DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE

 Article 1173, Civil Code

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.

 Corlis v. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674

Facts: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police officer of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he
was driving while accompanied with a P.C. A soldier collided with a locomotive of
Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago,
Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns
at the hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and
burns.

In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence,
concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming
locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he
became the victim of his own miscalculation.

The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof
to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal directed to us, the amount
sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40.

Issue: Whether or not the Manila Railroad Co. is negligent?

Ruling: No. The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.

The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to
great respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left
to the trial judge who had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their
demeanor on the witness stand.

But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making
clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence,
is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown,
therefore, that MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial
question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

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 Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United
States v. Barias. Cooley’ formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and
Barias decisions. Thus: “Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines
negligence to be:

“The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demands
whereby such other person suffers injury.”

There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ”

“Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or

comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.

Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”

To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of
Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that
the liability sought to be fastened on MRC had not arisen.

The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a
signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own,
ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility Corliss Jr., who
undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that
locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident
had taken place it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this
consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to
move on.

A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner

Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance

with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast
rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the situation demands.
 Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97626, 14
March 1997

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Facts: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's
Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo
Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed
by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing
various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not
credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido
Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.

Petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC these funds to his secretary,
Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC
with PBC.Irene Yabut's modus operandi is to accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit
slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as
depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account
number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller,
Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the
duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of
information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for
record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space
left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is
that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-
01980-3. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to
private respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name
and account number, she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she
deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being
deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas.

Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return
of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court rendered the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The
CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent
Rommel Marketing Corporation and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee?

Ruling: No. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence
of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.

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Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the
case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. CA, defines proximate cause as "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent
the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity. Apropos, once again, is the pronouncement made by
the respondent appellate court, to wit:

“Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds entrusted
to her by plaintiff, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her
husband's current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the
latter's accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for bank teller
Mabayad's aforesaid gross and reckless negligence. The latter's negligence was
thus the proximate, immediate and efficient cause that brought about the loss
claimed by plaintiff in this case, and the failure of plaintiff to discover the same
soon enough by failing to scrutinize the monthly statements of account being sent
to it by appellant bank could not have prevented the fraud and misappropriation
which Irene Yabut had already completed when she deposited plaintiff's money to
the account of her husband instead of to the latter's accounts.”

Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the
culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also
mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by
another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was
negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be
denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
Petitioners nevertheless aver that the failure of respondent RMC to cross-check the bank's
statements of account with its own records during the entire period of more than one (1)

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 year is the proximate cause of the commission of subsequent frauds and misappropriation
committed by Ms. Irene Yabut.

It also cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have
been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The
damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly
Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This
omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages
that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:

“When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.”

In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, Private respondent is entitled to by 40%.

 Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation v. Borja, G.R. No.

143008, 10 June 2002

Facts: On September 23, 1987, Smith Bell (petitioner) requested the Bureau of Customs
to inspect vessel M/T King Family which was due to arrive at the port of Manila on
September 24, 1987. Customs Inspector Borja was instructed to inspect said vessel. At
about 11 o'clock in the morning on September 24, while M/T King Family was unloading
chemicals unto two (2) barges owned by ITTC (respondent), a sudden explosion occurred
setting the vessels afire. Seeing the fire and fearing for his life, Borja hurriedly jumped
over board to save himself. Borja survived but he became permanently disabled due to
the incident. He made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for the damages caused by
the explosion but both denied liabilities and attributed to each other negligence. RTC
ruled in Borja’s favor and held Smith Bell liable for damages and loss of income, and
ordered the latter to pay actual damages for loss of earning capacity, moral damages and
attorney’s fees. CA affirmed.

Issue: Who, if any, is liable for Borja’s injuries?

Ruling: Smith Bell is liable. Both RTC and CA ruled that the fire and explosion
originated from Smith Bell’s vessel. (As supported by the testimonies of the eyewitnesses

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 and the investigation conducted by the Special Board of Marine Inquiry and affirmed by
the secretary of the Dept. of National Defense.) Negligence is conduct that creates undue
risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.

Smith Bell's vessel was carrying chemical cargo. While knowing that their vessel was
carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the
necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Smith Bell was, therefore, negligent. The
three elements of quasi-delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these
elements were established in this case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous
chemicals, Smith Bell was negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in
transporting the cargo. As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of
the chemicals from the vessel, Borja suffered damages and injuries.

Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of
negligent management or navigation. SC awarded: loss of earning capacity; moral
damages and attorney’s fees under the Civil Code’s Article 2219, par. 2, and Article
2208, par. 11, respectively.

TEST OF NEGLIGENCE

 Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809

Facts: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he
had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time
to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his
left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant

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assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to
the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge,
got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has
appealed.

Issue: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done?

Ruling: Yes. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated
in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable
to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable

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 consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.

 U.S. vs. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, 3 October 1912

Facts: Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of
Pavia to Santa Barbara, Iloilo at 4:00pm on April 23, 1911 by a car, of which respondent
is a chauffeur. According to Pedtro Latoja, one of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution, he was walking abreast along the said highway, and while they he was going
along, he heard a noise from behind. Upon turning around, he saw an automobile
approaching. He immediately called out that an automobile was coming and jumped to
the left, colliding with Labrila, another witness; that when he turned around to look for
Leal the latter was lying on the ground, having been knocked down.

Issue: Whether or not Juanillo is negligent?

Ruling: Yes. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The testimony of all the parties in the case at bar as to the surrounding conditions of this
occurrence was to the effect that the road on which they were traveling was dotted with
simple rural folk. It was Sunday afternoon and the road connected two rather populous
towns that were close together. In his brief, counsel for the appellant says: Two native

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 farmers who all their lives have seen nothing that moves faster than a bull cart, except on
the two or three occasions on which they testify they have visited Iloilo, cannot be
expected to give an intelligent idea of speed of an automobile, train, or even a fast horse.

They testify that they did not see or observe the deceased after hearing the automobile
until after he was struck. If they had never seen an automobile save in two or three
occasions in their lives, and looked back and saw one coming in a road not at all wide,
with even fifty or a hundred yards intervening, it would but be natural for them to rush to
the sides of the road. And finding himself alone on the right hand side, which had been
the most accessible to him at the moment, it would be perfectly natural for an ignorant
farmer at such a, to him, hazardous moment to decide suddenly to cross and join his
companions on the other side. And it is not surprising if such a man should miscalculate
the time necessary for an automobile, even running at only a very slow pace, to cover an
intervening distance. Under such conditions appellant being in charge of the powerful
machine, capable of doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a
high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers.

 People v. De los Santos, G.R. No. 131588, 27 March 2001

Facts: Glenn De los Santos was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder,
Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in only one information
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City.

The information read that the accused driving an Isuzu Elf, hit and killed members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class
0795), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of
35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, as a result thereof,
some PNP members were killed on the spot, while another trainee/victim, Antonio
Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while eleven (11) other trainee/victims
were seriously wounded, and some sustained minor injuries. After which said accused
thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore-
enumerated helpless.

The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the
qualifying circumstance.

Issues:
1) Whether or not accused is guilty as charged?

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2) Whether or not the filing of only one information for the offenses as charged is valid?

Ruling:
1) No, from the convergence of circumstances, the court held that the tragic event was
more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on accused’ part.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the accused intentionally rammed and
hit the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping
thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown
by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene. For its part, the
defense attributed the continuous movement of accused vehicle to the confluence that
the Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were
applied the truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum,
albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.

It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more
explanations – one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the
accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility – the Court
should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused. The court is
convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons
killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. Although
proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is
positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of
two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be true.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in
the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to
guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Glenn showed
an inexcusable lack of precaution and liable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather
the result of a single act of reckless driving, accused should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
2) Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. Since no, the slight physical injuries

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 caused by the accused to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would,
had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which
are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate
offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

However, it must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court.
However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of
the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to
have waived such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two
or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses
as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

 Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-

51806, 8 November 1988

Facts: Ernest Simke went to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law.
While walking towards the viewing deck or the terrace to get a better view of the
incoming passengers, he slipped over an elevation about four inches high, and he fell on
his back and broke his thigh bone. He filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict
with the CFI of Rizal against the Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity
empowered to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain, and develop the MIA.
Judgment was rendered in his favor, and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment
was affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the CAA, being an agency of the government, can be made a party
defendant?

Ruling: Yes. Not all government entities whether corporate or not are immune from
suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized. The CAA is not immune from suit it being engaged in functions
pertaining to a private entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the
exclusive prerogative of the state, may more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns. The CAA was created not to maintain a necessity of the
government, but to run what is essentially a business even if the revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public.
 Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Vivian Tan Lee, G.R. No. 166869, 16
February 2010

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 Facts: The bus owned by the Philippine Hawk Company collided with the motorcycle of
spouses Vivian Tan Lee and SIlverio Tan. The accident causes the death of respondent’s
husband and claims for actual damages. Respondent’s husband was leasing and operating
a gasoline station and earned an annual income of one million pesos and they also had a
copra business which gave them an income of P3,000 a month. In order to prove for loss
of earning capacity for the operation of gasoline station, respondent presented in evidence
a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source. On the other hand, she
presented her testimony as evidence for his husband’s earnings for copra business.

Issues: Is the evidence presented sufficient to compute the actual damages as indemnity?

Ruling: No. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by
Article 2206 of the Civil Code. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. It is reasonable to use the
Certificate and respondent’s testimony as bases for fixing the gross annual income of the
deceased at one million pesos before respondent’s husband died on March 17, 1999.

However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived from
their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot
be considered. In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary
expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross
income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less
necessary expenses).

 R Transport Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161, 18 February 2015

Facts: At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after having
alighted from a passenger bus in front of Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane
of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by
Antonio P. Gimena, who... was then employed by petitioner R Transport Corporation.
Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical City Hospital where she was pronounced dead
on arrival. The husband of the deceased, Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages
before the RTC of Makati City against petitioner R Transport, Antonio Gimena, and
Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC) for the death of his wife. MMTC denied
its liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus involved in the
incident, the actual owner, being R Transport.
It explained that under the Bus Installment Purchase Program of the government, MMTC
merely purchased the subject bus, among several others, for resale to petitioner R
Transport, which will in turn operate the same within Metro Manila. Since it was not
actually operating the bus which killed respondent's wife, nor was it the employer of the

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driver thereof, MMTC alleged that the complaint against it should be dismissed. R
Transport alleged that Yu had no cause of action against it for it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and drivers and that its buses
are in good condition.

Meanwhile, the driver Antonio Gimena was declared in default for his failure to file an
answer to the complaint. It also cited the case of Vargas vs. Langcay and Tamayo v.
Aquino insisting that it should not be held solidarily liable with MMTC for it is not the
registered owner of the bus which killed the deceased and contends that it is the
registered owner of the vehicle, rather than the actual owner, who must be jointly and
severally liable with the driver of the passenger vehicle for damages incurred by third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicle.

Issue: Is R TRANSPORT correct in its argument that since it was not the registered
owner of the bus which bumped the victim; it cannot be held liable for the damage?

Ruling: No. Under Art. 2194, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict is solidary. In the Tamayo case the responsibility of the registered owner
and actual operator of a truck which caused the death of its passenger is not solidary, the
same is due to the fact that the action instituted was one for breach of contract.

However, It must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of
carriage, as in Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article
2180 of the New Civil Code. As such, the liability for which R Transport is being made
responsible actually arises not from a pre-existing contractual relation between petitioner
and the deceased, but from a damage caused by the negligence of its employee. R
Transport cannot, therefore, rely on the ruling in Tamayo and escape its solidary liability
for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct and
primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. It has consistently been of the view that it is for the better protection of the
public for both the owner of record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and
severally liable with the driver. As aptly stated by the appellate court, “the principle of
holding the registered owner liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the
offending vehicle has already been transferred to another is designed to protect the public
and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in,
in order to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent act.”

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