CAMPUS LAW CENTRE

UNIVERSITY OF DELHI

MOOT COURT MEMORIAL

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.: ___/ 2020

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

IN THE MATTER OF:

MOOLCHAND……………………………………………………………. PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA…………………………….…………………………...RESPONDENT

NAME:SHWETA BIDHURI

ROLL NO: 19309806796

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Content Page no.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………......2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ……………………………………………………..…5
STATEMENT OF FACTS…..................................................................................................6
ISSUE RAISED.........................................................................................................................7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................7
WRITTEN PLEADINGS/ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………......................................8
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE CASTEIST REMARKS MADE TELEPHONICALLY OR
IN THE ABSENCE OF THIRD PERSON WOULD COME UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 3(1)(R) AND 3(1)(S) OF THE SCHEDULED CASTE AND SCHEDULED
TRIBE (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989?...................................................8
[1.1] THE ALLEGED REMARKS MADE TELEPHONICALLY DO NOT
FALL WITHIN AMBIT 'AT ANY PLACE WITHIN PUBLIC VIEW'
MENTION IN SECTION 3(1)(r)............................................................................8
[1.2] CASTEIST ASPERSIONS MADE IN THE ABSENCE OF THIRD PERSON
CAN NOT BE SAID TO HAVE ATTRACTED SECTION.................................11
[1.3] WHETHER MERE UTTERANCE OF WORDS LIKE “GET LOST FROM
MY OFFICE, OTHERWISE I’LL MAKE YOU CLEAN THE STREETS.” ARE
ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE SCHEDULED
CASTE AND SCHEDULED TRIBE (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT,
1989......................................................................................................................12
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT IS JUSTIFIED IN QUASHING THE
ORDER OF FRAMING OF CHARGES ISSUED BY TRIAL COURT ?........................13
ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE
BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT?................................................................16
[3.1] IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE APPELLANTS,
THE PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE IS NOT MAINTAINABLE…..16

1
 [3.2] SCOPE OF POWERS UNDER ARTICLE 136…………………………...17
[3.3] GROUNDS ON WHICH APPEAL ARE GRANTED NOT SATISFIED..17
[3.4] GROUNDS OF REJECTION………………………………………..……18
[3.5] NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTS……18
[3.6] NO IRREGULARITY OF PROCEDURE OR VIOLATION OF
PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IS BEING DONE………………..18
[3.7] INFERENCE FROM A PURE QUESTION OF FACT IS IN ITSELF
A FACT AND HENCE NOT OPEN TO REVIEW………………………19
[3.7.1] EVEN IF IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE MATTER INVOLVES
‘QUESTION OF LAW’, NO ‘SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF
LAW IS INVOLVED.’……………………………………………19
Prayer……………………………………………………………………………………….21
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

HC High Court

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

V. Versus

¶ Para

§ Section

AIR All India reporter

Anr. Another

Crpc Criminal procedure code 1973

2
SC&ST ACT Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe act 1989

Ed. Edition

Ors. Others

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

[A] CASES:
1. E. Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan and others 1997 Cri LJ 2036
2. Kusum Lata v. State & Ors.
3.
Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P.
4. Chandra Poojari v. State Of Karnataka
5. Daya Bhatnagar & Others v. State
6. Pardeep Kumar v. State Of Haryana And Another
7. Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat and Ors
8. Surinder Nath and Anr. v. State of Delhi
9. Mukesh Kumar Saini and Ors. v. State
10. Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan and others
11. Asmathunnisa v.Dhiren prafullbhai shah
12. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Rohtagi
13. Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka Special Leave Petition (Cri.),
14. Swaran Singh and Ors v. State through Standing Counsel and Anr.
15. Maheshbhai Bachubhai Patel & 3 vs State Of Gujarat .
16. R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab
17. State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others
18. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others (1992) 4 SCC 305 : (AIR 1993
SC 892)
19. State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 226 : (2010
Cri LJ 3844 (SC)
20. M. Mohan v. The State, 2011 (3) SCALE 78 : (AIR 2011 SC 1238)
21. Pritam Singh v. The State
22. M. C. Mehta v. Union of India

3
 23. Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar Suri,
24. Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
25. Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswanti v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills
26. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala
27. Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd.,
[B]BOOKS:
1. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th Ed., 2016)
2. The Law of Evidence, Batuk Lal, 19thEdition.
3. Archibold, Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice (1stEd.1822).
4. Criminal Procedure, R.V Kelkar’s 6 thEdition.
5. RV Kelkar, Lectures on Criminal Law (6th ed., 2017)
[C]WEBSITES:
1. https://www.lawctopus.com/
2. https://www.nluo.ac.in/
3. https://indiankanoon.org/
4. https://main.sci.gov.in/
5. http://www.manupatra.co.in/AdvancedLegalSearch.aspx
6. http://www.scconline.com
7. https://www.barandbench.com/columns/interpreting-scst-prevention-of-
atrocities-act-and-missed-opportunities
8. http://www.blog.ipleaders.in
9. https://www.lawsenate.com/publications/articles/special-leave-petition-
slp.pdf
10. http://www.livelaw.in
11. https://tribal.nic.in/actRules/preventionofAtricities.pdf
12. www.lexisnexis.co.in
[D]CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES:
1. The Constitution of India 1950
2. Criminal procedure code 1973
3. The scheduled, caste and scheduled tribe ( prevention of atrocities) act 1989

4
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondent have the honour to submit before the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Supreme
court of India, the memorandum for the respondent in an appeal filed by appeallant under
Article 136 of The Constitution of India ,1950. This article mentions the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in regard to Criminal Matters by the way of Special leave from the High
Court under its jurisdiction who have reversed the judgement of a trial court in a matter.

ARTICLE 1361: SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT

1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

1
The Constitution of India [INDIA],26 January 1950

5
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Moolchand (petitioner) is a resident of Rajpura town.He belongs to Schedule
Caste (SC). He was elected as a Ward Member of Ward no. 9 of Rajpura which
was reserved for Schedule Caste (SC).
II. The Body of the municipality was headed by Mr. Baldev who belonged to the
General Category.
III. As there was an issue of cleanliness in Ward No. 9, Baldev wanted to discuss
the same issue with Moolchand personally in his chamber. So Baldev sent him
a message via whatsapp on December 4, 2019, inviting him for personal
meeting in his chamber at 11 AM.
IV. Baldev was busy that day, therefore he read the message at 11:30 AM.
Heinformed Baldev about it. However, Baldev started shouting at him, made
some casteist remark and humiliated him for getting late. At that time, a clerk
was also sitting in the chamber
V. Despite the insult and humiliation, Mool Chand went to the Municipality to
attend the meeting. As soon as he entered into the chamber, Baldev got angry
and abused him on the name of his caste and shouted at him saying: “Get lost
from my office, otherwise I will make you clean the streets.” At that time,
there was no third person inside the chamber. Mool Chand left the chamber as
Baldev was not listening to him.
VI. After this, Mool Chand rushed to the Police Station to register an FIR against
Baldev. At the initial stage of the case, the trial court found that a prima
facie case had been made out against Baldev. Therefore,on February 4, 2020,
the court framed charges under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
VII. Accused Baldev challenged the order of framing of charges before the
Allahabad High Court. The high court quashed the order of framing the
charges on April 6, 2020. The court also denied to provide the certificate to
appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 134A of the Constitution of
India.
VIII. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, Mool Chand filed a Special Leave
to Appeal before this Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution and the same was admitted for hearing by the court.

6
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
Whether the casteist aspersions made telephonically or in the absence of third person are
covered under section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (prevention
of atrocities) act 1989?
2.
Whether the High Court is justified in quashing the order of framing of charges made by trial
court?
3.
Whether the special leave petition is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THE CASTEIST ASPERSIONS MADE TELEPHONICALLY OR IN THE
ABSENCE OF THIRD PERSON ARE NOT COVERED UNDER THE SECTION
3(1)(r) AND (s) OF THE SC/ST ACT OF 1989.
The Respondent humbly submits before this hon'ble court that the casteist aspersions made
telephonically or in the absence of third person does not attract section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the
SC/ST Act as the clause 'at any place within public view' in section 3(1)(r) and (s) requires that
third person must listen and view the person being humiliated and abused in the name of caste.
2. THE HIGH COURT IS JUSTIFIED IN QUASHING THE ORDER OF FRAMING
OF CHARGES ISSUED BY TRIAL COURT.
The Respondent humbly submits before this hon'ble court that HC is justified in quashing the
order of framing of charges issued by trial court. It is well settled that HC, by using its inherent
power, may quash any proceeding if there is no prima facie case is made out against the
accused.
3. THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY APPELLANT BEFORE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
The Respondent humbly submits before this hon'ble SC of India that the special leave petition
filed by appellant is not maintainable. Special leave petition or SLP holds a prime place in the
Indian judicial system and has been provided as a “residual power” in the hands of Supreme
Court of India to be exercised only in cases when any substantial question of law is involved
or gross injustice has been done.

7
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE ALLEGED REMARKS AND CASTEIST ASPERSIONS

MADE TELEPHONICALLY OR IN THE ABSENCE OF THIRD PERSON ARE
COVERED UNDER THE SECTION 3(1)(R) AND (S) OF THE SC/ST ACT OF 1989

1.It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the alleged remarks and casteist
comments made over telephonically or in the absence of third person do not fall in section
3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC/ST Act. The respondent submits the following arguments to affirm
the same.
[1.1] THE ALLEGED REMARKS MADE TELEPHONICALLY DO NOT
FALL WITHIN AMBIT 'AT ANY PLACE WITHIN PUBLIC VIEW'
MENTION IN SECTION 3(1)(r).

2. To constitute a case within the section of 3(1)(r) 2 of the act, it must be established that the
said remarks were made with the intention to insult and humiliate any member of scheduled
caste and scheduled tribe at any place within public view.

3. IN Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan 3and others, the hon'ble court explained the
clause at any place within the public view. The relevant paragraphs of this judgment are paras
12, 13 and 18. The said paragraphs read as under:
“12. A reading of Section 3 shows that two kinds of insults against the member of
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are made punishable -one as defined under sub-
section (ii) and the other as defined under subsection (x) of the said section. A combined
reading of the two subsections shows that under sub-section (ii) insult can be caused to a
member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes by dumping excreta, waste matter,
carcasses or any other obnoxious substance in his premises or neighbourhood, and to cause
such insult, the dumping of excreta etc. need not necessarily be done in the presence of the
person insulted and whereas under sub-section (x) insult can be caused to the person
insulted only if he is present in view of the expression "in any place within public view".

“13. Insult contemplated under sub-section (ii) is different from the insult contemplated
under sub-section (x) as in the former a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes

2
Substituted by the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (prevention of atrocities) amendment act 2015 for the
3(1)(II)
3
1997 Cri LJ 2036

8
gets insulted by the physical act and whereas in the latter he gets insulted in public view by the
words uttered by the wrongdoer for which he must be present at the place. The words "within
public view", in my opinion, are referable only to the person insulted and not to the person who
insulted him as the said expression is conspicuously absent in subsection (ii) of Section 3 of
Act. By avoiding to use the expression "within public view" in sub-section (ii), the Legislature,
I feel, has created two different kinds of offences an insult caused to a member of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes, even in his absence, by dumping excreta etc. in his premises or
neighbourhood and an insult by words caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes "within public view" which means at the time of the alleged insult the person
insulted must be present as the expression "within public view" indicates or otherwise the
Legislature would have avoided the use of the said expression which it avoided in sub-section
(ii) or would have used the expression "in any public place"

“18. As stated by me earlier the words used in sub-section (x) are not "in public place", but
"within public view" which means the public must view the person being insulted for which he
must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted. In my
view, the entire allegations contained in the complaint even if taken to be true do not make out
any offence against the petitioner."

4. Kusum Lata v. State & Ors.Basic ingredients for the offence under Clause (x) of Sub-
section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, revealed through the bare reading of this section are as
follows: (a) there should be intentional insult or intimidation by a person, who is not a member
of SC or ST; (b) the insult must be with an intent to humiliate the member of the SC or ST. As
the intent to humiliate is necessary, it follows that the accused must have knowledge or
awareness that the victim belongs to the SC or ST. This can be inferred even from long
association; and (c) the incident must occur in any place within the public view.
“19. Looking to the aims and objects of the Act, the expression "public view" in Section
3(i)(x) of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present, (howsoever
small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the
parties. In other words, persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the
complainant, would necessarily get excluded.”

9
5.In Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P.4 the hon'ble supreme court observed that the words used
are "in any place but within public view", which means that the public must view the person
being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said
section gets attracted if the person is not present."

6. In Chandra Poojari v. State Of Karnataka , it had been alleged that the incident took place
in the chamber of the complainant, who was working as the commercial tax officer. The
argument raised on behalf of the accused, that assuming the allegations are true, yet the
occurrence having taken place in the chamber of the complainant, it cannot be said that the
offence was committed in any place within ''public view'' was accepted

7.In Daya Bhatnagar & Others v. State . The interpretation shows that the utterance of abuses
should be heard and viewed at least by one independent person. The Court observed that the
witnesses who are relatives, friends, persons having blood relationship or the persons having
close business or fiduciary relationship with complainant/victim are excluded from the purview
of word “public” used in this ingredient.

8.In Pardeep Kumar v. State Of Haryana And Another5 case the hon'ble punjab and haryana
high court observed that :

"To constitute the offence under the Act, it must be alleged that the accused intentionally
insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Schedule
Tribe in any public place within public view. In the present case, it is alleged that the offence
has been committed by the petitioners by using the caste based remarks over a mobile phone
call to the informant, or a member of Scheduled Castes, of which there are no records. Once it
is admitted that the alleged conversation over the mobile phone was not in a public gaze nor
witnessed by any third party, the alleged use of caste words cannot be said to have been
committed within the public view."

9.In Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat and Ors.6The hon'ble court observed that the
expression "within public view" has specific meaning and in order to attract the provisions of
law under Section-3(1) (x) of the Atrocities Act, the acts amounting to insult or humiliation to

4
2011 Cri.L.J. 2594
5
CRR No. 1354 of 2019 (O&M)
6
R/CR.MA/9976/2015

10
the member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes should be visible and audible to the
public. Otherwise, it would not amount to an offence under the said provision of law.

10. In the both aforementioned provisions words used ‘within public view’ instead of ‘public
place’. The intention of the legislature was to cover private places also if the offence under this
act is committed against the persons of Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes. The offence of
intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view means the public is able to witness the offence
committed under this act. The dictionary meaning of the word ''public'' is ''open to the people
as a whole''. The dictionary meaning of the word ''view'' is vision or sight as from a particular
position. Reading these two meanings together in the context of the words ''public view'', it
only means that the public should have viewed the incident irrespective of the place where the
offence is committed; it may be private place or public place.

11. In Surinder Nath and Anr. v. State of Delhi petitioner allegedly used humiliating words
'Chamar Ki Bachi' against them. On these facts, it was held that ingredient of the offence was
not made out, as it was not committed in "public view". The Division Bench held that the FIR
was liable to be quashed

12.In Mukesh Kumar Saini and Ors. v. State 7 (Delhi Administration), there was a fight
between the two groups while one Mukesh was being dragged, he alleged that the accused
person uttered humiliating words. It was held that neighbors had not arrived by then, therefore,
ingredients of ‘public view’ were not made out and bail was granted.

13.In the present instance as the petitioner was not audible and visible to any third person so
it can not be said that alleged remarks were made within the public view. Thus no offence is
made out in section 3(1)(r) of the said act.

[1.2]CASTEIST ASPERSIONS MADE IN THE ABSENCE OF THIRD

PERSON CAN NOT BE SAID TO HAVE ATTRACTED SECTION 3(1)(s).

14.The Respondent humbly submits before this hon'ble court that the alleged casteist
aspersions made in the absence of a third person do not constitute an offence under section
3(1)(s) of the act. If there is no independent third person present at the time when the said

7
SLP (Cri.) No. 1719

11
casteist remarks were being made then no offence is made out in section 3(1)(s). To establish
an offence under this section, it must be satisfied that the alleged casteist remarks were made
within the public view. It is already discussed in the above-mentioned judgments(Krishnan
Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan and others8, Asmathunnisa and Dhiren prafullbhai shah)9
that 'within the public view' means any third person must be present at the time when the victim
is being abused and must listen and view the incident.

15. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that no independent third person was present
in the chamber of respondent when the casteist remarks were being used.Thus, no offence
can be said to have occurred in section 3(1)(s) of the sc/st act.

[1.3]Whether mere utterance of words like “Get lost from my office,

otherwise I’ll make you clean the streets.” are enough to constitute an
offence under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989?
16. The statement made by the Respondent was a simple statement made by a colleague to
another in a fit of anger. The words “I’ll make you clean the streets” cannot be said to be a
derogatory statement or intended casts based remark. They were not meant to be said in literal
sense. To stem out the offence the castiest slurs must have been made with intention to
humiliate and insult the Appellant. Thus main ingredient to constitute offence i.e., mens rea is
also not present in the case of Respondent.

17. Simply calling any person by caste name does not attract provisions of the Act. Other
ingredients are necessary in the complaint to constitute an offence under section 3 (1) (x).
‘Idiot’ and ‘nonsense’ uttered against a member of Scheduled Caste, it was held by the High
Court that these words have not reference to the community and from those “words it cannot
be inferred that the intention or intimidation are with reference to the community to which
complainant belonged”.

18. In Pardeep Kumar v. State of Haryana10, the Court in this case held that merely uttering
abusive and filthy words in the absence of any public view does not show any intention or mens
rea to humiliate the complainant. Basic ingredients of the offence in the FIR are that there must
be intentional insult; secondly the insult must be done in a public place within public view,

8
1997 Cri LJ 2036
9
R/CR.MA/9976/2015
10
CRR No. 1354 of 2019 (O&M)

12
which is not in the present case. To constitute the offence under the Act, it must be alleged that
the accused intentionally insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate a member of
Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe in any public place within public view.

ISSUE 2 : WHETHER THE HIGH COURT IS JUSTIFIED IN QUASHING THE

ORDER OF FRAMING OF CHARGES ISSUED BY TRIAL COURT

19.The Respondent humbly submits before this hon'ble court that the high court is well within
its power under section 482 of the criminal procedure code 1973 in quashing the order of
framing of charges issued by trial court.
Section 482 reads as:Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

20.It is well settled that if there is no prima facie case is disclosed in the FIR and grave
miscarriage of justice would be committed if trial is allowed then high court, using its
inherent power under section 482 of crpc, may quash the proceedings to secure the ends of
justice.

21.As the alleged remarks were not made within the meaning of 'public view'( no independent
third person was present at the time of alleged incident) so no offence is made out under section
3 (1) (r) and (s) of the sc&st act.

22.In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Rohtagi,11the court observe :

"It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can
be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no
offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint
as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High
Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482
of the present Code"

11
AIR 1983 SC 67

13
23.In Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka Special Leave Petition (Cri.),12 the Supreme Court
spelled out the caution in exercise of the inherent powers as was said in some of the earlier
cases and observed as under:
“Exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the
rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of
the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to
proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger
when prima facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal.
In other words, the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

24.In Swaran Singh and Ors v. State through Standing Counsel and Anr13.this hon'ble court
quashed the proceedings pending in trial court against the appellant no. 1 on the ground that
casteist remarks were not made within the meaning of 'public view.'

The Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power
under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section
482, Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, care-fully and with great caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself.
Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading
to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing
injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.”

25.In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized
some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings. The three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise
of its powers under section 482:

i. where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution
or continuance of the proceedings;

12
SLP (Cri.) No. 1719 of 2006
13
2008 Cri.L.J. 4369

14
 ii. where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
iii. where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge."

26. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others14 (1977) 2 SCC 699 : (AIR 1977 SC
1489), observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court
to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that
the proceedings ought to be quashed,achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this
case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though
justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been
followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.

27. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others15 (1992) 4 SCC 305 : (AIR 1993 SC 892) the
court observed as under:
“Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the
Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent power of the
High Court.” The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui
concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest" which means that when the law
gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not
exist.

28. In State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and others (2010)16 11 SCC 226 : (2010 Cri LJ
3844 (SC), this court observed that the power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is wide but has to be exercised with great care and caution. The interference must
be on sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate
prosecution. The court further observed that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not

14
AIR 1977 SC 1489
15
AIR 1993 SC 892
16
2010 Cri LJ 3844 (SC)

15
constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the
High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under section 482 of the Code.

29. In a recent decision in M. Mohan v. The State, 201117 (3) SCALE 78 : (AIR 2011 SC 1238)
this Court again had an occasion to consider the case of similar nature and this court held that
if all the facts mentioned in the complaint are accepted as correct in its entirety and even then
the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence, in such a case the High
Court should ensure that such frivolous prosecutions are quashed under its inherent powers
under section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

30. When we apply the ratio of the settled principles of law to the facts of this case, then, in
our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ,quashed the complaint qua the appellant only to
prevent abuse of the process of law."

31. Thus, it is humbly submitted that the high court is justified in quashing the order of framing
of charges issued by the trial court as no offence is made out in section 3(1) (r) and (s) of SC
& ST Act.

ISSUE 3 WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE

BEFORE SUPREME COURT?

32.It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the special leave
petition filed by the appeallant is not maintainable as Special Leave cannot be granted when
substantial justice has been done and no exceptional or special circumstances exist for case
to be maintainable [1.1]. Also in the present case, no substantial question of law is involved
and interference is based on pure question of fact which is entitled to be dismissed [1.2]

[3.1] Irrespective of the locus standi of the Appellants, the Petition for Special
Leave is not maintainable.

33.Article 136 does not confer a Right of Appeal, but merely, a discretionary power to the
Supreme Court to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice under exceptional
circumstances. In Pritam Singh v. The State18 , the Supreme Court held that the power under

17
AIR 2011 SC 1238
18
AIR 1950 SC 169

16
Article 136 is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only. In concluding the
discussion on Article 136 in the same case, it was held the by the Supreme Court that ‘
Generally speaking, this court will not grant Special Leave, unless it is shown that exceptional
and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the
case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
appealed against.’

34.Although the power has been held to be plenary, limitless , adjunctive, and unassailable ,
in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India19 and Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar
Suri,20 it was held that the powers under Article 136 should be exercised with caution and in
accordance with law and set legal principles.

35.In the cases of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi21 and Shivanand Gaurishankar
Baswanti v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills22, the Supreme Court has criticized the approach of
settling private disputes under Article 136, stating that it would lead to confusing results and
lack of precedents. The Court observed that the Court is not bound to interfere even if there is
error of law in the impugned order.

36.It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that there was no error in the judgement of the
Bombay High Court. The counsel for the Respondents would also like to submit to this
Hon’ble Court that there is no pressing matter or question of law, for which, the intervention
of this Court would be necessary, i.e. there is no necessity to invoke the jurisdiction conferred
upon this Hon’ble Court under Article 136.

[3.2]Scope of Powers under Article 136:

37.It is humbly submitted that if Special Leave is granted, the matter is registered as an appeal
and the Court does not take into cognizance all the points that may arise on appeal and decide
them on Merits. The Supreme Court– still we may not interfere if the justice of the case on
facts does not require interference or if we feel that the relief could be moulded in a different
fashion

19
AIR 2004 SC 4618
20
AIR 2005 SC 15
21
AIR 2006 SC 1806
22
Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswanti v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, (2008) 13 SCC 323

17
38.The Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala 23held that Article 136 consists of
two distinct stages, the first stage where the matter is merely being decided if it is to be
accepted as an appeal or not; if the Supreme Court decides to adjudicate the matter, it becomes
an appeal, if otherwise, the matter was never an appeal

[3.3] Grounds on which appeal are granted not satisfied

39.The Supreme Court has exercised its Jurisdiction under Article 136 under the following
circumstances-
(i) When the Tribunal ostensibly fails to exercise its patent
jurisdiction.19
(ii) When there is an apparent error on the face of the decision20
.
(iii) The tribunal has erroneously applied well-accepted
principles of jurisprudence
(iv) The tribunal acts against the principles of Natural Justice22,
or has approached the question in a manner likely to cause
injustice.

40.In the instant case, the High Court has not committed any error in law.. There is no breach
in law or natural justice; to say the decision of the High Court was wrong . Hence, it is humbly
submitted to this Hon’ble Court that no grounds can be made out for accepting this petition
for Special Leave.

[3.4] Grounds of rejection:

41.In Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala , it was held that a petition seeking grant
of special leave to appeal may be rejected for several reasons The question raised by the
petitioner for consideration by this Court being not fit for consideration or deserving being
dealt with by the Apex Court; it is humbly submitted that there is no ground for invoking this
Hon’ble Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136.

[3.5] NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTS

23
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 245 ITR 360 (SC)

18
42.It is contended by the respondent that the appellant must show that exceptional and special
circumstances exists and that if there is no interference, substantial and grave injustice will
result and the case has features of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the decision appealed
against on merits. Only then the court would exercise its overriding powers under Art.
136.Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure of justice or when substantial
justice is done, though the decision suffers from some legal errors.

43.In the case at hand, no exceptional and special circumstances have been shown by the
appellant. Article 136 does not give a right to a party to appeal to the SC rather it confers a
wide discretionary power on the SC to interfere in suitable cases.

[3.6] No irregularity of procedure or violation of principle of natural justice is

being done

44.In plethora of cases, it has been held that except that where there has been an illegality or
an irregularity of procedure or a violation of principle of natural justice resulting in the
absence of a fair trial or gross miscarriage of justice, the SC does not permit a third review of
evidence with regard to question of fact in cases in which two courts of fact have appreciated
and assessed the evidence with regard to such questions.24

45.It is contended that this court is not bound to go into the merits and even if it were to do so,
and declare the law or point out the error, still it may not interfere if the justice of the case on
facts doesn’t require interference or if it feels that the relief could be moulded in a different
fashion. Hence, it is submitted that the case is entitled to be dismissed on the above stated
ground only25

[3.7] INFERENCE FROM A PURE QUESTION OF FACT IS IN ITSELF A

FACT AND HENCE NOT OPEN TO REVIEW.

46.It is contended by the Respondent that the appeal doesn’t involve any substantial
question of law rather it involves pure question of fact and hence, is not maintainable.
Questions of fact cannot be permitted to be raised unless there is material evidence which
has been ignored by the high court or the finding reached by the court is perverse.26 In a case

24
State of U.P. v Ram Manorath (1972) 3 SCC 215 (SC); see also UOI v Rajeswari & Co.(1986) AIR 1748
(SC).
25
Raghunath G. Pauhale v Chagan Lal Sundarji & Co.(1999) 8 SCC 1 (SC)
26
Union of India v Rajeshwari & Co. (1986) 161 ITR 60 (SC)

19
it was held that the SC cannot consistently with its practice convert itself into a third court of
facts. 27

47.Hence, it is humbly submitted that in the light of the above mentioned authorities, the
impugned order of the High court deserves to be affirmed and HC didn’t err in dismissing
the appellant’s appeal holding that no substantial question of law is involved

[3.7.1] Even if it is assumed that the matter involves ‘question of law’, no ‘substantial
question of law is involved’.

48.Right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation28.Being a
substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the
relevant time. The conditions mentioned in Section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an
appeal can be maintained under Section 260A. An appeal under section 260A can be only in
respect of a 'substantial question of law’29. It cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds.

48. In Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd.30,this Court had
laid down the following tests to determine whether a substantial question of law is involved.
The tests are: (1) whether directly or indirectly it affects substantial rights of the parties, or (2)
the question is of general-public importance, or (3) whether it is an open question in the sense
that there is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding recorded when such
finding could be treated to be a finding of fact31.

49.It is submitted that the appeal filed by the Appeallant is not maintainable as Special
Leave cannot be granted when substantial justice has been done and no exceptional or special
circumstances exist for case to be maintainable. Also, it will not be granted when there is no
failure of justice or when substantial justice is done, though the decision suffers from some
legal errors. Article 136 does not give a right to a party to appeal to the SC rather it confers a
wide discretionary power on the SC to interfere in suitable cases. Further, no substantial
question of law is involved in the present case and interference is based on pure question of
fact which is entitled to be dismissed.

27
Gurbakhsh Singh v State of Punjab (1955) AIR 320 (SC)
28
Hero Vinoth (minor) v Seshammal (2006) AIR 2234 (SC).
29
M. Janardhana Rao v Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (2005) 193 CTR 58 (SC).
30
Sir Chunilal Mehta (n 26).
31
M. Janardhana Rao v Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (2005) AIR 1309 SC

20
 PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that;
1. The present special leave petition should be dismissed;
2. The decision given by the high court should be upheld;
AND/OR
Pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of justice,
fairness, equity and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness, the Respondent shall be duty bound forever.

Date:7.1.2021 Counsel for respondent

Place: XYZ SHWETA BIDHURI
19309806796

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