Platonic Piety: An Essay toward the Solution of an Enigma

Author(s): W. Gerson Rabinowitz

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1958), pp. 108-120
Published by: BRILL
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 PlatonicPiet:
An Essay Towardthe Solutionof an Enigma
W. GERSONRABINOWITZ

1
THE ONE dialogue of the Platonic corpus in which the concept of
piety is discussedas such and at any length at all is, of course, the
Euthyphro, and it is this work - or, to put it more strictly perhaps,
it is the concept of piety adumbratedwithin the work - which consti-
tutes the "enigma"of my title, for, unfortunately,the work itself does
not make it unambiguouslyclear what meaning, if any, Plato wished to
attach to 6o6atov. The Eithyphro,in fact, is one of the so-calledaporetic
dialoguesof definition, a dialogueto be distinguishedfrom the dialogue
of exposition by its apparentfailureto hit the truth, to answera question
satisfactorily,to arrive at an affirmativeand positiveresult. In short, it is
a dialogue of search which-beginsand ends with an apparentavowal of
ignorance concerning the meaning of piety; and the impression with
which nmany haveleft off its perusalis that of a typicallyminor, "Socratic"
dialogue- dramatic,early composed, tentative, and negative.
Negative and tentative as it is, it would be foolhardyto label what I
here propose to say about its central question a solution simpliciter:one
cannot claim certaintyfor a findingwhich is to be discoveredexplicitly
formulatedas such at no point within the dialogue,andwhich, moreover,
cannot be deduced therefrom without resort to the general hypothesis
that Plato's thought constitutes a unified system, the concepts of which
interpenetrateand illuminate one another. Nevertheless, I hope to be
able to suggest that there is reasonfor employingsuch an hypothesisin
connection with the Euthyphro,that this reason is to be found within
the confines of the dialogue itself, and that, once the hypothesis is
accepted, the enigmaticqualityof the work will vanishinto clarity.
It will be recalled that the work opens with a certain Euthyphro
meeting Socratesat the stoa of the &pXowvat.e6hq.Eachis soon to be
engaged in a trial: Socrates, it develops, is to be tried for impiety, for
beinga 7ronqg Oecov,a xacvoTotiZw nz-pLTX MOC whereby,it is alleged,
he corruptsthe young; Euthyphro,contraryto the wishes of his family,
is going to prosecute his own father for murder, a man who through
neglect has permitted a homicide, a 7csX'n of Euthyphro's, to die.
His family think Euthyphro's act an impious one (v6a0tov yap stvat 'o

108
Aov ypovou semL-vxc); but Euthyphro himself knows better: he
7rocptp
has, he claims, exact knowledge of a 0'Lta, sa a ivcxTL,and of tra' Oet
in general, and he will be glad to impart this knowledge to Socrates
(2A-SD).
He first asserts that 6 !SaLovis what he is in fact going to do, to proceed
against the akatx6v no matter who he may be. Such action, however, is
simply an example of that To'r6 so Eo, of that pta 8e'a, of that single
characteristic which all pious acts must possess if they are to be pious.
It is an account of this characteristic, which Socrates apparently does not
comprehend, that he wishes Euthyphro to impart to him (sD -6 E).
Accordingly, a second definition is offered - piety is that action which
is pleasing to the gods; and this is soon corrected to that which is
pleasing to all the gods, when Socrates points out that the gods of the
traditional cultus GaToaCL&ouGL... xxl 8a=povtoct M);Akot4 about what
is just and unjust, noble and base, good and evil (6E Io-9E).
This emended definition, according to which -r6 6aLov is o' OroypXe4,
is then subjected to a critical examination in which, perhaps for the
first time in the history of western thought, the distinction between
essential nature and accidental property is drawn. In brief, Socrates
shows that the piety of an act remains unaffected by the love which its
piety inspires in the gods. Its being pleasing to the gods and its piety
are, in fact, distinct characteristics which stand to one another in
the relation of =tOos to o6a[a, the act's piety entailing the love it
receives from the gods, but not vice-versa (9 E - i I B).
With the rejection of this definition, an impasse is reached and an
interlude in the search for the content of TO- 6aLov ensues, in which
Euthyphro complains that he does not know now how to express what
he means: their definitions refuse to remain stable and slip away from
them. Socrates banteringly suggests that this instability of definition is
the result of Euthyphro's Daedalean skill. To which Euthyphro retorts
that it is really Socrates who, like a Daedalus, has been imparting
motion to the definitions so that they refuse to stay put. "In that case, "
replies Socrates, "I am probably a greater artist than Daedalus to this
extent: he only made his own creations move, whereas I move those of
other people as well." Yet, he continues, he would rather not: e3ouX6unlv
y&p &Mv
fot ro6q X6youq V?'VCLV
XOL aXLVYG)4( lap5iaOML [LRX)XoV 7 -Cp n
AcaXou aopLoc -sC& Tav'&Xou Xp yev'aO. He would give the
wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus on top of that, for a
solid definition (i i B- Ei).
The interlude having ended with these words, Socrates asserts that
lO9
he will now try to help Euthyphroto see how he (Euthyphro)should
instruct him (Socrates) 7rptro5 'aou.. He begins by explaining the
distinction between genus and species, and easily gains Euthyphro's
consent to the proposition that the genus of piety is justice, that piety
is a kind of justice. What particularkind of justice piety is, however,
remains to be answered: the specific differentiamust be stated if the
requirementsof formal definition are to be met. Euthyphrotherefore
answers that piety seems to him to be that kind of justice which is
OepoutneL to the gods. Socrates commendshim warmlyfor this answer,
but is not clear about the meaning of Oepnxsta. In the first place every
true OCpO7E'L implies an art or science. Secondly every OepmnetLX
either improves the object of its concern or helps, in an ancillaryway,
the object of its concern to produce some effect, to achieve some
gpyov. Piety cannot be the sort of art that improves the gods, for gods
cannot be improved by men. It must therefore be an ancillaryart, an
u7nqpe?rTj-nctq,an art that helps the gods to achieve some act. But what
is this act, this 7r&yxomov
e'pyov, this utterly wonderful and noble act,
which the gods are helped to achieve through the instrumentalityof
man s piety? Ec at , X 01pta-e.T
nE Oeoz? U1tYpVTLX1 L TLY VO4 pyou
U't=plCTX? XV&V
&7repyMa[OCv ; 6'n
iXOTVy& olaOX, Z'=taip T& ye
OC?Z XAXLG'n 9X; el&VOC &vOpvrnV... ?CI 87 7tpO6 AL6 - t C7rO 'cOTV
exe7LVoT6 7CaXyXOV E'pyOV 8 OL OSO'LOb?pyok0VTCL 7 'LM)PeOC xp@"COL;
( iIE-I 3 E I i).
This questionEuthyphrofails to answer. He shirksthe issue by replying
that the works of the gods are 7roXX& XOLXa. But Socratespresseshim.
xod
The activities of generals and of farmers are 7to?&xoclxctX?atoo; yet
they each have some principaltask to achieve, so x cy'aXatov'pyov.
What is so xs%aCocLov of the ?pyopao of the gods? Again Euthyphro
evades the point. It would be a work of great magnitude, he says, to
'
learn &xptPc6q 76V'rocToJ3oc
cM ?Xs. But he will say this: that piety
consists in knowing how to speak and act in a mannergratifyingto the
gods, in prayer and sacrifice. This is the knowledge and such are the
acts which preserve the welfare of the state. Again, however, Socrates
persists in keeping in the foregroundthe definitionof piety as an art or
science that is ancillaryto the gods' achievementof some principalact.
He refersto his questionabout the natureof this act as the chief question
he has asked ('orXS oto0VJv Np6T9), and he chidesEuthyphro
for havingturnedaside at the very point at which he was face to face at
1 The iteration of 6 XZCP&XCxLov
here (r4B9) and the shift to a denotationdifferentfrom
that which the term bearsat i4A Io seem significant.See p. I I9, note 3, infra.

I 10
last with an adequate definition. Still, as asker, he must follow where the
replies of his interlocutor lead him: if piety consists in knowing how
to sacrifice and how to pray to the gods, then it ought to be a science of
putting requests and giving returns to them. "A really first-rate compre-
hension of my meaning!" Euthyphro exclaims at this. "Yes", replies
Socrates, "and the reason why I understand you so well is that I am an
XLOUp qg . . . aq qao CXp cnpOaeXyL tov voiv auq,Tc'- OU xcqtcd
7r6ZZLr 0Tt &VZn ( 1 3 E l 2 -I4 D 6).
In using these words at I4D4- 6, Socrates seems to be saying that he is
quick to grasp Euthyphro's meaning because of his earnest desire to
master Euthyphro's science of theology, because of the close attention
he pays to it. The result of this close attention to Euthyphro's words, he
seems to be saying, is this: that nothing said by Euthyphro will be lost
upon him. Nevertheless, there is a puzzle in this sentence which has not
heretofore been noticed. The result clause, (COT? oV xoa.[al neazarL
ocv ? , means literally "so that whatever you say will not fall
to the ground", i.e., will not be rendered invalid. All commentators, so
far as I know, have taken this clause to mean "so that nothing which you
(Euthyphro) say will be lost or thrown away upon me (Socrates)", but
there is no warrant in the Greek for the words "upon me". Their gra-
tuitous addition becomes understandable only when one realizes that
sense seems to vanish without them, that sense seems to vanish if Plato
here makes Socrates say that, as a result of his close attention to
Euthyphro's words and wisdom, whatever Euthyphro says will be
rendered valid. The puzzle, in short, is generated by the collocation of
the result clause with the idiomaticsense of -rpoaexcoTOv voUv,, for there
can be no causal relation, it would seem, between Socrates' mere
attention to them and the validity of Euthyphro's definitions. I shall have
occasion later to return to this point and to other ambiguities within the
passage.
To finish the resume - if that service of men to the gods that is piety
is to put requests and to give return to them, then right requests ought
to concern what men need from the gods, and right return what the
gods need from men. But, while there is no good for men which they
do not derive from the gods, what good or benefit do the gods receive
from men? "Gratification", says Euthyphro, "what pleases them", with
this reply completing the circle to the full and returning to the position
which Socrates has already refuted. We are thus no closer, apparently,
to a knowledge of what piety is at the close of the dialogue than we were
at its outset. The result of the investigation is negative; but Socrates, at
I I I
least, is not content with having proved Euthyphro an ignoramus in the
very sphere in which he claimed competence. "We must begin again,
then, he says in the epilogue, "and ask, what is piety? For syciO7tplv
&vFaLciOCVV ?tQt.
09X7tQtLXLXa&. a BX?C [LcE &x?0 & 7V l
Tp07r(d irpoaxcow 'r6vv0o5V 6Ot [c,CXLar0CVUV et7t 'MV oexv - "Some
other time," is Euthyphro's final rejoinder. "I've got in engage-
ment, and I really must be off." - "What a thing to do, my friend," says
Socrates. "You've dashed my hopes, you know. I was so hoping that
I'd learn from you the nature of piety and impiety and thus clear myself
of Meletus' indictment. I'd have told him that you had enlightened me
(ao?po... yTyovx) as to the meaning of ra&Oeo and that, in conse-
quence, I was no longer going to make ad hoc judgments about them out
of ignorance or make innovations regarding them, and that the rest of
my life would be better as a result. " (I4D6-i6A).
So the dialogue ends, negatively, on the face of it, and yet a work
relatively rich in motive. There can be little doubt, as Shorey has
suggested, that the purposes of the Euthyphro,like those of every other
Platonic dialogue, are complex, are, in fact, "its entire content: the
favorable contrast of Socrates with Euthyphro, the satire on popular
religion, the lesson in elementary logic, the hint, perhaps, of the theory
of ideas, the deeper problem of the relations of religion and morality,
the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, for finite minds of defining
without contradictions our relations and service to the infinite that we
apprehend as God." 1 There is an additional motive as well, however,
which is not listed in such a catalogue. This is precisely the persistent
attempt to come to grips with the nature of piety, which runs through
the entire length of the dialogue, giving it its unity and structure. To all
appearance, this is the major motive. On the face of it, Plato is striving
to make clear a concept of piety; and, on the face of it, he fails. But does
he really fail?
This question, which must have been debated at least as early as the
first century A.D., when Thrasyllus of Alexandria, in dividing Plato's
works into tetralogies and in classifying each, in part, by philosophical
method and purpose, must have put it to himself in order to reach the
conclusion that the Euthyphrowas a peirastic dialogue of search, was
raised anew in modern times by Schleiermacher, in the introduction to
his translation of the dialogue. There he observed that "man kann im
Euthyphron weder eine fortschreitende Berichtigung der allgemeinsten
ethischen Ideen nachweisen, noch auch, wenn man bei dem einzelnen
1 P. Shorey, WhatPlatoSaid (Chicago, X933), 78-79.
II2
Begriff stehen bleiben will, der den unmittelbaren Gegenstand der
Untersuchung ausmacht, finden sich hier solche indirekte Andeutungen,
welche den aufmerksamen Leser hinreichend mit der Ansicht des Ver-
fassers bekannt machen; sondern sowol die Beschranktheit des Zwekks
als die bloss skeptische Behandlung des gegenstandes liegt hier ganz
deutlich zu Tage." 1 Yet, only i6 years later Socher was to find in the
work just th-ose "indirekte Andeutungen", pointing to positive doctrine,
whose existence Schleiermacher had denied ;2 and with the publication
in Bonitz's PlatonischeStudien of a lecture on the interpretation of the
Euthyphrowhich had been delivered before the Berlin Academy of
Science in I 872, a position was taken which all proponents of a positive
interpretation have utilized since, with but minor degrees of alteration.3
In this lecture Bonitz maintained and reinforced Socher's view that the
key to the dialogue and the solution to the problem of Platonic piety
lay in the one question, put by Socrates at I 3 E I 0- I I and again at
i4A9-io, which Euthyphro fails to answer.
Since Bonitz's day, no scholar who has attempted to understand the
Euthyphrohas been able to avoid taking the one stand or the other. While
neither view has prevailed at the expense of the other 4, I shall here
contend that the more plausible position is that of those who assume a

I F. Schleiermacher, Platons Werkc, Ersten Theiles, Zweiter Band, Dritte Auflage

(Berlin, i8S5), 37. The first edition of the work was published in I8o4.
2 J. Socher, Ucber Platons Schrften (Munich, 1820), 62: "'Gott dienen ist Religion:
giebt es einen Zweck der Gottheit, ein erhabenes Werk, zu dessen Vollfiihrung sie die
Menschen als Mitarbeiter aufruft? Welches ist dieses?' Hier liegt der Schiussel!" cf.
Ibid., 6i: "Gew6hnlich, sagt Schleiermacher bei einer. andern Gelegenheit, legt er
[i.e., Plato] den negativen Resultaten den Schliissel zur positiven Kenntniss bei: ergreife
ihn, und schliess dir selbst auf! "
3 H. Bonitz, PlatonischeStudien, Dritte Auflage (Berlin, i 886), 2 2 7-242. Fot those who had
anticipated Bonitz in finding positive results in the dialogue - notably, Stallbaum and
Susemihl himself - see F. Susemihl, Dic GenetischeEntivickelungder PlatonischenPhilosophic,
ErsterTheil (Leipzig, I 8SS), I 17- I I9.
4 Among the positivists are to be found, for example: J. Adam (Platonis Euthyphro
[Cambridge, 1890], xii-xvii); W. A. Heidel ("On Plato's Euthyphro,"TAPA 31 [1900],
163-I8 I); T. Gomperz (GrcekThinkers[English transl. London, I905], vol. II, 3?8-367);
H. Raeder (Platons PhilosophischeEntwickelung[Leipzig, 1905], 127-130); H. von Arnim
(Platos Jugenddialoge [Leipzig-Berlin, 1914], 141-I54); Wilamowitz (Platon [Berlin,
19I9], vol. II, 76-8I); and P. Friedlander(Platon [Berlin, 1971, vol. 11, 7?-84). The
negativists include: B. Jowett (The Dialogues of Plato Translatedinto English, II, 67-73);
M. Croiset (Platon. Oeuvres Completes[Paris, Societe d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres,"
1946], 1,4 I81-I83); L. Robin (Platon [Paris, 19351, 4I and 254.-255); J. Burnet
(Plato's Euthyphro,Apology of Socrates, and Crito [Oxford, 1924], S7); and P. Shorey (op.
cit., 78-80). cf. E. Zeller, Die Philosophieder Griechen,II. i,5 193, note i and 479.

I 13
positive concept of piety in the work, a concept to which Plato was
himself committed and which was consciously meant by him to be
recognized as at least distinct from all conventionalnotions of the day,
even if it were not understoodin full. On the issue of the content of this
notion, however, I must part company with these scholars. Here, and
here alone, I may claim to be advancingsomething new.

11
There are severalreasonswhy one is justifiedin seekingpositive doctrine
in the dialogue. The Euthyphro falls naturallyinto two sections separated
from one another by an interlude. It has long been recognized that this
device of interlude is Plato's way of warningthe reader that everything
that has preceded is prefatory and that, if positive doctrine is to be
found, it is to be sought in the second part. This is the case, for example,
with the Phaceowhose majorinterlude, following the objections leveled
by Simmiasand Cebes againstthe immortalityof the soul, sets the scene
for the introduction of the theory of ideas as ultimate causes of all
characteristicswhich come to focus in phenomena in space-time; the
elaborate interlude of the Protagoras,in which Plato not only parodies
the sophists Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, but even involves
Socrates in a long and fantasticinterpretationof a piece of Simonidean
verse that is itself a parody of contemporarypractice in literary criti-
cism, similarly sets the stage for the proof of the homogeneity of the
virtues in intelligence and knowledge; and the case is similaragairnwith
the Phaedrusand the Theaetetus, each of which has a long interlude that
functions in just this sort of way. Now, up to the interlude, every
attempt to define piety in the Euthyphro ends in negation, every defi-
nition seems to slip awaylike one of Daedalus'moving statues. We note,
moreover, that these definitionsare the ones which have been advanced
by Euthyphro, that Socrates up to this point has confined himself
chieflyto criticizingwhat Euthyphrovolunteers as his own ideas. In the
interlude, however, Euthyphrois reduced to a confession of incompe-
tence; and, from this point on, Socrates, after statinghis earnestdesire
to detain the definitions, that is, to reach one that is adequate,plays a
different role. He is no longer chiefly critical, but now leads Euthyphro
step by step to the notion of piety as Oepxciv'Cm to the gods. We note
that he warmly congratulatesEuthyphrofor havingreached this insight,
and, what seems to me to be of extreme significance,he himself never
abandonsthis way of looking at piety even though Euthyphrois quite
incapableof elaboratingon it and at the dialogue's end returns to the
I 14
original position. These devices of artistry would seem to give every
indication not only that Plato intended to put positive content into the
work, but also meant his readers to look for it in the section that
succeeds the interlude. If such is not the significance of the devices, they
are left without function; and it is noteworthy that every negativist,
while implicitly denying the significance here accorded them, has
tacitly omitted to deal with them and to rem-ove them as possible
obstacles to his theory.
In any event, there are additional indications which, together with
those just mentioned, make it highly probable that the Ozpv.ta-
concept is to be regarded as being at the heart of the Platonic concept.
When piety is at last defined as the art ancillary to the performance of the
gods' chief function, we are presented with the one definition in the
entire dialogue that gets off scot free at Socrates' hands, that is not sub-
jected to the devastating elenchus. Instead, Socrates presses Euthyphro
to say what that function is, persists in keeping the definition before him
when he tries to alter it, refers to his own question about the nature of
the gods' function as the most important question he has asked, and
finally even rebukes Euthyphro for having turned aside just when they
had come in sight of an adequate definition. It is inconceivable to me
that Plato would have made Socrates speak and act so, had he not intended
his readers to understand that the vital point in the dialogue had been
reached.
To reach that vital point, however, is to stumble upon an enigma: for,
granted that Plato intends one to understand that piety is, in some
sense, an 7rnpseTxnToZq Ocoiqdc TOV XCCPO?XOu9pyou &i7rpyxaLCv,
what is that sense? What particular art does he have in mind? What does
he mean by OeoL?And what is the gpyov of whatever he means by
OsoL?It is scarcely surprising, in view of the ambiguity of these terms,
that practically all who believe positive doctrine to be latent in the
definition have given varying accounts of its content. What does surprise
one, apart from the fact that, in their concentration upon the meaning
of Epyovor Oco' or both together, all have ignored one element of the
definition altogether - that piety is an art or science, an U7prLXJ
t4 1 - is to find that they all manage, in one way or another, to import

1 Bonitz (op. cit., 234), for example, asserts that Platonic piety is "nichtsanderes...
als die vollendete Sittlichkeit, nur unter der Form, dass sich der Mensch bewusst ist,
hierdurch das dienende Organ fuirdas g6ttliche Wirken zu sein;" but precisely what
epistemonic form that "Sittlichkeit"would assume in Platonic terms he does not say.
And Heidel (op. cit., 174), interpretingthe definitionto mean "thedevotedservice of the

I IS
the Republic's idea of good into it, some seeing this concept in the
7yyxcXo0v gpyov of the gods, others equating it with the gods them-
selves, others, again, making the gods and their 'epyovthe subjective-
objective content of the idea of good. For such impletion of the defi-
nition blinks not nmerely the fact that no definite sign or clue can be
found within the dialogue to indicate that Plato intends Oeo' or epyov
tco'v O6v to be identified with the idea of good, but, what is more
important, the fact that no evidence exists within the entire Platonic
corpus to suggest that Oeos ever denoted the idea of good or the causal
agent thereof. As Professor Cherniss has demonstrated1, it is voii
that constitutes deity or the essential characteristic of deity for Plato
- the voiJg that rules "necessity" through persuasion in the ordering of
the universe in the Timaeus(48A), that is Pcxeug oPJOCvoi3 r xoc. ynq
in the Philebus (28C), and and that is CyxpQCr4gOCa-pcOv re xOLOacov
,Xcovas there are in the universe, of which it is the &LoxexoacpJXW,
in the Laws (966E). Moreover, "deity, as vo5q, is not causally inde-
pendent and so cannot be the 'ultimate reality'. It must, in fact, since
it is vok, exist in soul, and consequently must be intermediate between
the ideas and phenomena... The Republic shows both that voi3 is
causally dependent upon the ideas and why Plato insists that it can exist
only in soul. As there is vision in the eyes as soon as they are turned
upon objects lighted by the sun, so is there vo5q in the soul as soon as
it rests upon the intelligibles illuminated by the truth and reality

Ideal [Goodj, consciously conceived as God," is equally silent about the epistemonic
content of that service. The same is true of Gomperz (op. cit., 361-362: "The work of
the gods is the good, and to be pious is to be the organ of their will, as thus directed"),
Raeder (op. cit., 130: "Der Dialog schliesst... ohne dass eine geniugende Definition
der Fr6mmigkeit erreicht wird; doch zeigt es sich hier wie bei friiheren Definitions-
versuchen, dass eine richtige Definition nur unter der Bedingung zustande kommen
kann, dass das Gute als Zweck erfasst wird"), and Friedlander (op. cit., 82: "Und wenn
Sokrates fragt, welches denn das Hauptstiick dieses vielen Sch6nen sei, das die Gotter
wirken, und keine Antwort erhalt, so ahnen wir, dass der platonische Sokrates darauf
die Antwort hatte: 'das Gute'; wir wissen aber auch, wie hoch ihm dieses Gute steht,
und dass es vor Euthyphron nicht ausgesprochen werden konnte, ohne missverstanden
oder enttweiht zu werden"). von Arnim would appear to be an exception, for he says
(Op. cit., 149) that Plato "sie [i.e., piety] als eine ELt-fl.LV) u7np?j;rLz' Ozot; et4 -r
reXd0cu 7rOLe!V lcxX TOV MVOpO7tcov 4uy& auffasste." The sentence which immediately
follows this, however, shows that he too did not hold the definition to entail the concept
of a distinct science: "So ware sie auch nur eine Anwendung[italics mine.- WGR] der
it7rLaV on &o5 yOoA3."
1 H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticismof Plato and the Academy(Baltimore, 1944), Appendix
Xi, 603-6io.

I I6
emanating fromnthe idea of good as light does from the sun (go8 B-D).
Similarly in the Timaeus, although at the beginning it is said that the
demiurge constructed voi5 within soul (30B), it is later explained that
voi5 is the result in the soul of the soul's 'contact' with the ideas
(37A-C). For Plato, then, voi54 is not an 'entity' but is just the soul's
ability (cf. Republic So8 E) to 'see' the ideas or the state in the
soul (i.e., v6&jaLq,Republic riiD, Timaeus52A) produced by sight of
them. "1
It is the knowledge of this equation between deity and voi3c, vouched
for as it is by the evidence of the dialogues, which alone enables one to
answer without resort to conjecture the question shirked by Euthyphro;
for if the function of vo05 in the first of its two senses must be, and can
only be, the realization of itself in the second - if it is the function of
vo05 to become vo67aL4, - then the "work" of the gods, a atyxoaXov
epyov indeed, can only be the apprehension of the Platonic ideas.
Moreover, it is only on the condition that Plato had already conceived
of this equation at the time of composition of the Euthyphrothat one can
complete the definition of piety by allowing to it its full epistemonic
content; for if the gods are vo5q and their function is the apprehension
of ideas, then it follows that the only art capable of aiding them to
perform this function must be that Platonic art of philosophical dialectic
which enables vo5 - TO 6ptL '4r6 6'pymvov 4 xcTLav0acvt

excroq - to twist around and away from phenomenal process to the

end that it may confront the ideas (Republic 518 C-D). Thus, if the
equation between deity and vo54 is accepted as a relation which is valid
for the Euthyphro,every term in its enigmatic definition will be immedi-
ately accounted for by a precise denotation for which evidence exists in
the Platonic dialogues; the alternative to acceptance of this equation, on
the otlher hand, for those who would find positive doctrine in the work,
has in fact been, and can only continue to be, a conjectural reconstruction
of that doctrine which in every case must fail to account for its epi-
stemonic content.
The consciousness of the need to be clear about the meaning of any
term Plato might use, which the Euthyphrobespeaks not only in its
insistence throughout upon clear comprehension of the denotation of
tr 6aLovbut also in its suggestion at 3E IO-14C3 that the definition
as it stands will remain deficient so long as the denotation of the epyov
1 Cherniss, op. cit., 606-607. The last statement is not an exclusive disjunction. It is
clear from the passages cited by Cherniss that Plato conceived of voi3q both as 8U"Va1LLq
and as Nvipyem.

I 17
of the gods is not made explicit ', it bespeaks in particularfor Oso' in
its epilogue. There, after every effort at definitionhas ended in failure,
Socratesis made finallyand ironicallyto lament the fact that Euthyphro
has not enlightenedhim, not as to the meaningof T6 0aLov,be it noted,
but as to the meaningof t& Oet? - a strange lamentationto make, and a
point of striking significance for the interpretation of the dialogue,
when one recalls that not once in the entire conversationhas either
partyto it addressedhimselfto the particularquestion, rt e'trLT6 O?ZoV.
The condition for the answer to this question, no less than that for the
answer to the question concerning the teachability of virtue in the
Meno,is that a prior question be answered; and, for the Euthyphro, it
6
is this prior question, -L Eatv 0 GO4, and its answer, vo5i, which
(rather than the question concerning the spyovof the gods) constitute
the key to the solution of the enigma.
It may be objected, of course, that to accept for the Etuthyphro an
equation that is demonstrablyvalid only for the Republic,Philebus,
Timaeus,and Lawsis quite unnecessary,and even anachronistic.So to
object, however, is to overlook the fact that, long before the time of
composition of the Euthyphro,Anaxagorasof Clazomenaehad already
conceived of, and had published, his view of vok as 6o&otxoruzW-V 'C
xod. lt&vTcv 'rLo; s2, if not as the identical of Oeo', as the doxo-
graphical tradition asserts.3 Moreover, to object so is to overlook
evidence provided by the Euthyphro itself. It will be recalled that, when
at i4D4-6 Socrates ironically assures Euthyphrothat he will save the
validity of all the definitions by applying vo5q thereto, we noted a
puzzle in the sentence generatedby the collocation of the result clause
1 To be noted, too, is what Plato makes Socrates say at 9 E, after Euthyphro has defined
-r 6a8Lovas 6 csv 7rcv-rc ot Oeol (pLt)aLv. So defined, r 6&atovis tro Oro9LXc.
Socrates' critique of this definition is based upon his clarjfication of the meaning of this
term: it is an adjective which, in the last analysis, denotes merely a =aOo4of Tr66tov,
and as such it cannot be equated with the oUatLoof the latter. What I wish to emphasize
here is not the demonstration of the inadequacy of the definition as such, but rather the
demonstration of Plato's consciotisness that the denotation of a term must be understood if
the validity or lack of validity of the definition in which the term appears is to be
ascertained. Ovxo5v kmaxo6,tAev oZ TO-ro, cX EUOIcppav, - says Socrates, - et xc&5@s
Xkye-rL, i IpCv xot oTrw, v -re aluTrv & xo8rey[eOm xxat -rv &Xhw, va &
?6Vov c -rcq L gxe" oura, >YXC(pOUVVTECXLV; j aX)(T7rov -rt ?kyct 6 hey&w;
(9E4-7) The same consciousness of the necessity of clarifying a definition's terms is to
be seen at 3 A-D, where OrpTretoc -rv OEv is refined to its immediate denotation,
upenxi -rot Oeog. N.B. x 3 A I^2: :v y&p OepOMEL'VoiS7ro JUVJ.L 'VLVOw oVOFL&4M.
2 Phaedo97 B-C. cf. Laws966 E-967 B.

8 H. Diels, DoxographiGraeci (Berlin, 1929), 30 2 b Ii - 1 2.

I 8
with 7tpoaco trv vo5v taken in its idiomatic and normal sense. It is
meaningless, we noted, for Plato thus to have implied a causal relation
holding between Socrates' mere attention to them and the validity of
Euthyphro's definitions. It may now be pointed out, however, that it
would have been no less meaningless for Plato to have implied a causal
relation holding between the application of vo54 to the definitions and
their validity, unless he had already identified voi5 with the one term
common to them all.' The puzzle at i 4D 4-6 is therefore evidence for
Plato's conscious equation of vo-u and O6o. And what Plato makes
Socrates say at i g C I I -D 2, just before Euthyphro breaks off the conver-
sation altogether, buttresses this evidence. In this final appeal, Socrates
ambiguously describes himself as one who will not voluntarily give up
the process of search until he gain haOntL - in effect, as voi4 striving
to become v6TJaL4 - and enjoins Euthyphro not to devalue him so
described.2 The alternative to such devaluation is for Euthyphro to
speak the truth about so 6atov.. And how is he to attain this truth? By
applying voiu3, at last, to every turn of definition.3
One question, perhaps, remains to be considered. If it is true that,
when he wrote the Euthyphro,Plato had already "developed" the concept
of deity which was to "reappear" in the Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus,
Philebus, and Laws, why did he not make it crystal-clear in the earlier
work? The reason, I venture to say, is an obvious one: had he wished to
declare that god is voi5 and genuine piety philosophy, in his sense of
the term, he would have been forced to write not a Euthyphro,but a
Republic and a Timaeus to support his views; nXt?Lovo4 spyoi Ea-tv
MxpLP5; i&Vrx TaI3To c
64 x? iL,OeZv, replies Euthyphro, quite
i For a similar double entendregiven to 7rpoakXeLvr6v vo5v by Plato, see Philebus 32 E:
... et=p 6v-C(Oq10'Lt T6 hy6tkeVOV, 8LM&,pOeLpo0VaVtLaV 'U-r6V &?Yn8)V, cVM(,?O tACOVW
8 0ov, v V flu)-r at eetpoll?vo)v ftLre &VMa O.LkVWV1VVOqaG)VeV 7tppt, 'rtvc so-r0 Ctv
8et r6-re kv 1x&arotL ClvaL rot,; C6Olt, O'rav ot'urcotaxn; ac6apa 8& 7poo)cav 'rbv
voVv Eiiu. The fi; here asked about is revealed as vo54 in 33B-C 3.
2 The irony here is the same as that of Phaedo i i 5B-i I 6 A X. cf. Alcibiades 1 x32 B-I 3 3 C.
3 A similarambiguitysuggestingthe conscious equationof vok3 and Oe6qis to be seen
at x4B8-9: had Euthyphroonly wished to do so, he would have answeredthe xcpdaXtov
of the questionsSocrates had asked; or, he would have stated the xeci&Xotovof those
aboutwhomSocrateshad asked. The ambiguity of ebTc5 iv so' xe(P&'atov&v 7pC"3r(v
permits either of these interpretations. In the second, xEp&oXatov can mean either
"principalcharacteristicof" or, taken literally, "thatbelonging to the head, the upper
part of the body, of." The first of these senses is an obvious description of Wo%3, the
essentialcharacteristicof deity. The second is seeminglywithout sense, and does in fact
remain so, until one recalls that, for Plato, xcpaXr is the habitation of votig,- ' 'ro
Oetoa'-rouxcdt [epc'r&'rouotx-rjtg (Timaeus4sA).

i19
truthfully, to the question, T'L so6 xeyp.Xov ra'=L Tr 4yoa[
['c,v Oe7v]. Moreover, if Plato was to put his treatment of piety into
the synthetic, ironic, pseudo-historical form of Socrates' quest for it
from the lips of an unaffectedly orthodox and typically unreflecting
religionist - from the very sort of man, in short, whose narrow ortho-
doxy was responsible for his master's death, - he had to suppress dis-
cussion of the essential characteristic of deity which for him guaranteed
that true piety, like all other virtuous and intelligent activity, was in the
last analysis philosophy and the result of philosophy.
The monstrousness of the Athenians' treatment of Socrates, for Plato,
lay in this: that they had condemned and put to death for impiety a
man who, as Plato saw it, had practiced the true piety of dialectic all
his life. And the hints of the Euthyphrorecord this judgment for posterity
- for all, that is, capable of applying vouGthereto.

University of California.

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