
2.9.6 Intellectual Battlegrounds
Very soon after Deng Xiaoping launched the four modernizations program of
agriculture, industry, national defense and science & technology, questions concerning
accompanying political and social restructuring also became widespread in China,
resulting in a so-called “cultural fever”. Zhang Xudong writes in his article Nationalism,
Mass Culture and Intellectual Strategies in Post-Tiananmen China about an emerging
mass consumer culture which threatens the traditional role of elite intellectuals. He
explains ‘What is missing in this alliance between economic sphere and mass culture is
a theoretically articulate political philosophy and cultural vision. With the intellectuals
more sidelined than ever before, the newly emerging social experience suffers from a
lack of cultural vision, ideological assertiveness, and political legitimacy①. Zhang points
to a period shortly after Deng’s visit to Shenzhen and the launch of SEZs when
lamentations over "the loss of the humanistic spirit" by scholars in Shanghai triggered a
nationwide intellectual debate②. During the 1980s, liberal-humanist intellectuals had
believed that history had a message for them to deliver to the Chinese nation, but the
90s made it clear that the message was instead going to be delivered by the
marketplace③. In his 1994 article "Random Thoughts on Questions Concerning the
Humanistic Spirit" Wang Meng disdained a strong "spiritual civilization" as threatening
to "get a few people so excited that they will go back to the obsolete political labels and
charges and rekindle their passion for prosecution." ④In an article published in Hong
Kong, Henry Y. H. Zhao, discerns an unholy alliance between Chinese postmodernism
and mass culture that aims to "destroy elite culture." Positioning elite intellectuals as a
critical priesthood on the margins of modern society, Zhao defines the rise of mass
culture and its theoretical discourse as "neo-conservativism." ⑤ In this battle over
identity and culture in modern China, intellectuals may be seen to have spirituality and
humanism as their allies against a kind of consumer nihilism.
For professor of history at Tsinghua University Qin Hui however, battles over
national interest become sustainable and lawful precisely on the basis of universal
principles and institutions such as the free market⑥. What could be lost (through post-
modern mass culture) is not the elitist "human spirit" but rather a collective passion for
political and cultural democracy⑦. Thus there is a heightened political urgency to
formulate a new national culture to serve the popular struggle for a more just
distribution of wealth, and Democracy can only be anticipated through the imaginings
of a new nation and a new culture.⑧
①
Zhang, Xudong, Nationalism, Mass Culture and Intellectual Strategies in Post-Tiananmen China, p.117-118
②
Ibid, p.119
③
Ibid, p.121
④
Ibid, p.122
⑤
Ibid, p.126
⑥
Ibid, p.128
⑦
Ibid, p.135
⑧
Ibid, p.137
There’s little doubt that in today’s information age, a Taoist policy of ‘emptying the
people’s minds while filling their stomachs’ is unlikely to be sustainable. Isolating
individuals from their historic source of cultural identity, while it may have short term
politics benefits, in the long term it is likely to promote a nihilistic worldview. As
Daniel Bell wrote in 1972, ‘When one is cut off from the past, one cannot escape the
final sense of nothingness that the future then holds.’① He further explains, ‘Changes in
moral temper and culture are not amenable to social engineering or political control and
derive from the value and moral traditions of the society…The ultimate sources are the
religious conceptions which undergird a society; the proximate sources are the reward
systems and motivations which derive from the arena of work’②.
2.10 Modern views from Chinese sources on the role of
Chinese culture in China’s reform
2.10.1 Taoism and economic reform
Chinese views on the role of traditional culture in modernizing China emanate from
different sources, defined by Tu Wei-Ming as the three worlds of mainland China (plus
HK, Macau and Taiwan), Overseas Chinese, and non-Chinese experts. A diversity of
views exist even within the mainland, and these are discussed below.
While the reform and opening up under Deng Xiaoping brought renewed religious
freedom in China, and Deng promoted ‘liberating minds’, scholarly discussion on
traditional values also began to tentatively emerge. Chief among topics under discussion
was Confucianism and Taoism. Scholars started to say openly that the government
should minimize interference in the economy ③, and question the relation between
spiritual and material affairs.
Xie Hong En, in the Chinese Journal Philosophy and Reform, points to an
interdependent relationship between material and spiritual matters, writing ‘morality is
the high-level architecture of social consciousness that follows and serves the economic
base. Changes in morality flow into economic changes and the speed of one effects
speed of the other.’④ This view is contrasted with the Marxist perspective that gives
precedence to material production in determining moral values. He goes further to claim
that progressive values associated with China’s reform can stimulate moral progress. So
①
Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 6, No.1/2, Jan-Apr
1972, P.27
②
Ibid, p.37-38
③
赵新良刘文林, 洋为中用：可借鉴的美国经济管理体制，p.37
④
洪恩, 哲学与改革：经济体制改革与道德观念的变革谢, p.36
while collectivism leads to moral decay, purely capitalist values that directly associate
wealth with morality are considered ‘shameful’. Changes in economic systems
undoubtedly have power to transform people's moral concepts because moral progress is
determined by people's moral activities. Values held up during China's feudal times
(such as Confucianism) prevented people’s independent consideration of moral issues
and confident brave application of such choices into practice, thereby the reducing the
people's independence and creativity.①In the period of the four modernizations put
forward by Deng Xiaoping, moral judgments are economically-based i.e. ‘production is
good'.② Meanwhile, Deng’s policy of ‘letting some get rich first’ implies a relaxation of
controls that corresponds with a wuwei policy. But on an individual level, the success of
the reform depended on people’s aspirational action to take advantage of new economic
opportunities and improve their lot. But this does not contradict with wuwei because
naturally following innate aspirations is a form of wuwei action. The subtlety of the
wuwei concept is misunderstood by those who mistakenly equate it with laziness.
In the context of China’s recent past, values such as wuwei have been seen as
feudal and passive, negative and non-progressive. One explanation suggests this is
because small-scale producers in the past only sought to avoid government repression,
and became trained to cop abuse without reaction ③ (e.g. the ‘safety concept 求安观念).
Feudalistic values are seen to be deeply embedded in the Chinese social fabric, and
changing the old thought in morality is one goal of the economic reform.④But what if
are there certain liberating aspects of traditional morality that can be reinterpreted and
renewed during this process? More is written in the next chapter.
Lin Ping, questioning the relationship of Chinese traditional culture and China’s
modern transformation agrees that ‘ethics is more important than economy’ and ‘China
has the common interest to protect the benefit of the group’ ⑤While achieving benefits,
China can still place morality above benefits by thinking of morality when considering
benefit, and asking whether the benefit is moral.⑥ In traditional culture, economic
theory dictated that one should use a proper way to make money, be diligent and respect
one’s job, and trust one another when exchanging goods. Thus moderation in giving and
taking; control in consuming was exalted⑦. Were these values common in traditional
society also seen to apply to China’s past rulers?
Lin Ping goes on to observe that ‘New Confucianism is promoting North Asia's
economy, not traditional Confucianism any more’. This means there’s not only morality
but also marketing rules to follow. On the one hand, we trust each other, on the other
hand, we have to realize rule-of-law economy⑧.The harmonious functioning of the
system as a whole is thus prioritized above traditional conceptions of li ( 礼 ), or
①
洪恩, 哲学与改革：经济体制改革与道德观念的变革谢,p.37
②
洪恩, 哲学与改革：经济体制改革与道德观念的变革谢,p.38
③
哲学与改革：经济体制改革与道德观念的变革谢洪恩” P-39
④
哲学与改革：经济体制改革与道德观念的变革谢洪恩，p.40
⑤
林平，中国传统经济理论如何与现代化接轨，河北学刊，2002 年 7 月第 22 卷第 4 期, P-16-17
⑥
Ibid, p.17
⑦
Ibid, p.17-18
⑧
Ibid, p.19
propriety. China is breaking the traditional hierarchical conception of consumption and

promoting a mass consumption society.①
Another writer, Jin Hui Chuang traces the impact of wuwei economics back to early
Chinese dynasties such as the Han and early Tang. He quotes the famous Tang emperor
Li Shimin, who attributed much of his great success in governance to his practice of
wuwei (无为), more than to his virtue (德)“况朕之本系，出于柱史，今鼎作克昌，
既凭上德之庆，天下大定，亦赖无为之功”, thus showing the influence of wuwei
during the Tang dynasty.② This author goes on to talk about possible eastern origins of
western civilization, tracing Chinese ideas of economic wuwei to the French
philosopher Quesnay, who then popularized the concept of ‘Laissez-faire’ economics.
Other similarities between Taoism and western thought are noted in the Ancient Greek
belief that ‘man is the measure of all the things’, and the idea that humans seek wealth
in self-interested and rational way, which also underlies wuwei thought ③. While Taoism
promotes harmony of the individual with society and nature, Western individual
freedom emphasizes subjectivism, which leads to selfishness and environmental
degradation such as that caused by the Industrial Revolution, which originated Western
countries. The author sees 1600, when China closed its doors, as the turning point which
allowed the West to catch up and overtake it economically. Jin Hui Chuang concludes
that there’s an ‘Internal compatibility’ between Taoism and market economics, where
'Dao' is seen as a natural law. He suggests China build 'rule of law' in concert with
Taoist free market economics to help avoid pitfalls, chaos and preserve a socialist
market economy.④ However, an entirely free-market economy is not feasible because
Western experience shows that government macro-economic guidance is still required.
This means that there are two roles for government in China's current economic
situation: (1) get rid of the traditional of government's administrative mode, and (2)
enhance the ability to regulate and control the market economy and its existential risks.
Though the exact specifications of Taoist wuwei economics must result from practice,
there must be clear restrictions on the government role, including compartmentalized
service provision that prevents (even well-intentioned) mis-allocation of resources.⑤
In a shared piece called A comparison of Wuwei Thought and Western Economic
Liberalism, Zhou Jian Bo, Fang Jing Yu and Cong Yue Fen describe the Dao of Taoism
as the theoretical premise and basic philosophy of life, society and economic thinking.
Things are not born from consciousness but from nature, ‘the form of motion of Dao is
mutual transformation’, and a dialectical process.⑥In this way it is claimed that
subjective wuwei action of individuals adds up to objective wei progress of the whole. A
parallel is noted between the way of Taoism and Western economic liberalism in that
both see social and economic operations as not depending on regulations of the
subjective will. While in China this understanding emerged from the wuwei of the
①
Ibid, p.20
②
金会庆, 道家经济观及其对我国经济发展的影响，江淮论坛 2011，p.94
③
Ibid, p.95
④
金会庆, 道家经济观及其对我国经济发展的影响，江淮论坛 2011，p.96
⑤
Ibid, p.97
⑥
周建波，冯靖玉，丛月芬,《老子》无为思想与西方经济自由主义的比较, 经济思想研究,p.1
philosopher Laozi, in the West this method is traced to Quesnay, who, in France, first
put forward the idea that the laws made to govern society should be based upon natural
law①. Again, both Taoism and Western economic liberalism see self-interest as the
primary motivation factor in society. Any intervention in the natural process will lead
inevitably to failure (i.e. the law of unintended consequences). An example of
selfishness leading to beneficial outcomes is the Nash equilibrium, and the article says
that because this theory depends on rational people, it can’t compare to the
metaphysical, a-rational level on which Taoism operates.②
More similarities and differences between Taoist wuwei and Western Economic
Liberalism are noted by Zhou, Feng and Cong. Both concepts consider that stability and
sustainability depend on a certain frugality, and both agree that people's nature remains
the same despite external changes. Taoist thought is however, more personal than
Western economic Liberalism, which (under Keynesian influence) believes government
sometimes must act depending on the timeframe of events, while Taoism says ‘let
people adjust by themselves’③ and seeks to serve future generations in an apparently
perpetual manner. Through this wuwei method, the ultimate goal of government
wusuobuwei (无所不为）, or ‘unlimited power’ can be achieved.
The philosophies of both Quesnay and Laozi don't completely reject government
intervention, with the non-interference principle of free market economics meaning
government administration acts only as facilitator of the right conditions for prosperity,
similar to Taoism, where ‘weiwuwei’ ( 为无为 - striving for non-striving) and self-
interest is used to reach unlimited social economy and complete order. Differences lie in
the origin– which in the case of Taoism was the mysterious, charismatic character of
Laozi. Finally, history has shown the limits of free-market philosophy via such events as
The Great Depression of 1929.④
In another article called The Daodejing of Laozi and macroeconomic policy, Peng
Xiao Feng suggests governments should ‘first take action then take no action’ ⑤, which
sounds like the expression ‘to nip it in the bud’. He says the way of Laoziis of the same
nature as the invisible hand of Adam Smith. He goes on to outline the limits of
weiwuwei action, which can be seen to have its corollary in the saying, yuezudaipao (越
俎代庖 ) ， or exceeding in ones duty and meddling in others affairs. He quotes Hu
Jintao on how China's reform and opening is now in its 2nd stage and needs systematic
structural reform. For example, although State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have a
predominant position in the market and claim many advantages over private
enterprises(e.g. easy access to credit, resulting in over-abundance of construction), the
fact remains that people in China are wealthier in areas where private enterprise
dominates (e.g. Wenzhou) and less wealthy in areas dominated by state enterprise.⑥The
topic of frugality, emphasized in the Daodejing of Taoism meanwhile has its western
①
Ibid, p.2
②
Ibid, p.3
③
周建波，冯靖玉，丛月芬,《老子》无为思想与西方经济自由主义的比较, 经济思想研究,p.4
④
Ibid, p.5
⑤
彭晓峰, 老子《道德经》与宏观经济政策 p.270
⑥
彭晓峰, 老子《道德经》与宏观经济政策, p.271
corollary inthe expression 'down to earth' (i.e. finding happiness in the simple things).
Meanwhile Peng points to "system design problems" in the Chinese economy that
happen because the government emphasis on GDP growth causes currency
manipulation.① The state of China’s banking sector is also called into question, with a
lack of independence said to have caused stultification.
Overall, these sources from China seem to indicate the historical importance of
wuwei economics for stimulating economic prosperity. Following it, or a form of it,
seems essential in order to achieve a well-functioning market economy- and thus it is
important for China today. The lessons of wuwei for individual behavior (frugality) may
also help reduce tensions associated with over-consumption and the conspicuous wealth
divide. While a market economy has its limits and material wealth isn’t the only
measure of success, a well-functioning market system can provide a basis of prosperity
and economic security which release people from want and frees them to turn their
attentions toward self-cultivation and the higher purposes of life, such as that
encouraged by Confucianism.
2.10.2 Confucianism and Political Reform
Regarding Confucianism’s role in China’s future development, much writing has

focused on its role in society in general as well as the legal system. On the topic of
building a citizen consciousness (or ‘social civilization’) guidance is provided in ‘The
Outline of the Construction of the citizen ethics’, which points out that ‘only by
enhancing the citizenship research and training can the construction of the ethical order
be carried out effectively and lead to social civilization progress and accelerate the
progress of China’s socialist modernization.②Although this document describes the task
of building a citizen consciousness the same way one might describe the construction of
a building, perhaps more subtle ethical forces, difficult to quantify, are at play. As such,
the relationship between stimulating the development of citizen consciousness and
building a sustainable rule of law is acknowledged in the discourse. As Yao Huai Xi
states ‘the belief in legitimacy is provided through civic duty consciousness, so that
government can set up a generally effective system of legal order once that is
established③.
The general goal of discourse on the rule of law in China has been to try and
resolve the discord between contemporary legal systems and tradition. Liu Xue Song
describes the problem this way; 'the deviation and tension between the ideas of a
modern legal system and traditional people creates a serious and prominent issue
complicating the process of transitioning the country to rule of law'④. This sentence
①
Ibid, p.272
②
刘雪松, 儒家文化传统与法治社会中的公民意识塑造，北方论坛 2005 年第 2 期，第 133 页
③
姚怀喜, 传统文化在公民意识塑造中的作用，高校讲坛 2009 年第 11 期，第 504
④
indicates that theirs is a significant estrangement between the lives of people and the
complex demands of Chinas modern social economy. Zhang Pu Pan recommends China
should combine the fine traditions of Chinese culture with advanced legal culture from
around the world, and China's reform and opening-up must absorb advanced
experiences from abroad①, but exactly how this is to be done, and precisely which
aspects of legal culture should be adopted from which countries is not clearly outlined.
Other authors point out that simply transplanting or building an integrated legal system
of laws and rules can’t in itself guarantee an effective rule of law.②So there is a danger
that a kind of ‘hollow’ legal system could be established that won’t have the intended
effect of stimulating genuine social justice and accompanying perceptions of legitimacy.
On the other hand, if a legal system focuses too much on guaranteeing liberties without
sufficient restraints on behavior, this can also have negative repercussions. Qin Hui
explains that if a system has neither the function of restraining nor 'protecting' then it's
nothing to do with freedom at all③. This is a timely reminder of the ‘negative freedoms’
(i.e. responsibilities or limitations) that are necessary as part of any functioning system
of social liberty.
On the economic front, the breakdown of earlier collectivist practices has
encouraged people to pursue self-interested economic behavior in order to stimulate
economic growth, but this development has had other side effects. For example Liu Xue
Song writes 'self-sufficiency means people lack common economic links and quality
social interaction, thus limiting the formation of an economic basis of civic
consciousness’④. This observation denotes the important yet complex connection
between material and spiritual culture. For example, though China today may be
steadily becoming wealthier, there is also a trend towards materialism which has
deleterious effects because it is not moderated by citizen consciousness. This lack of
civic consciousness and gentlemanly behavior fosters a kind of national nihilism, which
is harmful to the traditional cultures of Chinas multi-ethnic nation⑤.
Interestingly, Qin Hui points to the historic prevalence of Confucian norms
practiced in mainly through small communities, explaining ‘in the earlier stage of
modernization process, the orientation of original Confucianism's basic unit of small
community (小共同体) does not suppress the development of personality and freedom.
On the contrary, it becomes an important item when it meets western learning. ⑥ Here he
seems to be suggesting that a refocus on establishing moral norms in smaller
communities, (such as the hutongs and yiheyuan of Beijings city center rather than
attempting the extremely difficult task of extending these norms in large busy modern
cities).
As some authors point out, Chinese traditional culture is full of realism's critical
①
张普潘《中华文化与现代法治对话录》，弘扬中华法文化丰富中国特色的社会主义法制，第 8-10 页
②
③
秦晖，《自由先于“文化”》，社会科学论坛 2001•5，第 19 页
④
⑤
⑥
spirit; it's the result of rational thinking① (in contrast to the irrational order epitomized
by wuwei). Such rational thinking is tested for adaptability amid the rapidly changing
environment of today’s modern globalized world. Despite these challenges, it seems
apparent that if China can successfully critically inherit past culture②, then these cultural
resources that still have plenty of life today will be able to stand the test of time.
Altogether, theses sources indicate the continuing relevance of Confucian thought
in building a modern citizen consciousness and rule of law. But they also point to
considerable challenges to be faced on the road to achieving these goals. These
challenges have unpredictable potential. As Zhang Pu Pan states, there’s a fear of
instability, (because) stability is very important for any country. ③ The challenge for
Confucianism is to maintain its basic orientation with negotiating a path between
stability and instability that can best serve the interests of the whole nation.
①
张普潘《中华文化与现代法治对话录》，弘扬中华法文化丰富中国特色的社会主义法制，第 5 页
②
秦晖,《自由先于“文化”》, 社会科学论坛 2001•5，第 24 页
③
Chapter 3: Wuwei and ‘Invisible Hand’ of the Free-Market
Chapter 3:Wuwei and ‘Invisible Hand’ of the Free-

Market
3.1 Conceptual Metaphors
The aim of this chapter is to make a comparison of wuwei and the invisible hand of
the Free Market and show links between the two by drawing upon broad interpretations
of the ‘wuwei’ concept and interpreting the ‘invisible hand’ in light of these analyses.
The text by Edward Slingerland Effortless Action: Wuwei as Conceptual Metaphor and
Spiritual Ideal in Early Chinais an important source as it appears to be the only book
published in English which addresses the concept of ‘wuwei’ in depth. It explains that
although the exact phrase ‘wuwei’ is only found once in The Analects, the conceptual
metaphor it represents was already linguistically well-developed by the time of that
books writing. According to Slingerland, and many other scholars, wuwei can be seen to
embrace various terms often used in the writings of China’s ancient sages, including
effortlessness, naturalness, spontaneity, uncontrivedness, peacefulness, equanimity, etc.
It is seen as a method of self-cultivation, and also a means or conducting one’s affairs in
the world, including as an administrator or ruler. Notably, free-market (‘laissez-faire’)
economics and wuwei philosophy share very similar metaphors describing their
operation. The frequent use of agricultural and water based metaphors such as ‘Trickle-
down’ policies, ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, ‘green shoots’ of economic recovery etc. are
a case in point.
3.2 Definitions of wuwei
Wuwei is variously translated as ‘no-doing’ or ‘inaction’, ‘non-action’ or ‘in the

absence of exertion’ ‘non-contrivance’. According to Edward Slingerland in his book
Effortless Action: Wu-wei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China
wuwei properly refers to not a form of action but rather a spiritual state of mind that
obtains at the very moment of action. A state of personal harmony in which actions flow
freely and instantly from one’s personal inclinations and yet nonetheless accord
perfectly with the dictates of the situation at hand, display an almost supernatural
efficiency and harmonize with the demands of conventional morality’①. Alternatively it
is described by Jean Francois Billeter as representing a state of ‘perfect knowledge of
①
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-wei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.7
the reality of the situation, perfect efficaciousness and the realization of a perfect
economy of energy’. In Taoist writings, wuwei is often put together with the character
for ‘to govern/cure’ to make ‘wuweierzhi’ or ‘to govern by doing nothing’.
3.3 The Invisible Hand
The invisible hand concept emerged during early modern history in Europe, after
an extended period of intellectual exposure to Confucian ideas from China. The
Physiocratic school, popular in France under Louis XV, promoted a ‘natural order’ in
economics and popularized the term ‘laissez-faire’ (meaning ‘let do’)①. Building on
these theories, in 1776, the so-called ‘father’ of modern free-market economics Adam
Smith introduced wrote that if “all systems either of preference or of restraint” are
“completely taken away” a “simple system of natural liberty” would thereby arise of its
own accord. Each individual person would then be “left perfectly free to pursue his own
interests his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with
those of any other man or group of men” providing “he does not violate the laws of
justice”. The Natural Law Outlook subsequently became a preconception of economic
theory②.The above reference to elimination of ‘preference or restraint’ conceptually
reflects the metaphor of wuwei (in terms of individual cultivation) as elimination of
likes and dislikes. In Smith’s view, the government need not oversee “the industry of
private people, and direct it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the
society” because this is an obligation “for the proper performance of which no human
wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient”. In modern times, free-market
economist often point to the ‘moral hazard’ of allowing government to make decisions
for us, when in fact we as individuals are naturally endowed with more effective
faculties to decide what is in our best interests. Adam Smith was also influenced by
Newton, who wrote about inescapable natural laws ‘like every action has an equal and
opposite reaction’ which seem to echo Taoist principles. The philosophy of economic
freedom, reinforced in more recent times by writers like F.A. Hayek (who refers to the
‘fatal conceit’ of Socialism in thinking that human reason is superior to the naturally
existing spontaneous order), is in no small part responsible for the wealth of developed
nations today. This argument is also related to the principle that one should not force
another to become virtuous (e.g. by limiting wealth), but rather, let them learn by
themselves through the operation of natural laws. Therefore, to embrace free-market
reforms and enter a new age of greater prosperity, China need not import foreign
ideologies, nor look to enforce new standards of morality, but instead look to reawaken
the home-grown Taoist concept of wuwei.
①
Michael Perelman, An Ecological Future: Marx and Wu-Wei, California State University, 2008
②
Ken McCormick, The Tao of Laissez-Faire, p. 335
3.4 Free-Market economics in the Daodejing
3.4.1 Effortless Action
The very first mention of wuwei in the Daodejing is in Chapter 2, translated by

Cleary as ‘Effortless Service’ from the passage ‘Sages manage effortless service, and
carry out unspoken guidance. All beings work, without exception: if they live without
possessiveness, act without presumption, and do not dwell on success, then by this very
non-dwelling, success will not leave’① In this section ‘unspoken guidance’ refers to
leading by example –i.e. actions speak louder than words.
Wuwei comes up again at the end of chapter 3 in describing a method of
governance whereby the people are kept innocent and passionless. The passage ends
‘action being without contrivance, nothing is disordered’ ( 为无为则无不治 ) (Cleary
p.10). This is further explained ‘It’s not that sage rulers don’t employ the intelligent,
only that they don’t exalt them… Thus the intelligent are employed but the people don’t
compete’. According to Emperor Huizenga of the Song dynasty “Sage rulers have open
minds; therefore they listen impartially, seeing all together without feelings of like and
dislike’②.
Probably the clearest reference to a free-market economic approach to government
as indicated in the Daodejing is in chapter 57, and is quoted by James A. Dorn in his
article China’s Future: Market Socialism or Market Taoism③:
Administer the empire by engaging in no activity. (How do I know this?)
The more taboos and prohibitions there are in the world,
The poorer the people will be.
The more laws and orders made prominent,
The more thieves and robbers there will be.
Therefore, the sage (ruler) says:
I take no action and the people of themselves are transformed.
I am fond of tranquility and the people are naturally upright④
I engage in no activity and the people of themselves become prosperous
This chapter is titled ‘Governing nations by Normalcy’, and it is the strongest and
clearest elucidation of the ‘wuwei’ philosophy as it applies to economic governance
contained within the Daodejing. The chapter begins by offering a method of governance
that involves straightforward administration, surprise military tactics and ‘non-
involvement’ in order to seize all under heaven. But importantly we are not expected to
①
②
③
James A. Dorn, China’s Future: Market Socialism or Market Taoism (p.135)
④
believe in this philosophy in an uncritical or credulous way, rather the passage proceeds
to explain underlying laws which, demonstrably verified as scientifically observable
phenomenon, can prove beyond doubt that this philosophy has its origins in the
elementary rules of nature.
3.4.2 Intrinsically responsive market and ‘Pivot’ of The Way
Daodejing Chapter 62 has a reference slightly more oblique but perhaps equally
insightful, once properly understood, into the fundamental relationship between ‘wuwei’
(which, as a term, is at times used interchangeably with ‘The Way’ in both the
Daodejing and the Zhuangzi) and the market economy. The chapter proceeds ‘The way
is the pivot of all things: the treasure of good people, the safeguard of those who are not
good. Fine words can be sold; honored acts can oppress people; why should people who
are not good abandon them?’ In interpreting this section, ‘the pivot’ can be seen to
represent the classic ‘market equilibrium’ point where supply and demand come
together in a free and open environment (like the central pivot of a spinning circle, we
can perceive its existence ‘a priori’ although it takes no physical form). This is ‘the
treasure of good people’ because it offers no advantage or opportunity for distortion or
corruption by any actors in the marketplace, thereby being a reliable and non-
discriminating instrument for the pursuit of properly-earned wealth. It is also
paradoxically the ‘safeguard of those who are not good’ because the innate fairness of
the open market prevents less virtuous people who from becoming victims of their own
greed. The 2nd of the two sentences quoted above contrasts the treasure of the pivot of
the way (free market equilibrium) with the corrupting influence of ‘fine words’ and
‘honored acts’ of ‘people who are not good’- which can be extended to imply ‘dark
forces’ of ideology and contrived morality which subvert the operation of the free
market, which if only left to operate freely would in-itself naturally bestow wealth on
the people. This ‘pivot’ (奥) of Taoism has the same role as the impartial arbiter in the
marketplace as the ‘suspended balance’ (懸衡) concept discussed by Xunzi.
The dangers of excessive acting or striving on the part of governments are
described in Daodejing Chapter 75 which states ‘When people are starving, it is because
their governments take too much, causing them to starve. When people are hard to
control, it is because of the contrivances of their governments, which make them hard to
control.’①This may bring to mind failed states like Somalia with corrupt governments
and social instability.
Many other examples can be found in the Daodejing which seem similarly to
suggest a method of small government which practices minimalist intervention in
people’s everyday lives. For example chapter 58, line 3 & 4 ‘When the government is
unobtrusive, the people are pure. When the government is invasive, the people are
①
wanting’①. Chapter 73 makes a similar reference ‘The Way of Heaven wins well
without contest, responds well without speech, comes of itself uncalled’②. This way has
much in common with ‘the invisible hand’ in that it acts quietly, independently,
automatically and with supreme efficiency. In Chapter 51 the prose beckons ‘It produces
but does not possess; it acts without presumption, it fosters growth without ruling.’ ③In
Chapter 64 we are extolled ‘what is at rest is easy to hold. What has not shown up is
easy to take into account. Those who contrive it spoil it; those who cling, lose it. Thus
sages contrive nothing. They cling to nothing and so lose nothing’. These references to
‘wuwei’ action illustrate the parallels between wuwei as individual self-cultivation (e.g.
meditation) and wuwei as governance method. Though in this case it seems to be
referring to individual cultivation, the basic rules of the operating system are the same.
So the sovereignty of the individual can be seen as a reflection of the sovereignty of the
state. These references to ‘wuwei’ from the Daodejing are so similar to the arguments
made by so-called ‘Confucian’ literati during the Salt and Iron debates discussed earlier
that we can see Confucians had borrowed many concepts from Taoism even at a very
early stage in Confucian development. The mathematical language used by Laozi in the
Daodejing is notable for describing spatial functions and inverse proportional
relationships.
3.5 Wuwei as Market Equilibrium
Reading Daodejing chapter 32, one might easily imagine a conceptual parallel
between this description of a ‘wuwei’ economy and the economic model which
illustrates the operations of the invisible hand. The saying goes ‘Heaven and earth
combine, thus showering sweet dew. No humans command it; it is even by nature’ ( 天
地相合，以降甘露，民莫之令而自均). Where in this sentence ‘heaven’ corresponds
to supply in the conventional economic model and ‘earth’ corresponds to demand, while
the sentence ‘it is even by nature’ refers to the equilibrium price level that is reached as
these two forces, heaven (or supply) and earth (or demand) meet. The phrases ‘thus
showering sweet dew’ and ‘no humans command it’ from the intermediary sentences
explain the operation of this phenomenon as being naturally endowing with wealth
(sweet dew) without the need for external (e.g. government or corporate) interference.
Chapter 77 again uses visual imaging to describe ‘The Way’ (e.g. wuwei) as ‘like
drawing a bow; the high is lowered, the low is raised; excess is reduced, need is
fulfilled. The way of heaven reduces excess and fills need, but the way of humans is not
so: they strip the needy to serve those who have too much.’ The high and low points on
the bow could be imagined as the x and y axis on a graph (see appendix 3), one moving
up the other moving down until they meet each other-just as the market operates- with
①
②
③
prices automatically responding to changes in demand (x-axis) and supply (y-axis) to

allow for products to be available at all times. The comment about the way of humans is
a reminder of the corruption in the aid industry written about by authors like Graham
Hancock in Lords of Poverty. Finally, we can point to the correspondence of the feature
‘elasticity’ attributed to prices of goods under the free-market concept with the
‘tenuousness’ (虚) of wuwei.
3.6. Relationship between Political and Economic
Development
3.6.1 Packaging Reforms
As many scholars assert, political and economic development are closely related.
Democratic rights are often grouped with economic liberalism in a kind of ‘package’
that is claimed to be mutually-reinforcing. As Tianjin Shi says “Since the seminal work
of Barrington Moore, political scientists have realized that democracy is associated with
private property, capitalism and a bourgeoisie”① Yu Keping explains in detail that this
has been the case in China under Deng Xiaoping②. According to Tianjin Shi,
‘Democracy made possible continuous political reform, so that capitalist economic
development and the evolution of democracy naturally became intertwined’ ③. Given
this close association between economics and politics, an examination of native cultural
norms related to economic behavior is relevant to the question of China’s
democratization.
3.6.2 Political and Economic Origins of wuwei in China
Wuwei governance has its origins way back at the dawn of Chinese civilization.
Confucius said “It was magnificent the way (the ancient sage kings) Shun and Yao held
the world, and without getting involved in it” (8:18) Many people perceive China as a
country with authoritarian traditions and a penchant for centralized power, but that’s a
shallow conception for a country with a vast and complex history and numerous
divergent political traditional schools of thought. This great breadth is illustrated in
books like Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook by Patricia Buckley Ebrey, which offers
①
Shi, Tianjian. Cultural Values and Democracy in the People’s Republic of China, p.548
②
Yu Keping, Democracy in China: Challenge or Opportunity?p.4
③
a fascinatingly rich number of practical examples from history. In that book, the concept
of wuwei is introduced as a vitally important principle, first propagated by Laozi, and
then followed and emulated by many statesmen and emperors through China’s history
who sought to increase the prosperity of their realm. Often understood as ‘effortless
action’ (Edward Slingerland), It can also be understood as essentially meaning letting
go/allowing nature to take its course or a kind of self-relinquishment in which one does
not attempt to go beyond what is natural in exerting influence on the world around us.
This is an inclination has been further developed by sages like Zhuangzi and Guanzi ①
and can be said to be deeply ingrained in Chinese culture and thought. Some writers in
recent years have drawn parallels between wuwei and free-market principles that seek
economic balance via the functioning of an’ invisible hand’.
The famous Chinese historian Sima Qian advocated such a natural, non-interfering
approach “There is no need to wait for government orders: each man will play his part,
doing his best to get what he desires . . . When all work willingly at their trades, just as
water flows ceaselessly downhill day and night, things will appear unsought and people
will produce them without being asked. For clearly this accords with the Way and is in
keeping with nature”②. Coming from such a prominent historian (when historian are
traditionally involved in politics in China) this is a powerful statement on what
constitutes China’s traditional beliefs and what likely was a major factor in her former
prosperity at the top of the world’s productive trade and economic order for many
hundreds of years prior to the era of Western colonialism.
Confucianism has also been an advocate of wuwei economic during China’s
history. This is illustrated by the position taken by Confucian literati during the Salt and
Iron debate and other examples. In The Analects Confucius says “It was magnificent the
way (the ancient sage kings) Shun and Yao held the world, and without getting involved
in it.”③In the next section, referring to the rule of king Yao it states ‘such was their
freedom that the people had no name for it.”④For the time in which he lived, Confucius
recommended “To guide a state, be serious and faithful in its affairs; be economical and
love the people, employing the citizens in season.” On the other hand, perhaps from a
class-based viewpoint, Confucius warns against using the profit motive as the primary
source of legitimate action, stating “If you act on the basis of profit, you will be much
resented.”⑤While this statement accords with the hostility towards large multi-national
corporations we see today among some sectors of the populations in Western countries,
it can be seen to be consistent with the common principles of wuwei and pure market
economics as moderated by frugality, in that a pure wuwei market people do not do
business in order to profit from others, but rather to satisfy their own basic needs and
realize mutual benefit.
Evidence abounds indicating that wuwei philosophy was an important influence
①
Chris Fraser (reviewer), Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China by Edward
Slingerland, p.99
②
Jack Barbalet, Daoist Concepts in Analysis of China’s Post-1978 Reform Economy p.337
③
④
⑤
facilitating the Western development of free-market ideas. Vital parts of early European
Free-Market thought can be clearly traced back to Chinese sources via Jesuits
missionaries working in China who influenced the Physiocratic school (with their belief
in ‘Natural Order’), who in turn influenced Adam Smith and his The Wealth of Nations.
People involved in this exchange were François Quesnay (author of Le Despotisme de
la Chine), Vincent de Gourney (who coined the term laissez-faire) Pierre Poivre and
French finance minister Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot①.This is discussed in detail by
Christian Gerlach, professor at the London School of Economics who also traces the
spread of ideas via ‘minben’ images on porcelain, and points to a combination of
‘Chinese agrarian wuwei’ with ‘Swiss “commercial wuwei”’ evolving in Europe by the
mid 19th Century. He concludes ‘the later development of Europe’s laissez-faire doctrine
has to be seen as a Eurasian co-production- without wu-wei, Europe’s pro-commercial
ideology would have never sufficiently matured’②. Even Max Weber seems to suggest
laissez-faire theories originated in China in his introduction to The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism (p.xxxvi). A chart which visually displays the development and
connection of these ideas can be seen in appendix 7.
3.6.3 Western Views and Modern Examples of wuwei in China
James Dorn of the CATO institute, who called market socialism a ‘grand illusion’,
has written regularly on this conception of wuwei as free-market. He quotes Laozi to
reinforce this conceptual parallel. " The more taboos and prohibitions there are in the
world, The poorer the people will be…Take no action and the people of themselves are
transformed . . . Engage in no activity and the people of themselves become
prosperous”③Barbalet goes go to assert, ‘Wuwei is positive and dynamic precisely
because it is non-coercive’④
Another potent argument in favor of the free-market/wuwei approach, and one still
in the living memory of hundreds of millions of Chinese, is the results of the economic
reforms of China in the 1980’s. When rural villages were given the opportunity to
participate in entrepreneurial ventures in the form of Town and Village Enterprises (or
TVEs), this reform, along with the Household Responsibility System, was a key in the
overall reform package which resulted in a massive burst of economic growth and
poverty eradication, particularly for the rural population of China⑤.
①
Derk Bodde, Chinese Ideas in the West, 2005, Asia for Educators Columbia University
②
Christian Gerlach, Wu-wei in Europe: A Study of Eurasian Economic Thought
③
James A. Dorn, China’s Future: Market Socialism or Market Taoism?, p. 135
④
Jack Barbalet, Daoist Concepts in Analysis of China’s Post-1978 Reform Economy p.341
⑤
Huasheng Yang, Private Ownership: The Real Source of China’s Economic Miracle, McKinsey Quarterly 2009,
No.1
3.7. Apparent Paradoxes of wuwei
In chapter 37, wuwei is again cited with the first two lines stating an apparent
paradox as follows ‘The way is always uncontrived, yet there’s nothing it doesn’t do’
（道常无为而无不为）. This sentence epitomizes the seemingly contradictory nature
of wuwei’s operations- after all – how can it get everything done if it doesn’t do
anything? However, when one considers the very nature of ‘the way’ itself as being
indescribable, one can understand that perhaps this seeming contradiction is the closest
description one can get under the limits of language. Delving further into the self-
cultivation aspect that aims to reach a wuwei state of mind can also bring greater
meaningfulness to this paradox.
In chapter 38, wuwei is raised in parallel with virtue: ‘higher virtue is uncontrived,
and there is no way to contrive it. Lower virtue is created, and there is a way to do it’
（上德无为而无以为；下德无为而有以为） , or in other words, higher virtue is
uncontrived wuwei while lower virtue is contrived wuwei. This shows that there can be
‘fake’ forms of wuwei which may appear similar but nonetheless lack the essential
magnetic virtue power of higher, uncontrived forms.
Chapter 43 begins with the sentence ‘What is softest in the world drives what is
hardest in the world’. To extend this to the modern world and consider what is the most
competitive （hardest）field many people would state that the world of business is the
toughest of all. What is the soft entity driving it- that would be the market, of course –
which it may be seen is entirely soft in its responsiveness, subtlety and elasticity in
response to changing prices, products and external conditions.
Chapter 48 proceeds ‘For learning you gain daily, for the way you lose daily.
Losing and losing, thus you reach non-contrivance’ (为学日益，为道日损。损之又损，
以至于无为。无为而无不为 ) This sentence explains that learning brings benefits.
‘The way’ on the other hand, involves suffering losses and more losses up to the point
where one reaches ‘wuwei’ and is able to complete all tasks with no effort. This seems
to remind us of the tortured artist who sometimes seeks self-harm in order to fall deeper
into the depths of despair and thereby unleash greater creativity. Perhaps the clearest
example of apparent paradox in wuwei comes from the Zhuangzi. In Chapter three of
the Zhuangzi it states ‘With a mind of no-knowledge, no-self, no-thinking, and
altogether no-mind, one is able to do things with the least effort but the greatest
success.’①
①
Geling Shan, Zhuangzi: Dancing with the World, Re-discovering China, p.60
3.8 ‘Weiwuwei’
According to Zhuangzi, “What is spiritual and cannot but be put into action (不可不为),
this is Heaven”①. Meanwhile, Chapter 63 of the Daodejing begins with the phrase
‘weiwuwei’ (为无为), which means ‘do non-doing’, then is followed by a phrase ‘strive
for non-striving’, which can both have similar meaning of acting for the purposes of
non-action, reaching for no-reaching, aiming for the aimless. This reference to wuwei
leans strongly toward the self-cultivation aspect. It’s enjoining us to a kind of mission
that the author challenges the reader to take up, thereby benefitting one-self and others.
In Chapter 81, the final words of the Daodejing say ‘The way of heaven helps and does
not harm. The Way for humans is to act without contention’. So although Heaven is
superior to humans, we can benefit from its magical power by ‘acting without
contention’ or ‘weiwuwei’. In this way we are imitating heaven and transcending
conventional human weakness, but it is a fine line, and the intention of actions may be
most important. From the economic governance perspective, these sections of the text
perhaps provide rationalization of some forms of state intervention in the economy, only
if it is ultimately for the purpose of achieving wuwei (i.e. a heaven-like state). For
example, if some foreign nations engage in mercantilist trade policies or exploitative
resource extraction, a state or a person would be justified in taking appropriate counter
measures as long as they serve the limited purpose of countering the schemes of others,
and don’t venture into the realm of launching new schemes themselves. Adam Smith
wrote in The Wealth of Nations ‘If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb,
in order to make it straight, you must bend it as much the other.’ ②But the temptation to
keep bending the rod further in the other direction for one’s own perceived advantage
must be resisted. For example, preserving China’s national sovereignty may be a pre-
requisite for preserving and achieving wuwei (given that this concept was born in
China), and therefore justifies ‘wei’ action. But if this ‘wei’ action develops into
violating the sovereignty of other states – that is no longer ‘weiwuwei’ and becomes
unjustifiable ‘wei’. In the domestic arena, a potential area where aggressive reforms are
needed to return to a wuwei state of normalcy is on the matter of land reform.
Reinforcement of basic property rights will encourage social stability in the countryside,
but the nexus that has formed between private gangs and local governments is a
formidable obstacle③. Only ‘weiwuwei’ determination from those leading the reforms
can succeed and thereby provide an anchor for a stable Chinese state into the future.
This balance between wuwei and weiwuwei in Taoist texts is illustrated by the
relatively few mentions of weiwuwei, meaning that wuwei is the primary value while
weiwuwei is a secondary value. This means China’s Taoist historical mandate for ‘wei’
①
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: wuwei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.203
②
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, The Electronic Classics Series,
Pennsylvania State University, p.540
③
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/chinese-premier-faces-clash-with-local-crime-gangs-20130523-2k3tl.html
action (e.g. control, manipulation and interference in the market) is valid only in
circumstances where, on balance, ‘wuwei’ is being served by ‘wei’. So ‘weiwuwei’
cannot simply be used as an excuse for pursuing ‘wei’ policies- because that would lead
to further contention, disturbance and suffering. As Chapter 17 verse 9 of the Zhuangzi
says ‘we must not let human discard heaven, reason discard fate, or profit defame name-
rather, we must consciously preserve them. This is called “returning to genuineness”’.①
3.9 Why can Wuwei work today?
Edward Slingerland explains how in China’s ancient writings wuwei is

conceptualized as a self-supporting normative order.② In today’s China, the problem is
not state ownership as such, but the political interference (wei) this invites. As the
saying goes, ‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. The temptation
for people in government to pursue private agendas at cost to the public via influence
over the operation of state-owned assets is simply too great for many people to resist.
No matter the safeguards that are put in place, the more tightly-knit the nexus is
between people in government and in business, the more potential there is for abuse of
the system. Having exchangeable currencies, the profit motive, free trade, access to
credit and the natural laws of demand and supply has through history been the most
effective way of creating wealth. The role of government under a wuwei system is to
interfere to a minimum extent with the operation of these economic forces- which
means that permanent state ownership and centralized control of assets vital to the
functioning of the economy is unacceptable. Only short-term interventions with clearly
defined goals and purposes are countenanced. This philosophy is no doubt a major
reason for the relative prosperity China enjoyed for many centuries up until the onset of
the industrial age.
Though technologies and the physical environment have changed since the
invention of wuwei, the basic elements of human nature and the human mind are still
the same. People still experience greed, desire, selfishness while at the same time
yearning for peace and freedom. Therefore, a determined and decisive movement of
economic reform toward a wuwei management style will given time, inevitably inspire
confidence among Chinese entrepreneurs and consumers, encouraging them to spend
and invest knowing that their money is safe from the hand of a meddling government
and bureaucracy and will grow naturally along with the people’s dreams and aspirations.
In this way economic forces will be unleashed that can catapult China toward a new
level of development and meet the currently rapidly growing demands of the Chinese
people.
①
Geling Shan,Zhuangzi: Dancing with the World, p.34
②
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: wuwei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.203
3.10 Wuwei and China’s economic reform trajectory
The achievements of China’s reform movement of the past 30 plus years, particularly in
the economic sphere, speak for themselves. From 1978 to 1988, during the most
economically free period, the number of rural people living below China’s poverty line
fell by more than 150 million, compared to a drop of 60 million during the 1990’s when
state capitalism emerged.① The Town and Village Enterprises (TVE’s) which emerged
during the 1980s have been praised by Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz
as ‘a form of public ownership that prevents asset plundering (e.g. Russia early 90’s)
while achieving the efficiency of private companies’.② These structures, which Deng
reportedly described in 1987 as “appearing out of nowhere”, achieved a yearly average
output increase of 27.5 % from 1979 to 1991 to eventually be contributing two thirds of
China’s rural GDP by 1993③. The policy of creating Special Economic Zones (SEZs),
launched by Deng in 1992, and associated FDI Liberalization and ‘cluster strategy’, has
also been very successful in channeling credit into China economic growth while also
limiting the potential negative effects on the rest of the economy (e.g. inflation). In
southern China there are many vibrant cities, like Wenzhou stand testament to the
efficacy of free-market policies. Decentralization that occurred as part of the reform
process has created competition between provincial and regional governments for FDI
flow that is credited with allowing the right incentives for local officials to unleash their
developmentalist tendencies in a process called “competitive liberalization” by Dali
Yang④.
Incremental reform is most beneficial when it maintains a steady pace and
momentum, thus somewhat soothing market fears and shaping expectations of more
progress to come. If the process stalls, the danger is that the country might become
‘trapped in transition’ and victim to ‘crony capitalism’ ⑤. As Yu Liu and Dingding
Chen⑥ explain, Chinese citizen’s demands for greater voice and accountability in
government are growing steadily as a result of the action of powerful long-term social
and economic forces. However the ‘techno-paternalism’ that to Daniel Bell is the
essence of illiberal political culture still is an obvious feature of life in China. According
to He Zhengke, this ‘over-centralization of power is the root cause of illness in this kind
of political system’⑦.Progress on the democratic front since the 15 th party congress in
1997, which emphasized developing ‘socialist democratic politics’ and stated ‘without
①
Yasheng Huang, Private Ownership: The real source of China’s economic miracle, p.150
②
Yasheng Huang, Private Ownership: The real source of China’s economic miracle, p.153
③
Fan, Chen and Kirby, Chinese Peasant Entrepreneurs: An Examination of Township and Village Enterprises in Rural
China, Journal of Small Business Management, 34:4, p.71-76
④
⑤
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Democracy with Chinese Characteristics? Political Reform and
the Future of the Chinese Communist Party, p.67
⑥
Yu Liu and Dingding Chen, Why China Will Democratize
⑦
He Zhengke , Incremental Political Reform and Transition to Democracy, p.17
democracy there is neither socialism nor modernization’ ① has been regarded by many as
too slow. While developing the Rule of Law has been prioritized in many recent public
statements, some question why the goal of democracy can’t be pursued concurrently
with that of Rule of Law. Meanwhile, for those wealthy and influential people in China
who naturally resist democratic changes out of fear of wealth re-distribution, they could
take note of Confucius words “In a state that has the Way, to be poor and of low status is
a cause for shame; in a state that is without the Way, to be wealthy and honored is
equally a cause for shame.”②A similarly frugal theme is presented throughout the
Daodejing, such as in chapters 53, 59, 67, 44 and in chapter 46 where it states ‘No
crime is greater than approving of greed’ ③, there is a consistent rejection of excesses of
wealth ad preference for frugality in everyday habits. Such exemplary frugal behavior is
displayed by Zong Qinghou, boss of wahaha and China’s richest man, who claims he
only spends around $20USD per day in living expenses ④. This is a modern example of a
person who lives in line with ancient traditions, and could be a worthy inspiration to
others, keeping in mind that Deng Xiaoping once said ‘to get rich is glorious’. Frugality
is also often advocated in The Analects of Confucius, to where we now turn.
①
Wei Pan, Towards a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, p.4
②
The Analects, 8.13
③
④
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13427392
Chapter 4：Aspirational Confucianism and Educated Democracy
Chapter 4: Aspirational Confucianism and Educated

Democracy
4.1 Confucius’s Aspirations
4.1.1 Confucius the Democrat?
To begin with, Confucius was a democrat in one important respect- his use of the
concept ren. According to Wing-tsit Chan, Chinese scholars agree that ren in ancient
pre-Confucian Classics connotes a particular virtue, namely, kindness of a ruler to his
people①. However, Confucius expanded its use, implying that this characteristic, along
with the attainment of gentleman status and the establishment of a virtue-relationship
with heaven, was within the reach of all people②. Although many of Confucius
conversations with his disciples concern government, yet in no instance did he use the
word ren as a special quality of rulers.' On the contrary, it denotes a quality of man as
such. Whenever he discussed ren, he referred to it in relation to man as man.’ This
connotes a sense of universal suffrage, in the sense that all humans are deemed capable
of this most sublime form of empathy. Wing-tsit Chan agreed, saying ‘All this amounts
to an ethical revolution, for a moral quality that formerly belonged to aristocrats now
belongs to all men’③. Confronted with this conceptual evolution I would ask, If a moral
quality can be transferred from rulers to the common people, why not also the act of
ruling itself? By taking a virtue formerly seen only to apply to rulers and saying that it
could be cultivated by all humans- this seems to be encouraging a process of democratic
self-cultivation on the individual level. Since Confucius time, ren (or jen) has had its
meaning expanded and elaborated upon by many scholars, including neo-Confucians.
4.1.2 Anti-authoritarian Confucius
In part 2.3 of The Analects The Master said, “If you try to lead the common people
with government regulations and keep them in line with punishments, the laws will
simply be evaded and the people will have no sense of shame. If, however, you guide
①
Wing-tsit Chan, The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Ren, p.296
②
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wuwei as conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.66
③
Wing-tsit Chan, The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Ren, p.299
them with Virtue, and keep them in line by means of ritual, the people will have a sense
of shame and will moreover reform themselves”①. The above quote, though not directly
pro-democracy in any way, is certainly anti-authoritarian. In 12.17 he said “To govern
(zheng) means to correct (zheng). If you set an example by being correct, who will dare
to be incorrect?” Meanwhile in 12.19 he said “In your governing what need is there for
executions? If you desire good, then the people will also desire good.” In the modern
Chinese state where there are thousands of executions every year and laws strict but
enforcement uneven and where corruption is said to be pervasive (according to
Transparency International) this may therefore be interpreted as advocating some kind
of alternative system where the government is more transparent and/or accountable to
the citizens, such as a Chinese form of democracy.
4.1.3 Confucius and open debate
On the matter of public debate and the need for dialogue, Confucius also has
wisdom for us. In The Analects 3.23, the master was discussing with the Grand Music
Master of Lu. He said “What can be known about music is this: when it first begins, it
resounds with a confusing variety of notes, but as it unfolds, these notes are reconciled
by means of harmony, brought into tension by means of counterpoint, and finally woven
together in a seamless whole. It is in this way that music reaches its perfection.” This
process whereby a discordant symphony is brought together by a shared desire for
harmony reflects the democratic system where people are encouraged to express their
views openly, with the shared goal of what’s best for the country or community. ‘Being
brought into tension by means of counterpoint’ might refer to the multi-party system
where political groups oppose each other in parliament, but ultimately are expected to
agree to represent the national interests as a seamless whole.
4.1.4 Confucius on ‘Participating in Government’
In part 2.21 of The Analects, When asked why it is that he is not participating in
government, Kongzi appears to advocate ‘exerting an influence on government’ to be
implicitly equal to ‘already taking part in government’. Therefore he says “What need is
there, then, to speak of ‘participating in government’?” ②This corresponds perfectly well
in a sense to the idea that, as a voter in democratic elections, one is influencing the
political system (‘taking part in government’ as a stakeholder), thus cancelling out the
need to seek official positions in government agencies in order to have an impact. I
interpret this such that he’s also implicitly advocating small government for any
democratic system. Evidence suggests this ‘small government’ approach is also in
①
Philip J. Ivanhoe and Byran W. Van Norden (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, p.5
②
Philip J. Ivanhoe and Byran W. Van Norden (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, p.6
accord with the real situation of people’s sentiment in China today. As explained by
Tianjin Shi, ‘unlike the urban people, the rural poor of China benefited from economic
reform and de facto privatization. Their experiences primed them to expect that more
privatization and less government intervention would bring them an even better life.’①
4.1.5 Confucian Civility
Further in The Analects 4.14 Kongzi adds “Do not be concerned that you lack an
official position, but rather concern yourself with the means by which you might take
your stand”. ‘Taking a stand’ in the sense that it means taking a position on political
matters, can be seen as like that of choosing which party or leader to vote for in an
election, and also the position taken when discussing political matters with friends and
relatives. He also says in 3.4 ‘it is better to be frugal than extravagant’ – in modern
times, extravagance is usually associated with authoritarian regimes who are not
accountable to citizens (such as the richly adorned wedding of Burma’s military
dictators’ daughter), while in democratic countries which have laws requiring the
transparency of spending of public monies, scandals often arise when politicians or
government officials are seen to spend public money too freely or on unnecessary items,
regularly leading to the accused persons resignation. And finally, of course the ‘Golden
Rule’ of Confucius jisuobuyuwushiyuren 己所不欲勿施于人 has its parallel in the
basic rules of expected behavior as citizens in a democracy and is a fundamental
principle of citizen consciousness.
4.1.6 Confucian concepts ‘Li’ and ‘Ren’
Below I connect two Confucian concepts with Democratic counterparts. They are
Ren and Li. Ren and Li as Wei-Ming Tu explains them are as follows: ‘we can consider
ren as a concept of personal morality in classical Confucianism…, and li as basically a
concept of social relations’②. The ‘rule of law’, often described as a fundamental aspect
of a democratic system, in this sense can be considered a principle of equality in social
relations for everyone to follow whereby all people, regardless of wealth/rank etc.,
acknowledge each other’s equality under some form of higher power (i.e. heaven or
law). The pursuit of civic-awareness, or citizen-consciousness, on the other hand, can be
seen to correspond to the above-mentioned ren or virtue concept of personal morality
which is used to guide or moderate the people. For example, the citizen whom is
considerate of others and the impact of their behavior on society as a whole may be held
up as a ‘good’ or ‘model citizen’ for others to learn from and imitate. Fingarette defines
ren and li in a way that echoes the ideas of citizenship and rule of law;"li are forms of
①
②
Wei-ming Tu, The Creative Tension Between Ren and Li, p.31
conduct done with the right spirit, and ren tells us what that spirit is: to approach others
empathetically and to treat them with the dignity they deserve." ①In Chapter 3, line 3 of
the Analects, Confucius says “If people are not humane (ren), what is the use of rites
(li)? If people are not humane, what is the use of music”? ② Here Confucius appears to
be giving conceptual precedence to ren over li. In my estimation, Citizenship, as a sense
of responsibility to the group voluntarily arising in each individual, is also more
fundamental to a successful democracy society than the Rule of Law– which is
primarily an externally experienced egalitarian legal principle.
4.2 ‘Li’ and the Rule of Law
4.2.1 Definitions of Key Concepts
Li is usually translated as politeness or ritual behavior that gives external

expression to the proper order of relationships in the universe. This kind of behavior
means ‘keeping the universe in proper order’ and includes both major state rituals and
mundane courtesy in the same way.③ Li was so important during Imperial times in
China that it a government ministry was typically dedicated to its proper carrying out. It
has similarities to democratic civility (a duty of citizenship) in that both require
‘acceptance of a mutual set of understandings that allow peaceful social interaction to
continue even when people disagree’④. But Li in China has also meant a lot more than
this, being part of an external expression of ‘the way’ that is united with the cosmos.
Therefore it has been variously defined as "ceremony," "ritual," "rites," "propriety,"
"rules of propriety," "good custom," "decorum," "good form," ‘norms of appropriate
behavior’, and a host of other ideas including that of natural law ⑤. Definition and
translation of the concept ‘Li’ was a matter of controversy from very early on in the
exposure of Confucian ideas to the West. The German philosopher Leibniz, was one
among others who understood Li to mean ‘Law’⑥.While The Rule of Law, is defined as
‘the prevailing of regular power rather than arbitrary power’⑦, it is also associated with
procedural justice and equality. The Rule of Law in China, was historically associated
with the Legalist approach to governing a state, that is, “to establish unity and stability
through the singularities of a common law or order (fa), strategic method (shu), and
position/power of the ruler (shi)”.Because some scholars argue that Li can’t be limited
①
Kim Chong-Chong, The Practice of Ren, p.308
②
Thomas Cleary, The Essential Confucius, p.133
③
Robert P. Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan, p.26
④
Ibid, p.27
⑤
Wei-ming Tu, Li as a process of Humanization, p.190
⑥
Donald F. Lach, Leibniz and China, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.6, No.4 (Oct. 1945), p.450
⑦
http://law.yourdictionary.com/rule-of-law
to a set of rules, I won’t attempt to make the claim that the 2 concepts are identical or
interchangeable. However, similarities of Li with a legal principle that amounts to
equally shared obligations are significant enough to speak for themselves. Precedent for
clear rules and regulations in China also comes from the ancient Book of Change part 21
which states ‘Ancient kings clarified penalties and proclaimed laws.’①
4.2.2 ‘Li’ in a Rule-of-Law context
In his article titled Li as a process of humanization, Wei-Ming Tu talks about the

Confucian balance between an ‘inner sense of personal morality and an outer expression
of social responsibility’ and his interpretation of ‘Li’ as ‘an externalization of ren in a
concrete social situation’② is one shared by other scholars. Self-transformation in the
Confucian sense is manifested through human relations. Thus, the road to sage-hood is a
"narrow ridge" between spiritual individualism and ethical socialism③. Li can be said to
‘point to the step or act whereby spiritual beings are properly served and human
happiness obtained’, ‘to relate oneself to another is the underlying structure of li’ and
"The feeling of respect and reverence is what we call li."④. These definitions all convey
the sense of equality that is inherent in the rule of law. The rule of law, like Li, is also
flexible. It depends on interpretation by human beings and, like Li can be described as
an idea we aspire to.
Li in Confucianism, like the rule of law in Democracy, is not enough on its own to
ensure social harmony and individual fulfillment. As Wei-Ming Tu says ’If an inner
decision is not made, no matter how ingeniously social values are imposed upon the
individual, the best consequence one can expect is a kind of passive submission’ ⑤. In
the same way that Confucius expanded use of the term ‘ren’ to apply to the broad
population instead of only rulers, Li has been understood ‘as the movement of self-
transformation, the dialectical path through which man becomes more human’. Of four
widely understood developmental stages of ‘Li’, the final two ‘ordering the affairs of
the state’ and ‘bringing peace to the world’ appear to have direct connections to the
concept of ‘Rule of Law’⑥
As Karyn Lai describes, li denotes a variety of rituals concerning personal conduct,
social relations, political organizations, and religious behavior. The rule of law similarly
regulates such relationships within the modern legal system. While Lai describes li as an
'attitude of equanimity'⑦, similarly, equality is essential to the rule of law. There are
many examples in the Analects of the spontaneity, imaginativeness, and mastery
①
②
Wei-ming Tu, Li as a process of Humanization, p.187
③
Ibid, p.191
④
Ibid, p.190
⑤
Wei-ming Tu, Li as a process of Humanization,, p.194
⑥
Ibid, p.197
⑦
Karyn Lai, Li in the "Analects": Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility, p.70
required in the practice of li①. Others point to Confucius frequent engagement with his
disciples and other interlocutors reflects the encouragement of a style of open-ended
inquiry② that seems something akin to Socratic questioning- itself intimately associated
with Athenian Democracy. Lai goes on ‘Li… are indispensable because they create the
conditions for appropriate expressions of the self. They facilitate the expression of
attitudes, intention, and emotion within the boundaries of meaningful action. ③’ Again,
the same could be said of the rule of law in the sense that it allows us to express
ourselves as individuals, while remembering that we are part of a community of equals.
Lai also quotes Phillip Ivanhoe who says ‘The li are both the best means for developing
virtue and the best way in which to display the perfected virtue’ ④.Li provides a channel
for the expression of human emotion that is both aesthetically pleasing (The Analects
8:2) and ethically influential. Finally, sources point to the ‘inherent solemnity and
dignity of li’⑤ and explain that Li is also associated with expression of certain values
such as ‘sincerity, earnestness… dignity, and having a sense of order.’ ⑥ All these
descriptions have their parallels with parts of the ‘Rule of Law’, in the sense that the
law is expected to be applied sincerely and with fairness that recognizes the dignity of
each individual, and it exists for the purpose of establishing order in society.
Confucius himself instructed his disciples to “take your stand through ritual” (The
Analects, 8.8). ‘Ritual’ in this sense might be seen to be analogous to election
procedures (applied according to the rule of law) that ensure fairness and uphold the
‘one person, one vote’ principle of universal suffrage. Other scholars interpreted Li to
mean ‘a package of mutually related tendencies to behave in certain ways.’ Finally,
Zhang Pu Pan writes, To govern a country, the basis is li, li is the basis of governing a
country (治国首要是礼，礼是治国之本)⑦.
4.3. Old and New Definitions of Citizenship
The Chinese language translation of ‘Citizenship’ (gongminquan 公民权) may be

misleading due to its emphasis on rights, without analogous responsibilities. In the
①
Ibid, p.74
②
Ibid, p.75
③
Ibid, p.77
④
Ibid, p78
⑤
⑥
⑦
classic formulation by contrast, citizenship is viewed as an unwritten social contract

with the rest of the community whereby an individual has certain rights and privileges,
AS WELL as duties, responsibilities and functions ①. This misunderstanding, inherent in
the basis of language, is perhaps part of the reason so many people see Confucianism
and Citizenship as being incompatible. Many scholars also acknowledge that in a
democracy the duties of a citizen go beyond merely obeying the law and paying taxes.
To the contrary, for democracy to be vital, citizens obeyed their leaders and the law even
as they questioned and challenged political authority in their everyday life. They
concluded that if democracy was to survive a severe crisis, citizens had to be involved
in politics and seek relevant information and knowledge to improve their government's
efficiency②. Tianjin Shi has talked about the need for ‘citizens (in a democracy) to
evaluate their leaders intelligently, participate in direct elections and work continually to
improve the government's performance’③. This is a basic duty of any conscientious
citizen.
In the post-modern era, these duties might be extended to include obligation for
citizens to participate in specific feedback procedures that assess the performance of
government agencies and services (citizens watchdogs), the obligation to report any
suspicious behavior (e.g. to assist anti-terrorist vigilance) as well as the duty of
providing basic assistance to victims of crime or accidents. Such legal developments
might seem extreme or a long way off yet, but when one considers the institution of
‘Jury Duty’- long a basic part of the Western judicial system- then such additional
citizen roles might seem to be a logical extension. Also, in the technological and
terrorist threatened environment we live today, web-based tools exist to facilitate
feedback mechanisms and social alienation (such as those which lead to the ‘bystander
effect’) may need legislative remedies. Such changes can be seen as a kind of public
outsourcing which saves money and promotes efficiency in government. Neither can
such methods be considered purely ‘Western’ in origin, as they echo perhaps exactly
what was meant by the Chinese philosopher Mozi when he elucidated upon the concept
of jian’ai (兼爱) or universal love. In the Daodejing, chapter 9 there’s another warning
against selfishness ‘when the rich upper classes are haughty, their legacy indicts them’.
①
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/citizenship
②
Shi, Tianjian. Cultural Values and Democracy in the People’s Republic of China, e China Quarterly, 2000 (162)
p.540.
③
4.4 Ren and Citizenship
Confucius describes ren in chapter 17, verse 6 of The Analects; “You are humane
(ren) if you can practice five things in the world: respectfulness, magnanimity,
truthfulness, acuity, and generosity”①I propose that ren has much in common with
concepts like civic duty or citizen consciousness that have developed in democratic
systems. According to Wei-ming Tu ‘Never for a moment does a gentleman quit the way
of ren …in the Neo-Confucian tradition the "becoming process" is not just "functional,"
or merely a means to an end; it is also "substantial" in the sense that the "becoming" is
an end, or even an ultimate end in itself’. The process of democratization and
humanization under ren reflect similar properties of valuing life above power. Also,
through universal suffrage, Democracy can be seen to encapsulate a form of ren-like
morality, whereby the process of self-realization that Wei-ming Tu refers to is pursued
under the principle of universal reach-ability. Just as in Democracies one is expected to
respect other citizens views and each person has one vote to decide the governing party,
according to Tu, ‘the mind of ren… is intrinsic to every human being’.②
Also, just as ‘the Neo-Confucian philosophers concept of ren… must in practice be
closely related to a given situation’, so with democratic citizenship, it is developed and
depends on constant cultivation through actions in concrete situations. Wing-tsit Chan's
third characterization of ren as sociality is most relevant in this connection③. He goes on
‘li means the standards of this world, whereas ren means the summons to choice and
answerability. Li signifies the fact that a man lives in society; ren points to the equally
important fact that he is more than the intersection of social forces. He feels himself
summoned to choose, to actualize a potential selfhood which is more than the sum of
genes, plus glands, plus class’. According to Mou Tsung-san, ren needs "windows" to
expose itself to the outside world, otherwise it will become suffocated ④. Windows
equals role of media- traditionally seen as an important element of a democratic society,
but more often being blamed nowadays for a descent into commercialism and relativity.
Static definitions and translations of ren include as "benevolence," "love," "altruism,"
"kindness," "perfect virtue," "goodness," "human-heartedness," "humanity". Citizen
①
②
Wei-mingTu, The Creative Tension Between Ren and Li, p.32
③
Ibid, p.34
④
Ibid, p.37
consciousness in its broadness sense, where one sees oneself as part of a community of
fellow human beings whom are expected to help each other in all reasonable ways,
might be said to share these definitions. Wing-tsit Chan goes on to say that "Generally
speaking, there can be no doubt that jen (or ren) is love for all." ① While others equate
universal love as only the beginning of Ren ②. Chu Hsi also shares similar view in
saying "jen is the principle of love and the virtue/power of the heart/mind" ③. Similarly,
Xinzhong Yao argues that jen is not only an ethical commitment, but, also "the universal
principle that aims at integrating all beings and all people." The greatest contribution
that Confucius made to the understanding of jen is…his redefinition of jen as love and
his refinement of such love as ethical commitment and metaphysical principle. In this
love Confucian secularism and transcendentalism are integrated④.
The parallels between ren (or jen) and civic duty or a kind of gentlemanly or
‘impartial’ behavior are extensive. For example ‘A man of jen is respectful in private
life, earnest in handling affairs, and loyal in his association with people"⑤. A man of jen
seeks jen so eagerly that "when it comes to jen, he will compete even with his teacher".
He cherishes jen so highly that he "will never seek to live at the expense of jen and
would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize it" ⑥. "The man of jen, wishing to
establish his own character, also seeks to establish the character of others. Wishing to
succeed, he also seeks to help others succeed. To be able to judge of others by what is in
ourselves, this may be the method of achieving jen" ⑦. Jen is when man puts impartiality
into practice. With impartiality, one can accommodate both others and himself.
Therefore, a man of jen (or ren) has both altruism and love. Altruism is the application
of jen, while love is its function⑧. The same may be said for citizenship.
The neo-Confucians updated common conceptions of ren near the turn of the 20 th
century. Cheng Hsiian's definition that 'jen' is people living together’, while T'an Ssii-
t'ung (1865-1898), identified jen with a metaphysical force or "energy of mind”, that
makes all things equal while containing no conflicts or contradictions.⑨. Fung Yu-Lan
claims that Ren is a higher existence because it is a "spiritual attitude." In this higher
①
②
③
Ibid, p.299
④
Ibid, p.304
⑤
Ibid, p.298
⑥
⑦
Ibid, p.300
⑧
Ibid, p.312
⑨
Ibid, p.317
realm the self is transcended, and there is no longer any distinction between the self and
the Great Whole. This kind of communitarian citizenship is in harmony with Christian
compassion. There is also much evidence to suggest that many European intellectuals
(e.g. Voltaire, Leibniz, Christian Wolff) saw Confucianism as an inspiration and guide
toward a kind of democratic secularism during the period known as The Enlightenment.
This Confucian influence probably contributed the evolution of modern concepts like
citizenship and the rule of law that are part of the social contract in Western countries.
So many shared and similar ideas indicate conceptual exchange and evidence the
compatibility of modern democratic and Confucian thinking.
4.6 The Future of Political Confucianism in China
In the 21st century, with global communications technology, international

economic interdependence, discount airlines and cross-border high speed railways, we
are living in a different world from the one where indigenous culture formed and
developed in past centuries. Confucianism, as a system of belief, successfully balanced
social forces to foster political sustainability, while also inspiring aspirations toward
self- improvement. At the same time though it subtly tied people down to conventional
norms in a way that hindered social development. Today, adaptation and renewal is
required for Confucianism to continue to exert meaningful influence in the global
environment.
While predictions have been made of a clash of civilizations, the obvious deep and
profound historical overlaps between different civilizations make such ideas seem rather
fanciful. Borders around the world are arbitrary people share basic values that unite
humanity in fundamental ways. People are using tools like Wikipedia to better inform
themselves and are waking up to shared global predicaments, finding ways to cooperate
and deter governments from building walls and fencing people off physically and
psychologically from each other. As Liu Binyan has said ‘no culture is an island’①.
China’s increasing global influence means her humanist Confucian traditions have
potential to contribute much once again. Wei-ming Tu talks about the need for a global
ethic mindful of…sympathy, civility, duty-consciousness, dignity of person, sense of
intrinsic worth, and self-cultivation. As A.T Nuyen said, Confucianism “is neither a
villain blocking the progress of universal justice, a necessary condition for conflict-free
①
Liu Binyan, Civilization Grafting: No Culture is an Island, p
globalization, nor a helpless victim of that progress” ① According to Judith Berling,

Confucianism has ‘taken on a new guise as a critical participant in the search for values
and understandings of the human situation in the contemporary world ②. Tu Wei-ming
asserts “we are intrinsically free, and our freedom… is the only thing that demands and
deserves respect”③. To the extent that Chinese citizens feel captive or subject to
arbitrary authority, they may look for alternatives or ‘opt out’ of the growth process.
That’s why government must act as the servant of the people, placing them on a pedestal
rather than treating them as children. As Confucius said in chapter 2, verse 7 “without
respect, what is the difference?” Allowing more people to participate in election of
government officials would be just such a gesture of respect. Given that Confucius was
not a populist, his version of democracy would be one where people are lead to make
sensible judgments, not based on purely selfish or financial interests, but partly affected
by group standards, as expected of democratic citizens. The uplifting, aspirational
aspects Confucian teachings, as well as scientific standards, could be applied to assess
which mechanisms of Western Liberal Democracy are compatible with China’s future
democratic reforms.
Other quotes attributed to Confucius which express more totalitarian views of
governance, are probably a product of the pre-Christian period in which he lived, rather
than the views of the man himself. However such statements could theoretically provide
justification to those who would like to promote a brand of political Confucianism that
re-establishes a fixed-relationship hierarchical society, under the auspices of social
stability. This would appear to contradict the Confucian teaching, （ dizibubiburushi,
shibubixianyudizi 弟子不必不如师，师不必贤于弟子） ‘ the student is not
necessarily inferior to the teacher, the teacher is not necessarily more virtuous than the
student’. When the norm of submitting to hierarchical norms is absolute, society
operates in a way similar to a military and independent creativity is harmed. Daodejing
chapter 61 it begins ‘A great nation flows downward into intercourse with the world’
and finishes with the line ‘The great should be below’.
As stated by Tianjin Shi, “younger people in China are more concerned about
political and governmental affairs than older people because they are better educated
and/or have higher incomes”④. So they are naturally more inclined to push for
①
A.T Nuyen, Confucianism, Globalization and the Idea of Universalism, p.75
②
Ibid, p.224
③
Wei-ming Tu, Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality
④
democratic reform than their elders. What a modern interpretation of Confucianism can
do is to build a bridge across generation gaps to connect public sentiment with political
power and help build a broad-based movement for political change. It can also more
directly assist with the kind of ‘elite mobilization’ which Shi concludes is most needed
in order for democratization to occur.
Yu Keping explains in the book Chinese Scholars Discuss Democracy and the Rule
of Law a little about how Democracy could occur in China. Incremental democracy
theory, that aims toward a major reform of democratic governance, suggests that in
order to reach this aim, practical political power is required that is gained through the
support from the vast majority of people and political elites and has a wide ranging
social basis.①Furthermore the idea of administration and good governance is extremely
important to China's political reform. Good governance political reform is extremely
meaningful, and, as a basic aim of China’s future political development this reform
should move towards and be suitable to the socialist market economic
system.②Confucius statement in The Analects 9.19 can be understood as advocating
determination through the process of the main task (e.g. democratization) “even if I
have only dumped one basketful of earth, at least I am moving forward.” In part 13.12
he is quoted “If a true king were to arise, it would certainly be a generation before we
saw a return to ren.” Thus, even in the situation where there’s a ‘true king’ as ruler, real
change takes time to be achieved.
①
俞可平，《中国学者论民主与法治》，重庆出版社，2008 年，第 13 页
②
Chapter 5: Sustainability of Taoguangyanghui: How should China relate to the world?
Chapter 5: Sustainability of Taoguangyanghui: How

should China relate to the world?
5.1 Background to Taoguangyanghui
‘Taoguangyanghui’(韬光养晦), which means keeping a low profile on the international

stage, was first put forward by Deng Xiaoping in late 1989 as part of a 28 character, 7
phrase foreign policy strategy. This strategic guidance included ‘never becoming the
leader’ and ‘make some contributions① and ‘hegemonism endangers world peace and
stability’②. This policy was continued by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and its efficacy
was strongly defended by Wen Jiabao in 2007. Deng Xiaoping, before promoting this
policy in the early 1980s, predicted from overall strategic estimates that China would
have 'several decades of peace' to grasp the opportunity to develop our own country, and
take economic construction as a central task and carry on resource allocation in
domestic China③. So, although Chinese policy and international situation interact each
other④, the central purpose of the taoguangyanghui policy was to allow China to focus
its energy and resources on economic development As Deng described when launching
his ‘peaceful development’ policy, ‘at present, the general international situation is
peace and mild stability. While war, turmoil and tenseness still exists in places, since
peace and development is still the theme of this time, therefore peace and development
should be the basic principle of our diplomatic policy strategy.⑤ When confronted with
upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s, Deng
advocated that China maintain its own (independent) view, respect the choices of other
people and do not artificially ( 人为地 ) set ourselves against others. Deng later
recommended that China should not let other countries problems affect it. Though
China has international ambitions… China just wants to avoid getting into trouble and
becoming other countries target⑥. From such statements it’s clear that Deng advocated
moving with the times and staying away from Cold War politics, meddling in foreign
countries conflicts and making enemies of other nations. The question is, have times
changed or was Deng wrong to pursue this policy in the first place? I’d suggest not.
However, in the face of nationalist pressure this policy has come under more and more
pressure from commentators in China and internationally who doubt its purpose and
①
Quansheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, p.114
②
Fei-Ling Wang, Preservation, Prosperity and Power: What motivates China’s foreign policy?, p.675
③
曲星,《邓小平外交思想的现实意义》，世界经济与政治 2004 年第 11 期，第 15 页
④
⑤
⑥
efficacy and suggest it should be abandoned and replaced with a greater role in the
international system.① Analysis of Chinese historical political culture indicates parallels
with concepts of non-interference, the kingly way of rule by virtue (opposition to
hegemonism), and taoguangyanghui②. Even Morgenthau is said to have observed that
imperial China did not primarily rely on military expansion but rather upon “the
establishment of subtle and complex tributary relationships between herself and her
neighbours.” and since ‘China has worked hard through official rhetoric and diplomatic
practice to promote a view of itself as a new kind of great power, one that lacks
aggressive intent’ ③, then there’s a strong argument for caution when reviewing policies.
Chinese scholars and policy analysts argue that China’s independent, non-ideological
foreign policy has made China appealing.④
5.2 Defining Interests
As Yan Xuetong states in the article how to evaluate national interests ‘the law of
uneven development would suggest that a country’s national interests are never static
but are changing against the backdrops of the external environment, one’s capabilities,
technology, and self-evaluation.’. While China has in recent times been a staunch
defender of state sovereignty, Xin Qi describes a China standing ‘between being an
emerging regional power and one that increasingly sees itself as the natural leader in
East Asia, broadly defined.⑤ While some authors claim China is simultaneously seeking
three goals of preservation, power (prestige) and prosperity through its foreign policy ⑥,
the question remains how can China gain respect and esteem through changing
circumstances in international affairs? Is a wuwei-style foreign policy the answer? At a
speech given at Tsinghua University by director of the policy planning department of
the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cai Run, explained that he felt the policy will bring
greater rewards at a future time, but he was not specific about what these benefits would
be. He stressed the need for consistency in foreign policy-making and for planners to
take a long-term view. Once China achieved developed country status, this policy would
continue to bear fruit, he asserted.
As calls have become more and more widespread for China to take a greater
role in world affairs, to some extent these calls have been heeded, e.g. with the
participation of the Chinese navy in anti-piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden. But there
remains a strong grouping within the Chinese foreign policy establishment which is
①
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/14/world-needs-more-active-china/g3f8
②
Ronald C. Keith, The Origins and Strategic Implications of China’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, International
Journal, Vol.41, No.1 Winter 1985-86, p.114
③
Yanzhong Huang and Shen Ding, Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power, East Asia, Winter 2006,
Vol.23, No.4, p.28-29
④
Hongying Wang & Yeh-Chung Lu, The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of
China and Taiwan, Journal of Contemporary China, 17:56, p.429
⑤
Yan Xuetong,, 战略与管理, no.3 1996, p.35-44， quoted in Confronting the Bush Doctrine,p.118
⑥
Fei-Ling Wang, Preservation, Prosperity and Power: What motivates China’s foreign policy?
skeptical of such calls and highly resistant to China participating more with the
‘international community’. This resistance is perhaps understandable given China’s past
record as an underdeveloped, communist-led country standing against exploitation by
more wealthy nations as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). China does not
wish to appear to be ‘selling out’ to rich nations by joining them in acts of interference
against unstable or violent regimes in poor countries. Other Chinese sources explain that
China exact foreign policies will evolve in interaction with the international situation ①.
But many also state also that peace and development must be the basis of China’s
diplomatic strategy formation because it is consistent with the 5 principles of peaceful
co-existence first put forward by Zhou Enlai.
5.3 Increasing calls for more assertive global policy
Criticism of the taoguangyanghui policy includes that it is ‘risk-averse’ foreign policy

that remains ‘basically conservative, pragmatic, pro status-quo, and reactive’ ②. As
Daniel Bell indicates ‘the realities and responsibilities of being a great power are
gradually rendering preoccupation with state sovereignty obsolete. ‘To each his own’ in
international affairs no longer makes any sense.③ At a recent public debate at Tsinghua
University, professor Yan Xuetong explained that the Taoguangyanghui policy ‘has
failed to produce a better environment for China’s rise’ and was therefore open to
serious question. Meanwhile, in a recent public talk titled China’s Global Role 2.0:
Keeping a High Profile Professor Wang Yizhou from Peking University School of
International Studies asserted that, while previously China had been a ‘free-rider’ in the
international system, the time has come for the low profile to be revised. This is because
of Chinas increasing interests around the world that require a proportionately increased
role. For example, he pointed out that foreign ministry has only 6500 staff, making it
akin to a xiaomadache(小马大车), or a small horse pulling a large wagon (i.e. is under-
resourced). According to him, the government should allow private companies,
businesses and individuals to play a greater role.
While, In 2012 Hu Jintao called for greater UN involvement in world affairs④,more
recently, president Xi has reiterated China’s commitment to assisting Africa as a
development partner, promising to stay in Africa for the long term. While a spokesman
for the Chinese embassy in Fiji, Hu Lihua, recently stated "China does not pose a
military threat to any other country…China opposes all forms of hegemonism and
power politics", voices in the region are not so sure about China’s intentions. At a recent
meeting of pacific country aid donors the group released the statement ‘Noting China’s
growing military power and its emerging role in the region, participants agreed that
①
曲星，邓小平外交思想的现实意义,, p.17
②
Fei-Ling Wang (2005), Preservation, Prosperity and Power: what motivates China’s foreign policy?, Journal of
Contemporary China, 14:45, p.670
③
Daniel A Bell, War, Peace and China’s Soft Power: A Confucian Approach, Diogenes 2009 56:26, p.28
④
http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7880655.html
while China’s visibility had increased rapidly, there remained uncertainty over what it
was seeking to achieve.’①. Though this group may not representative all pacific nations,
the sentiments they express are quite common and they may take a toll on China’s
diplomatic efforts, especially if China’s continues ambitious expansion of foreign
policies initiatives without analogous increases in policy transparency and openness
about intentions.
5.4 Taoist and Confucian Foreign Policy
The Taoist Daodejing seems to take quite a clear position on the matter of the
relative efficacy of Taoguangyanghui in Chapter 61, stating ‘by being lower than a great
nation, a small nation takes a great nation’. In chapter 48 the same text beseeches
‘Taking the world is always done by not making anything of it. For when something is
made of it, that is not enough to take the world.’ ② These proverbs seem to advocate a
Taoguangyanghui, low-profile approach to foreign policy, and also have parallels with
‘Soft Power’ as promoted by Professor Joseph Nye- who notably referred to Taoism
when discussing the meaning of soft power③. Furthermore, Chapter 28 follows a similar
tone ‘be humble to the world and eternal power never leaves…be open to the world, and
eternal power suffices’④. This appears to advocate both a humble and open outlook.
According to Soft Power logic, China should maintain relative consistency in its
conduct of foreign policy in order to attract loyalty from other countries toward its
principled positions. Following wuwei logic, China may maintain its current
taoguangyanghui policy, while maintaining active bi-lateral and multi-lateral
engagement internationally. The principle of weiwuwei may justify overt global action
in exceptional circumstances, but wuwei implies non-intervention as the rule. In this
sense, limited operations could be justified to secure Chinese nationals and deter
criminals, but extended operations and any kind of ‘nation-building’ exercises would
have to be avoided.
President Xi Jinping is also known to have recently (March 19th 2013) given his
own voice to Taoist wisdom and quoted the Daodejing (Ch. 60), saying “governing a
great nation is like cooking little fish” (“ 治大国如烹小鲜 ” )⑤. While this statement is
highly relevant to China’s domestic policy, it also has implications in its foreign policy.
Coupling this statement with a well-known English idiom, we might imagine that China
is choosing to ‘be a small fish in a big pond’ (of the world) rather than a ‘big fish in a
small pond’ (of East Asia), and thus preserving its global aspirations⑥.
①
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Pacific_relations
②
③
http://english.pku.edu.cn/News_Events/News/Focus/9305.htm
④
⑤
http://www.sjzdaily.com.cn/newscenter/2013-03/21/content_1745252.htm
⑥
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/big-fish-in-a-small-pond.html
Many of Chinas neighbors have been influenced profoundly by Confucian culture.

In an era of public diplomacy, the use of Confucian culture to promote Chinese values,
and relationships in the region may be essential to a successful foreign policy. Already
with 320 Confucius institutes in 96 countries around the world as of 2011 ①, such
international efforts should continue, matched with more public Confucian initiatives at
home to increase credibility and effectiveness. It should also be remembered that Deng
had a friendly policy with Japan, a nation strongly influenced by Confucians (especially
Wang Yangming) and as author Ma Li Cheng recently wrote ‘there is no future for
hatred’. Mencius shared similar sentiments, and his philosophy of ‘minben’ (or people
as foundation) may still have much relevance for the future of China’s soft power. This
theory is related by Daniel Bell, ‘There is a way to gain the whole world. It is to gain
the people, and having gained them one gains the whole world. There is away to gain
the people. Gain their hearts and minds, and then you gain them.’②
5.5 Informal vs. Formal Diplomacy
Although China appears relatively isolated in international terms, at least from a

security perspective, having concluded formal alliances with very few countries; this is
perhaps misleading when one is considering her true foreign policy ‘capital’. This is
because China not only has strong trade and investment links with a very large number
of countries worldwide, she also has built-up exceptional informal diplomatic
relationships around the world and has the added advantage of a widely-spread ethnic
Chinese Diaspora, some of whom still have strong connections to the mainland. The
development of such ‘de-facto’ relationships has been a relatively consistent feature of
Chinese diplomacy historically. One consequence of this relatively ‘ad-hoc’ approach to
foreign policy is that China comes under criticism for the lack of disclosure with regard
to China’s aid③. While they retain an element of fluidity and unpredictability, which can
be said to reflect Chinese conceptions of nature, the effect of such mutually beneficial
international understandings can at times be as significant as more formally agreed
undertakings. So China’s diplomatic strength may well be much stronger than many
people assume. On the other hand, such informally imagined relationships may also be
more inclined to evaporate without warning in times of pressure. So the stakes are high.
5.6 South-East Asia: China’s historic Backyard
Influence in the East Asian region- and especially in Southeast Asia, is key for China’s
long term foreign policy strategy. Authors point out that China’s strategies have led to
①
Heng Pheakdey (2012), Cambodia-China Relations: A Positive Sum Game?, p.71
②
③
the rise of its soft power in Southeast Asia to such an extent that it appears to be
outpacing the influence of Japan, Taiwan, and even the US in the region. ① Martin Stuart
Fox points out that history and culture are central to any understanding of the likely
future shape of China –Southeast Asia relations②. Historically, relationships with the
region were governed by reciprocal tributary trading arrangements that were based on a
Chinese assumption of imperial centrality. This tributary system, which explains Daniel
Bell, was based on a Confucian-Mencian discourse, did help create stability and ‘curb
the excesses of bloodthirsty warriors and greedy merchants’.③The strategy of recent
decades- i.e. prioritizing economic development, trade, agriculture and more recently
co-operation in water resource management and law-enforcement has seen significant
win-win benefits accrue, particularly in the overall living standards in the region.
Sensitive issues like the Spratly Islands and Mekong dams should be dealt with in ways
that help to assuage memories of past wars including the 1979 Chinese attack on
Vietnam and the Haw Wars of the late 19th century④. The case of Cambodia for example
is a rare victory for China in foreign affairs, but the friendship has in the past cost that
country a lot in terms of upheaval and suffering. Hun Sen described China as
Cambodia’s ‘most trustworthy friend’.
As discussed recently on an ABC radio national program, some leading experts see
a great degree of strategic mistrust between China and other powerful states in Asia ⑤.
‘Perhaps the most worrying trend there is the China/Vietnam situation⑥. There is
something of a quiet arms race occurring in East Asia. Statistics show that between
2008 and 2012 the Asian region accounted for almost half of the global imports of
major conventional weapons, while over the same period the volume of Chinese arms
exports rose by 162 per cent⑦. Some observers are expecting military expenditure levels
to continue to rise. ‘Vietnam's increases in military spending are very clearly directed
towards China. They are spending a lot on major naval equipment. This means there
may well be an asymmetric arms race going on between the two in the South China
Sea.’ China has been criticized for using rather blunt tactics to avoid discussion of
South China Sea issues at the ASAEN summit in April 2012 ⑧. The sustainability of
such aggressive tactics is questionable, and more determined engagement with
Southeast Asian neighbors at the people-to-people level would probably provide better
long term results. Thailand is a good example of China’s civilizational norms in foreign
policy, with sources pointing to how ‘Chineseness’ has been assimilated into ‘Thai-
①
China and Taiwan, Journal of Contemporary China, 17:56, p. 441
②
Martin Stuart-Fox, Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2004),abstract
③
④
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haw_wars
⑤
Rory Medcalf, the director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in
Sydney, from: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/futuretense/military-expenditure/4672124
⑥
DrPerlo Freeman, from ibid
⑦
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/futuretense/military-expenditure/4672124
⑧
ness’. A model of similarly successful cross-cultural communication is provided in the

appendix.
5.7 Overall Strategies for the future
The International Relations scholar John Mearsheimer has suggested that the question
that comes first for China is whether she aims to become a great power (superpower)
with global reach, a pre-dominant regional player, or merely aims to share its
neighborhood with other powers? In the post-cold war world, Chinese global
perspectives revolve around consistent themes of multi-polarity, a greater role in world
affairs, state sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs’①. Exactly what this
means however is hard to tell. How can China play a greater role in the world while not
interfering in other countries, given that multilateralism has limitations?
Despite these new emerging voices calling for a change to China’s low profile
policy, China must be very careful about charting a new course because of potential for
all kinds of severe unintended consequences. How a country implements its values and
policies can enhance its image and perceived legitimacy②. Many questions remain such
as are Chinese people themselves ready for a much greater global role for the country?
Could a more globally interventionist policy lead to the sacrifice of future soft power
(for example in democratic Africa) potential? Could the one-party state, perhaps seeing
outside distractions as an opportunity to bolster their domestic popular support against
threats to their power, be influencing the push toward a more active global role?
I suggest China follow Li principles in foreign affairs, and aim to keep the peace
instead of fully embracing an anarchic principle that has highly unpredictable outcomes.
As China’s regional leadership clams are based on cultural and philosophical affinities,
therefore cultural renewal should be emphasized in order to gain respect and recognition
from neighbors in an era of Democracy. A major weakness right now is Chinas
‘invisible exports’, currently can’t compete on a superpower level, but that means, with
the right strategy, there’s much potential future growth of this power element.
‘In a more open, richer, and more confident China, the popular power aspiration
may inevitably push Beijing to ask for more influence, demand more presence and gains
in the international community.’③ My advice would be that this should be managed
slowly. Despite the fact that China, as a nation, is now secure and enjoying at least a
nominal status as a great power in the world, a persisting sense of frustration, insecurity
and even victimization still seems to color people’s feelings about themselves and about
China’s relations with Western powers. As George Washington once said “Permanent,
①
Chapter 5 of Confronting the Bush Doctrine, p.117
②
Vol.23, No.4, p.27
③
Fei-Ling Wang (2005), Preservation, Prosperity and Power: what motivates China’s foreign policy?, Journal of
Contemporary China, 14:45, p.690
inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachment to others,

should be avoided.”①Nor are noisy public protests or ‘loudspeaker diplomacy’ the right
way to conduct diplomacy and can lead to events spinning out of control. Neither are
they in-line with the spirit of wuwei.
Overall, while recalling that CASS director Ma Hong once stated ‘the
implementation of the policy of opening up to the world and expanding economic and
technological exchange with foreign countries is the firm and resolute strategic principle
of China’②, The author suggests a maintenance of the taoguangyanghui policy in an
altered form that acknowledges changes in the international situation that have taken
place since the policy was first launched. At the same time, China should seek to
reassure other nations that it won’t engage in hegemonic behavior and instead plan to
leverage its cultural connections to the region (including those shaped by Taoism,
Confucianism and Buddhism) by sincerely engaging in cross-cultural exchange and
joint study projects. Such efforts are likely to pay significant long term dividends.
Please note, a table analyzing the costs and benefits of continuing this policy is in the
appendix.
①
quoted by Owen Harries in Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, p.240
②
Ronald C. Keith, The Origins and Strategic Implications of China’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy’, International
Journal, Vol.41, No.1 Winter 1985-86, p.127
Chapter 6: Interview Results and Analysis
6.1 Introduction
This primary data survey sought out responses to 23 questions (see appendix) regarding
their views and preferences on topics of Chinese traditional culture, China’s political
and economic reform and democratization. Whether China should aim to reform
towards a more Western-style democratic system, and if so, when, has been under
question for more than two decades. Comparing data collected by a survey done today
with data from one conducted earlier during the reform process should theoretically
show a transformation in people’s views occurring alongside the profound changes in
people material conditions, indicating the effect of reforms on ‘liberating minds’ (as
Deng Xiaoping claimed to be seeking).The survey below asked some similar questions
to the survey carried out for this paper (results after), therefore a comparison may able
to shed some light on whether significant changes have occurred.
6.1.1 Survey conducted by Tianjin Shi in 1993
Data on surveys of public opinion in China is quite scarce, but records from a survey
conducted by Tianjin Shi in 1993 present a mixed picture of ‘progressive’ values as well
as continuing conservatism. According to that survey, a majority of Chinese supported
reform of both the political and the economic systems. 60 per cent of respondents
supported private ownership and opposed government restrictions on income inequality.
A majority of respondents (57.5 per cent) also believed that China needed political
reform①. 27.6 per cent of people surveyed reported they tried to seek information from
unofficial channels②. China at that time had a higher rate of reading and listening to
newspapers reports and discussing politics with family and friends than Italy (but was
lower than the UK and Germany in these measures)③. Meanwhile, the level of civic
competence in mainland China was higher than that in Italy and Mexico. According to
those results, overall political attitudes in China are not inconsistent with those of some
democratic countries, and a majority of Chinese support reform of both the political and
the economic systems. This is encouraging for prospects of democratization in China.
However, other results in the survey indicate that democratization in China may have to
be led from the top. This is because in a democratic system citizens view their
①
②
Ibid, p543
③
Ibid p.544-45
relationship with the state as a reciprocal one. But in 1993 a majority of people
perceived the relationship between the individual and the state as hierarchical, and less
than 15 per cent perceived their relationship with authority to be reciprocal ①. Later
surveys also conducted in mainland China by Tianjin Shi showed rather alarmingly that
‘42% of survey participants in China had no idea what Democracy means’ and that this
‘suggests that a democratic transition in China is unlikely to happen in the near future’.
②
On the relationship between Confucianism and Democracy, surveys conducted in
South Korea in 2001 found that certain Confucian values undermine democratic values,
others support it, and still others have no effect ③. Meanwhile, higher education
consistently resulted in increased support for democratization in the same survey.④
6.1.2 Survey Background
The total number of respondents was 24. These were made up of 5Tsinghua university
professors, 8 working-age adults of professional background and 11 university students,
of which 8 were from Tsinghua University. While all professors were male, a majority
of other respondents were female, and most respondents were younger than 30. The
specific questions asked are listed in the appendix. The answers of respondents when
asked about their political and economic views and preferences should be understood in
the context of the current stage of China’s reform process. Reform has reached a point
where people now have much more economic freedom than previously and popular
(though not genuinely multiparty) elections have been introduced at the village level ⑤.
However in more recent years, much emphasis has been placed on stability, with the
internal security budget now higher than that for the entire military. Claims are
sometimes made (e.g. by cadres) that instituting democracy in China would inevitably
produce chaos, and therefore can’t be attempted in the short-medium term. Historical
factors may support this argument to some degree, and some commentators, such as
Benjamin Herscovitch who have recently argued that the CCP has ‘given the Chinese
more personal freedom than they have enjoyed at almost any time in their nation’s
thousands of years of history’, expect that the CCP will be able to maintain power
virtually indefinitely while maintaining economic growth and carrying out minor
incremental reforms⑥. Fei-Ling Wang also predicts ‘the one-party rule by the CCP in
the PRC appears formidable, at least for the near future.’⑦
China is a diverse country, and data from this survey reflects prevailing attitudes
①
Shi Tianjin, Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy, p.548
②
Shi Tianjin and Jie Lu, The Shadow of Confucianism, Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 4,
October 2010, pp.128
③
Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christoper Soper, The Effect of Confucian Values on Support for Democracy and Human Rights
in Taiwan, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, No.1, p.145
④
Ibid, p.151
⑤
Shi Tianjin, Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy, p.550
⑥
Benjamin Herscovitch, Foreign Policy Analysis, No.8, October 2013, p.12
⑦
Fei-Ling Wang, Preservation, Prosperity and Power: What motivates China’s foreign policy?, p.677
only in the capital, Beijing (although many participants were from elsewhere). As the
political center, it is a place where debates over democratization have turned to protest
in the past. The public views of many Beijing leaders on this issue are quite clear. Jiang
Zemin said in an interview in 2003, “Should China apply the parliamentary democracy
of the Western world, the only result will be that 1.2 billion Chinese people will not
have enough to eat… The result will be great chaos.” ①
A number of questions in the survey relate to the role of Confucian, Taoist and also
Buddhist thought in the reform program as well as Chinese life in general today. Interest
among respondents may indicate a rise in faith belief in general. As stated in Essential
Readings in Comparative Politics ‘faith is not a fundamental factor in democratic
government…but it is vital in a one-party state… What other justification can one
leader or one party have to monopolize government power?’②
One of the last questions in the interviews broached the topic of corruption. The
scale of this problem in China was made clear in a story published by the Southern
Weekly (南方周末) newspaper on 26th September 2013③. The story explained that in an
analysis of ‘grey income’ (meaning irregular or unidentified income, a typical indicator
of corrupt activities) as a percentage of total income of 7 different groups ranging from
the lowest paid to the highest paid, results showed that the highest paid group obtains by
far the largest proportion of their income from ‘grey’ sources. According to this data,
from a survey of almost 6000 people from towns and cities in 18 different Chinese
provinces, the highest paid bracket of people received more than half, or precisely
53.5% of their income from unknown sources. This is a large jump up from the level of
the next highest income bracket (who obtain 18.5% from grey sources), and results
show, when moving down the 7 pay brackets from highest to lowest income, a steadily
decreasing percentage of income is obtained from grey sources, with the lowest level
obtaining only 1% of their income from grey sources. This seems to be a fairly clear
indication that people at or near the top of the economic ladder in today’s China are the
one’s benefitting the most from transactions that may be putting others at a
disadvantage, and thereby distorting incentives.
6.1.3 Interview Method and Respondents
The interview method used in this research was open-ended interviews, with a total of
23 questions, of which approximately half were yes/no or multiple choice answers,
while the other half were open response- i.e. using both a qualitative and quantitative
format. The relatively open format gave respondents a chance to elaborate by providing
more information in relation to any of the question whenever they felt it relevant or
necessary and to skip questions on which they felt unqualified or unable to speak. The
①
②
Ibid, p.358
③
王小鲁，灰色收入又三年，南方周末，2013.9.26, p.24
yes/no and multiple choice questions made for convenient quantitative analysis of the
results (see appendix).
6.2 Analysis of Responses
Overall, there was a generalized consensus on the need for continued reform- both
economic and political. Respondents consistently agreed that the benefits of both
economic and political reform outweighed the risks. Regarding the current situation,
people were more confident about the pace of economic reform than they were about
the pace of political reform. Approximately half of respondents (when given a choice
between moving forward/stagnating/going backwards) said they felt political reforms
were stagnating, while most respondents saw economic reform as moving forward.
Comments indicated that people were not sure of just what form economic reforms
would take, and they thought the process of reform may be difficult. Prospects for
political reform were seen as even less clear.
Most respondents agreed there are significant connections when comparing wowed
and the Invisible Hand of the Free-Market and Confucian li and ren with Democratic
concepts such as Rule of Law and Citizenship, while others thought the connections
were limited only, and some did not see any direct connection at all. Recognition of a
connection was more commonly accepted with regard to the Wuwei-Invisible Hand link
than with the Confucianism and Democracy connection, with a number of people
stating they saw no direct link between Confucianism and Democracy. Perhaps such
perspectives can be partly explained by the varying emphasis placed on political and
economic reform priorities in recent years (see conclusions).
In response to a question about the possibility of another Cultural Revolution (as
warned of by Wen Jiabao in 2012), the majority were unconvinced that this was a
serious possibility and a significant number of them stated plainly that such a turn of
events would have disastrous consequences and therefore would not be allowed to
happen. A couple of the younger students, while they did not expect such kind of events
to recur, were positive about the chance such changes would provide to help overcome
systematic problems like bureaucratism and corruption. All those who responded in any
detail to this question agreed that if something similar occurred today if would be quite
different in nature to the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong.
When questioned about the relation of 3 well-known Communist party leaders to
Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, respondents were almost uniformly reluctant to
associate those leaders with traditional philosophies (one person agreed that Hu Jintao
could be described as a Confucian). This may indicate a successful secularization of
politics, or alternatively, a perceived incompatibility or lack of integration between
political norms and traditional philosophical norms.
The most controversial question in the survey (i.e. the one that most divided
opinions) related to whether Confucius, if he was alive today, would or wouldn’t
advocate further democratizing political reforms. The question may seem like an
impossible hypothetical, but if we recognize that the spirit of Confucianism can be
surmised through the outlook of Confucius himself, then the question is really seeking
respondents views about the potential application of the original spirit of that belief
system in today’s China. Results showed an almost 50/50 split of views between those
who thought he would advocate such reform and those he thought he wouldn’t. Given
that the vast majority (95%) of respondents saw further democratizing political reforms
as beneficial; this result can be partially seen as a vote of confidence or no-confidence
in Confucian ideas themselves. A similar roughly 50/50 split was seen in respondents
answers to a question regarding the possible connection between Confucian concepts of
Li and Ren with Democratic concepts of the Rule of Law and Democratic Citizenship.
When asked to prioritize highest to lowest from 1 to 6among a list of 6 commonly-
cited reform goals, respondents overall showed a higher than expected level of support
for the goals of inner-party democracy and political decentralization. We may assume
that this is because inner-party democracy is perceived as a relatively safe method that
may still produce enough momentum to drive a gradual transition towards multiparty
democracy. Most respondents prioritizing highly inner party democracy corresponds
with the expert view put forward by Yu Keping who writes ‘To deepen democracy in the
party and in the grass-roots level may bring the important breakthrough for the current
development of democratic politics.’① Note: Precise Statistical Analysis of Responses to
quantitative questions can be seen in Appendix 10
6.3 Anecdotal quotes
Three different respondents referred to the principle of ‘Yirenweiben’ or ‘taking people

as the base’ which has origins in the ancient thought of Mengzi who said ‘the people are
more important even than the country and the country is more important than the ruler
( 民为贵，社稷次之，君为轻)②, as being of continued relevance today. This slogan may
be seen displayed on large red banners in cities across China. Other ancient philosophies
which were mentioned as having continued relevance include ‘修身齐家治国平天下’
(meaning ‘self-cultivating, family regulating, state ordering, then the land will be calm
and at peace’) and 得人心者得天下 (meaning ‘win the people’s hearts to win all under
heaven’). A postgraduate arts student put forward the statement that ‘money can’t solve
any of our problems from here’ to suggest that major political reforms were also needed.
Similarly, a reference to the ‘vulgar economics of capitalism’ was made, thus illustrating
a possible undercurrent of resentment towards materialistic and commercializing trends
in some circles. In response to a question about the possibility of another Cultural
Revolution, one respondent (a law student) said ‘I believe this trend will destroy our
country one day, because people do not trust the government’. This recalls Confucius’s
①
俞可平,《中国学者论民主与法治》，重庆出版社，2008 年，第 88 页
②
陈光中,《中华文化与现代法治对话录》，摒弃封建专制糟粕弘扬优秀文化遗产，第 11 页
appeal that winning the trust of the people is most important. One professor warned that
the corruption problem could never be completely eliminated. Meanwhile, several
professors stated that if China adopted a democratic system, the result would be chaos
due to the plethora of competing interest groups. However no businesspeople or student
respondents directly expressed such a view. One respondent drew a comparison between
the recent era of opening up and reform with the journeys of the sailor Zheng He, saying
that if there was another Cultural Revolution now this would be akin to the burning of
the ships and naval yards that occurred when the Ming decided to close its doors to the
outside world.
The comments of several professors were notable. Pointing out the predominance
of Marxist thinking during the era of Deng Xiaoping, one noted ‘opening up and reform
is not based on traditional culture’. Another professor recognized this too but admitted a
definite trend towards traditionalism, pointing out that although most philosophical
inspiration in new China has come from Marxism, the past 20-30 years has seen an
increasing importance of traditional thought. On the matter of Confucian li (rites), one
professor suggested that li principles were not expected to be followed by the ruler
themselves, but only all of the people below them, which is indicating a potential flaw
in the system of Li put forward by Confucius. For example, it is heaven that is supposed
to hold rulers accountable to a system of li, but the incentive for rulers to govern well
were limited when dynastic consequences of misrule were sometimes not felt for a
generation or more. Li was contrasted to the rule of law by one professor who explained
that while li is ‘top-down’ in nature, the rule of law is ‘bottom-up’.
During the survey a point of difference between wuwei and the invisible hand was
put forward. For example, the invisible hand may be conceptualized as a process
whereby everyone, by pursuing personal interests, can lead the group to socially
beneficial outcomes. On the other hand, wuwei has mysterious connotations that
suggest access to a special power for individuals who follow it.
Another reference was made to an ancient principle with continuing relevance
today in ‘Xian li hou fa’ which means using li first, then using the law as a means of
regulating people and the state. This seems to slightly echo a phrase put forward by
Tsinghua history professor Qin Hui called biaorilifa ( 儒表法里 ), meaning
Confucianism on the outside, legalism on the inside. In a historical sense, this suggests
that Confucianism has in the past often been used as the pretext for oppressive forms of
legalism. One professor suggested that the traditional emphasis on social harmony, on
political meritocracy, on self-cultivation should be carried on to future generations. In
terms of reform prospects, it was pointed out that the smaller politburo that just came
into office may make the process of reform easier. The same professor saw meritocratic
reform as a fundamental part of political reform.
When asked to prioritize different reforms, many participants found this
challenging and commented that because the reform process is an interdependent whole,
with the success of different parts depending on the success of other parts, it is very
difficult to place one higher than another in importance. Rather, some participants
reflected that the many reform priorities ought to be pursued concurrently with the
balance of priorities changing in response to the exigencies of the circumstances at the

time. Overall, people, even university professors, often said that they felt unqualified to
answers questions. I would speculate that this is a result of the compartmentalization of
knowledge in specialized economies. On the other hand, respondents, once comfortable,
expressed a variety of views and opinions and were usually quite open to discussion.
6.4 Conclusions
From the interview results, one can observe that most respondents felt it challenging to
conceptually connect in their minds typical norms from Chinese culture and Western
social life. Perhaps this is because of the public discourse which often assumes a
theoretical divide between ‘East’ and ‘West’, as if the two are dialectically opposed to
one another. Given that geographic circumstances and historical records point to long-
standing connection between China and Europe, this thesis may need to be revisited. In
reopening this debate on cultural connectedness, there is also an opportunity for public
education to make people more aware of such connections in future. This might then
inspire more confidence about future political directions (given that respondents
expressed less confidence with regards to continuing political reforms) and
compatibility of competing norms. Combining the Taoist perspective on internal and
external gain and loss (Daodejing Chapter 42) with an analysis of the socially
equalizing outcomes of the Cultural Revolution (as pointed out by one interviewee) may
help students to better understand that era (and reflect further on the relations between
the economic and spiritual worlds).
The choice of decentralization as the no.1 priority (among a list of 6 choices for
China’s reforms) by many respondents is slightly surprising given that decentralization
is a less noticeable part of the official policy discourse. This may indicate that many
people still understand and agree with the basic principle of liberty as the de-
concentration of power. Though people easily saw a significant connection between the
wuwei of Taoism and modern free-market economics, their reluctance to accept any link
between Confucian ideas and Democratic ideals may be due to the prevailing influence
in media of popularly promoted slogans emphasizing the traditional Confucian value of
‘he’ （和） or harmony (implying political stability), While values such as Ren 仁
(benevolence) (which was essentially interpreted in a democratizing way by Confucius)
have not been emphasized as much in propaganda. This imbalance in interpretation of
Confucian ideas means there may be the opportunity for public re-interpretation of
Confucius’s legacy. Given than 95% of people thought further democratic reforms
would be beneficial for China, but less than 50% of people thought Confucius himself,
if alive today, would advocate such reforms, and assuming the effects of nihilistic
consumerism are gradually eroding spiritual beliefs in China, it could be argued that
Confucianism is reaching a crisis point of decline in public faith. Given the current
direction of state policy and economic reforms, this decline in public faith might even
appear statistically irreversible. But, then again, such spiritual matters do tend to defy
statistical measure and in the modern world public opinion often is seen to shift
dramatically in response to the winds of change, so Confucian believers need not lose
hope. Given also that broadly distributed economic prosperity is a sound basis for social
stability and common security, in the long term economic progress is also broadly
supportive of Confucian goals and may actually help facilitate a re-flourishing of
Confucian thinking once other restrictive factors are removed.
Chapter 7: Policy Implications for China
7.1 Taoism and Confucianism: Contradictions or
Compromise?
While national interests have in recent years come to be seen by scholars in China
to embrace cultural interests, with Yan Xuetong arguing that cultural interest is an
important part of national strength and power. Furthermore, he recognized that for
China to be strong it needs to actively promote its traditional culture to ‘enhance the
vitality of modern Chinese culture’①.Philosophies of Taoism and Confucianism,
considered together can be used to explain many of the trends and conflicts that exist in
today’s world. These philosophies express desires for ‘truth’, social mobility and
attempt to explain human interaction with the underlying forces virtue and natural
economic laws described in the Daodejing. The difference between the two lies in their
relative worldliness. Confucian thought helped carry Chinese civilization to a world-
leading role, but it is necessary to evolve with the times. While the liberal ‘wuwei’
philosophy advocated by Laozi, if hastily implemented in today’s China, would
probably create greater inequality (at least in the short term), inequality in China as
measured by the Gini coefficient is already extremely high at more than 0.45. Perhaps
after a period of struggle the other values promoted in the daodejing would have their
chance to take effect and altruistic Confucianism may have a role to play in moderating
the socially undesirable aspects of free-market competition.
As well as promoting frugality (as discussed earlier) the Daodejing actually has
many passages that support naturalist egalitarian ideas. As Cleary says ‘Egalitarian
ideals are very prominent in ancient Taoist social and political thought. Their mode of
class distinction is based on inner qualities of character and wisdom rather than
circumstances of birth’②. Unfortunately, though these ideas may have been applicable in
ancient times, but today, the complex picture of competing interests and political
roadblocks means that there implementation would cause a period of chaos of
proportions difficult to predict.
Zheng Jiadong, a leading Confucian scholar, sees Confucianism finding itself up
against a more serious test than it has ever before encountered. This test cannot be
resolved by shouting stirring slogans about how this next century will be the “Asian
Century” or the “Confucian Century.” This kind of test may provide contemporary
①
Yan Xuetong, An Analysis of China’s National Interest, pp.232-235,249-252
②
Confucianism with an opportunity for transformation and development. A simultaneous

test and opportunity: this is the fundamental reality that Confucianism today must face.①
Zhuangzian thought may offer a useful example of compromise between the worldly
Confucianism and more esoteric Taoism. The sage Zhuangzi criticized fixed forms of
Confucianism which limited people’s imagination and flexibility and stated “the way is
hidden by petty achievements” i.e. supposedly noble Confucian virtues. In a
conversation from the book Zhuangzi where one disciple is asking another about the
discipline of benevolence and righteousness and speaking clearly about right and wrong
the reply is- ‘you have already been tattooed with benevolence and righteousness and
had your nose cut off with right and wrong. Now how are you going to be able to freely
wander along the distant, carefree, transforming path?’② This is a call for flexibility and
greater dependence on natural intuition rather than externally imposed norms. Finally,
from a global power structure viewpoint, I’d venture that conservative Confucianism
has greater parallels with the social democratic tradition of Europe, while Taoist wuwei
is more in line with libertarian American capitalism, and as such moves in either
direction on the domestic front in China may be perceived as leaning to one side in that
tri-polar configuration.
7.2 Implications for Political and Economic Policies
7.2.1 Incremental Reforms
The success of China’s reforms so far is widely attributed to their gradual nature. It was
Deng Xiaoping who first put forward the policy mozheshitouguohe (摸着石头过河) or
‘crossing the stream by feeling the stones’. During the shift away from a collective
economy, this policy translated into a dual-track system whereby market and state prices
coexisted. It was this method allowed the implementation of ‘reform without losers’ and
created the social consensus to continue reform with reduced threat of political
instability.’③This gradual, incremental reform method has been called ‘radical
pragmatism ‘has succeeded in reducing the shock of transition, maintaining a sense of
continuity and avoiding the trauma of great change experienced in Russia after the fall
of the Soviet Union. While it is acknowledge that China should avoid such an
experience in its reforms, scholars point out that domestic political institutions have
constrained Beijing’s ability to use its soft cultural power. While Jospeh Nye has
pointed out that states that are likely to gain from soft power in an information age are
those whose dominant ideas are close to global norms, which now emphasize liberalism,
①
郑家栋: Confucianism and Chinese Philosophy in East-West dialogue, 2001, p. 519.
②
③
pluralism and autonomy①, Yu Keping writes ‘China's democratic politics should

proceed by steady and unwavering steps; otherwise it would be separated from the
national conditional of China②. Such a separation might have disastrous consequences,
for the economy, and also for national identity. The vivid words of Tu Wei-ming
describing Chinese culture as an ‘endless stream’, are a reminder that policies leading to
sustainability are required to prevent this stream being cut off.③.
7.2.2 A new era of economic reforms: wuwei is The Way
The new premier Li Keqiang has made intentions quite clear on the matter of economic
reform "Let's restore to the market the hand that has mis-grown on the government," he
said. "The reform is about curbing government power. We have to shake-up vested
interests. It's a self-imposed revolution."④In April, Robert Kuhn, advisor to Xi Jinping
stated “The new premier Li Keqiang as well as president Xi really want to see the
government hand be less where it can be less” i.e. “by letting other elements of society
(other than government) adjudicate on complex issues”⑤This process could be good
news for consumers. For example, Chen Xian from Shanghai Jiaotong University said
that ‘competition will help consumers get better services and prices. The oil price could
become 10% cheaper.⑥’ But this process won’t be easy As Richard Herd, head of the
OECD China desk in Beijing said ‘It’s extremely difficult to reform some of these
SOE’s because not only are they very powerful economically, but the leadership of these
companies are politicians as well, and very powerful politicians⑦
The above reference to reduction of the ‘government hand’ in Chinas economy
implies a greater role for the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, and thus a kind of ‘letting-
go’ which is also associated with wuwei. In the Daodejing ‘The Way’ is the subject of
discussion in which the specific expression “wuwei” is situated at the center of the
complex network of mutually motivating metaphor systems ⑧. The difficult paradoxes to
①
Vol.23, No.4, p.40
②
③
He Zhengke , Incremental Political Reform and Transition to Democracy
④
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-25/mcdonell-chinasmog/4591584
⑤
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-09/pressure-mounting-for-china-to-set-north-korea/46195 34
⑥
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-13/chinas-top-leaders-finish-key-meeting-with-reform/5088486
⑦
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-25/china-tipped-to-become-worlds-biggest-economy/4593868
⑧
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wuwei a conceptual metaphor and spiritual ideal in early China, p.104
be encountered on the path of wuwei can in-themselves be energizing ①. A wuwei

approach offers flexibility. It is not tied down to conventions of right and wrong, but
instead responds with fluidity and harmonizes with the exigencies of any given
situation, resting on the ‘Heavenly Potter’s Wheel’ ( 天鈞)- this is called ‘walking two
roads’②. Such flexibility or ‘fitting’ to the situation recalls the advice given by former
leader Deng Xiaoping who once said ‘it doesn’t matter what color is the cat as long as it
eats mice’.
7.3 Implications for China’s Social and Cultural Policies
7.3.1 Cultural Policy Implications
Cultural change is a result of adaptation. It cannot be instantly altered by fiat from

above. Many would agree that ‘political transitions must draw on existing cultural
resources if they are to achieve long term political legitimacy’③. Chinese people should
have the opportunity to gain first-hand experience of their native culture and feel
connected with the distant past. This might include part-funded school trips to places
like Langzhong in Sichuan, which offers an ideal fengshui environment, or to jointly
climb sacred mountains like Mt Taishan or Mt Emei. Such trips would be a great
opportunity for students to both absorb the natural scenes that inspired their ancestors
and also gain a literary understanding of the ancient ideas that flowed therewith, made
more meaningful and more effectively fostering a love of nation when presented
together. If a single passage of writing is to be chosen to capture a sense of Chinese
identity perhaps the following from the Zhuangzi could be chosen ‘life, death,
preservation and loss, failure and success, poverty and wealth… all these represent the
vagaries of affairs and the movement of fate. Day and night they alternate before you..,
but they are not worth disturbing your harmony, they should not be allowed to enter into
the storehouse of the Numinous ( 灵府 )’.④Flexible conceptions of identity and
civilization lead to more robust notions of popular sovereignty and as such lessons can
be learned from the experience of Chinese overseas.
Mid-high level Party officials should more often take trips into the countryside and
①
②
③
Daniel Bell in The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, p.139
④
more remote urban areas to witness first-hand the social conditions on the ground and to
get a feeling for the troubles and problems faced by everyday people. This is bound to
result in increased humility and frugality as advocated in the classics. If these people
enter into the villages with open minds and subjective attitudes (as advocated by
Zhuangzi and others), then they’ll be able to experience the life of others and feel
genuinely concerned about others suffering. Because if one can’t put oneself fully in
one own shoes (subjectively), then one will not be able to really put oneself in others
shoes (i.e. experience empathy).
7.3.2 Intellectual-Common People Divide
Many scholars point to the formation in recent years of a co-operative alliance between
political, intellectual and business elites who have come to share the power and benefits
of ruling China. Of these three groups, it is the intellectuals who might most logically be
expected to maintain the most moral and social connections to everyday citizens. But a
trend is perhaps observable whereby intellectuals are ‘losing touch’ with the bigger
picture of everyday suffering. This problem is well-illustrated by the controversy
concerning the publication of books interpreting the teachings of Confucius and
Zhuangzi by the Beijing Normal University Professor Yu Dan. Prior to the ‘Yu Dan
Phenomenon’, the role of interpreting Confucian and other ancient texts was considered
the exclusive domain of intellectuals and high level officials. But by writing a sensitive
interpretation that of The Analects called ‘Confucius from the Heart’, that appealed to
the common man and sold more than 10 million copies, then promoting this and her
other book on Zhuangzi via a television portal. Yu Dan became a highly successful
trailblazer in the field of re-interpreting the classics for public consumption. She was
even met by the Prime Minister of Japan, Fukuda Yasuo to discuss the Analects ①. But
she was soon to face stern criticism from elite professors with regards to her apparently
biased interpretations. The criticism she received was harsh and was hardly in
proportion to the minor errors she apparently made. This episode illustrates the tensions
that erupt when people who claim to represent the legacy of Confucius emerge in
today’s China. While Yu Dan may be congratulated for her efforts at bringing
discussions of traditional culture back into the daily discourse of Chinese people’s lives,
in doing so none can avoid coming under the close scrutiny of other public intellectuals.
①
Evelyn S. Rawski, Confucius in a Business Suit, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Vol.16, No.3 May 2011
The special role and status of intellectuals has been an important part of Chinese
history, so it’s important that admiration for scholarly achievement is not sacrificed. But
in order to maintain social stability and national unity in general, more and more links
may be built up between universities and public-level institutions, allowing students and
professors (as well as government officials) to connect on a practical level with people
engaged in social, agricultural and construction work of various fields. Such efforts will
help reduce the problem (acknowledged by Xi Jinping) of officials being ‘out of touch’
with the people. Bertrand Russell once described China as an ‘artist nation’. Artistic
pursuits should therefore be appreciated for the many unintended benefits they provide,
and this will lead to increased creativity in other areas, including technology.
Just as Confucius emphasized the importance of ‘correcting words’ (zhengming 正
名) as the 1st task he would take up if made leader of a state, and George Orwell warned
of the abuse of language for purposes of mass-control, also Zhuangzi proclaimed
‘goblet words’ (zhiyan 卮言 ) as the solution to the limits of language. Just as the
brilliant poets and artists of Chinas past found delight in allegorical and paradoxical
turns of phrase, a new generation of literati should be allowed to emerge and re-enliven
the common speech (putonghua 普通话), mixing it with roman script, as is beginning to
happen in forums such as Weibo. As the famous Confucian thinker Wang Yangming 王
阳明 is known to have put forward zhengzaiqin min（政在亲民）(building upon the
earlier words of Mencius qinqinren min 亲亲仁民） , ‘politics must be close to the
people’.
7.3.3 Official Status for Ancient Books
Given that the major schools of Chinese traditional culture originated with Pre-Qin
philosophies, and the prominence of concepts such as faith and trust in the writings of
the ancient Sages, an option well worth considering in the future is the designation of
special spiritual, divine or heavenly status by the government or relevant authorities to a
core selection of these philosophical teachings. This kind of canonization of selected
ancient texts-to be made accessible to all Chinese people as a source of inspiration,
moral support and cultural identity- would strengthen China’s cultural base, making it
less pervious to outside influences in an era described by Samuel Huntington as a ‘clash
of civilizations’. Religious freedom is about freedom to do the right thing, and faith can
provide an unlimited reserve of energy and willingness to struggle for one’s country.
Confucius emphasized the importance of faith, saying ‘if people have no faith, I don’t
know what they are good for. Can a vehicle travel without a link to a source of power ①?
While governments like to think they have a right to people’s loyalty, humans are
generally smart enough to know the flaws of institutions. Official recognition of certain
texts would make it clearer to people what they should trust in, and would provide
sacred standards with which to judge themselves and others, the government included.
7.3.4 Open Society and Meritocracy
Daniel Bell is one important scholar who strongly advocates the building of an open and
meritocratic society in China. Merit must be measured not only by utilitarian standards
(e.g. computer skills), but also by considerations of virtue. This is in line with the spirit
of Confucius who said “Promote the honest over the crooked, and the people will obey.
Promote the crooked over the honest, and the people will not obey.” ②In the analects part
13:2, he said “Appoint the wise and talented to office.” A similar statement in relation
to virtue based meritocracy is again made later in The Analects “Promote the honest,
placing them over the crooked, and you can cause the crooked to straighten out.” ③In
another section he stated “cultured people… place primary importance on loyalty and
trustworthiness… they do not hesitate to reform.” The spirit of meritocracy in China
also pre-dates the advent of hereditary imperial dynasties- with the ancients Yao and
Shun known to have selected successors on the basis of ability and virtue, not heredity.
The problem remains of how to assess a person’s virtue- this may include taking into
account the spirit of volunteerism, which has suffered setbacks in China during the
reform era.
There is some empirical evidence to suggest there’s no inherent contradiction
between Confucian values and civil society. The East Asian Barometer (EAB) Survey
data shows that anti-pluralistic values are not widely accepted among the South Korean
people. In a widespread poll of South Koreans, only about one-third (35%) agreed with
the statement “Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of
groups”. Additionally, less than a half (47%) agreed with the statement “If people have
①
The Analects (2:22), quoted in Thomas Cleary, The Essential Confucius, p. 29
②
③
too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.” ①Daniel Bell also notes
that countries that have already become democracies are unlikely to revert to
authoritarianism, due to the resistance among people to losing their right to vote. As
Confucius said “a man cannot be deprived of his will.”②
Finally, in chapter 3, verse 15 of The Analects, Confucius is criticized for asking
too many questions upon visiting the national shrine, he replies saying ‘this is part of
the ritual’. From this it can be implied that asking questions and being criticized for
doing so is necessary in the context of national identity. He seems to be suggesting a
continual renewal of national identity through reflective dialogue and civilized debate.
7.4 Nationalism and Racism
As a country of 56 nationalities, with many autonomous provinces and prefectures,

China’s identity has a complex base. Social pressures mean there is the possibility of
racial estrangement emerging, and preventing this requires the development of new
common understandings.③ Samuel Huntington said if a society wants to maintain a high
degree of unity, then the government should expand political participation at the same
time as developing more powerful, more complicated and more independent political
systems.④Narrow, arbitrary conceptions of race and ethnicity are unlikely to assist the
unity and territorial integrity of China. While authors point to a possible process of
racial estrangement occurring in recent years in China⑤, and Steve Tsang goes so far as
to call the brand of nationalism that has been recently promoted China’s party
leadership as one which is ‘essentially xenophobic in nature’.⑥
True nationalism or patriotism does not extend to holding negative views of other
groups. Being proud of one’s civilization implies a certain broadmindedness. As quoted
in the Gongyang Zhuan part 1.1, ‘The Zhou calendar is used as an instrument of the
world's unity’⑦This is in line with the Chinese spirit of hospitality. As Confucius said
“Ideal people are universal and not clannish. Small-minded people are clannish and not
①
Chong-Ming Park and Doll Chu-Shin, Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy?
The Case of South Korea, Asian Barometer Working Paper Series
②
③
萧功秦，超越左右激进主义, p. 329
④
⑤
萧功秦，超越左右激进主义, p.329
⑥
Steve Tsang, Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework? March 2010, University of Nottingham
China Policy Institute, Discussion Paper no.58, p.15
⑦
1http://www.chinaknowledge.de/Literature/Classics/chunqiuzuozhuan.html
universal.”① This is not to say Confucian and Taoist values do not need re-interpreting.
To the contrary, taking an a open view to the complex narratives of national identity
allows for a healthy dialogue to emerge, one deeply based in people’s shared
experiences more than dictated from above. This means also that notions of ‘Chinese
Capitalism’ which have emerged as popular among some circles should also be rejected
as too ethno-centric. Arif Dirlik, in his paper, Critical Reflections on “Chinese
Capitalism” as paradigm explains that ‘many Chinese have taken the idea of a ‘Chinese
spirit of Capitalism’ to imply ethnic and cultural superiority’ ② and ‘the culture argument
has been utilized in recent years to justify continued authoritarianism at all levels.’ ③
This means Chinas enterprises ought to strictly follow principles of racial equality in
hiring practices and avoid fostering resentment (as has occurred many times in the past).
The ancient Confucian principle of heerbutong ( 和而不同 ) , or ‘harmony but not
uniformity’ may be a guiding principle for a multicultural employment policy.④
7.5 Cross Cultural Communication
In The Analects chapter 15, verse 6 Confucius said “If your words are truthful and your
actions are in earnest, they will be effective even in foreign countries. If your words are
not truthful and your actions are not in earnest, do you think they would be effective
even in your homeland?”⑤ This is a simple model for communicating successfully with
foreigners. With the release of data showing that China’s image around the world has
become mostly negative and is worsening⑥, the task of rectifying this becomes urgent.
In the concept of Public Diplomacy, every person is a cultural ambassador for their
country. Vice-Premier Wang Yang has himself taken issue with the problem of badly
behaving Chinese tourists, which is damaging China’s reputation abroad ⑦. Tourism
operators agree that behavior can be a problem;" Some Chinese nouveau riche enjoy the
power brought to them by money. They kind of skipped the phase of sophistication
because their wealth accumulated overnight and they feel they deserve anything because
①
②
Arif Dirlik, Critical Reflections on “Chinese capitalism” as paradigm, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and
Power, 3:3, p. 313
③
Ibid, p.316
④
⑤
⑥
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1244498/china-takes-battering-poll-perceptions-25-nations-and-eu
⑦
http://www.traveldailynews.asia/news/article/52345/china-vice-premier-summoned-twice
they're a paying guest,"① This needs remediation and as Wang Yang said ‘improving
the civilized quality of the citizens is the obligation of governments at all
levels’②.Damage to China’s international image doesn’t only come from ignorant
tourists. Aggressive or expansionist foreign policy also has the potential to cause
damage.
On a person to person level, engaging in cross-cultural communication requires
recognizing the different images of reality as shaped by different cultures. This means
allowing for the possibility of the equality of women and all people on a fundamental
level and so on. Such benevolently-perceived values are essential for China to develop
greater Soft Power. Joseph Nye, who coined the term, said recently that China currently
just ‘doesn’t get’ the concept of soft power ③. Nye, when visiting Peking University, also
mentioned Lao Tzu as an early Chinese philosopher who understood the power of
softness④.Such a revolution in thinking will also help China in more effectively
integrating its ethnic minorities. It does not mean an abandonment of Confucianism, but
a moderation of singular political Confucianism, and a building on concepts like
reciprocity to allow for an adapted version or versions to emerge which will be more
effective in spreading Chinese culture in today’s world. To use a medical metaphor- If
Confucianism is not allowed to adapt and integrate itself with different belief systems
around the world in this benign way, then there’s the danger that it will be seen as
malignant and people will attempt to remove it. A model for such a more open and
egalitarian communication exchange is displayed in appendix 4. This illustrates the
unmistakable benefits of using reciprocity (and curiosity) as a guiding principle when
interacting with people from a different cultural background. In a recent visit to
Pakistan, Li Keqiang said the Chinese believe that you should not do onto others what
you do not want them to do unto you ⑤. China would not wish to be faced with
neighbors or partners who look down on them as their cultural inferior, so what excuse
can there be for maintaining such an attitude in today’s world?
①
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/783021.shtml#.UZ-aJLX7DHY
②
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1240206/dire-manners-and-uncivilised-behaviour-tourists-harming-
chinas-image
③
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842.html
④
http://english.pku.edu.cn/News_Events/News/Focus/9305.htm
⑤
http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130522/105853.shtml
7.6 Education
7.6.1 Citizenship Education
Scholars have recently pointed to problems in the current moral education regime
including utilitarianism, political pressures, scientism and a lack of relevance to real-
life①. Others point out the limiting effects when education practices focus on ideology
with a paternalistic attitude②. Given the priority Confucius placed on Ren (or
humaneness) in creating a healthy society, and the parallels that concept has with
democratic citizenship discussed earlier, I recommend China follow the path of other
countries in prioritizing citizenship education in building a modern, open and
harmonious society. Following the principle of ‘harmony but not uniformity’, such an
education program could build on Confucian norms and integrate more modern
concepts like individual responsibility, law and multiculturalism. Citizenship education
that focuses too much on accountability and not enough on care should be avoided.③
China can learn from the experience of Taiwan, where programs focused on study of the
constitution, the rule of law and democracy were begun in junior high school and
continued into senior high school④. Such training focuses not only on laws but also
morality because following laws is not enough, people must also carry out minimum
standards of morality. To maximize effectiveness, such moral education and training
could be delivered in a specialized way to specific groups, just as Pre-Qin theories of
law and virtue were mainly aimed at rulers, not the common people⑤. The goal could be
to cultivate citizens who are motivated by thoughts of justice, as described by Confucius
In The Analects chapter 15, verse 18 “Cultivated people make justice their sustenance,
and carry it out in an orderly manner; they set it forth with humility, and actualize it by
faithfulness.”⑥The very term used in Chinese translations of ‘Citizenship’ should also
be altered from gongminquan (公民权) to gongminquanyi(公民权义) to acknowledge
the responsibilities (as well as the rights) entailed within.
①
Zhao &Fairbrother, Pedagogies of cultural integration in Chinese citizenship education, p.46
②
Ibid, p.38
③
R.D Crick & C.W Joldersma, Habermas, lifelong learning and citizenship education, p.77
④
Mei-Hui Lu & Jo-Lieh Hung, Democratic Citizenship Education in Taiwan, p.253-256
⑤
张普潘《中华文化与现代法治对话录》弘扬中华法文化丰富中国特色的社会主义法制，第 8-9 页
⑥
7.6.2 Education for a Creative China
China is great in cultural resources, but is not strong in cultural industries, and
overcoming this deficit requires creating a politically relaxed environment that
encourages freedom of expression and a free exchange of ideas between China and the
world at large①. Complimenting this, Jin Shenghong and Jau-wei Dan assert that ‘moral
education should not be separated from life…What is needed is that we should return to
the original thoughts of classic thinkers and reinterpret them in a modern context.’ ②
Modern Chinese scholars agree that what are most needed are native original thinkers ③.
Historical artifacts and continuing handicraft traditions seem to indicate a ‘cultural
competitive advantage ‘in the production of art forms that is being under-utilized in
China today. In order to achieve a more creative society, education must not place too
high a value on conformity. Orthodoxy, be it Marxist or neo-liberal, has the effect of
limiting the educational resources which a budding student has available to draw from
in the learning process. To maximize learning outcomes therefore, China should take an
open ‘wuwei’, de-politicized and ‘middle-way ‘approach to educational doctrines. The
benefits of such an approach are illustrated visually in the appendix.
As Confucius said “Study without thinking, and you are blind; think without
studying, and you are in danger. ④”.In the same vein, the Socratic method of question
and answer to stimulate inquiring minds could be integrated into Chinese education.
The Great Learning (大学) puts forward ‘eight particulars’ of learning as investigating
things, extending knowledge, being sincere in thought, rectifying the heart/mind,
cultivating oneself, regulating the family, governing the state well, and bringing peace
to the world⑤. Tianjin Normal University also suggests the teaching of artistic and
dramatic skills using role plays, storytelling and appreciation of poems and essays is
another way to enrich learners⑥- which is consistent with Confucius’s emphasis on
poetry and music as ‘food for the soul’.
Xiao Gongqin, a writer on modern Confucianism in Beyond Left and right
①
Vol.23, No.4, p. 31
②
Jin Shenghong and Jau-wei Dan, The Contemporary Development of Philosophy of Education in Mainland China
and Taiwan, Comparative Education, Vol.40, No.4, Special Issue (29), (Nov., 2004) p. 576
③
萧功秦，超越左右激进主义, p.329
④
⑤
Zhao and Fairbrother, Pedagogies of cultural integration in Chinese citizenship education, p.47
⑥
Zhao and Fairbrother, Pedagogies of cultural integration in Chinese citizenship education, p.43
Radicalism ( 超越左右激进主义 )points to a clear slow, dangerous collapse of public

consciousness occurring in China over the past 10 years. Li suggests a path of economic
development leading to individual freedom and democratic constitutionalism. Part of
this is raising children to become balanced human beings with healthy, open, adaptive
minds. The focus on the ‘century of national humiliation ‘in education and blaming
western countries for China’s relative weakness in the past is not conducive to
producing balanced individuals- nor, I’d argue, beneficial to China’s national interests.
On the contrary this tends to produce people whom have a ‘chip on their shoulder’. As
Mencius said ‘A gentleman doesn’t complain about destiny no blame anyone but
himself.’ (君子不怨天，不尤人).① Other scholars also warn that this version of history
appeals to a logic of entitlement.②
The teachings of Habermas suggest aiming for citizens capable of ‘critical social
action’. Teachers as transformative change agents within their school communities
require a participatory and relational model of learning. Excessive focus on performance
in exams and acquisition of credentials can cause problems. Lifelong learners are likely
to live by four basic principles: personal commitment to learning, social commitment to
learning, respect for others’ learning and respect for truth. Meanwhile, there are also
seven dimensions of learning power important for lifelong learning ③.Finally, being
creative doesn’t mean blindly adopting new technologies whenever they become
available. Technological developments should first go through a process of scrutiny that
assesses the overall impact on society in general before being adopted.
7.7 Parallelisms in History and Philosophy
There’s been much said of Confucianism’s contribution to Asia’s economic success in

recent years, but less credit has been given to Taoism. Historic sources from the Salt and
Iron debate (Ch.2), indicate from very early on Confucian scholars were already
borrowing Taoist concepts of wuwei to argue for less interference in the economy,
lower taxation to ensure prosperity and thereby long-term security for the ruler and his
subjects. Since then, Confucianism consistently has played a more prominent role in
Chinese life and scholarship than Taoism. Based on evidence that points to a peak in
①
David Holm, Quotations from Mencius, p.91
②
Wiliam A. Callahan, Nationalism, Civilization and Transnational Relations: the discourse of Greater China, p.279
③
R.D Crick & C.W Joldersma, Habermas, lifelong learning and citizenship education, p.
production and commerce during the Song dynasty, it may be speculated that since then,
China has drifted away from Taoist norms toward Confucian orthodoxy, a closed state
and more centralized bureaucracy and at the same time started to lose economic
dynamism, leaving it weakened by the time of the late Qing when foreign imperialism
threatened.
Though excessive focus on Confucianism legalism and hierarchical norms, in
interaction with historical factors may have generated an imbalance between the two
most fundamental of China’s native teachings (Taoism and Confucianism) which
weakened China, both may still have vital roles to play as China’s moves further into
the 21st century and secures it’s very important place in the world system. The past 30
plus years of successful reform and opening up is a powerful demonstration of the
efficacy of adopting Taoist wuwei norms (such as free-trade, decentralization,
encouragement of private initiative and private consumption) of economic management.
To continue this economic process in a new phase, scholars and authorities should
prioritize a renewal and refocusing on the potentialities of Taoist economics in the
Chinese context both from a macroeconomic and microeconomic perspective. Taoism,
apart from being a philosophy which promotes economic freedom, can, with it’s
essential 50/50 yin-yang structure, also be seen as a philosophy which demands equality
between the sexes (at least on a philosophical level), which is in harmony with the
social trends of our age. Meanwhile, excessive stress has been placed on the facilitating
role of Confucianism in China’s economic success by those whom might be motivated
to justify continued patriarchal norms and continued authoritarian rule in mainland
China and other parts of East Asia. This focus on Confucianism may have had some
beneficial role in building a common sense of identity for the East Asian region, but it
also had the side effect of underestimating the importance of Taoist wuwei philosophy
as a facilitator of economic success throughout Chinas long history.
Just as domestic and International policy environments act upon one another, so
outside threats to China should be assessed realistically from a domestic perspective. If
there IS an imminent threat from some neighboring nation or sophisticated transnational
grouping, then that is probably not the most suitable time to engage in dramatic reform
of a wuwei nature at the grassroots political level. But planning can be put in motion for
this to take place at a suitable time. While political reform may have to be slow,
courageous reform that gives full play to wuwei in the economic sphere would be sure
to keep China’s economy growing at a rapid rate and the wealth of the people
expanding. At the same time, Confucian social norms can be built upon to raise self-
esteem, dignity and honor among the population and let them see beyond materialistic
value judgments, and the education system (if not civil society) can be used as a vehicle
to prepare each and every Chinese national for the rights and responsibilities of
democratic citizenship. As Yu Keping writes, the transformation from the political
culture of subjects into that of citizens is one of the most important parts of democratic
political development.①
Chapter 8: Conclusions
8.1 The current situation
In the past, a high value was placed on philosophy as a source of motivation and
persuasion in China. Perhaps today there’s an opportunity for renewed philosophy to
again play a larger role as China transforms itself from a country struggling against
imperialist aggression to a country engaged proactively in the international system. This
research project has not succeeded in solving all the dilemmas associated with Chinese
culture and the modern Chinese nation and its place in the world, but it has elaborated
on conceptual links between past and present and China and the world that point to
possible ways ahead. Around the world, the debate over what constitutes the appropriate
relationship between government and state is still an open question. If China does not
wish to be ‘a world apart’, then it must actively participate in this debate. While some
point to the emergence of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ justifying greater interference in the
economy, prominent economic historian and Harvard University professor Niall
Ferguson recently commented at a conference that “It is the economic ideals of Keynes
that have gotten us into the problems of today," ②Scholars point to China reaching a
stage in political reform of ‘deliberative authoritarianism’ and an increasing ‘rules-based
consciousness’. These changes can be seen as a cutting edge of democratization, which
has already made progress in China, with the institution of local-level elections, or seen
merely as adaptation on the part of the government as it attempts to maintain its image
as the representative of the people and preserve its rule. Economically, the free-market
①
②
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2013/may/04/niall-ferguson-apologises-gay-keynes
reforms of the 1980’s have stagnated to some extent since the 1990’s, and the way
forward is not clear. Utilizing traditional Chinese principles of virtuous, wuwei
leadership, allowing contradictory forces to settle into place and be reformed for the
greater good may present a way out.
Given the vested interests that hamstring political, economic and to some extent
intellectual elites, the Chinese people themselves are possibly the unknown quantity, or
x-factor that will decide the country’s future direction. This is why China’s future has
been described by an Australian Prime minister as ‘The Great Imponderable” ①. Changes
have occurred rapidly and the nation has experienced political extremes in its 60+ year
history. Continuing economic growth may ensure support for the government in the
short term, but it also has the effect of raising people’s expectations in terms of good
governance, participation rights and political voice. This leads to an apparent choice
between a prosperous and relatively free society or a backward slide towards
authoritarianism and hardship. Undertaking political reform, though it may be a
formidable task, is also, sooner or later, going to be a necessary one ②. Noam Chomsky
explains that China has emerged as the most significant winner from the financial crisis,
at least partly due to the fact that it has remained sheltered from the effects of excessive
financial liberalization, which can be a ‘powerful weapon against democracy’③. But
given the important connection between economic freedom and wealth described in
Taoist texts, the task for China now is more likely to be balancing demands for
democracy with needs of greater financial liberalization.
8.2 Perspectives
The breadth of matters under discussion in this report necessarily limits the specificity
of some of the conclusions that can be drawn for policy-making purposes. And it is not
easy to entirely separate subjective views based on experience from those views and
opinions that result from a scientific study such as this. In the everyday realm where
International Relations happens outside of institutions, there are no dividing lines
between politics, economics, philosophy, society, thought and action. Therefore it is
imperative, as Confucius emphasized, for scholars to take a broad view before
①
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/beijings-foreign-policy-enigmas/story-e6frg76f-
1226648704570
②
Zhengxu Wang, Before the emergence of critical citizens: economic development and political trust in China, p168
③
Noam Chomsky, Hopes & Prospects, Haymarket Books, Chicago, 2010, p.114
attempting to reach specific conclusions. Science is not enough. Philosophy in everyday

life perhaps cannot be separated from the powers, people’s and organizations that make
decisions and exercise control and influence over the conduct of world affairs. But for
the purpose of taking the broad and long views, it is refreshing to abstract philosophy as
a separate domain of ideas that evolves, in connection with practical concerns. After all,
no matter one’s educational status, level of wealth or individual desires (etc.) the
decision a person makes, when presented with a picture that presents different possible
realities, as to which reality they choose is ultimately influenced by subjective factors.
This is explained by Wittgenstein “What I really see must surely be what is produced in
me by the influence of the object”① (see duckrabbit’② in appendix). Zhuangzian thought
has called the study of such mysterious forces that affect human behavior as xuanxue
（玄学） and some see this as a way to transcend conventional political and social
reason③.
The era of Hu-Wen brought material growth, but from a philosophical perspective
there were few new developments. The question remains how to creatively integrate the
new China, which can be seen to represent hope, while the old China of tradition would
represent truth. Wuwei is a kind of ‘truth’ that can hardly afford to be forgotten for those
planning reforms for China’s future. It is verifiable through the actions of the market,
and the consequences this has for people. Even the most well-meaning financial or
economic interventions have the potential to foster unintended consequences and
resentment among people. Future reforms are likely to have unintended consequences if
not planned carefully and carried out in a minimalist fashion, thereby letting the rules of
nature speak for themselves.
8.3 Benefits of Retaining Traditional Cultural Elements in

Political System
The principle of compromise and integration of traditional and modern norms could
result in a winning model for China. While it has been shown above that Taoism
contains the same essential free-market elements proven to facilitate economic growth
and prosperity, there are also similarities between Confucianism and Marxism in the
①
Marie McGinn, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, p.178
②
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Investigations
③
Geling Shan, Zhuangzi: Dancing with the world, p.180
characteristic appeal of revolutionary movements.’① A similar sentiment is expressed by

Thomas Herberer when he says that ‘in the long term the development of society
requires the transition from individual autonomy to a sense of citizenship and civic
duty’② While the practice of Confucianism during feudal times might seem to contradict
claims that it has the characteristics of a revolutionary movement, a return to the
original Confucian ideas could stimulate new, more accommodating interpretations. In
Analects 9.3 Confucius cited an example of adapting the rites to changing social
practices, pointing out that he follows the majority in adjusting his methods of faithful
practice when the change occurs for the right reason ③. The success or failure of political
reforms occurring during Chinas future may be measured by the same standard. If they
are just a way for elite groups to hold on to power -they are bound to fail- but if they are
designed to benefit the country for the long term- then success is much more likely.
Jiang Qing is an intellectual who has been pushing for the re-establishment of
Confucian political institutions in China and was described as “the most prominent
Confucian political thinker of our day” by Tsinghua University professor Daniel A. Bell.
Jiang has staked out a position as defender of Confucian values against creeping
Westernization. He says ‘China and the world need political and social institutions that
allow human beings, in interaction with their environment, to cultivate and lift
themselves up, while economic systems provide for everyone’s basic needs.’ He
criticizes many Neo-Confucians for giving in too easily to versions of Confucianism
shaped by western norms of Liberal Democracy and Christianity. But in condemning
those who have reached out to other traditions with efforts to integrate contending
schools of thought, he appears rather chauvinistic. While Jiang Qing admits that
Political Confucianism must adapt to suit a new social reality in order to establish the
institutional force for realizing Confucian ideals④, he sees Western norms as a threat.
Perhaps he could draw on the resources of Taoism to find the inspiration for equalizing
his hostile views of Westernization. Instead of Western norms, Mr Jiang suggests
Buddhist-influenced Mind Confucianism can act as a balancing force to prevent the
subversion of Political Confucianism by elite ruling classes⑤, but the necessity for
①
Jin Shenghong and Jau-wei Dan, The Contemporary Development of Philosophy of Education in Mainland China
and Taiwan, Comparative Education, Vol.40, No.4, Special Issue (29). p.578
②
Thomas Herberer (2009), Evolvement of Citizenship in Urban China or authoritarian Communitarianism?, p 509
③
Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wuwei as conceptual metaphor in early China, p.64
④
Jiang Qing in The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, p.27
⑤
Jiang Qing in The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, p.29
excluding other thought traditions is not fully explained. While Jiang Qing is right to
promote frugality as an important equalizing principle which promotes social harmony
and reduces friction and social envy, at the same time, aspirations are what drive people
to creatively achieve their best, and space must be provided to individuals and groups
for the playing out of their common economic ambitions.
As evidence laid out in previous chapters has shown, the pinnacle of political and
economic achievement in Ancient China was achieved through a combination of
Confucian and Taoist principles such as virtue, truth and letting-go (wuwei). These
methods were effective because they brought into harmony natural laws and human
tendencies described as the way of heaven and the way of man ( 天人合一 ). In
traditional philosophy, these laws and tendencies are universal and timeless, and are
therefore still operating today, ready to be utilized by the sensitive practitioner.
I agree with the possibility expressed by Daniel Bell in China’s New Confucianism
that a system of Li is able to limit the desires of the strong and protect the interests of
the weak in social life①. He focuses in that book on how a hierarchical system of Li is
able to produce an equal social result. There can be benefits for Western countries that
integrate more Confucian values into their society and politics. These could include
reducing the rich and poor wealth gap and finding a new ‘win-win’ social equilibrium
that would be a basis for continuing human progress. As laid out in previous chapters, li
and ren both represent forms of equality, much the same as with the Rule of Law and
Democratic Citizenship. But in a very complex world, the relative efficacy of those
traditional Chinese values that were born in agrarian societies to be able to tame the
desires born of urban life to produce an equitable socio-economic result in a largely
urban setting, is untested and unknown. We may expect, that, in the words of Dean
Acheson in US President Truman’s July 1949 White Paper ‘ultimately, the profound
civilization and democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will
throw off the foreign yoke.’②
①
Daniel Bell, China’s New Confucianism, (p.55)
②
Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan, p.63-64
8.4 Leadership in China
8.4.1 Responsibilities of a Leader
Chinese culture places great emphasis on good leadership. The Analects chapter 13
verse 4 states “If leaders are trustworthy, people will not dare to be dishonest”. The
example of moral and virtuous behavior set by the leader is reflected into subordinates
and so on down the chain such that it permeates the entire society. At the same time, the
leader should not act as if he has a heavy weight on his shoulders. Rather he (or she)
should achieve goals through merely orienting themselves correctly (i.e. facing south
like the sage-king Shun), a position from which appropriate actions flow effortlessly.
Only by leading by example can the situation improve, following the ascending pattern
of self, family, state and world cultivation.
Based on ancient Chinese wisdom (Daodejing chapter 10), what a leader should
employ in ordering the state and the world is a kind of ‘mysterious Virtue’ ( 玄德 ),
which, like the way of heaven, does ‘not employ knowledge’, ‘gives life and yet lays no
claim’, ‘leads yet is not domineering’①. This teaching has relevance in the modern sense
avoiding micro-management, exuding confidence and not fretting over details, and
focusing on employing ‘metaknowledge’ rather than conventional knowledge.
8.4.2 Challenging times ahead
Xi Jinping did not shirk from tough words during the closing address of the 18 th
people’s congress. According to him ‘Every bit of happiness in the world is created by
hard work…Our party faces many pressing challenges and serious problems such as
corruption, taking bribes, being out of touch with the people, undue emphasis on
formalities and bureaucraticism…’②He also more recently (March 19th 2013) evoked a
metaphor from The Analects (8:3), by saying that governing China today requires a
careful attitude akin to “standing on the edge of an abyss or treading on thin ice ”(“如
临深渊，如履薄冰”)③. This concurs with other analyses which suggest it would
take only one major policy miscalculation or ‘slip-up’ for the regime to be threatened .
①
②
http://news.163.com/12/1115/12/8GBOUFK90001124J.html
③
http://news.sohu.com/20130319/n369432397.shtml
Popular support of the government depends on ability to satisfy the needs and demands
of the people in terms of social justice and equality ①. According to David Zweig,
professor at Hong Kong university of Science and Technology ‘China is in trouble… the
leadership knows the worries of inflation, corruption…they understand that society can
revolt’.② Peking University professor Zhou Qiren appears to agree, saying recently that
"There's nowhere out, China has to do serious reforms....We've almost got to the end of
the road."③It will take a delicate balancing act to maintain growth and order while
satisfying the aspirations for better lives of the Chinese people. Xunzi’s sage is able to
use the standard of rightness (yi) to respond to changing conditions (bianying) because
he knows how to accord (dang) with any situation, whether curved or straight, he bends
with the wind. In the Odes we read ‘He rides to the left, to the left, the gentleman does it
properly (yi); he rides to the right, the right, the gentleman has the knack.’ ④The reader
may imagine a modern politician deftly balancing between ‘left’ and ‘right’ wing
factions. Most recently, the 3rd plenum of the new leadership released a 3,500-word
communiqué that indicated the general nature of economic reforms set to take place. We
must closely revolve around the decisive function that the market has in allocating
resources, deepen economic structural reform, and accelerate the perfection of modern
market systems. It referred to a need for establish(ing) a rule of law government and a
service-type government. It also made mention of political reform; to develop Socialist
democratic politics, we must ... pay more attention to completing democratic
systems(and) enriching democratic forms.⑤
These statements indicate an intention to carry out widespread economic reform along
with limited political reform. However, progress come at a cost, and the opportunity to
carry out ‘reform without losers’ is more limited now than during Deng’s time. As De
Tocqueville said ‘men cannot enjoy political liberty without some sacrifice, and they
have never won it without great effort. But equality offers its pleasures free.’ ⑥ Guiding
various interest groups through a period of upheaval will require clear, critical thinking
and creative leadership. As Xiao Gongqin writes in his book Beyond Left and right
①
China and Taiwan, Journal of Contemporary China, 17:56, p. 430
②
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-14/the-rise-of-xi-jinping/4372482
③
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/the-next-revolution-the-battle-over-land-20130523-2k3v8.html
④
⑤
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-13/kohler-talk-of-chinese-reform-is-no-longer-just-talk/5087864
⑥
De Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America Edition by Scott A. Sandage, Harper Perennial Modern Classics,
2007, New York, p.280
Radicalism., China needs sensible people (明白人) to help avoid following each other
toward misfortune.①
8.5 Social Philosophy Dilemma: To Depend on Morality or

Law? Rule of Law or Rule by People?
Putting into practice avowed democratic aspirations requires China to fully implement a
constitution with supreme legal status②. According to many this has yet to be achieved.
During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong led an effort that went to the extreme of
abolishing most laws and all lawyers.’③ One of the reasons why the political tragedy of
the Culture Revolution was able to occur is because of a flawed legal system in which
the political rule depends on human administration instead of rule of law. ④ While today
China’s legal institutions are said to be susceptible to a kind of “legal populism” ⑤,‘the
challenge is to complete the process of creating a strong modern economy built on a
foundation of law’⑥, rather than a foundation of guanxi, which has less enforceability.
China needs laws and standards- this was emphasized by its ancient kings. The
Constitution of 1982 is an already existing document emphasizing socialist citizen
consciousness⑦ and if adhered to without exception; this constitution could push China
toward decisive political reform. As Giovanni Sartori from Columbia University said
regarding the path from constitutional liberty to democracy “the itinerary is not
reversible”⑧In this paper, many features of Chinese traditional political culture have
been discussed which stand in stark contrast to Western secular political system models
that are characterized by ‘checks and balances’, accountability and oversight. Most
exemplary of this is the US constitution which aims to ‘tie the government in chains ⑨’
by strictly and explicitly limiting the powers of various organs of government. Whereas,
as can be seen from the above research, a wuwei system of cultivated, virtuous
①
萧功秦，超越左右激进主义, p. 329
②
③
Dwight H. Perkins, writing in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, Ch.17, Law, Family Ties and the
East Asian Way of Business, p.235
④
⑤
Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry, Embracing Uncertainty: Guerilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in
China, May 2013, www.chinapolitik.de, p.17
⑥
Dwight H. Perkins, writing in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, Ch.17, Law, Family Ties and the
East Asian Way of Business, p.243
⑦
冯留建，中国改革开放以来公民意识问题研究综述, p.91
⑧
P. O’Neil & R. Rogowski (eds.), Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, Chapter 6, p.219
⑨
Ron Paul, The Revolution: A Manifesto, Grand Central Publishing 2000
individuals and small government seems to offer an alternative whereby less

interference occurs and therefore much less oversight is required. Because government
is not expected to interfere in secular matters and high-ranking individuals are expected
to have adopted wuwei spiritual values, the resulting combination of moral integrity
among leaders and a ‘less-is-more’ model of governance can save the state the resources
required for accountability and oversight. Complimentary to wuwei governance, in the
traditional system, the expected standards of ren-like benevolence and ritualized li
norms provided a framework of morality. China therefore has a choice whether to
follow the road of explicit laws by constructing a comprehensive Rule of Law
framework (such as that in the United States), and undertaking the necessary judicial
and executive reform associated with that, or whether to depend solely on traditional
concepts such as ‘virtue’ and wuwei as moderating forces to earn the trust of the people
and maintain the viability of government. At the moment, China seems to be walking
both these paths at the same time. Perhaps a compromise is possible- one that
establishes standards that can keep up with changing times and technologies, while also
avoiding creating a culture of litigation. As Confucius emphasized, the function of laws
is not to manipulate or manage the people, but to guide them towards self-reformation.
Social trust, which does not originate from laws but from the mores of societies
themselves, plays an important role in making laws effective. Without it, law
enforcement can delve deeper into the private lives of citizens. Alexis De Tocqueville
warned a long time ago ‘it is through order that all peoples have reached tyranny.’
Rather than depending on governments and laws, we should rely on each other. In a
democracy, ‘it is ever the duty lawgivers and all upright educated men to raise up the
souls of their fellow citizens and turn their attention toward heaven.’①
8.6 Global consciousness and integration
The necessity of continuing to promote democratic political development is determined

by changes in national conditions and global factors.②As written in the sublime text, the
Daodejing, chapter 56 ‘resolve the complications; harmonize the light, assimilate to the
world. This is called mysterious sameness. Chinese civilization, which dates back just
①
2007, New York, p.306-07
②
as far as the above-mentioned civilizations and was known as the ‘Celestial Empire’ (天
朝 Tianchao) during former dynasties, lives on as a beacon of ancient mysteries that
may provides clues to our common origins. I believe that humanity, just as with an
individual or a nation, loses its identity when it forgets its origins, therefore open-
minded, and publicly transparent, investigation of paleo-archaeology must continue, and
not be suffocated by vested interests that might prefer such histories were forgotten.
This ancient knowledge, shared by all civilizations, may serve as a basis for a global
morality even today. Perhaps today the technology is becoming available to enable a
reawakening of wuwei human consciousness, a realization of basic goodness like that
said to prevail in the past glory days referred to by Confucius and other of China’s
ancient sages. To borrow a phrase used by Confucius and echoed by Sun Yat Sen 天下
为公 tianxiaweigong – all is equal under heaven China.
China has a long history of absorbing and adapting outside ideas into new, Chinese
forms, and synthesizing disparate religious traditions (Taoism/Buddhism/Confucianism)
Even ruling dynasties like the Yuan and Qing have been absorbed and Sinicised over
time. This suggests that Chinese culture has the strength and adaptability of Chinese
culture in the face of outside influences. Therefore the task of re-interpretation must go
on, and as part of this, conventional conceptual divides must also be questioned, and if
necessary, pulled down. Essentially, seeing things are conceptually divided is a
psychological choice. As Zhuangzi states ‘If being in the same category and not being in
the same category are construed as being in the same category with each other, then
there is no difference’.
A big part of the goal of global integration can be achieved via co-operation on
environmental issues such as global warming, water pollution, and deforestation. Wu-
wei, as a natural law, has its origins in the functioning methods of the natural
environment. To recall these rules, it is necessary to observe the natural world. The story
of Zhuangzi journeying into the forest in Zhuangzi 20/8 where he realized he had been
blinded by his own desire and haste is illustrative of this. Urban environments restrict
the ability of humans to commune with nature and therefore conservation work must be
done and people should be encouraged to journey into nature more often.
The environment is one aspect in which the global-local interdependent
connection, in light of modern science, is undeniable. It’s also an issue that has raised
the ire of more and more Chinese citizens in recent years with grassroots protests
against local pollution as well as a major protest vote among almost a third of delegates
on an environmental issue at the recent National People’s Congress ①. Government can
reform incentive structures to foster better environmental outcomes, in line with the wu-
wei principle. Perhaps the most urgent twin tasks in order to ensure sustainability of
biodiversity on the planet are the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
gradual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
8.7 Further Research
This research has explored deep conceptual parallels between ideas often separated into
paradigms of ‘east’ and ‘west’. ‘It is the creativity with which we specify bad models
that leads us to good ones.’② Terms such as ‘public interest wuwei’, ‘Confucian
solidarity’ will seem unfamiliar now but could be made more meaningful in future.
Further research into more ancient parallels between Greek/Roman and Pre-Qin
philosophy may help to further overcome such superficial divisions. Many areas lay
beyond the scope of this paper yet are surely worthy of further research. They include
studying connections between Mind Confucianism and Constructivism, China’s middle
class and citizenship consciousness, Confucianism as a base for multicultural
citizenship, and the relationship between wuwei and Virtue in Ancient Chinese Thought.
Another avenue would be to compare the Chinese ‘Mandate of Heaven’ concept with
the pre-modern Europe ‘divine right of kings’. Also, because it is seen by many as the
heyday of Chinese civilization, it would be interesting to compare the trade. Governance
and economic policies of the Tang Dynasty with today’s China. In terms of
understanding International Relations theories, more research ought to be done into the
dynamic of relations between states, international business and transnational criminal
networks. De Tocqueville makes an intriguing statement in Democracy in America
‘there is a closer connection than is supposed between the soul’s improvement and the
betterment of physical conditions.’③ This invites further study to attempt to quantify the
relationship of spiritual and financial factors, building upon the work on Max Weber.
An important area of research may be the relationship of the Mencius-originating
‘minben’ philosophy with the rise of the Beijing consensus and continuing
①
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-03-17/china-delegate-stages-pollution-protest-vote/4578022
②
P. O’Neil & R. Rogowski (eds.), Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, p.31
③
2007, New York, p.310
democratization. Also, the similarities and differences between ‘minben’ and liberal-
democratic theories of governance is an area of research which may be prescient for the
present day Due to the greater effectiveness of Confucian norms in relatively smaller
networks, and also the historic dynamism of China's village-based rural economy, a
comparative study of economic laissez faire combined with Confucianism in the context
of the 小共同体 could provide a model for further development. Given the concepts
explored in chapters 3 and 4, further exploration of the field of ‘public interest wuwei’
(i.e. macroeconomic facilitation policies) and Confucian Democracy (or more
systematic comparison of the practice of li and ren with the rule of law and citizenship)
may result in fruitful discoveries. Finally, what impact did Mao have on the process of
democratization in China? Hopefully, the combination of increasing experience and a
rich cultural heritage will help China produce its own well-developed contribution to
development of IR Theory①. Various authors also point to the need for future research
to focus more on complex yet important horizontal relationships that affect daily life in
China. This means to avoid falling into the trap of over-emphasizing the hierarchical
aspects of Confucian-shaped culture and to see the subtle workings of networks that
provide meaning, hope and justification to individuals.
8.8 Predictions
The field of my research is a highly contested one, furthermore, there’s a lack of recent
and reliable data measuring public opinion in China. Although this research has
involved much observation and analysis, it is extremely difficult to make objective
predictions in the social sciences. While Steve Tsang points out that the traditional
Chinese concept of ‘the ideal government… is one which is efficient, fair, honest and
paternalistic, yet non-intrusive vis-à-vis the life of the ordinary people.’ ② Henry
Kissinger writes ‘analysis depends on interpretation; judgments differ as to what
constitutes a fact, even more about its significance.’
Evidence suggests that though economic growth may promote positive sentiment
about government performance, this in itself is not sufficient to engender political
trust③.Therefore one may predict that due to a combination of internal and external
①
Gustaaf Geeraerts & Men Jing, International Relations Theory in China, Global Society (2001), 15:3, p.276
②
Steve Tsang, Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework? March 2010, University of Nottingham
China Policy Institute, Discussion Paper no.58, p.6
③
Zhengxu Wang, Before the emergence of critical citizens: economic development and political trust in China, p.165
factors, there is a high chance that a transition to a Chinese brand of democracy will
occur in China within the next 5-10 years. Yu Liu and Dingding Chen similarly see the
probability of democratic reform occurring in China within approximately 5 years or so
as high. But any prediction must be tempered with caution, because the path towards
any outcome very different to the current status quo is difficult to foresee because the
precise nature of ongoing economic and political reforms is unknown. There are a
variety of options available to Chinas leadership, but powerful economic forces,
combined with social forces from above and below are expected to push leaders towards
making the judgment that a transition to a political system of greater plurality and
openness is ultimately in the national interest. In the words of Chen Guang Zhong,
‘True socialism must implement the rule of law and democracy. If there's no democracy,
there's no socialism’①.This means that, contrary to many expectations, it is possible that
political reform may occur ahead of economic reforms. The approximate date for such a
transition to formally begin is expected to be 2020.
Given the important place that Confucianism has been allotted in China’s post-
industrialization society (with even a statue of Confucius for a time visible in
Tiananmen Square), and the complementarities that exist between it and secular
democracy, leads to the prediction that a greater emphasis on native cultural traditions
within China will not necessarily contradict moves toward democracy. At the very least,
any attempts to evoke Confucius as a reason to avoid democratic reforms in China will
fall on deaf ears, and may evoke criticism amongst learned scholars familiar with
Confucius’s message. The deep-down undercurrents of traditional cultural beliefs
described in this paper, rather than being totally antithetical to democratic norms of
plurality and economic freedom, may instead combine as push factors toward continued
reform as opposed to stagnation under outdated ideological standards which place
shackles on the free-will, self-cultivation and nature-attuned instincts of the Chinese
people.
Overall, although China faces the danger of ‘the explosion of accumulated
contradictions and crisis’②, the sentiments proclaimed by leaders such as Wen Jiabao
provide a sense of reassurance. It may be a rather unseemly process, but many people
among elites and the general population seems to have the will-power to make reform
succeed. Xi Jinping is facing a number of challenges as leader. If he is able to push
①
陈光中《中华文化与现代法治对话录》，摒弃封建专制糟粕弘扬优秀文化遗产，第 11 页
②
He Zhengke , Incremental Political Reform and Transition to Democracy, p.20
forward reforms, I predict that loosening of government control of the economy (Wuwei
economics) would result in a massive boost to economic growth as the entrepreneurial
spirit of the Chinese people is further unleashed. A combination of wuwei economic
reform and above mentioned political reform could have a dynamic mutually supporting
effect that reduces the costs of such reforms. In case of such profound changes, there’s
always an element of unpredictability and a likelihood that chaos may reign at certain
points in time and at certain places. But if careful planning is undertaken, and the
lessons from the Soviet experience learned, then the long term rewards may greatly
outweigh the long-term costs. So, while the fluid nature of Taoism metaphysics may
seem like a metaphor for the wild fluctuations of boom and bust economies, Confucian
thought may act as a socially moderating and stabilizing influence during periods of
transition. Just as the Pre-Qin philosophers advocated dual standards of internal and
external cultivation, so the goal today should not only be GDP (external) growth, but
also the development of people’s (internal) characters. In this sense, we see that faith in
China’s historic civilization also implies a belief in the transformative power of
education.
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements:
I’d like to thank all those people who assisted me while I was completing the research and writing of
this paper. They include my friends Li Jingyu and Wang Chaoxin whose words of encouragement
gave me the determination to go on, and whose practical advice saved a lot of time. At various
stages my professor and official advisor Zhao Kejin also provided many helpful tips and advice.
Zhang Chuanjie was kind enough to indicate to me the importance of foreign policy aspects to my
research topic. I’d also like to thank my classmates with whom I’ve had the opportunity to discuss
matters related to my thesis. In particular I extend my warm appreciation to Linda Samsinger, with
whom philosophical discussions were an added inspiration. To all the participants who bravely
accepted the challenge of answering interview questions relating to matters of national culture and
China’s future, I express my deep regard and sincere respect. In particular I must also thank
Tsinghua philosophy professor Daniel Bell for pointing me towards records from the Han dynasty
Salt and Iron debates and Peking University professor David Kelly for his reference to the China
economic history writings of Elvin and Skinner and other friendly guidance.
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Appendices
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Appendices
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(Chunqiuzuozhuan)
Appendices
Appendices
Appendix 1: Model for Effective Cross-Cultural communication:
The two necessary pre-conditions are a combination of principles promoted by Confucius

(reciprocity) and Deng Xiaoping (open-mindedness).
Open-mindedness
Effective Cross-Cultural
+ Communication
Reciprocity
Experimentation and adoption of Mutual understanding AND

learned values that pass the appreciation for alternative
practicality test values
Eventual predominance of superior

norms through process of peaceful
integration
Appendices
Appendix 2a) and 2b): Free Market equilibrium and ‘The way of
Heaven’
a) Text in red, taken directly from Chapter 77 of theDaodejing translated by Thomas

Cleary, is overlaid on original market equilibrium graph (from website below):
b) Text on the right is taken from chapter 32 of the Daodejing as translated by Thomas Cleary. The
preceding line in that text states ‘Heaven and earth combine’. Those terms can be seen to
correspond with supply and demandin the conventional economic model:
Appendices
Appendix 3: Benefits of a Wu-wei Approach to Education:

Contrasting doctrines are on the horizontal axis, while the vertical measures the volume of creative
resources available to any student. This can also be described as the middle way (or 中庸) of de-
politicized education.
Appendix 4: Public-Private Land distribution during Zhou

dynasty
Well-field system (井田制度) of Zhou Dynasty as advocated by Mencius① and

temporarily re-established by Wang Mang (9-23AD). The peasants who privately
farmed the eight surrounding fields were jointly responsible for providing the produce
of the central field to the ruler as tribute:
①
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well-field_system
Appendices
Appendix 5: Ancient Cultural forms of related Chinese

characters:
Oracle bone script of wu 无 (from wuwei) from: http://www.handedict.de/fr/zi/%E7%84%A1
Bronze inscription seal script of wu 无 (from wuwei) from:

http://xh.5156edu.com/hzyb/a1679b22892c45746d.html
Regular (traditional) script of ‘wu’ 无 from Wuwei, from:

http://www.handedict.de/fr/zi/%E7%84%A1
Appendices
Oracle bone script of 'wei’ 为 from Wuwei, from:

http://zds32.blog.163.com/blog/static/13389279020101091573946/
another version of oracle script of ‘wei’ 为 from:

http://news.scj.cn/20120127/190132966500.shtml
bronze inscription seal ( 金文大篆 ) version of‘wei’, from:

http://xh.5156edu.com/hzyb/a1751b37767c80924d.html
regular (traditional) script of ‘wei’ 为 from wuwei, from:

http://www.handedict.de/fr/zi/%E7%82%BA
Appendices
Chinese Oracle script for de 德 "virtue
Chinese Bronze script for de 德 "virtue”
bronze script for Dao 道 , from:

Appendices
Large seal script for ‘the way’ or dao 道 , from:

Small seal script for ‘the way’ or dao 道 , from:

Appendices
Appendix 6: Wittgenstein’s ‘duckrabbit’- Illustrates cognitive

factors in perception
Do you see a rabbit or a duck? Why?

Appendices
Appendix 7: Chart of the Evolution of wuwei and the Libaniusian model
From: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/daten/2005/gerlach_christian_wu-wei.pdf
Appendix 8: Advantages and Disadvantages of maintaining

taoguangyanghui strategy:
Advantages of maintaining Taoguangyanghui Disadvantages of maintaining

policy Taoguangyanghui policy
1. Uphold reputation for consistency and 1. Less direct potency in international affairs
reliability of positions taken 2. ‘Waste’ of potential opportunities for
2. Conforms with the long-advocated ‘5 maximizing China’s national interest
principles of peaceful co-existence’ 3. Other countries may not feel they can
3. Requires less investment in military and depend on China for their security
diplomatic resources
4. Adheres to principle of ‘wuwei’ as advocated
by sages Laozi and others
Advantages of adopting a more Disadvantages of adopting a more

interventionist foreign policy interventionist foreign policy
Appendices
1. Enables China to actively defend interests in 1. Risks getting involved in ‘quagmire’

conflicts zones in Africa and the Middle-East situations such as failed states and suffering
2. Strengthen philosophical relations with ‘blowback’.
other strong, assertive major powers 2. Inexperience of China’s Foreign Affairs
3. Foreign Affairs and army may gain department with complex and volatile middle
experience in operational theatre conflicts and east and African situations may cause shock
thus be better prepared for future events 3. Lose trust of weaker states who saw China as
an alternative to more interventionist powers
Appendix 9: Interview Questions
Q1. Are you (very/moderately/slightly) familiar with the teachings of Confucius, Laozi
and China’s other Ancient Sages?
您熟悉孔子、老子等中国古代先贤的教义吗？（如论语、道德经等）
Q2. Do you think these teachings are (highly/moderately/slightly) important for China’s
future development?
您认为这些教义对中国未来的发展（非常重要/一般重要/不太重要）
Q3. Have traditional Chinese philosophies been a source of motivation and/or
inspiration for China’s leaders when they have launched political and economic reforms
since 1978? How?
自从 1978 年中国实行改革开放后，中国哲学是否已经成为中国领导人实施改革的
动力和来源？中国哲学是怎样激励、启发中国领导人的？
Q4. Are the teachings of Laozi, Confucius and other Sages seen as a source of
motivation in your workplace? If applicable, please provide examples
您的单位/学校是否以老子、孔子以及其他先贤的教义激励下属？如果可以的话，
请举例。
Q5. Do you believe that China’s leaders today are motivated by thoughts such as those
espoused by the Ancient Sages?
你认为当今中国领导人受到先贤思想的激励/启发吗？
Q6. Do you think that a connection may exist between the ‘Wuwei’ philosophy of Laozi
and the ‘Invisible Hand’ of the Free-Market economic concept as explained by Adam
Smith and others?
您认为老子的“无为”思想是否与亚当斯密自由市场经济中“无形的手”这一概
念有某种联系？
Q7. In your view, is there or could there be a connection between Confucian concepts of
Li and Ren and the rule of law/electoral procedures and principles of Democratic
Citizenship as emphasized in Western democratic theory?
您认为，孔子思想中的礼和仁是否与法治、选举过程、西方民主理论所强调的民
主公民权原则有某种联系？
Q8. Do you think that if Confucius lived today he would advocate further
democratization of China’s political system? Why/why not?
如果孔子活在当今社会，他会倡议增进中国政体的民主化进程吗？为什么？
Q9. Do you support further privatization of China’s economy? Do you support greater
deregulation of economic activity in China?
您支持增进中国经济的私有化吗？您支持中国进一步解除对经济活动的管制吗？
Q10. What are the most essential aspects of Chinese culture/civilization that should be
Appendices
upheld and carried on to the next generation, if any?

中国文化，抑或是中华文明，其中的哪一方面应该被支持并传承到下一代，能谈
谈您的想法吗？
Q11. Do you feel that political reforms in China are now on the trajectory of (1) moving
forward with momentum, (2) stagnating or (3) going backwards?
您感觉中国现在政改（政治改革）的形式正处于什么状态（正在什么样的轨道
上）(1) 势头强劲, (2)原地踏步 (3) 正在退步？
Q12. Do you feel that economic reforms in China are now on the trajectory of (1)
moving forward with momentum, (2) stagnating or (3) going backwards?
您感觉中国现在经济改革的形式正处于什么状态（正在什么样的轨道上）(1) 势头
强劲, (2)原地踏步 (3) 正在退步？
Q13. Do you think the recent and ongoing national leadership transition will have a
positive effect towards encouraging continuing political and/or economic reforms in
China?
您认为现在正在进行的领导人换届会不会对鼓励继续政治改革以及经济改革产生
积极影响？
Q14. Do you think China’s relationships with major foreign countries could be
improved if it adopted a clear, consistent and systematic policy platform based on its
traditional philosophy?
基于传统哲学，筑建一个透明、始终如一且有条理的政治平台，是否会增进中国
与外国（主要国家）的关系？
Q15. If someone said ‘Mao Zedong was a Taoist, Deng Xiaoping a Buddhist and Hu
Jintao a Confucian’ to what extent would you agree with them?
如果有人说，毛泽东是道教徒，邓小平是佛教徒，胡锦涛是儒家学者，在多大程
度上您赞成这种说法？
Q16. Do you think there is some danger of China falling into a situation where
Orwellian ‘newspeak’ threatens the integrity of society as a whole? Is there any danger
of another Cultural Revolution occurring in China?
总体来讲，中国陷入奥威尔式的官腔威胁了社会的整体性是有一定危险的，您怎
么看这个问题？有多大的可能，中国再发生一次文化大革命？
Q17. In your opinion, does the benefits of further (democratizing) political reform in
China outweigh the risks, or vice versa?
在您看来，中国民主化进一步政改是利大于弊还是弊大于利？为什么？
Q18. In your opinion, does the benefits of further (liberalizing) economic reform in
China outweigh the risks, or vice versa?
在您看来，中国自由化经济改革是利大于弊还是弊大于利？为什么？
Q19. Should statues of China’s past sages be more often situated in public places in
China’s cities like Tiananmen Square?
应该更多地将中国古代先贤的塑像建造在公共场合吗？比如放置在天安门广场
Q20. Is the pattern of leaders claiming legitimacy based on historical precedent still
relevant in today’s China? Is the ‘mandate of heaven’ still a concept believed in by the
Chinese people?
基于历史先例，领导人世袭政策是否依然与当代中国有内在联系？中国人还信天
命吗？
Q21. China’s economic growth has been rapid and transformative. In your view is social
and cultural capital also on a sustainable development path?
近年来，中国的经济显现出快速发展的势头和有改革的能力。在你看来社会资本
和文化资本，还依然在可持续发展的路径上吗？
Appendices
Q22. Please rank the following issues in order of importance for China’s progress: 1)
Cleaning out corruption 2) Decentralization of government power 2) Economic
Liberalization 4) Political Liberalization 5) Inner-Party Democracy 6) Establishing Rule
of Law
请按照中国发展的重要性来为下列事件排序：1.反腐 2.分散政权 3.经济自由化 4.
政治自由化 5.党内民主 6. 建立法制
Q23. Are there any other ancient Chinese philosophies, sagely quotes or historical
precedents you feel are most relevant to China’s future reform plans?
还有哪些中国哲学、先贤语录或者历史事件与中国未来的改革计划最密切相关呢？
Appendix 10: Statistical Analysis of Interview Results

Appendices

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中国传统文化对中华人民共和

Thesis Supervisor : Professor Zhao Kejin

Statement on thesis usage authorization

I entirely understand Tsinghua University policies concerning reserving and using

签名： 导师签名： 日期：

Author: ___________Advisor: Date:

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Ancient

Chapter 2: Literature Review- Political philosophies of China’s

Chapter 3:Wuwei and ‘Invisible Hand’ of the Free-Market............34

Chapter 4: Aspirational Confucianism and Educated Democracy.49

Chapter 5: Sustainability of Taoguangyanghui: How should China

relate to the world?.......................................................................62

Chapter 6: Interview Results and Analysis....................................71

Chapter 7: Policy Implications for China.......................................80

Studying International Relations involves analyzing the ‘bigger picture’ perspective on

1.2 Core Questions

The core questions I’m seeking to answer include

Presumptions and predictions established before undertaking this study include:

This paper, in progressing from generality to specifics, begins with a literature

Chapter 7 deals with policy recommendations in the field of education, religion

Chapter 2: Literature Review- Political philosophies of

2.1 Historical Background: The Zhou Dynasty

2.2 Pre-Qin Dynasty Schools of Thought

During this Pre-Qin era, a great flourishing of philosophical thought occurred

2.3 Key Concept ‘Dao’ （道）or ‘The Way’

2.3.1 General Meanings

In Chinese philosophy, ‘Dao’ is a fundamental concept signifying the correct or

2.3.2 Different kinds of Dao

2.3.3 Origins of Dao

Tao as a metaphysical concept originated with Laozi, and is associated with the

2.3.4 Pursuing Dao

Although it cannot be described, practitioners believe that Dao can be known or

inevitably creates counter-actions (similar to Newton’s number three law of motion) as

2.4 Key Concept ‘De’ （德） or ‘virtue’

De is often translated as "inherent character; inner power; integrity", in Taoism as

and lecture on it before actualization is to throw away your accumulation of virtue." ①

2.5 Key Concept: The Heart/Mind (心)

‘faculties’.”① Although heart/mind is not greatly elaborated upon in The Analects of

2.6 Key Concept: Moral Education and Self-Cultivation

In traditional Chinese Philosophy, the student was involved in an ‘active’ form of

2.7 Key Concept: The Mandate of Heaven

Tianming, or ‘The Mandate of Heaven’, became an important source of legitimacy

2.8 Early Chinese Administrative Systems and Debates

2.8.1 The 3 departments and 6 ministries

2.8.2 Salt and Iron debate

‘wuwei’ approach to economic governance①, while the ‘modernists’ or ‘legalists’-

2.9 Modern views from international sources on the role of

Chinese culture in China’s reform

2.9.1 The relevance of culture

2.9.2 Chinese culture and political reform

2.9.3 Chinese Culture and economic reform

2.9.4 Chinese Enterprise Management

2.9.5 Post- Qin dynasty historical factors in China’s

Qin Hui, history professor at Tsinghua University, while critical of ‘cultural

of major philosophical breakthroughs (with Wang Yangming as the last major

2.9.6 Intellectual Battlegrounds

2.10 Modern views from Chinese sources on the role of

Chinese culture in China’s reform

2.10.1 Taoism and economic reform

propriety. China is breaking the traditional hierarchical conception of consumption and

2.10.2 Confucianism and Political Reform

Regarding Confucianism’s role in China’s future development, much writing has

Chapter 3:Wuwei and ‘Invisible Hand’ of the Free-

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