Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Regulation
(Case Study: Hungary)
Dr. Iván Schmideg
Communication Authority, Hungary
schmideg@hif.hu
30
Number of primary areas
25
20
15 12
10
6
5
2 1
0
50-150 150-250 250-350 350-450 450-
Population in the primary area (1000)
October 25-26, 2000 12
PSTN TARIFF
REBALANCING (1995 - 1997)
Ex ante set by ministerial decree based on the proposal of
telephone concessionaires.
Other services: uncontrolled.
1995 -1997 Overall price cap = PPI
Re-balancing factors to the previous year:
1995 1996 1997
Basket I (subscription fee) + 5,1% + 5,8% + 6,2%
Basket II (local calls) + 7,3% + 8,3% + 8,6%
Basket III (long distance calls) - 4.8% - 6,7% - 4,9%
Basket IV (international calls) - 4,8% - 6,7% - 4,9%
35.3%
60.0%
14.7%
70.9%
Present position
4
Regulatory intervention
Market environment
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Non competitive Semi competitive Fully competitive
Interconnection
SMP
Obligations
of SMP
Number portability
political influence,
HU
EU
3.0% OECD
MEX
Telecom revenue / GDP
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
HU
EU
2.0% OECD
MEX
1.5%
Telecom invest /GDP
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
70%
Investment / revenue
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
“Affordable prices”
Too low prices discourage
investment and the provision of up-
to-date infrastructure and services.
Too high prices can split the
country into “information rich” and
“information poor.”
Onall telecommunications
services 25% VAT imposed
70
Main lies / 100 inhab
60
50 HU
40
30
20
10
0
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Residential tariff basket US$ PPP
October 25-26, 2000 37
INTERCONNECTION
All network owners or network service providers
have to conclude contract, when interconnection is
requested on reasonable terms.
Interconnection prices calculated
Fully Divided Cost (FDC).
Long Run Average Incremental Cost (LRAIC) from
1st January of the third calendar year following
entering in force of the Act change to.