G.R. No.
204894               March 10, 2014 P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO
SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel
Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y
Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder before the Las
Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening
of August 29, 2006, he and P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling
the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF
Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the
driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but,
having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked
him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for further
questioning.2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On
reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they
stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the
store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them.
PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape.
But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he
saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee
outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The
latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio
radioed for help and for an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that
accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
Police, testified that he and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately
responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi
driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned
taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred
instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was
someone named Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The
police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up
operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects,
Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused
Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused.
The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of
accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture
accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile
phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his
death 28 years old, unmarried, and was receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to
₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial expense, ₱16,000.00 for the
interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in
the case,7 the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for
their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were
all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not
having been properly identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder
qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of
PO2 Pangilinan with ₱165,999.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of
earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA,
however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to
prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused
appealed from the CA to this Court.10
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the
accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan
dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently
provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the
taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The
officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the
questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the
taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to
the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab
drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the
police station where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show
that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards
to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he
saw running away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged
PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as
the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor,
Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in
entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all
named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by
Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of
"Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an
organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile
phones with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the
killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the
same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-
principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a
special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.14
Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the
information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order
to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1
But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime
charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an
unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue
here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and
the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the
mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the
participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current
jurisprudence.18

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012
in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas
y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger
Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES
the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with an additional
₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208749               November 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated March 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05374, which upheld the Decision2 dated November
24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (stationed in Taguig City),
Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 139521, convicting Anecito Estibal y Calungsag
(accused-appellant) of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A(2), in relation to Article
266-B(5)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
83533 and in further relation to Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369.4
The falloof the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Anecito Estibal y Calungsag guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
without eligibility for parole in lieu of the death penalty; and to pay AAA5 the amount
of PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP
25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.6 (Citation omitted)
Antecedent Facts
The accusatory portion of the Information7 for rape against the accused-appellant filed
on February 6, 2009 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 2009 in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while taking
advantage of his moral authority and ascendancy and with his intention to gratify his
sexual desire upon his daughter [AAA], by means of force, violence and intimidation
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will and consent, the said crime having been
attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority, as the said
accused being the natural father of the victim, a thirteen (13)[-]year[-]old, a minor
atthe time of the commission of the crime, which is aggravated by the circumstances of
abuse of superior strength and dwelling, all to the damageand prejudice of the said
victim [AAA].
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The accused-appellant, 43 years old, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on March 9,
2009. But during the pre-trial, BBB, wife of the accused-appellant and mother of
AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case. Her reasons
were that she pitied the accused-appellant and, according to her, AAA had already
forgiven her father. But having entered the accused-appellant’s plea, the trial court
refused to entertain their desistance.9
At the trial, four witnesses came forward to testify for the prosecution. The testimony
of the first witness, Dr. Jesille Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) who conducted the medicolegal
examination on AAA, was stipulated by the prosecution and the defense, as follows:
1. That she is a Police Chief Inspector of the PNP particularly assigned at the
PNP Crime Laboratory as Medico Legal Examiner;
2. That she was the one who conducted the medico-legal examination on the
minor victim on February 5, 2009;
3. That she reduced her examination into writing and issued the Initial Medico
Legal Report Case No. R09-288 which Anogenital findings are diagnostic of
previous blunt force or penetrating trauma (to the hymen);
4. And that she also issued other documents in relation to the examination.10
The parties also agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Michael Estudillo (Estudillo)
and Ronillo Perlas (Perlas), members of the Barangay Security Force (BSF) who
arrested the accused-appellant as he was coming home from work at 6:00 p.m. on
February 5, 2009, to wit:
1. That BSF Michael Estudillo and BSF Ronilo Perlas are members of the
Barangay Security Force x x x;
2. That in the evening of February5, 2009 while they were on duty at x x x,
the minor victim and her mother appeared at their office and reported that the
 victim was molested or sexually abused by the accused; and that based on this
report, they proceeded to the house of the perpetrator;
3. That while on their way, they met the accused and informed him about the
complaint of the minor victim and eventually arrested him without the
corresponding warrant of arrest and brought to their office;
4. That based on the incident, they referred the case to the Taguig City Police
Station for proper disposition; and
5. That they have no personal knowledge as to the incident.11
Concerning AAA and BBB, several subpoenas were sent to their address for the taking
of their testimonies, but they never appeared. On April 13, 2010, it was reported to the
court that they had moved out of their house, and subsequent subpoenas were returned
unserved.12
The prosecution’s last witness, Police Officer 3 Fretzie S. Cobardo (PO3 Cobardo),
was the officer assigned at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Women and Children
Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she who investigated the above incident and
took down the sworn statement of AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009. Her
testimony was also stipulated, as follows:
1. that she is a member of the PNP assigned at the Women and Children
Protection Desk, Taguig City Police Station;
2. that she was the investigating officer at the time the accused was brought to
the police station;
3. that she personally encountered the private offended party and the accused;
4. that she brought the private offended party to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
Genito Physical Examination;
5. that she was present at the time the private offended party executed an
affidavit complaint;
6. that she was the one who brought the private offended party and the
accused for inquest proceedings;
7. that she has no personal knowledge as to the incident which gave rise to this
case;
8. that Exhibit "A" was the same document executed by the mother of the
victim as well as the victim herself before her;
9. that Exhibit "G" was the same Medico Legal Report that was transmitted to
her by the PNP Crime Laboratory;
10. that she was the one who received the Initial Medico-Legal Report.13
On clarificatory questioning by the court, PO3 Cobardo narrated how she was trained
to prepare for her assignment as desk officer at the PNP Women and Children
Protection Center; that during her investigation of AAA and BBB, they were both
crying; that without being asked leading questions and without being coached by her
mother, AAA, 13 years old and a first-year high school student, revealed in detail how
the accused-appellant abused her for several years and how he raped her that morning
of February 5, 2009; that AAA told that the first time she was raped by her father was
when she was in Grade III, but this was the first time she was telling anyone about the
rapes; that BBB told PO3 Cobardo that she could not imagine how her husband could
commit such an outrage against their own daughter; that from her own observations of
AAA’s demeanor, PO3 Cobardo was convinced that she was telling the truth.14
The accused-appellant’s defense consisted mainly of denial. From his testimony, the
court learned that the accused-appellant, his wife BBB and their two children, AAA
and CCC, livedin a one-room house in Taguig City; that he and his wife were
employed as security guards in Taguig City; that on February 4, 2009, his wife was on
night duty and came home the next morning; that on the night of the alleged rape, he
and his two children retired for the night at around midnight, and thus, he could not
have sexually abused his daughter AAA between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on February
5, 2009; that he and his wife used to fight about her brothers Romulo and Rey Santos,
whom he now suspected of influencing AAA to file the complaint for rape against
him, although he treated themas his own brothers; that he was arrested by the
Barangay Tanodat 6:00 p.m. on February 5, 2009 as he was coming from work.15
Relying on PO3 Cobardo’s testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC
considered the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by PO3
Cobardoas part of the res gestae, and convicted the accused-appellant. The court said:
Thus, the court considers the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as
confirmed by PO3 Cobardo. Moreover, there is nothing on record that would compel
the court to believe that said prosecution witness has improper motive to falsely testify
against the accused-appellant. Accordingly, it shall uphold the presumption of
regularity in the performance of her duties. Further, the testimony of PO3 Cobardo was
corroborated by the findings of Dr. Jesille Baluyot of a shallow healed lacerations at 4
and 8 o’clock and deep healed laceration at5 o’clock positions in the hymen of AAA
which Anogenital findings are diagnostic of previous blunt force or penetrating
trauma.16 (Citations omitted)
Below is the pertinent portion ofPO3 Cobardo’s testimony cited by the RTC:
COURT –
Some questions from the Court.
Q PO3 Cobardo[,] you were the one who investigated the minor victim in this
case?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q Could you tell the Court what is the appearance of the victim at the time of
the investigation?
A At that time Your Honor the victim was together with her mother, they were
crying.
Q Both were crying?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q When you conducted the investigation[,] the mother was present?
A Yes[,] Your Honor, the mother was present.
Q You were aware of course when you inquired the age of the minor?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q When she narrated the incident[,] was she coached by the mother?
A No[,] Your Honor, the victim was not coached by the mother. It was the
victim who stated all the incident.
Q Did you make, did you use leading questions in conducting, propounding
the questions?
A No[,] Your Honor.
Q How did you ask the victim? Was it in a question and answer where first
you will ask the victim to narrate the incident?
A Yes[,] Your Honor. First I asked the victim to narrate the incident.
Q And then you propounded question in the question and answer form?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q After obtaining all the facts relative to the incident?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q And you found out that, was that the first time that the incident happened or
several times already?
A During that interview[,] Your Honor[,] I found out that the victim was
sexually abused by her father several times when she was in Grade III.
Q You mentioned that the victim and her mother during your investigation
were both crying?
A Yes[,] Your Honor[.]
Q Did you inquire why?
A The mother told me that she could not imagine that her husband molested
their daughter.
Q How about the daughter? Did you inquire? Did you allow her some time to
rest?
A She was crying[,] Your Honor[,] since it was her first time to reveal the
incident.
Q So you asked her why she was crying? A Many times already[,] Your Honor.

A Yes[,] Your Honor. x x x x17

Q Because, I notice, actually I noticed in the preliminary question you stated
"hindi ako magagalit, kahit ano ang sasabihin mo sa akin, naiintindihan mo ba
lahat ng sinabi ko". It may be a preliminary question because you have
attended seminars on this. Is that right?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
COURT –
So judging from the preliminary question[,] I know that you had undergone
seminars on how to conduct questions on child abuse cases.
WITNESS
Yes[,] Your Honor.
COURT –
Q Are you convinced that the victim is telling the truth?
A Yes[,] Your Honor, I am convinced.
Q Why are you convinced? Convinced based on your questions that you
propounded, why are you convinced?
A Because for a father and daughter relationship it’s not good, it’s not easy to
accused [sic] your father of sexual abuse.
Q So judging from the appearance of the minor she would be able to tell the
Court that she is telling the truth?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q How many seminars have you attended relative to on how to conduct
examination on child abuse?
Significantly, it appears from the sworn statement,18 executed by AAA before PO3
Cobardo, that she first revealed her ordeal to her cousin DDD that same afternoon of
February 5, 2009. With DDD’s help, BBB confronted her daughter AAA, who told her
that the accused-appellant did not only rape her that morning, but had sexually abused
her several times since she was in Grade III.
Appeal to the CA
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that due to the absence of
AAA’s testimony, the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances proving
beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his daughter; that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, not being
themselves victims or witnesses to the "startling occurrence" of rape, cannot create the
hearsay exception of res gestae [literally, "things done"]; and, that the medical findings
of Dr. Baluyot do not prove that he had carnal knowledge of AAA but only that she
had had sexual relations.
In its appellee’s brief, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) asserted that although
AAA did not personally testify, and none of the prosecution witnesses had any direct
knowledge of the sexual molestation of AAA by the accused-appellant, his guilt was
fully established by circumstantial evidence. In particular, the OSG argued that the
testimony of PO3 Cobardo concerning what AAA narrated to her during her
investigation was part of the res gestae pursuant to Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The
OSG reasoned that AAA had just undergone a startling occurrence at the time she told
PO3 Cobardo that she had been raped by her father that morning, a statement which
PO3 Cobardo found spontaneous and credible; that the gap between the sexual assault
and the time when AAA made her narration to PO3 Cobardo was too short to permit
fabrication by AAA of such a serious accusation against her own father; and, that
AAA made the charge in the presence of her mother could only have lent credence to
her claim. Moreover, the claim of rape by AAA is corroborated by Dr. Baluyot’s
finding that she has genital lacerations, in contrast to the accused-appellant’s only
defense of a general and uncorroborated denial.
The appellate court agreed withthe RTC and the OSG that the testimonies of the three
prosecution witnesses, PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, form part of the
res gestae, although none of them was a participant, victim or spectator to the crime.
According to the CA, "they heard what [AAA] said when she reported the sexual
abuse committed against her by accused-appellant Estibal."19 To further quote the
CA:
Thus, in this case, even if prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and PO3
Cobardo were not present during the startling occurrence experienced by AAA, they
heard what she said when she reported the sexual abuse committed against her by
accused-appellant Estibal. There is no merit to the argument of accused-appellant
Estibal that, since prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and PO3 Cobardo
were "neither participants or victims or spectators to the crime of rape being charged
against the accused-appellant" their testimonies could not be considered as part of the
res gestae.
The testimonies of said prosecution witnesses comply with the above-mentioned
requisites, viz., there is no question that the sexual abuse committed by accused-
appellant Estibal against her daughter AAA was a startling occurrence and a traumatic
experience, at that; she had no opportunity to contrive or devise falsehood when she
reported the crime to BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas and narrated the incident to PO3
Cobardo hours after the incident; and, the statements she made was relative to her
sexual abuse by accused-appellant Estibal and its attending circumstances.
There might be an intervening period between the time the crime of rape was
committed and the first time it was reported by AAA to the prosecution witnesses.
However, said intervening period of less than twenty-four (24) hours is so short a time
for AAA to fully recover physically and emotionally from such a traumatic and
harrowing experience, considering her tender age of only thirteen (13) years and the
fact that her abuser is her own biological father.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the
spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These
statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An
important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the
statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental
balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.
Indeed, the statements made by AAA before BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and PO3
Cobardo were spontaneous and her utterances were inspired by the excitement of the
occasion, without any opportunity to fabricate a false statement.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined
although a number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined
to: (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the
making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition
of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening
events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature
and the circumstances of the statement itself. The Supreme Court, in People v.
Manhuyod, has explained the import of the first four factors; thus: "x x x (C)ases are
not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the
startling event and the making of the declaration. What is important is that the
declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made ‘so nearly contemporaneous as
to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made
under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of design or deliberation.’
"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that ‘a statement made, or an act done, at a
place some distance from the place where the principal transaction occurred will not
ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible.’
"Anent the third factor, ‘[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the
time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an
inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had
just received a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense
excitement. Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor
of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a
statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different
statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.’
"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened
between the event or transaction and the making of the statement relative thereto, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore
his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation."20 (Citations omitted)
Automatic review by the Supreme Court
Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution would consist mainly
of hearsay statements by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas all reiterating
what AAA allegedly told them. The same question, whether res gestaeas an exception
to the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case, is
now before this Court in this automatic review.
To pardon her father, AAA chose to ignore the trial court’s subpoenas to testify in her
rape complaint, thus leaving missing a vital component in the prosecution’s case, her
eyewitness account. But in itself, her pardon would not have worked the dismissal of
the rape case since it was given after the complaint was filed in court.
AAA never appeared at the trial proper despite several subpoenas for her to testify, and
subsequent subpoenas could not be served after her family moved to a new but
unknown address on April 13, 2010. Recall that at the pre-trial, BBB told the court that
she was no longer interested in pursuing the case against the accused-appellant since
her daughter had already pardoned him. It has, however, been held that even if it is
construed as a pardon, AAA’s desistance is not by itself a ground to dismiss the
complaint for rape against the accused-appellant once the complaint has been instituted
in court.21
In People v. Bonaagua,22 the accused tried to invoke the affidavit of desistance
executed by the minor victim’smother stating that they would no longer pursue the
rape cases against him. But the high court pointed out that since R.A. No. 8353, or the
Anti-Rape Law, took effect in 1997, rape is no longer considered a crime against
chastity. Having been reclassified as a crime against persons, it is no longer considered
a private crime, or one which cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the aggrieved party. Thus, pardon by the offended party of the offender will not
extinguish his criminal liability.
"As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and
reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly
unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the
probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be
interminable."23
The gravity of the crime of rape and its imposable penalty, vis-á-vis the ease with
which a charge of rape can be made, compels the Supreme Court to conduct a
thorough review of rape every conviction.
A charge of rape by its very nature often must be resolved by giving primordial
consideration to the credibility of the victim’s testimony.24 Because conviction may
rest solely thereon, the victim’s testimony must be credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things,25 it must be scrutinized
with utmost caution, and unavoidably, the victim’s credibility must be put on trial as
well.26
But if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in this case, then
the court must consider the adequacy of the circumstantial evidence established by the
prosecution. In People v. Canlas,27 the Court said:
Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the combined effect of the
pieces of circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than
moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.28
xxxx
x x x Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on
experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the
known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Conviction may be
warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others,
as the guilty person.29 (Citations omitted)
The Court is called upon to review the verdict of conviction below, keeping in mind
the following principles as guidance: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility, while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
accused, albeit innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only
two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme care; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
succeed or fail on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.30
In essence, the res gestaeexception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations
must have been "voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to
be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and weremade
under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules." Res gestae, one
of eleven (11) exceptions to the hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:
Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence
is taking place orimmediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance may be received as part of the res gestae.
In People v. Ner,31 this Court elaborated on Section 36 of Rule 130 as follows:
[T]hat declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or
occurrence in litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if they were
yet voluntarily and spontaneously madeso nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and weremade under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation, must, upon
the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction itself.32
(Italics in the original)
The Court enumerated three essential requisites for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of res gestae, to wit:
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of res gestae,is
that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who
made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or
contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in
obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circum[s]tances.33 (Citations omitted)
There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae,
namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.34
In People v. Dianos,35 the Court acknowledged that there are no hard and fast rules in
determining the spontaneity of a declaration, but at least five factors have been
considered:
By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission
of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing
but spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there
being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement
become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. x
x x.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined
although a number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined
to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the
making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition
of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening
events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature
and the circumstances of the statement itself. x x x.36 (Citations omitted and italics in
the original)
In People v. Jorolan,37 the Court emphasized that there must be no intervening
circumstances between the res gestae occurrence and the time the statement was made
ascould have afforded the declarant an opportunity for deliberation or reflection; in
other words, the statement was unreflected and instinctive:
An important consideration is whether there intervened between the occurrence and
the statement any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant, and thus
restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation. His statement then
cannot be regarded as unreflected and instinctive, and isnot admissible as part of the
res gestae. An example is where he had been talking about matters other than the
occurrence in question or directed his attention to other matters.38 (Citation omitted
and emphasis ours)
In People v. Salafranca,39 the Court cited two tests in applying the res gestaerule: a)
the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact orevent that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself; and b) the said evidence clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts,
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact asto exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility
of evidence as a part of the res gestaeis, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.40
(Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the original)
By way of illustration, in People v. Villarama,41 the 4-year-old rape victim did not
testify, but the accused, an uncle of the victim, was convicted on the basis of what the
child told her mother. The Court said:
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the
victim could not havehad the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that
her uncle made her lie down, took off her panties and inserted his penis inside her
vagina.
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so
to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The
fact that Elizabeth was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion
that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to
appellant.
xxxx
x x x [I]n Contreras, the victim’s statement that she had been sexually molested by the
accused was not received under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because
her statement did not refer to the incident witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern
of molestation of her and her companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeth’s
declaration to her mother regarding the then just concluded assault were so full of
details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she was referring to the
same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.42
In People v. Velasquez,43 the 2-year-old rape victim told her mother the following: a)
"Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu." ("Tatang has been doing something to me."); and b) "I-
tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya." ("Because Tatang has been
doing something to my private part, that is why it hurts.") The girl then showed her
mother her private part, which was swollen and oozing with pus, and then she gestured
by slightly opening or raising her right foot, and using her right finger, to show what
the accused had done to it.44 The Court ruled:
We hold, therefore, that Aira’s statements and acts constitute res gestae, as it was made
immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered shortly thereafter by her with
spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. Regail’s account of Aira’s
words and, more importantly, Aira’s gestures, constitutes independently relevant
statements distinct from hearsay and admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the
fact that they had been thus uttered.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or
falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does
not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of
such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 45
(Citation omitted)
In People v. Lupac,46 the Court accepted as part of res gestae the 10-year-old victim’s
denunciation ofher uncle to a neighbor whom she met soon after she managed to get
away from her uncle after the rape, uttering the words "hindot" and "inano ako ni Kuya
Ega."47
In People v. Moreno,48 shortly after the three accused left the house where the
complaining victims workedas maids, the maids told their employers, who had just
arrived, that they had been raped. The employers testified in court on these statements.
The Court held that the maids’ statements were part of res gestae since they were
spontaneously made as soon as the victims had opportunity to make them without
threat to their lives. The Court said:
This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because
made instinctively, "while the declarant’s mental powers for deliberation are controlled
and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances
at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by
retrospective mental action." Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to
be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness stand.49
(Citations omitted)
But in People v. Contreras,50 the accused was acquitted in one of several statutory
rape charges because, among other things, the prosecution failed to present the victim,
a 6-year-old girl, and the court found that her alleged res gestae statement referred not
to the incident or circumstance testified to by the witness but rather to a general
patternof molestation which she and her companions had endured for some time
already.
AAA’s statements to the barangay tanodand the police do not qualify as part ofres
gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable
time between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity
for reflection.
In People v. Manhuyod, Jr.,51 the Court stressed that in appreciating res gestaethe
element of spontaneity is critical. Although it was acknowledged that there is no hard
and fast rule to establish it, the Court cited a number of factors to consider, already
mentioned in Dianos.The review of the facts below constrains this Court to take a view
opposite that of the RTC and the CA.
It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn statement to the police, AAA
admitted that she first revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin DDD in the
afternoon of February 5, 2009, although her mother BBB had returned from her
overnight guard duty that morning. Shocked by what AAA told him, DDD relayed to
BBB "na may problema [si AAA]." BBB thus confronted her, and AAA in her own
words narrated that, "kaya kinausap na po ako ni Mama kung ano ang problema ko
kaya sinabi ko na po ang ginawa sa akin ni Papa ko po kaya nalaman na lahat ni Mama
ang panggagahasa sa akin ni Papa."52
After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the courage to reveal to
her mother her heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her own father. Emboldened by
her cousin DDD’s moral support, AAA told her mother that she had been hiding her
dark secret since Grade III. But as soon as BBB learned, events quickly took their
logical course. With BBB now leading the way, BBB and AAA sought the help of the
barangay tanodthat same day between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to have the accused-
appellant arrested. At around 6:00 p.m., they were able to arrest him as he was coming
home. Later that night, AAA accompanied by BBB gave her statement to PO3
Cobardo of the PNP women’s desk.
AAA’s revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of events that led to
the arrest of the accused-appellant. There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing
spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the
barangay tanodand later that night to the police. Her statements werein fact a re-telling
of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time
however, her story to the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a
newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and
put behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she
was seeking their help to punish the accused-appellant. There was then nothing
spontaneous about her so-called res gestaenarrations, even as it is remarkable to note
that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her father was already
being held in detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to determine if
there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.
Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting with the
occurrence of a startling event which triggered it and including any spontaneous
declaration made by a witness, participant or spectator relative to the said occurrence.
The cases thisCourt has cited invariably reiterate that the statement must be an
unreflected reaction of the declarant, undesigned and free of deliberation. In other
words, the declarant is spontaneously moved merely to express his instinctive reaction
concerning the startling occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose or design already
formed in his mind. In People v. Sanchez,53 the Court be labored to explain that
startling events "speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the
unprompted language of the participants:"54
Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement." A spontaneous exclamation is defined as
"a statement or exclamation made immediately after some exciting occasion by a
participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it
isobserved by him. The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience
that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of
nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties
and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and
sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the
external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period
when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,’ the
utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just
observed by him." In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the declaration is such
that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant
ratherthan the declarant speaking for himself. Or, stated differently, "x x x the events
speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted
language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the language is assumed to
preclude the probability ofits premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of
the moment is regarded, with a good dealof reason, as a guarantee of its truth.55
(Citations omitted)
The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay
tanodand the police are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is
obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her
mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened
AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of her father. Here then lies the
crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under the immediate
influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by another powerful
compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.
Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original
declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination
by the defense, except in a few instances as where the statement is considered part of
the res gestae.
This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements allegedly made by AAA
were conveyed to the trial court not by AAA herself but by PO3 Cobardo, BSF
Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO3 Cobardo made a summation of what she
claims was AAA’s narration of her ordeal, along with her own observations of her
demeanor during the investigation. But unless the prosecution succeeded in invoking
res gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements
were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res gestae, the
appealed decision runs contrary to the well-settled rule against admitting hearsay
evidence, aptly described as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of
what he has heard from others."56 The hearsay rule puts in issue the trustworthiness
and reliability of hearsay evidence, since the statement testified to was not given under
oath or solemn affirmation, and more compellingly, the declarant was not subjected to
cross examination by the opposing party to testhis perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness, on whose reliability the entire worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.57 It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own
personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His testimony cannot
be proof as to the truth of what he learned or heard from others.58 But equally
important, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to
face x x x." By allowing the accused to test the perception, memory, and veracity of
the witness, the trial court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability of his
testimony. There is no gainsaying that the right to confront a witness applies with
particular urgency in criminal proceedings, for at stake is a man’s personal liberty,
universally cherished among all human rights.
In Patula v. People,59 the Court rendered a helpful disquisition on hearsay evidence,
why it must be rejected and treated as inadmissible, and how it can be avoided:
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of
Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts
that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness isa substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence
that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of
the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives
its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from
the veracity and competency of the extra judicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say
about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information
on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oathto be examined and cross-
examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the
witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness
without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in
court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, thata person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she
entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden
entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests
mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it
is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only whenmade on
the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For
example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused
say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those
words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The
distinction is, therefore, between (a)the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to
which the hearsay rule applies.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction
or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands tobe denied because the declarant
is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse
party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the
truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-examine her
adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to
require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court
under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtformalizes this
solution, viz.:
"Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.– The examination of witnesses
presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode ofanswer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally."
The second solution is to require that allwitnesses be subject to the cross-examination
by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution
thusly:
"Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the termination of the
direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or
bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to
criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which
guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x
x x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x," the rule requiring the cross-examination
by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to
cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity
and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the
worth of the out of-court statement depends.60 (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and
italics in the original)
When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the
test of moral certainty required for conviction.
It is well-settled, to the pointof being elementary, that when inculpatory facts are
susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral
certainty required for conviction.61 A forced application of the res gestae exception
below results if the Court says that AAA’s incriminatory statements were spontaneous
and thus part of a startling occurrence. It produces an outright denial of the right of the
accused-appellant to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to mention that he
was also denied his right to confront the complainant. As the Court held in People v.
Ganguso:62
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees.1âwphi1 Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that
burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such
degree of proof as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible
for the offense charged.63 (Citations omitted)
This Court’s views are not a condonation of the bestiality of the accused-appellant but
only indicate that there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt entitling him to acquittal. As
the Court stated in People v. Ladrillo:64
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical:
sympathy for the victim and admiration for her in publicly seeking retribution for her
outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of
the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
proclivities and deal with it withextreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free
themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her
having been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they
ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as
she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to
render justice based on the law.65 (Citation omitted)
It needs no elaboration that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.66 "[T]he burden ofproof rests on the [S]tate. The accused, ifhe so chooses,
need notpresent evidence. He merely has to raise a reasonable doubt and whittle away
from the case of the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence
demands no less,"67 even as it also demands no less than a moral certainty of his PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
guilt.68 vs.
ROMY LIM y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby
ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless DECISION
he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate PERALTA, J.:
implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five (5) days from receipt hereof. On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision2 of
SO ORDERED. Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos.
2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim)
guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any
dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the
substance recovered from his possession is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.3

On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also
indicted for illegal sale of shabu, committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
September 4, 2018 drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or
offer for sale, and give away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-
G.R. No. 231989 sealed transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally
known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing
the same to be a dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) standing near the door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1
consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932, which was Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were
previously marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation. visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put
their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda
Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.4 rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both. When he
frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket.
In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty. 5 They were detained in the IO1 Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and
city jail during the joint trial of the cases.6 a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it
contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal
drug was seized.
The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, 101 Nestle
Carin, 102 Vincent Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside
from both accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense. IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet
of white substance, and a disposable lighter. 101 Carin turned over to him the plastic
sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two
Version of the Prosecution
plastic sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative
from the media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at
Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a
The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1
report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the
Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused
sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were
and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence
directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust
and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of
operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IO1 Carin were assigned
the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It
as the team leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-
was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public
buyer, respectively. The team prepared a ₱500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its
official and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as
serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest
witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.
police station, and other related documents.
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug
Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about15 minutes before
specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of
10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IOI Carin and the
the sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a
CI alighted froin the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1
Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (P02) Bajas7 personally received the letter-
Orellan and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and positioned
requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
themselves in the area to observe. IOI Carin and the CI turned at the comer and
crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and
stopped in front of a house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nong
conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her examination, only
Romy." Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa
Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry
while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer,
Report No. DTCRIM-I96 and I97-2010. With respect to the two sachets of white
Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as
crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of shabu after a chromatographic
instructed. After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took
examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in Chemistry
one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn,
Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane
IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence
custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's
After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, office during the inquest.
which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members,
immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were
Version of the Defense
Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in
Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while
Gorres was watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped over
their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door, however, it was
already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing.
They entered the house, pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still,
boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and handcuffed him. They inquired on where the
shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of
"Romy," he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there
and kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He
questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet. The men let
him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the
two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the
inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel,
ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would
imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest.
Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was
acquitted in the case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any
quarrel with the PDEA agents and that neither do they have grudges against them or
vice-versa.
Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in
Pita, Pasil, Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made. The following day, she
returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She
took pictures of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense, which the
court admitted as part of her testimony.
RTC Ruling
After trial, the R TC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of
shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator.
The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12] years and
one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to pay a Fine in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-
payment of Fine;
2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the Fine in the amount of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].
3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby
ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of ELDIE
GORRES y Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him from detention unless
he is being charged of other crimes which will justify his continued incarceration. 8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight
of evidence favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and
uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was
able to establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and
the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple,
straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible
manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions
that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and
no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or
resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of
evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to
preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.
In so far as Gorres is concerned, the R TC opined that the evidence presented were not
strong enough to support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim
because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the box contained. It also noted
Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was
"NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial
court that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of illegal sale of a
dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial showed that a
valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all the elements of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not
present any proof or justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the
same. The CA was unconvinced with his contention that the prosecution failed to
prove the identity and integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court,
it was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
drugs were not compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify on
every link in the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain from the
time the seized items were first discovered until they were brought for examination
and offered in evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and frame-up, the CA
did not appreciate the same due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the
police officers were inspired by an improper motive. Instead the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty was applied.
Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a
Supplemental Brief, taking into account the thorough and substantial discussions of the
issues in their respective appeal briefs before the CA.9 Essentially, Lim maintains that
the case records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the
procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165. 10
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements the law, defines chain of custody as -
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition. 11
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be
authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. 12 To establish a chain of custody
sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational
basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. 13 In
other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from
which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the
government claims it to be. 14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-
established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not
readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination,
courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with
sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 15 This was adopted
in Mallillin v. People, 16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of
custody of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. 17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the
investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and ( 4) the
turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. 18
Seizure and marking of the illegal
drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DO.T), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. 20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among
other modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR,
thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A.
No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence
acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in
the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and
also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts."21 Specifically, she cited that
"compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For
one, media representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines,
especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where elected
barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended."22 In
addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is
also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where
accused persons were apprehended."23
Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial
number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the
prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain
adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its]
standard implementation."24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized
and powerful local and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that
have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law
enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to
comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory
and photograph of seized illegal drugs.
xxxx
Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We
did not realize this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons
required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the
preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where
the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a location where
the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal
drugs be allowed to be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective
measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it
more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly
conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to
technicalities.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the
seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers
could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to
amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media
people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses
should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of
a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected
official is afraid or scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated
items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of
the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who
have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.26 The present case is not
one of those.
Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic
sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him
the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked
the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the
marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To ensure that .they
were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to 101 Carin and the
one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and
AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the
DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items. 29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro: 30
The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for noncompliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive
duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings,
it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the
requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately
explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It
should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply
mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit,
coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized
items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs
seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of
evidence.31
It must be alleged and proved that the -presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s
such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s
acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in
the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence
of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of
the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of
confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven.
People v. Ramos33 requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses
under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held
that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives
were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded
as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for
noncompliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare
for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements
beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set
procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled
not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the
Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and
that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials
arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it
unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house.35 102 Orcales similarly declared that the
inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and
there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort
to contact them.36 He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the
barangay officials prior to their operation as they might leak the confidential
information.37 We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there
was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.
The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-
bust team to secure the presence of a barangay official during the operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO:
xx xx
Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a
barangay official to witness the operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation,
Sir.
Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our
information. 38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ). While the arresting officer, IO1
Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay
officials and the media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that
they tried to contact a DOJ representative.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an
earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They
also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the
representatives in Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten
(10) members, and the two accused were the only persons in the house.
It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved
applies not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation
but also on those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national
penitentiary, checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or
those by virtue of a consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a
lawful arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the
arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.
To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to
illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest
proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody
Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A. I. I 0. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the
requirements of Section 2I (1) of R.A. No. 9I65, as amended, shall be clearly stated in
the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the
steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated
items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA
pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9I65 shall be
presented.39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from
the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related
cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and
its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must
state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/ confiscated i terns.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements
or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the
court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in
order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise
its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5,40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of
G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013
Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.
guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y DECISION
Miranda is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an BRION, J.:
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and decision2 and November 17, 2009 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, for immediate implementation. The said G.R. CV No. 88645.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken. The Facts

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on
as well as to the Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the Office of the January 14, 1979.4 During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot
Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police, the located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the (TCT) No. 21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the
Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the
Decision to all trial courts, including the Court of Appeals. subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as
attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
SO ORDERED. Jose in her favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was
P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was
issued in the name of Tomas. 8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds
of Naga City.9 The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan,
Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the
SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to proceed with the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's
sell the subject property to Tomas. 10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. 11 With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial
Before he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of
his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by
order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the property Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written
was annotated at the back of the title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it
was done to save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed money
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her
damages, attorney's fees, and expenses, for litigation, in the event that judgment be money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
rendered in favor of Jose.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose's
complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.15 On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint In its decision dated December 27, 2006, 25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and
against the Register of Deeds since it was only a nominal nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated
party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact,
was actually null and void.
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio of P20,000.00 as temperate damages.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
testified that he learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros' son. 18 When
Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the sale, Milagros The CA Ruling
retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money. Bonifacio
immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
sale.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC:
and Bonifacio verified with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title first, by deleting the award of temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose and
covering the disputed property had been transferred to Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under
Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00
for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged. 21 Bonifacio established this claim.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine
passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February 2002, Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the
notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot
and a handwritten letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary was insufficient and not supported by the evidence formally offered before and
admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the
Rosana Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas RTC.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the sale
transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated
who confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to November 17, 2009.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
which ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
price he paid in the amount of P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary record.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the
consideration stated, cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null and void; Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property
second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration is a factual question that the CA had already resolved in the negative. 39 The CA found
of the sale;32third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of P700,000.00 Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property to be unsubstantiated as
paid was uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually paid he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.
under the principle of solutio indebiti.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We uphold the CA's finding.
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the
purchase price indicated in the deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of
question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to proving them by a preponderance of evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the
include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
terms of the agreement itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issues Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." 42 Preponderance
of consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
the actual purchase price of the sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
OUR RULING
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition. P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing
evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
in a petition for review on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the
correctness of the appellate court's factual findings are not the functions of this Court, It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
as we are not a trier of facts. 36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary it;44 the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to
prove non-payment.45 A mere allegation is not evidence,46 and the person who alleges
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence,
falsehood of alleged facts,"37 except in the following which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when evidence.
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the
the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale,
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions based on the principle of unjust enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the
deed of sale as basis for the reimbursable amount because a null and void document
cannot be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. 47 This
rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the
case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse's written consent. 48 A void
contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It cannot
be validated either by ratification or prescription. 50 When, however, any of the terms of
a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary
to allow restitution of what has been given under it. 51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what
has been given is in order."52 This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil
Code which states that "every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of
what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is
deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to
prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 53 The purpose of introducing
documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be
the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of
introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale,
rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such
contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to
allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules.54 There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant
and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility. 55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing
it as evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the
terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and
not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of
the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does
not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.
The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of
the court to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue
before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to
determine the presence of the essential elements of the sale, including the
consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is
incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence. 57
Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the
regularity of the sale.58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the; lower
courts to consider the terms written therein to determine whether all the essential
elements59 for a valid contract of sale are present, including the consideration of the
sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the court from
relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid
by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the
sale is not necessary since it is necessarily included in determining the regular
execution of the sale. partnership.

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00 since
amount paid by the petitioner. this the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court.
Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover the
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.
truth of the facts stated therein.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such dated August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. 61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie
evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name.
Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration
stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring
the consent of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no
question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the
actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it
remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the
amount of P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of
sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount
was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment is
self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received
P700,000.00 for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the
actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under
the principle of unjust enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." 62 The prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article 22
of the Civil Code.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros

received under the void contract which presumably benefitted their conjugal
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described
in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from
"using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence
this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to
return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision,
petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court
ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct,
For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision
of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the
trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of
the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix,
Jr.], he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional
Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7."
On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court
on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid
date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence,
during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally
admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's
admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit,
 and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound
by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more
than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing
Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a
violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in
that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only
because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the
trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was
eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's
order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133964               February 13, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMIL PEÑA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Ramil Peña was charged with murder in an Information which
reads, thus:
That on or about the 8th day of December, 1995, in the municipality of Obando,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused armed with a firearm with intent to kill one Jimbo Pelagio y
Ferrer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot the said Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer,
hitting the latter on the head thereby inflicting wound which directly caused the death
of the said Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer.1
In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a
tricycle driver working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When
they reached their destination, he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then,
accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head
with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant shot him on the
head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency
Hospital stating that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1
Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious
Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which
he took down on two sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio
affixed his thumbmark on both sheets. In his statement, Pelagio related how accused-
appellant inflicted his injuries on him.
The owner of the tricycle, Wilfredo Lampa, after being informed that Pelagio had been The pivotal issue is whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the
shot, proceeded to the hospital. There, Pelagio told him that it was accused-appellant testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the victim’s declaration can be considered
who shot him and took away his tricycle. as part of the res gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.

Francisca Pelagio, Jimbo Pelagio’s mother, also rushed to the hospital. Upon advice of The statement or declaration made by Pelagio, taken by SPO1 Bautista, reads:
the doctors, Francisca brought her son to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. On
February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired. According to Francisca, she spent T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital
P26,000.00 for his medical and funeral expenses. at kinukunan ka ng salaysay?

For his part, accused-appellant claimed that he was in San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga S: Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha and
together with his wife on the date of the incident. He went into hiding in the house of tricycle kong minamaneho.
his uncle, Maximiano Guevarra, for nine (9) months because he allegedly killed a
certain Roger Wininsala. He came to know that he was being accused of the murder of T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Peña?
Pelagio, whom he did not know, only while he was in detention on a drug charge.
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
Accused-appellant’s testimony was corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
The trial court was not persuaded. On May 13, 1998, it rendered a decision,2 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15
ng umaga.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds RAMIL PEÑA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña?
Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay the victim’s mother, Francisca Pelagio, the amount of P26,000.00 representing
actual damages and the costs of suit. S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.

Hence this appeal. T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Peña?

Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant S: Opo.
shot Pelagio because there is no evidence that a bullet was embedded in the skull of the
victim. More specifically, the attending physicians were not presented to testify that T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
the victim died of a gunshot wound in the head.
S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
Accused-appellant next claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court is
hearsay and inadmissible. He argues that said evidence does not constitute res gestae. T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
Particularly, he emphasizes that "it was imperative on the part of the lower court that it
should have appreciated the principle of res gestae on the basis of the contents of S: Si Rey Dagul.
Jimbo Pelagio’s statement reduced in handwritten form by SPO1 Bautista, and not on
the dying declarations made by Jimbo Pelagio to SPO1 Bautista, Wilfredo Lampa and T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
Francisca Pelagio because these prosecution witnesses had all the time to contrive and
improvise on what was actually told them, allegedly by Jimbo Pelagio."3 S: Muntik na ho.
T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko ho.4
The trial court ruled that Pelagio’s statement was a dying declaration since it was
uttered at the point of death and with consciousness of that fact due to the serious
nature of his wounds. Thus, it admitted Pelagio’s statement in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established
in a long line of cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to
probative weight if: (1) at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and
the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the
victim was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of
the inquiry.5
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty
whether Pelagio uttered his statement with consciousness of his impending death.
While he was in pain when he made his statement, he expressly stated that accused-
appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.6
The significance of a victim’s realization or consciousness that he was on the brink of
death cannot be gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order
because at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. The
utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be
considered the incident speaking through the victim. It is entitled to the highest
credence.7
Granting that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized that he was dying,
his statement still can not be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to
consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and the
moment of the realization of death. The time the statement was being made must also
be the time the victim was aware that he was dying.
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagio’s statement may nonetheless
be admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae. In People v. Marollano,8 this Court
held:
The requisites for the admissibility of the victim’s ante mortem statement as part of the
res gestae and also as a dying declaration are present in this case, hence the same
should be admitted under both exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Citation omitted) While
the admissibility thereof would naturally not be affected whether viewed under either
or both considerations, the advantage of resting the issue on the aforesaid dual bases is
that its admission would be invulnerable to a theorized absence of an element of one of
said exceptions. This is particularly important in this case, considering that the very
identification of the assailant and the accuracy thereof are essentially based on the
declaration of the victim. (Emphasis supplied)
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the
res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.9
In People v. Naerta,10 this Court held that:
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual
occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which
interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of
forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Pelagio’s declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly
after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances,
the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.11
In People v. Hernandez,12 the infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part
of the body should qualify by any standard as a startling occurrence. And the rule is
that testimony by a person regarding statements made by another as that startling
occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, although
essentially hearsay, is admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said statements are
natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, made before there had been
opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred, it
being said that in these cases, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the
latter speaking of the event.
In this case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of Pelagio
qualified as a startling occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly complained of pain in
his head while his statement was being taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there
was no opportunity for him to be able to devise or contrive anything other than what
really happened.
In People v. Putian,13 the Court held that although a declaration does not appear to
have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death,
and, for that reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration
was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a
time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the
declarant’s mind, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.
Indeed the defense admitted as much when it stated, thus:
We should stress that Jimbo Pelagio’s handwritten statement, or his declarations
therein, were made immediately after the res gestae or the principal act took place, and
he had no time to contrive or devise, while his statements directly concerned the
occurrence in question and its immediate circumstances. We should take note further
that the handwritten statement’s contents are rather detailed in terms of the specifics of
the circumstances before, during and after the subject incident which elicits guarded
conclusion that notwithstanding Jimbo Pelagio’s physical condition at the Valenzuela
Emergency Hospital, he was conscious and lucid enough to intelligently respond rather
spontaneously on the questions propounded to him by SPO1 Bautista. These acts and
statements made by Jimbo Pelagio definitely constitute part of res gestae and not the
testimonies and/or written statements of the three prosecution witnesses in this case.14
By stating, however, that the testimonies or the written statements of the three
prosecution witnesses were taken into consideration by the trial court as part of the res
gestae betrays a misapprehension of said principle. This Court agrees with the
Solicitor General when it observed thus:
Since res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims or spectators to a crime before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, they should necessarily be the ones who must not have the
opportunity to contrive or devise a falsehood but not the persons to whom they gave
their dying declaration or spontaneous statement. In other words, the witness who
merely testifies on a res gestae is not the declarant referred to in the second requisite
whose statements had to be made before he "had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood." (citation omitted)
Thus, even if there were intervening periods between the time the victim gave his
account of the incident to the prosecution witnesses and the time the latter first
disclosed what the victim told them, the same will not affect the admissibility of the
victim’s declaration or statement as part of res gestae since it is sufficient that such
declaration or statement was made by the victim before he had time to contrive or
devise a falsehood.15
In any case, there is no reason why SPO1 Bautista would contrive or devise a
falsehood especially on the matter that Pelagio was shot on the head and that it was
accused-appellant who shot him. As a police officer, he was duty-bound to investigate
and unearth the facts of the case. There is a presumption that as an officer of the law,
he sought only the truth. Besides, no motive was shown as to why he would contrive or
devise a falsehood against accused-appellant.
In his Investigation Report,16 SPO1 Bautista gathered that accused-appellant shot
Pelagio from the Radiologic Report conducted at the Valenzuela District Hospital
wherein the presence of metallic fragments was discovered. Moreover, the results of
the C.T. Scan conducted on the victim showed the presence of metallic fragments in
his skull. In Pelagio’s Death Certificate,17 the underlying cause of death was indicated
as gunshot wound to the head.
There is, therefore, no merit in accused-appellant’s contention that there was no
evidence that Pelagio was shot in the head. It should be noted that accused-appellant
pistol-whipped Pelagio repeatedly. The Solicitor General’s following submission
would, therefore, make sense:
Given the probability that he was already unconscious or his head had become numb
due to severe head injuries when accused-appellant shot him, it is not unlikely for the
victim not to have known or felt being shot and hit by accused-appellant on the head.
This was probably the reason why in his initial declaration, the victim merely stated
that he was nearly shot by accused-appellant.18
Regardless, Pelagio categorically declared that it was accused-appellant who caused
his head injuries which eventually led to his death.1âwphi1 SPO1 Bautista’s testimony
as well as Wilfredo Lampa’s and Francisca Pelagio’s merely corroborated Pelagio’s
statement that it was accused-appellant who caused his head injuries.
The trial court found, thus:
The straightforward and consistent testimonies of the three vital prosecution witnesses
bear the earmarks of credibility. Further, there exists no ill motive on their part to
prevaricate. This absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal
witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed
and their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit (citation omitted), for witnesses
do not generally falsely impute to an accused a serious criminal offense were it not the
untarnished truth. (Citation omitted)
Settled is the rule that in the absence of any fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misconstrued to impeach the findings of the trial court, the appellate courts will not
interfere with the trial court’s findings on the credibility of the witnesses or set aside
its judgment, considering that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question for it had heard the witnesses themselves during the trial. The evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is a matter that particularly falls within the authority of the
trial court.19

However, this Court cannot agree with the trial court that the crime should be murder.
While evident premeditation and treachery were alleged in the information, the trial
court did not state why the killing was qualified to murder. The prosecution failed to
establish the attendance of the qualifying circumstances with concrete proof. The
crime proved was only homicide.

In accordance with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should
be sentenced to reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed shall be the medium period of reclusion
temporal, ranging from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused-appellant shall be entitled to a minimum penalty, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree or prision mayor, in any or its periods, ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

As to the matter of damages, we hold that the trial court should have awarded civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.20 The
award of P26,000.00 as actual damages is upheld, being duly proven with receipts.21

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision is MODIFIED. Accused-

appellant Ramil Peña is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim Jimbo Pelagio the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P26,000.00 as actual damages.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.