Jou KEARSHE MER The Tash, Ga oh TEN Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century na world where freedom, simply does not compute, Iti ill-suited to a new era.” Five years later he sounded the same theme when defending the expansion of the North ‘Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include some of the formerly communist Warsaw Pact states. Clinton argued that the charge that this expansion policy might isolate Russia was based on the belief “that the 360 ce in the Twenty-first Contury great power territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 21st century.” which he rejected. Instead, he emphasized his belief that “enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in mnore constructive ways to cooperate in more constructive ways."! and will compel us “The optimists’ claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the ‘major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foresee- able future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explana- tions of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. ‘tates still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's ‘expense, because international anarchy—the driving force behind great- power behavior—did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused @ major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries, Indeed. considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power pol- ities has not disappeared [rom Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great pow: crs such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there js potential for intense security competion among the great powers that ight lead to a major war, Probably the best evidence of that possibility ts the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace, 261362 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS ‘These relatively peaceful circumstances are largely the result of benign distributions of power in each region. Europe remains bipolar (Russia and the United States are the major powers). which is the most stable kind of power structure. Northeast Asia is multipolar (China, Russia, and the United States), a configuration more prone to instability; but fortunately there is no potential hegemon in that system. Furthermore, stability is enhanced in both regions by nuclear weapons, the continued presence of U.S. forces, and the relative weakness of China and Russia. These power structures in Europe and Nertheast Asia are likely to change over the next two decades, however, leading to Intensified security competition and possibly war among the great powers, ‘The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next se tion, 1 analyze the claims that international politics has changed or is about to change in essential ways, thus undermining realism. Because of space limitations, it is impossible to deal with each argument in detail, Nevertheless, it should be apparent from my analysis that the baste struc- ture of the international system did not change with the end of the Cold ‘War, and that there is litle reason to think that change is in the offing. 1 attempt to show in the following section the considerable evidence from the decade 1991-2000 that security competition among the great powers Is not obsolete, either in Europe or in Northeast Asia. In the subsequent four sections, I make the case that we are likely to see greater instability in those important regions over the next twenty years. Finally, in a brief conclusion, I argue that a rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century. PERSISTENT ANARCHY he structure of the intemational system, as emphasized in Chapter 2, is defined by five assumptions about how the world is organized that have some basis in fact: 1) states are the key actors in world polities and they operate in an anarchic system, 2) great powers invariably have some offensive military capability, 3) states can never be certain whether other states have hostile intentions toward them, 4) great powers place a high premium on survival, and 5) states are rational actors who are reasonably cffective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival. ‘These features of the international system appear to be intact as we begin the twenty-first century, The world still comprises states that oper ate in an anarchic setting, Neither the United Nations nor any other inter- national institution has much coercive leverage over the great powers. Furthermore, virtually every state has at least some offensive military capability, and there is little evidence that world disarmament is in sight. ‘On the contrary, the world arms trade is flourishing, and nuclear prolifer- ation, not abolition, is likely to concern tomorrow's policymakers. In addi- tion, great powers have yet to discover a way to divine each other's intentions. For example, nobody can predict with any degree of certainty what Chinese or German foreign policy goals will be in 2020. Moreover, there is no good evidence that survival is a less important goal for states, today than it was before 1990, Nor is there much reason to believe that the ability of great powers to think strategically has declined since the Cold War ended. ‘This description of continuity in great-power politics has been chal- Jenged on a variety of fronts by experts who believe that significant changes have recently occurred in the structure of the international sys- tem—changes that portend a welcome peace among the great powers. Although there are sharp differences among these optimists about the root causes of this purported transfor on, each argument is essentially a direct challenge to one of the realist assumptions described above. The only claim that the optimists do not challenge is the claim that states are rational actors. Instead, they concentrate their fire on the other four real- {st beliefs about the international system. Let us consider, in turn, their best arguments against each of those core assumptions. Sovereignty at Bay Some suggest that international institutions are growing in number and in their ability to push states to cooperate with each other. Specifically inst-364 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS tutions can dampen security competition and promote world peace because they have the capability to get states to reject power-maximizing behavior and to refrain from calculating each important move according on in the balance of power. Institutions, so the argument goes, have an independent effect on state behavior that at least to how it affects their posi ‘mitigates and possibly migat put an end to anarchy. ‘The rhetoric about the growing strength of international institutions notwithstanding, there is litle evidence that they can get great powers 10 act contrary to the dictates of realism.? I know of no study that provides ied Nations is the only worldwide evidence to support that aim, The Un organization with any hope of wielding such power, but it could not even, shut down the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, much less push a ‘great power around, Morcover, what little influence the United Nations (UN) holds over states is likely to wane even further in the new century, because its key decision-making body, the Security Council, is sure t0 ‘grow in size, Creating a larger council, especially one with more perma- nent members who have a veto over UN policy, would make it virtually impossible to formulate and enforce policies designed to limit the actions of the great powers ‘There is no institution with any real power in Asia. Although there are {a handful of impressive institutions in Europe, such as NATO and the European Union, there is little evidence that they can compel member states to act against their strategic interests. What is most impressive about international institutions is how lite independent effect they seem to have on great-power behavior. (Of course, states sometimes operate through institutions and benefit from doing so. However, the most powerful states in the system create , their own and shape institutions so that they can maintain, if not increa share of world power, Institutions are essentially “arenas for acting out power relationships." Waen the United States decided it did not want Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to head the UN for a second term, it forced him out, despite the fact that all the other members of the Security Council wanted him to stay on the job. The United States is the most powerful state in the world, and it usually gets its way on issues it Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century judges important. If it does not, it ignores the institution and does what it deems to be in its own national terest Others argue that the state is being rendered impotent by globalization or by today’s unprecedented levels of economic interdependence, In par- ticular, great powers are said to be incapable of dealing with the mighty forces unleashed by global capitalism and are becoming marginal players in world politics. “Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states."* For some, the key actor in the market is the ‘multinational corporation (MNC), which is seen as threatening to over- helm the state.? The fact is that the levels of economic transactions among states today. when compared with domestic economic dealings, are probably no sgreater than they were in the early twentieth century.* The international economy has been bulfeting states for centuries, and they have proved remarkably resilient in the face of that pressure. Contemporary states are nno exception in this regard: they are not being overwhelmed by market forces or MNCs but are making the adjustments necessary to ensure their survival.” Another reason to doubt these claims about the state's impending ‘demise is that there is no plausible alternative on the horizon. If the state isappears, presumably some new political entity would have to take its place, but it seems that nobody has identified that replacement, Even if the state disappeared, however, that would not necessarily mean the end of security competition and war. After all, Thucydides and Machiavelli wrote long before the birth of the state system. Realisin merely requires anarchy: it does not matter what kind of political units make up the system. They could be states, city-states, cults, empires, tribes, gangs, feudal principali- ties, or whatever. Rhetoric aside, we are not moving toward a hierarchic international system, which would effectively mean some kind of world government. In fact, anarchy looks like it will be with us for a long time. Finally, there is good reason to think that the state has a bright future. Nationalism is probably the most powerful political ideology in the world, and it glorifies the state."° Indeed, it is apparent that a large number of 365