RULE 73- SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED
PERSONS
1. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK V. LANTIN,
124 SCRA 483
[G.R. No. L-33929. September 2, 1983.]
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, petitio
ner, vs. HON. GREGORIO
T. LANTIN, Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VII, and CANDIDO
RAMOS, respondents.
Jose Diokno for petitioner.
Romeo C . Carlos for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION;
CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF
CREDITS; INSUFFICIENT ASSETS OF DEBTOR
RAISES QUESTION OF PREFERENCE AS WELL
AS QUESTION OF CONSEQUENCE IN
CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS. — Concurrence of
credits occurs when the same specific property of
the debtor or all of his property is subjected to the
claims of several creditors. The concurrence of
credits raises no questions of consequence were the
value of the property or the value of all assets of the
debtor is sufficient to pay in fall all the creditors.
However, it becomes material when said assets are
insufficient for then some creditors of necessity will
not be paid or some creditors will not obtain the full
satisfaction of their claims. In this situation, the
question of preference will then arise, that is to say
who of the creditors will be paid the all of the others
(Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970
ed., Vol. VI, p. 472).
2. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS;
ARTICLES 2249 AND 2242 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSTRUED. —
Under the system established by Article 2249 of the
civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes and
assessments upon immovable property enjoy
absolute preference. All the remaining specified
classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242
enjoy no priority among themselves. Their credits
shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the
amount of the respective credits.
3. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2249 AND 2242 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE; PAIL REQUISITE TO
THEIR FULL APPLICATION UNDER THE DE
BARRETO CASE. — Under the De Barreto decision,
1
the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249
demands that there must first be some proceeding
where the class of all the preferred creditors may be
bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the
settlement of a decedent's estate under Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, or other liquidation proceedings
of similar import.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS AND SETTLEMENT OF A
DECEDENT'S ESTATE; BOTH PROCEEDINGS IN
REM, OTHER EQUIVALENT GENERAL
LIQUIDATION OF SIMILAR NATURE. — Insolvency
proceedings end settlement of a decedent's estate
are both proceedings in rem which are binding the
whole world. All persons having interest in the
subject matter involved, whether they were notified
or not, are equally bound. Consequently, a
liquidation of similar import or other equivalent
general liquidation must also necessarily be a
proceeding in rem so that all interested persons
whether known to the parties or not may be bound
by such proceeding.
3. ID.; ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF
UNPAID CONTRACTOR'S FEE; NOT AN
ACTION IN REM. — The proceedings in the court
below do not partake of the insure of insolvency
proceedings or settlement of a decedent's estate.
The action filed by Ramos was only to collect the
unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex
apartment. It is far from being a general liquidation of
the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
6. CIVIL LAW; CREDIT TRANSACTION;
ANNOTATION OF CLAIMS AND CREDITS AS
STATUTORY LIENS; RELEVANCE TO THE
STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM. — In the
case at bar, although the lower court found that
"there were no known creditors other than the
plaintiff and the defendant herein," this cannot be
conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the event
they show up and present their claims State
petitioner bank, claiming that they also have
preferred liens against the property involved.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
101864 issued in favor of the bank which is
supposed to be indefeasible would remain
constantly unstable and questionable. Such could
not have been the intention of Article 2243 of the
Civil Code although it considers claims and credits
under Article 2242 as statutory liens. Neither does
the De Barreto case sanction such instability. In fact,
an annotation, as suggested above, would insure to
the benefit of the public, particularly those who may
subsequently wish to buy the property in question or
who have a business transaction in connection
therewith. It would facilitate the enforcement of a
legal statutory right which cannot be barred by
laches (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135).
 7. ID.; SALE; BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OF
REALTY; TAKES IT FEE FROM LIENS AND
ENCUMBRANCES OTHER THAN STATUTORY
LIENS AND THOSE ANNOTATED IN THE TITLE;
CASE AT BAR. — Since the action filed by the
private respondent is not one which can be
considered as "equivalent general liquidation" having
the same import as an insolvency or settlement of
the decedent's estate proceeding, the well
established principle must be applied that a
purchaser in good faith and for value takes register
land free from liens and encumbrances other than
statutory liens and those recorded in the Certificate
of Title. It Is an limited fact that at the time the deeds
of real estate mortgage in favor of the
petitioner bank were constituted, the transfer
certificate of title of the spouses Tabligan was free
from any recorded lien and encumbrances, so that
the only registered liens in the title were deeds in
favor of the petitioner.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII,
presided over by respondent Judge Gregorio
T. Lantin, in Civil Case No. 79914 entitled Candido
Ramos v. Philippine Savings Bank and of the order
denying a motion for its reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant ordering
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P15,000.00 as his pro-rata
share in the value of the duplex-
apartment house which was built by
the plaintiff for the spouses likewise
Filomeno Tabligan and Socorro
Espiritu, which is now registered in the
name of the defendant under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 101864 issued
by the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila, on August 6, 1970, with legal
interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint until fully paid; to pay
the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees;
and to pay the costs.
"The counterclaim interposed
by the defendant is hereby
dismissed."
2
Involved in this case is a duplex-apartment
house on a lot covered by TCT No. 86195 situated
at San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and owned
by the spouses Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan.
The duplex-apartment house was built for
the spouses by private respondent Candido Ramos,
a duly licensed architect and building contractor, at a
total cost of P32,927.00. The spouses paid private
respondent the sum of P7,139.00 only. Hence, the
latter used his own money, P25,788.50 in all, to
finish the construction of the duplex-
apartment. LibLex
Meanwhile, on December 16, 1966,
February 1, 1967, and February 28, 1967, the
spouses Tabligan obtained from
petitioner Philippine Savings Bank three (3) loans in
the total amount of P35,000.00, the purpose of
which was to complete the construction of the
duplex-apartment. To secure payment of the loans,
the spouses executed in favor of the petitioner three
(3) promissory notes and three (3) deeds of real
estate mortgages over the property subject matter of
this litigation.
On December 19, 1966, the petitioner
registered the December 16, 1966 deed of real
estate mortgage with the Register of Deeds of
Manila. The subsequent mortgages of February 1,
1967, and February 28, 1967, were registered with
the Register of Deeds of Manila on February 2, 1967
and March 1, 1967, respectively. At the time of the
registration of these mortgages, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 86195 was free from all liens and
encumbrances.
The spouses failed to pay their monthly
amortizations. As a result thereof, the
petitioner bank foreclosed the mortgages, and at the
public auction held on July 23, 1969, was the highest
bidder.
On August 5, 1969, the
petitioner bank registered the certificate of sale
issued in its favor. On August 9, 1970,
the bank consolidated its ownership over the
property in question, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 101864 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila in the name of the petitioner bank.
Upon the other hand, the private respondent
filed an action against the spouses to collect the
unpaid cost of the construction of the duplex-
apartment before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch I, which case was docketed therein
as Civil Case No. 69228. During its pendency, the
private respondent succeeded in obtaining the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and
pursuant thereto, had the property in question
attached. Consequently, a notice of adverse claim
was annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 86195.
 On August 26, 1968, a decision was
rendered in Civil Case No. 69228 in favor of the
private respondent and against the spouses. A writ
of execution was accordingly issued but was
returned unsatisfied.
As the spouses did not have any properties
to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. 69228, the
private respondent addressed a letter to the
petitioner for the delivery to him (private respondent)
of his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-
apartment in accordance with Article 2242 of the
Civil Code. The petitioner refused to pay the pro-rata
value prompting the private respondent to file the
instant action. As earlier stated, a decision was
rendered in favor of the private respondent. cdphil
The parties are agreed that the only issue is
whether or not the private respondent is entitled to
claim a pro-rata share in the value of the property in
question. The applicable provision, Article 2242 of
the Civil Code, reads as follows:
"ART. 2242. With reference to
specific immovable property and real
rights of the debtor, the following
claims, mortgages and liens shall be
preferred, and shall constitute an
encumbrance on the immovable or
real right:
"(1) Taxes due upon the land
or building;
"(2) For the unpaid price of
real property sold, upon the
immovable sold;
"(3) Claims of laborers,
masons, mechanics and other
workmen, as well as of architects,
engineers and contractors, engaged in
the construction, reconstruction or
repair of buildings, canals or other
works, upon said buildings, canals or
other works;
"(4) Claims of furnishers of
materials used in the construction
reconstruction, or repair of buildings,
canals or other works upon said
buildings, canals or other works;
"(5) Mortgage credits recorded
in the Registry of Property, upon the
real estate mortgaged;
"(6) Expenses for the
preservation or improvement of real
property when the law authorizes
reimbursement, upon the immovable
preserved or improved;
3
"(7) Credits annotated in the
Registry of Property, in virtue of a
judicial order, by attachments or
executions, upon the property
affected, and only as to later credits;
"(8) Claims of co-heirs for
warranty in the partition of an
immovable among them, upon the real
property thus divided;
"(9) Claims of donors of real
property for pecuniary charges or
other conditions imposed upon the
donee, upon the immovable donated;
"(10) Credits of insurers upon
the property insured, for the insurance
premium for two years."
Both the petitioner bank and private
respondent Ramos rely on the case of De
Barreto v. Villanueva (6 SCRA 928).
The petitioner bank would impress upon this
Court that the proceedings had before the court
below is not one of the proceedings contemplated in
the De Barreto case that will sustain the authority of
the respondent court to adjudicate the claims of all
preferred creditors under Article 2242 of the Civil
Code. Petitioner argues that for Article 2242 of the
Civil Code to apply, there must have been an
insolvency proceeding or other liquidation
proceedings of similar import. And under the facts
then obtaining, there could have been no insolvency
proceeding as there were only two known
creditors. ** Consequently, it is argued that private
respondent's unpaid contractor's claim did not
acquire the character of a statutory lien equal to the
petitioner's registered mortgage.
Upon the other hand, private respondent
Ramos maintains that the proceedings had before
the court below can qualify as a general liquidation
of the estate of the spouses Tabligan because the
only existing property of said spouses is the property
subject matter of this litigation. LLjur
Concurrence of credits occurs when the
same specific property of the debtor or all of his
property is subjected to the claims of several
creditors. The concurrence of credits raises no
questions of consequence where the value of the
property or the value of all assets of the debtor is
sufficient to pay in full all the creditors. However, it
becomes material when said assets are insufficient
for then some creditors of necessity will not be paid
or some creditors will not obtain the full satisfaction
of their claims. In this situation, the question of
preference will then arise, that is to say who of the
creditors will be paid ahead of the others.
(Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970
ed., Vol. VI, p. 472.)
 Under the system established by Article
2249 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only taxes
and assessments upon immovable property enjoy
absolute preference. All the remaining specified
classes of preferred creditors under Article 2242
enjoy no priority among themselves. Their credits
shall be satisfied pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to the
amount of the respective credits.
Under the De Barretodecision, the full
application of Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that
there must first be some proceeding where the
claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly
adjudicated, such as insolvency, the settlement of a
decedent's estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court, or other liquidation proceedings of similar
import.
The pertinent ruling reads:
"Thus, it becomes evident that
one preferred creditor's third-party
claim to the proceeds of a foreclosure
sale (as in the case now before us) is
not the proceeding contemplated by
law for the enforcement of preferences
under Article 2242, unless the
claimant were enforcing a credit for
taxes that enjoy absolute priority. If
none of the claims is for taxes, a
dispute between two creditors will not
enable the Court to ascertain the pro
rata dividend corresponding to each
because the rights of the other
creditors likewise enjoying preference
under Article 2242 can not be
ascertained. Wherefore, the order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila
now appealed from, decreeing that the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale be
apportioned only between appellant
and appellee, is incorrect and must be
reversed.
"In the absence of insolvency
proceedings (or other equivalent
general liquidation of the debtor's
estate), the conflict between the
parties now before us must be
decided pursuant to the well
established principle concerning
registered lands; that a purchaser in
good faith and for value (as the
appellant concededly is) takes
registered property free from liens and
encumbrances other then statutory
liens and those recorded in the
certificate of title. There being no
insolvency or liquidation, the claim of
the appellee, as unpaid vendor, did
not acquire the character and rank of
a statutory lien co-equal to the
4
mortgagee's recorded encumbrance,
and must remain subordinate to the
latter."
The resolution of this petition,
therefore, hinges on the determination
of whether an insolvency proceeding
or other liquidation proceeding of
similar import may be considered to
have been conducted in the court
below.
The respondent court ruled in
the affirmative holding that:
"There were no known
creditors, other than the plaintiff and
defendant herein, and the proceedings
in the present case may ascertain and
bindingly adjudicate the respective
claims of the plaintiff and the
defendant, serving as a substantial
compliance with what the Supreme
Court stated:
"'. . . it is thus apparent that
the full application of Articles 2242 and
2249 demands that there must be first
some proceeding where the claims of
all the preferred creditors may be
bindingly adjudicated, such as
insolvency, the settlement of a
decedent's estate under Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, or other liquidation
proceedings of similar import. (de
Barretto v. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No.
L-14938, December 29, 1962).'"
A careful considering of this petition leads us
to agree with the petitioner. The conclusions of the
lower court are not supported by the law and the
facts.
The proceedings in the court below do not
partake of the nature of the insolvency proceedings
or settlement of a decedent's estate. The action filed
by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the
construction of the duplex apartment. It is far from
being a general liquidation of the estate of the
Tabligan spouses.
Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a
decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which
are binding against the whole world. All persons
having interest in the subject matter involved,
whether they were notified or not, are equally bound.
Consequently, a liquidation of similar import or "other
equivalent general liquidation' must also necessarily
be a proceeding in rem so that all interested persons
whether known to the parties or not may be bound
by such proceeding.
 In the case at bar, although the lower court property in question or who have a business
found that "there were no known creditors other than transaction in connection therewith. It would facilitate
the plaintiff and the defendant herein", this can not the enforcement of a legal statutory right which
be conclusive. It will not bar other creditors in the cannot be barred by laches. (See Manila Railroad
event they show up and present their claims against Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., 100 Phil. 135). LLphil
the petitioner bank, claiming that they also have
Respondent Ramos admitted in the partial
preferred liens against the property involved.
stipulation of facts submitted by both parties that at
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
the time of the loans to the spouses, the
101864 issued in favor of the bank which is
petitioner's bank had no actual or constructive
supposed to be indefeasible would remain
knowledge of any lien against the property in
constantly unstable and questionable. Such could
question. The duplex apartment house was built for
not have been the intention of Article 2243 of the
P32,927.00. The spouses Tabligan borrowed
Civil Code although it considers claims and credits
P35,000.00 for the construction of the apartment
under Article 2242 as statutory liens. Neither does
house. The bank could not have known of any
the De Barretto case sanction such instability. It
contractor's lien because, as far as it was
emphasized the following:
concerned, it financed the entire construction even if
"We are understandably loath the stated purpose of the loans was only to
(absent a clear precept of law so "complete" the construction.
commanding) to adopt a rule that
Since the action filed by the private
would undermine the faith and credit
respondent is not one which can be considered as
to be accorded to registered Torrens
"equivalent general liquidation" having the same
titles and nullify the beneficient
import as an insolvency or settlement of the
objectives sought to be obtained by
decedent's estate proceeding, the well established
the Land Registration Act. No
principle must be applied that a purchaser in good
argument is needed to stress that if a
faith and for value takes registered land free from
person dealing with registered land
liens and encumbrances other than statutory liens
were to be held to take it in every
and those recorded in the Certificate of Title. It is an
instance subject to all the fourteen
admitted fact that at the time the deeds of real estate
preferred claims enumerated in Article
mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank were
2242 of the new Civil Code, even if the
constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the
existence and import thereof can not
spouses Tabligan was free from any recorded lien
be ascertained from the records, all
and encumbrances, so that the only registered liens
confidence in Torrens titles would be
in the title were deeds in favor of the petitioner.
destroyed, and credit transactions on
the faith of such titles would be Prescinding from the foregoing, the private
hampered, if not prevented, with respondent's claim must remain subordinate to the
incalculable results. Loans on real petitioner bank's title over the property evidenced by
estate security would become aleatory TCT No. 101864.
and risky transactions, for no
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
prospective lender could accurately
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
estimate the hidden liens on the
Branch VII is, hereby, reversed and set aside. The
property offered as security, unless he
complaint and the counterclaim are dismissed.
indulged in complicated, tedious
investigations. The logical result might SO ORDERED.
well be a contraction of credit to
unforeseable proportions that could ||| (Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-33929,
lead to economic disaster. [September 2, 1983], 209 PHIL 382-392)

"Upon the other hand, it does

not appear excessively burdensome to
require the privileged creditors to
cause their claims to be recorded in
the books of the Register of Deeds
should they desire to protect their
rights even outside of insolvency or
liquidation proceedings.
In fact, an annotation, as suggested above,
would inure to the benefit of the public, particularly
those who may subsequently wish to buy the
5
2. HRS. OF THE LATE SPS. MAGLASANG, ET. Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte. 8 They
AL. V. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, GR 171206, availed of their credit line by securing loans in the
9/23/2013 amounts of P209,790.50 and P139,805.83 on
October 24, 1975 and March 15, 1976,
[G.R. No. 171206. September 23, 2013.] respectively, 9 both of which becoming due and
demandable within a period of one year. Further, the
parties agreed that the said loans would earn
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES interest at 12% per annum (p.a.) and an additional
FLAVIANO MAGLASANG and 4% penalty would be charged upon
SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, default. 10 CAHTIS
namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG,
EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died
CONCEPCION CHONA A. intestate on February 14, 1977, his widow Salud
MAGLASANG, GLENDA A. Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children,
MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A. herein petitioners Oscar (Oscar), Concepcion
MAGLASANG, FELMA A. Chona, Lerma, Felma, Fe Doris, Leolino, Margie
MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A. Leila, Ma. Milalie, Salud and Ma. Flasalie, all
MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. surnamed Maglasang, and Glenda Maglasang-
MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A. Arnaiz, appointed 11 their brother petitioner Edgar
MAGLASANG, MA. MILALIE A. Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-
MAGLASANG, SALUD A. fact. 12 Thus, on March 30, 1977, Edgar filed a
MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE verified petition for letters of administration of the
A. MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING intestate estate of Flaviano before the then Court of
THE ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE- First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City, Branch 5
NAMED DECEASED (probate court), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1604-
PARENTS, petitioners, vs. MANILA 0. 13 On August 9, 1977, the probate court issued
BANKING CORPORATION, now an Order 14 granting the petition, thereby appointing
substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN Edgar as the administrator 15 of Flaviano's
ASSET MANAGEMENT [SPV-AMC], estate. cITAaD
INC. [FSAMI], respondent. In view of the issuance of letters of
administration, the probate court, on August 30,
1977, issued a Notice to Creditors 16 for the filing of
money claims against Flaviano's estate. Accordingly,
DECISION as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent
notified 17 the probate court of its claim in the
amount of P382,753.19 as of October 11, 1978,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p: exclusive of interests and charges.

Assailed in this petition for review
on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated July 20,
2005 and Resolution 3 dated January 4, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50410
which dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the
Decision 4 dated April 6, 1987 of the Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc City, Branch 12 (RTC) directing
petitioners to jointly and severally pay respondent
Manila Banking Corporation the amount of
P434,742.36, with applicable interests, representing
the deficiency of the former's total loan obligation to
the latter after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage subject of this case, including
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The Facts
On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and
Salud Maglasang (Sps. Maglasang) obtained a
credit line from respondent 5 in the amount of
P350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate
mortgage 6 executed over seven of their
properties 7 located in Ormoc City and the
During the pendency of the intestate
proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able to obtain
several loans from respondent, secured by
promissory notes 18 which they signed.
In an Order 19 dated December 14, 1978
(December 14, 1978 Order), the probate court
terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs
executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties
of Flaviano's estate. The loan obligations owed by
the estate to respondent, however, remained
unsatisfied due to respondent's certification that
Flaviano's account was undergoing a restructuring.
Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized
the rights of respondent under the mortgage and
promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang,
specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within the
statutory period." 20
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps.
Maglasang's properties and emerged as the highest
bidder at the public auction for the amount of

6
P350,000.00. 21 There, however, remained a
deficiency on Sps. Maglasang's obligation to
respondent. Thus, on June 24, 1981, respondent
filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of
P250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against the estate
of Flaviano, his widow Salud and petitioners,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1998-0. 22 AHSEaD
The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
After trial on the merits, the RTC (formerly,
the probate court) 23 rendered a Decision 24 on
April 6, 1987 directing the petitioners to pay
respondent, jointly and severally, the amount of
P434,742.36 with interest at the rate of 12% p.a.,
plus a 4% penalty charge, reckoned from September
5, 1984 until fully paid. 25 The RTC found that it was
shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that
petitioners, after the extra-judicial foreclosure of all
the properties mortgaged, still have an outstanding
obligation in the amount and as of the date as
above-stated. The RTC also found in order the
payment of interests and penalty charges as above-
mentioned as well as attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the outstanding obligation. 26
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to
the CA on appeal, contending, 27 inter alia, that the
remedies available to respondent under Section 7,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court (Rules) are alternative
and exclusive, such that the election of one operates
as a waiver or abandonment of the others. Thus,
when respondent filed its claim against the estate of
Flaviano in the proceedings before the probate
court, it effectively abandoned its right to foreclose
on the mortgage. Moreover, even on the assumption
that it has not so waived its right to foreclose, it is
nonetheless barred from filing any claim for any
deficiency amount.
During the pendency of the appeal,
Flaviano's widow, Salud, passed away on July 25,
1997. 28 DISHEA
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 29 dated July 20, 2005, the CA
denied the petitioners' appeal and affirmed the
RTC's Decision. At the outset, it pointed out that the
probate court erred when it, through the December
14, 1978 Order, closed and terminated the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 1604-0 without first
satisfying the claims of the creditors of the estate —
in particular, respondent — in violation of Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules. 30 As a consequence,
respondent was not able to collect from the
petitioners and thereby was left with the option of
foreclosing the real estate mortgage. 31 Further, the
CA held that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does
not apply to the present case since the same does
not involve a mortgage made by the administrator
over any property belonging to the estate of the
decedent. 32 According to the CA, what should
7
apply is Act No. 3135 33 which entitles respondent
to claim the deficiency amount after the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage of Sps.
Maglasang's properties. 34
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied in a Resolution 35 dated
January 4, 2006. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether
or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's award of
the deficiency amount in favor of respondent.
Petitioners assert 36 that it is not Act No.
3135 but Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules which
applies in this case. The latter provision provides
alternative and exclusive remedies for the
satisfaction of respondent's claim against the estate
of Flaviano. 37 Corollarily, having filed its claim
against the estate during the intestate proceedings,
petitioners argue that respondent had effectively
waived the remedy of foreclosure and, even
assuming that it still had the right to do so, it was
precluded from filing a suit for the recovery of the
deficiency obligation. 38 AEIHaS
Likewise, petitioners maintain that the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null
and void, not having been conducted in the capital of
the Province of Leyte in violation of the stipulations
in the real estate mortgage contract. 39 They
likewise deny any personal liability for the loans
taken by their deceased parents. 40
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Claims against deceased persons should be
filed during the settlement proceedings of their
estate. 41 Such proceedings are primarily governed
by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the
Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions
may, as far as practicable, apply
suppletorily. 42 Among these special rules, Section
7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides
the rule in dealing with secured claims against the
estate:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due
from estate. — A creditor holding a
claim against the deceased secured
by a mortgage or other collateral
security, may abandon the security
and prosecute his claim in the manner
provided in this rule, and share in the
general distribution of the assets of
the estate; or he may foreclose his
mortgage or realize upon his security,
by action in court, making the executor
or administrator a party defendant,
and if there is a judgment for a
 deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other
proceeding to realize upon the
security, he may claim his deficiency
judgment in the manner provided in
the preceding section; or he may rely
upon his mortgage or other security
alone, and foreclose the same at any
time within the period of the statute of
limitations, and in that event he shall
not be admitted as a creditor, and
shall receive no share in the
distribution of the other assets of the
estate; but nothing herein contained
shall prohibit the executor or
administrator from redeeming the
property mortgaged or pledged, by
paying the debt for which it is held as
security, under the direction of the
court, if the court shall adjudged it to
be for the best interest of the estate
that such redemption shall be made.
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) DTEAHI
As the foregoing generally speaks of "[a]
creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security"
as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably
concluded that the aforementioned section covers all
secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other
form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce
against the estate of the deceased debtor. On the
contrary, nowhere from its language can it be fairly
deducible that the said section would — as the CA
interpreted — narrowly apply only to mortgages
made by the administrator over any property
belonging to the estate of the decedent. To note,
mortgages of estate property executed by the
administrator, are also governed by Rule 89 of the
Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other
Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
In this accord, it bears to stress that the CA's
reliance on Philippine National Bank
CA 43 (PNB) was misplaced as the said case did
not, in any manner, limit the scope of Section 7, Rule
86. It only stated that the aforesaid section equally
applies to cases where the administrator mortgages
the property of the estate to secure the loan he
obtained. 44 Clearly, the pronouncement was a
ruling of inclusion and not one which created a
distinction. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that it is
Section 7, Rule 86 which remains applicable in
dealing with a creditor's claim against the mortgaged
property of the deceased debtor, as in this case, as
well as mortgages made by the administrator, as
that in the PNB case.
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under
Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured
creditor has three remedies/options that he may
alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his
indebtedness. In particular, he may choose
to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt
from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove
the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on
the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
foreclose the same before it is barred by
prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
deficiency. 45 It must, however, be emphasized that
these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the
election of one effectively bars the exercise of the
others. With respect to real properties, the Court
in Bank of America v. American Realty
Corporation 46 pronounced: cDTACE
In our jurisdiction, the
remedies available to the mortgage
creditor are deemed alternative and
not cumulative. Notably, an election
of one remedy operates as a waiver
of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the
filing of the suit for collection or upon
the filing of the complaint in an action
for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant
to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy
is deemed elected by the mortgage
creditor upon filing of the petition not
with any court of justice but with the
Office of the Sheriff of the province
where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118. 47 (Emphasis
supplied) CTHDcE
Anent the third remedy, it must be
mentioned that the same includes the option of
v. extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act
No. 3135, as availed of by respondent in this case.
However, the plain result of adopting the last mode
of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to
recover any deficiency from the estate. 48 These
precepts were discussed in the PNB case,
citing Perez v. Philippine National Bank 49 which
overturned the earlier Pasno v. Ravina ruling: 50
Case law now holds that this
rule grants to the mortgagee three
distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be
alternatively pursued by the mortgage
creditor for the satisfaction of his credit
8
in case the mortgagor dies, among
them:
(1) to waive the
mortgage and claim
the entire debt from
the estate of the
mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the
mortgage judicially
and prove any
deficiency as an
ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the
mortgage
exclusively,
foreclosing the
same at any time
before it is barred
by
prescription without
right to file a claim
for any deficiency.
In Perez v. Philippine National
Bank, reversing Pasno vs. Ravina, we
held: ACSaHc
The ruling in Pasno v.
Ravina not having been
reiterated in any other case,
we have carefully reexamined
the same, and after mature
deliberation have reached the
conclusion that the dissenting
opinion is more in conformity
with reason and law. Of the
three alternative courses that
section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule
86), offers the mortgage
creditor, to wit, (1) to waive
the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of
the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim; (2) foreclose the
mortgage judicially and prove
any deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and (3) to rely on the
mortgage exclusively,
foreclosing the same at any
time before it is barred by
prescription, without right to
file a claim for any deficiency,
the majority opinion in Pasno
v. Ravina, in requiring a
judicial foreclosure, virtually
wipes out the third alternative
conceded by the Rules to the
mortgage creditor, and which
9
would precisely include
extra-judicial
foreclosures by contrast with
the second alternative.
The plain result of adopting
the last mode of foreclosure is that
the creditor waives his right to
recover any deficiency from the
estate. Following the Perez ruling
that the third mode includes
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the
result of extrajudicial foreclosure is
that the creditor waives any further
deficiency claim. . . . . 51 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied; italics in
the original) THIECD
To obviate any confusion, the Court
observes that the operation of Act No. 3135 does not
entirely discount the application of Section 7, Rule
86, or vice-versa. Rather, the two complement each
other within their respective spheres of operation.
On the one hand, Section 7, Rule 86 lays down the
options for the secured creditor to claim against the
estate and, according to jurisprudence, the
availment of the third option bars him from claiming
any deficiency amount. On the other hand, after the
third option is chosen, the procedure governing the
manner in which the extra-judicial foreclosure should
proceed would still be governed by the provisions of
Act No. 3135. Simply put, Section 7, Rule 86
governs the parameters and the extent to which a
claim may be advanced against the estate, whereas
Act No. 3135 sets out the specific procedure to be
followed when the creditor subsequently chooses
the third option — specifically, that of extra-judicially
foreclosing real property belonging to the estate. The
application of the procedure under Act No. 3135
must be concordant with Section 7, Rule 86 as the
latter is a special rule applicable to claims against
the estate, and at the same time, since Section 7,
Rule 86 does not detail the procedure for extra-
judicial foreclosures, the formalities governing the
manner of availing of the third option — such as the
place where the application for extra-judicial
foreclosure is filed, the requirements of publication
and posting and the place of sale — must be
governed by Act No. 3135.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now,
their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third
option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise
the first option of directly filing a claim against the
estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely
notified 52 the probate court of the outstanding
amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano
and that it was currently restructuring the
account. 53 Thus, having unequivocally opted to
exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure All told, finding that the extra-judicial
under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now foreclosure subject of this case was properly
precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency conducted in accordance with the formalities of Act
amount as earlier discussed. cIADaC No. 3135, the Court upholds the same as a valid
exercise of respondent's third option under Section
As a final point, petitioners maintain that the
7, Rule 86. To reiterate, respondent cannot,
extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties
however, file any suit to recover any deficiency
was null and void since the same was conducted in
amount since it effectively waived its right thereto
violation of the stipulation in the real estate mortgage
when it chose to avail of extra-judicial foreclosure as
contract stating that the auction sale should be held
jurisprudence instructs. ADCTac
in the capital of the province where the properties
are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The complaint for the recovery of the
The Court disagrees.
deficiency amount after extra-judicial foreclosure
As may be gleaned from the records, the filed by respondent Manila Banking Corporation is
stipulation under the real estate hereby DISMISSED. The extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage 54 executed by Sps. Maglasang which the mortgaged properties, however, stands.
fixed the place of the foreclosure sale at Tacloban
SO ORDERED.
City lacks words of exclusivity which would bar any
other acceptable fora wherein the said sale may be ||| (Heirs of the Late Sps. Magsalang v. Manila Banking
conducted, to wit: Corp., G.R. No. 171206, [September 23, 2013], 718
It is hereby agreed that in PHIL 256-273)
case of foreclosure of this mortgage
under Act 3135, the auction sale shall
be held at the capital of the province if
the property is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the province concerned,
or shall be held in the city if the
property is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city
concerned; . . . . 55
Case law states that absent such qualifying
or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the
agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as
an additional, not a limiting venue. 56 As a
consequence, the stipulated venue and that
provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied
alternatively.
In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135
allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the
province where the property to be sold is
situated, viz.:
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be
made legally outside of the
province which the property sold is
situated; and in case the place within
said province in which the sale is to be
made is subject to stipulation, such
sale shall be made in said place or in
the municipal building of the
municipality in which the property or
part thereof is situated. (Italics
supplied) DAEcIS
In this regard, since the auction sale was
conducted in Ormoc City, which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Leyte, then
the Court finds sufficient compliance with the above-
cited requirement.
10
3. GARCIA FULE V. CA, 74 SCRA 189 A motion for reconsideration was filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that
[G.R. No. L-40502. November 29, 1976.] the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since
no notice of the petition for letters of administration
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE and has been served upon all persons interested in the
HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
Presiding Judge, Court of First the proceedings for the appointment of a regular
Instance of Laguna, Branch administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado
VI, petitioners, vs. THE G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS  appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia
* , PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in
lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix
[G.R. No. L-42670.] after due hearing. prcd
While this reconsideration motion was
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,  pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa
vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Presiding Judge of Court of First Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging,
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion
Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her
B. GARCIA, respondents. appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations;
that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the
Francisco Carreon for petitioners. estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private administratrix and as officer of the court.
respondents. In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the
petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia
G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
DECISION
1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly
publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa
MARTIN, J p: B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the
Appointment of Regular Administrator" filed by
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified
question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, referring to that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado
the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last
appointment of a special administrator is sought to place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the
be reviewed. deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia;
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the
for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she
No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, administration of the estate in favor of Virginia
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
Laguna, and in other places, within the supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it
time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First
special administratrix over the estate. On even date, Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not
May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. possessed at the beginning because the original
petition was deficient.

11
 On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed
an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue,
lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and
disqualification of Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia
G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to
take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to
secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on
the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real
properties making up the estate of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and
already issued an order, received by Preciosa
B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18, 1973. LLphil
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa
B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in
interest has not been acquired by the court; (2)
venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia
G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled
to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa
B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning
that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before
the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G.
Alcaide, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcaide, with
whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no
relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the
special administratrix from taking
possession of properties in the hands of third
persons which have not been determined as
belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove
the special administratrix for acting outside her
authority and against the interest of the estate; and
still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina
B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper
venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar
resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina
G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge
12
Malvar ruled that the powers of the special
administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the
previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should
remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a
previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody
and possession of all papers and certificates of title
and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all
certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not
appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already
been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia
G. Fule to allege in her original petition for
letters of administration in the
place of residence of the decedent at the time of his
death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as
special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the
making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the
petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that
filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove
the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar
issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix, and the second,
holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an
inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa
B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19,
1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on
the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing
(cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to
the special administratrix of checks and papers and
effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued
the first questioned order denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the
other three questioned orders one, directing Ramon
Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix,
copy of the statement of accounts and final
liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her
the corresponding amount due the estate; another,
directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia
G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to
the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to
deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married
to Amado Garcia." prLL
During the hearing of the various
incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City.
On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973
showing that three months before his death his
residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the
proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in
the alternative, to vacate the questioned four
orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974,
denying their motion for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and
supplemental petitions on the issue, among
others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated
July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia
G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975,
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling
the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in
Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on
March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated
13
the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could
receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over
the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently
moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
granted the motion and appointed Preciosa
B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a
bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified
and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975,
Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and
the annulment of the proceedings therein by
the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She
manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw
Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the
decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not
yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered
the suspension of the proceedings before
his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform
the court of the final outcome of the case pending
before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question
Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds
stated in the previous special appearance of March
3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had already
filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still
pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order
granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that
there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-
C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12, 1976.
 On February 4, 1974, VIRGINIA
G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to
restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting
in the case. A restraining order was issued on
February 9, 1976. LLpr
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-
40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts,
such as death, the name and last residence of the
decedent, the existence, and situs if need
be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon,
and the right of the person who seeks
administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise,
to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate
and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest,
and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the
state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73
(formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes." 4 It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not
altered or changed by procedure, which simply
directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases
though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to
a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather,
it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction
over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption
that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In
plain words, it is just a
matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Because of the
existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the
country, the Rules of Court, however purposedly
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall
be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not
constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
the
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is
upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What
does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the
time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule
that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
14
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence
is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by
Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the
time of his death. In her original petition for
letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia
G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26, 1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa
B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement and improper
laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers
no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia. To say that as "property
owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur.
On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by
Virginia G. Fule herself before the
Calamba court and in other papers, the last
residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia
G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado
G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna." LibLex
On this issue, We rule that the last
place of residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado
G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by
Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his
death; the Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning
over the administration of his two parcels of sugar
land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
15
Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation
dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his
interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that
Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia
C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the
long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue
is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us
the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in
asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily
waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the
Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at
the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia
G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is
another issue of perplexity. Preciosa
B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as
surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that
"(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint
a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly,
the appointment of a special administrator was only
proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will
is under appeal. The new Rules, however,
broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or administration by
any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to
appoint a special administrator or not lies in the
probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for
the judge to become partial, or to make his personal
likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to
rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must
be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should not y be
taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing G. Garcia and the appointment of special
a special administrator. After all, the consideration administratrix over the latter's estate be approved
that overrides all others in this respect is and authorized and the Court of First
the beneficial interest of the appointee in the Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow with the case and instead be required to transfer all
would have the right of succession over a the records thereof to the Court of First
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For proceedings. LLjur
such reason, she would have as such, if not more,
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani
interest in administering the entire estate correctly
Cruz Paño of December 17, 1975, granting the
than any other next of kin. The good or bad
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
administration of a property may affect rather the
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc.
fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670,
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver
status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late to her as special administratrix the
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no obligations is hereby upheld.
relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter,
petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R.
incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this
No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L-42670 are hereby
point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima
denied, with costs against petitioner.
facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the SO ORDERED.
issuance of such appointment, which is but
||| (Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40502,
temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the [November 29, 1976], 165 PHIL 785-802)
appointing court does not determine who are entitled
to share in the estate of the decedent but who is
entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is
one to be determined in the decree of distribution,
and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to
be the basis of distribution. 21 The
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient
reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the
deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in
favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that
he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his
certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to
the Constitutional Convention for the First
District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he
wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as
his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can
be reasonably believed to be the surviving
spouse of the late. Amado G. Garcia. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the
doctrine laid down
in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under
its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City
and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
16
4. QUIAZON V. BELEN, GR 189121, JULY
31,2013
[G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013.]
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON,
JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
JENNIFER QUIAZON, petitioners, vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in
behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88589, 1 the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal in
hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and
the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto. 2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-
law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by
herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon (Amelia) to
whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her
children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Piñas City. 3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc.
No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation
17
to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties
worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late father's
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss. 5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, 7 the petition for settlement of decedent's estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo's
estate.
In a Decision 8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC
directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise
upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled
that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the
petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas,
Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:
Having attained legal age at
this time and there being no showing
of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore,
be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes
Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of
P100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision 10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the
RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo's
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of
Las Piñas City. The petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution 11 dated 7 August 2009.
 The Issues place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the
be contested in a suit or proceeding,
assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on
except in an appeal from that court, in
the following grounds:
the original case, or when the want of
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS jurisdiction appears on the record.
GRAVELY ERRED IN (Emphasis supplied).
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
OF LAS PIÑAS AND
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
THEREFORE[,] THE
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
ADMINISTRATION WAS
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
PROPERLY FILED WITH
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS[;]
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS is the significant factor. 13 Even where the statute uses
GRAVELY ERRED IN the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
DECLARING THAT AMELIA residence and not domicile in the technical
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS sense. 14 Some cases make a distinction between
NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
PRE-EXISTING MARRIAGE[;] synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
[AND] term "inhabitant." 15 In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
OVERLOOKED THE FACT habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS abode. 16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
NOT SHOWN ANY actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil actions
INTEREST IN THE PETITION and that for special proceedings have one and the same
FOR LETTERS OF meaning. 18 As thus defined, "residence," in the
ADMINISTRATION[.]12 context of venue provisions, means nothing more
The Court's Ruling than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and
We find the petition bereft of merit. consistency. 19
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the
the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the
where the decedent resides at the time of his death: estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
Sec. 1.  Where estate of
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
deceased persons settled. — If the
Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
decedent is an inhabitant of the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will In opposing the issuance of letters of
shall be proved, or letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
administration granted, and his estate Eliseo's Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
settled, in the Court of First Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
in the province in which he resides proofs of a decedent's residence at the time of his death,
at the time of his death, and if he is the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
Court of First Instance [now Regional that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
Trial Court] of any province in which themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
he had estate. The court first taking time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with
cognizance of the settlement of the the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
estate of a decedent, shall exercise partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo went
court, so far as it depends on the to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before
18
the courts of law renders untenable petitioners' position
that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners' submission that the lower courts'
findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the
evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners' contention
that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia's
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it
was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot
be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage. 22 It must be pointed out that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the
law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog 23 applicable four-square to the case at hand.
In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing
void from voidable marriages, to wit:
[C]onsequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. 24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void
marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot
be the source of rights, such that any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that
Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by
her father's marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse,
such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, 26 has a cause of action for the
19
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the
said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn
Eliseo's marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent's marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners,
the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than
the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of
Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said
marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility
that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
time Amelia and Eliseo's marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled
to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom
letters of administration granted.
— If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband
or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband
or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that
administration be granted to some
 other person, it may be granted to one right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his
or more of the principal creditors, if natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
competent and willing to serve; interested party within the purview of the law.
(c) If there is no such creditor WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
competent and willing to serve, it may petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
be granted to such other person as Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision
the court may select. and 7 August 2009 Resolution, are AFFIRMED in toto.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 SO ORDERED.
provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus: ||| (Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, [July 31,
2013], 715 PHIL 678-691)
Sec. 2. Contents of petition
for letters of administration. — A
petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person
and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and
residences of the
heirs, and the names
and residences of the
creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and
character of the
property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person
for whom letters of
administration are
prayed.
But no defect in the petition
shall render void the issuance of
letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is
one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next
of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the
estate as distributees. 28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir
who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to
prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding on
her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the
debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having a vested

20
5. REYNOSO V. SANTIAGO, 85 PHIL 268
[G.R. No. L-3039. December 29, 1949.]
VICTORIO REYNOSO and
JUAN REYNOSO, petitioners, vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon,
PIA REYNOSO,
AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON
PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ ET
AL., respondents.
Laurel, Sabido, Almario, & Laurel for
petitioners.
Ed. Espinosa Antona for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS;
INTESTATE PROCEEDING MAY BE CONVERTED
INTO TESTATE PROCEEDING ONLY AS A
MATTER OF FORM. — Whether the intestate
proceeding already commenced should be
discontinued a new proceeding under a separate
number and title should be constituted is entirely a
matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of
the court. In no manner does it prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the heirs or
creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing that
is at stake on this phase of the controversy.
2. ID.; APPOINTMENT OF REGULAR
ADMINISTRATOR IN LIEU OF SPECIAL ONE IS IN
ORDER AFTER COURT HAS DECREED
PROBATE OF WILL. — The appointment of a
special administrator is justified only when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will or some other
cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the
probate of the will and the appointment of
an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further
retention of the special administrator. The
appointment of a regular administrator is necessary
for the prompt settlement and distribution of the
estate. There are important duties devolving on a
regular administrator which a special administrator
can not performs, and there are many actions to be
taken by the court which could not be accomplished
before a regular administrator is appointed.
3. ID.; APPOINTMENT OF REGULAR
ADMINISTRATOR; SURVIVING SPOUSE;
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE. — While the surviving
spouse is entitled to preference in the appointment
(section 6, rule 79), circumstances might warrant his
21
rejection and the appointment of someone else.
Mandamus lies where the duty is specific and
ministerial. It does not lie where judgment or
discretion is exercised in the performance of the act.
Applying the rule to this case, it is proper to
command the court below to appoint a regular
administrator, but it is not proper to tell it whom to
appoint.
DECISION
TUASON, J p:
Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso apply
for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge
Vicente Santiago of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon to order the opening of a testate estate of
the deceased Salvadora Obispo in the place of
special intestate proceeding No. 2914, and to
appoint Victorio Reynoso as executor of the
decedent's last will and testament.
Briefly, the facts are as follows: On April 29,
1947, Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora
Obispo presented an application in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon for the administration of the
property of the deceased, application which was
docketed as intestate proceeding No. 2914.
Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora
Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest son,
respectively, opposed the application and filed a
document, which purported to be the last will and
testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a
counterpetition for its probate. Upon trial the court
rejected that instrument as a forgery, but on appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the
court below, found the will authentic and drawn with
all the formalities of law. The dispository part of the
decision of the Appellate Court, promulgated
November 27, 1948, reads as follows:
"Se revoca la sentencia de
que se apela, y reuniendo el exhíbito
A los requisitos exigidos por la ley, se
ordena, (a) la legalizacion de dicho
documento como testamento y ultima
voluntad de la finada Salvadora
Obispo, para que surta todos sus
efectos legales; (b) la apertura de la
testamentaria de dicha finada; y (c) el
nombramiento de un albacea de la
misma testamentaría de conformidad
con el precepto del artículo 6, de la
Regla 70 de los Reglamentos de los
Tribunales."
Thereafter Victorio Reynoso and
Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in special
proceeding No. 2914 and another under a separate
and new docket number (3107) and with a different
title (Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora
Obispo). The first prayed that the special
administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had
theretofore been appointed in special proceeding
No. 2914, be ordered to turn over the properties of
the deceased and the proceeds of coprax, nuts and
other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and
to render an accounting within a reasonable time. It
also asked for the closing of the intestate
proceeding. The other petition prayed that the estate
be administered and settled in special proceeding
No. 3107 and that Victorio Reynoso be appointed
executor of Salvadora Obispo's last will and
testament. It also contained a prayer for an
accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him to the
new executor of the properties that came to his
possession including the proceeds from the sales of
coprax, nuts, etc.
The two petitions were decided separately
by Judge Santiago on April 20, 1949. With respect to
the opening of another expediente, His Honor
believed that the proposed change or substitution
was "not only unnecessary but inconvenient and
expensive." An intestate proceeding like special
proceeding No. 2914, he said, could and should be
converted into a testate proceeding in the same
original expediente without the necessity of changing
its number, name or title.
This petition has no merit. Whether the
intestate proceeding already commenced should be
discontinued and a new proceeding under a
separate number and title should be constituted is
entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound
discretion of the court. In no manner does it
prejudice the substantial rights of any of the heirs or
creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing that
is at stake on this phase of the controversy.
As to the appointment of the deceased's
husband as executor or administrator, the court said
that action on the petition should be withheld for the
time being, because of the pendency on appeal of a
case in which the special administrator in special
proceeding No. 2914 is plaintiff and appellee and
Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant. It
involves the question whether an extensive parcel of
coconut land is conjugal property or the exclusive
property of the husband.
On this feature of the second petition we
disagree with the respondent judge. If one other than
the surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible,
the feared conflict will not materialize. If
Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator
may be named to represent the estate in the suit
against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If
the executor or administrator has a claim against the
estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in
22
writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a
special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of
such claim, have the same power and be subject to
the same liability as the general administrator or
executor in the settlement of other claims." The
situation in which Victorio Reynoso is found with
reference to the land in litigation between him and
the estate, comes within the spirit if not exactly
within the letter of this provision.
Subject to this observation, an administrator
should be appointed without delay in accordance
with the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The
appointment of a special administrator is justified
only when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will
or some other cause. The Court of Appeals having
decreed the probate of the will and the appointment
of an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further
retention of the special administrator. The
appointment of a regular administrator is necessary
for the prompt settlement and distribution of the
estate. There are important duties devolving on a
regular administrator which a special administrator
can not perform, and there are many actions to be
taken by the court which could not be accomplished
before a regular administrator is appointed.
But whether or not Victorio Reynoso should
be appointed as administrator we do not and can not
of course decide in a petition for mandamus. While
the surviving spouse is entitled to preference in the
appointment (section 6, Rule 79), circumstances
might warrant his rejection and the appointment of
someone else. Mandamus lies where the duty is
specific and ministerial. It does not lie where
judgment or discretion is exercised in the
performance of the act. Applying the rule to this
case, it is proper to command the court below to
appoint a regular administrator, but it is not proper to
tell it whom to appoint.
The petition for the constitution of a separate
proceeding for the administration of the estate under
the will is denied. The petition for the appointment of
a regular administrator is granted subject to the
provision of section 6 of Rule 79 in the selection of
the person to be appointed. Without costs.
||| (Reynoso v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-3039, [December
29, 1949], 85 PHIL 268-272)
6. ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS, GR 129 SCRA 33
[G.R. No. 55509. April 27, 1984.]
ETHEL
GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner, vs. JU
DGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch
38, Court of First Instance of
Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N .J . Quisumbing and Associates for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala, and
Cruz for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS;
PROBATE THEREOF, MANDATORY; INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS FILED PRIOR TO TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED
WITH LATTER. — We hold that respondent Judge
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's
motion to dismiss the petition for probate of Grimm's
two wills. A testate proceeding is proper in this case
because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved add allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code, Sec. 1,
Rule 75, Rules of Court). The probate of the will is
mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and
98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Paño, L-42088, May 7,
1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate
of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case
should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
The question in this case is whether a
petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition,
approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of
the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the
Utah district court). Cdpr
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm, an
American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati
23
Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was
survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm,
and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm
II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by Juanita Grimm
Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his
two children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B, pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two
wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed
of his Philippine estate which he described as
conjugal property of himself and his second wife.
The second will disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two
children were favored. The two children of the first
marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the
will dealing with his property outside this country, the
testator said:
"I purposely have made no
provision in this will for my daughter,
Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter,
Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel
Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a
separate will disposing of my
Philippine property." (First clause, pp.
43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented
for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. La Var
Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah.
Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and
Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of
the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April
10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to
probate the two wills and the codicil. It was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4,
1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate
Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. La
Var Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C,
pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978,
Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the
first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and
their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm, as the second
parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding
in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E.
Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the
parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of
Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p.
Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm. LLphil 90, testate case). prLL
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Also with the court's approval and the
Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for
personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project
should be reserved for her and that would not be
of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco
less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and
and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of
indicated the computation of the "net distributable
July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to
the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8)
pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142,
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the Record). No mention at all was made of the will in
decedent's four children "shall share equally in the that order. prcd
Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and
Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the
her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del
total of the net distributable estate and marital share.
Callar as their lawyer, who on August 9, moved to
A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25,
defer approval of the project of partition. The court
1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp.
considered the motion moot considering that it had
49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
already approved the declaration of heirs and project
Intestate proceeding No. 113024. — At this of partition (p. 149, Record).
juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated
after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his
August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer
daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through
connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when
lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and Gerardo B.
the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court
Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with
of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for
Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to
the settlement of his estate. She was named special
sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex
administratrix.
H, p. 78, testate case).
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine,
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of
through the Angara law office, filed an opposition
the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on
dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that
the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding
Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and
for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that
penalties and that he interposed no objection to the
she be appointed special administratrix. She
transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153,
submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will
Record). The court noted the certification as in
disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in
conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
pages 58 to 64 of the record.
After November, 1979 or for a period of
The intestate court in its orders of May 23
more than five months, there was no movement or
and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new
activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980
lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case), withdrew that
a motion for accounting "so that the Estate
opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest
properties can be partitioned among the heirs and
of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar,
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant
Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found Before that motion could be heard, or on
in the record. June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its
appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as
The three administrators submitted an
counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and
inventory. With the authority and approval of the
Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had
court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the
previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel
so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned
on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss
by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly
the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with
conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It
a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm
turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co.,
was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband,
24
 Petition to annul partition and testate WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No
Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm, in behalf costs.
of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the
SO ORDERED.
lower court a petition praying for the probate of
Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that ||| (Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. 55509, [April 27,
the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be 1984], 214 PHIL 30-36)
set aside and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and to return the same
to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children
alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978
Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the
intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died
testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition.
Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his
order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying
that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or,
alternatively that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the
matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise
agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate
(pp. 22-23, Rollo). LLphil
Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's
motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case
because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1,
Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory
(Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Baluyot vs. Paño, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71
SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate
case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice
of the finality of this judgment an opposition and
answer to the petition unless she considers her
motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for
the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the
intestate case, should be served with copies of
orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

25
7. URIARTE V. CFI OF NEGROS, 33 SCRA 252 3. ID.; ID.; TESTATE PROCEEDINGS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE
[G.R. Nos. L-21938-39. May 29, 1970.] PROCEEDINGS. — Testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. T purpose. Thus, if in the course of intestate
HE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF  proceedings pending before
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th a court of first instance it is found that the decedent
Judicial District) had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE O latter should replace the intestate proceedings even
F MANILA, BRANCH IV, if at that stage an administrator had already been
JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and appointed, the latter being required to render final
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents. account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed. This, however,
is understood to be without prejudice that should the
Norberto J . Quisumbing for petitioner. alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. This is a
respondents. clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a
will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; PROBATE OF WILL SHOULD
SYLLABUS BE FILED IN SAME COURT WHERE INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN COMMENCED. —
1. REMEDIAL LAW; Where intestate proceedings had already been
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; ORIGINAL AND commenced before a court of first instance, as in the
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER "ALL case at bar, the probate of the will of the decedent
MATTERS OF PROBATE." — Under the Judiciary should be submitted to the same court, either in a
Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph (e), separate proceeding or in an appropriate motion for
Courts of First Instance have original exclusive said purpose in the intestate proceedings. It is not in
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over accord with public policy and the orderly and
special proceedings for the settlement of the inexpensive administration of justice to
estate of deceased persons — whether they died unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several
testate or intestate. courts would be involved. Furthermore, the party
seeking the probate of the will in the instant case
2. ID.; knew before filing the petition for probate with
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED another court of first instance of the pendency of the
PERSONS; intestate proceedings .
VENUE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PROVI
NCE WHERE DECEDENT 5. ID.; ID.; VENUE; WRONG VENUE
INHABITANT OF PHILIPPINES RESIDED AT WAIVABLE; WAIVER BY LACHES; INSTANT
TIME OF HIS DEATH OR WHERE CASE. — It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
INHABITANT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY HAD wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect.
ESTATE. — The matter of venue, or the Petitioner, in the instant case, has waived the right to
particular Court of First Instance where the special raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by laches.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT NOT INCLINED TO
which provides that the estate of a decedent ANNUL PROCEEDINGS REGULARLY HAD IN
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, LOWER COURT ON THE
whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE. — This Court is
the court of first instance in the province of which he not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an lower Court even if the latter was not the proper
inhabitant of a foreign country, venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the
the court of first instance of any province in which he same proceedings repeated in some
had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be other court of the same jurisdiction; more so in a
settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the case like the present where the objection against
decedent in the instant case — the said proceedings is raised too late.
Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent 7. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special FILIATION; NATURAL CHILD:
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. QUESTION OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT MAY BE
PRESENTED IN INDEPENDENT ACTION FOR
26
 COMPULSORY ACKNOWLEDGMENT OR IN July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS. — A party claiming to Manila court denying
be an acknowledged natural child of testator is petitioner's omnibus motion to
entitled to submit for determination the intervene and to dismiss the later-
question of his acknowledgment as a natural instituted Special Proceeding No.
child of said deceased testator in the proceeding 51396, supra, both special
instituted precisely for his compulsory proceedings pertaining to the
acknowledgment as such natural child, or intervene settlement of the same estate of the
in proceedings for the probate of will of testator if it is same deceased, and consequently
still open, or to ask for its re-opening, if it has already annulling all proceedings had in
been closed, the probate having jurisdiction to Special Proceeding No.
declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator 51396; supra of the respondent
and whether or not a particular party is or should be Manila court as all taken without
declared his acknowledged natural child. jurisdiction.
8. ID.; PETITION FOR MANDAMUS; "For the preservation of the
DISMISSAL AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC; INSTANT rights of the parties pending these
CASE. — The supplemental petition for mandamus, proceedings, petitioner prays for the
in the case at bar, has become moot and academic issuance of a writ of preliminary
for if the said petition is successful it will only result injunction enjoining respondents
in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
the appeal that petitioner was taking from the and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding
orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and with Special Proceeding No.
February 26, 1964, the first being the order of the 51396, supra, until further
said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, orders of this Court."
and the second being an order denying petitioner's
motion for the reconsideration of said Reasons in support of said petition are
order of dismissal. Said order being, as a stated therein as follows:
result of what has been said heretofore, beyond "6. Respondent
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not Negros court erred in dismissing its
be other than that the intended appeal would serve Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
no useful purpose, or worse still, would enable and failing to declare itself
petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no 'the court first taking cognizance of the
longer question the validity of said orders. settlement of the estate of' the
deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the
Rules of Court. Respondent
DECISION
Manila court erred in failing to dismiss
its Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, notwithstanding
DIZON, J p: proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Negros court."
Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against was granted and issued by this Court on October 24,
the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, 1963.
Higinio Uriarte, and the
Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to same respondents a pleading entitled
hereinafter as the Negros Court and the SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS —
Manila Court, respectively — praying: docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 —
praying, for the reasons therein stated, that
" . . . that after due judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by
proceedings judgment be rendered the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and
annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record
(Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex on appeal and the second denying his motion for
'I') of respondent reconsideration, and further commanding
Negros court dismissing said court to approve his record on appeal and to
the first instituted Special Proceeding give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We
No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 issued a resolution deferring action on this
27
Supplemental Petition until the original action
for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the
merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in
G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing
petitioner's contention that the respondent courts
had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation
to the matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961
petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for
the settlement of the estate of the late Don
Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural
son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that,
during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for
his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural
son. Upon petitioner's motion the
Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank
as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and
two days later it set the date for the hearing of the
petition and ordered that the requisite notices be
published in accordance with law. The record
discloses, however, that, for one reason or another,
the Philippine National Bank never actually qualified
as special administrator. prcd
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte,
one of the two private respondents herein, filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging
that he was a nephew of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
whereof has been requested and which shall be
submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity
and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private
respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No.
51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed
in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the
following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no
legal basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that petitioner
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest
to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an
acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A
copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged
Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to
dismiss contending that, as the
Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
28
Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the
Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion
for reconsideration of said order having been denied
on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal
for the purpose of appealing from said orders to
this court on questions of law. The administrator with
the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the
approval of the record on appeal, and under
date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued
the following order:
"Oppositor prays that the
record on appeal filed by the petitioner
on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for
having been filed out of time and for
being incomplete. In the meantime,
before the said record on appeal was
approved by this Court, the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court entitled
Vicente Uriarte,
Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance o
f Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-
21938, bringing this case squarely
before the Supreme Court on
questions of law which is tantamount
to petitioner's abandoning his appeal
from this Court. LexLib
"WHEREFORE, in order to
give way to the certiorari, the record
on appeal filed by the petitioner is
hereby disapproved."
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner
filed the supplemental petition
for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an
Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396
pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition
and the annulment of the proceedings had in said
special proceeding. This motion was denied by
said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the
same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y
Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his
compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child.
Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed
the action, as well as when he commenced the
aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y
Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect
appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special
proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special
administrator in the person of the Philippine National
Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that,
after proper proceedings were had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to
probate the document submitted to it as the last
will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate
appearing not to have been contested. It appears
further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by
the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner
Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention,
Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said
proceedings. prLL
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion
to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the
Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a
copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite
and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its
probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the
start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the
Negros Court and petitioner
Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the
aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its
probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the
petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the
Negros Court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the
other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in
not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44,
paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate,"
that is, over special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons —
whether they died testate or intestate. While their
jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the
particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that the estate of a decedent
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country,
29
the court of first instance of any province in which he
had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be
settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the
Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the
case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are
the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and
city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left
considerable properties. From this premise petitioner
argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken
cognizance of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the
estate of the same decedent in accordance with his
alleged will, and that consequently,
the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in
not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396. cdtai
It can not be denied that a special
proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in
accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is
equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been
held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before
a court of first instance it is found that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even
if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed. This, however,
is understood to be without prejudice that should the
alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As
already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises
as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have
filed the petition for the probate of the last
will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court —
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or
was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the
Manila Court.
 The following considerations and the
facts of record would seem to support the view that
he should have submitted said will for probate to the
Negros Court, either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special
Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several
courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the
result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the
Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent
Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to
Vicente Uriarte's petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, he had already
informed the Negros Court that the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which
a copy had been requested for submission to
said court; and when the other respondent,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss
Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to
the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the
decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like
Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for
probate with the Manila Court that there was already
a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for
the settlement of the estate of the same deceased
person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it
seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's
petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had
expressly promised to submit said will for probate to
the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid
will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the
latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said
petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor. LLphil
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong
venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and,
in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such
objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It
is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by
Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962
when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he
30
filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all
the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus
enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or
more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the
validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his
negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would
be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case
like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge
Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not
inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner
that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted
Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action
justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If
the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities
cited by him in support of his contention, the proper
thing for him to do would be to intervene in the
testate estate proceedings entitled Special
Proceedings No. 51396 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila
instead of maintaining an independent action, for
indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the
decedent is of his doubtful character pending the
final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above
matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil
Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or
intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the
Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be
able to submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased
testator, said court having, in its capacity as a
probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a
particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child (II Moran on
Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya,
13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343;
Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs.
Belmonte, 47 O.G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition
for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the
 opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions
heretofore stated, the same has become moot and
academic. If the said supplemental petition is
successful, it will only result in compelling the
Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that
petitioner was taking from the
orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first being the
order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, and the second being an order denying
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said
order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a
result of what has been said heretofore, beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not
be other than that the intended appeal would serve
no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable
petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no
longer question the validity of said orders. cdrep
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the
petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as
well as the supplemental petition
for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are
hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against
petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J ., Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ ., concur.
||| (Uriarte v. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, [May 29, 1970], 144
PHIL 205-216)

31
8. ADVINCULA V. TEODORO, GR L-9282,
5/31/56, 99 PHIL 413
[G.R. No. L-9282. May 31, 1956.]
EMILIO ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE
TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, and ENRIQUE A.
LACSON, respondents.
Jose Y. Torres for petitioner.
G. D. Demaisip and C. A. Dabalus for
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR;
EXECUTOR NAMED IN THE WILL WHEN MAY HE
BE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. — The
provision of section 4 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "when a will has been
proved and allowed, the Court shall issue letters
testamentary thereon to the person named as
executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the
trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules,
cannot be enforced, until after said document has
been allowed to probate.
2. ID.; DISCOVERY OF WILL AFTER
APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR EFFECT
OF. — The discovery of a document purporting to be
the last will and testament of a deceased, after the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the
latter upon the assumption that he or she had died
intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the letters of
administration already issued or even authorize the
revocation thereof until the alleged will has been
proved and allowed by the court." (Rule 83, section 1
of the Rules of Court.)
3. ID.; APPOINTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATOR; SURVIVING SPOUSE NOT
STRANGER TO THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED. — It is untenable from the viewpoint of
logic and experience, because a stranger to
deceased may be competent, capable, and fit to
administer his estate in much the same as a
member of her immediate family could be
incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. At any
rate A is not a stranger either to her or to her estate,
he being her surviving spouse and as such, one of
her forced heirs, (Arts. 887, 888, 892, 893, 894, 897
to 900 and 995 to 1001, Civil Code of the
Philippines), whether she died testate or intestate.
What is more he is prima facie entitled to one-half of
32
all property subject to the authority of the
administrator of said estate, apart from his share of
the other half thereof, as heir of the deceased, for
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership" — of which he is its
administrator (Article 165, Civil Code of the
Philippines) — "unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife" (See Arts.
160 and 185, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
Petitioner Emilio Advincula seeks a writ of
certiorari, to annul certain orders of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.
Said petitioner was, on November 22, 1954,
appointed, special administrator of the estate of his
deceased wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula, in special
proceeding No. 3245 of said court. In due course, he
was, on February 12, 1955, appointed regular
administrator of said estate. After Advincula had
qualified as such, the brothers of the deceased, who
left no issue, submitted to the court, for allowance, a
document purporting to be her last will and
testament. Petitioner opposed the probate thereof
upon the ground that it did not bear the signature of
the deceased; that the signature thereon, if hers,
was secured through fraud and duress; and that, the
instrument had not been executed with the requisite
formalities. On May 4, 1955, respondent Enrique
Lacson, one of the brothers of the deceased, filed a
motion praying that he be appointed administrator of
said estate, in lieu of petitioner herein, for the reason
that said respondent is the executor named in the
aforementioned alleged will. On or about May 16,
1955, Attys. Jose Y. Torres and Antonio Lozada, as
counsel for Advincula, filed an opposition to said
motion. When the latter was called for hearing on
May 18, 1955, Atty. Lozada was served, in open
court, copy of an amended motion, of respondent
Lacson, for change of administrator, dated May 14,
1955. It was alleged therein, in addition to the
ground set forth in the first motion:
"5. That the present
administrator is incompetent,
incapable and unsuitable to the
discharge of the trust, he being foreign
to the estate, and without changing or
removing him as such would be
disastrous to the estate and to the
heirs named in the will of the
decedent."
 Atty. Lozada asked a postponement of the
hearing upon the ground that Advincula's main
counsel, Atty. Torres, was in Manila, but his request
was denied. Then, after hearing the argument of
opposing counsel, the court, presided over by
respondent, Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., Judge,
issued, on the same date (May 18, 1955), an order
the pertinent parts of which read:
"The Court, after hearing the
oral arguments of both parties, finds
the motion for postponement not well-
taken and hereby denies the same;
and finding the motion dated May 4,
1955 as amended by the amended
motion dated May 14, 1955, well-
founded and the opposition thereto
dated May 16, 1955 not well-founded,
said motion is hereby granted.
"WHEREFORE, in the interest
of justice and for the preservation of
the property for the heirs, the
appointment of Emilio Advincula as
administrator is hereby revoked and in
his stead, the oppositor, Enrique A.
Lacson, is hereby appointed
administrator of this intestate estate,
and same may qualify by filing a bond
in the sum of P5,000 and taking and
subscribing the corresponding oath of
Office. Once said Enrique A. Lacson
has qualified, let letters of
administration issue in his favor.
"The former administrator,
Emilio Advincula, is hereby ordered to
submit within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, his final account
covering the entire period of his
administration and should it appear
that any deficiency has been incurred
by him during his incumbency, his
bond shall answer for said deficiency."
Thereupon, Lacson gave the requisite bond,
letters of administration was issued to him, and he
tried to take possession of the estate of the
deceased. A reconsideration of said order of May
18, 1955, having been denied by another order,
dated May 30, 1955, petitioner instituted the present
action for certiorari, against Lacson and Judge
Teodoro, to annul his aforesaid orders of May 18
and 30, 1955, upon the ground that the same were
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Upon the filing
of a bond by Advincula, we issued, as prayed for in
his petition, a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondent Lacson and his agents from
interfering, molesting and harassing the petitioner in
the administration of the estate of the deceased,
during the pendency of this case.
33
The writ of certiorari prayed for is in order.
Lacson's appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as
administrator of the estate of Josefa Lacson
Advincula, is predicated upon the fact that the former
is named executor in the alleged will of said
deceased. The provision therein to this effect cannot
be enforced, however, until after said document has
been allowed to probate, for section 4 of Rule 79 of
the Rules of Court provides:
"When a will has been proved
and allowed, the court shall issue
letters testamentary thereon to the
person named as executor therein, if
he is competent, accepts the trusts,
and gives bond as required by these
rules." (Italics supplied.)
Besides, the discovery of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of a
deceased, after the appointment of an administrator
of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption that
he or she had died intestate, does not ipso
facto nullify the letters of administration already
issued or even authorize the revocation thereof, until
the alleged will has been "proved and allowed by the
court." Rule 83, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is
plain and explicit on this point.
"If after letters of
administration have been granted on
the estate of a decedent as if he had
died intestate, his will is proved and
allowed by the court, the letters of
administration shall be revoked and all
powers thereunder cease, and the
administrator shall forthwith surrender
the letters to the court, end render his
account within such time as the court
directs. Proceedings for the issuance
of letters testamentary or of
administration under the will shall be
as hereinbefore provided." (Italics
supplied.)
The amended motion for change of
administrator endeavored to justify the removal of
Advincula by alleging that he is "incompetent,
incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the
trust, he being foreign to the estate" of the
deceased. By holding, in its order of May 18, 1955,
that said motion is "well-founded" — with nothing,
absolutely nothing else, to indicate the basis of this
conclusion — respondent Judge has impliedly
adopted the line of argument followed in the above
quoted allegation of the amended motion to change
administrator. Said argument is, however, devoid of
merit.
It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic
and experience, because a stranger to deceased
may be competent, capable and fit to administer her
estate, in much the same as a member of her
 immediate family could be incompetent, incapable
and unfit to do so. At any rate, Advincula is not a
stranger, either to her or to her estate, he bring her
surviving spouse and, as such, one of her forced
heirs (Arts. 887, 888, 892, 893, 894, 897 to 900, and
995 to 1001, Civil Code of the Philippines), whether
she died testate or intestate. What is more, he
is prima facie entitled to one-half of all property
subject to the authority of the administrator of said
estate, apart from his share of the other half thereof,
as heir of the deceased, for "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership" — of which he is its administrator
(Article 165, Civil Code of the Philippines) — "unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife" (See Articles 160 and 185,
Civil Code of the Philippines). Lastly, Advincula has
not been found guilty of any specific act or omission
constituting one of the legal grounds, enumerated in
Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for the
removal of an executor or administrator. Hence, it is
clear that respondent Judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in removing Advincula and appointing
Lacson as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Josefa Lacson Advincula.
Wherefore, the aforementioned orders of
respondent Judge, dated May 8 and 30, 1955, are
reversed, and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in this case hereby made permanent, with
costs against respondent Enrique A. Lacson. It is so
ordered.
||| (Advincula v. Teodoro, Sr., G.R. No. L-9282, [May 31,
1956], 99 PHIL 413-418)

34
9. LUCILA DAVID, ET. AL, V. CHERRY (Sunset Valley Estate), as well as for the support
CALILUNG, GR 241036, 1/26/21 and delivery of presumptive legitimes of their
common children. However, the 2005 Nullity
[G.R. No. 241036. January 26, 2021.] Decision, as well as its certificate of finality was not
registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Angeles City, thus, no annotation of the said
LUCILA DAVID and THE HEIRS OF Decision on TCT No. 90811 was ever made. Also,
RENE F. AGUAS, namely: actual partition of the Sunset Valley Estate had not
PRINCESS LUREN D. AGUAS, been undertaken and the presumptive legitimes of
DANICA LANE D. AGUAS, SEAN the Aguas heirs were not delivered.
PATRICK D. AGUAS, SEAN
MICHAEL D. AGUAS and On October 7, 2006, Rene contracted a
SAMANTHA * D. second marriage with Cherry. 8
AGUAS, petitioners, vs. CHERRY S. On November 17, 2015, Rene died
CALILUNG, respondent. intestate.
On May 24, 2017, Cherry filed a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Rene
DECISION docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. R-ANG-
17-01449-SP entitled, "In the Matter of the Petition
for Letters of Administration and Settlement of
Intestate Estate of Rene F. Aguas, Cherry Calilung-
DELOS SANTOS, J p: Aguas, Petitioner" (Settlement Proceeding). The
This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a Settlement Proceeding was raffled to RTC-Angeles
Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of City, Branch 56 (Branch 56). 9 On the other hand,
the Rules of Court, from the Orders dated November the Aguas heirs filed a
24, 2017 2 and June 13, 2018 3 of the Regional Trial Comment/Opposition 10 dated October 2, 2017 in
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 60, in Civil the Settlement Proceeding, alleging, among others,
Case No. R-ANG-17-03316-CV, dismissing for lack that they are the legitimate children of the late Rene
of jurisdiction the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of with Lucila; that the marriage of Rene and Lucila
Marriage of Rene F. Aguas (Rene) and Cherry S. was dissolved, but there was no liquidation or
Calilung (Cherry) filed by petitioners Lucila David separation of the properties acquired during their
(Lucila) and her children, namely: Princess Luren D. marriage in accordance with Article 102 of
Aguas, Danica Lane D. Aguas, Sean Patrick D. the Family Code; that Article 52 of the Family
Aguas, Sean Michael D. Aguas, and Samantha D. Code requires that the judgment of absolute nullity of
Aguas (collectively, the Aguas heirs). marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
The Facts children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
Lucila married Rene on November 24, 1981 the appropriate civil registry and registries of
in Mabalacat, Pampanga. They begot five children, properties; that the failure to comply with the
the Aguas heirs. requirements of Article 52 of the Family Code would
have the effect of nullifying the subsequent marriage
On December 10, 2003, Rene filed a petition between Rene and Cherry pursuant to Article 53 of
to declare his marriage with Lucila null and void on the same Code; and that when Rene married
the ground of the latter's psychological Cherry, the properties of Rene acquired during the
incapacity. 4 In the said petition, Rene declared as previous marriage should not have been included in
conjugal properties a parcel of land located in their property regime pursuant to Article 92 of
Sunset Valley Estate, Angeles City, consisting of the Family Code. 11
500 square meters (sq. m.) and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 90811 in the names of On November 3, 2017, Lucila and the Aguas
Rene and Lucila, 5 and the merchandise inventory in heirs (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Angeles City
Rene's pawnshop and ready-to-wear sales a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 12 of
business. 6 Rene and Cherry (RTC petition) on the ground that
the said subsequent marriage was entered into
In a Decision 7 dated December 22, 2005 in without complying the provisions in Articles 52 and
Civil Case No. 11284, Rene and Lucila's marriage 53 of the Family Code on the partition and
was judicially declared null and void on the ground of distribution of the properties of the previous marriage
psychological incapacity (2005 Nullity Decision). The and the delivery of the presumptive legitimes.
same Decision also ordered for the division of the
conjugal properties consisting of the lot covered by
TCT No. 90811 and the house standing thereon
35
 The RTC petition was raffled to RTC-
Angeles City, Branch 59 (Branch 59), the designated
Family Court.
On November 10, 2017, Branch 59 issued
an Order 13 (Transmittal Order) directing the
transmittal of the case record to the Office of the
Clerk of Court for re-raffle among courts of general
jurisdiction. Branch 59 held that the RTC petition
involves a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
of Rene and Cherry which does not fall within the
jurisdiction of a Family Court, to wit:
Considering that the instant
Petition involves a collateral attack
on the validity of marriage of
[Cherry] and [Rene], it does not fall
within the jurisdiction of a [F]amily
[C]ourt.
As per deliberations of the
Supreme Court Committee on
Revision of Rules:
Only an aggrieved or injured
spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory heirs of the
spouse or the State. The Committee
is of the belief that they do not have
a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only
question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the
death of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek
dissolution.
IN LIGHT OF THE
FOREGOING, the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to transmit
the record of this case to the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City for re-raffle
among courts of general
jurisdiction. 14 (Citations omitted;
italics, emphasis and underscoring
in the original)
In view of the Transmittal Order of Branch
59, the RTC petition was re-raffled to RTC-Angeles
City, Branch 60 (Branch 60).
On November 24, 2017, Branch 60 issued
the first assailed Order which dismissed the re-
36
raffled RTC petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Branch 60 held that the RTC petition is
hinged upon the issue of validity of marriage
emanating from Articles 52 and 53 of the Family
Code. Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act
of 1997, it is the Family Court which has jurisdiction
over the case and not Branch 60 which is no longer
a Family Court. In addition, citing A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC 15 and the ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Spouses
Medinaceli, 16 Branch 60 ruled that the petitioners
have no cause of action to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is the sole
right of the husband or the wife to file the said
petition involving marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines. Nonetheless, the compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. In the
end, Branch 60 decreed as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the
petition filed by the petitioners Lucila
David and the Heirs of Rene Aguas
namely: Princess Luren D. Aguas,
Danica Lane D. Aguas, Sean Patrick
D. Aguas, Sean Michael D. Aguas
and Samantha Mari S. Aguas
against Cherry Calilung, is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 17
On December 5, 2017, petitioners received
both the Transmittal Order of Branch 59 and the first
assailed Order of Branch 60.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the first assailed Order of Branch
60, praying, in the main, that the case be referred
back to the Family Court instead of dismissing the
same.
On June 13, 2018, Branch 60 issued the
second assailed Order 18 denying the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. It explained that the
Transmittal Order of Branch 59 has already become
final after the petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration thereto and that to refer back the
case to the said Family Court would effectively
disregard the aforesaid Order of a co-equal branch
which is already final and executory. Branch 60 also
maintained its position that, according to the rules,
only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
Aggrieved, petitioners seek direct recourse
with the Court through the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of The issues involved in the instant petition,
Court on pure questions of law. being interrelated, are discussed jointly.
The petitioners raised the following grounds The petition for declaration of nullity
to support their petition: of marriage is under the jurisdiction
of the RTC branch designated as
I. THE ABRUPT DISMISSAL BY THE
Family Court pursuant to R.A. No.
LOWER COURT (RTC
8369 when there is one in the area.
BRANCH 60) OF THE
PETITION FOR It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the
DECLARATION OF NULLITY jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an
[OF MARRIAGE] WITHOUT action is conferred by law 20 and that the same is
WAITING FOR THE determined by the statute in force at the time of the
PETITIONERS TO commencement of the action. 21
EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO
Pertinent to the instant case is R.A. No.
FILE A MOTION FOR
8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of
RECONSIDERATION ON
1997, 22 which took effect on November 23,
THE ORDER OF
1997. 23 The said law, particularly Sections 3 and 5
TRANSMITTAL ISSUED BY
thereof, created Family Courts and grant unto them
RTC BRANCH 59 TO HAVE
exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for declaration
ELAPSED IS
of nullity of marriage, among others, to wit:
UNPROCEDURAL.
II. RTC BRANCH 60 ERRED IN SEC. 3. Establishment of
HOLDING THAT THE Family Courts. — There shall be
REFERRAL OF THE CASE established a Family Court in every
BACK TO THE FAMILY province and city in the country. In
COURT IS AN IMPOSITION case where the city is the capital of
UPON A CO-EQUAL the province, the Family Court shall
BRANCH. be established in the municipality
which has the highest population.
III. THE LOWER COURT
COMMITTED MANIFEST xxx xxx xxx
ERROR OF LAW AND SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of
ACTED IN A MANNER Family Courts. — The Family Courts
CONTRARY TO LAW AND shall have exclusive original
ESTABLISHED jurisdiction to hear and decide the
JURISPRUDENCE IN following cases:
DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR NULLITY ON THE a) Criminal cases where
GROUND OF LACK OF one or more of the accused is below
JURISDICTION. 19 eighteen (18) years of age but not
less than nine (9) years of age or
The Issues where one or more of the victims is
The issues which confront the Court in the a minor at the time of the
instant case may be summarized as follows: commission of the
offense: Provided, That if the minor
1. Whether it is Branch 59 or Branch 60 is found guilty, the court shall
which has jurisdiction over the RTC promulgate sentence and ascertain
petition for declaration of nullity of any civil liability which the accused
marriage; may have incurred;
2. Whether or not Branch 60 erred in The sentence, however,
dismissing the RTC petition for shall be suspended without need of
nullity of marriage; and application pursuant to Presidential
3. Whether or not the petitioners are the real Decree No. 603, otherwise known
parties-in-interest to file the subject as the "Child and Youth Welfare
RTC petition for nullity of marriage. Code";

The Court's Ruling b) Petitions for

guardianship, custody of children,
The Court denies the petition. [habeas corpus] in relation to the
latter;

37
 c) Petitions for adoption of
children and the revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for
annulment of marriage,
declaration of nullity of marriage
and those relating to marital
status and property relations of
husband and wife or those living
together under different status
and agreements, and petitions for
dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support
and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial
proceedings brought under the
provisions of Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code of the Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration
of status of children as abandoned,
dependent or neglected children,
petitions for voluntary or involuntary
commitment of children; the
suspension, termination, or
restoration of parental authority and
other cases cognizable under
Presidential Decree No. 603,
Executive Order No. 56, (Series of
1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the
constitution of the family home;
i) Cases against minors
cognizable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act
No. 7610, otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act," as
amended by Republic Act No. 7658;
and
k) Cases of domestic
violence against:
1) Women — which are acts
of [gender-based]
violence that results,
or are likely to result
in physical, sexual or
psychological harm or
suffering to women;
and other forms of
physical abuse such
as battering or threats
and coercion which
38
violate a woman's
personhood, integrity
and freedom
movement; and
2) Children — which include
the commission of all
forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence,
and discrimination
and all other
conditions prejudicial
to their development.
If an act constitutes a
criminal offense, the accused or
batterer shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the corresponding
penalties.
If any question involving any
of the above matters should arise as
an incident in any case pending in
the regular courts, said incident shall
be determined in that court.
(Emphasis supplied)
Equally important to note is Section 17
(Transitory Provisions) of R.A. No. 8369, which
provides:
SEC. 17. Transitory
Provisions. — Pending the
establishment of such Family
Courts, the Supreme Court shall
designate from among the
branches of the Regional Trial
Court at least one Family Court in
each of the cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig,
Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag,
Baguio, Santiago, Dagupan,
Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose,
Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena,
Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban,
Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran,
Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro,
Davao, General Santos, Oroquieta,
Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga,
Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other
places as the Supreme Court may
deem necessary.
Additional cases other than
those provided in Sec. 5 may be
assigned to the Family Courts when
their dockets permit: Provided, That
such additional cases shall not be
heard on the same day family cases
are heard.
 In areas where there are no Regional Trial Court as Family
Family Courts, the cases referred to Courts, to wit:
in Section 5 of this Act shall be
DESIGNATION OF
adjudicated by the Regional Trial
CERTAIN BRANCHES OF THE
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AS
As can be observed in the Transitory FAMILY COURTS
Provisions, the law mandated the Court to designate
To implement the provisions
from among the branches of the RTC, in the cities
of Section 17 of Republic Act No.
mentioned therein, at least one Family Court
8369, otherwise known as the
"pending the establishment of Family Courts." It may
"Family Courts Act of 1997," and in
also be underscored that under the second
the interest of the expeditious,
paragraph of the Transitory Provisions, the RTC
effective and efficient administration
branches to be designated by the Court are referred
of justice, and subject to the
to as Family Courts, and by that, it means that they
guidelines herein set forth, the
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over family cases
following branches of the Regional
enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 8369 (family
Trial Courts are hereby designated
cases). Accordingly, though temporary in nature,
as Family Courts which shall
these specific branches exercise exclusive
exclusively try and decide the cases
jurisdiction over complaints for declaration of nullity
subject of Section 5 of said Act:
of marriage, among other family cases, to the
exclusion of other RTC branches and courts. xxx xxx xxx
It might not be amiss to stress that the THIRD JUDICIAL REGION
Congress was unquestionably authorized to confer
xxx xxx xxx
jurisdiction ovr family cases to RTC branches to be
designated by the Court as Family Courts pending Angeles City
the establishment of the regular Family Courts,
independent and distinct from the RTCs. This is (31) Br. 60,
pursuant to the Congress' constitutionally- Judge Ofelia T.
established power "to define, prescribe, and Pinto
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts" under On September 10, 2008, however, the Court
Article VIII, Section 2 24 of the 1987 issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 08-8-460-RTC
Constitution subject only to the limitations that: first, revoking the designation of Branch 60 as special
the Congress cannot diminish the jurisdiction of the court for family court cases and designated Branch
Court enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of 59 as special court to try and decide family court
the 1987 Constitution; 25 and second, the Congress cases in lieu of Branch 60, to wit:
cannot increase the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court without its advice and concurrence. 26 A.M. No. 08-8-460-
RTC (Re: Partial Report on the
A distinction must be made, though, Judicial Audit of Pending Cases and
between areas with designated Family Courts and Special Audit of Family Court Cases
those where there are none. As provided in the third in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
paragraph of Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 60, Angeles City). — The Court
8369 grants exclusive jurisdiction over family cases resolves:
to the RTC in general in areas where there are no
Family Courts. (1) To NOTE the aforesaid partial
report;
Branch 59 was designated as Family
Court to exercise exclusive (2) To REVOKE the designation of
jurisdiction over family cases. the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60,
Angeles City, Pampanga presided
In an En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-11- over by Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto
07-SC dated February 1, 2000 (Re: Designation of as special court for family court
Certain Branches of the RTC as Family Courts), the cases, effective immediately from
Court designated specific RTC branches as Family receipt of notice;
Courts to try and hear family cases to the exclusion
of other courts or tribunals. Among these RTC xxx xxx xxx
branches is Branch 60 of RTC-Angeles City. Thus: (4) To PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND
The Court Resolved to Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto,
APPROVE the draft resolution Regional Trial Court, Branch 60,
designating certain branches of the Angeles City, and Officer-In-Charge
39
 Raquel L.D. Clarin, the same court,
from office effective immediately
from receipt of notice;
(5) To DESIGNATE the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City,
presided over by Executive Judge
Angelita T. Paras-Quiambao, as
special court to try and decide family
court cases in lieu of Branch 60,
same court[.]
Accordingly, when the
Court designated Branch 59 in lieu of Branch 60 as
special Family Court, no other meaning can be had,
but that Branch 59 replaces Branch 60 as a
designated Family Court in implementation of the
Transitory Provisions of R.A. No. 8369, which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over family cases.
Branch 59 has jurisdiction over
subject matter of the RTC petition.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and
authority of the courts to hear, try, and decide cases.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. 27 Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. 28
In the instant case, the RTC petition was
captioned as Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. More
importantly, in their allegations, the petitioners
mainly and directly sought for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of Rene and Cherry, to wit:
4. Lucila and [Rene] entered into a
marital union on November
24, 1981 in Mabalacat,
Pampanga.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Out of their marital union, Lucila
and Rene begotten five
children — Princess, Danica,
Patrick, Michael and
Samantha x x x.
6. On [December 10, 2003], Rene filed
a Petition for Nullity of
Marriage against Lucila before
the [RTC], Branch 60 of
Angeles City x x x. In the said
Petition for Nullity, therein
Petitioner Rene declared
conjugal properties as follows:
 That the parties have amassed
between them a parcel of land
located at Sunset [Valley]
Estate, Angeles City
consisting of five hundred
square meters, more or less.
This is aside from the assets
in business consisting mainly
of merchandise inventory in
[Rene's] pawnshop and RTW
sales business.
xxx xxx xxx
7. The subject property is covered by
[TCT] No. 045-90811 x x x
and was indeed registered in
the names of Spouses Rene
F. Aguas and Lucila Aguas.
the 8. Without receiving any notice from
the Court regarding the
Petition for Nullity, Lucila
learned sometime in the year
2007 that a Decision dated
[December 22, 2005] has
already been rendered by the
RTC granting the said
[Petition for Nullity] filed by
Rene. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
9. The Decision above-mentioned, as
well as its Certificate of
Finality, was not registered
with the Office of Registry of
Deeds of Angeles City where
the subject property is
located. Thus, no annotation
of said Decision on the title
covering the subject property
has ever been made.
xxx xxx xxx
10. On [October 7, 2006], Rene and
Cherry entered into a marital
union without the partition and
liquidation of the subject
property, and proper delivery
of the prospective legitimes of
Princess, Danica, Michael,
Patrick and Samantha, who
are children of the first
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
11. On [November 17, 2015], Rene
died intestate.
xxx xxx xxx
40
 12. Due to the failure of Rene and made impugning the validity of marriage to obtain a
Cherry to comply with the different affirmative relief or by way of defense, even
express provision of the law, though there is no final judgment yet in a direct
the subsequent marriage proceeding declaring the marriage annulled or
contracted by the deceased nullified. That is not the case here. Petitioners did
Rene with Cherry is null and not assail the validity of marriage of Rene and
void pursuant to Article 53 in Cherry as an incident to an action to obtain a relief
relation to Article 52 of other than the declaration of nullity of marriage. The
the Family Code[.] 29 RTC petition was precisely filed by the petitioners to
nullify the marriage of Rene and Cherry, hence, a
As can be observed from the allegations in
direct action impugning the validity of marriage.
the RTC petition, the same was precisely filed to
annul or nullify the marriage of Rene and Cherry. The foregoing considered, it was improper
Otherwise stated, the petition is filed in a direct for Branch 59 to order for the re-raffle of the RTC
proceeding impugning the validity of a marriage of petition to the other branches of Angeles RTC.
the aforesaid spouses. Obviously, the subject Nonetheless, the erroneous Transmittal Order of
petition is a complaint for declaration of nullity of Branch 59 is binding upon the petitioners as the
marriage referred to in Section 5 (d) 30 of R.A. No. same has long attained finality, there being no
8369, which, pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. motion for reconsideration, appeal,
8369 in relation to A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC and A.M. or certiorari petition filed.
No. 08-08-460-RTC, falls under the jurisdiction of
Branch 60 properly dismissed the
Branch 59.
RTC petition on the ground of lack
Branch 59 improperly ordered for of jurisdiction.
the re-raffle of the RTC petition to
As explained in the preceding discussions,
the regular courts.
jurisdiction over complaints for declaration of nullity
Branch 59 ruled in its Transmittal Order that of marriage and other family cases fall under the
it has no jurisdiction over the RTC petition because exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts when there is
the same was not filed by an aggrieved or injured one in the area. Considering that Branch 59, a
spouse, who are the only parties who can file a designated Family Court, exists in Angeles City,
petition for declaration of nullity of void marriages Branch 60, therefore, does not have jurisdiction over
pursuant to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. It added that the the subject RTC petition. Accordingly, without
petition was filed by the heirs of Rene which jurisdiction over the subject matter, Branch 60 has
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of his no other recourse, but to dismiss the RTC petition. It
marriage with Cherry. is worthy to note that when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
The above reasoning is misplaced.
power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act
If, on its face, the RTC petition was not filed it performs without jurisdiction is null and void,
by real party-in-interest, as Branch 59 wanted to and without any binding legal
point out, the proper ground for dismissal should be effects. 35 Consequently, Branch 60 cannot order
failure to state a cause of action and not lack of the transfer of the RTC petition to Branch 59 as it
jurisdiction. One having no material interest to lacks authority to act on the re-raffled RTC petition
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as nor on the motion for reconsideration filed by
plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real petitioners subsequent to the dismissal thereof. On
party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the this score, the Court affirms the dismissal order of
ground of lack of cause of action 31 or of failure to Branch 60.
state a cause of action, as the case may
The petitioners are allowed to file
be. 32 Otherwise stated, Branch 59 certainly has
anew a petition for declaration of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed
nullity of marriage without violating
by the petitioners, but it could dismiss the same for
rules on res judicata. The same,
failure to state a cause of action, though only upon
however, is not warranted in the
proper motion by the party. 33
present case.
Moreover, there is no collateral attack on the
In the ordinary course of law and procedure,
validity of marriage of Rene and Cherry to speak of
the petitioners' sensible action to pursue their case is
in this case. A collateral attack is defined as an
to file anew a complaint for declaration of nullity of
attack, made as an incident in another action, whose
marriage before a designated Family Court, without
purpose is to obtain a different relief. 34 Accordingly,
violating the rules on res judicata.
there is a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
when, as an incident in a pending action not There is res judicata where the following
precisely brought to nullify the marriage, an attack is four essential conditions concur, viz.: (1) there must
41
be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering
it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action. 36
Anent the third element, a judgment may
be considered as one rendered on the merits
when it determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties based on the disclosed
facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections; or when the judgment is rendered after
a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point. It is not required that a trial, actual
hearing, or argument on the facts of the case
ensued, for as long as the parties had the full legal
opportunity to be heard on their respective claims
and contentions. 37
In this case, the Orders of Branch 59 and
Branch 60 do not constitute res judicata as the same
are not rendered on the merits of the RTC petition. It
did not contain legal declaration of the parties' rights
and liabilities nor was there a determination on
whether or not the petitioners were right in asking for
the nullity of Rene and Cherry's marriage. In other
words, the final order did not resolve substantial
issues. Moreover, in certain cases, the Court has
disregarded res judicata in the broader interest of
justice, as well as when the circumstances of the
case justify the relaxation of the said rule and
declared that a party is not barred from filing a
subsequent case of similar nature. 38
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is
of the opinion that to simply uphold the dismissal
orders of Branch 60 and let the petitioners to file
anew a complaint for nullity of marriage before the
designated Family Court would not serve any
compelling purpose, is impractical, and
counterproductive to the cause of justice. With both
parties having extensively discussed in their
pleadings filed before the trial court and before the
Court their respective positions on the issue on
whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the
RTC petition, the Court finds it imperative to properly
evaluate the arguments of the parties and decide on
that particular issue. To rule otherwise would only
invite redundancy of bringing the same purely legal
issue to the Court as the parties would just file the
needed pleadings and raise the aforesaid issue in
the trial court, and then elevate the same to the
Court via a Rule 45 petition. This would not be
conducive to the speedy administration of justice,
and it becomes unnecessary where the Court is in a
position to resolve the issue based on the records
before it. 39 Apropos thereto, it is well-settled that
the Court can take cognizance of and immediately
42
resolve cases either when the parties deserve
speedy, but legally warranted relief, or when
remanding the cases would be counterproductive to
the cause of justice. 40 Likewise, it is an accepted
precept of procedural law that the Court may resolve
the dispute in a single proceeding, instead of
remanding the case to the lower court for further
proceedings if, based on the records, pleadings, and
other evidence, the matter can readily be ruled
upon. 41
Hence, the Court will now rule on the issue
of whether or not the petitioners are the real parties-
in-interest to file subject petition for nullity of
marriage.
The petitioners are not the real party-
in-interest to file the RTC petition.
The Court issued A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, in order to
govern direct actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage. As ruled in Enrico, Section 2
(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC makes it the sole right
of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the
wife. 42 (Underscoring in the
original)
In explaining why A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC only allows the spouses to file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, the Court
held:
The Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2 (a) in the following
manner, viz.:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured
spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured
spouse may file a petition for
 annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity
of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution. 43 (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original)
Like in Enrico, the Aguas heirs are the
children of the deceased spouse whose marriage is
sought to be annulled. And as ruled in the aforecited
case, they have no legal personality to file the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of their
father with Cherry. They can only question the
validity of the marriage of the said spouses in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their
deceased father filed in the regular courts.
Lucila, on the other hand, is not the wife in
the marriage that she and her children sought to
annul. Be it noted that she is not a spouse of Rene,
their marriage having been declared null and void
from the very beginning on the ground of
psychological incapacity in the 2005 Nullity
Decision. 44 Accordingly, Lucila, could not be the
aggrieved or injured spouse referred to by A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC who has the legal standing to file the
complaint for nullity of marriage of the spouses Rene
and Cherry.
The Court is aware that in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, 45 it was held that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing
of a petition for nullity, does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing a suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage, thus:
Note that the Rationale
makes it clear that Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If
Estrellita's interpretation is
employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precluded from filing an
action. Surely, this is not what
the Rule contemplated.
43
The subsequent spouse
may only be expected to take action
if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in
a subsequent marriage benefit from
the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and
the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution. 46
In this case, however, the RTC petition
was not anchored on the ground of bigamy, but
on non-compliance with the provisions in Articles 52
and 53 of the Family Code on the partition and
distribution of the properties of the previous marriage
and delivery of the presumptive legitimes. It is also
noteworthy that Rene and Cherry's marriage is not
bigamous. Rene and Lucila's marriage was already
declared null and void, hence, there is no existing
marriage to speak of so as to constitute Rene and
Cherry's marriage to be bigamous. As such, Lucila
could not be considered as an injured spouse in a
bigamous marriage that entitles her to file a petition
for nullity of the subsequent marriage.
Niñal v. Bayadog is not applicable in
this case.
The petitioners insist on the application
of Niñal v. Bayadog 47 where the Court allowed the
children by a previous marriage to file a direct action
to declare a subsequent marriage void after the
death of their father. The Court cannot agree with
the petitioners. The ruling in Niñal is not applicable in
the instant case as it involves a marriage under
the Civil Code while the instant case, like in Enrico,
concerns a marriage celebrated during the effectivity
of the Family Code and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Thus, as held in Enrico:
While it is true that Niñal in
no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father's
 marriage to therein respondent after parties could have been had, as well as the delivery
the death of their father, we cannot, of the presumptive legitimes of the Aguas heirs.
however, apply its ruling for the
As it happened, however, neither Rene nor
reason that the impugned marriage
petitioners herein moved for the execution of the
therein was solemnized prior to the
2005 Nullity Decision. Also, neither Rene nor
effectivity of the Family Code. The
petitioners attempted to execute the 2005 Nullity
Court in Niñal recognized that the
Decision by instituting an independent action for its
applicable law to determine the
revival. Hence, the subject property remained under
validity of the two marriages
the state of co-ownership among Rene, Lucila and
involved therein is the Civil Code,
the Aguas heirs. Moreover, Rene's death
which was the law in effect at the
supervened the enforcement of the 2005 Nullity
time of their celebration. What we
Decision and the partition of the Sunset Valley
have before us belongs to a different
Estate. Thus, succession set in and triggered the
milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to
application of the Civil Code provisions governing
be declared void was entered into
succession and the procedural rules governing the
during the effectivity of the Family
settlement of deceased persons. Consequently, the
Code. As can be gleaned from the
Aguas heirs' right to the delivery of their presumptive
facts, petitioner's marriage to
legitimes had been superseded by their statutory
Eulogio was celebrated in
right to succeed Rene as compulsory heirs. 53
2004. 48 (Citation omitted)
Now, the Aguas heirs filed the RTC petition
As it stands now, Section 2, paragraph (a)
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
Rene and Cherry's marriage would affect their
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
successional rights and share in Rene's estate,
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
which allegedly included the entire subject property.
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
As earlier explained, however, they do not have the
distinguish between marriages covered by
legal standing to file the RTC petition.
the Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code.Specifically, A.M. No. 02- Nevertheless, all is not lost for them.
11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by
As explained in Enrico, while A.M. No. 02-
the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
in application, it is confined only to proceedings
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
commenced after March 15, 2003. 49 Considering
the compulsory or intestate heirs are already
that the marriage between Rene and Cherry was
without any recourse under the law. They can still
contracted on October 7, 2006 and that the RTC
protect their successional right, for, as stated in
petition was filed on November 3, 2017, A.M. No.
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
02-11-10-SC is absolutely applicable to the
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
petitioners.
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
Aguas heirs can collaterally attack (Rationale of the Rules), compulsory or intestate
the validity of Rene and Cherry's heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
marriage in the proceedings for the the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
settlement of the estate of Rene. nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
Lucila can file a separate civil action
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
for partition against the administrator
of Rene's estate. The Court notes that there is a pending
intestate proceedings of the estate of Rene, SP
It is necessary to stress, as insightfully
Case No. R-ANG-17-01449-SP entitled, "In the
pointed out and discussed by Justice Caguioa in his
Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration
Concurring Opinion, that upon the finality of the 2005
and Settlement of Intestate Estate of Rene F. Aguas,
Nullity Decision, Rene, Lucila, or the Aguas heirs
Cherry Calilung-Aguas, Petitioner." The Aguas heirs
could have already moved for its execution by
can certainly amply protect their successional rights
motion within five years from the entry of the 2005
by collaterally raising the issue on the validity of
Nullity Decision in accordance with Section
Rene and Cherry's marriage in the aforesaid
6, 50 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, said
proceedings which they did when they filed a
parties had 10 years from entry of the 2005 Nullity
Comment/Opposition to the Petition in SP Case No.
Decision to file an independent action for its revival
R-ANG-17-01449-SP 54 together with Lucila and
pursuant to Article 1152 51 of the Civil Code.52 With
raised the argument that Rene's marriage with
that, partition and delivery of the corresponding
Cherry is null and void.
portion of the subject property to the respective
44
 In fact, as correctly pointed out by Justice
Caguioa in his Concurring Opinion, the Aguas heirs'
successional rights and share in Rene's estate
should be properly determined in the Settlement
Proceeding, which was already pending with Branch
56 upon the filing of the RTC petition, to the
exclusion of all other courts of concurrent
jurisdiction. This is pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court in relation to the principle of
priority or the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction.
The rule is that the court which first takes
cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction
and power to afford complete relief has the exclusive
right to dispose of the controversy without
interference from other courts of concurrent
jurisdiction in which similar actions are subsequently
instituted between the same parties seeking similar
remedies and involving the same
questions. 55 Such rule is referred to as the principle
of priority or the rule of exclusive concurrent
jurisdiction. Although comity is sometimes a motive
for the courts to abide by the priority principle, it is a
legal duty of a court to abide by such principle to
reduce the possibility of the conflicting exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction, especially to reduce the
possibility that a case involving the same subject
matter and the same parties is simultaneously acted
on in more than one court. 56
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court states:
SEC. 1. Where estate of
deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Emphasis supplied)
45
As stated, Section 1, Rule 73 grants to the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
decedent's estate the exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide all matters relating to the settlement
and liquidation of the decedent's estate to the
exclusion of all other courts of concurrent
jurisdiction. The main function of settlement of
estate proceedings is to settle and liquidate the
estates of deceased persons. Integral to this process
is the determination of the assets that form part of
the decedent's estate, the heirs who shall participate
in said estate, and the amount or proportion of these
heirs' respective shares therein. Certainly, Branch
56, which is handling the Settlement Proceeding,
has primary and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
over the Aguas heirs' successional rights and share
in Rene's estate where they can collaterally attack
the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage.
Relatedly, it may not be amiss to stress that
the Aguas heirs may collaterally attack the validity of
Rene and Cherry's marriage in the Settlement
Proceeding since the same is for purposes of
succession and not of remarriage.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 57 the
Court already clarified that a collateral attack against
a void marriage may be permitted for purposes other
than remarriage. Same ruling was made in De
Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, 58 where collateral
attack was allowed by a spouse to a void marriage in
an action for support.
In De Castro, petitioner Reinel Anthony De
Castro and respondent Annabelle Assidao-De
Castro got married in 1995 without a marriage
license, but with affidavit stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. On June 4, 1998, Annabelle filed a complaint
for support against Reinel alleging that the latter has
reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his
child. Reinel Anthony denied that he is married to
Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit and that they never lived together as
husband and wife. The trial court ruled that the
marriage between Reinel Anthony and Annabelle is
not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as
the natural father of the child, and, thus, obliged to
give her support. On appeal, the CA ruled that since
the case is an action for support, it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of Reinel
Anthony and Annabelle as null and void in the very
same case. When the case was elevated to the
Court, it ruled that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage.
Thus:
 Anent the first issue, the obtained only for
Court holds that the trial court had purpose of
jurisdiction to determine the validity remarriage.
of the marriage between petitioner
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño
and respondent. The validity of a
v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it
void marriage may be collaterally
is clothed with sufficient authority to
attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,
pass upon the validity of two
we held:
marriages despite the main case
However, being a claim for death benefits.
other than for Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
purposes of Court may pass upon the validity of
remarriage, no a marriage even in a suit not
judicial action is directly instituted to question the
necessary to validity of said marriage, so long
declare a marriage as it is essential to the
an absolute determination of the case.
nullity. For other However, evidence must be
purposes, such as adduced, testimonial or
but not limited to documentary, to prove the existence
determination of of grounds rendering such a
heirship, marriage an absolute
legitimacy or nullity. 59 (Citations omitted;
illegitimacy of a emphases supplied)
child, settlement
Moreover, that the Aguas heirs may
of estate,
collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's
dissolution of
marriage in the Settlement Proceeding is very clear
property regime,
from the Rationale of the Rules, which states:
or a criminal case
for that matter, the Only an aggrieved or injured
court may pass spouse may file a petition for
upon the validity annulment of voidable marriages or
of marriage even declaration of absolute nullity of void
in a suit not marriages. Such petition cannot be
directly instituted filed by compulsory or intestate heirs
to question the of the spouses or by the State. The
same so long as it Committee is of the belief that they
is essential to the do not have a legal right to file the
determination of petition. Compulsory or intestate
the case. This is heirs have only inchoate rights prior
without prejudice to to the death of their predecessor,
any issue that may and hence can only question the
arise in the case. validity of the marriage of the
When such need spouses upon the death of a
arises, a final spouse in a proceeding for the
judgment of settlement of the estate of the
declaration of nullity deceased spouse filed in the
is necessary even if regular courts. On the other hand,
the purpose is other the concern of the State is to
than to remarry. preserve marriage and not to seek
The clause "on the its dissolution. 60 (Emphasis and
basis of a final underscoring supplied)
judgment declaring
As appropriately observed by Justice
such previous
Caguioa, the Rationale of the Rules draws a
marriage void" in
distinction between a "petition for annulment of
Article 40 of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity"
the Family
on the one hand, and an action assailing the validity
Code connotes that
of a predecessor's marriage for the purpose of
such final judgment
determining successional rights, on the other. The
need not be
former is a direct action assailing the validity of
46
marriage that is governed by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and pertains exclusively to the aggrieved or
injured spouse. The latter pertains to a collateral
attack against the validity of a predecessor's
marriage brought in a proceeding for the settlement
of the latter's estate in accordance with the
procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
With regard to Lucila, it is interesting to note
that Enrico and the Rationale of the Rules only
mentioned compulsory or intestate heirs as the
ones who could collaterally assail the validity of a
marriage in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts in order to protect their successional rights.
This would mean then that the said remedy or
recourse under the law is not available to Lucila
since she is not an heir of Rene, her marriage with
the deceased having been declared null and void
from the very beginning on the ground of
psychological incapacity in the 2005 Nullity Decision.
Lucila is, therefore, considered as a stranger in the
estate proceedings with no right to succeed as an
heir of Rene, thus, she has no standing to participate
in the Settlement Proceeding.
Concomitantly, Lucila's claim cannot be filed
in the Settlement Proceeding. It is well-settled that a
probate or intestate court cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. This is clearly elucidated in the case
of Agtarap v. Agtarap. 61 Thus:
The general rule is that
the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters
having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the
determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale
for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction. As held in
several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to
47
determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem,
but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for
a final determination of the
conflicting claims of
title. (Emphases supplied)
It must be noted, though, that the
above rule is subject to exceptions, as likewise
explained in Agtarap, to wit:
[T]his general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate [or
intestate] court may provisionally
pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the
final determination of ownership
in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property
in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased
spouse. 62 (Emphasis supplied)
Of the exceptions referred to above, the
Court notes that the intestate court in the Settlement
Proceeding may provisionally pass upon the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of the subject properties in this case. The
same, however, would not give Lucila full and
complete relief as the said inclusion or exclusion is
still subject to the final determination of ownership in
a separate action. How would Lucila amply and
finally protect then her right and interest over Sunset
Valley Estate or recover her share in the aforesaid
co-owned property?
 The Court holds that Lucila, being a stranger
to the Settlement Proceeding, should file a separate
civil action for partition before the regular
courts against the administrator of Rene's estate.
This course of action is not only consistent with the
aforesaid jurisprudential pronouncements, but is
likewise in accord with Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that an action to
recover real property or an interest therein from the
estate may be commenced against administrator, to
wit:
SEC. 1. Actions which may
and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. —
No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or
administrator; but to recover real or
personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition is DENIED. The Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage in Civil Case No. R-ANG-17-
03316-CV filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 59, and re-raffled to Branch 60
of the same station, is ORDERED
DISMISSED without prejudice to petitioners Princess
Luren D. Aguas, Danica Lane D. Aguas, Sean
Patrick D. Aguas, Sean Michael D. Aguas, and
Samantha D. Aguas in challenging the validity of the
marriage of Cherry S. Calilung to the late Rene F.
Aguas in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the latter and to petitioner Lucila David in
filing a separate action for partition of the Sunset
Valley Estate against the administrator of Rene's
estate.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Gesmundo,
Hernando, Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, M.V.
Lopez, Gaerlan and Rosario, JJ., concur.
Leonen, ** J., is on official business.
Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., pls. see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
CAGUIOA, J., concurring:
The ponencia affirms the dismissal of Civil
Case No. R-ANG-17-03316-CV (RTC Petition) on
the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In so
48
ruling, it characterizes the RTC Petition as one
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Branch 59
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City,
the duly designated Family Court of said station.
I concur.
I submit this Concurring Opinion only to
highlight the remedies which may be availed of by
the petitioners herein to enforce the partition of
property and delivery of presumptive legitimes
ordered in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage filed by
Rene F. Aguas (Rene) against petitioner Lucila
David (Lucila).
For context, a brief restatement of the
relevant facts is in order.
Lucila married Rene on November 24, 1981
in Mabalacat, Pampanga. They begot five children
namely, petitioners Princess Luren D. Aguas
(Princess), Danica Lane D. Aguas (Danica), Sean
Patrick D. Aguas (Patrick), Sean Michael D. Aguas
(Michael) and Samantha 1
On December 10, 2003, Rene filed a petition
to declare his marriage with Lucila null and void on
the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.
Rene declared as conjugal property a 500-square
meter parcel of land in Sunset Valley, Angeles City
covered by TCT No. 045-90811 issued in the name
of Rene and Lucila. 2
On December 22, 2005, Rene and Lucila's
marriage was declared null and void. Hence, the
handling court ordered the division of the lot covered
by TCT No. 045-90811 and the house thereon
(Sunset Valley Estate), as well as the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes of their common
children. 3 Despite this, the presumptive legitimes of
the Aguas heirs were not delivered. As well, the
partition of the Sunset Valley Estate had not been
undertaken. 4
On October 7, 2006, Rene contracted a
second marriage with respondent Cherry Calilung
(Cherry). 5
On November 17, 2015, Rene died
intestate. 6
On May 24, 2017, Cherry filed Special
Proceeding Case No. R-ANG-17-01449-SP entitled
"In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of
Administration and Settlement of Intestate Estate of
Rene F. Aguas, Cherry Calilung-Aguas, Petitioner"
(Settlement Proceeding). The Settlement
Proceeding was raffled to RTC Branch 56. 7
Lucila and the Aguas heirs (collectively,
Petitioners) actively participated in the Settlement
Proceeding. In their Comment/Opposition, they
alleged:
 1. The [Aguas heirs] are the otherwise, the
legitimate children of the late [Rene] subsequent
with [Lucila]. The marriage of [Rene] marriage shall be
and [Lucila] was dissolved by virtue null and
of the Decision of [RTC] Branch 60, void. 8 (Emphasis
dated [December 22, 2005] x x x. supplied)
2. Although the marriage On November 3, 2017, or after the
was dissolved, there was no Settlement Proceeding was filed, Petitioners filed the
liquidation or separation of the RTC Petition, 9 where they prayed that the marriage
properties acquired during their between Rene and Cherry be declared null and void
marriage in accordance with Article pursuant to Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of
102 of the Family Code. the Family Code. 10 The RTC Petition was originally
raffled to RTC Branch 59.
3. Thus, when [Rene]
married [Cherry] on [October 7, In its Order dated November 10, 2017
2006], the properties of [Rene] (Transmittal Order), Branch 59 directed the
acquired during the previous transmittal of the case records to the Office of the
marriage should not [have been] Clerk of Court for purposes of re-raffling. The
included in their property regime relevant portions of the Transmittal Order read:
pursuant to Article 92 of
Considering that the instant
the Family Code x x x.
[RTC] Petition involves a collateral
xxx xxx xxx attack on the validity of marriage of
[Cherry] and [Rene], it does not fall
4. Furthermore, Article 52 of
within the jurisdiction of a family
the Family Code explicitly provides:
court.
Art. 52. The
xxx xxx xxx
judgment of
annulment or of IN LIGHT OF THE
absolute nullity of FOREGOING, the Branch Clerk of
the marriage, the Court is hereby directed to
partition and transmit the record of this case to
distribution of the the Office of the Clerk of Court,
properties of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
spouses and the City for re-raffle among the courts
delivery of the of general
children's jurisdiction. 11 (Emphasis
presumptive supplied; italics omitted)
legitimes shall be
Pursuant to the Transmittal Order, the RTC
recorded in the
Petition was re-raffled to RTC Branch 60. Days later,
appropriate civil
or on November 24, 2017, Branch 60 issued the
registry and
assailed Order 12 (First assailed Order) dismissing
registries of
the RTC Petition on the ground of "lack of
property; otherwise,
jurisdiction," thus:
the same shall not
affect third persons. It is apparent from the face
of the petition that the same is
5. Failure to comply with the
hinged upon the issue of validity of
requirements of Article 52 will have
marriage emanating from Articles 52
the effect of nullifying a subsequent
and 53 of the Family Code.
marriage pursuant to Article 53 of
Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic
the same Code, to wit:
Act 8369 otherwise known as
Art. 53. Either of the the Family Courts Act of 1997[,] it is
former spouses the Family Court who has
may marry again jurisdiction over this case.
after compliance
Considering that this
with the
court is no longer a Family Court,
requirements of the
this court has no jurisdiction over
immediately
the case.
preceding Article;

49
 It is noteworthy to discuss cannot be
the case of Lolita D. Enrico v. Heirs filed by the
of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and compulsor
Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli y or
represented by Vilma M. Articulo, intestate
where the [Court] opined that A.M. heirs of the
No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages spouses or
under the Family Code of the by the
Philippines, and is prospective in its State. [Sect
application. The [Court] emphasized ion 2;
that: Section 3,
paragraph
There is no
a]
ambiguity in
the Rule. Absolute Only an
sententil expositore aggrieved
non indiget. When or injured
the language of the spouse may
law is clear, no file a
explanation of it is petition for
required. Section annulment
2(a) of A.M. No. 02- of voidable
11-10-SC, makes it marriages
the sole right of the or
husband or the wife declaration
to file a petition for of absolute
declaration of nullity of
absolute nullity of void
void marriage. marriages.
Such
The Rationale of the
petition
Rules on Annulment
cannot be
of Voidable
filed by
Marriages and
compulsory
Declaration of
or intestate
Absolute Nullity of
heirs of the
Void Marriages,
spouses or
Legal Separation
by the
and Provisional
State. The
Orders explicates
Committee
on Section 2(a) in
is of the
the following
belief that
manner, viz.:
they do not
1. Only an have a legal
aggrieved right to file
or injured the
spouse may petition. Co
file petitions mpulsory
for or intestate
annulment heirs have
of voidable only
marriages inchoate
and rights prior
declaration to the
of absolute death of
nullity of their
void predecess
marriages.  or, and
Such hence can
petitions only

50
question it does not
the validity mean that
of the the
marriage compulsor
of the y or
spouses intestate
upon the heirs are
death of a already
spouse in without
a any
proceeding recourse
for the under the
settlement law. They
of the can still
estate of protect
the their
deceased successio
spouse nal right,
filed in the for, as
regular stated in
courts. On the
the other Rationale
hand, the of the
concern of Rules on
the State is Annulment
to preserve of Voidable
marriage Marriages
and not to and
seek its Declaratio
dissolution. n of
Absolute
Re
Nullity of
spondents
Void
clearly
Marriages,
have no
Legal
cause of
Separation
action
and
before the
Provisional
court a
Orders,
quo.
compulsor
Nonetheles
y or
s, all is not
intestate
lost for
heirs can
responden
still
ts.
question
While A.M.
the validity
No. 02-11-
of the
10-SC decl
marriage
ares that a
of the
petition for
spouses,
declaration
not in a
of absolute
proceeding
nullity of
for
void
declaration
marriage
of nullity,
may be
but upon
filed solely
the death
by the
of a
husband
spouse in
or the wife,
a
51
 proceeding dissolution of conjugal partnership of
for the gains[.]
settlement
As stated at the outset, I agree.
of the
estate of Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
the is conferred by law and determined by the
deceased allegations in the complaint, as well as by the
spouse character of the reliefs sought. 18
filed in the
Here, the relevant allegations in the RTC
regular
Petition state:
courts. x x
x 4. Lucila and [Rene] entered
into a marital union on [November
In view of the foregoing, the
24, 1981] in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
petition filed by [Petitioners] is
hereby dismissed for lack of xxx xxx xxx
jurisdiction. 13 (Additional emphasis
and underscoring supplied) 5. Out of their marital union,
Lucila and Rene begotten five
However, the Transmittal Order of Branch children — Princess, Danica,
59 and the First assailed Order of Branch 60 were Patrick, Michael and Samantha x x
only received by Petitioners on December 5, 2017. x.
Petitioners thus filed a motion for 6. On [December 10, 2003],
reconsideration praying that the RTC Petition be Rene filed a Petition for Nullity of
referred back to Branch 59, the latter being the Marriage against Lucila before the
designated Family Court of Angeles City. Said [RTC], Branch 60 of Angeles City x
motion was denied by Branch 60 in its assailed x x. In the said Petition for Nullity,
Order 14 dated June 13, 2018 (Second assailed therein Petitioner Rene declared
Order), noting, among others, that "there is already a conjugal properties as follows:
pending intestate proceedings in [Branch 56] x x
x." 15 xxx xxx xxx

Aggrieved, Petitioners seek recourse with 14[.] That the

the Court through this Petition filed under Rule 45 of parties have
the 1997 Rules of Court (the Rules). amassed between
them a parcel of
The ponencia upholds the assailed Orders land located at
of Branch 60 and finds the dismissal of the RTC Sunset [Valley]
Petition proper. According to the ponencia, the Estate, Angeles City
subject matter of the RTC Petition falls within the consisting of five
exclusive jurisdiction of Branch 59, the designated hundred square
Family Court of Angeles City. 16 meters, more or
less. This is aside
This finding rests on Section 5 (d)
from the assets in
of Republic Act No. 8369, 17 otherwise referred to
business consisting
as the Family Courts Act of 1997. Section 5 (d)
mainly of
states:
merchandise
Section 5. Jurisdiction of inventory in [Rene's]
Family Courts. — The Family Courts pawnshop and
shall have exclusive original RTW sales
jurisdiction to hear and decide the business.
following cases:
It is the desire of
xxx xxx xxx [Rene] that title to
the aforementioned
d) Complaints for annulment
real property be
of marriage, declaration of nullity of
transferred entirely
marriage and those relating to
to their common
marital status and property relations
children while the
of husband and wife or those living
commercial assets
together under different status and
be retained under
agreements, and petitions for
his administration,
52
 given that he still the Office of Registry of Deeds of
provides for their Angeles City where the subject
subsistence and property is located. Thus, no
education; annotation of said Decision on the
Title covering the subject property
xxx xxx xxx
has ever been made.
7. The subject property is
xxx xxx xxx
covered by [TCT] No. 045-90811 x x
x and was indeed registered in the 10. On [October 7, 2006],
names of Spouses Rene F. Aguas Rene and Cherry entered into a
and Lucila D. Aguas. marital union without the partition
and liquidation of the subject
8. Without receiving any
property, and proper delivery of the
notice from the Court regarding the
prospective legitimes of Princess,
Petition for Nullity, Lucila learned
Danica, Michael, Patrick and
sometime in the year 2007 that a
Samantha, who are children [from]
Decision dated [December 22, 2005]
the first marriage.
has already been rendered by the
RTC granting the said Petition [for xxx xxx xxx
Nullity] filed by Rene. The
11. On [November 17,
dispositive portion of the said
2015], Rene died intestate.
Decision is herein reproduced as
follows: 12. Due to the failure of
Rene and Cherry to comply with the
"WHEREF
express provision of the law, the
ORE, the petition is
subsequent marriage contracted by
granted and the
the deceased Rene with Cherry is
marriage between
null and void pursuant to Article 53
petitioner Rene F.
in relation to Article 52 of the Family
Aguas and
Code x x x[.] 19 (Italics and
respondent Lucila
underscoring omitted)
D. Aguas
solemnized on Based on these allegations, Petitioners
November 24, 1981 prayed for the issuance of a judgment: (i) declaring
is hereby declared the marriage between Rene and Cherry null and
null and void. void; and (ii) ordering the Local Civil Registrar of
Angeles City to annotate the fact of nullity on Rene
Their conjugal
and Cherry's Certificate of Marriage and transmit the
property consisting
same to the Philippine Statistics Authority for proper
of a house and lot
registration. 20
located at Sunset
Valley Estate, As astutely observed by the ponencia, the
Angeles City is RTC Petition is a direct action for declaration of
ordered divided nullity of marriage falling under the exclusive
between them jurisdiction of the Family Court, which, in this case, is
providing for the Branch 59. Thus, Branch 60 correctly dismissed the
support and the RTC Petition on the ground of lack of subject matter
delivery of the jurisdiction.
[presumptive]
Even assuming, for the sake of argument,
legitime to their
that Branch 60 possessed subject matter jurisdiction
children. Thereafter,
over the RTC Petition, the latter would have still
the conjugal
been subject to dismissal based on A.M. No. 02-11-
partnership of gains
10-SC which sets forth the Rule on Declaration of
is ordered
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
dissolved.
Voidable Marriages.
xxx xxx xxx"
Section 2 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC limits the
xxx xxx xxx parties who may file a direct action for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages, thus:
9. The Decision above-
mentioned, as well as its Certificate
of Finality, was not registered with
53
 SEC. 2. Petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A
petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
Clearly, Lucila and the Aguas heirs lack the
legal standing to file the RTC Petition.
Nevertheless, the dismissal of the RTC
Petition does not bar the resolution of the issues
raised therein in the Settlement Proceeding involving
Rene's estate as far as the successional rights of the
Aguas heirs and Cherry, if any, are concerned, and
in a separate action for partition with respect to
Lucila's decreed share in the Sunset Valley Estate.
I expound.
Rene and Lucila's marriage was declared
null and void through the December 22, 2005
Decision 21 (2005 Nullity Decision), the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition
is granted and the marriage
between petitioner Rene F. Aguas
and respondent Lucila D. Aguas
solemnized on November 24, 1981
is hereby declared null and void.
Their conjugal property
consisting of a house and lot located
at Sunset Valley Estate, Angeles
City is ordered divided between
them providing for the support and
delivery of the [presumptive]
legitime (sic) to their children.
Thereafter, the conjugal partnership
of gains is ordered dissolved.
After the finality of this
Decision, let a Decree of Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage be issued in
this case.
SO ORDERED. 22
Before delving into the remedies available to
Lucila and the Aguas heirs, I find it necessary to
stress, for purposes of clarity, that the 2005 Nullity
Decision erred in characterizing the Sunset Valley
Estate as conjugal property.
To recall, Rene and Lucila's marriage had
been declared null and void on the basis of Article
36 of the Family Code. Their union thus falls under
the scope of Article 147 of the same statute, which
reads:
ART. 147. When a man
and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live
54
exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to
the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber
or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the
parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation. (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties during their
cohabitation are placed in a special co-ownership.
Here, Article 147 applies even if Rene and
Lucila were married before the Family Code took
effect. Such retroactive application had been settled
by the Court in Paterno v. Paterno, 23 thus:
There is no quarrel that the
marriage of the petitioner and the
 respondent had long been declared
an absolute nullity by reason of their
psychological incapacity to perform
their marital obligations to each
other. The property relations of
parties to a void marriage is
governed either by Article 147 or
148 of the Family Code. Since the
petitioner and the respondent suffer
no legal impediment and exclusively
lived with each other under a void
marriage, their property relation is
one of co-ownership under Article
147 of the Family Code. The said
provision finds application in this
case even if the parties were
married before the Family
Code took effect by express
provision of the Family Code on
its retroactive effect for as long
as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. Here, no vested rights
will be impaired in the application
of the said provision given that
Article 147 of the Family Code is
actually just a remake of Article
144 of the 1950 Civil
Code. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Lest there be any confusion, it must be
clarified that the Sunset Valley Estate is not conjugal
property, but rather, co-owned property, as the
property relations of Rene and Lucila are "governed
by the rules on co-ownership." 25
That said, the remedies to enforce the
liquidation, partition, and delivery of the presumptive
legitimes of the common children are the same,
whether the subject properties are community
property, 26 conjugal property, 27 or co-owned
property. 28
Execution of the 2005 Nullity Decision
The 2005 Nullity Decision lapsed into finality
on January 6, 2006 in the absence of an
appeal. 29 As a result, the declaration of the Sunset
Valley Estate as the sole property owned in common
by Rene and Lucila and the sole source of the
Aguas heirs' presumptive legitimes had become final
and executory.
Upon finality of the 2005 Nullity Decision,
Rene, Lucila, or the Aguas heirs could have already
moved for its execution, either by motion or
independent action, in accordance with Section
6, Rule 39 of the Rules:
SEC. 6. Execution by
motion or by independent action. —
A final and executory judgment or
55
order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of
its entry. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 6, Rule 39 should be read in
conjunction with Articles 1144 and 1152 of the Civil
Code which state:
ART. 1144. The following
actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of
action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation
created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1152. The period for
prescription of actions to demand
the fulfillment of obligation declared
by a judgment commences from
the time the judgment became
final. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing provisions, Rene,
Lucila, and the Aguas heirs had five (5) years from
the entry of the 2005 Nullity Decision to move for its
execution before the issuing court. Thereafter, said
parties had ten (10) years from entry of the 2005
Nullity Decision to file an independent action for its
revival. 30
To be sure, Rene, Lucila, and the Aguas
heirs' right to move for the execution of the 2005
Nullity Decision is not inchoate. It vested upon
finality of the 2005 Nullity Decision. Nevertheless, it
should be stressed that even as the final 2005 Nullity
Decision ordered the "division" of the Sunset Valley
Estate between Rene and Lucila and the delivery of
the Aguas heirs' presumptive legitimes, it
did not separate, identify, and assign the specific
portions to which they are entitled. Thus, the
execution of the 2005 Nullity Decision would
have merely triggered partition, or the process of
"separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may
belong." 31
Partition is effected when the titles of
acquisition or ownership corresponding to specific
portions of the co-owned property are delivered to
the parties to whom such portions are
 adjudicated. 32 In cases where the title covers one
specific portion of the co-owned property which have
been assigned to two or more parties, a separate
duplicate certificate may be issued to each of them
under Section 41 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Accordingly, partition would have been
effected by the delivery to Rene and Lucila of titles
corresponding to their specific assigned portions in
the Sunset Valley Estate. With respect to the Aguas
heirs, partition would have been effected either by
delivery of individual titles in their favor covering their
respective specific assigned portions in the Sunset
Valley Estate, or the delivery of a single title naming
them as pro-indiviso co-owners of the specific
portion of the Sunset Valley Estate corresponding to
their presumptive legitimes.
However, as things happened, neither Rene
nor Petitioners herein moved for the execution of the
2005 Nullity Decision. As well, neither Rene nor
Petitioners attempted to execute the 2005 Nullity
Decision by instituting an independent action for its
revival. Because of this, the partition of the Sunset
Valley Estate and the delivery of the presumptive
legitimes of the Aguas heirs did not proceed. Without
said partition, the Sunset Valley Estate remained
under a co-ownership among Rene, Lucila, and the
Aguas heirs, in the following proportions:
Parties Net Share in Basis
Sunset Valley
Estate
Rene One-fourth 33 Article 147
the Family Code, in
relation to Article
888 of the Civil
Code 34
Lucila One-fourth 35 Article 147
the Family Code, in
relation to Article
888 of the Civil
Code
Princess, One-tenth 36 eac Article 888
Danica, h (collectively, the Civil Code
Patrick, one-half of
Michael and the entire Sunset
Samantha Valley Estate)
 
Succession set in upon Rene's death
Here, Rene's death supervened the
enforcement of the 2005 Nullity Decision and the
partition of the Sunset Valley Estate. Thus,
succession set in and triggered the application of
the Civil Code provisions governing succession and
the procedural rules governing the settlement of
estate of deceased persons.
I. The successional rights of the Aguas heirs
must be determined in the
Settlement Proceeding pending with
Branch 56
The Aguas heirs' right to the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes had been superseded by their
statutory right to succeed Rene as compulsory heirs.
In turn, their successional rights and their respective
shares in Rene's estate must be determined in the
proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate,
which as stated, is already pending with Branch 56.
Reference to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
is proper:
SECTION 1. Where estate
of deceased persons settled. — If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall
of exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be
of contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules can be
of traced back to Sections 599 to 603 of Act No.
190, 37 otherwise referred to as the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings:
SECTION
599. Jurisdiction. — Courts of First
Instance shall have jurisdiction in all
matters relating to the settlement of
estates and probate of wills of
deceased persons, the appointment
and removal of guardians and
trustees, and the powers, duties,
and rights of guardians and wards,
trustees and cestuis que trust. This
56
 jurisdiction shall be called probate court first taking cognizance of the
jurisdiction. settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction
SECTION 600. Where
to the exclusion of all other courts."
Resident's Estate Settled. — If an
Pursuant to this provision, therefore
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands
all questions concerning the
dies, whether a citizen or alien, his
settlement of the estate of the
will shall be proved, or letters of
deceased Rosina Marguerite
administration granted, and his
Wolfson should be filed before
estate settled, in the Court of First
Branch VIII of the Manila Court of
Instance in the province in which he
First Instance, then presided over by
resided at the time of his death.
former Judge, now Justice of the
SECTION 601. Where Court of Appeals, Manuel
Nonresident's Estate Settled. — If a Barcelona, where Special
person resided out of the Philippine Proceedings No. 63866 for the
Islands at the time of his death, his settlement of the testate estate of
will shall be allowed and recorded, the deceased Rosina Marguerite
and letters testamentary or of Wolfson was filed and is still
administration shall be granted in pending.
the Court of First Instance of any
This Court stated the
province in which he had estate.
rationale of said Section 1
SECTION 602. The Court of Rule 73, thus:
Once Taking, to Retain
"x x x The
Jurisdiction. — When a Court of
reason for this
First Instance in any province has
provision of the law
first taken cognizance of the
is obvious. The
settlement of the estate of a
settlement of the
deceased person, as mentioned
estate of a
in the preceding sections, such
deceased person in
court shall have jurisdiction of
court constitutes but
the disposition and settlement of
one proceeding. For
such estate, to the exclusion of
the successful
all other courts.
administration of
SECTION 603. Jurisdiction, that estate it is
When May be Contested. — The necessary that
jurisdiction assumed by a Court of there should be but
First Instance, for the settlement of one responsible
an estate, so far as it depends on entity, one court,
the place of residence of a person, which should have
or of the location of his estate, shall exclusive control of
not be contested in a suit or every part of such
proceeding, except in an appeal administration. To
from that court, in the original case, entrust it to two or
or when the want of jurisdiction more courts, each
appears on the record. (Emphasis independent of the
supplied) other, would result
in confusion and
These provisions were later consolidated delay."
and adopted as Section 1, Rule 75 of the
1940 Rules of Court and carried over verbatim to the xxx xxx xxx
1964 Rules of Court, and again, to the present
"The
Rules.
provision of Section
In Macias v. Uy Kim, 38 the Court discussed 602 [now Section
the functions of the settlement court and the 1, Rule 73 of the
rationale behind the well-established rule on the present Rules],
exercise of the settlement court's jurisdiction: giving one court
exclusive
Under Section 1 of Rule 73, jurisdiction of the
[of the 1964 Rules of Court], "the settlement of the
57
 estate of a either summarily
deceased person or through the
was not inserted in process of
the law for the administration. (Se
benefit of the e Rules 74 to 91,
parties litigant, but inclusive, Rules of
in the public interest Court.) In order to
for the better settle the estate of
administration of a deceased
justice. For that person it is one of
reason the parties the functions of
have no control the probate court
over it." to determine who
the heirs are that
"On the
will receive the net
other hand, and for
assets of the
such effects as may
estate and the
be proper, it should
amount or
be stated herein
proportion of their
that any challenge
respective
to the validity of a
shares. x x x"
will, any objection to
the authentication xxx xxx xxx
thereof, and every
Even in other cases, it is
demand or claim
also a general principle that the
which any heir,
branch of the court of first instance
legatee, or party in
that first acquired jurisdiction over
interest in a testate
the case retains such jurisdiction to
or intestate
the exclusion of all other branches
succession may
of the same court of first instance or
make, must be
judicial district and all other
acted upon and
coordinate courts. x x
decided within the
x 39 (Emphasis and underscoring
same special
supplied)
proceedings, not in
a separate action, Section 1, Rule 73 thus grants to the court
and the same judge first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
having jurisdiction in decedent's estate the exclusive jurisdiction to hear
the administration of and decide all matters relating to the settlement and
the estate shall take liquidation of the decedent's estate to the exclusion
cognizance of the of all other courts of concurrent jurisdiction. Hence,
question raised, in Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 40 the Court
inasmuch as when observed:
the day comes he
A fair reading of the Rule —
will be called upon
since it deals with venue and comity
to make distribution
between courts of equal and co-
and adjudication of
ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that
the property to the
the court with whom the petition
interested parties, x
is first filed, must also first take
x x."
cognizance of the settlement of the
This was reiterated estate in order to exercise
in Maningat vs. Castillo, thus: jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of
all other courts.
"x x x The
main function of a Conversely, such court, may
probate court is to upon learning that a petition
settle and for probate of the decedent's last will
liquidate the has been presented in another court
estates of where the decedent obviously had
deceased persons his conjugal domicile and resided

58
 with his surviving widow and their
minor children, and that the
allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of
the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead
defer to the second court which has
before it the petition for probate of
the decedent's alleged last
will. 41 (Italics in the original)
As stated, the main function of a probate
court is to settle and liquidate the estates of
deceased persons. 42 Integral to this process is the
determination of the assets that form part of the
decedent's estate, the heirs who shall participate in
said estate, and the amount or proportion of these
heirs' respective shares therein. 43
Here, the settlement of Rene's estate
involves two phases.
The first phase involves the partition of the
Sunset Valley Estate for the purpose of determining
the portion thereof which should be included in the
inventory of assets forming part of Rene's estate.
To recall, the Sunset Valley Estate is co-
owned property acquired during the union of Rene
and Lucila. Under Article 147 of the Family Code,
Rene owned one-half of the Sunset Valley Estate
during his lifetime. One-half of Rene's share is
reserved for the Aguas heirs' presumptive legitimes.
Accordingly, following partition, only one-fourth of
the Sunset Valley Estate shall be included in the
inventory of assets forming part of Rene's estate.
The second phase involves the
determination of Rene's net share in the assets
acquired during his marriage with Cherry. During this
phase, Branch 56, as settlement court, must pass
upon the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage
collaterally, insofar as it is necessary to determine
the property regime governing their marriage, and
ultimately, Rene's net share in the assets acquired
during their union. Thereafter, Rene's estate,
consisting of his one-fourth share in the Sunset
Valley Estate derived from his union with Lucila, his
net share in the assets derived from his union with
Cherry, and all other assets exclusively acquired by
or pertaining to him, shall be distributed among his
heirs in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code, with the Aguas heirs' presumptive legitimes
and other gratuitous dispositions by Rene during his
lifetime being brought to collation pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article 51 44 of the Family
Code and Article 908 45 of the Civil Code,
respectively.
At this point, it may not be amiss to stress
that in the 1993 case of Domingo v. Court of
59
Appeals 46 (Domingo), the Court already clarified
that a collateral attack against a void marriage may
be permitted for purposes other than remarriage.
In Domingo, respondent Delia Soledad
Domingo (Delia) filed a petition for "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against her husband Roberto Domingo (Roberto).
Delia married Roberto in 1976. Nearly a decade
after, Delia discovered that Roberto was previously
married to a certain Emerlina dela Paz (Emerlina).
Delia only came to know of such fact when Emerlina
sued her and Roberto for bigamy. Roberto filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Delia's petition
stated no cause of action since the marriage
between him and Delia is bigamous, and thus,
void ab initio.
The lower court denied Roberto's Motion to
Dismiss, stressing that while Delia and Roberto's
marriage can be presumed void ab initio, a judicial
declaration to this effect is still necessary. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, prompting Roberto to elevate
the case to the Court. The Court granted the petition,
citing the deliberations of the Civil Code and Family
Law Revision Committees, thus:
The Family Law Revision
Committee and the Civil
Code Revision Committee which
drafted what is now the Family Code
of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again. This is borne out by
the following minutes of the 152nd
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees where the
present Article 40, then Art. 39, was
discussed.
B. Article
39. —
The
absolute nullity of a
marriage may be
invoked only on the
basis of a final
judgment declaring
the marriage void,
except as provided
in Article 41.
[Justice Eduardo P.
Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)]
remarked that the above provision
should include not only void but also
voidable marriages. He then
 suggested that the above provision Prof. Baviera remarked that
be modified as follows: the original idea in the provision is to
require first a judicial declaration of
The validity
a void marriage and not annullable
of a marriage may
marriages, with which the other
be invoked only . . .
members concurred. Judge Diy
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. added that annullable marriages are
Reyes), however, proposed that presumed valid until a direct action
they say: is filed to annul it, which the other
members affirmed. Justice Puno
The validity remarked that if this is so, then the
or invalidity of a phrase 'absolute nullity' can stand
marriage may be since it might result in confusion if
invoked only . . . they change the phrase to 'invalidity'
On the other hand, Justice if what they are referring to in the
Puno suggested that they say: provision is the declaration that the
marriage is void.
The
invalidity of a Prof. Bautista commented
marriage may be that they will be doing away with
invoked only . . . collateral defense as well as
collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
Justice Caguioa explained explained that the idea in the
that his idea is that one cannot provision is that there should be a
determine for himself whether or not final judgment declaring the
his marriage is valid and that a court marriage void and a party should not
action is needed. Justice Puno declare for himself whether or not
accordingly proposed that the the marriage is void, which the other
provision be modified to read: members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
The added that they are, therefore, trying
invalidity of a to avoid a collateral attack on that
marriage may be point. Prof. Bautista stated that there
invoked only on the are actions which are brought on the
basis of a final assumption that the marriage is
judgment annulling valid. He then asked: Are they
the marriage or depriving one of the right to raise the
declaring the defense that he has no liability
marriage void, because the basis of the liability is
except as provided void? Prof. Bautista added that they
in Article 41. cannot say that there will be no
judgment on the validity or invalidity
Justice Caguioa remarked of the marriage because it will be
that in annulment, there is no taken up in the same proceeding. It
question. Justice Puno, however, will not be a unilateral declaration
pointed out that, even if it is a that it is a void marriage. Justice
judgment of annulment, they still Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
have to produce the judgment. Bautista and suggested that they
Justice Caguioa suggested limit the provision to
that they say: remarriage. He then proposed that
Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The
invalidity of a The
marriage may be absolute nullity of a
invoked only on the marriage for
basis of a final purposes of
judgment declaring remarriage may be
the marriage invalid, invoked only on the
except as provided basis of final
in Article 41. judgment . . .
xxx xxx xxx
60
 Justice Puno suggested that the nullity of a previous marriage,
the above be modified as follows: said subsequent marriage is void ab
initio.
The
absolute nullity of a After further deliberation,
previous marriage Justice Puno suggested that they go
may be invoked for back to the original wording of the
purposes of provision as follows:
establishing the
The
validity of a
absolute nullity of a
subsequent
previous marriage
marriage only on
may be invoked for
the basis of a final
purposes of
judgment declaring
remarriage only on
such previous
the basis of a final
marriage void,
judgment declaring
except as provided
such previous
in Article 41.
marriage void,
Justice Puno later modified except as provided
the above as follows: in Article
41. 47 (Emphasis
For the
and italics supplied)
purpose of
establishing the It is worthy to note that the Court laid down
validity of a its ruling in Domingo through Associate Justice
subsequent Flerida Ruth Romero, who was a member of
marriage, the the Family Code and Civil Code Revision
absolute nullity of a Committees.
previous marriage
It is thus clear that in cases where the
may only be
validity of marriage is collaterally attacked for
invoked on the
purposes of succession, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC shall
basis of a final
not apply. This is confirmed no less by the Rationale
judgment declaring
of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
such nullity, except
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
as provided in
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
Article 41.
(Rationale of the Rules), which states:
Justice Caguioa commented
Only an aggrieved or injured
that the above provision is too broad
spouse may file a petition for
and will not solve the objection of
annulment of voidable marriages or
Prof. Bautista. He proposed that
declaration of absolute nullity of void
they say:
marriages. Such petition cannot be
For the filed by compulsory or intestate heirs
purpose of entering of the spouses or by the State. The
into a subsequent Committee is of the belief that they
marriage, the do not have a legal right to file the
absolute nullity of a petition. Compulsory or intestate
previous marriage heirs have only inchoate rights
may only be prior to the death of their
invoked on the predecessor, and hence can only
basis of a final question the validity of the
judgment declaring marriage of the spouses upon the
such nullity, except death of a spouse in a proceeding
as provided in for the settlement of the estate of
Article 41. the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand,
Justice Caguioa explained
the concern of the State is to
that the idea in the above provision
preserve marriage and not to seek
is that if one enters into a
its dissolution. x x x 48 (Emphasis
subsequent marriage without
supplied)
obtaining a final judgment declaring
61
The Rationale of the Rules draws a distinction for this rule is that such court
between a "petition for annulment of voidable exercises special and limited
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity" on one jurisdiction.
hand, and an action assailing the validity of a
A well-recognized deviation
predecessor's marriage for the purpose of
to the rule is the principle that an
determining successional rights, on the other. The
intestate or a probate court may
former is a direct action assailing the validity of
hear and pass upon questions of
marriage that is governed by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
ownership when its purpose is to
SC and pertains exclusively to the aggrieved or
determine whether or not a property
injured spouse. The latter pertains to a collateral
should be included in the inventory.
attack against the validity of a predecessor's
In such situations the adjudication is
marriage brought in a proceeding for the settlement
merely incidental and provisional.
of the latter's estate in accordance with the
Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
procedure set forth in the Rules.
Appeals, we held:
II. Lucila may recover her share in the
"x x x As
Sunset Valley Estate through a
a rule, the
separate action for partition
question of
As a stranger to Rene's estate, Lucila does ownership is an
not have standing to participate in the Settlement extraneous matter
Proceeding as heir. Nevertheless, Lucila's right to which the probate
recover her share as co-owner of the Sunset Valley court cannot
Estate subsists. Lucila may thus recover said share resolve with
by filing a separate action for partition of the Sunset finality. Thus, for
Valley Estate against the administrator of Rene's the purpose of
estate consistent with Section 1, Rule 87 of the determining
Rules: whether a certain
property should or
SECTION 1. Actions which
should not be
may and which may not be brought
included in the
against executor or administrator. —
inventory of estate
No action upon a claim for the
properties, the
recovery of money or debt or
probate court may
interest thereon shall be
pass upon the title
commenced against the executor or
thereto, but such
administrator; but actions to
determination is
recover real or personal property,
provisional, not
or an interest therein, from the
conclusive, and is
estate, or to enforce a lien
subject to the final
thereon, and actions to recover
decision in a
damages for an injury to person
separate action to
or property, real or personal, may
resolve
be commenced against him.
title." 50 (Emphasis
(Emphasis supplied)
supplied; italics
The filing of separate action under Section omitted)
1, Rule 87 is necessitated by the limited scope of the
It must be stressed, however, that Lucila
trial court's jurisdiction in estate settlement
only owns one-half of the Sunset Valley Estate. In
proceedings. The Court's ruling in Pacioles, Jr. v.
turn, one-half of Lucila's share in the Sunset Valley
Chuatoco-Ching 49 is instructive:
Estate is reserved for the Aguas' heirs' presumptive
The general rule is that the legitimes. This leaves Lucila with the right to recover
jurisdiction of the trial court either as one-fourth of the entire Sunset Valley Estate through
an intestate or a probate court a separate action for partition.
relates only to matters having to do
Based on these premises, I vote
with the settlement of the estate and
to DENY the Petition, and affirm the dismissal of
probate of will of deceased persons
Civil Case No. R-ANG-17-03316-CV.
but does not extend to the
determination of questions of LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
ownership that arise during the
I concur in the result. I agree for the most
proceedings. The patent rationale
part in the reasons given by the learned Justice
62
Edgardo L. Delos Santos. It is my respectful
submission though that
the ponencia's pronouncement that "Aguas heirs can
collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's
marriage in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Rene," does not bear the weight of ratio
decidendi.
I find this portion of the ponencia to be a
legal advice and an obiter dictum. To be sure, each
of us is not prohibited from inserting obiter in our
respective ponencia — indeed at times obiter is
important for stylistic effect and overall impact of
which I am guilty at times or even many a time. As
well, the Court is unfettered to extend gratuitously
legal advice that we deem to be guidance to the
bench and bar. Besides, it is often necessary to
point out the obvious because the obvious often gets
lost midstream of a communicative act.
Nonetheless, I would like to impress upon
the parties here this caution. In saying that the
"Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of
Rene and Cherry's marriage in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Rene," what we mean
is that procedurally this is allowed but it does not
mean the challenge will succeed with certainty. I am
constrained to add this caution because what is not
said may actually say a lot either subtextually or
metatextually.
Further, petitioners' basis for claiming the
nullity of the marriage of Rene Aguas and Cherry
Calilung is Article 53 of the Family Code which
states:
ARTICLE 53. Either of the
former spouses may marry again
after complying with the
requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null
and void.
Out of abundance of caution, may I stress
that this provision may not be as free-standing as it
reads. It must be correlated with Articles 43, 44 and
50 of the Family Code and our ruling in Diño v.
Diño. 1 I am not going to aver anything more since
the issue might become a live one when or if it
happens.
Additionally, may I refer to Rodriguez v.
Rodriguez 2 to enlighten further on petitioners'
options at the trial court going forward.
The ponencia held that Lucila David is a
stranger to the estate of her former spouse since
their marriage had been declared void ab initio.
The ponencia explained:
With regard to Lucila, it is
interesting to note that Enrico and
the Rationale of the Rules only
63
mentioned compulsory or intestate
heirs as the ones who could
collaterally assail the validity of a
marriage in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts in order protect their
successional rights. This would
mean then that said remedy or
recourse under the law is not
available to Lucila since she is not
an heir of Rene, her marriage with
the deceased having been declared
null and void from the very
beginning on ground of
psychological incapacity in the 2005
Nullity Decision. Lucila is, therefore,
considered as a stranger in the
estate proceedings with no right to
succeed as heir of Rene, thus, she
has no standing to participate in the
Settlement Proceeding.
Concomitantly, Lucila's
claim cannot be filed in the
Settlement Proceeding. It is well
settled that a probate or intestate
court cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties.
This is clearly elucidated in the case
of Agtarap v. Agtarap (Agtarap). . . .
The ponencia stated the general rule.
However, as it appears that Lucila and her
co-petitioners have no adverse interests at least for
now, there is no legal obstacle for all of them to
submit the settlement of Lucila's proprietary interests
to the intestate court. Of course, respondent Cherry
Calilung Aguas would be among the parties in the
intestate proceedings to respond not only to the
status of her marriage with the deceased but also as
to her share if any in his estate. In this regard, for the
sake of judicial economy and avoiding multiplicity of
suits, and in practical terms, of saving the estate
from depletion due to legal expenses, it behooves to
remind petitioners and respondent that:
Equally important is
the rule that the determination of
whether or not a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of
First Instance in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court
(probate, land registration, etc.) is in
reality not a jurisdictional question. It
is in essence a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived."
 Such waiver introduces the
exception to the general rule that
while the probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction, it may settle
questions relating to ownership
when the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the probate court for
adjudgment.
Such waiver was evident
from the fact that the respondents
sought for affirmative relief before
the court a quo as they claimed
ownership over the funds in the joint
account of their father to the
exclusion of his co-depositor.
In this case, the Court notes
that the parties submitted to the
jurisdiction of the intestate court in
settling the issue of the ownership of
the joint account. While respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss, which
hypothetically admitted all the
allegations in Anita's petition, the
same likewise sought affirmative
relief from the intestate court. Said
affirmative relief is embodied in
respondents' claim of ownership
over the funds in said joint account
to the exclusion of Anita, when in
fact said funds in the joint account
was neither mentioned nor included
in the inventory of the intestate
estate of the late Reynaldo.
Therefore, respondents impliedly
agreed to submit the issue of
ownership before the trial court,
acting as an intestate court, when
they raised an affirmative relief
before it. To reiterate, the exercise
of the trial court of its limited
jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but
procedural; hence, waivable.
For the same reasons, and also for the
repose of the deceased, I also endorse to the parties
the beauty, clarity and serenity that compromise and
alternative dispute resolution would bring.
 
||| (David v. Calilung, G.R. No. 241036, [January 26,
2021])

64
10. MA. CONCEPCION ALFEREZ, ET. AL. V. SPS.
CANENCIA, ET. AL., GR 244542, 6/28/21
[G.R. No. 244542. June 28, 2021.]
MA. CONCEPCION ALFEREZ,
ANTONIO S. ALFEREZ, and
ESPERANZA ALFEREZ
EVANS, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
EXEQUIEL and CELESTINA
CANENCIA, NORMA A. ALFORQUE,
and TERESA A.
ALFORQUE, respondents.
DECISION
J. LOPEZ, J p:
This resolves a petition for review
on certiorari 1 filed by petitioners Ma. Concepcion
Alferez (Ma. Concepcion), Antonio Alferez (Antonio),
and Esperanza Alferez Evans (Esperanza) assailing
the June 29, 2018 Decision 2 and January 16, 2019
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 04491-MIN, which declared the May
17, 2016 Judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 19, Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No.
4805 void for lack of jurisdiction.
The Antecedents
Federico J. Alferez (Federico) died on
September 23, 1980 without leaving any will. He was
survived by his spouse, Teodora, and their children,
namely: Ma. Concepcion, Antonio, and Esperanza
(petitioners).
Petitioners allege that since the late
Federico left several bank debts, Ma. Concepcion,
as Federico's daughter and compulsory heir, filed a
Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration for
the Intestate Estate of Federico Alferez 5 on October
25, 1980, which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 437, in the Court of First Instance
(CFI), Branch 5, Davao Del Sur.
In the intestate proceedings, the Estate of
the late Federico consists of one-half of all the real
and personal properties of his conjugal partnership
with his surviving spouse, Teodora, to wit: 6
(1) Lot 1885-C, Psd-20401-D containing an
area of 240,000 square meters located at
Goma, Digos City covered by and bounded
in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
6029-1518 of the Registry of Deeds of
Davao del Sur;
65
(2) A parcel of land located at Goma, Digos
City with an area of 23.2607 hectares
covered by and bounded in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-173-29 of
the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Sur;
(3) Lot-1885-B, Psd-20401-D, containing an
area of 240,000 square meters located at
Goma, Digos City, covered by and bounded
in OCT No. P-6028 of the Registry of Deeds
of Davao del Sur;
(4) Parcel of land located along Rizal
Avenue, Digos City, containing an area of
901 square meters covered by and
bounded OCT No. P-5586; and
(5) Parcel of land located at Matti, Digos
City, containing an area of 400 square
meters covered by and bounded in TCT No.
T-5907 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao
del Sur.
On January 16, 1981, the CFI issued Letters
of Administration 7 in favor of Ma. Concepcion,
appointing her as administratrix of the Estate of
Federico.
On January 15, 1982, Teodora and
Petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with
Donation 8 with the following relevant provisions:
1. Teodora, is the absolute owner of one-
half of the parcels of land, particularly
covered by OCT No. P-6029-1518; OCT No.
6028; and TCT No. T-173-29, being her
conjugal share in the conjugal partnership
with Federico;
2. Teodora, Antonio, and Esperanza waives
their inheritance share, participation and
interest in Lot No. 1885-C, Psd-20401-D,
covered by OCT No. P-6029-1518 in favor
of Ma. Concepcion;
3. Teodora, Ma. Concepcion, and
Esperanza waives their respective
inheritance share, participation, and interest
in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
173-29 in favor of Antonio; and
4. Teodora, Antonio, and Ma. Concepcion
waives their respective inheritance share,
participation, and interest in Lot No. 1885-B,
Psd-20401-D covered by OCT No. P-
6028 in favor of Esperanza.
By reason of the outstanding debts incurred
by the late Federico, part of his estate needed to be
sold to settle the same. Necessarily, Ma.
Concepcion, as administratrix, was constrained to
file an Urgent Motion to Allow Administratrix to Sell
Properties 9 dated April 24, 1985, in the same
proceedings. In support of the motion, Ma.
Concepcion alleged the willingness of the other heirs
to sell their respective shares. Particularly,
Esperanza executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in 1984, authorizing Ma. Concepcion to
negotiate a sale of the property covered by OCT No.
P-6028. 10 Likewise, on March 28, 1985, Antonio
also executed an SPA capacitating Ma. Concepcion
to sell the lot covered by TCT No. T-173-29. 11
In an Order 12 dated August 29, 1985, Ma.
Concepcion was authorized to sell the properties
located in Digos, Davao del Sur, and covered by the
following titles: (1) TCT No. T-173-29 adjudicated to
Antonio; (2) OCT No. P-6029-1518 adjudicated to
Ma. Concepcion; and (3) OCT No. P-
6028 adjudicated to Esperanza.
To finally settle Federico's outstanding
debts, Ma. Concepcion, in behalf of the estate,
executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage 13 (Deed) dated October 8, 1985 with
Spouses Exequiel and Celestina Canencia
(respondents Canencia), Norma A. Alforque and
Teresa A. Alforque (respondents) covering the
properties adjudicated to petitioners for a
consideration of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00).
Petitioners, later filed an action for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, Recovery of
Possession, Damages, and Attorney's
Fees. 14 Petitioners assert that during negotiations
with respondents, they were clear that the land
forming part of Federico and Teodora's estate, which
was about 71 hectares, was not entirely for sale;
what they intended to sell was only the half of
Federico. While respondents expressed their interest
to buy the remaining half of the farm pertaining to
the conjugal share of Teodora, Ma. Concepcion
explained that the primary reason for the sale of the
estate was for the payment of bank debts; in fact,
she herself planned to till the other half of the farm
using her share of the money from the sale.
During the execution of the Deed, Ma.
Concepcion was surprised to see that the entire
property was included in the sale. Despite her
protests, she was reassured that the Deed was a
temporary document to serve only as a security for
the amount to be advanced by respondents
Canencia and that a subsequent Deed would be
prepared once the sale was consummated. To
protect their interest as heirs, Ma. Concepcion
requested that the Deed of Sale remain unnotarized.
However, her request went unheeded as
respondents went ahead and notarized the Deed.
Left without any security, Ma. Concepcion
endeavored to have respondents Canencia sign a
Memorandum of Agreement to express their earlier
agreed terms. The Memorandum included a
provision that the terms for the sale of the portion
66
belonging to Teodora would be drafted upon
respondents Canencia's payment for the sale of
Federico's portion.
When the last yearly installment for the
portion belonging to Federico was settled by
respondents Canencia in 1990, Ma. Concepcion
reminded respondents Canencia of their agreement
regarding the purchase of the conjugal share of
Teodora. To her astonishment, respondents
Canencia instead showed her the supposed
temporary Deed, telling her that they had already
paid for the entire estate of Federico and Teodora.
At that moment, it was evident on the part of Ma.
Concepcion that from the beginning, during the
negotiations for the sale of Federico's share, that
respondents had acted in bad faith, and at the same
time, had taken advantage of her financial difficulties
and earnestness in the transaction due to their
desire in settling Federico's indebtedness.
In frustration, Ma. Concepcion had no other
recourse but to refer the matter to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of San Jose, Digos City. As the
parties failed to reach a settlement, a certificate to
file action was issued by the Lupon. As a
consequence, a case was filed before the RTC,
Branch 20, in 1995, which was dismissed without
prejudice on May 31, 2007 for lack of jurisdiction, as
the value of the property was not alleged in the
complaint. Hence, the action was timely refiled on
August 26, 2007 in RTC, Branch 19. 15
Respondents Canencia present their own
version of the facts. 16
Respondents Canencia allege that they first
met Ma. Concepcion sometime in 1985. She
approached respondents Canencia offering the sale
of three (3) parcels of land owned by her parents in
Goma, Digos, Davao del Sur. Initially, respondents
Canencia rejected her offer, as they did not have the
resources to buy the said parcels of land. However,
Ma. Concepcion was persistent and practically
begged them to buy the land, as she needed the
money to settle her father's debts with Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and Bank of Philippine Islands
(BPI). She also intimated that such lands were
subject to foreclosure as the lands were mortgaged
with the banks.
After much convincing, respondents
Canencia decided to help Ma. Concepcion by
agreeing to buy the lands she was offering to sell.
Anent payment terms, it was agreed that Ma.
Concepcion would receive Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) in cash, which respondents
Canencia would pay by installments and in addition,
they would also assume the mortgage debt of the
estate with the banks amounting to more or
less Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00).
 Being in agreement, the parties reduced the
same in writing by executing a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage dated October 8,·1985. The
contract was signed by Ma. Concepcion as vendor,
and respondents as vendees. At the request of Ma.
Concepcion, the contract reflected a different
amount of consideration at Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), as she wanted to
save some money for herself and her
siblings. 17 The true amount of the compensation
was thereafter reflected in a Memorandum of
Agreement 18 between the parties.
After fully paying the consideration of the
sale on July 27, 1990, respondents requested
petitioner to facilitate the transfer of titles to them. To
their surprise, Ma. Concepcion refused to accede to
their request. Instead, she filed an action before the
RTC for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Recovery of
Possession.
The Ruling of the RTC
On May 17, 2016, the RTC rendered a
Judgment 19 in favor of respondents.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing
premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage executed by and between
the [petitioner] Maria Concepcion
Alferez and the [respondents]
Spouses Exequiel and Celestina
Canencia, Norma A. Alforque, and
Teresa A. Alforque, VALID. The
propriety of a subsequent CARP-
coverage of the parcels of land
subject of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage is beyond
the province of this Court.
No award of damages or
costs to either party.
SO ORDERED. 20
Ruling in favor of respondents, the RTC
found that the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage possesses all the elements of a valid
contract. While petitioners assert that the properties
subject of the Deed are part of the estate of Federico
and Teodora, the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Donation proves otherwise. The said Settlement
clearly states in no uncertain terms the act of
donation by Teodora to her children of all her
conjugal shares in the parcels of land which are to
become the subject properties in the Deed. As the
properties were now the exclusive properties of Ma.
Concepcion, Antonio, and Esperanza, they were free
to convey and dispose of the same. Given that
Antonio and Esperanza had executed an SPA to
67
capacitate Ma. Concepcion to sell their respective
portions, Ma. Concepcion was thus authorized to
sign the Deed and enter into a sale with
respondents.
By signing the Deed which bears no
infirmity, petitioners are barred from questioning the
validity and the bounds of the same.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On June 29, 2018, the CA issued a
Decision 21 which declared void the Judgment of the
RTC for lack of jurisdiction. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the assailed 17 May
2016 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Digos City, Davao
del Sur in Civil Case No. 4805 is
hereby declared VOID for lack of
jurisdiction. The Complaint in Civil
Case No. 4805 is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED. 22
In finding the assailed RTC Judgment to be
suffering from jurisdictional infirmity, the CA cites
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Here, when Federico died intestate on
September 23, 1980, he left behind several bank
debts. As a result, his heirs, herein petitioners,
instituted intestate proceedings before the CPI,
Branch 5 of Davao del Sur. Undoubtedly, CPI,
Branch 5, being the court to first take cognizance of
the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Federico, acquired jurisdiction over the properties to
the exclusion of all other courts. RTC, Branch 19, in
issuing the assailed Judgment, encroached on the
jurisdiction of the CPI, Branch 5; to hold otherwise
would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate
forum in the resolution of incidents arising in a case
before it.
On July 24, 2018, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was thereafter denied in
a Resolution 23 dated January 16, 2019.
Petitioners, claiming that the CA decision
was adverse to them, considering that no
reconveyance was decreed, filed the instant petition.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
 Petitioners essentially anchor their prayer for
the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution on a
sole argument:
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED, DEPARTING FROM THE USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND
SUPPLANTED THE LOWER TRIBUNAL'S
DISCRETION ON PURELY PROCEDURAL
MATTERS WITH ITS OWN, THAT IS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND SUPREME COURT RULINGS,
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE COURT A QUO WERE VOID FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE RULED
ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE. 24
In the main, petitioners argue that the CA
should have decided on the merits of the case
instead of dismissing the appeal on jurisdictional
grounds. Moreover, they "insist that the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage should be annulled as
it is not reflective of their intent to limit the sale only
to the portion of the properties belonging to
Federico.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the arguments
presented and the evidence submitted, the Court
finds partial merit in the petition.
First, on the issue of jurisdiction.
Petitioners assert that the dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds is without legal basis. While it
may be true that the Deed pertains to the Estate of
Federico, the greater issue in this present case is
the reconveyance of the conjugal properties of
Teodora, which were not included in the Deed and
not within the jurisdiction of the intestate court, as
the proceedings therein only dealt with properties
forming part of the estate of Federico.
In their Comment, 25 the respondents
counter that the CA properly ruled on the
jurisdictional issue. Particularly, when the Deed was
executed, the entire estate including the conjugal
share was still under administration and the intestate
proceedings had not yet been terminated. Moreover,
there was even no approved plan of partition yet at
the time. Thus, regardless of the contention of the
petitioners, the entire parcels of lands subject of the
sale were under the jurisdiction of the intestate court.
We rule for the petitioners.
In law, nothing is as elementary as the
concept of jurisdiction, for the same is the foundation
upon which the courts exercise their power of
adjudication, and without which, no rights or
obligation could emanate from any decision or
resolution. 26
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and
authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
68
case. 27 In order for the court or an adjudicative
body to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction
over the subject matter. 28
In Padlan v. Dinglasan, the Court held:
Basic as a hornbook principle is that
jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained
in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted
therein. 29
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law
because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished
from venue, which is a purely procedural matter. The
conferring law may be the Constitution, or the statute
organizing the court or tribunal, or the special or
general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing
court or tribunal, but it must be in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. 30
When the settlement proceedings were
instituted in 1980, R.A. No. 296 31 was in effect. The
law provides for the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance (CFIs), now Regional Trial Courts. More
specifically, Section 44 thereof confers original
jurisdiction to the CFIs in all matters of probate, to
wit:
Section 44 as last updated by R.A.
3828 (1963) Original jurisdiction. —
Courts of First Instance shall have
original jurisdiction:
a. In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation;
b. In all civil actions which involve
the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or
the legality of any tax, impost or
assessment, except actions of
forcible entry into and detainer of
lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by
this Act upon justice of the peace
courts and municipal courts;
c. In all cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, or value of the
 property in controversy, amounts to
more than ten thousand pesos;
d. In all actions in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, irrespective of
the value of the property in
controversy or the amount of the
demand;
e. In all matters of probate, both
of testate and intestate estates,
appointment of guardians,
trustees and receivers, and in all
actions for annulment of
marriage, and in all such special
cases and proceedings as are not
otherwise provided for;
f. In all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos;
g. Over all crimes and offenses
committed on the high seas or
beyond the jurisdiction of any
country, or within any of the
navigable waters of the Philippines,
on board a ship or water craft of any
kind registered or licensed in the
Philippines in accordance with the
laws thereof. The jurisdiction herein
conferred may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any
province into which the ship or water
craft upon which the crime or
offense was committed shall come
after the commission thereof:
Provided, That the court first lawfully
taking cognizance thereof shall have
jurisdiction of the same to the
exclusion of all other courts in the
Philippines; and
h. Said courts and their judges, or
any of them, shall have the power to
issue writs of
injunction, mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo
warranto and habeas corpus in their
respective provinces and districts, in
the manner provided in the Rules of
Court. (Emphasis Ours)
It must be stressed that the recent law
conferring jurisdiction to the RTC, R.A. No.
7691, 32 did not divest matters of probate, both
testate or intestate, from its original jurisdiction; it
merely added a jurisdictional amount to delineate
estates whose gross value may come within the
ambit of the Regional Trial Courts or alternatively,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
69
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 1
provides:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
— Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction where the
demand or claim exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila,
where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00);
"(4) In all matters of probate, both
testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate
matters in Metro Manila, where
such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00);
"(5) In all actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital
relations;
"(6) In all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
 "(7) In all civil actions and special
proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law;
and
"(8) In all other cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two
Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00)."
The law is clear: an action for probate, both
testate and intestate, as in this case, is cognizable
by the CFI, now the RTC. By concluding that the
RTC, Branch 19, Davao del Sur lacks jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 73, 33 the CA has
apparently confused jurisdiction with venue, which
pertains to the place or geographical location where
a case is filed. 34
In Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental, et
al., 35 the Court in probate proceedings has made
the distinction between jurisdiction, lodged with the
CFIs, or RTCs, and venue, which shall be vested in
the court of the province where he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of any province in which he
had estate. The Court was explicit in pointing out
that Section 1, Rule 73, as invoked in this case,
regulates venue, rather than jurisdiction, viz.:
Under the Judiciary Act of
1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)],
Courts of First Instance have
original exclusive jurisdiction over
"all matters of probate," that is, over
special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased
persons — whether they died
testate or intestate. While their
jurisdiction over such subject
matter is beyond question, the
matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the
special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by
former Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, now Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that the
estate of a decedent inhabitant of
70
the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an
alien, shall be in the court of first
instance in the province in which
he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the court of
first instance of any province in
which he had estate. (Emphasis
and underscoring Ours)
Similarly, in Malig, et al. v.
Bush, 36 defendant sought to dismiss the settlement
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds, citing Section
1, Rule 75, now Section 1, Rule 73. The Court, in
clarifying that the aforementioned rule pertains to
venue, enunciated:
x x x the foregoing rule
[Section 1, Rule 75] fixes jurisdiction
for purposes of the special
proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, "so far
as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate." The matter
really concerns venue, as the
caption of Rule cited indicates,
and in order to preclude different
courts which may properly
assume jurisdiction from doing
so, the Rule specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts." 37 (Emphasis Ours)
Ireffragably, it was erroneous for the CA to
dismiss outright the assailed May 17, 2016
Judgment of the RTC and declare the same void for
lack of jurisdiction under Section 1, Rule 73. In
effect, the issuance of the Judgment by the RTC,
Branch 19, instead of the CFI, Branch 5, involves a
mere issue on the venue of the action and not the
jurisdiction of the court, as misapprehended by the
CA.
Analogously the Court is not unaware of the
recourse available to parties in cases of improper
venue vis-à-vis lack of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the
principle that objections to jurisdiction cannot be
waived and may be brought at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed
with a court which has no jurisdiction over the action,
the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case. On the
other hand, a party's objections to venue must be
brought at the earliest opportunity in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the objection
shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil
action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu
proprio dismiss the case. Wrong venue is merely a
procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional
impediment. 38
Records in this case bear out that
respondents did not even object to the allegedly
wrongful venue of the complaint filed by petitioners;
in fact, respondents actively participated in the case,
having taken part in the mediation proceedings and
trial, proffering both testimonial and documentary
evidence for the consideration of the RTC.
Consequently, in failing to raise their objections to it
either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer,
coupled with having sought favorable judgment from
the court, respondents themselves have evinced an
acceptance on the venue of the action. Without an
explicit rejection of the venue, the Court thus finds
no error in the RTC's action of issuing the assailed
May 17, 2016 Judgment. In Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 39 the Court has
expounded that venue, though technically wrong,
may be held acceptable to the parties absent any
objection from the defendants.
Parenthetically, it is indubitable that the CFI,
Branch 5, sitting as a probate court, is a tribunal of
limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to
the estate, but never on the rights to property arising
from the contract. 40 In Aranas v. Mercado, et
al., 41 the Court has expounded that the jurisdiction
of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. It cannot adjudicate title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate. All that the trial court can
do regarding said properties is to determine whether
or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator.
This rule is not without certain qualifications or
exceptions: if the interested parties are all heirs, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership. 42
The Court finds that the case does not fall
under any such exceptions. Obviously, respondents,
as interested parties and purchasers of the lands,
are not heirs of the late Federico. Further, the point
in issue is glaringly not one of collation or
advancement; rather, the question sought to be
resolved by the RTC, Branch 19, is one involving
ownership. Sans any applicable exceptions in this
case, CFI, Branch 5 is devoid of any jurisdiction to
decide on such issue. Thus, with all the more reason
should the Court lend credence to the Judgment of
the RTC, Branch 19, as questions pertaining to
ownership and titles to property should be ventilated
appropriately in a separate action.
In fine, the CA erroneously dismissed the
May 17, 2016 Judgment on the ground of lack of
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jurisdiction in light of Section 1, Rule 73, as the
same pertains to matters of venue and not
jurisdiction. Correlatively, the issue at bench being
one of ownership, CPI, Branch V, as a probate court,
has no jurisdiction to decide on the same.
Second, we rule on the issue of whether the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage is valid
only insofar as the one-half share of the estate of
Federico is concerned.
It is petitioners' contention that the Deed, as
the primary document that governs the transaction
between the parties, and taken together with the
documents and exhibits submitted by respondents
Canencia, is plain that the party to and seller in the
transaction of sale is the Estate of Federico Alferez.
The parties to the contract, as specified in the Deed,
completely and unambiguously names the Estate of
Federico Alferez, represented by its administratrix,
Ma. Concepcion, as the first party thereto. Moreover,
the Letters of Administration dated January 16,
1981, authorizing Ma. Concepcion as administratrix
did not extend to the conjugal share of Teodora. As
such, there cannot be any doubt that the subject of
the sale is only the property which was owned by the
Estate of Federico.
In contrast, respondents aver that the pieces
of evidence identified and offered by the parties, and
admitted by the RTC, all demonstrate without doubt
that petitioners sold the subject three (3) parcels of
lands to the respondents and that the said sale is
valid. Respondents insist that the provisions of the
Deed did not even remotely suggest that petitioners
were only selling half of the parcels of land thereof;
in fact, there were no doubtful provisions therein that
could have indicated a different intention on the part
of the petitioners. Thus, petitioners should be bound
by the terms and conditions of the Deed and should
not be allowed to escape the obligatory force of their
contractual commitment by contending that the Deed
failed to correctly embody their true intention.
We rule for the respondents.
It is basic that a contract is the law between
the parties. Obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith. Unless the
stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, the
same are binding as between the parties. 43 Being
the law between the parties, courts have no choice
but to enforce such contracts. Simply put, courts
cannot stipulate for the parties or amend the latter's
agreement, for to do so would be to alter the real
intention of the contracting parties when the contrary
function of courts is to give force and effect to the
intention of the parties. 44
A cursory examination of the Deed
affirmingly shows that petitioners, without
qualification, sold, transferred, and conveyed to and obligations. It is the best evidence of the
respondents the parcels of land, without any mention intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an
of their alleged intention to only offer half of the said agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
property, with the other half belonging to Teodora, to considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
wit: and there can be no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement between
That for and on
the parties and their successors in interest. 46
consideration of the sum of PESOS:
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
PESOS ONLY (P300,000.00), Court is on point:
Philippine Currency, to the FIRST
SEC 9. Evidence of written
PARTY [petitioners] in hand paid by
agreements. — When the terms of
jointly and severally by the other
an agreement have been reduced in
parties hereto, the FIRST PARTY
writing, it is considered as
does by these presents hereby
containing all the terms agreed upon
SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY,
and there can be, between the
in a manner absolute and
parties and their successors in
irrevocable, the above-described
interest, no evidence of such terms
three (3) parcels of land with all the
other than the contents of the written
improvements found thereon, unto
agreement.
the following persons:
However, a party may
1. TO MR. EXEQUIEL
present evidence to modify, explain,
CANENCIA
or add to the terms of the written
(SECOND PARTY) —
agreement if he puts in issue in his
That parcel of land
pleading:
covered by
ORIGINAL (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake,
CERTIFICATE OF or imperfection in the written
TITLE P-6029-1518; agreement;
2. TO NORMA A. ALFORQUE (b) The failure of the written
(THIRD PARTY) — agreement to express the true intent
That parcel of land and agreement of the parties
covered by thereto;
ORIGINAL
(c) The validity of the written
CERTIFICATE OF
agreement; or
TITLE P-6028;
(d) The existence of other terms
3. TO TERESA A.
agreed to by the parties or their
ALFORQUE
successors in interest after the
(FOURTH PARTY) —
execution of the written agreement.
That parcel of land
covered by The "parol evidence rule" described above
TRANSFER forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms
CERTIFICATE OF of a written instrument by testimony or other
TITLE T-(173)-29 evidence purporting to show that, at or before the
execution of the parties' written agreement, other or
or their assigns, free from any liens
different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
and encumbrances x x x. 45
varying the purport of the written contract. When an
The provisions thereof are categorical and agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties
admits of no other interpretation; the sale, transfer, cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove
and conveyance of the parcels of land covered by alleged practices, which to all purposes would alter
the aforementioned titles appear absolute, there the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not
being no reservation of ownership of half of the lots found in the writing is understood to have been
therein described, nor a stipulation making mention waived and abandoned. 47
of Teodora' specific share of the said properties. As
None of the above-cited exceptions finds
mandated by Article 1370 of the Civil Code, if the
application to the instant case, more particularly, the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt,
alleged failure of the contract to express the true
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
intent and agreement of the parties. By reason of the
The Deed, as the agreement between the parties, is
glaring lack of evidence, the Court cannot subscribe
the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties,
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to petitioner's contention that respondents had acted The Judgment dated May 17, 2016 rendered
in bad faith and had taken advantage of their by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 4805
financial difficulties to settle Federico's is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale with Assumption
indebtedness. The Court cannot anchor its of Mortgage executed by and between Maria
conclusions on mere allegations, without more, that Concepcion Alferez and the Spouses Exequiel and
the subject Deed was only a temporary document to Celestina Canencia, Norma A. Alforque, and Teresa
serve only as a security and that Ma. Concepcion A. Alforque is VALID.
requested that it remain unnotarized to protect her
SO ORDERED.
interest; neither did petitioners proffer the alleged
Memorandum of Agreement, which includes a ||| (Alferez v. Spouses Canencia, G.R. No. 244542,
provision that the terms of sale of the portion [June 28, 2021])
belonging to Teodora would be drafted upon
respondents Canencia's payment for the sale of
Federico's portion.
Finally, neither can petitioners find succor in
their defense that Ma. Concepcion's authority as
administratrix does not extend to the exclusive
properties of Teodora. Records prove that when
petitioners entered into the Deed with respondents,
they were the absolute owners of the subject parcels
of land. Hence, their right to sell the properties flows
from their right as owners thereof and not from their
right as heirs and as administratrix of Federico.
It is undisputed that the Deed, executed on
October 8, 1985, disposing certain parcels of land
through sale, was preceded by an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Donation dated January 15, 1982,
whereby Teodora, as owner of one-half of the
parcels of land covered by OCT No. P-6029-1518,
OCT No. P-6028, and TCT No. T-173-29, had
bequeathed and waived her rights to the same in
behalf of petitioners Ma. Concepcion, Esperanza,
and Antonio, respectively. As owners, petitioners
had every right to dispose of the lands through sale,
without any limitation or
restriction. 48 Demonstrative of their intention to sell
their respective shares, both Esperanza and Antonio
executed separate SPAs authorizing Ma.
Concepcion to enter into a contract of sale in their
behalf.
All facts considered, the Court is inclined to
sustain that Ma. Concepcion, in her interest as
owner of the land covered by OCT No. P-6029-1518,
and having been capacitated to sell the lands
covered by OCT No. P-6028, and TCT No. T-173-29
by virtue of a SPA, validly entered in a contract of
sale with respondents; verily, absent any proof,
petitioners cannot now belatedly insist that the Deed
failed to reflect their true intention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
June 29, 2018 Decision and January 16, 2019
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 04491-MIN, which found that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del Sur has no
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 4805
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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