J.A.

P
Juris Doctor III
Local Government- Dual Nature

CITY OF MANILA VS IAC

179 SCRA 428 (1989)

FACTS:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the
city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the
full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such
lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as
ready for exhumation.

On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the
remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The
lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were
shocked to find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed.

The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the
widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline
Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officerin-charge of the North Cemetery; and
Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned
and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs
the right to make use of another lot.

The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUE:
1. WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a
corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila.
2. WON the city is liable for damages

RULINGS:

I.

Operations and functions of a public cemetery proprietary function.

In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or
governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity.

Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and
promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipal powers, on the one hand, are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate.

The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial
properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is
patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.

The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with
law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted
with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and
corporate, private and proprietary on the other.

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Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery
are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves,
niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge
and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no
doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in
its proprietary or private character.

Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents.
Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.
Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no
penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

Therefore, the operations and functions of a public cemetery is a proprietary function of the City
of Manila.

II.
Yes. The City is liable for damages.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is
liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of
the contract of lease.

All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate
happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their
deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis.

Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the
replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North
Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city
government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978
when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed from the
disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of
plaintiffs hereunder.

As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195
of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated
in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city
government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the
trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract
of lease.

The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5,
series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from
June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject
lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50)
years was still in full force and effect.

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MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS FIRME

G.R. No. L-52179
195 SCRA 692
April 8, 1991

FACTS:

The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack
of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence
of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The
owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
2. Are municipal corporations suable? Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by
its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?

RULING:

I.

Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the
State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with
the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.

The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of
the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations
are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless,
they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant
the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover.

The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its
judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of

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the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he
held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for
the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether
or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary
functions.

II.

Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.
Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and
be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing
this, the claimant cannot recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to
the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.

Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability.

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Dacanay v Asistio (1992)

FACTS:

5 Jan 1979: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Commission, designating certain city
and municipal streets as sites for flea markets.

10 Jan 1979: EO No. 135 was issued by Acting MMC Mayor Virgilio Robles; the Caloocan City
Flea Market Authority was established;

The Caloocan City mayor opened 7 flea markets in their city. One of the streets designated was
“Heroes del ‘96” where the petitioner lives. The road was considered “the most viable and
progressive, lessening unemployment in the city and servicing the residents with affordable basic
necessities.”

In 1987: Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan, had the stalls demolished.
Stall owners filed an action for prohibition against the City, the OIC Mayor, and the City
Engineer.

Trial Court: Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Sts. Are of public dominion.
1. They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts;
2. Cannot be acquired by prescription;
3. Not subject to attachment and execution;
4. Cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.

LGC provides that the City Engineer shall “prevent the encroachment of private bldgs and fences
on the streets and public places. The Charter of the City of Caloocan grants the City Engineer
similar powers. Asistio then became the mayor. He did not pursue Martinez’s policy of clearing
the city streets.

Dacanay then filed a complaint in the Ombudsman. Ombudsman: There is an omission of an act
which ought to be performed, in clear violation of RA 3019.

ISSUE:
WON public streets or thoroughfares may be leased or licensed to market stall holders by virtue
of a city ordinance or resolution passed by the Metro Manila Commission.

RULINGS:

NO.

The streets, being of public dominion must be outside of the commerce of man. Considering the
nature of the subject premises, the following jurisprudence co/principles are applicable on the
matter:
(1) They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts.
(Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602);
(2) They cannot be acquired by prescription against the state (Insular Government vs.
Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even municipalities cannot acquire them for use as communal
lands against the state (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327);
(3) They are not subject to attachment and execution (Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of
Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52);
(4) They cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain 520;
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 2930).

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A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424.
Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other
contract (Villanueva et al. vs. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of
Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869,
and Muyot vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860). The disputed areas from which the market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case C-12921.

The disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A
public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. It may not be the
subject of lease or other contract.

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public
street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them.
Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law.

The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The
interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community
whose health, peace. safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are
under legal obligation to protect. The Executive Order issued by the Acting Mayor authorizing
the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by
the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public
use. The Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets
for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.

Ordinance 2, s. 1979 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is an ordinance “authorizing and

regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within
Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and
conditions, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, and for other
purposes.”

Section 2 of said ordinance provides that “the streets, roads and open spaces to be used as sites
for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas; the design, measurement or specification of the
structures, equipment and apparatuses to be used or put up: the allowable distances: the days and
time allowed for the conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or
fees or charges to be imposed, levied and collected; the kinds of merchandise, goods and
commodities sold and services rendered: and other matters and activities related to the
establishment, maintenance and management and operation of flea markets and vending areas,
shall be determined and prescribed by the mayors of the cities and municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila where the same are located, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission and consistent with the guidelines hereby prescribed.”

Section 6(m) of said ordinance provides that “in the establishment operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and vending areas, the following guidelines, among others, shall be
observed: xxx (m) that the permittee shall remove the equipment, facilities and other
appurtenances used by him in the conduct of his business after the close or termination of
business hours.”

In the case of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, it was held that properties for public use may
not be leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and void for the reason that a municipal
council cannot withdraw part of the plaza from public use. If possession has already been given,
the lessee must restore possession by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to
him any sums it may have collected as rent.

In the case of City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia, 19 SCRA 413, it was held that “The
property being a public one, the Manila Mayors did not have the authority to give permits,
written or oral, to the squatters, and that the permits granted are therefore considered null and

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void. As reiterated in the case of Baguio Citizens Action Inc. vs. The City Council. 121 SCRA
368, “an ordinance legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public land is null and void.”

QUISUMBINGVS GARCIA, 2008

FACTS:

The subject COA report stated "Several contracts in the total amount of ₱102,092,841.47 were
not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor
to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160."

Gov. Garcia sought for reconsideration from COA but without waiting for its resolution, she
instituted an action for Declaratory Relief where she alleged that the infrastructure contracts
complied with R.A. No. 9184 bidding procedures and were entered into pursuant to the general
and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, hence a
separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer necessary.

The trial court declared that Gov. Garcia need not secure prior authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It further declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have
juridical personality nor is it vested by R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue and be sued. It also
ruled that it is only when the contract (entered into by the local chief executive) involves
obligations which are not backed by prior ordinances that the prior authority of the sanggunian
concerned is required.

Petitioners insisted that prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan should be
secured before Gov. Garcia could validly enter into contracts involving monetary obligations.
The Province of Cebu was operating under a reenacted budget in 2004. Gov. Garcia entered into
contracts on behalf of the province while this reenacted budget was in force.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prior approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is required before Gov. Garcia
could have validly entered into the questioned contracts.

RULING:

The Court held that the case should be remanded to the lower court and treated as an ordinary
civil action rather than as a declaratory relief action. The lower court was directed to admit
further evidence in order to determine the nature of the questioned contracts entered into by Gov.
Garcia, and the existence of ordinances authorizing her acts.

The Supreme Court laid out the framework for the lower court’s guidance in resolving the issue.
Requirement of prior authorization by the Sanggunian
Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.–(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have
the following powers:
xxx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous
place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.

Prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive may
enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit.

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Gov. Garcia argued that Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 are the exceptions to Sec. 22(c)
and operate to allow her to enter into contracts on behalf of the Province of Cebu without further
authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

However, the Court noted that Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 merely contains a definition of terms.
Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec. 306 authorizes the local chief executive to make
disbursements of funds in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental
appropriations.

The "ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government unit’s
budget, for which reason no further authorization from the local council is required, the
ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative authorization of the budget.

To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render the
requirement of prior sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. There would
be no instance when such prior authorization would be required. Yet, this is obviously not the
effect Congress had in mind when it required the prior authorization of the sanggunian
concerned.

Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a reenacted budget, "only the annual
appropriations for salaries and wages of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations,
and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets for the
preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance
therewith."

As indicated by the word "only" preceding the above enumeration, the items for which
disbursements may be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly, contractual
obligations which were not included in the previous year’s annual and supplemental budgets
cannot be disbursed by the local government unit. New contracts entered into by the local chief
executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian.

To give life to the intendment of the law and to avoid a construction which would render Sec.
22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 meaningless, disbursement should be understood to pertain to payments
for statutory and contractual obligations which the sanggunian has already authorized thru
ordinances enacting the annual budget and are therefore already subsisting obligations of the
local government unit. Contracts are those which bind the local government unit to new
obligations for which the local chief executive needs prior authority from the sanggunian.

Following are other provisions of R.A. No. 7160 which support petitioners’ stand: (a) Sec. 465,
Art. 1, Chapter 3 states that the provincial governor shall "[r]epresent the province in all its
business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents upon authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or pursuant to law or ordinances;"
(b) Sec. 468, Art. 3 also establishes the sanggunian’s power, as the province’s legislative body,
to authorize the provincial governor to negotiate and contract loans, lease public buildings held
in a proprietary capacity to private parties, among other things.

What the trial court should have done

As things stand, the declaration of the trial court to the effect that no prior authorization is
required when there is a prior appropriation ordinance enacted does not put the controversy to
rest. The question which should have been answered by the trial court was whether, during the
period in question, there did exist ordinances (authorizing Gov. Garcia to enter into the
questioned contracts) which rendered the obtention of another authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan superfluous. It should also have determined the character of the
questioned contracts, i.e., whether they were, as Gov. Garcia claims, mere disbursements
pursuant to the ordinances supposedly passed by the sanggunian or, as petitioners claim, new
contracts which obligate the province without the provincial board’s authority.

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Resort to appropriation ordinance is necessary

The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the appropriation ordinance is
required should be resolved depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Should the
appropriation ordinance, for instance, already contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of a
capital outlay such that all that the local chief executive needs to do after undergoing the
requisite public bidding is to execute the contract, no further authorization is required, the
appropriation ordinance already being sufficient.
On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic terms such
as "infrastructure projects," "inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control,
and irrigation systems projects," "reclamation projects" or "roads and bridges," there is an
obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project that in turn requires approval by
the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian approval may also be required for the purchase of goods
and services which are neither specified in the appropriation ordinance nor encompassed within
the regular personal services and maintenance operating expenses.

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TORIO VS FONTANILLA, 1978

FACTS:

The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 “to manage the
1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration…”

The “1959 Malasiqui „Town Fiesta Executive Committee” was created, which, in turn,
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage. A “zarzuela” troupe, of which Vicente
Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their performance on January 22.

During the “zarzuela”, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was
immediately hospitalized, but died the following day. Fontanilla‟s heirs filed a complaint to
recover damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the
Council‟s individual members.

The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of
its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any
of its agents. The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipality‟s agents in
carrying out the municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in
implementing the municipal ordinance.

After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the construction of the stage,
and the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of the committee. Consequently, the
defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‟s decision and ordered all the
defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of
P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages:P1200.00 its attorney‟s fees; and the costs.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the celebration of a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipality’s governmental
or public function or one of a proprietary character.
2. Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable

RULINGS:
I.

The celebration of a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipality’s governmental as

proprietary character.
The basic element is that it is governmental in essence. Under the doctrine of respondent
superior, the municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla if that was
attributable to the negligence of the officers of the municipality.

If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty, no
recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter, nor from its officers, as long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or
that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.

With respect to proprietary functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons
ex contractu or ex delicto.

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Sec. 2282 of the Admin Code simply authorizes the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but
it does not impose a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta for whatever purpose is in essence an
act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a state policy.

The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to
provide entertainment is not a conclusive test.

Found and held that there was negligence. Only P100 was appropriated for the two stages and
the posts and braces were only made of bamboo.

The performance was a donation offered by the respondents, and that when the Municipality
accepted it, the participants in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality,
through its “Committee” would build a stage strong enough to support the performance. The
Councilors did not directly participate in the construction of the stage so they could not be held
liable.
Issue:.

II.
Yes. They may also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.

Municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in
their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted
with.

The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or political on the
one hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.

Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and
political.

Municipal powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community. These include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. This distinction of
powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents
which result in injury to third persons.

If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no

recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor
from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is
that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto.

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