TOPIC: Definition of “Labor Dispute”
respondent Court to enjoin the Union from their acts. The Court issued a
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union vs. Bersamira,
           June 13, 1990, 186 SCRA 496
FACTS:
Petitioner entered into contracts for merchandising services with Liperon
and D’Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by
the DOLE. In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the
workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that
none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. Thus no
EE relationship.
Petitioner (San Mig employees) is monthly paid rank-and-file employees of
SanMIg with whom the the latter executed a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides that "temporary, probationary,
or contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit
and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement."
Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed
up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment
with SMC.
Union alleged that this group of employees have been continuously working
for SanMig for a period ranging from six (6) months to fifteen (15) years
and that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing
work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
SanMig. The Union filed a notices of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA
violations, and union busting. The two (2) notices of strike were
consolidated and several conciliation conferences were held to settle the
dispute before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of
DOLE.
Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various
SMC plants and offices.
SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before
Temporary Restraining Order and set the application for Injunction for
hearing. The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss which was then opposed by
SanMig. The Motion was denied by the respondent Judge. The Court then
issued the Order granting the application and enjoining the union from the
acts thereof. Court issued the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction
after SanMig had posted the required bond of P100,000.00 to answer for
whatever damages petitioners may sustain by reason thereof. Petitioners
then sought for the nullification of the Writ before the SC while it also went
to strike as some of the contractual workers were laid off. NCMB called the
parties for conciliation.
ISSUE:
Whether the case at bar relates to a labor dispute
RULING: YES
A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes
"any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment
or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship
exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of
Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist
"regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of
employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the
controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of
employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently,
and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the
fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee.
That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At
bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees
contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the
working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working
relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and
conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus
involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further,
the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for
Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its
part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-
employee relationship between it and those workers and because the
demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation
and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of
employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was
precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of
representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be
denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor
dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE .
 employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes
from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the regular court. 

Topic: Exception to the Rule on Jurisdiction over Labor Dispute
     
      Halagueña, et al. vs. PAL, October 2, 2009,  602 S 297
Facts:
Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on different
dates prior to November 1996. They are members of FASAP union
exclusive bargaining organization of the flightattendants, flight stewards
and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA
incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000
to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55 for female and 60 for males).
In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter,
manifested that the provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory. On July 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for
Declaratory Relief with issuanceof TRO with the RTC Makati. The RTC
issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on itsmotion for
reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted
respondent’s petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. Hence,
this petition.
Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor
tribunals.The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor
Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes,
law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the
constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of
general jurisdiction. In GeorgGrotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court
held that not every dispute between an employer and employee involves
matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of
their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved
by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
exclusively cognizable by the RTC. Being an ordinary civil action, the same
is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the

employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-

Jurisdiction over breach of contractual obligations
Pioneer Concrete vs. Todaro, 524  S 153
Facts:
PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia
and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete
aggregates business. Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval
Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete
and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval.
PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in
connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and
other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his
availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to
an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the
latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be
employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the
company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its
operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its
undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.
PPHI, PCPI RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the
complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Ruling:
Where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no
issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code,
other
labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional
Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In the present case, no employer-employee
relationship exists between petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his
complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor
Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged
breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled
that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil
dispute.
With respect to the applicability of the principle of forum non conveniens
in the present case
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning ‘the forum is
inconvenient’, emerged in private international law to deter the practice of
global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from
choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious
reasons, such as to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the
defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly
venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.

Jurisdiction over claim for damages arising from employer-employee
relationship
 
Kawachi v. Del Quero March 27, 2007, 519 S 102
Facts:
Petitioners scolded private respondent in front of many people about the
way she treated the customers of the pawnshop and afterwards terminated
private respondent’s employment as a pawnshop clerk.  Private respondent
charged the petitioner with illegal dismissal, non-execution of a contract of
employment, violation of the minimum wage law, and non-payment of
overtime pay. The complaint was filed before the NLRC. The private
respondent also filed an action for damages against the petitioners before
the MeTC.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and forum-shopping or splitting causes of action. At first, the
MeTC granted petitioners’ motion and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Upon private respondent’s motion, the
MeTC reconsidered and set aside the order of dismissal. It ruled that no
causal connection appeared between private respondent’s cause of action
and the employer-employee relations between the parties.
The RTC held that private respondent’s action for damages was based on
the alleged tortuous acts committed by her employers and did not seek any
relief under the Labor Code.
Issue:
Whether the regular courts lack jurisdiction in the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. The regular courts lack jurisdiction in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the allegations in private respondent’s complaint for
damages show that her injury was the offshoot of petitioners’ immediate
harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy
manner by which she had discharged her duties. Petitioners’ reaction
culminated in private respondent’s dismissal from work in the very same
incident. The incident on 10 August 2002 alleged in the complaint for
damages was similarly narrated in private respondent’s Affidavit-Complaint
supporting her action for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Clearly, the
alleged injury is directly related to the employer-employee relations of the
parties.
Where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the
cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation, the Court has
not hesitated to uphold the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Where the
damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of
contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former
employee or seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a prior
employment contract, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld. The
scenario that obtains in this case is obviously different. The allegations in
private respondent’s complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her
alleged illegal dismissal.

Jurisdiction over claim for damages arising from SSS contributions
Amecos Innovations, Inc. Vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 1780555, July 2,   2014
( Art 224 a(4))
FACTS:
Amecos is a corporation engaged in the business of selling
assorted products. In 2003, a complaint was filed by the SSS
against Amecos for an alleged delinquency in the remittance
of SSS contributions and penalty liabilities in violation of
Section 22(a) and 22(d) in relation to Section 28(e) of the
SSS law, as amended.
By way of explanation, Amecos claimed that it hired Lopez
as Marketing Assistant to promote its products; that upon
hiring, Lopez refused to provide Amecos with her SSS
Number and to be deducted her contributions; that on the
basis of the foregoing, Amecos no longer enrolled Lopez
with the SSS and did not deduct her corresponding
contributions up to the time of her termination in February
2002.
Amecos eventually settled its obligations with the SSS;
consequently, SSS filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint,
which was approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Thereafter, Amecos sent a demand letter to Lopez for
P27,791.65 representing her share in the SSS contributions
and expenses for processing, but to no avail. Thus, Amecos
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
Lopez before the MeTC.
Lopez filed her Answer with Motion to Dismiss claiming,
among others, that the regular courts do not have
jurisdiction over the instant case as it arose out of their
employer-employee relationship.
MeTC RULING: DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction
RTC RULING: AFFIRMED the MeTC
CA RULING: AFFIRMED the RTC
ISSUE:
Does the LA have jurisdiction over cases involving the
reimbursement of SSS contribution paid by the Amecos in
behalf of Lopez?
SC RULING:
YES. The LA has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter, since the same necessarily flowed from the
employer-employee relationship between Amecos and
Lopez. In this connection, it is noteworthy to state that "the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs
provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the
Civil Code."
At the same time, it cannot be assumed that since the
dispute concerns the payment of SSS premiums, Amecos’
claim should be referred to the Social Security Commission
(SSC). As far as SSS is concerned, there is no longer a
dispute with respect to Amecos’ accountability to the
System; Amecos already settled their pecuniary obligations
to it. Since there is no longer any dispute regarding
coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties to speak of,
the SSC need not be unnecessarily dragged into the picture.
Besides, it cannot be made to act as a collecting agency for
petitioners’ claims against the respondent; the Social
Security Law should not be so interpreted, lest the SSC be
swamped with cases of this sort.

At any rate, the complaint shall be dismissed for lack of

cause of action. Since Amecos did not remit the full SSS
contributions of Lopez, the latter was never covered by and
protected under the System. If she was never covered by
the System, certainly there is no sense in making her
answerable for the required contributions during the period
of her employment. And it follows as a matter of
consequence that claims for other damages founded on the
foregoing non-existent cause of action should likewise fail.
 Who are Corporate officers for purposes of jurisdiction over the
dispute
Marc II Marketing, Inc. et al. vs. Alfredo Joson, G.R. No.  171993,
December 12, 2011
FACTS:
Respondent Alfredo Joson was the General Manager,
incorporator, director and stockholder of Marc II Marketing
(Petitioner Corporation). Before Petitioner Corporation was
officially incorporated, respondent has already been
engaged by petitioner Lucila Joson, in her capacity as
President of Marc Marketing Inc., to work as the General
Manager of Petitioner Corporation through a management
contract.
However, Petitioner Corporation decided to stop and cease
its operation wherein respondent's services were then
terminated. Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a Complaint
for Reinstatement and Money Claim against petitioners
before the Labor Arbiter which ruled in favor of respondent.
The National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed said decision. The Court of Appeals (CA) however,
upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the
controversy at bar
RULING:
Yes. While Article 217(a) 229 of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides that it is the Labor Arbiter who has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
termination or dismissal of workers when the person
dismissed or terminated is a corporate officer, the case
automatically falls within the province of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The dismissal of a corporate officer is always
regarded as a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate
controversy.
In conformity with Section 25 of the Corporation Code,
whoever are the corporate officers enumerated in the by-
laws are the exclusive officers of the corporation and the
Board has no power to create other officers without
amending first the corporate by-laws. However, the Board
may
create appointive positions other than the positions of the
corporate officers, but the persons occupying such positions
are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning
of Section 25 of the Corporation Code and are not
empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate
officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to them.
Their functioning and duties are to be determined by the
Board of Directors/Trustees.
In the case at bar, the respondent was not a corporate
officer of Petitioner Corporation because his position as
General Manager was not specifically mentioned in the
roster of corporate officers in its corporate by-laws. Thus
respondent, can only be regarded as its employee or
subordinate official. Accordingly, respondent's dismissal as
Petitioner Corporation’s General Manager did not amount to
an intra-corporate controversy. Jurisdiction therefore
properly belongs with the Labor Arbiter and not with the
RTC.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, herein petitioners Marc II Marketing, Inc. and
Lucila V. Joson assailed the Decision[1] dated 20 June 2005
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76624 for
reversing and setting aside the Resolution[2] of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 15 October 2002,
thereby affirming the Labor Arbiters Decision[3] dated 1
October 2001 finding herein respondent Alfredo M. Josons
dismissal from employment as illegal. In the questioned
Decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the Labor Arbiters
jurisdiction over the case on the basis that respondent was
not an officer but a mere employee of petitioner Marc II
Marketing, Inc., thus, totally disregarding the latters
allegation of intra-corporate controversy. Nonetheless, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the NLRC for further
proceedings to determine the proper amount of monetary
awards that should be given to respondent.