Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, Inc.

ALSOP, District Judge.

On February 3, 1975, Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. (Helzberg), a Missouri corporation, and Valley West Des
Moines Shopping Center, Inc. (Valley West), an Iowa corporation, executed a written Lease Agreement. The Lease
Agreement granted Helzberg the right to operate a full line jewelry store at space 254 in the Valley West Mall in West
Des Moines, Iowa. Section 6 of Article V of the Lease Agreement provides:

[Valley West] agrees it will not lease premises in the shopping center for use as a catalog jewelry store
nor lease premises for more than two full line jewelry stores in the shopping center in addition to the
leased premises. This clause shall not prohibit other stores such as department stores from selling jewelry
from catalogs or in any way restrict the shopping center department stores.

Subsequently, Helzberg commenced operation of a full line jewelry store in the Valley West Mall.
Between February 3, 1975 and November 2, 1976 Valley West and two other corporations entered into leases for
spaces in the Valley West Mall for use as full line jewelry stores. Pursuant to those leases the two corporations also
initiated actual operation of full line jewelry stores.
On November 2, 1976, Valley West and Kirk's Incorporated, Jewelers, an Iowa corporation, doing business as
Lord's Jewelers (Lord's), entered into a written Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement granted Lord's the right to
occupy space 261 in the Valley West Mall. Section 1 of Article V of the Lease Agreement provides that Lord's will use
space 261

. . . only as a retail specialty jewelry store (and not as a catalogue or full line jewelry store) featuring
watches, jewelry (and the repair of same) and incidental better gift items.

However, Lord's intended to open and operate what constituted a full line jewelry store at space 261.
In an attempt to avoid the opening of a fourth full line jewelry store in the Valley West Mall and the resulting
breach of the Helzberg-Valley West Lease Agreement, Helzberg instituted suit seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief restraining Valley West's breach of the Lease Agreement. The suit was filed in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri. Subject matter jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332 based upon diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy which exceeded $10,000.
Personal jurisdiction was established by service of process on Valley West pursuant to the Missouri "long arm" statute,
Rev. Stat. Mo. § 506.500 et seq. (1977). Rule 4(e), Fed.R.Civ.P.
Valley West moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19 because Helzberg had failed to join Lord's as a party defendant.
n1 That motion was denied. The District Court n2 went on to order that “pending the determination of [the] action on
the merits, that [Valley West] be, and it is hereby, enjoined and restrained from allowing, and shall take all necessary
steps to prevent, any other tenant in its Valley West Mall (including but not limited to Kirk's Incorporated, Jewelers,
d/b/a Lord's Jewelers) to open and operate on March 30, 1977, or at any other time, or to be operated during the term of
[Helzberg's] present leasehold, a fourth full line jewelry store meaning a jewelry store offering for sale at retail a broad
range of jewelry items at various prices such as diamonds and diamond jewelry, precious and semi-precious stones,
watches, rings, gold jewelry, costume jewelry, gold chains, pendants, bracelets, belt buckles, tie tacs, tie slides and
earrings, provided, however, nothing contained herein shall be construed to enjoin [Valley West] from allowing the
opening in said Valley West Mall of a small store, known by [Valley West] as a boutique, which sells limited items
such as only Indian jewelry, only watches, only earrings, or only pearls.”

From this order Valley West appeals.

It is clear that Valley West is entitled to appeal from the order granting preliminary injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1). However, Valley West does not attack the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction directly;
instead, it challenges the District Court's denial of its motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party and
argues that the District Court's order fails for lack of specificity in describing the acts of Valley West to be restrained…

1
 Rule 19, Fed.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest . . . .
(b) If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it,
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be
considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Because Helzberg was seeking and the District Court ordered injunctive relief which may prevent Lord's from
operating its jewelry store in the Valley West Mall in the manner in which Lord's originally intended, the District Court
correctly concluded that Lord's was a party to be joined if feasible. See Rule 19 (a)(2)(i), Fed.R.Civ.P. Therefore,
because Lord's was not and is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the Western District of Missouri, the District Court
was required to determine whether [*819] or not Lord's should be regarded as indispensable. After considering the
factors which Rule 19(b) mandates be considered, the District Court concluded that Lord's was not to be regarded as
indispensable. We agree. . .
Rule 19(b) requires the court to look first to the extent to which a judgment rendered in Lord's absence might be
prejudicial to Lord's or to Valley West. Valley West argues that the District Court's order granting preliminary
injunctive relief does prejudice Lord's and may prejudice Valley West. We do not agree.
It seems axiomatic that none of Lord's rights or obligations will be ultimately determined in a suit to which it is not
a party. Even if, as a result of the District Court's granting of the preliminary injunction, Valley West should attempt to
terminate Lord's leasehold interest in space 261 in the Valley West Mall, Lord's will retain all of its rights under its
Lease Agreement with Valley West. None of its rights or obligations will have been adjudicated as a result of the
present proceedings, proceedings to which it is not a party. Therefore, we conclude that Lord's will not be prejudiced in
a way contemplated by Rule 19(b) as a result of this action.
Likewise, we think that Lord's absence will not prejudice Valley West in a way contemplated by Rule 19(b). Valley
West contends that it may be subjected to inconsistent obligations as a result of a determination in this action and a
determination in another forum that Valley West should proceed in a fashion contrary to what has been ordered in these
proceedings.
It is true that the obligations of Valley West to Helzberg, as determined in these proceedings, may be inconsistent
with Valley West's obligations to Lord's. However, we are of the opinion that any inconsistency in those obligations
will result from Valley West's voluntary execution of two Lease Agreements which impose inconsistent obligations
rather than from Lord's absence from the present proceedings.
Helzberg seeks only to restrain Valley West's breach of the Lease Agreement to which Helzberg and Valley West
were the sole parties. Certainly, all of the rights and obligations arising under a lease can be adjudicated where all of
the parties to the lease are before the court. Thus, in the context of these proceedings the District Court can determine all
of the rights and obligations of both Helzberg and Valley West based upon the Lease Agreement between them, even
though Lord's is not a party to the proceedings.
Valley West's contention that it may be subjected to inconsistent judgments if Lord's should choose to file suit
elsewhere and be awarded judgment is speculative at best. In the first place, Lord's has not filed such a suit. Secondly,
there is no showing that another court is likely to interpret the language of the two Lease Agreements differently from
the way in which the District Court would. Therefore, we also conclude that Valley West will suffer no prejudice as a
result of the District Court's proceeding in Lord's absence. Any prejudice which Valley West may suffer by way of

2
inconsistent judgments would be the result of Valley West's execution of Lease Agreements which impose inconsistent
obligations and not the result of the proceedings in the District Court.
Rule 19(b) also requires the court to consider ways in which prejudice to the absent party can be lessened or
avoided. The District Court afforded Lord's an opportunity to intervene in order to protect any interest it might have in
the outcome of this litigation. Lord's chose not to do so. In light of Lord's decision not to intervene we conclude that the
District Court acted in such a way as to sufficiently protect Lord's interests.
Similarly, we also conclude that the District Court's determinations that a judgment rendered in Lord's absence
would be adequate and that there is no controlling significance to the fact that Helzberg would have an adequate remedy
in the Iowa courts were not erroneous. It follows that the District Court's conclusion that in equity and good conscience
the action should be allowed to proceed was a correct one.
In sum, it is generally recognized that a person does not become indispensable to an action to determine rights
under a contract simply because that person's rights or obligations under an entirely separate contract will be affected by
the result of the action.
In view of the foregoing, it follows that the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

3
 HAAS, v. JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI BEACH
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1971
442 F.2d 394

Before Gewin, Ainsworth and Aldisert, * Circuit Judges.

ALDISERT, CIRCUIT JUDGE: Following a pre-trial conference, the district court entered an order finding that
Charles H. Glueck was an "indispensable party" under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 19, and dismissing the action on the ground that
Glueck's presence in the case "violates the requirements of complete diversity." We must determine whether the court's
action was appropriate at a pre-trial stage, and, if so, whether it abused its discretion in dismissing the action instead of
proceeding without Glueck.
Invoking jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Haas, a citizen of Ohio, sought a
mandatory injunction from the district court directing the Jefferson National Bank, a citizen of Florida, to issue to him
169 1/2 shares of its common stock. Alternatively, he asked for damages reflecting the stock's value. He alleged a 1963
agreement with Glueck, also an Ohio citizen, under which they were to jointly purchase 250 shares of the bank's stock;
the certificates were to issue in the name of Glueck but Haas was to have a one-half ownership of the shares. He also
pleaded a similar 1966 agreement with Glueck to purchase 34 additional shares. According to Haas, he paid Glueck
amounts representing one-half ownership, the bank had knowledge of his ownership interest, and the certificates and
subsequent dividends were issued to Glueck.
Haas contends, however, that in 1967 he requested Glueck to order the bank to issue certificates in Haas' name,
reflecting his ownership of 169 1/2 shares, and that pursuant to this request Glueck presented to the bank properly
endorsed certificates for 250 shares with instructions to reissue 170 shares to Haas and the balance to Glueck.
In its answer, the Bank explained that it had refused to make the assignment because at the time of the transfer
request Glueck was indebted to it under the terms of a promissory note which required that Glueck pledge, assign, and
transfer to the bank property of any kind owned by Glueck and coming into the possession of the Bank. The Bank
averred that Glueck withdrew the transfer request and instead pledged the stock certificates with a second bank as
collateral for a loan there.
With these contentions forming the backdrop of the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated to the questions of
fact which remained to be litigated at trial:

(a) Did the Bank have knowledge of Haas' claimed ownership of the stock prior to Glueck's 1967 transfer
request?
(b) Did Glueck withdraw the 1967 transfer request?
(c) What was the status of Glueck's obligation to the bank as represented by the promissory note?
(d) Did the second bank have possession of the stock in controversy at the time Haas filed the action?
(e) Did Haas in fact own 169 1/2 shares of the bank stock?

Following the pre-trial conference and the entry of these stipulations, the district court entered an order directing
Haas to amend his complaint to join Glueck as a party. The court then denied his motion to dismiss Glueck as a party,
and granted the Bank's motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the jurisdictional ground of incomplete diversity. 1

We have no difficulty in concluding that the district court did not enter its joinder order prematurely. It was
entirely appropriate to resolve Glueck's status on the basis of the pleadings and stipulations of the parties which posed
the trial issues with completeness and precision. The vital factual issues having been joined, there was no reason to
postpone the resolution of the indispensability problem until after the commencement of trial. 2

*
Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
Service of process was not properly effectuated because the attempted service in Ohio was beyond the territorial limits
of the district court in Florida. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 4(f).
2
The Advisory Committee commented in part upon Rule 19 as follows: A person may be added as a party at any stage

4
 Moreover, if the district court did not err in ordering the joinder of Glueck, it was obviously correct in finding a
jurisdictional defect. It is clear beyond any doubt that the diversity statute requires complete diversity of citizenship.
Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S 63, 62 S.Ct. 15, 86 L.Ed. 47 (1941); Treinies v. Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S.
66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed.2d 435 (1806). “The policy
of the statute calls for its strict construction.” Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270, 54 S. Ct. 700, 703, 78 L.Ed. 1248
(1934). It is of course immaterial that the nondiverse party has been required to be joined as an indispensable party.
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. 102, 124, 88 S. Ct. 733, 746, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936
(1968). “It is settled that failure of the district court to acquire jurisdiction over indispensable parties to an action
deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and render a judgment.” Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d
952, 957 (6 Cir. 1947). 3

In approaching the dispositive question whether Rule 19 required the joinder of Glueck, we begin with the
formulation of Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L. Ed. 158 (1854). Indispensable parties were defined
as
[p]ersons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final
decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.

As Mr. Justice Harlan declared in Provident, Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. 102, 124,
88 S.Ct. 733, 746, 19 L.Ed.2d 936, the generalizations of Shields "are still valid today, and they are consistent with the
requirements of Rule 19. * * * Indeed, the * * * Shields definition states, in rather different fashion, the criteria for
decision announced in Rule 19(b)." It is essential, however, to bear in mind that the broad statements in Shields "are not
a substitute for the analysis required by that Rule." Id.
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 19, as amended in 1966, provides:

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will
not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. * * *

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)
(1)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience
the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will

of action on motion or on the court's initiative (see Rule 21); and a motion to dismiss, on the ground that a person has
not been joined and justice requires that the action should not proceed in his absence, may be made as late as the trial on
the merits (see Rule 12(h) (2), as amended; cf. Rule 12(b) (7), as amended). However, when the moving party is
seeking dismissal in order to protect himself against a later suit by the absent person (subdivision (a) (2) (ii)), and is not
seeking vicariously to protect the absent person against a prejudicial judgment (subdivision (a) (2) (i)), his undue delay
in making the motion can properly be counted against him as a reason for denying the motion. A joinder question
should be decided with reasonable promptness, but decision may properly be deferred if adequate information is not
available at the time. Thus the relationship of an absent person to the action, and the practical effects of an adjudication
upon him and others, may not be sufficiently revealed at the pleading stage; in such a case it would be appropriate to
defer decision until the action was further advanced, Cf. Rule 12(d).
3
See generally Note, Indispensable Parties in the Federal Courts, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 1050 (1952); Note, Indispensable
Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 Yale L.J. 1088 (1947).

5
 be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder. 4

The Rule thus commands that we address ourselves to two broad questions: (1) Was Glueck a party "to be joined if
feasible" under section (a)? If so, (2) was the court correct, under section (b), in dismissing the action or should it have
proceeded without the additional party?
It is readily apparent that Glueck "falls within the category of persons who, under § (a), should be 'joined if
feasible,'" Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. at 108, 88 S. Ct. at 737, 19 L. Ed. 2d
936, for his presence is critical to the disposition of the important issues in the litigation. His evidence will either
support the complaint or bolster the defense: it will affirm or refute Haas' claim to half ownership of the stock; it will
substantiate or undercut Haas' contention that the Bank had knowledge of his alleged ownership interest; it will
corroborate or compromise the Bank's contention that Glueck rescinded the transfer order; and it will be crucial to the
determination of Glueck's obligation to the Bank under the promissory note. The essence of Haas' action against the
Bank is that it "unlawfully and recklessly seized, detained, [**10] [and] exercised improper dominion" over his shares
in transferring and delivering them to the second bank as collateral for Glueck's loan. Thus, Glueck becomes more than
a key witness whose testimony would be of inestimable value. Instead he emerges as an active participant in the alleged
conversion of Haas' stock.
Applying the criterion of Rule 19(a) (2) (ii), we believe that Glueck's absence would expose the defendant Bank "to
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest."
If Haas prevailed in this litigation in the absence of Glueck and were adjudicated owner of half of the stock, Glueck, not
being bound by res adjudicata, could theoretically succeed in later litigation against the Bank in asserting ownership of
the whole. In addition, a favorable resolution of Haas' claim against the Bank could, under (a) (2) (i), "as a practical
matter impair or impede [the absent party's] ability to protect [his] interest" in all of the shares -- an interest that is at
least apparent since all of the stock was issued in Glueck's name.
Because Glueck cannot be made a party without destroying diversity, however, it remains to be decided whether,
under Rule 19(b), his presence is so vital that "in equity and good conscience the action * * * should be dismissed, the

4
Rule 19, as amended, has not received uniform endorsement by commentators. See, e.g., Fink, Indispensable Parties
and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 Yale L.J. 403 (1965). In arguing against the adoption of the new
rule, the author concluded:

Undeniably the indispensable parties rule sometimes puts the federal courts to a cruel choice: whether to proceed
without absent persons whose interests might be affected by any decree entered or whose presence is required for the
entry of a complete, just, and viable decree, or to dismiss the action and thereby perhaps deny the present plaintiff any
forum in which his action may be heard. This problem can best be attacked, not by seeking ways to proceed without
interested persons, which inevitably has the effect of fragmenting law suits, but by searching for the means of bringing
all interested persons before a single forum so that whole controversies may be expeditiously settled.
For this reason, the more desirable answers would seem to be an extension of service of process in the federal courts to
bring in absent indispensable and conditionally necessary parties; a relaxation of venue requirements as to such parties,
and a relaxation of complete diversity requirements in regard to such absent parties. These changes, which may be
made readily by the Court and by Congress, would meet the real problem involving joinder requirements -- the largely
artificial barriers which today prevent complete and expeditious adjudications of entire controversies in the federal
courts.

Id. at 448. In this connection, see Cound, Friedenthal, Miller, Civil Procedure 489 (1968):

Notice that a federal court can acquire jurisdiction over an absentee not within the state pursuant to any long arm statute,
Rule 4(e), and that it can also serve persons brought in under Rule 19 if they are within 100 miles from the place where
the action is commenced, whether or not the place of service is within the state in which the action is pending, Rule 4(f).
Should the remaining territorial barriers be broken down?

See also American Law Institute Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts, § § 2341 et
seq (official draft 1968); Carrington, Civil Procedure, 896-899 (1969).

6
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." This decision is always a matter of judgment and must be
exercised with sufficient knowledge of the facts in order to evaluate the exact role of the absentees. As the Supreme
Court has said:

The decision whether to dismiss (i. e., the decision whether the person missing is "indispensable") must
be based on factors varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some
procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests.
Rule 19 does not prevent the assertion of compelling substantive interests; it merely commands the
courts to examine each controversy to make certain that the interests really exist.

Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. at 118, 119, 88 S. Ct. at 743, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936.
The spirit of the Rule is to depart from the tyranny [**12] of the old labels of "necessary" and "indispensable", and to
solve each problem "in the context of particular litigation." Id. at 118, 88 S. Ct. at 742, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936. 5
We turn now to the specific factors enumerated in Rule 19(b), as applied to the facts before us. In our view the first
[*399] factor tracks the considerations of 19(a) (2) (ii) discussed above: "to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might [**13] be prejudicial to him or those already parties." And based on the reasoning previously
set forth, we believe this factor supplies weighty reason for a finding of indispensability. 6
The second factor directs the court to consider the extent to which the shaping of relief might avoid or lessen the
prejudice to existing or absent parties. 7 Because the title to the stock certificates, although not the immediate issue in
this litigation, assumes such commanding importance, it is difficult to conceptualize a form of relief or protective
provisions which would not require as a preliminary matter the determination of the question of title with all the
resulting potential for prejudice.
In analyzing the third factor, "whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate," Mr. Justice
Harlan cautioned:

[T]here remains the interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement
of controversies. We read the Rule's third criterion, whether the judgment issued in the absence of the
nonjoined person will be "adequate," to refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever
possible, for clearly the plaintiff, who himself chose both the forum and the parties defendant, will not be
heard to complain about the sufficiency of the relief obtainable against them. * * *

5
See Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 70, at 296-302 (2d ed. 1970). Prior to the amendment of the Rule in 1966,
Professor James observed:

Moreover, in many cases a factual inquiry is needed before a realistic appraisal can be made of the weight properly to
be attached to one or more of the factors. Because of all this, the problem does not readily lend itself to solution by
fixed and rigid rules. What is called for, rather, is flexibility and a case-by-case appraisal of the relevant factors.
James, Civil Procedure § 9.20, at 425 (1965).
6
[T]he defendant may properly wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a
liability he shares with another. * * * There is [also] the interest of the outsider * * *. Of course, since the outsider is
not before the court, he cannot be bound by the judgment rendered. This means, however, only that a judgment is not
res judicata as to, or legally enforceable against, a nonparty * * *. Instead, as Rule 19(a) expresses it, the court must
consider the extent to which the judgment may "as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect" his interest
in the subject matter. * * *
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. at 110, 88 S. Ct. at 738, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936.
7
Rule 19(b) also directs a district court to consider the possibility of shaping relief to accommodate these four interests.
Commentators had argued that greater attention should be paid to this potential solution to a joinder stymie, and the
Rule now makes it explicit that a court should consider modification of a judgment as an alternative to dismissal.
Id. at 111-112, 88 S. Ct. at 739, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936.

7
 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. at 111, 88 S. Ct. at 739, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936. It
seems evident to us that the absence of Glueck in this litigation would, of necessity, result in less than a complete
settlement of this controversy. For reasons already discussed, there is no semblance of a guarantee that a judgment on
Haas' terms would settle the whole dispute generated by the facts here.
Finally Rule 19(b) requires us to consider whether the plaintiff will have an avenue for relief if the district court's
dismissal for nonjoinder is affirmed. 8 Clearly, the state courts of Ohio afford plaintiff Haas an opportunity to adjudicate
his rights against Glueck. 9 They provide a ready forum to settle the question of title to the stock. Moreover, assuming
the disposition of the preliminary question of title in the Ohio courts, it is not difficult to conceptualize circumstances
permitting the possibility of a second action against the Bank in which the problem of nonjoinder will not be so acute.
Accordingly, applying Rule 19 (b)'s "equity and good conscience test", we hold that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that Glueck was an indispensable party and in dismissing this action.
Affirmed.

8
[T]he plaintiff has an interest in having a forum. Before the trial, the strength of this interest obviously depends upon
whether a satisfactory alternative forum exists. * * *
Id. at 109, 88 S. Ct. at 738, 19 L. Ed. 2d 936. See James, Civil Procedure, § 9.20 at 432 (1965):

The availability of the state court is a factor properly to be considered by the federal court in weighing the relative
interests which will be affected by a ruling of indispensability. Even if the plaintiff's preference for the federal forum
deserves the court's enthusiastic protection, the disappointment of that choice is not so great a hardship on the plaintiff
as the foreclosing of all courts to him.
9
In response to the court's inquiry at oral argument, Haas' counsel reported that a state action between Haas and Glueck
is now pending.

8
 TEMPLE v. SYNTHES CORP., LTD.
Cite No. 111 S. Ct. 315 (1990)

Billy J. TEMPLE Following surgery, the device's screws broke off inside
Temple's back.
v.
SYNTHES CORPORATION, LTD. Temple filed suit against Synthes in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
No. 90-295.
Louisiana. The suit, which rested on diversity
Decided Nov. 5, 1990. jurisdiction, alleged defective design and manufacture of
the device. At the same time, Temple filed a state
administrative proceeding against Dr. LaRocca and the
Patient brought action against manufacturer of "plate
hospital for malpractice and negligence. At the
and screw device" implanted in patient's lower spine,
conclusion of the administrative proceeding, Temple
after the device's screws broke off inside the patient's
filed suit against the doctor and the hospital in Louisiana
back. Manufacturer filed motion to dismiss for failure
state court.
to join as necessary parties doctor who performed
implant surgery and hospital where surgery was
Synthes did not attempt to bring the doctor and the
performed. The United States District Court for the
hospital into the federal action by means of a third-party
Eastern District of Louisiana, Charles Schwartz, Jr., J.,
complaint, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil
130 F.R.D. 68, ordered joinder of doctor and hospital,
Procedure 14(a). Instead, Synthes filed a motion to
and dismissed suit with prejudice when patient failed to
dismiss Temple's federal suit for failure to join necessary
comply. Patient appealed. The Court of Appeals for
parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 898 F.2d 152. Certiorari was
Following a hearing, the District Court ordered Temple
granted. The Supreme Court held that it was error to
to join the doctor and the hospital as defendants within
label doctor and hospital, who were potential joint tort-
20 days or risk dismissal of the lawsuit. According to
feasors, as indispensable parties, and to dismiss suit with
the court, the most significant reason for requiring
prejudice for failure to join them.
joinder was the interest of judicial economy. App. C to
Pet. for Cert. A-12. The court relied on this Court's
Reversed and remanded.
decision in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed.2d 936
1. Torts k25
(1968), wherein we recognized that one focus of Rule 19
It is not necessary for all joint tort-feasors to be
is "the interest of the courts and the public in complete,
named as defendants in a single lawsuit. Fed.Rules
consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies."
Civ.Proc.Rule 19, 28 U.S.C.A.
Id., at 111, 88 S.Ct., at 739. When Temple failed to join
the doctor and the hospital, the court dismissed the suit
2. Federal Civil Procedure k21, 1748
with prejudice.
Products Liability k71
Doctor who performed implant surgery and hospital
Temple appealed, and the United States Court of
where surgery was performed were merely permissive
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 898 F.2d 152
parties in patient's products liability action against
(1990) (judgement order). The court deemed it
manufacturer of "plate and screw device" implanted in
"obviously prejudicial to the defendants to have the
patient's lower spine, and it was error to order their
separate litigations being carried on," because Synthes'
joinder as indispensable parties, and to dismiss suit with
defense might be that the plate was not defective but that
prejudice for failure to join them. Fed.Rules Civ.
the doctor and the hospital were negligent, while the
Proc.Rule 19(a, b), 28 U.S.C.A.
doctor and the hospital, on the other hand, might claim
that they were not negligent but that the plate was
PER CURIAM.
defective. *7 App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3. The Court of
Appeals found that the claims overlapped and that the
Petitioner Temple, a Mississippi resident,
District Court therefore had not abused its discretion in
underwent surgery in October 1986 in which a "plate and
ordering joinder under Rule 19. A petition for rehearing
screw device" was implanted in his lower spine. The
was denied.
device was manufactured by respondent Synthes Corp.,
Ltd. (U.S.A.) (Synthes), a Pennsylvania corporation.
[1] In his petition for certiorari to this Court,
Dr. S. Henry LaRocca performed the surgery at St.
Temple contends that it was error to label joint
Charles General Hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana.
tortfeasors as indispensable parties under Rule 19(b) and

9
to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice for failure to join
those parties. We agree. Synthes does not deny that it,
the doctor, and the hospital are potential joint tortfeasors.
It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all
joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single
lawsuit. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.,
349 U.S. 322, 329-330, 75 S.Ct. 865, 869, 99 L.Ed. 1122
(1955); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining &
Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 132, 32 S.Ct. 641, 644, 56
L.Ed. 1009 (1912). See also Nottingham v. General
American Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880
(CA5) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854, 108
S.Ct. 158, 98 L.Ed.2d 113 (1987). Nothing in the 1966
revision of Rule 19 changed that principle. See Provident
Bank, supra, 390 U.S., at 116-117, n. 12, 88 S.Ct., at
741-742, n. 12. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule
19(a) explicitly state that "a tortfeasor with the usual
'joint-and-several' liability is merely a permissive party
to an action against another with like liability." 28
U.S.C.App., p. 595. There is nothing in Louisiana tort
law to the contrary. See Mullin v. Skains, 252 La. 1009,
1014, 215 So.2d 643, 645 (1968); La.Civ.Code Ann.,
Arts. 1794, 1795 (West 1987).

[2] The opinion in Provident Bank, supra, does

speak of the public interest in limiting multiple litigation,
but that case is not controlling here. There, the estate of
a tort victim brought a declaratory judgment action
against an insurance company. We assumed that the
policyholder was a person "who, under § (a), should be
'joined if feasible.' " 390 U.S., at 108, 88 S.Ct., at 737,
and went on to discuss the appropriate analysis under
Rule 19(b), because the policyholder could not be joined
without destroying diversity. Id., at 109-116, 88 S.Ct., at
737-741. After examining the factors set forth in Rule
19(b), we determined that the action could proceed
without the policyholder; he therefore was not an
indispensable party whose absence required dismissal of
the suit. Id., at 116, 119, 88 S.Ct., at 741, 743.

Here, no inquiry under Rule 19(b) is necessary,

because the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) have
not been satisfied. As potential joint tortfeasors with
Synthes, Dr. LaRocca and the hospital were merely
permissive parties. The Court of Appeals erred by
failing to hold that the District Court abused its
discretion in ordering them joined as defendants and in
dismissing the action when Temple failed to comply with
the court's order. For these reasons, we grant the petition
for certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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