Elizabeth Bigham

May 12, 2019

ENVI T 248

Prof. Kohler

Solar Radiation Management in the Context of the Paris Agreement

On March 11, 2019, the Swiss government brought forward an ambitious plan that

directly addressed the future of solar geoengineering and carbon dioxide removal. They asked

parties at the fourth session of the UN environmental assembly to consider the “state of

geoengineering technologies” 1, specifically those related to CDR and SRM. While the resolution

ultimately failed, the session brought up some important considerations: because some parties

expressed interest in the feasibility of these geoengineering technologies, the IPCC should

“increase the attention given to CDR and especially SRM, which has been largely ignored to

date” 2. Dr. Duncan McLaren from the Lancaster Environmental Center points out that this

resolution was intended to “build knowledge” and address the “potential social, environmental,

political and technical implications and side effects” 3 of the technologies presented in the

resolution. They are hopeful that this resolution, even though it failed, will open the door for

international conversation about geoengineering and will encourage parties to address why these

technologies may or may not work for them. While there has not been a specific COP dealing

with geoengineering specifically, it seems feasible that SRM technologies could fit into the

framework of existing legislation, such as the Paris Agreement. SRM’s potential compatibility

with the Paris Agreement makes this geoengineering policy promising. The Paris Agreement is

already widely agreed upon, and by incorporating the ability to do SRM into adaptation

1
“Perspectives on the UN Environment Assembly resolution on geoengineering”, Harvard Solar Geoengineering Research Program, (2019) 1.
2
Ibid, 7.
3
Ibid, 7.

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measures, parties can further work towards their commitments as spelled out in the Articles.

SRM in the context of the Paris Agreement also provides an oversight framework, something

that hindered the agreement in Nairobi.

At the Paris Agreement, which came to a conclusion on December 12, 2015 4, parties

agreed to several different objectives. First, they set “common core obligations for all countries”
5
, which stated that all signatories would set Nationally Determined Contributions, emissions

reductions goals in a certain timeframe. These emissions, however, directly refer to GHGs.

While the Paris Agreement makes references to keeping the global average temperature “well

below 2 ºC” 6, the objective of the agreement is to prevent temperature increase by reducing

national GHG emissions, and not by introducing SRM. “Governing Solar Radiation

Management”, a report written by the Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment, however,

finds that this international desire for keep global average temperatures below certain levels can

be assisted by SRM, and that this question should be explored further.

Early on in their report, the Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment rightfully

acknowledges the risks of SRM. These “risk-risk tradeoffs” 7 consist of three parts. The report

first discusses concerns surrounding the decisions to do research, then recognizes the risks

surrounding the “deployment” 8 of technologies, and finally addresses concerns surrounding

governance, perhaps one of the bigger issues surrounding geoengineering. Geoengineering is

global in nature, and without international consensus, as seen clearly at the UNEA 4, it is likely

that resolutions will continue to be shot down. There is also “no governance capacity to

adequately assess a proposal for deployment” at the moment, forcing the decision to be split
4
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani. International Climate Change Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 209.
5
Ibid, 210.
6
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 123.
7
Netra Chhetri, et. al. Governing Solar Radiation Management, (Washington, DC: Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment, American
University, 2018), 4.
8
Ibid.

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between the UNEA and IPCC, as was problematic at UNEA 4. As a result of all of this, SRM

may not be completely politically feasible in the immediate future. However, there appear to be

places in international climate resolutions, such as the Paris Agreement, where SRM can be

researched, deployed and governed on an international scale. Although the Paris Agreement does

not establish a separate governance body for overseeing NDC efforts, it does instead establish

that “a mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of

this Agreement” 9. This mechanism “shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and

facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial, and non-

punitive” 10. While the Paris Agreement does not spell out specifically which body will take on

this role, it does state that one will oversee the implementation of the Articles. Placing SRM in

the context of the Paris Agreement gives it a global oversight committee, and thus addresses the

risks of governance as mentioned by the Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment.

SRM appears to fit into the Paris Agreement in other ways as well. First, SRM

technologies, assuming risks are account for, and the technology is successfully deployed, can

help parties reach the goals set in the Preamble of the Agreement. Parties recognized that there is

a “need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the

basis of the best available scientific knowledge” 11. There is currently a clear lack of “best

available scientific knowledge” in regard to SRM because of the risks associated with deploying

these technologies, even at the research phase. However, SRM experiments done in the US and

other nations have added to the “scientific knowledge” available to policy makers in figuring out

how to best keep the global average temperature below 2 ºC. The report notes that “even if SRM

research makes little progress in understanding SRM technologies, SRM research may improve

9
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 338.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid, 110.

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other parts of our understanding of climate science or fundamental atmospheric physics and

chemistry” 12. There are risks associated with failing to even try to research this technology, and

the international community could be missing opportunities to deploy the best scientific options

if there is a failure to research these technologies.

As mentioned, while SRM does not control the amount of carbon produced, it does

attempt to control the heating of the planet. Therefore, this type of climate engineering can help

keep forest sinks healthy by keeping global temperatures down. Afforestation, a way for

countries to meet their “Nationally Determined Contributions” 13, can be helped by SRM. This is

a second way that SRM can fit into the Paris Agreement: parties recognize “the importance of

conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases” 14.

“The Paris Agreement on Climate Change” by Daniel Klein, et. al. has also shown that “forests

and tree-based ecosystems have found to be to lessen social vulnerability to climate change…

particularly in developing countries” 15. The protection of forests as a source of carbon

sequestration and as a source of income in developing countries is essential. Climate Focus, a

committee that advised parts of the Paris Agreement, also found that Article 5 not only

encourages parties “‘to make use of the full range of ecosystem-based mitigation options,’ but

(to) also… encourage ‘technology-oriented’ solutions” 16. SRM fits into Article 5 as a technology

that can enhance sinks by keeping global average temperatures at a minimum. It is unlikely,

however, that the connection will be legitimized at the international level, as “reflecting sunlight

back into space… (does not) directly enhances sinks” 17. It would have to be proven that SRM
12
Netra Chhetri, et. al. Governing Solar Radiation Management, (Washington, DC: Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment, American
University, 2018), 4.
13
Ibid, 7.
14
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 117.
15
Ibid, 167.
16
Ibid, 172.
17
Netra Chhetri, et. al. Governing Solar Radiation Management, (Washington, DC: Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment, American
University, 2018), 8

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improves forest health in order for this provision to fit nicely into the existing framework of the

Paris Agreement.

Despite its looser connection to carbon removal, SRM fits nicely into adaptation and

“‘loss and damage’ provisions” 18. SRM also seems to be a unique type of adaptation: keeping

cool, in any form, is adaptation in the wake of climate change. Instead of using air conditioners,

the global community would opt to increase the reflectivity of the earth’s surface. Despite the

fact that adaption is perceived to only “provide local benefits” 19, the Paris Agreement still

concludes that “adaptation is a global challenge” 20, thus implying that it can and should be

addressed at the global level. The Agreement even addresses the need for “international

cooperation” 21, implying that physical action should be taken on a global scale. SRM fits into

these provisions: if deployed, SRM is designed to cool the planet, which is in line with the goal

of staying “well below 2 ºC”. While SRM does not prevent other carbon-related effects of

emissions, it can be used to maintain a livable temperature, which is also in line with the parties’

desire to “respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on humans rights” 22,

including “right to life” 23, although this is hotly debated. SRM also fits into the Paris Agreement

in the context of “Loss and Damage” 24. This Article spells out the importance and current

understanding of climate-induced loss and damages. The “stand-alone” nature of the article

points out the “unique set of cross-cutting issues” that are associated losses and damages from

climate change 25. The Paris Agreement specially mentions that parties recognize the loss and

18
Ibid, 8.
19
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani. International Climate Change Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 237.
20
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 204.
21
Ibid, 338.
22
Ibid, 114.
23
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani. International Climate Change Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 237.
24
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 224.
25
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), 225.

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damages caused by “extreme weather events and slow onset events” 26. Heat waves, and heat-

related weather events can be adverted by SRM, if deployed successfully. Therefore, it is in the

best interest of parties to take steps to deploy this technology, which will reduce some effects of

temperature-related environmental damage.

SRM also fits in nicely to the Paris Agreement’s “hybrid approach” 27: it can be

supervised governed by the international body spelled out in the Articles, and each state can

determine how much it wishes to research and deploy, all within the context of adaptation as a

global challenge. Allowing nations to take the lead on SRM may also prevent blockages by

states at the international level. Many experts note that the “majority view” at UNEA 4 “was

assiduously blocked by a vocal minority – notably the US and Saudi Arabia” 28. An international

resolution that develops nationally-determined SRM contributions can begin to solve the

problem of too much or too little adaptation. The Paris Agreement in the context of adaptation

and loss and damages can encourage countries to set their own goals for how much they want to

implement SRM and similar technologies by a set date. A recommendation such as the one

proposed above could have begun the process of encouraging climate-alternating technological

experiments at a pace that individual nations could be comfortable with. The risks surrounding

national governance are adverted because nations, if they chose to take on nationally-determined

SRM contributions in the immediate future, will be able to place their new commitments within

the context of the Paris Agreement.

However, there are two major problems of framing SRM in the context of NDC. First, by

letting individual nations determine their own contributions, it is very likely that there will be an

inefficient amount of SRM done: countries that supported early SRM research could do more
26
Ibid, 226.
27
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani. International Climate Change Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 237.
28
“Perspectives on the UN Environment Assembly resolution on geoengineering”, Harvard Solar Geoengineering Research Program, (2019)
14.

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than their per-capita fair share to address warming. These nations that gave their support to

Switzerland’s resolution, mainly those countries in “the Global South” 29, have not contributed

nearly as much to climate change as a country like the United States has. On the flip side, the

ability to research and deploy must be framed within the contexts of the Paris framing of

CBDRRC – “‘in the light of different national circumstances’” 30. The Preamble recognizes the

“specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties” 31: SRM is likely to be

an expensive technology, and while the need to delay contributions is recognized in NDC, this

does not work quite as well for SRM or geoengineering in general. Having nations dictate their

own contributions and when they deploy geoengineering technologies can be highly problematic,

particularly because the effects are relatively unknown at the present, and geoengineering in its

fullest capabilities would impact the whole planet.

Bibliography:

Bodansky, Daniel, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani. International Climate Change Law.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Chhetri, Netra, Dan Chong, Ken Conca, Richard Falk, Alexander Gillespie, Aarti Gupta, Sikina

Jinnah, Prakash Kashwan, Myanna Lahsen, Andrew Light, Catriona McKinnon, Leslie

Paul Thiele, Walter Valdivia, Paul Wapner, David Morrow, Carolyn Turkaly and Simon

29
“Perspectives on the UN Environment Assembly resolution on geoengineering”, Harvard Solar Geoengineering Research Program, (2019) 2.
30
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Lavanya Rajamani. International Climate Change Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 220.
31
Daniel Klein, et. al. ed. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 110.

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 Nicholson. 2018. Governing Solar Radiation Management. Washington, DC: Forum for

Climate Engineering Assessment, American University.

Klein, Daniel, Carazo, Maria Pia, Doelle, Meinhard, Bulmer, Jane and Higman, Andrew, ed. The

Paris Agreement on Climate Change – Analysis and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2017.

“Perspectives on the UN Environment Assembly resolution on geoengineering”. Harvard’s

Solar Geoengineering Research Program, (2019): 1-32