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    4 views32 pages

    Legal Apostasy

    Uploaded by

    Ming Yao

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    of 32
    Chapter VI APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Fred Ruiz Castro* It might'be apt to commence my speech by adverting to and narrating an interesting incident that happened in one of the intermediate appellate courts in Spain. A barrister was arguing a case before a panel of appellate judges presided by the most brilliant and at once the ugliest judicial magistrate in Spain. Realizing that he was arguing against overriding odds because his side of the case was rather infirm, and already piqued because the presiding judge had asked a number of questions about the case which he encountered great difficulty in answering, to his embarrassment of course, the barrister wanted to get even with the presiding judge. So in the course éfhis argument he said: “Your Honors, for the first time in my life as a barrister who has argued before practically all of the appellate courts of Spain, I am confronted with the spectacle of a presiding judge who is as double-faced as his questions.” As he was aboot 0 vatinue his argument, the presiding judge interrupted to remark: ‘Mr. Counsel, you called me doublefaced. If I had two faces, do you think I would wear this one?”, pointing to his own face. ecause it indicates in a substantive way the theme of iny spéech. For, this morning I will discourse on what I believe judges expect'from lawyers who, when they’ took their oath of office, were formally invested with the distinguished appellation of “officer of the court.” It was indubitable that the barrister desired soulfully to insult the presiding judge of the appellate court — and this surely evokes an important topic, which is, that as officers of the court, lawyers have no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of good fidelity to the maurts and respectful behavior towards the judges ‘who preside them. I say this incident is apt, b “Fred Ruiz Gastro later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court: 136 Scanned with CamScanner CHAPTER VI APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1. _ Upon his investiture into the legal profession, a lawyer vows solemnly to conduct himself “with all good fidelity to the courts,” and the Rules of Court constantly remind him “to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.” And yet you and I are fully cognizant that we have a great number of lawyers who are apostates to their exalted position as officers of the court, who have not only intentionally transgressed the ethics of the profession but also shunted aside the constraints of the lawyer's oath. This may be pointedly illustrated by the following examples: a. _ The lawyer who, with alacrity, recklessly denounced the members of the Supreme Court as recreant to their office because they allegedly “do not themselves pass upon” petitions for review filed with the Court, asserting, of course incorrectly, that only the clerk of court himself decides whether to deny or to give due course to such petitions. 4 b. _ The lawyer who, because of frustration resulting from the denial of his petition for review, libeled the Court as manned by “people who commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity” and who administer justice that is “not only blind but also deaf and dumb,” and proclaimed to the world that “his client had become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” c. The lawyer who, suddenly from nowhere, entered his appearance in the Court in.a.case more than two years after the completed execution in the court below of the final judgment of the Court. d. The lawyer, if he can be considered one, who filed a petition that was completely unintelligible and undecipherable. e. The lawyer who, facing charges of moral turpitude that could lead to his disbarment, instead of throwing himself at the mercy of the Court, compounded his malfeasance by sub- sequently submitting to the Court documents maliciously falsified by him. f. The lawyer who petitioned the Court for transfer of venue of a case (where he was a counsel) on the completely false assertion, made under oath, that his life was threatened several times by the opposing litigants. g. The lawyer who advised his client to escape from 137 Scanned with CamScanner ae LEGAL PROFESSION Readings and Materials prison after the petition for habeas corpus filed by him in behalf of his client was decided adversely. h. The lawyers who, because of their negligent ei gligence the right of appeal to the Supreme Court was lost due to the lapse of the reglementary period, later filed special civil actions for review, in the hope that the Court would fail to discover their duplicity. i. | The lawyers who argue before the Court completely unprepared. j. The lawyers who lack candor and/or are intellectu- ally dishonest when arguing before the Court. k. _ The lawyers who file petitions so cleverly prepared that while such petitions do not intentionally tell a lie, they do not tell the whole truth in the sense that they omit to state unfavorable or adverse facts. 1, The lawyers who so desperately want to win cases solely on the basis of technicality. m. . The lawyers, who foist bizarre theories upon the Court. 2. Permit me, at this juncture, to dwell briefly on the matter of the Court’s controversial minute resolutions. We are quite aware of the criticisms expressed against the Court’s practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously srarchails his arguments, only to have his efforts ultimately rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by the Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged ‘at all. The rést-do exhibit a first-impression cogench but fail to withstand critical scrutiny. Were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would bo unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of . Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present question: whose resolutions will have immedi: ‘ate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” 138 Scanned with CamScanner CHAPTER VI APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION If the Court is to do its work, it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive — and this apart from the fact that different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable. In Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963, the Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel urged that a “lack of merit” resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the [1935] Constitution. Replied Chief Justice Bengzon: “The same question has been raised before, and we held that these ‘resolutions’ are not ‘decisions’ within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of section 4 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court [July 1, 1940] and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. A petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.” We underscore the fact that cases taken to the Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if the Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon the Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court [January 1, 1964] which recites: “Review of Court of Appeals’ decision, discretionary. — A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will be considered: “(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a 139 Scanned with CamScanner LGCAL PRORMHNION Hendin and Matariala quontion of substance, nol tharatofore determined by tho Suprome Court, or haw decided it in a way prob- ably nob in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Buprome Court; “(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far de- partod from the accepted and usual course of judicial procoodings, or no far nanetioned such departure by a lower court, as 0 call for the exercise of the power of supervision,” 3, And now, let me move forward to the related matter of lawyers’ criticisms of courts and judges. It is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. This is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts’ rulings but also the manner in which they are handed down. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticiam is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts’ actuations are thrown open to public consumption. “Our decisions and all our official actions,” said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, “are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them. Judicial officers, like other public servants must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion.” Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. For, courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice, Hence, as a citizen and an officer of the court, every lawy

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