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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 2, April 1981,

pp. 135-150 (Article)

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DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0101

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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v019/19.2griswold.html

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 The Ideas and the
Criticism of Poetry in
Plato's Republic, Book 10

CHARLES GRISWOLD

ONE OF THE most frequently cited passages in Plato that bears directly on the
nature and number of Ideas occurs at the start of the Republic, Book 10. Here
Socrates invokes a "customary procedure" to " s e t down some one particular
form for each of the particular 'manys' to which we apply the same name"
(596a5-8). 1 Thus we seem to have, all at once, the conceptual key to the origin
of the Ideas and an indication of their nature. Socrates proceeds to give ex-
amples of Ideas, namely, the "Idea of the Bed" and the " I d e a of the Table."
Two difficulties arise immediately. First, the examples are often seen as being
comic, and because of them (as well as for other reasons) many commentators
have found it difficult to take the passage seriously. More importantly, beds and
tables are artifacts; yet Socrates' previous discussion of the Ideas in Republic 5-
7 not only failed to refer to artifacts, but also omitted reference to Ideas of
things. The Ideas discussed earlier were predominantly what we would call
"ethical" or "aesthetic" in nature, z Secondly, the use of the " o n e over many"

i All quotations in English from the Republic are from Allan Bloom's translation (New York and
London: Basic Books, 1968). For the Greek text I have relied on John Burner, ed., Platonis Opera, 5
vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). I would like to point out at the outset that by "Soc-
rates" 1 mean, in this essay, the "Socrates" of Plato's dialogues.
2 Thus 1. M. Crombie says that the criticism of poetry in Book 10 is a "swashbuckling passage,
a n d . . , it is possible that Plato was enjoying himself by overstating his case"; the choice of beds
and tables is "surely derisory"; Plato may have been "teasing us a little" (An Examination of
Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols. [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962], 1 : 147). G. M. A. Grube, in his
translation of the Republic, also says that "the painter is here used as an illustration, and if we take
the details too seriously they involve many difficulties, such as the existence of Forms of artifacta,
that the Forms are created b'y the gods, which they are nowhere else in Plato, and that the carpenter
imitates the Form directly" (The Republic [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1974], p. 241, n. 4).
For a similar approach, see F. M. Cornford, ed. and trans., The Republic of Plato (1941; reprint ed.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 315-16. A. D. Woozley and R. C. Cross, in Plato's Republic: A
Philosophical Commentary (New .York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), remark that in the passages at
issue Plato "musters every argument he can think of in justification of what he had said earlier, and
that in so doing he is in places less strict in the statement of an argument than he would be

[135]
136 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

argument alone for specifying Ideas leads to the setting down of Ideas for virtu-
ally everything ( " m a n y " might be interpreted as " a t least t w o " ) ) For if there
are Ideas of beds and tables, one supposes that there must also be Ideas of
pillows, mattresses, alarm clocks, saltshakers, and so on ad absurdum. A thesis
which recreates the ordinary world in order to explain it, however, raises more
difficulties than it resolves. The " o n e over many" argument in itself generates
an extreme and finally unintelligible "realism" or "essentialism." But neither
here nor in the other dialogues does Plato clearly delimit the range of the Ideas.
Yet the Parmenides shows that Plato was fully aware of the " h o w m a n y "
question, among others. 4
The beginning of Republic 10 presents us with another difficult question:
What is the relationship between God and the Ideas? Socrates asserts that the
Idea of the Bed (along with "everything else," and so the other Ideas too;
597d7-8) is produced by God (59765-7). This passage has concerned inter-
preters since antiquity, and for a very good reason: it contradicts Socrates'
frequent assertions earlier in the Republic and elsewhere that the Ideas are
eternal, never coming to be or passing away. Efforts to interpret this passage as
suggesting that the Ideas are thoughts of God or that the Ideas and God are the
same have been ably refuted by Harold Cherniss. 5

elsewhere" (p. 284; see also pp. 285,287). According to N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's
Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 132, Plato is using the theory of Ideas in Book 10 to
" m a k e do" with it to solve problems other than those at issue in the earlier books: in Book 10 Plato
is referring to the theory " i n a rather obscure form" (p. 225). In a note to p. 133 Murphy informs us
that since Prnclus's time people have suggested that this passage in Book 10 should not be taken too
seriously. Also W. J. Oates, Plato's View of Art (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 39:
in Book 10 Plato is attacking poets with the "crudest and most naive form" of "the Theory of
Ideas." Finally, R. L. Nettleship, in Lectures on the Republic of Plato, ed. G. R. Benson (1897;
reprint ed., London: Macmillan & Co., 1901), p. 346, acknowledges that "Plato applies the same
conception to tables and beds in a way that sounds harsh and ludicrous" (the "same conception" is
the theory of Ideas as previously applied to justice and the like).
3 The view that the realm of Ideas should be extended so as to include those of beds and tables
is held by James Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1902),
2: 386-87; W. D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 79; W. Temple,
"Plato's Vision of the Ideas," Mind 17 (1908):509, 510, 516; and in a more cautious vein, Murphy,
The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, p. 137. J. G. Frazer, on the other hand, favors a more
historical solution to the issue: given the inconsistencies between the earlier and later books of the
Republic, he is led to "favour Hermann's view that the tenth book was composed after the others"
(The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory [London: Macmillan & Co., 1930], p. 80; on p. 77 also Frazer
states that there is an inconsistency between the presentation of the "Ideal theory" in Books 5-7
and Book 10, and that this supports Hermann's solution). Nevertheless Frazer remarks that in laying
down Ideas for "very substantial things" such as beds and tables "Plato has given in to logical
requirements" (p. 77).
4 Parmenides 130b-e; Socrates is uncertain as to whether there are Ideas of man, fire, water,
hair, dirt, mud, or "'any other undignified and trivial objects." Artifacts are not mentioned, but beds
and tables could be classified as trivial or undignified. The list of Ideas in other dialogues usually
ends with "the like," "all the rest," " a n d so on," as in Phaedo 100b5-7, Phaedrus 247cl-e4. In the
first undisputed reference to the Ideas (which in this paper I shall consider to be identical with
" F o r m s " ) in the Republic, Socrates mentions "justice and injustice, good and bad, and all the
forms" (476a4-5; see also 479a5, b l - 2 , e3-4). In Book 10, Socrates refers to Ideas of beds, tables,
and the "other things" (596b8-9; see also 596a6-7, 597d7-8).
s H. F. Cherniss, " O n Plato's Republic X 597 B , " American Journal of Philology 53
(1932):233-42. Hence Cherniss argues, on p. 239: "Consequently, even though the phraseology is
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 137

In this essay I will offer an explanation of why Socrates asserts that the
Ideas are created by God and why he asserts that there are Ideas of beds and
tables. The assertions are very closely linked to one another; both are part of
Socrates' critique of imitation (/~i./z~/o-~), and in particular of "imitative p o e -
try. ''6 In brief, Socrates constructs the following tripartite schema. There are
three kinds of beds, and three kinds of producers of beds. God produces the Idea
of the Bed, the artisan (by looking at the Idea) makes a bed, and the artist
imitates the artisan's bed and makes a third bed. Hence the artist imitates not
what is (the Idea) but "something that is like the being, but is not being" (597a4-
5). The artist is therefore "at the third generation from nature" or "third from a
king and the truth" (597e). The schema is initially stated very simply with
reference to manual artisans and painters. Subsequently it is elaborated so as to
replace the former with those who produce opinion in the city (legislators, edu-
cators, military commanders, among others), and the latter with "the first
teacher and leader of all these fine tragic things" (595b10-c2), that is, Homer.
Homer, the imitative poet, is the "antistrophe" of the painter (605a8-b2). Thus
the notion of painters imitating beds and tables must be understood as a kind of
shorthand for the more complex subjects dealt with by the poetic imitators. Beds

merely popular, and even though an interlocuter might be expected to understand it in this popular
sense, it is inconceivable that Plato should have been unaware that the statement [that God created
the Ideas] directly contradicts all the rest of his writings . . . . But if we admit that the contradiction
was evident to him--and we should be setting up a dangerous canon of criticism in supposing that
the author of any text was unaware of the meaning of his words--it follows necessarily that it was
wilfully set down." Ross, on the other hand, says that "the truth is that at this stage of his
t h o u g h t . . . Plato does not seem to have thought out the relation between God and the Ideas," and
that we are "justified in not taking seriously Plato's description of God as making the I d e a s . . . "
(Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 78-79). For further discussion of the efforts in antiquity to solve the
problem in question and of the problem's historical permutations down to Spinoza, see Harry A.
Wolfson, "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas," Journal of the History of
Ideas 22 (1961) : 3-32.
6 In Book 3 Socrates shitis from an analysis of the content of poetry to its style (392c6 ft.).
Narration in poetry and mythteiling are divided into simple narrative, imitative narrative, and a
mixture of the two. The first kind is a description of events told in the third person such that poet
and character are explicitly different, as in dithyrambs. The second occurs when the poet speaks
through the characters and indicates no difference between himself and them, so "hiding" himself;
Socrates cites tragedy and comedy as examples. The third is a combination of the two, as in epics.
Homer's Iliad and Odyssey fall into this class, though the mixture is heavily biased in favor of
imitation rather than simple narration. "'Nearly all" of these two works is imitative. Thus Homer is
later termed "the most poetic and first of the tragic poets" (607a2-3), and the like. In Book 10
Socrates says that "those who take up tragic poetry in iambics and in epics are all imitators in the
highest possible degree" (602b8-I0). In discussing the content of education in Books 2 and 3 (376c-
39"2c) Homer is associated with imitation of deeds and words of Gods, demons, heroes, and Hades'
domain (392a3-6, 377el-3; 382b7-cl, 388c3). The content of Homer's poems is imitative in the
sense of representative, while on the whole the form is imitative in the sense described above. When
I refer to "imitative poetry" or simply to "poetry" I must be understood to be referring to the kind
of poetry exemplified by Homer. In Books 2 and 3 Socrates deals with imitation in other arts, but in
the Republic poetry is by far the most important kind of art, because of its comprehensiveness,
power over men's souls, and influence in political life, among other reasons. It is also worth remem-
bering that the Greek ("poetry") derives from r ("making"), since in Book 10 Socrates wants
to bring out the literal meaning of "poetry." On this point see Paul Vicalre, Recherches sur les mots
ddsignant la podsie et le podte dans l'oeuvre de Platon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1964), pp. 168-72. Cf. the Symposium 205b8-c9.
138 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

and tables serve as symbols of one dimension of political life (below). In my

interpretation, Socrates' criticism of the imitative poets is also a caricature of
their imitations. Understood in this manner, we need not accept the view that
Socrates' puzzling assertions about God, Ideas, and indeed imitation, are either
straightforwardly held by him or may be dismissed as passing ploys in the
argument. In part, my interpretation of Socrates' assertions depends on an
analysis of the context and on a method of reading the dialogues that allows for
ad hominem arguments and irony. 7
The approach taken in this essay does not solve the " h o w many Ideas"
question or describe the nature of the Ideas conclusively. Comparison of Book
I0 with Books 5-7 (as well as with other dialogues) indicates, however, crucial
differences in the problem that gives rise to the view that there are Ideas. These
differences bear directly on the fact that in the earlier books Socrates does not
refer to Ideas of things, let alone of artifacts. In the earlier books the problem to
which the Ideas are a response is not that there are " m a n y s , " but that particu-
lars are perceived by us as having contrary properties. This approach to the
Ideas is by now well known, thanks to G. E. L. Owen and A. Nehamas, among
others. 8 In Republic 5, the problem is, in brief, stated as follows. The Ideas
really are, while particulars both are and are not; thus the Idea of the beautiful
itself "stays the same in all respects" while each of the many beautiful things
will also look ugly, each of the just things unjust, each of the holy things unholy
(479a). Even "the things that we assert to be big or tittle, light and heavy," will
be "addressed by these names" as well as "'by the opposites of these names"
(479b). Like a riddle, " t h e manys are also ambiguous, and it is not possible to
think of them fixedly as either being or not being, or as both or neither" (479c).
This is the problem which leads the "lovers of wisdom" to the fixed and non-
wandering "things that are always the same in all respects" (479e7-8).
In Book 7 the same point is made in terms of the hand and fingers. The
sensations that "summon the intellect" are those that " a t the same time go over
to the opposite sensation" (523b9-c4). The contrariety of sensations is the im-
For a full defense of this principle of interpretation and for reflection on Plato's use of the
dialogue form, see Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964), pp. 50ft.;
Jacob Klein, introductory remarks to A Commentary on Plato's Meno (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1965); Stanley Rosen, introduction to Plato's Symposium (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968); Drew Hyland, "Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric I
(1968):38-50; and my "Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues," The Monist 63, no. 4
(1981).
s Owen, " A Proof in the Peri lde6n," reprinted in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E.
Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 293-312; Alexander Nehamas, "Predication
and Forms of Opposites in the Phaedo, '" Review o f Metaphysics 26 (1973):461-91, and "Plato on
the Imperfection of the Sensible World," American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975): 105-17. Thus
in "Plato" Nehamas states, "And here we have one of the reasons why the Forms that Plato
postulates all correspond to incomplete predicates. His problem was that sensible objects, still being
the same, would appear to be both equal and unequal, both beautiful and ugly, and so on . . . . And
for these particulars to remain the same, there would have to be some properties which those
particulars possessed in themselves, independently of their relations to other objects, properties
which would allow their reidentification over time. These properties all corresponded to complete
terms, they did not confuse the soul by appearing together with their opposites, they did not require
the postulation of F o r m s . . . " (p. 116). See also "Predication," p. 476.
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 139

portant factor, and not, as Socrates emphasizes, whether the object is clearly or
dimly seen. Determination of whether the object really is a finger or hand is an
empirical matter. As Socrates points out in Book 10, a bed observed from
various angles might look different, but it is not really different from itself
(598a7-10). It is not simultaneously a bed and not a bed. Even if it did look that
way in the dark, one would decide the issue not by looking at the "Idea of the
Bed" (this use of the Idea is not advocated in Book 10) but by turning the lights
on. The problem, then, that leads us to posit an Idea does not seem to be
generated by stable objects such as hands or beds, so much as by the contrariety
of properties that these objects exhibit. Those properties that are instantiated
along with their opposites are described by Owen and Nehamas as "incomplete
properties" and are "attributive or relational," in contrast to "complete prop-
erties," which are " 'substantival' properties specified by nouns," such as beds
and tables. 9
If correct, this analysis of the problem leading to the "setting down" of
Ideas allows us to rule out an Idea of the Bed. I do not maintain that there is no
conceptual problem and strategy that would allow us to say that there is such an
Idea, although the "one over m a n y " criterion alone is inadequate. 1~ But since
that is the only criterion offered in Book 10, and since the criteria (which specify
the problem to which the Ideas are solutions) offered with much more care and
development in the same dialogue would rule out such an Idea, the " t h e o r y " of
Book I0 may be rejected as it stands. This is afortiori the case when we
remember that the Ideas in Book 10 are supposed to be made by God; moreover,
a number of other details in Socrates' description there make little sense (be-
low). Taking the most conservative approach possible, however, we might say
that Book 10 is just completely different from the previous books on this issue.
The Republic is, regrettably, an incoherent dialogue (even though Socrates re-
fers to a "customary procedure" and gives no overt indication that he is chang-
ing everything around). But I believe that we can avoid this conclusion by
explaining Socrates' remarks in the passage at issue as intentionally ironic. As
stated above, this interpretation requires a study of the context. We shall find
that Plato has in fact prepared us, in earlier books, for this interpretation. What-
ever difficulties arise from limiting the domain of Ideas (on the basis of the
9 Nehamas, "'Predication," pp. 469-70, et passim.
t0 In "Predication" Nehamas states that "accordingly, we should be wary o f taking the passage
at Republic 596A6--7, ' w e usually assume one distinct Form for each group of many things to which
we apply the same n a m e ' , to express [Plato's] final position on this matter. If the 'one-over-many'
argument, implicit in this passage, were the only, or even .the main, argument for the existence o f
Forms, Plato would have used it more often. There may well be Forms of table or of bed . . . . But
there is no reason to believe a priori that every argument Plato uses generates a Form for every
general term . . . . The one-over-many argument must not be imported into contexts where it does
not belong; among other things, it leads to an untenable interpretation ofPhaedo 1 0 0 B - 1 0 5 C . . . "
(pp. 462-63). But as Nehamas himself argues (see pp. 466-68, and " P l a t o " p. 108), Books 5-7 of the
Republic are consonant in this respect with the Phaedo; hence the Republic, with the exception o f
Book 10, must also preclude an Idea of beds o r tables. Either the Republic is inconsistent or the
sophisticated and plausible approach of the earlier books must be chosen over the sketchy and
implausible approach o f Book 10. This choice is superior if we can explain why Socrates espouses
the views of Book 10 at all.
140 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

middle books of the Republic) and from attributing the remarks of Book 10 to
irony, they are less serious than those entailed by the thesis that the Republic is
incoherent, that there are Ideas for every "one over many," and that God
created the Ideas. However, I must also show what Socrates gains by using
irony at this particular point.
Book 10 is in large part an attack on imitative poetry, culminating in Soc-
rates' famous statement that there is an old 8wt~oop&or ~votvr~too't~ between
poetry and philosophy (607b3-c3). In order to develop the attack, Socrates
proposes the tripartite schema outlined above. In his article on this passage,
Cherniss is more concerned with the role of God in the schema than with the
setting down of an Idea of the Bed, but he correctly argues that "Plato could
make poetical or rhetorical use of his most cherished and most serious be-
liefs," i~ for example, the belief that God only imitates the Ideas. Cherniss gives
three reasons for Plato's intentional misstatement of his true beliefs. First, " G o d
must be brought into the schematic classification for the sake of symmetry. ''12
Were God an imitator, the symmetry would be lost. Secondly, "it is only be-
cause [Plato] desires to degrade the artist as an imitator that he so carefully
avoids ascribing any imitative activity to God." 13 Finally, if Plato had said that
God too imitates the Ideas, he would have been drawn into "impertinent objec-
tions which would require lengthy digressions to refute, ''14 that is, objections to
the effect that if all imitation is bad, then God's imitation is bad too. Such
digressions would be "unrelated to the purpose of the passage. ''15
I am persuaded by Cherniss's basic approach, but not by the specifics of his
solution to the problem. To take the first point: Cherniss would have to demon-
strate that " s y m m e t r y " has, for Plato, some inherent value, sufficient to allow
the introduction of notions so pivotal as that of " G o d . " Indeed, Cherniss would
have to demonstrate that the value of "symmetry" is greater than that of pre-
serving a philosophically coherent doctrine. Cherniss certainly has not attempted
to do any of this; his appeal to "symmetry" has the air of afaute de mieux. In
my interpretation a more plausible and substantive reason will be given for the
introduction of God into the classification. Symmetry is a result of this introduc-
tion, not a cause of it. With respect to the second point, I note that Plato is not
simply criticizing imitation; he is also criticizing 7ro~r/trt~, that is, "making," the
ancestor of our "creativity" (below). This activity is the basis for the symmetry
of the schema. Only the artist is explicitly said to imitate. By making or creating,
God is liable to part of the charge brought against the poet. Finally, it would not
take a lengthy digression to point out that when GOd imitates he does so with
knowledge of the Ideas, unlike the poet. And why would this be a "digression"?
If Socrates is criticizing "imitation as a whole" (595c7), what could be more

it "On Plato's Republic X 597 B," p. 241.

12 Ibid., p. 240. Ross also uses the "symmetry" argument (Plato's Theory of Ideas, pp. 79, 236),
as do Cross and Woozley (Plato's Republic, p. 286).
m3 "'On Plato's Republic X 597 B," p. 240.
14 Ibid., p. 241.
is Ibid., p. 242.
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 141

relevant than some discussion of divine imitation? Indeed, Socrates has already,
in Book 2 (below), discussed God's nature and the imitative poet's false concep-
tions of it. One would think that the notion of God's creation of the Ideas would
require a "lengthy digression," given what has been said about the Ideas in the
earlier books. For these reasons, then, it is necessary to reject portions of
Cherniss's interpretation.
Socrates begins Book 10 by stating that he is now all the more persuaded by
his earlier decision (of Book 3) not to admit "at all any part of [poetry] that is
imitative" into the city. However, this was not his earlier conclusion, and the
relationship between the earlier and later critiques of poetry has generated con-
siderable discussion in the literature. In Book 3 Socrates and Glaucon had de-
cided that the "unmixed imitator of the decent" (397d4-5) and a brief and
playful imitation of the not so decent (396d3-e2) are acceptable. More broadly,
the poet who imitates the style of the decent man and says only what had been
allowed for in Books 2 and 3 is permissible (398a8-b4; also 401bl-402a4, 459e5-
460a2). As already noted (n. 6), "imitation" can mean either "impersonation"
("mimicking") or "representation." Thus we learn from Books 2 and 3 that
imitative poetry in the sense of impersonation is bad when the imitator (or
auditor) is adversely affected, while in the sense of representation it is bad when
it portrays its subject matter falsely (especially when the falsity is not conducive
to a good end), so corrupting those who hear it. These false representations can
be the same as fictions; thus representation takes on the sense of production
(~ro~r/~r~s). I do not believe that these results are inconsistent with the critique of
Book 10. However, that critique is more penetrating than the critique of the
earlier books because it can take advantage of the intervening discussion of the
Ideas, philosophy, the soul, and other subjects. Socrates still does not dismiss
imitative poetry altogether, since he concludes that "only so much of poetry as
is hymns to gods or celebration of good men should be admitted into a city"
(607a3-5) and that he will always be ready to listen to a defense of poetry (by
which he means primarily Homer, though "lyrics or epics" are mentioned also;
607d3-e2). Thus Socrates is not dismissing poetry on the basis of its style (e.g.,
depending on whether or not it is imitative or simply narrative). Nor do the
criteria for judging poetry depend on the ambiguity of the word "imitation";
thus the hymns to the Gods might be representations, and the celebration of
good men might be impersonation. The point is rather that poetry must be
guided by philosophy, and ultimately by a philosophical vision of the Ideas (as
early as Book 3,402b-c, Socrates remarks that the use of images must be ruled
by knowledge of originals, although it is debatable whether the "forms" men-
tioned here, such as moderation and courage, are "Ideas").
In Book 2 Socrates begins the education of the guardians, and indeed begins
with the start of their education, namely, with the kinds of myths the young
guardians will be allowed to hear. Founders of a city must "know the models
according to which the poets must tell their tales" (379al-3). First among these
are "models for speech about the gods" (o~."rOTro~zrCp~.0r163 379a5-6). The
poets, especially Hesiod and Homer, have lied about the Gods (377b ft.). Soc-
142 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

rates attempts to purify their theology so as to make it conducive to the philo-

sophical vision of the divine (the Ideas). The result of this purification is soon
apparent; if God is not simply equivalent to an Idea, in Socrates' revised theol-
ogy, he is like an Idea insofar as he cannot in any way become or change. God
cannot alter his condition or be moved (380d-383c). God is not a wizard, "able
treacherously to reveal himself at different times in different ideas [~5~m], at one
time actually himself changing [y,3wr/zevo~] and passing from his own form
[EZSo~] into many shapes [/zopg~]." God is "simple" and will never "depart
from his own idea [~8~a]" (380<11-6; also 381c7-9). God is also good and can be
the cause only of good things (38066-c3). From all this it would seem to follow
that God does not imitate other things or take on tasks such as creating Ideas, let
alone Ideas of beds and tables.
Thus we can explain Socrates' statements in Book l0 about God when we
relate them to his previous discussion of the issue. His statements are in effect
equivalent to the assertions of the uncensored poets. The earlier books have also
prepared us for this sort of duplicity. 16 It is important to note that in Book 10
Socrates emphasizes that the imitator concerns himself with making images of
the Whole; such a person "makes everything that each one of the manual arti-
sans makes separately" (596c2); he "produces everything" (598b7) and seems to
be "all wise" (598d3-4). This strange wisdom might include, Socrates says, "all
arts and all things human that have to do with virtue and vice, and the divine
things too" (598el-2). t7 Now in spite of both this statement and his final admo-
nition that "only so much of poetry as is hymns to gods or celebration of good
men should be admitted into a city" (607a3-5), Socrates is strangely quiet about
the Gods in the development of his critique of poetry in Book 10. I submit that
this is because he has already criticized the poet's view of the Gods in earlier
books and expects us to be reminded of this by his reference to God creating the
Ideas and so to see the irony in this reference. Similar, but more explicit, is his
reference back to the previous discussion of imitation. By understanding all of
the tripartite schema as ironic, that is, as Socrates' caricature of the poet's own
vision of the Whole, other important criticisms of poetry emerge (below). Again,
we have been prepared for these criticisms in earlier books. Socrates' nonironic
criticisms in Book 10 (e.g., that the poet flatters the base part of the soul;
below), however, remain valid and in fact complement the ironic points.
Consideration of Socrates' choice of beds and tables, in the initial or simple

ts At the end of Book 2 Socrates states that lying in speeches by men is " a kind of imitation of
the affection in the soul" (382b7-cl) and that men may use this lie as a " d r u g " (~o&pl~oLxov)"for
so-called friends when from madness or some folly they attempt to do something bad" (382c7-10). It
is also worth remembering Thrasymachus's statement that Socrates is a habitual ironist (337a3-7).
At 459c2-d2 Socrates asserts that the rulers may use a "throng of ties and deceptions for the benefit
of the ruled," just as a "courageous doctor" would u s e a ~pp~axov (cf. 389b-c). An example of
such a lie is the "noble lie" (414b-415d). The philosopher is the doctor who founds and rules the just
city. In Book I0, Socrates, who is not a ruler but who is a philosopher founding (in speech) a just
city, uses the deceptive tripartite schema to inoculate his auditors against imitative poetry.
17 Thus by the " W h o l e " I mean what Socrates means in the passages quoted by "everything";
i.e., the divine, the human, the material. The world " c o s m o s " might also convey my meaning. See
also 597d8, 598c9, and n. 22 below.
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 143

formulation of the tripartite schema (596a-597e) supports my remarks in the

previous paragraph. In the Republic these two objects have important connota-
tions, since they are the loci for the satisfaction of three fundamental bodily
desires, or rather for the desires of the "lowest part" of the soul, namely, the
desires for sex, sleep, and food. Bed and table are introduced in Book 2 during
the founding of the city. The "healthy city" (372e7) or the "city of sows"
(372d4) has no need for such things (it also lacks imitators and poets). Glaucon,
however, insists that there be beds and tables "as is conventional" and "just
like men have nowadays" (372d7-e1). This is the start of the "luxurious"
(372e3) or "feverish" (372e8) city. The Republic gives elaborate attention to the
regulation of these desires (e.g., 389d7 ft., 402e ft., 457c ft.); indeed Book 9 deals
at length and in detail with the pleasures and pains of this part of the soul.
From the standpoint of the individuaI soul, these lowly desires are dangerous
because they tend to dominate the higher part of the soul. From the standpoint
of the city, and of the interests of justice, the lowly desires are dangerous
because they encourage love of one's own, a principle that destroys the city by
making it many instead of one (462a-e). Love of one's own finally leads to the
desire to increase one's own and so to dominate others and their possessions,
that is, to tyranny. In the Republic the desires centered around bed and table are
summarized under the name " e r o s " ; eros is branded as a "tyrant" (573b6-7).
Most people are servants of eros and so potential tyrants; hence Socrates pre-
sents "the life of the m a n y . . , in the form of an oracle" (586b5-6), in which
men are compared to cattle, who "'with their heads bent to earth and t a b l e . . .
feed, fattening themselves, and copulating." They become insatiable and at-
tempt to master each other (586at-b4). Their "pleasures" are in fact "mere
phantoms and shadow paintings of true pleasure" (586b7-8). The "erotic and
tyrannic desires" are the ones that are "most distant from philosophy and argu-
ment" while the "kingly and orderly" desires are least distant (587a-b). The
tyrannic desires are third in order; the kingly or philosophical are first and
highest.
Now, the tragic poets "make hymns to tyranny" (568b7-8), that is, they
flatter tyrants and so the third and lowest part of the soul. Translated into the
language of Socrates' tripartite schema in Book 10, as initially stated by him, the
tragic poet imitates beds and tables and is "third" in the order of things, that is,
"third from a king and the truth" (59747). As Socrates develops this criticism in
Book 10, we see that he concentrates on tragedy, even though comedy is also
imitative poetry (394b8-c2). ~g No comedians are ever criticized by name in the
Republic, though one would expect some reference to Socrates' archenemy,
Aristophanes. Euripides, Aeschylus, Hesiod, and above all Homer are referred
to frequently. For Socrates, Homer is the "first teacher and leader of all these
fine tragic things" (595b10-c2), the "leader" of tragedy (598d7-8), the "most
poetic and first of the tragic poets" (607a2-3). Homer originated tragedy by
~ Trage~ly is referred to six times in Book 10 (595b4, 597e6, 598d8, 602b9, 605c11, 607a3; see
also 595cl). Comedy is referred to twice (without citation of any authors of comedies), in one
paragraph (606c2-9).
144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

supplying it with many of its themes, mythology, vision of the Gods and heroes.
Thus he is said to be the poet who "educated Greece" (606r Socrates
attacks the source of this education rather than those who developed it. In the
earlier books, Socrates referred to other poets as well as to Homer and his
poems by name (or by direct quotation). In Book 10 he refers only to Hesiod and
Homer by name, but not to their poems (or those of anyone else) by name (or by
direct quotation).
In Books 2 and 3 Socrates attacks the Iliad rather than the Odyssey, al-
though as pointed out above neither work is mentioned directly in Book 10.19
But since the Iliad seems to be associated with tragedy and the latter is attacked
in Book 10, and since Socrates' own poetic myth at the end of Book 10 is
modeled on the Odyssey, it is safe to say that the Iliad remains the chief culprit.
Clearly the defects Socrates finds in the "tragic poet" Homer are symbolized by
Achilles rather than by Odysseus. The irritable, irrational, and fickle part of our
soul that is imitated by " H o m e r or any other of the tragic poets" when they
portray "one of the heroes in mourning and making quite an extended speech
with lamentation" or "singing and beating his breast" (605c10-d2) is surely the
soul of Achilles. Earlier on Achilles (who is "third from Zeus"; 391c2) is explic-
itly criticized for his lack of moderation. 2~ This part of the soul also contains
desires for sex, spiritedness, pleasures (606d inter alia), and so for honor and
booty as well. The part of the soul opposed to this is self-controlled, calm, quiet,
and keeps its suffering to itself, especially when a man loses " a son or something
else for which he cares particularly" (603e3-5). This good part of the soul is
calculating (602e-603a), quiet, and prudent (604e2); thus it does not exalt the
"ordinary things in us" (603a7-8). The ordinary is the root of the conventional
(except in the best cities); tragic poetry (symbolized by Achilles) in fact binds us
to the conventional and the lowly.
Given the symbolic significance of beds and tables, the creation of the Ideas
of beds and tables by GOd becomes all the more un-Socratic. Although the
tripartite schema suggests that some men imitate God, the portrait of God's
activities here is anthropomorphic: God imitates man. In any event, God con-
cerns himself with the lowest desires, with eros. The human defects the poet
flatters are enshrined by him in God. This is hardly the purified theology advo-
cated by Socrates in the earlier books. Moreover, ff the Idea is to serve as a
model for human beds, it seems that God must have analyzed human bodily
needs (which he did not create) in order to make the " B e d itself." This means
that God concerns himself with the lowest part of man, thus altering (in creating)
his own condition on behalf of something rather base. But if GOd did not create
the Bed in nature for man, he either created it capriciously or made it for his
19 In passages dealing with the critique of imitation in Book 2 Socrates refers (e.g., by way of
quoting passages) to the Iliad seven times and to the Odyssey twice. In the context of the same
critique in Book 3, Socrates refers eighttimes to the Odyssey and approximatelytwenty-fivetimes to
the Iliad (countingreferences to differentpassages separately).
20 390e-391c. Achilles' mourningfor Patroclus comes to mind here. At 388a and 391b Socrates
disapprovinglycites passages in which Homer depicts Achillesmourningfor Patroclus (and in which
Achilles drags Hector around Patroclus's tomb).
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 145

own use--a rather comic possibility, but not an unimportant one, since Homer
has Zeus lying down and sleeping in the Iliad. 21 Here the anthropomorphism is
especially striking.
The tripartite schema (God-Idea, artisan-thing, artist-imitation) contains
other elements out of keeping with Socrates' statements in the rest of the Repub-
lic. Up to Book 10 the Ideas function as principles of theoretical knowledge, not
productive-technical knowledge. Up to this point Socrates does not suggest that
vision of the Ideas would supply one with the sort of technical information
required to manufacture a particular item. Further, in the present passage Soc-
rates does not say how the artisan " s e e s " the Idea. As one of the lower classes
in the Republic, the artisan would have none of the theoretical education re-
quired for a philosophical vision of the Ideas. It seems that now anyone (except
imitators) can simply see the Ideas with no difficulty. Yet previously Socrates
held that a highly selective and arduous education is needed to train that rare
individual who might be able to discern the Idea; the Ideas cannot be seen by the
" m a n y . " In Book 10 Socrates suggests that the seer has no need to look at
images or reflections of the Ideas, as was previously the case in Books 5-7.
Evidently the vision is now direct and unmediated. There is no "separation"
between Ideas and particulars.
Preliminary reflection on the notion of an "Idea of the Bed" does not recom-
mend it for its intelligibility (and as argued in the opening pages above, the
doctrines of Books 5-7 are of little help here). What exactly does the artisan
" s e e " (putting aside the points made in the previous paragraph) when he be-
holds this " I d e a " ? Perhaps he would see a blueprint for a bed. Socrates asserts
that there can be only one Idea of the Bed (597ci-d3), thus implying that the
same Idea is, so to speak, valid for all men and for all times. If the Idea is a sort
of blueprint, the blueprint must be perfect, universally applicable at all times.
But what measttres would this blueprint use? What language would it be written
in? What materials would it recommend? Are there not many perfect kinds of
beds, depending on the given contingent situation? Is not the best bed finally a
matter of opinion? One might retort that the human body and its needs remain
basically the same through history, and so that the Idea of the Bed is somehow
derived from the Idea of the Human Body and its Needs. But such an Idea

z~ Iliad 1. 605-I 1. At 389a Socrates quotes Iliad 1. 599-600, the passage immediately preceding
Zeus's brief sleep, and at 390b6-7 refers to Iliad 2. 1-4, where Zeus is awake again and all the other
Gods are asleep. It is clear from Socrates' discussion of the Gods in Books 2 and 3 that they ought
not to be portrayed as having bodily needs such as those for sleep and sex (see also Iliad 14. 294-
351, to which Socrates also adverts at 390b7-c6); the Gods do not need beds. Murphy, in The
Interpretation of Plato's Republic, suggests that in order to understand a bed one should "study the
needs of the body in sleep," which is what the artisan is doing when he looks at the Idea. The
carpenter "keeps his mind on the nature of the need [~rpb~ r/iv ~.8~ctv/3k~rtav, 5 9 6 b ] . . . " (p. 238).
The association of needs with the Idea of the Bed is also made explicit by J. A. Stewart, Plato's
Doctrine of Ideas (1909; reprint ed., New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 60: " T h e ~ ~u c-t?
r xk/,u-r/, the Idea, made by God, which the carpenter copies, is that need in human life which it
is possible to meet by making x),iua~. That need is part of the constitution of Human Nature and of
the Universe, is not made by man. The Idea as need, or use, we have had already in the Cratylus,
389Aff...."
146 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

would be very complicated indeed; how could it yield immediate productive

knowledge to a nonphilosopher? At this point further speculations are fruitless,
especially if we are to keep the Republic in mind at all. The artisan's access to
the Idea of the Bed, his use of the Idea in manufacture, and finally the Idea
itself, are either inconsistent with what Socrates says in the rest of the dialogue
or (at least in the absence of some other sophisticated metaphysical scheme)
unintelligible.
Consequently it is very improbable that Socrates intends this schema to be a
true representation of his conception of the Whole; it is far more probable that
he intends it as a representation of the poet's conception of the Whole. It could
be countered that even if the present schema is not intended literally by Socrates
(since it is incommensurate with his other views), there are explanations of his
use of the schema other than the one I am offering. But I cannot think of any
other plausible explanations that do not appeal to the context, that is, to the
criticism of imitation. As Cherniss and others have seen, Socrates explicitly
formulates the tripartite schema in order to characterize and criticize imitation.
Once that approach is accepted, then we are left with the problem of making
sense out of an analysis and criticism of imitation, certain features of which are
simply inconsistent with Socrates" views articulated elsewhere in the same dia-
logue, and other features of which seem to be easily refutable or silly. Without
repeating my criticisms of alternative attempts to do this, I would stress that my
interpretation is the least problematic explanation of the present passage, that it
is supported by a careful reading of the text, and that it alone allows us to grasp
the richness and depth of Socrates' dispute with poetry (below). Finally, it also
allows us to make use of the other criticisms leveled against poetry in Book 10.
Several more important defects in the poet's world-view are brought to our
attention when the passage is interpreted in the manner I suggest. Beds and
tables are, in their own ways, the loci of human corporeal generation. Within the
schema, the imitators produce images of beds and tables by imitating the arti-
san's productions of real beds and tables. The imitator or poet concerns himself
solely with genesis. Thus imitation is "an ordinary thing having intercourse with
what is ordinary" and "produces ordinary offspring" (603b4: trvyy*y~,o/~v~,
y6vw). The imitator is at the cpir y~,v~p.a (597e3-4). Indeed, the whole
schema of Idea-God, artifact-artisan, imitation-imitator, is shot through with the
language of genesis. Idea, artifact, imitation, are all made and so have all be-
come at one time or another. God, artisan, artist, themselves change at one time
or another and have no stable paradigms for their activity. The artist's genera-
tion is at the third generation from divine generation. One might say, in sum,
that two of the most condemned and regulated principles in the Republic, eros
and genesis, are praised by this triadic schema.
As indicated above, Socrates tells us clearly that the poet is bound to the
conventional as well as to eros or genesis (in Book 10, however, eros and
genesis are not explicitly associated with each other). By understanding the
tripartite schema as an abbreviation of the poet's view of the Whole, we see that
these principles are fundamental to poetic imitation. Eros replaces stable ~ZSo~
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 I47

as the principle of human "wisdom," genesis replaces the eternal as the N~trp.6~
of the Whole, and making replaces knowing as our access to the Whole. In
short, the philosopher has lost his priviledged place in the Whole. Correspond-
ingly, his access to the divine, and the divine itself, are no longer philosophically
conceived. We are beginning to see the seriousness of the "old quarrel between
poetry and philosophy."
In the triadic schema the imitator has no direct access to nature or to the
divine, that is to the standards which have functioned thusfar in the Republic as
the measures of truth and knowledge, and this lack of access is not itself known
to the imitator (I will discuss the issue of inspiration below). Hence we are led to
believe, further, that the artist is a slave to convention and entirely passive to it.
He must receive his forms from the artisan without really understanding them.
Interpreted symbolically, these forms are not so much beds and tables as they
are a variety of human desires, aims, and ways of achieving these aims. The
poetic imitators reproduce conventional attitudes toward the basest parts of
human beings. Secondly, since he is subservient to the artisan, the imitator
must, in his production, exalt the artisan as the standard of knowledge and truth.
Again, interpreted symbolically, this means that the poetic imitator exalts the
actions of nonphilosophical human beings (cf. 603c4-8) above himself and his
own activity, particularly of human beings such as the " h e r o e s " of the "men of
action," that is those whose arts are oriented toward "practice" rather than
" t h e o r y . " These men are not the artisans; I remind the reader that in Socrates'
discussion the tripartite scheme is made to characterize poetry in a symbolic or
analogical way. Homer is said by Socrates to be an imitator and third from the
truth (598d7-599a4, 599d, 602b-c); but Socrates does not literally mean that
Homer imitates only manual artisans and their products. Homer imitates some
artisans and some technicians (such as doctors; 599c), but above all he imitates
the "greatest and fairest" activities, that is "wars and commands of armies and
governances of cities, a n d . . , the education of a human being" (599c6-dl), as
well as the human beings who undertake these activities (and in particular, the
baser aspects of these beings). But in the schema there is no room for the poet's
imitation of poetic activity; the man of action is implicitly superior to the man of
speech, the actor to the observer. As Socrates says at one point, if the imitator
had knowledge of the things he imitates, he would try to perform deeds rather
than imitate them and so "be the one who is lauded rather than the one who
lauds" (599b3-7).
Thus Socrates suggests that the poet Homer has not had a good influence on
the conventions of his time (599c-600e); we cannot conclude from this that he
has had no influence. Socrates himself argues for quite the opposite; it is the
poet's power to produce passions that makes him so dangerous. That is, the poet
does understand how to persuade the many in some areas. The poet's imitation
cannot be entirely passive; he produces the imitation, affects those who experi-
ence the imitation, and possibly in one case produces the object of the imitation
entirely. This case is that of the Gods (particular Gods, not the notion of
" G o d s " itself). The Gods and their deeds, as described by Homer, are poetic
148 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

myths g r o u n d e d in the productive rather than reproductive imagination (and so

not in knowledge or fact). As noted above, Socrates tends to keep quiet, in Book
10, about the p o e t ' s views about Gods, though he states that they do have such
views (598e2, 607a4; the poets are supposed to be " a l b w i s e " ) . The tripartite
schema, when interpreted as Socrates" caricature o f the p o e t ' s position in the
manner described above, points to the primacy o f " m a k i n g " in that position. 22
Understanding the schema as a caricature runs into several difficulties with
respect to the points made in the previous two paragraphs. It appears from the
schema, interpreted as a caricature, that the poet views himself as passive to
convention. Yet in fact he does influence convention. The solution to this diffi-
culty is that there is a difference between what the poet does in fact and what he
does in speech. Within his poems, the poet does not represent himself (to the
extent that he represents himself at all) as an influence on convention. His
beautiful reporting o f events does not look like an effort to encourage the base
elements in men. A second difficuRy suggested by the previous paragraphs again
concerns the relationship between speech and deed (although the deed is really
one level of the speech). Within the schema (understood as a caricature) the poet
is represented as cut off from the Gods or the divine. Yet since the schema as a
whole is the p r o d u c t of the poet, and since the schema refers to the Gods, the
poet does have some direct relation to the divine. By abstracting from the role of
the poet the poems gain an appearance of objectivity, in the preliminary sense
that they do not look like fictions. The poet does not normally announce within
the poem that he knows the Gods and therefore can vouch for what is said about
them in the poem (as noted above, in his criticism o f poetry Socrates is thinking
primarily o f H o m e r , not Hesiod.) Thus the poet does not (within the poem)
portray himself as having access to the divine (concerning inspiration, see be-
low). H o w e v e r , when we realize that everything said in the poem derives from
the poet, we realize (according to Socrates) that in fact there is no basis (with
respect to the Gods) in truth for the p o e t ' s mythtelling. Let me rephrase this
point in terms o f my response to another difficulty in my interpretation.
In the s c h e m a the poets o c c u p y the lowest place. If the s c h e m a represents

zz See also 596d-e, where Socrates illustrates the "wisdom" of the imitator (whom Glaucon at
first compares to a sophist) with the analogy of a man who carries a mirror around everywhere and
so makes everyth/ng, including "the sun and the things in heaven." As Bloom points out in his
interpretive essay at the end of his translation (pp. 428-429), "the man who carries the mirror around
will not catch the reflections of some of the things which appeared in the sophist's mirror: no
ordinary mirror can reflect the gods and the things in Hades; the sun would have to take their place.
Only the poets and the painters can reproduce the gods and the life after death, and they have no
models for their imitation of them in the works of other craftsmen or in the visible universe. The
poets are the authentic, the only, teachers about the gods. The great mystery is how they find out
about them, how they are able to present them to men. . . . The real quarrel between Socrates and
Homer concerns the way in which one finds out about the gods. or the view of the whole which
causes a poet to present the gods in one way rather than another.'" I am in full agreement with these
remarks. Thus Bloom's statement that "the ideas were in this context [of the tripartite schema]
understood not as eternal but as the product of art, thus constituting a world in which artisans or
makers, rather than knowers, are the highest human beings" (p. 431) is an important element in my
view that the schema is Socrates' ironic caricature of the poet's view of the Whole.
 REPUBLIC, BOOK 10 149

the poet's own conception of the Whole, we are asked to believe that he sees
himself as being at the third generation from the truth, and this hardly seems
plausible. Now, in caricaturing the poet's conceptions, Socrates is both summa-
rizing and criticizing him (it should be added that there is no question here of
psychological interpretations of the poet's conceptions). To say that the poet is
at the third generation from the truth could be seen as another way of saying that
he is, even from the standpoint of his own poems, inferior to the men of action,
who are in turn inferior to the Gods. 23 This might be seen as a way of attaining
objectivity. However, in Socrates' view this is also a real criticism of the poet,
since it accurately conveys what is in fact the case: the poems as a whole are not
grounded in the truth.
That is, what holds for the poet within his poem holds for the poet as such;
he does not show how he knows that about which he speaks. More accurately:
since the poet does not discuss himself or his poetry within his poem (though he
may refer to other poets), he in effect excludes himself from his own universe of
discourse and so has no discursive or philosophical exposition of how he knows
the things recounted in the discourse itself. The Whole portrayed in the dis-
course, moreover, is not one characterized by reason, that is, it is not a Whole
which could be susceptible to discursive exposition. The Whole portrayed within
the poems accurately reflects the process that produced the poems, that is, a
nonrational "poetic" process. But the poetic conception of the Whole cannot
internally sustain itself, because it is unreflexive. It does not seek to know itself.
The demand for reflexivity has been made, and met, by Socrates himself.
Indeed, Books 5-7 are in great measure about the nature of philosophy and its
access to the truth about the Whole. Far from being subservient to a kind of
activity that excludes the philosopher, philosophy turns out to be the highest of
all activities, on the basis of which the rational justification of all other activities
is founded. Socrates' discussion of the nature of philosophy is itself philosophi-
cal. The Whole outlined by Socrates is governed by the Good; it is intelligible. I
do not claim that Socrates' conception of philosophy is unproblematic; but it is
not open to the criticisms (at least not initially) which he levels against poetry.
Socrates avoids these criticisms, particularly that of failing to include philosophy
in his (philosophical) conception of the Whole, because self-knowledge is for him
an indispensable component of philosophical discourse. Socrates does not main-
tain, as the poet does implicitly (at least in Socrates' interpretation), to be "all
wise" while having no place in the Whole for the activity by which he claims to
know the Whole.
One might defend the poets by pointing to their ostensible access to the
divine through inspiration. Nowhere in the Republic does Socrates mention the
23 Within his poems, it is possible that the poet may praise not himself but some other poet; thus
in Book 8 of the Odyssey Homer praises Demodocus. However, in two of his three recitations in that
book Demodocus exalts " t h e famous actions of men on that venture [to Troy], whose fame goes up
into the wide heaven" (73-74; cf. 487ff.), and once he sings of the adulterous "love of Ares and
sweet-garlanded Aphrodite" (267). That is, the criticisms that in my interpretation Socrates directs
against Homer could also be directed against Homer's representation of another poet. Demodocus,
like Homer, is third from the truth.
150 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

p o e t ' s claim to inspiration; indeed, that claim is pointedly omitted in the pas-
sages in which Socrates talks a b o u t the beginnings of the Iliad (392e2-393a5).
Socrates implicitly denies the validity of that claim throughout the Republic.
G i v e n his conception of the divine as Idea, such a claim c a n n o t be true, since the
I d e a s do not speak, let alone speak the things which H o m e r and Hesiod recount.
I h a v e already discussed S o c r a t e s ' purification o f the p o e t ' s views of the Gods;
the purification surely excludes inspiration, especially inspiration that could pro-
duce the Iliad. H o w e v e r , Socrates does not explicitly analyze the claims to
inspiration; hence his critique of p o e t r y is not exhaustive.
By way of conclusion, I note that we might argue that Socrates actually
imitates the poets while criticizing t h e m , since in the Republic he occasionally
c o n n e c t s philosophy with inspiration or divination (e.g., 499ci, 505el, 506a6,
523a8), uses images, and tells a m y t h which in s o m e w a y s is modeled on the
Odyssey. Socrates' critique of poetry is closely c o n n e c t e d with his critique of
eros; yet in Books 5 - 7 Socrates uses erotic language to describe philosophy and
the Ideas. We might also point to other dialogues in which S o c r a t e s ' poetry is
undeniable. Philosophy, it seems, does not consist simply o f " l o g i c , " L,mathemat_
i c s , " or " d i a l e c t i c " understood in a technical-scientific sense. This point is also
visible in terms of the m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e level on which p o e t r y and philosophy
are c o m b i n e d by Plato, namely that of the dialogue form itself. 24 P l a t o ' s dialogues
are simultaneously works of art and works of philosophy; an understanding of
why Plato wrote dialogues would clarify in a fundamental w a y the quarrel be-
tween poetry and philosophy. To gain such an understanding we m u s t turn to a
n u m b e r of other dialogues, and in particular to the dialogue that deals directly
with the problems of poetry, philosophy, and w r i t i n g - - t h e Phaedrus. 2s

H o w a r d University

~4 In the Phaedrus Socrates recites a "mythical hymn" (265cl) to the God Eros (242d9) and
equates philosophy with divine madness (249c4-e4). In the Symposium Socrates claims that erotic
matters are the only things he knows about (177d7-8, 212b; and Lysis 204cl-2). For an excellent
analysis of eros in the Republic and of tbe conflict between the "logical" and "poetic" sides of
philosophy see Stanley Rosen, "The Role of Eros in Plato's Republic," Review of Metaphysics 19
(1965) :452-75. For a lengthy discussion of the roles and natures of eros and soul in the Phaedrus,
see my "Self-knowledge and the '~t~' of the Soul in Plato's Phaedrus," Revue de metaphysique et
de morale (1981), forthcoming. Our century has of course seen much debate about the issue of the
dialogue form; interpreters of all persuasions, however, are willing to grant that Plato's handling of
the dialogue form shows that he is a great artist. Interpreters differ as to how this fact should bear on
the reading of Plato. For further discussion of this issue, see the works by the authors cited in n. 7
above.
25 I am pleased to acknowledge the valuable criticisms of this paper offered to me by David
Levy, Drew Hyland, and Alexander Nehamas. Of course I bear all responsibility for remaining
eITOrs.