Aristotle on Action John L. Ackrifl Mind, New Series, Vol. 87, No. 348 (Oct., 1978), 595-601. Stable URL: http flinksjstor.orgsici?sici=026-4123%28 1978 10%202%3A87%BAS18%ICS9SHIAAOAGAE20.CO®IB2-D Mind is currently published by Oxtord University Press, ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhupvful-jstor-orp/abouv'terms.himal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have ‘obtained prior permission, vou may not download an entire issue of a joumal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial us. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at fhupfuk-jstor-orp/journals/oup. html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hupsfuk.jstor.org/ Mon Dec 20 18:11:08 2004Aristotle on Action JonN 1, acKRrE Asiatalle's statements about actich and choice seem to involve serious incansistencies—and on topics central to ethics and ta hie Ethier. Here ae some samples." (@) Ariatatle holds that when we choose to do samething we always choose with a view ta some ené, for the sake of something; but he alsa insists that a man who doce a virtuous act ia not doing it virtu- ‘sls not displaying virtue—unless he fas chosen it “or tae () Actions are done for the sake of ather things, and things we can do are not themselves the ends with ¢ view to which we do them; yet faction (prasis) differs from production (pais), according to Aristotle, precisely becauze it is its own end. (©) Im recommending the theoretical life Aristotle says that whereas contemplation ‘aime at no end beyond itself fine actions da ‘aim at some eid and ate nat desirable for their awe sake; but ip recors- ‘mending the life of action he eays that doing noble and good deeds ig a thing desirable for its own sake, and that ‘those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyoud the activicy. Passages like ese suggest two problema. First, haw ean aetion be sod in itelt if i is valued a8 a menns to exdainonia? Secondly, how eae an action be samething dane ta bring about an outcome and yet be dis- tinguished from a production because Gone for ite own sake? ‘The Fest frablem invites discussion of Arstatle’s view of morality adits founda- tion: is ft vatuable infact or only because hk promous something else? ‘The second—vith whieh the prevene nate is eancerned—ealls for an examination of Aristotle's concept of an action, and of his dstinedon beween prasit and poisie? Gommensatrs discussing this distinction, often fait to face che real digiecey, that sctons often always are productions and productions often of alway are actions. (The idea that some periods of the day are Secupied by action-epiaodes and others by production-episodes would Gaviously be absurd even if ‘production’ refered onty to the exercise of special techniques or ail, since a period of suck exercise could Ceriinly be a period duting which an Action, of prozase-keeping for fcxample, was being performed. In fact however Avetode’s nation of 1 Nicemachean Roe 55M 4: UL. 35 VL a 5,134 % 67. 2 Tn'Gusaher ig7e delivered 8 che Chapel Ft Eatogatu i hilconhy paper crutch ‘Atisale om Aco’ “The See part discrsed the Bate Seadban in eudainon, aoc expresed views colar to those ‘Arto Sn eadaimota', Precedings of the Brak Azedeny i (uapay. Jee the Stand pa al paper ta se eh re Te an wa STU SUTRA T Shae lee etn ie ofa ede ion 595598 JOHN L. AcKRIEE: production is no: Limiced either 19 technical performances ar to the ‘making of material objects) The brave man's action & fighting uphill tm relieve the garvison, and the just man is paying off his debe by mending his neighbour's fence, Haw then is ome to understand the thesis that paying off a debt ie an action but mending a fence is a production? 1 propose to examine ane oF (wo, passages in which Aristotle speaks of choosing to do comething ‘for ite!" or of doing something hatouias Gntentionally), in order 10 see if they throw any light on the problem. For Aristotle cloeely connects the concept of prasis with choice; and 2 ‘man's actions, properly speaking, for which he can be praised or blamed, are confined to what he does if nat feora choice we lease Kekrusifs, In Nicomachean Rehicr TL. 4 Aristotle confranes a puzzle: how can he say-—as he has saici—that men hecame just by doing just things, when surely men who do just things are already, eo ipso, just? He frst renmacks that even in the cate of skills comect performance does not suffice t0 prove the performer's possession. of the relevant shill, Hie goes an co make further points specially zelevant to virtues as opposed to aiila. It is not enough that the thing dene should itself have a certain characcer, ‘ay justice in ordes to justify the inference that itis done justly and that ‘ee agent is a just man; it is necessary that he should do ic knowingly, choosing to do it for itself, and fam a settled disposition. Actual things done (pyagwmata) ate called just if they aze guch 48 4 just man would do, Buc it fs not he who does them that is just, but he who does them in the vay in. which just men do, Aristotle thus draws a strong contrast between what is dane—which sight have been dane from various motives or inadvertertly—and hy iv is done. If inferences ta the character of the agent are to be made from the character of the thing done, it must have been done ‘for itself’, ‘This last, however, seems to be an unhappy formulation, For the ‘actual thing done’ niust be some performance—such as mending a neighbour's fence—which is in fact (in the circumstances) just, though it might be done by someone ignocant of o indiferent to its justice, But when i ix ‘asked whether the daer chose to éo it for iif the question is of course ‘whether he chose to do it because it was just, not whether he ehose to doit hecause it was mending a neighbour's fence. How can doing some- thing because it is 4 be doing it for itself or for its own sake unless the thing done is specified precisely as 2 Only if the action is designated rat as mending 4 fence hut 38 the @ act does the expression ‘Jor itself get the necessary grip. Yer the ¢ acts same such performance as mending 4 fence, and it does not seem ratural to say in such a case that the agent has done two things at the same time. It is easy to understand ho Aristotle, aot having addeessed himself to this theoretical difficulty, Should have said of an action both that itis done for itself and that itis done for the sake of something else: the ¢ act is done for itelf, the mending of a fence is nat done for ita av sake but for its dness. Itmay be though that to take mending a fence as one’s example of an. ‘actual thing done’ is to make it unnecessarily dificult to interpret the requirement dhac the just agent should choose to da what he does ‘Sor Feel Mending fence is all to0 obviously something in itself unaztractive,ARISTOTLE ON ACTION 597 zor is it by any means always the just thing to do. However, Aristotle's position would hardly be easier if an example like repaying a debt were used. It is not always just to repay a debt either. In any case, even if ‘what is done could he given a description such that any auch act would bbe just, yet such an act would inevitably have other characteristics too. Whur “for itself” paints to will be clear only if the act ie rough before tus precisely ar having the relevant chacacterstic, eg, at the just uct: it ‘snot enough that it should actually of even necessarily have it. One wey of bringing out the point at issue is to distinguish two ways of understanding the expreasion ‘do something that is 4". Tt may mean “do something (that is 4)’, where there is no implication that the doer necessarily knows or supposes that what he does is g- Or it may mean "Go something-thacie-4, where it is implied that the doer lnows or supposes it z0 be 4 (whether or not he does f Because itis ‘fr itso”) “Aristotte comes close to this kind of formulation in Nicomachean Hthice V. & Here, before contrasting the character of what is done wich the character of the agent (along the same lines as IL. 4), he raises a pre liminary question: hefore asking whether someone did a just act ‘for itaelf' (or for ulterior matives) we must ack whether he did a just act at all, properly speaking. Aristatle first distinguishes between ‘doing a thing that is in fact ‘wrong! and ‘doing. wrong? (adikein, a single word). To do-wrong isto do something wong knowingly and intentionally. If one does what is a6 a matter of face wong but does not know that what one ig doing ia wrong, lone cannot be said to do-wrong (save per accdens) (V. 8.1). Later in the chapter (¢. 8.4} Aristotle applies the same principle to expressions like ‘doing what is right’ and ‘doing things that are wrong’. A man who hes bbeen compelled to return. a deposit cannot be said to have done-tight oF even to have done what is right, save per accident. So it seems that what |-man can be aid eo have dane strictly, without qualification, not per ‘aceidane, 9 what he has done unforced and knowingly. "The contrast between doing something, properly speaking, and only doing something per accidens, differs from the earlier contrast between doing something for itself and doing it for an ulterior motive. But here again whae is involved is a context that does not permit free substitution of alternative descriptions of the agent's performance, In the strict use man ‘doce? only if he ‘doca—~ knowingly’, An action of hia, then, js not something some of whose features or cireumetances he may be Jgnorant af. Rather it must be defined by features he is aware of, since itis only ar so defined that he can be atid to have dane it kacsingly and hhence to have done it at all (strictly speaking). ‘Aristotle implies thea that nothing 2 man does unknowingly can ‘count as an action of his. Does he recognise chat, since there are ou any ‘occasion a great qumber of facts an agent knows about what he is daing, there will be a geeat number of different waye of characterising what he in doing knowingly? Doee he see that what is done may be eubject to praise under one deseripsion and blame under another, or may constitute ‘ne offence under ane description anda different one under another, or ‘may invite moral appraisat under one description and technical appeaisal under another?598 JOHN L. AGEREEL: Ine Nieomachcan Ethies V. 8, between the sections already summarised, Aristotle explains what counts ag hkousion: ‘whatever of the things in hhis power a man doce in knowledge and not ignorance of either the person, the instrument, ar the zesult—e.g. whom he strikes, what be Stties with, and with what eesult—and Clnowing) each of them not ‘per accident!> Tois last requirement is explained by an, example: you . mnay know thet sou are seriking a man but not knaw that zhe man is vour father; 40, Aristatle implica, you do not Imow zehom you are striking (your father) save per accidene. Similarly, he adds, as regards the result and the whole action. Here, then, Ariatetle touches an some of the various factors or cir cumstances of any practical situation—whase number and diversity he often, of course, stresses; and he usea the nation of knowing per accidens, ‘anotion that is estentially connected with the idea that free substitution fof extensionally equivalent expressions is not always permissible. Yet hhe conspicuously fails to remark that thougi an his aceaunt you donot strike your father hekourize, you do strike a man AdkousiSs; or that, in vite of diferent inown factors in a given situation, a man may be Accused of and offer diverse exeuses for—diflerent offences. Aviscotle’s mind is clearly on act as already speciied i the accusation: the struck his father a fatal ‘blow withasward’. ‘We mist, however, examine Aristode's fuller account of actions and excuses in Micomachean Eehice TIT. «, He starts with the privative term, f@kourion: a man can deay responsibility far something done—claim that ft was akousion—it he can plead force or ignorance, Ry ‘force! is meant real piysical farce, where it would in fact be misleading to sty eat the man had done anjthing-—‘the arch [originating principle) is outside and nothing is contributed by the person who acts or rather is acted fon’. By ‘ignorance’ ‘a meant ignorance of facts, citeumstances, and consequences, not ignorance of ‘the universal’, of what is good or leu. (Corresponding to these negative tests far afousion—not cue ta an arche in the person, not lnown—is the positive formula: the houston is ‘that whose originating principle is im the agent himseli, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the aetion’ Verious questions arise as to the interpretation of the ignorance test, and Aristotle discusses come of thers, But the point of concern to us he does nat bring aut, and indeed his way of epeaking serves to conceal 1 give someone a drink not knowing it to be poison—t think it will refresh but in fact t will lll. Tgnocance makes my act ahousion. What fact? Cleacly what I did throug ignorance was ta poison any friend, not to give him a drink. The ignorance that males my act akousion is ignorance of a feature that goes to define chat act and not ignorance of a feature that simply characterises it, Now same of Aristotle's foremulations could pesiaps he construed in such a way as to accommodate this point. When, after refering to the various circumstances of action, he saya 1 ‘The Sow of the sentence is jn favour of understanding ‘knawing’ rather than “caing’ before “ech of theta, (Ror ‘knowin pur accident’ wee for example Poiterior Anaiyioes 76a 1, 93825, 930 25)ARISTOTLE ON ACTION 599 that ‘the man ignarant of any of these sete ahousi’ (ILI. 145), we right take him t9 mean that corresponding to ignorance of any factor there will be some act the man ean be said to have done adpusicr. And ‘when lie says that that is hekowion which a man dacs in knowledge of person, instrument, and regule (V. 8.3), we might take him to be using ‘only by way of example a case where the performance in question specified as the bringing about of a certain result by using a cert inateument on 4 certain person. This would then be consistent with bis allowing that that is also Aekousion which a man dacs in keowledge of person and instrument (hue in ignorance of result): he struck his father hhekausias (Qhough he struck his fether a fatal blow ahussids) ‘These would, however, be very forced ways of interpreting Aristotle's words. His own approach it indicated hy the fact cha, after going through, “Chumber of things of which one might be ignorant, be says thet ane who was ignorant of any of these ig thought to have acted okcusids—and especially if he was ignorant an the moet important points (III. 18), Tis cleee that Aristotle it not associating knowledge or ignorance of this, that, or the other with various aet-deseriptions invalving this, tbat, far the other, with respect to each of which the question ‘did he do it ehousis? could be asked. Rather he ix asking simply whether w roan ‘acted hekousidr' on tome accasion, and saying that he did so anly if he new all the important cixcumstances. Tis eagy ¢o understand why Aristotle should have spoken as he dacs. In a simple exposition he considers simple and striking cases. We all know what Oedipus did, and ve are quite willing to say simply that fe ‘acted akcusid?. "The enormity of the charge of striking his father a fatal blow pushes aside any minor infelicities of which he may simultancously have been guilty, and even submerges the quite eerious charge (which be enight well find it harder to evade) of having struck a san. In such a Ccramatie case one ean ask simply whether a man ‘zcted Hckoutide, oF ‘whether he “did it hekousis, without entering into oF even noticing theo- retical questions about che identification of actions. Tt is dificule, hawever, to eee how closer considerstion could have Iefe Aristotle satisfied with hia way of speaking. Por whether he identified the thing done (i) with the perton’s bodily movement M or with the total package M (a, b, ¢-..)--where the letters in brackets stand for vorious circumstances ete.—he wauld find it impossible to raise the ‘questions that we (and the courts) want to raise. But if he tecated M(a), Mb), ete. a8 diferent things done (perhaps diflerent offences), about teach of which separately the question whether it was done hekottis could be asked, he could aot esy that the knowledge required for an afirmetive anawer was knowledge of al or af the most important factors in the situation, ‘The knowledge required for an affirmative answer to the ‘question about A¥(a) would.be simply the knowledge that IM would be Me. Temight be said that, though whet a man does on a particular accesfon smut he (asi were) taken apart inthis way—the question about intention or ‘valantariness’ being directed nat at the whole package but at the tlements in it, Af{a), Bf(b), ete.—, yet whut a man does hehausits on a600 JOHN L. ACKRILL: particular occasion cin be treated a¢ 2 single zetion (the action he per« formed)—eay, Mt, g, m. -.), where the letters in brackets stand for the. circumstances etc. known t0 the agent. Certainly, however much he disliked some of the circumstances, however much he regretted that doing M(e) would be doing M(g) he did know that it eas precisely this ppadage—M(a, g, m...) that he was taking, and he took it because on “the whole he stanted to do so rather than not "There ere, nevertheles, till reasons for picking M(a, g, m...) apart. Firstly, he may well have to go t0 different courts to meet different charges in cespect of JAG), M(g) ete, In one cauct M(a) will be the faction complained of, and ‘that ie was also M(g) will be, perhaps, a ruitigating circumstance, Secondly, even if our knowledge that he took the package because on the whole he wanted to make it superfluous to ask separately whether M(@) was hekousion, whether MA(q) was hekouston, cte., we may well want to ask with respect to each whether he was glad ‘or carry (or indifferent) that he wis doing that. Was that what made him take the whole package, or was it perhaps an element he regretted but hhad eo accept in order to get some other? He wanted Ma, g, m...) on ‘the whole, Was it perhaps only (or precisels) M(a) that he raaily wanted? “Thia takes us baele ta the fist pare of Aristotle's account ofthe hekoution that whose arche [originsting principle] is in the agent himself, he tacing awace of the particular citeumstances’. The arche relevant for action ig no doabe desite, orexs. (For, a3 Aristotle recognises, not every internal arche leads to performances classfiable—even given knoviledge— as hiekousia, Many processes of a biological kind are not influenced by four wishes and desires; they are nat hehowsia and they are not akousia either, V. 8.3, 11352 33-b 2.) But of what exactly is desire the ociginating principle? Is it, vo use the above crude symbolism, M or Ad(a) or Mla, g, mm...) or Mla, bc. .)? Does Aristotle's general account of human and animal movement theow any light on this? "The central featuces ofthis account are familiar. Ifan object of thought or innagination hecomes an abject of desire a man’s faculty of desire is stimulated and moves him towards realising or achieving it. ‘Three ‘eauses'—or explanstory factore—are mentioned here: the final cause, the object of desire; the efficient cause, the man’s actual desire; and the formal eause, the estence at definition of the movement produced. In a ccectain way these dee ‘causes’ coincide, a8 Aristotle says, for example Jin Physics B. 3, where he takes his ilkistrations feo productive crafts. Te would appear then that akat action precisely has been performed— what action is genuinely explained by the arche in the agent—depends ‘on what the object of thought and desice was. Unfortunately difficulties [at once srse. Aristotle often gives asthe object of desire (or of its species, ‘appetite nd wish) a characteristic (like the pleasant, the noble), and not something that could strictly be done, When he does speak of what we may wont to do he is naturally often concerned. with cases in. which liberation is involved, where one thing is done as a rneans to another for where the pros snd cas of a course af action heve to be weighed up. ‘So an imnediaca distinction presents itself between what one primarily ‘wants to-do and what one wants to do derivatvely, insofar as one thinksARISTOTLE ON ACTION 601 it necessaey to achieve one’s real sim. Should we then say that what we really want to do, ar want (0 do without qualification, is only what we want non-derivatively to do? Aristotle comes close to this in Nicomachean Ethics VIL. 9.1: if @ person chooses or pursues this for the ste of that, for ce ics chat chat he pursues and chooses, but pur accidens tt is this But when we speak without qualification we mesa what is per «e'. This suggests a series or hierarchy of deicriptions of what a man does because he desires to, etch successive description coming nearer to revealing cexcetly what he aims at. In our siraple case, M(a, a.m...) comes first, and is followed by M(a): his wanting the package was derivative from his wanting 4G), But if is alwaya for some desirable characteristic that a possible line of action appeals, there will be M(B) after D(a) in the series, Desire is then the arche of Af{a, g, m... ), M(a), and M¢#)—but primarily of the last end only derivatively of the others. Tis clea, [ think, ehac what Aristotle aays about desire at the originating principle of action does nor pravide an answer to the sorts af question ‘bout actions and action-deseriptions that were lefe unanswered by his discussions of responsibility. Moreover his account of the pirysiology of Soimal mavement, which shows how desire operates as a physical (non- intentional) procest leading to muscular and Timb movements (how desire isin 2 way the arche of M), gives no clue as vo how the physiological story is connected to the psychological one, or how questions ahout the individuation of movements are related to questions about the individuae tion of actions. T conclude that while Ariatotle has much to tell us about the responsi bility for eetions, the motives of actions, and the physiology of actions, hhe does not direct his gaze steadily upon the questions ‘What i an action? and “What iam action”. It is not that such questions would be beyond him, He revels in questions ofthis kind, 2nd he has the conceptual land linguistic equinment needed to tackle them. Whatever the reasons thy he did nox tackle these questions head-on, it seems likely that this failure is itself che reason for many of the ‘incoberences' and ‘eontsa~ Gictions’ to be found in passages such as those I quoted at the beginning.