SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 210554, August 05, 2015

DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN L. YU, ROSA GAN,
LILIAN CHUA WOO YUKIMTENG, SANTOS YU, MARCELO YU, AND SIN
CHIAO YU LIM, Petitioners, v. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E.
REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL, AND ATTY. DAN REYNALD R. MAGAT,
PRACTICING LAW UNDER THE FIRM NAME, YOUNG REVILLA GAMBOL &
MAGAT, AND JUDGE OFELIA L. CALO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 211
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears
under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect
contempt of court.

Through this Petition,1 petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat,
and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be cited in contempt of court under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.2 Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on December
2009 in an En Banc Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054 entitled Que v. Atty.
Revilla, Jr.3

David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua
Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim are the majority
stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation.4

In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et al.,5 this court

ordered the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation and transferred the case to
the appropriate Regional Trial Court branch to supervise the liquidation.6

The liquidation was raffled to Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court in
Mandaluyong City,7 presided by Judge Calo.8

Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and Dan Reynald
Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat.9 They entered their appearance in the liquidation proceedings as counsels
for the liquidator.10

An Opposition11 was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat
on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009.12

Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply13 to the Opposition stating that the firm
opted to retain Revilla's name in the firm name even after he had been disbarred,
with the retention serving as an act of charity.14
Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat and stated that Atty. Young could still appear for the liquidator as long as his
appearance was under the Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla Gambol &
Magat.15 Young Law Firm does not exist.

Thus, petitioners David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa
Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim filed
this Petition under Rule 71 to cite respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr., Atty. Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L.
Calo in contempt.

This court required respondents to comment on the Petition.16 Respondent law firm

Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed its Comment17 on April 14, 2014, while
respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment.18

On April 16, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Consolidated
Reply.19 This was granted in the Resolution20 dated June 18, 2014. In the same
Resolution, this court denied petitioners' Motion to Consider Case Submitted
without Comment from [Judge Calo]21 and ordered the parties to await Judge Calo's
comment.22

Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation,23 informing this court

that they have yet to receive a copy of Judge Calo's Comment.24 No Comment was
filed by Judge Calo.

Petitioners cite San Luis v. Pineda25 and United States v. Ney, et al.26 to support

their argument that the use of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is
tantamount to contempt of court.27

Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that they maintained
Revilla's name in the firm name for sentimental reasons.28

Atty. Young and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to deceive the
public29 and that in any case, the retention of Revilla's name "does not give added
value to the [law firm] nor does it enhance the standing of the member lawyers
thereof."30

They further argue that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name is
no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law
firm's name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is a fraternal expression to a
former brother in the profession that the Private Respondents fully understand, his
[referring to Revilla] principled albeit quixotic advocacy.31
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is derailing the liquidation of
Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this Petition for contempt because the Balgos
Law Firm resents that its nominee was not elected as liquidator.32 Private
respondents add that petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial
Corporation's unsecured creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number of
times that Ruby Industrial Corporation's cases have reached this court.33

Private respondents also raise the issue of forum shopping in their Comment
because petitioners allegedly filed a disbarment Complaint against them before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. One of the grounds
for disbarment cited by petitioners was the use of Revilla's name in their firm
name.34

Private respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment,35 arguing that from the
time Revilla was disbarred, he no longer practiced law.36

Private respondent Atty. Gambol stated that he passed the 1990 Bar Examination
but took his oath in July 2006.37 He is a junior member of the Young Revilla Magat
& Gambol law firm and "has no power and/or authority [to decide] who should be
removed from the firm's name[.]"38

Private respondent Atty. Gambol argues that in all the cases he handled after Re
villa's disbarment, he omitted Re villa's name from the firm name in the pleadings
that he signed. Such deletion was through his own initiative.39

Petitioners filed their Reply,40 with petitioners addressing respondents' allegations

that they remained silent on the disbarment case they had filed by citing Rule 139-
B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court,41 which provides that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

....

Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and

confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like
its decisions in other cases. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from disciplinary action;
hence, no forum shopping was committed.42

Petitioners did not address private respondents' allegations regarding the delay in
the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation.

The issues in this case are:

First, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito Gambol, and
Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court when they continued to use
respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.'s name in their firm name even after his
disbarment; cralawlawlibrary

Second, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito Gambol,
and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court for deliberately allowing a
disbarred lawyer to engage in the practice of law; cralawlawlibrary
Third, whether private respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is in contempt of court
for continuing to practice law even after disbarment; cralawlawlibrary

Fourth, whether public respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is in contempt of court when
she held that respondent Atty. Walter T. Young can appear in court as long as it is
under the Young Law Firm, which is a non-existent firm; and

Lastly, whether the filing of this Petition despite the pendency of a disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines constitutes forum shopping.

II

Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.— After

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in

his official transactions; cralawlawlibrary

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a

court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;cralawlawlibrary

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of
a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; cralawlawlibrary

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; cralawlawlibrary

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an

officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. (Emphasis
supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This court has defined contempt of court as: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense,

contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to
impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.
The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a
variety of different acts.43 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt
under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of
Professional Responsibility when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in
their firm name.

Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name
shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible
provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no more
misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's
name."44

III

Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using a
deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a
deceased partner's name as long as there is an indication that the partner is
deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the
retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public into
believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.

The use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name was the issue in the
consolidated cases Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo" and In the matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes."45 Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue including Atty.
Alexander Sycip's and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta's names in their firm names.46 This
court denied the petitions, explaining that there is a possibility of deception in the
use of a deceased partner's name.47 Also, Article 1815 of the Civil Code48 shows that
the partners in a partnership should be "living persons who can be subjected to
liability."49 Further, the use of a deceased partner's name is not a custom in the
Philippines.50 On the contrary, the local custom shows that the firm name usually
identifies the senior members or partners of a law firm.51 Justice Aquino dissented,
stating that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be
indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander
Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when
they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal
services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to
the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate
motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before
the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross,
the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was
retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.52
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The use of a deceased partner's name in a law firm's name was allowed upon the
effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that "the
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased."53

On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name of a person who is
not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court.

In San Luis v. Pineda, this court has held that "[n]eedless to say, [the] practice of
law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of court."54United States v. Ney,
et al. involved J. Garcia Bosque who was denied admission to the bar because he
chose to remain a Spanish subject during the cession of the Philippines under the
Treaty of Paris.55 Bosque entered into an arrangement with Ney, a practicing
attorney, and established "Ney & Bosque."56 Bosque did not personally appear in
courts but the papers of their office were signed "Ney and Bosque-C.W. Ney,
Abogado."57 The matter was referred to the then Attorney-General, and contempt
proceedings were instituted.58 At that time, Section 232 of the Code of Civil
Procedure defined contempt of court as: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or

command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge; cralawlawlibrary

2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or

in his official transactions.59 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This court found that Atty. Ney was in contempt of court and held that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under the second subdivision of [Section 232], Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this
subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of
Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the
improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible.60 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Cambaliza v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio,61 Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio used a

letterhead indicating that Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. was a senior partner in the Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office when, in fact, he was not a lawyer.62 This court held that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer

and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.

Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to
the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration
of his services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative
of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law. Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of
the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.63 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts
were exerted to remove his name from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty.
Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of court.

Rule 71, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the imposable
penalties for indirect contempt: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.—If the respondent is adjudged

guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished
by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1)
month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction,
temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make
complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved
or such amount as may be alleged and proved.

The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of
a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides. (Emphasis
supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of Rule 71, Section 7, a fine of P30,000.00 each is imposed on respondents
Atty. Young and Atty. Magat.

IV

Respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment, explaining that he dropped

respondent Re villa's name from the firm name in the pleadings that he filed in
several courts. Respondent Atty. Gambol's explanation is supported by the
allegations in the Comment filed by respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat
stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol, initially cowed perhaps, by the same
intimidation worked upon him by the Complainants' counsel in another case, asked
permission to delete [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name in
the pleadings that he (i.e. Private Respondent Gambol) would subsequently file,
Respondent Young allowed him to do so.64 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol's effort to avoid misleading the
public by removing respondent Revilla's name in the pleadings he filed. Thus, the
Complaint against him is dismissed.

Petitioners included Revilla as a respondent, but they did not serve copies of the
Petition and subsequent pleadings upon him. Respondent Revilla also did not
receive a copy of this court's Resolution requiring respondents to comment. Thus,
this court shall refrain from ruling upon respondent Revilla's liability.

With regard to respondent Judge Calo, petitioners pray that she be cited in
contempt for allowing respondent Atty. Young's appearance as long as it was under
the Young Law Firm. A photocopy of the Order65 was attached to the Petition. A
portion of Judge Calo's Order states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Although this court grants the appearance of Atty. Walter Young for the Liquidator,
his appearance however shall be allowed only if in the name of the Young Law Firm,
managed by the said counsel, and not under the name of the Law Firm of Young
Revilla Gambol and Magat. This is to avoid any misconception that a disbarred
lawyer, Revilla, continues to practice law.66 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioners argue that respondent Judge Calo's Order is an indirect violation of "the
proscription against the participation of ... disbarred lawyer[s]"67 in court. Further,
the Young Law Firm does not exist.68

Respondent Judge Calo was required to file a Comment on the Resolution69 dated

February 24, 2014, but she did not comply.

From petitioners' allegations, it appears that respondent Judge Calo committed an

error in judgment when she allowed respondent Atty. Young's appearance under
the Young Law Firm. However, this Petition to cite respondent Judge Calo in
contempt is not the proper remedy. Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese70 discussed the
remedies available to litigants as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies
against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e.,
error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new
trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which
may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions
of certiorari , prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for
change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to
and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the
door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.71 (Citation omitted) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Whether petitioners availed themselves of judicial remedies was not stated in their
Petition. Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore the possible effect of respondent
Judge Calo's Order. Thus, the Complaint against respondent Judge Calo shall be re-
docketed as an administrative matter. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 11. . . . The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court72 provides
that the administrative functions of this court include "disciplinary and
administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel[.]"

VI

As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not deny that they filed a
Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however, that they did not mention the
disbarment proceedings against respondents in view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of
the Rules of Court, which states that disbarment proceedings are private and
confidential.73 In addition, a Petition for contempt under Rule 71 and a Complaint
for disbarment are different from each other.

The filing of a Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the filing of this Petition for contempt under Rule 71 do not constitute forum
shopping. Forum shopping has been defined as: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court.74
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The elements of forum shopping are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; cralawlawlibrary

(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and

(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.75 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This court has explained that disbarment proceedings are sui generis, and are not
akin to civil or criminal cases.76 A disbarment proceeding "is intended to cleanse the
ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts."77

Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' findings are recommendatory, and the
power to sanction erring members of the bar lies with this court.78

As discussed by this court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan:79

The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than]
the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by
lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with
which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of
the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the
Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A
lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as
such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes
both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.80 (Citations omitted) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat
are found in contempt of court for using a disbarred lawyer's name in their firm
name and are meted a fine of P30,000.00 each.

The Complaint against Atty. Jovito Gambol is DISMISSED. This is without prejudice
to any disciplinary liabilities of respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Dan
Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo.

The counsels are ordered to make the necessary amendments in relation to the use
of the disbarred lawyer's name including changes in their signage, notice of
appearances, stationeries, and like material within a period of five (5) days from
receipt.

The Complaint against respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is also ordered re-docketed
as an administrative matter.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to private respondents' personal records as attorneys, to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133090        January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite,
declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.
1âwphi1.nêt

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil
Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent
judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to
annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on
April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed
counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On
August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for
Contempt of Court.3

During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following
incident transpired:

ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY. CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for
contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds is
properly notified for today's hearing.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which
directed your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with this
case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the
CONCEPCION: subpoena.
ATTY. BUGARING: May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the
Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please,
and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or
pleadings or pleadings with respect to this motion.
ATTY. Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the
CONCEPCION: Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our
office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this
morning the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
respondent that he was not informed.
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is
recorded.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will
be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor
please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is
irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the
parties concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video
recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such
proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied
me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the
permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots
should be done.
ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an
occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove
your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor
please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask
the apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority
or permission should be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is
personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being ….
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence
as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt
CONCEPCION: you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a
criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the
Register of Deeds.
ATTY. Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
represented.
ATTY. As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing….
CONCEPCION:
ATTY. BARZAGA4: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our
documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your
Honor please….
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly
appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately
hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt
proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of this case so
that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case
your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on November
6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record of the
case shows up to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as the Deputy
Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996,
March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion
has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18,
1996 addressed to the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to
TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for
the annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in
the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention of the Hon.
Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The
letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff
only on September 18, 1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as
August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as
follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED
and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL
the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248,
51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary
evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel
has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he
is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly
proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BUGARING: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your
 Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has
already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be
given a period of ten days from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal
written opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty.
Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis
pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty.
Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the record of this case, the reason
for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it
was dated March, 1996. May 1 have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your
Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be
guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started
from that. After the submission of the …. What are you suppose to submit?
ATTY. BUGARING: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in
contempt of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the
counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an
equal time within which to submit his reply.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that
we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing
for today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet
what are we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please …
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the
submission of the comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for
contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado
Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do.
This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of
record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your
evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and so
we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time
furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should
have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled
for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of
the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure,
 your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and
then do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the
Court of this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on
record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not….
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his
comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything
but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this
Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many certiorari
cases, your Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging
the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to
the Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of
this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one
way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this
Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail." (pp. 29-
42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt of
court, thus:

During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1)
operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was
ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court)
the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
 The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a
function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman
after the Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the
public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such
situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.

When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the
services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him,
the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring started to insist
that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that
Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his
client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.

At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that
Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to
disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the
Court for an orderly proceeding.

While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus,
the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered
words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his
cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he
was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to
his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's
sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and
contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three
(3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence
immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5

Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail,
and paid the fine of P3,000.00. 6

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996,
petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Both
motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996. 7

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court
of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct
contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge
Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that
said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at
times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic
towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00
exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and ordered the excess of
P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order
dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.

Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS
SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. 11

Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and
legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always
addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."

We disagree.

Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:

Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or

so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior
court.

We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial
court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the
proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:

1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".

2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the
other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to
a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case".
 3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings
(pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the courts
(1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe
and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others".

4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was
making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner
and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp.
34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which obliges a
lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and

5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III,
1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due
consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a
lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice."

The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your
honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his
subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be
countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. 12

Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the
court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration
of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of justice. 13 Direct contempt is
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished
summarily without hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the
actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the
petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records
show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge,
and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day. 15

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the
case of his client – by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent
judge's contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his
client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.

The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to
exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not,
 therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon
10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon
12 of the same Canons (Ibid).

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16

Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in
imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not
established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the
return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to
petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.

It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in
its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return
to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

674 Phil. 42
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of
court, same may only be availed of when the procedures laid down for its
availment are satisfied.

By this Petition for Certiorari,[1] petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner)

assails the Order[2] dated November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased
Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (Judge Gingoyon) of Branch 117, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent court) citing him in direct contempt
of court, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of

imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Essentially, petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order
void and that Judge Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing him in
contempt, as well as in denying his motion to fix the amount of bond.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint[4] filed by petitioner against his

neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in
the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance.  In the said case,
petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the
"basketball goal" which was permanently attached to the second floor of
Mina's residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public's only
right of way.

Mina was declared in default[5] hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-

parte.

After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision[6] dated October 21,

2005, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the
case on the ground that petitioner lacked "locus standi."  Citing Article 701
of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of
nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a
private individual like the petitioner.

In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live
in. x x x Their place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped
tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or doing
their daily household chores.

Thus, residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys
become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where
adults do all sorts of things to entertain them or pass the time, their wash
area or even a place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant vendors who
display their wares in their choice spots in the alley and their customers
that mill around them, and one can only behold chaos if not madness in
these alleys. But for the residents of the places of this kind, they still find
order in this madness and get out of this kind of life unscathed. It's because
they all simply live and let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the
residents of the area have become adept at [weaving] away from the
playthings that children at play throw every which way, sidestepping from
the path of children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking]from
awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach
[on] the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and delicate and they
cannot be faulted for such a desirable trait. But they can only do so within
their own abode. Once they step outside the doors of their home, as it were,
they cannot foist their delicacy and fastidiousness upon their neighbors.
They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the site of myriad
of activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the people in their
place as they are; they must live and let live. Unless they choose to live in a
less blighted human settlement or better still move to an upscale residential
area, their only remaining choice is for them to live in perpetual conflict
with their neighbors all the days of their lives.[7]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for

Reconsideration,[8] he took exception to the advice given by Judge
Gingoyon thus:
The 12th and 13th paragraphs of the assailed decision, though only an advice
of the court, are off-tangent and even spouses illegality;

Since when is living in cramped tenements become a license for people to

invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as
wash area or cooking food? In effect, this court is making his own
legislations and providing for exceptions in law when there are none, as far
as nuisance is concerned;

The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to
the defendants and to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting,
illegal occupation of property is all right and justified when violators are
those people who live in cramped tenements or the underprivileged poor,
as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed that "residents are forced
by circumstance to invade the alleys;"

For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte
presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties
which are subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and defendants have their own
titled properties and even the right of way or alley has a separate title) and
not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the place to be;

Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon the herein plaintiffs to
accept their alleys as a jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities
that it is. For the information of the court, plaintiffs have holdings in
upscale residential areas and it is a misconception for the court to consider
the Pasay City residence of the plaintiffs as a blighted human settlement.
Apparently the court is very much misinformed and has no basis in his
litany of eye sore descriptions;

Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do should he be similarly

situated with the plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his residence, giving
way to illegality in the name of live and let live principle?

Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the fact that the court in his
unsolicited advice knows exactly the description of the alley where the
complained nuisance is located and the specific activities that the
defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded that
the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else
can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the
logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the
defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.
[9]
  (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for

reconsideration on November 18, 2005.[10]

In an Order[11] dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for

hearing on November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner, [12] and directed
him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he
should not be punished for contempt.[13] Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest
of shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the
present. Plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz is therefore directed to substantiate his
serious charge that he "has been communicating with the defendant off the
record, given that the latter has already been declared in default". He is
therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he should not
be punished for contempt of court for committing improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice. [14]

On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear.  Judge

Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order[15] in open court to give
petitioner another 10 days to show cause.  The Order reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz specifically

prayed that he is submitting his Motion for Resolution and Approval of this
court today, Friday, November 18, 2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays have always
been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long before plaintiff
filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no longer scheduled
hearings for November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on
this date as they will be holding their National Convention. Nevertheless,
since it is the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will be submitting his
motion for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court
yielded to his wish and set his motion for hearing on his preferred date.
When this case was called for hearing today, plaintiff did not appear. The
court waited until 9:45 A.M. but still no appearance was entered by the
plaintiff or any person who might represent himself as an authorized
representative of the plaintiff.  Instead it was the defendant and his counsel
who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration.

xxxx

In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear in today's hearing, the court
considers the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. As for
the Order of this court for the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court, the court [motu proprio] grants plaintiff
last ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of court. After the lapse of the said period, the court will resolve
the issue of whether or not he should be cited for contempt. x x x[16]

In his Compliance[17] to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that

the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the
same were based on the circumstances of the instant case.  He even
reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina
by posing the query: "...where then did this court gather an exact
description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the
inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the
defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff's evidence so exacting
as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his
Decision dated October 21, 2005."[18]

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order[19] finding

petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court.  The Order reads:

Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with facts his serious charge
that the Judge "has been communicating with the defendant off the
record". But instead of presenting proof of facts or stating facts, Cruz
simply shot back with a query: "Where then did this court gather an exact
description of the alley and the myriad activities that the inhabitants of
interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in
default and absent plaintiff's evidence so exacting as the description made
by this court..." By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on his accusation,
which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the Judge has
been communicating with the defendant off the record.

The suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way
for the Judge [to] know the blight in his place in Pasay City is for the Judge
to communicate with the defendant. It is only by communicating with the
defendant and by no other means may the Judge know such blight.

Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider that as State Prosecutor, the
Judge was detailed in Pasay City in 1991 and that he has been a judge in
Pasay City since 1997. The nuisance that Cruz complained of, or the blight
of his place, is not a unique feature of that particular place. It is replicated
in many other places of the city. Indeed, it is but a microcosm of what is
prevalent not only within the urban areas within Metro Manila but also in
many other highly urbanized areas in the country. Judges are no hermits
that they would fail to witness this blight. Cruz did not care to make this
allowance for the benefit of preserving the dignity of the court.

Cruz's open accusation without factual basis that the judge is

communicating with the defendant is an act that brings the court into
disrepute or disrespect; or offends its dignity, affront its majesty, or
challenge its authority. It constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De
Leon, L-10236, January 31, 1958).  x x x By alleging that the judge
communicated with the defendant, Cruz is in effect charging the judge of
partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge did the act
complained of, the charge of partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct
contempt (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57
Phil.86; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113).

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of

imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[20]

An Order of Arrest[21]  was issued against the petitioner on even date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-

Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)
[22]
 with the respondent court.  In said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred
that:

xxxx

2. To date, undersigned has already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court;

xxxx
The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in its Order[23] dated
December 1, 2005 based on petitioner's failure to attach the alleged duly
filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.  The respondent court
held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition
for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005. In a

Resolution[24] dated February 1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent
Judge of Branch 117, RTC of Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a
comment on the petition "inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt pertains
to the misbehavior or disrespect committed towards the court and not to
judges in their personal capacities."[25]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A.

WHETHER X X X PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

B.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT HAS ENOUGH FACTUAL BASIS FOR

CITING PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.
 C.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO FIX BOND.[26]

The issues may be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court

properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse
of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-
Parte Motion.

Petitioner contends that the alleged contumacious remark is merely a fair

observation or comment and a logical conclusion made based on the
detailed description given by the respondent court of what has been
happening in the alley subject of the civil case.  Petitioner avers that no
other conclusion can be had except that Judge Gingoyon was
communicating with the defendant off the record, since the exact
description of what was happening in the alley was not adduced in evidence
during trial. Further, petitioner contends that fair and logical conclusion
founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.

Petitioner likewise insists that the respondent court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to fix bond, therefore violating due process.

Our Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive

or malicious statements submitted to the court
or judge wherein proceedings are pending is
considered direct contempt.

"[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court

constitute direct contempt."[27] "[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which
the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be equivalent to
`misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the proceedings before the same' within the meaning of Rule 71, §
1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt."[28]
Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing
principles set forth, we agree with the finding of respondent court that
petitioner is guilty of direct contempt of court.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent

court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been
communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a
grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual
basis.  In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was
not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his "fair observation or
conclusion."[29]

Petitioner vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in

the Compliance to the show-cause Order dated November 11, 2005 which
he filed with the respondent court. The allegation was repeated despite
Judge Gingoyon's outright denial of communicating with the defendant and
explanation in the Order[30] dated November 25, 2005 that Judge Gingoyon
was familiar with the area as he was detailed in Pasay City since 1991 as
State Prosecutor, and thereafter, as judge since 1997.

Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge

Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted
that there is nothing contumacious about his allegation against the Judge
as he was just giving his fair and logical observation.  Clearly, petitioner
openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. 
Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge
Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.

On the other hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge

Gingoyon in the Decision shows but a general description of what is
normally seen and what normally happens in places such as Edang Street,
to wit:  "x x x place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped
tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or [do]
their daily household chores x x x. The alleys become the grounds where
children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of
things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or even
a place to cook food in x x x.  Ambulant vendors who display their wares
in the alley and their customers that mill around them; x x x children
chasing  each other,  dodging and [ducking]  from  awnings or 
canopies;  x  x  x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on]
the alleys x x x."[31]

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating

with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court
into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is
derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility
and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality.  It is a direct
affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of
public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration
of justice.

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the

facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt.  "Where the matter
is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the
facts is not admissible as a defense.  Respect for the judicial office should
always be observed and enforced."[32]

Moreover, the charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no

scintilla of proof that Judge Gingoyon did the act complained of,
petitioner's act amounts to direct contempt of court.[33]

Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and

Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

Petitioner avers that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying
his Ex-Parte Motion.  Petitioner insists that the respondent court should
have granted his Ex-Parte Motion since he already filed a Petition
for Certiorari before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 
He further avers that respondent court violated his right to due process by
fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005 or 10 days after the Orders of
contempt and arrest were issued.

Petitioner's contention lacks merit.

The respondent court was  well  within  the bounds  of its authority when it
denied petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion.
A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section
1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court[34] without need of a hearing but may
thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.[35]

Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by

any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies
of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be
suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files
a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned
that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be
decided against him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied

petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already filed a
petition for certiorari.  Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the
respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M.[36] and therein
petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this
Court.  However, perusal of the records would show that the Petition
for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06
P.M.[37]  Clearly, when the motion was filed with the respondent court, it
cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly
filed with this Court.  Significantly, the records show that respondent court
was furnished a copy of the Petition for Certiorari by registered mail and
which was received only on December 5, 2005.[38] It is therefore clear that
at the time that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent
court, he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari.  In fact, it was
only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court that petitioner
filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.  This explained
why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to the respondent
court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of
filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in
Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[39] Petitioner thus cannot attribute
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-
Parte Motion.  To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed
and acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to
the remedy prayed for.  Clearly, the respondent court did not commit error,
nor did it overstep its authority in denying petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion.
All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order
adjudging petitioner guilty of direct contempt.  However, as to the penalty
imposed upon petitioner, we find the fine of P2,000.00 commensurate with
the acts committed.

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy

of courts.  "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level (`inferior') courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA).  A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition."[40] For the guidance of the
petitioner, "[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as
well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive."[41]  Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA,
and with the RTC in proper cases.[42] "However, this concurrence of
jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary
writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. 
This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition."[43] Unwarranted demands upon this Court's
attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, "[w]here the issuance

of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a
[RTC], it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented."[44]  In consequence, the instant petition
should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or
compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to
avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.

Finally, it must be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed

petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel[45] within 15 days
from notice.  Petitioner failed to comply hence we directed him to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution dated
September 6, 2010.[46]  Still, petitioner failed to comply hence he was fined
P1,000.00 in our Resolution dated January 17, 2011 [47] which was increased
to P3,000.00 in our Resolution of June 29, 2011.  Consequently, petitioner
is hereby directed to pay said fine of P3,000.00 otherwise he would be dealt
with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.  The Order

dated November 25, 2005 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to
pay a fine of P2,000.00.  In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of
P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. 
Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, (Acting Chairperson), Bersamin,

Perez,* and Mendoza,** JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 158971. August 25, 2005

MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well as in his capacity as owner of PHILIPPINE
AGRI TRADING CENTER, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELENA EMBANG, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

For resolution is private respondent Elena Embang’s motion to cite Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo,
counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt of court for delaying this case and impeding the
execution of the judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of
1  2 

Professional Responsibility.

This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay and
holiday premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center. The
labor arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The dispositive portion of his September 29, 2000
decision read:
3 

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Embang] to be a regular employee of the

PHIL-AGRI TRADING CENTER and ordering the latter to reinstate her to her former position and
pay her backwages from the date of her dismissal on February 18, 2000 until her reinstatement
which computed as of today amounts to ₱37,771.50 (₱5881 x 6.5 months) plus 1/12 thereof or the
amount of ₱3,147.62 as corresponding 13th month pay for the period.

An additional award of 5% of the total award is also rendered since [,] compelled to litigate [,]
[Embang] had to engage the services of counsel.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied
petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with modification. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated
September 29, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in [that Mariano Y. Siy] should be
made jointly and severally liable together with Phil. Agri Trading Center and that [Embang] is entitled
only [to] the ten (10%) percent of his awarded 13th month pay as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED. 4

After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution, petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for certiorari. Finding the petition to be without merit,
the appellate court dismissed the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
5 

likewise denied.6

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the CA’s
decision (dismissing his petition) and resolution (denying his motion for reconsideration). Since we
found no reversible error on the part of the appellate court, we denied the petition in our September
22, 2003 resolution. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of our resolution but we resolved to deny the
same with finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made on December 30, 2003.

In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang’s counsel filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution dated February 16, 2004 before the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty.
Quevedo entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a comment to the motion for writ of
execution. He alleged that Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to her by
7 

petitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the date of
the promulgation of the labor arbiter’s decision.

This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and motions between the parties. Finding8 

that his office was never informed by petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention
on their part to reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued an order dated July
30, 2004 granting the February 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of execution be issued.
9 

Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC on August 12, 2004. He
insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order
that the backwages should be computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no backwages
should accrue thereafter because of Embang’s refusal to be reinstated.

Embang’s counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the appeal was not perfected
because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center did not post the required cash or surety bond.
Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in
contempt of court.

By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the execution of the decision but
only sought the consideration of Embang’s refusal to be reinstated in any writ of execution that may
be issued. He claims that such refusal on Embang’s part constituted a supervening event that
justified the filing of an appeal ― notwithstanding the finality of the decision. He also asserts that an
appeal was the proper remedy to question the July 30, 2004 order of the labor arbiter.

Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution on February 28, 2005 resolving not
10 

to give due course to the appeal and to remand the case to the regional arbitration branch for further
proceedings. The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order was not appealable. Despite the denial of
the appeal, however, Atty. Quevedo filed a motion for clarification/partial reconsideration of the
NLRC’s February 28, 2005 resolution.

For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment, we hold Atty. Quevedo in
contempt of court.

Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct
tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court, contempt is
11 

classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or
so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same. Indirect
12 

contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court. It is an act done at a distance which tends
13 

to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. 14

Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is committed by a
person who commits the following acts, among others: disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order or judgment of a court; any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes
15 

or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt; and any improper conduct tending,
16 

directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

17

We denied with finality the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari almost two years ago. But the
decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this
Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo’s sly maneuvers on behalf of his
client.

Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The
prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect
the court’s verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of
Appeals: 18

…well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land.

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the
controversies.

The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Contrary to Atty. Quevedo’s
contention, there existed no supervening event that would have brought the case outside the ambit
of the general rule on the immutability of final and executory decisions.

Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment becomes final and executory or to
new circumstances which develop after judgment acquires finality. The "refusal" of Embang to be
19 

reinstated happened, assuming it really happened, before the finality of our September 22, 2003
resolution, i.e., before the decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final and
executory.

In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embang’s rejection of the same was not a
new one and had already been passed upon by the courts. Atty. Quevedo himself admits that
petitioner brought the issue before the CA in his June 6, 2002 petition for certiorari and December 3,
2002 memorandum. The appellate court brushed it aside and found neither factual nor legal merit in
the petition. The matter was again raised in petitioner’s June 3, 2003 motion for reconsideration
which was denied on the ground that the basic issues had already been previously considered by
the court. Embang’s alleged refusal to be reinstated was also alleged in the petition for review
on certiorari filed by petitioner before this Court. We denied it for failing to show that a reversible
error had been committed by the CA.

Atty. Quevedo’s client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of the modified decision of the
labor arbiter. He should not have tried, under the guise of a flimsy appeal to the NLRC, to reopen a
case already decided with finality. Nor should he have raised anew matters previously considered
and issues already laid to rest.

Atty. Quevedo’s act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was obviously intended to defeat the
implementation of a final and executory decision. Elementary is the rule that an order granting a
motion for a writ of execution is not appealable. Thus, Atty. Quevedo’s deceptively "innocent"
20 
appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules of procedure resulting
in the obstruction of justice.

By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying the fruits of her hard earned
legal victory. In effect, he has been tying the hands of justice and preventing it from taking its due
course. His conduct has thwarted the due execution of a final and executory decision. By appealing
an order which he knew to be unappealable, he abused court processes and hindered the
dispensation of justice. His dilatory tactics were an affront to the dignity of the Court, clearly
constituting indirect contempt.

We note that the ground cited in the motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court was his
violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While a lawyer’s
violation of his duties as an officer of the court may also constitute contempt, the grounds for holding
a person in contempt and for holding him administratively liable for the violation of his lawyer’s oath
are distinct and separate from each other. They are specified in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. A
finding of contempt on the part of a lawyer does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
against him for his contravention of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus:

x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that
the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. A contempt proceeding for
misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object
of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court’s officer to continue in that office, to
preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or
unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt
is to safeguard the functions of the court [while that] of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the
Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges,
are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not
considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner, an
attorney’s conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent
disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to
conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them
a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed
by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.

Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline
lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the court’s basic power
to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. As was
succinctly expounded in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et al.:

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us
here: the Court’s inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where
the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over lawyers may
come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not
merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the
task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part
which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him,
and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power. 21

We therefore refer the complaint against Atty. Quevedo’s behavior to the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an investigation of his possible liabilities under
Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for
which a FINE of ₱30,000 is imposed upon him, payable in full within five days from receipt of this
resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467           August 5, 1999

ATTY. SAMUEL D. PAGDILAO, JR., Chief of Police, Caloocan City, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for grave abuse of discretion filed against respondent Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City. Complainant is the Chief of Police
of Caloocan City, Samuel D. Pagdilao, Jr. The complaint stemmed from several orders of arrest
issued by respondent against Caloocan City policemen for their failure to attend hearings in criminal
cases and testify as state witnesses, which respondent wanted complainant to personally enforce. 1âwphi1.nêt

The record shows that on August 10, 1998, respondent issued an order of arrest which reads as
follows:1

In today's initial trial in Criminal Case Nos. C-53625 (98), 53626 (98), 53622 and 53623 (98),
accused Manuel Mendoza and Romeo Cendaño appeared and assisted by Atty. Ojer Pacis
of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). However, there was no appearance on the part of PO2
Alexander Buan. The records will show however that he was duly notified of today's hearing
but despite notice he did not appear thereby delaying the early termination of these cases.

Consequently, and on motion of the public prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued
against PO2 ALEXANDER BUAN and the Chief of Police, Caloocan City, Police
Superintendent Samuel Pagdilao is hereby directed to effect the service of the warrant of
arrest and to bring the body of the witness not later then 8:30 o'clock in the morning
tomorrow, August 11, 1998 for him to testify in these cases.

The accused is likewise directed to appear tomorrow, August 11, 1998.

WHEREFORE, let the scheduled hearing for today be cancelled and have it reset tomorrow,
August 11, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

On August 11, 1998, respondent issued another order in another case (Criminal Case No. C-
53081(97)), the pertinent portion of which reads: 2

After the pre-trial in this case has been waived by the accused through counsel, the Public
Prosecutor failed to present its evidence on the ground that his witnesses, mostly police
officers, did not appear despite notices.

Consequently, on motion of the Public Prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against
SPO1 Edgardo Fernandez and PO3 Eduardo S. Avila.

Let the service of the warrant of arrest upon SPO1 Edgardo Fernandez and PO3 Eduardo S.
Avila be effected by no less than the Chief of Police of Caloocan City, Supt. Samuel Pagdilao
and the latter is directed to make a return on or before September 1, 1998.

On August 12, 1998, in Criminal Case No. C-53796(98), respondent issued an order reading: 3
 A cursory examination of the records will readily show that on June 23, 1998 P/Insp.
Emmanuel R. Bravo appeared and signed for the scheduled hearing today, August 12, 1998
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, but he did not appear despite notice thereby delaying the
early termination of this case.

Let it be noted that the accused is a detention prisoner who is entitled to a speedy trial and
the trial could not proceed in view of the non-appearance of the aforesaid witness.

Consequently, and on motion of the public prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued
against P/Insp. Emmanuel R. Bravo of the Caloocan City Police Force and let the warrant be
served personally by the Chief of Police of Caloocan City, Police Superintendent Samuel
Pagdilao and the latter is directed to make a return of the warrant not later than 8:30 o'clock
in the morning tomorrow, August 13, 1998.

Apparently, resenting the tenor of the orders directed personally at him, complainant wrote
respondent on August 14, 1998 asking for the reconsideration of the foregoing orders: 4

14 August 1998

Honorable Adoracion G. Angeles

Acting Presiding Judge
RTC Branch 125, Caloocan City

Your Honor:

This is with regards to orders lately coming from that (sic) Honorable Court directing the undersigned
to personally serve and return subpoenas and warrants of arrests against PNP personnel assigned
within and/or outside the Caloocan City Police Station.

As Chief of Police of one of the three biggest Police Departments in the National Capital Region
(next only to Manila and Quezon City), I have to attend to many matters which would prevent my
personally performing the task of service on (sic) subpoena and warrants.

May I, therefore, respectfully request the Honorable Court to reconsider such orders and instead
allow the undersigned to delegate to subordinate officers particularly, the Chief, Warrant and
Subpoena Section and Sub-Station Commanders, the performance of this task. This will allow the
undersigned to personally attend to the many operational activities of law enforcement as well as the
various administrative functions as Head of the City's Police Department.

The order of the Honorable Judge to the undersigned Chief of Police disregards the time honored
tradition and system of Command and Control practiced in our organization and reduces the level of
the Chief of Police into a subpoena server and arresting officer. A job which can be readily
accomplished by the Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section and by other officers whom the
Commander may direct under this system.

Records show that service of warrants and subpoena to PNP personnel have all been duly
accomplished by our warrant and Subpoena Section.

I hope that this request will merit your favorable consideration.

Very respectfully yours,

 (signed)

ATTY. SAMUEL D. PAGDILAO JR.

Police Superintendent (DSC)
Chief of Police

Copy Furnished:

The Honorable Chief Justice, Supreme Court

The Honorable Court Administrator, Supreme Court
The Chief of the Philippine National Police

Respondent's reaction was just as acerbic. In an order, dated August 21, 1998, denying
complainant's request for reconsideration, she said:5

Before this court for consideration is a Letter-Request dated August 14, 1998 filed by P/Supt.
Samuel D. Pagdilao, Jr., Chief of Police of the Caloocan City Police Department.

He assails the orders coming from this court directing him to personally serve and return
subpoenas and warrants of arrest against PNP personnel assigned within and/or outside the
Caloocan City Police Station. He further contends that such orders disregard the time-
honored tradition and system of Command and Control practiced in their organization and
reduces the level of the Chief of Police into a subpoena server and arresting officer.

Apparently, P/Supt. Samuel D. Pagdilao, Jr. perceives the assailed orders as an affront to
the eminence of his position as Chief of Police above all else.

Nonetheless, this court has never entertained thoughts of debasing the Chief of Police or
anybody else for that matter. Nor was it ever enticed to employ dictatorial schemes to
abbreviate its proceedings despite the fact that the Presiding Judge is practically handling
three (3) salas at the moment — the first as the duly appointed judge, the second in an
acting capacity and the third as the pairing judge for the presiding judge thereat who has
been on leave for quite some time already. 1âwphi1.nêt

Notwithstanding the incessant pressure inherent in the job, this court takes pride in the fact
that it has never lost its clear vision that it exists primarily for the proper and expeditious
administration of justice.

Indeed, this court has always been very zealous in the discharge of its bounder duties.
Nonetheless, its earnest efforts to promote a speedy administration of justice has many
times been unduly hampered by the frequent non-appearances of police officers in court
hearings despite sufficient notice. It has always been a big disappointment to the court that
its dedication to duty is sometimes not matched by some law-enforcement officers.

Hence, in order to solve this dilemma, the Court directed the Chief of Police to personally
ensure the attendance of his men in court hearings so much so that (sic) their testimonies
are very vital to the outcome of the criminal cases herein. The Orders of the court were never
meant to disregard the system of Command and Control being employed in the Police
Force. Its only concern was that such system of Command and Control must be effectively
used to address the lukewarm attitude of the Chief of Police's subordinate relative to their
duty to appear in court.
 It is noteworthy to mention that since the issuance of the assailed Orders, the concerned law
enforcement officers have shown an impressive attendance in court hearings which confirms
that it makes a lot of difference when the Chief of Police himself acts to ensure the
compliance of his subordinates to a lawful court Order.

Needless to state, the court was able to solve a perennial problem with the renewed
cooperation of the City's police force.

The court should not therefore be taken to task for its issuance of the questioned Orders
because the same was done in the interest of justice.

On the other hand, the Chief of Police must be reminded that this is not the time to be onion-
skinned and regard the said Orders as a personal insult to his dignity.

During this time when criminality is on the rise, would it not be more prudent for the Chief of
Police to lay aside his egotistical concerns and instead work with the courts of justice in
addressing the more pressing problems of criminally, violence and injustice?

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Letter-Request of the Chief of Police of Caloocan

City is duly noted but the court reiterates its stand that its foremost concern is the
administration of justice and with this consideration indelibly etched in its mind, it will issue
such Orders which are geared towards the achievement of its noble purpose.

Let copies of this Order be furnished upon the Honorable Chief Justice and Honorable Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court as well as to the Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).

SO ORDERED.

In his complaint, dated October 28, 1998, complainant avers that respondent's orders betray her
ignorance of the rulings of this Court in several cases that non-attendance at a trial does not
constitute direct but indirect contempt punishable only after written charge and hearing under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. He states that the action of respondent not only seriously affects the
service records of the concerned policemen but also jeopardizes their promotions.

Complainant likewise assails the orders of respondent requiring him personally to arrest the
policemen concerned, make a return of the orders, and in the case of PO2 Alexander Buan, to bring
the latter to respondent's court not later than 8:30 in the morning of August 11, 1998. Complainant
claims that the order is capricious and whimsical because the time given to him for serving the
warrant was short and disregarded the "system of command and control, and the doctrine of
qualified political agency in the administration of public offices." According to complainant, when he
asked respondent to reconsider her order and allow his subordinates, particularly the Chief of the
Warrant and Subpoena Section and the Sub-Station Commanders, to serve the orders in question,
respondent "arrogantly dismissed [the principle complainant was raising] as nothing but a display of
egotistical concerns."

In her comment on the complaint, respondent contended that the warrants of arrest against the
Caloocan City policemen were issued merely for the purpose of compelling the attendance of the
policemen at the court hearings as state witnesses as it had been her experience that the policemen
ignored her orders. She stated that in issuing the orders in question she was never motivated by ill
will but that her concern was solely to expedite the proceedings in two salas of the court over which
she was presiding since justice delayed is justice denied. She reiterated what she said in her order
denying complainant's request to be relieved from serving the orders. Respondent contends that a
prior charge or hearing is not required before a warrant of arrest may be issued under Rule 21, §8 of
the Rules of Court. She argues that this provision only requires proof of service of subpoena on a
witness and the fact that the witness failed to attend the scheduled hearing before a court can
exercise its power of compulsion.

On the allegation that complainant was given a very short period of time for serving the warrant of
arrest against witness PO2 Buan, respondent points out that the policeman was right in the
Caloocan City Police Station were complainant held office. As for her statement that complainant's
letter was "nothing but a display of egotistical concerns," respondent said that obviously complainant
took offense because of what he considered his "exalted position as chief of police."

Replying to respondent's comment, complainant argues that Rule 21, §8 invoked by respondent to
justify her orders is not applicable. He points out that the orders were intended not only to compel
the attendance of policemen in court but also to punish them for contempt of court. He also alleges
that, contrary to respondent's statement in her order dated March 10, 1999, in Criminal Case Nos. C-
55145(98) and 55146(98), that he did not make a return of the warrant of arrest against PO3 Nestor
Aquino, complainant says he made a return which, in fact, was received in respondent's court on
March 10, 1999 at 10:22 a.m.6

Respondent's order reads as follows:7

In an order of the court dated March 8, 1999, a warrant for the arrest of PO3 Nestor Aquino,
prosecution's witness in these cases were issued by the Court directing the Chief of Police of
Caloocan City or the duly authorized representative of the latter to produce the body of the
aforesaid police officer not later than March 10, 1999 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

A cursory examination of the records will show that the order was received by the Chief of
Police of Caloocan City on the same date, March 8, 1999 but despite receipt thereof, the
Chief of Police of Caloocan City did not bother to make a return of the warrant of arrest
thereby delaying the early disposition of these cases.

Let it be stressed that this is a joint trial of Crim. Case No. 55145 (98) and Crim. Case No. C-
55146 (98) for the violation of the drugs law.

This indeed does not speak well of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City.

WHEREFORE, the Chief of Police of Caloocan City is hereby given a period of three (3)
days from receipt of a copy of this order to explain and to show cause why he should not be
cited in contempt of court for failure to produce today, March 10, 1999, the body of the afore-
said witness.

Let copies of this order be furnished upon the Director of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR), Bicutan, Metro Manila as well as to the
Director General of the PNP, Roberto Lastimosa for them to know the actuation of the Chief
of Police of Caloocan City in the discharged of its official function.

Complainant's return, bearing the stamp "RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan, City, received, 3/10/99, 10:22
a.m.," reads:8
 Date 10 March 1999

Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court RTC BR 121 Cal City the attached Warrant/Order
of Arrest in Crim. Case No. 55145-55146 (98) against PO3 NESTER AQUINO with address
at DDEU, NPDC, Tanigue St., Kaunlaran Vill. Caloocan City for the crime of Non-appearance (at the
scheduled hearing held on 8 March 1999.

REASONS: UNSERVED. Subject PNP personnel was already dismissed from the service
effective 16 February 1999. Attached herewith is the xerox copy of Spl Order No. 366
relative to his dismissal.

Complainant adds that, in Caloocan City, only respondent issues orders to policemen to serve court
processes on short notice, and orders their arrest without hearing in case they fail to comply without
taking into account that they also have other work to do. He states that he filed the instant complaint
against respondent not to cause her dishonor but to promote respect for the law and to correct the
misimpression that Caloocan City policemen are "inefficient or defying court orders."

The Office of the Court Administration (OCA) recommends the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent for lack of merit. In its report, it states among other things:

A cursory reading of the records of this case shows the utter lack of merit of complainant's
cause.

First, a perusal of the questioned orders issued by the respondent reveals that the subject
policemen were not punished for contempt of court hence the contempt provisions under the
Revised Rules of Court is not applicable. Prior written charge and hearing therefore is not
necessary before Judge Angeles can issue warrant of arrest to compel their attendance in
court hearings;

Second, a judge is not prohibited to issue orders directing heads of police stations to
personally serve and return processes from the court;

Third, it cannot be considered as unreasonable the period given to complainant within which
to effect the service of the warrants of arrest issued by the court considering that the police
officers to be served by said warrants are working right at the Station headed by the
complainant himself; and

Lastly, on the charge that respondent arrogantly regarded the letter of complainant as
"nothing but a display of egotistical concerns" we are inclined to believe that the
respondent's remarks were not tainted with malice and that her only concern is for the
"speedy and efficient administration of justice."

Rule 21, §8, pursuant to which respondent issued her orders, states that "in case of failure of a
witness to attend, the court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of
the failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his deputy, to arrest
the witness and bring him before the court or officer where his attendance is required." Respondent
is thus correct in contending that a judge may issue a warrant of arrest against a witness simply
upon proof that the subpoena had been served upon him but he failed to attend the hearing.  The
purpose is to bring the witness before the court where his attendance is required, not to punish him for contempt which requires a previous
hearing.9 However, unnecessary tension and asperity could have been avoided had respondent simply called the attention of complainant to
the failure of the latter's men to comply with her orders instead of directing complainant to personally serve the orders and bring the
policemen himself to her sala. Moreover, as is clear from Rule 21, §8, the orders of arrest should have been addressed to the sheriff or the
latter's deputy. Respondent could have done this while calling complainant's attention to the alleged disregard by policemen of her orders so
that appropriate disciplinary action could be taken if necessary.

It would appear that respondent's order of August 10, 1998 in Criminal Case Nos. C-53625(98),
53626(98), 53622, and 53623(98), which provoked this incident and gave rise to the "word war"
between the parties, was made because respondent thought that in the other cases (Criminal Case
Nos. 55145(98) and 55146(98)) heard that morning, complainant ignored her order to produce a
policeman whom she had ordered arrested. However, as already noted, the policeman could no
longer be presented in court as he had already been dismissed from the service, and complainant
did make a return informing the court of this fact, although his return did reach the court a few hours
after the hearing in which the policeman's testimony was required.

It was this unfortunate incident which provoked the exchanges between complainant and
respondent: respondent acting on the erroneous belief that complainant had ignored her order and,
consequently, requiring complainant to personally arrest his own men and take them to her court,
and complainant taking umbrage at the orders. The observance of restraint was never more
demanded on the part of both parties.

Respondent acted a bit rashly while complainant reacted too strongly. The courts and the law
enforcers are two of the five pillars of the criminal justice system, the other three being the
prosecution, the correctional subsystem, and the community. 10 Cooperation among, and coordination
between, the five pillars are needed in order to make the system work effectively. Indeed,
complainant and respondent, both avow a common objective of dispensing justice. More than that,
the parties should observe mutual respect and forbearance.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121,
Caloocan City is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial function with
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The instant
complaint is DISMISSED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 155849               August 31, 2011

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING

LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and
CORA CURAY, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioners filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt of court for
including allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called Sea Transport Update concerning the
Court’s resolutions dated June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002 issued in G.R. No. 152914 entitled
Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, et al. v. Administrator Oscar Sevilla,
Maritime Industry Authority, et al.

Antecedents

On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, 1 advising
respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of
the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially
considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153
(MC 153).

For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled
Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24,
1994.2

On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-
Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary
restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29, 2001, 3 however, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the
Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001. 4 Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA denied DMAP’s motion for
reconsideration.5

DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, 2002, 6 the Court denied DMAP’s
petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56,
in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b)
pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of ₱202.00 in accordance
with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular
No. 1-88 of this Court."

On August 12, 2002,7 the Court denied with finality DMAP’s motion for reconsideration.

In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which
DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a
consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, 8 which is reproduced as
follows:

SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE

Oct. 2002 GMM

20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE

1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities
and not on the legal issue DMAP presented.

Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the amount of filing fee lacking &
failure to indicate date of receipt of court resolution)

> Some technical matters that could cause denial

- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings

- Failure to provide copies to respondents.

> Legal issue DMAP presented

- Public Service Act

- Regulated or Deregulated

- MC 153

- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months.

WHAT TO EXPECT?

1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI

WHAT TO DO?

1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:

- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on merits of the case

- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of reasonableness of freight is not under their
jurisdiction but with MARINA

- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic) as there is a pending case
filed before MARINA.

- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for resolution

2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved by MARINA

3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping service may not suffer

NEXT MOVE

Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same case and may be using the
same arguments. (emphasis supplied)
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the respondents,
insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for
patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous, malicious,
tasteless, and baseless innuendo" 9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be
influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling
issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." 10 They averred that the
respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision, for it
was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!" 11

In their comment dated January 20, 2003,12 the respondents denied any intention to malign,
discredit, or criticize the Court.13 They explained that their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling
issued in one month time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" 14 was not per se
contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the resolution of petitions by the
Court was either less than a month, if the petition was to be denied on technicality, and more or less
from three to six months, if the petition was to be given due course; that what made the petitioners
describe the statement as contemptuous was not the real or actual intention of the author but rather
the petitioners’ false, malicious, scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and that the
petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had no basis to assert that the DMAP’s
presentor, the author of the material, or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention
or made any malicious insinuations.15

The respondents further stated that the term time frame was layman’s parlance to explain to DMAP
members that the petition had been dismissed due to a technicality, considering that the appeals
process in the case before the Court had taken only a month instead of the expected three to six
months;16 that the term lead time, although not the proper legal term to describe the process that the
respondents’ petition had undergone in the Court, was common parlance in the business sector in
which the respondents belonged; that the discussions during the presentation focused on the legal
options of DMAP with respect to the 20% increase, i.e., to go back to MARINA for the resolution of
the propriety and reasonableness of the 20% increase; 17 that a lead time was indicated in the
presentation material simply to tell DMAP members that the lead time to go back to MARINA had
been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for review; and that, on the other hand, had the
Court given due course to the petition, the expected time for the Court to resolve the appeal on the
merits would have been from three to six months, a normal expectation. 18

Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of the decision of the CA, which
the Court affirmed, revealed that the decision of the CA centered only on the constitutionality of the
assailed executive issuances, and did not include any determination of the reasonableness and
propriety of the 20% increase; that, accordingly, the discussion of the recourse with respect to the
20% increase, which was to go back to MARINA for the resolution on the matter, could not be
considered as a defiance of the order of the Court because the CA itself decreed that the propriety
and reasonableness of the 20% increase should be brought to and resolved by MARINA; 19 and that
considering that there was yet no entry of judgment in relation to the denial of the petition at the time
of the GMM on October 17, 2002, the respondents were not defying any final order or writ of the
Court and thereby commit any act of indirect contempt. 20

Issue

Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt
of court?

Ruling
We dismiss the petition.

I
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body.
In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice,
or dignity of a court.21 The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification
a variety of different acts.22

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,23 and need not be specifically granted by
statute.24 It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. 25 Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and
their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. 26 The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.28

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or
so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect
contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. 29

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is
necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. 30 The inherent power of courts to punish
contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without
aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their
authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary
conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. 31 There is authority for the view,
however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be
committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the
actions of the court in the courtroom itself.32 Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence
of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct
contempt,33 although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show
cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the
misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath
of other persons.34

In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings
for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge
generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written
charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and
sentence imposed.35

Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the
timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the
formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and
answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of
findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial. 36

A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a hearing
and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require
normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend
the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of
courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that
interfere with the judicial process.37

The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof and without issue
or trial in any form to punish a contempt

committed directly under its eye or within its view.38 But there must be adequate facts to support a
summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. 39 The exercise of the summary power to
imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive
conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary
proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with
obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active manifestation,
against obstruction and outrage. 41

Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well
as criminal actions, and independently of any action. 42 They are of two classes, the criminal or
punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against
the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil
contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil
case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. 43 It is at times difficult to determine whether the
proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or
civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the

contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose. 44 The proceedings are to be regarded
as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial.45 Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of
a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the
dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of
the general public, the contempt is criminal.46 Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity
of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and
compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights. 47

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
 (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property
by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces

another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring
the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. 48 There is no question
that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. 49 Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of
the alleged contemnor should be considered.50 Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does
not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is
within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be
determinative of its character.51 A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends
for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights.52 To constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. 53

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary,
they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a
lawyer, a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

II.
Utterances in Sea Transport Update,
Not Contemptuous

The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule
71, supra.

The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court because
of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to
be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said
respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time
is at least 3 to 6 months,"54 was insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.

Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea Transport Update stating:
"The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities
and not on the legal issue DMAP presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading
"Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary
to the petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered as "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and
baseless innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the
petitioners"57 or that "the point that respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the
decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!’", 58 we find the
phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914 were issued, or
as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the resolutions. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases
was to inform DMAP’s members of the developments in the case, and on the taking of the next
viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals
instructed.1avvphi1

We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter,
to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and
through legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and
respect, for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading
case of In re: Almacen:59

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption.

xxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.xxx

xxx

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx

xxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action. (bold emphasis supplied)60

The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the
prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect
contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power to punish for contempt of
court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally
should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail.61 As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish
contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the
power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or
vindictiveness.62

WHEREFORE, the petition for indirect contempt is DISMISSED.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice