1 Emerita-Malate Hotel V Mayors of Manila

2/3/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020 2/3/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020
ordinance which is not void on its face, the

presumption of constitution-ality must prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating
hotels, motels, etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating
the operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses
is a police power measure specifically aimed to
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849 safeguard public morals. As such, it is immune
from any imputation of nullity resting purely on
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
conjecture and unsupported by anything of
Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967. has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL powers, extending as it does "to all the great public
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL needs".
DEL MAR, INC. and Go CHIU, petitioners-
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial
appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY
inquiry.—On the legislative organs of the
MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
government, whether national or local, primarily
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
rests the exercise of the police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
Presumption as to constitutionality of ordinance; general welfare of the people. In view of the
Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—An requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors who
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with 850
the necessities of their particular municipality or
city and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action, must
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
be presumed to be valid and should not be set
ANNOTATED
aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its
validity is unavoidable. Where there was no the exercise of such police power, however, insofar
factual foundation laid for overthrowing an as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
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person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such occupations which may in the public need and
exercise of police power may be considered as interest be affected by the exercise of the police
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or power embark in those occupations subject to the
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation disadvantages which may result from the exercise
of any other applicable constitutional guarantee of that power.
may call for correction by the courts. Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license legal infirmity.—There is no controlling and
fees.—Municipal license fees can be classified into precise definition of due process. It furnishes
those imposed for regulating occupations or though a standard to which governmental action
regular enterprises, for the regulation or should conform in order that deprivation of life,
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non- valid. The standard of due process which must
useful occupations are incidental to the police exist both as a procedural and as substantive
power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
from the power to license and regulate, but in governmental action for that matter, from
fixing the amount of license fees the municipal imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to
corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates
class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known of justice. It would be an affront to reason to
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts what a municipal lawmaking body considers an
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with evil of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary
such discretion. The desirability of imposing and capricious exercise of authority. What should
restraint upon the number of persons who might be deemed unreasonable and what would amount
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the 851
determination of the amount of this kind of license
fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851
discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction
earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state
police power. Persons licensed to pursue of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating guess at its meaning and diff er as to its
hotels, etc.— The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 application.
of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
Instance of Manila.
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any The facts are stated in the opinion of the
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 Court.
hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law
shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a Office for respondent-appellant.
transgression against the command of due process. J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates
The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor for intervenorappellee.
arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an FERNANDO, J,:
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt
at correction. Moreover, every regulation of The principal question in this appeal from a
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which judgment of the lower court in an action for
cannot be absolute. prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila is violative of the due
Same; Public interest; Government
process clause. The lower court held that it is
interference.—The policy of laissez faire has to
and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
some extent given way to the assumption by the
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be
government of the right of intervention even in
more specifically set forth, such
contractual relations affected with public interest.
If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or 852
the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at 852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the most rights of property, the permissible scope ANNOTATED
of regulatory measures is wider. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Statutes; When statute is void because of
ambiguity.— What makes a statute susceptible to
a charge that it is void on its face for alleged judgment must be reversed, there being a
vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either failure of the requisite showing to sustain an
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that attack against its validity.
men of common intelligence must necessarily The petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963
by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and unconstitutional and void for being
Motel Operators Association, one of its unreasonable and violative of due procfess
members, Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain insofar as it would impose ?6,000.00 fee per
Go Chiu, who is "the president and general annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
manager of the second petitioner" against the second class motels;
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who
was sued in his capacity as such "charged _______________
with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give 1 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel
the necessary orders for the faithful execution Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm
and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow
It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel,
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz
members "operating hotels and motels, Motel.
characterized as legitimate businesses duly
853
licensed by both national and city authorities,
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood, to not less than 2,500 person and VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853
representing an investment of more than P3
1 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
million." (par. 2). It was then alleged that on
Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila,
June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then that the provision in the same section which
ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the would require the owner, manager, keeper or
time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. duly authorized representative of a hotel,
(par. 3). motel, or lodging house to refrain from
After which the alleged grievances against entertaining or accepting any guest or
the ordinance were set forth in detail. There customer or letting any room or other quarter
was the assertion of its being beyond the to any person or persons without his filling up
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of the prescribed form in a lobby open to public
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate view at all times and in his presence, wherein
motels, on the ground that in the revised the surname, given name and middle name,
charter of the City of Manila or in any other the date of birth, the address, the occupation,
law, no reference is made to motels; that the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian
would be specified, with data furnished as to and making it unlawful for the owner,
his residence certificate as well as his manager, keeper or duly authorized
passport number, if any, coupled with a representative of such establishments to lease
certification that a person signing such form any room or portion
has personally filled it up and affixed his
854
signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms 854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
and records kept and bound together, it also ANNOTATED
being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
houses would be open for inspection either by
the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their
duly authorized representatives is thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
unconstitutional and void again on due counter to the due process guaranty for lack
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, of certainty and for its unreasonable,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being arbitrary and oppressive character; and that
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise insofar as the penalty provided for in Section
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
and the guaranty against self-incrimination; subsequent conviction would cause the
that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance automatic cancellation of the license of the
classifying motels into two classes and offended party, in effect causing the
requiring the maintenance of certain destruction of the business and loss of its
minimum facilities in f irst class motels such investments, there is once again a
as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, transgression of the due process clause.
restaurant and laundry similarly offends There was a plea for the issuance of
against the due process clause for being preliminary injunction and for a final
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a judgment declaring the above ordinance null
conclusion which applies to the portion of the and void and unenforceable. The lower court
ordinance requiring second class motels to on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
have a dining room; that the provision of injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No.
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
from being accepted in such hotels, motels, In the answer filed on August 3, 1963,
lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of
business in the City of Manila, of the Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial sued;
of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or "2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly
constitutional grounds. After setting forth elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
that the petition did fail to state a cause of executive of the City of Manila charged with the
action and that the challenged ordinance general power and duty to enforce ordinances of
bears a reasonable relation, to a proper the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
and proper exercise of the police power and ordinances;
that only the guests or customers not before "3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to
the court could complain of the alleged engage in the business of operating hotels and
invasion of the right to privacy and the motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
guaranty against selfincrimination, with the "4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
assertion that the issuance of the preliminary of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-
respondent Mayor prayed f or its dissolution Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
and the dismissal of the petition. Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent
Instead of evidence being offered by both regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,
parties, there was submitted a stipulation of 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads: ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor
Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the "5. That the explanatory note signed by then
City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with
president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to
Inc., and the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;
855
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an
annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855 paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to
respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the
stress was laid on the presumption of the case for decision of the Court." It does appear
validity of the challenged ordinance, the obvious then that without any evidence
burden of showing its lack of conf ormity to submitted by the parties, the decision passed
the Constitution resting on the party who upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional
assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, grounds of the challenged ordinance,
but likewise applicable American authorities. dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
Such a memorandum likewise refuted point the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
by point the arguments advanced by authority of the City of Manila to regulate
petitioners against its validity. Then barely motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
memorandum for petitioners was filed Manila, would be unconstitutional and,
reiterating in detail what was set forth in the therefore, null and void." It made permanent
petition, with citations of what they the preliminary injunction issued against
considered to be applicable American respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
authorities and praying for a judgment him from enforcing the ordinance in
declaring the challenged ordinance "null and question.''" Hence this appeal.
void and unenforceable" and making As noted at the outset, the judgment must
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction be reversed. A decent regard for
issued. constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the
856
lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS decision cannot be allowed to stand,
ANNOTATED consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such
After referring to the motels and hotels, a decision is the absence of any evidence to
which are members of the petitioners offset the presumption of validity that
association, and referring to the alleged attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
constitutional questions raised by the party, As was expressed categorically by Justice
the lower court observed: "The only remaining Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
issue here being purely a question of law, the validity. x x x The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and

set aside. The councilors must, in the very hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
nature of things, be familiar with the law. As underlying questions of fact may
necessities of their particular municipality condition the constitutionality of legislation of
and with all the facts and circumstances this character, the presumption of
which surround the subject and necessitate constitutionality must prevail in the absence
action. The local legislative body, by enacting of some factual foundation of record for
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that overthrowing the statute." No such factual
the regulations are essential to the wellbeing foundation being laid in the present case, the
of the people. x x x The Judiciary should not lower court deciding the matter on the
lightly set aside legislative action when there pleadings and the stipulation of f acts, the
is not a clear invasion presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
857
Nor may petitioners assert with
plausibility that on its face the ordinance is
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857 fatally defective as being repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The
mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners.
This particular manifestation of a police
of personal or property2
rights under the guise power measure being specifically aimed to
of police regulation." safeguard public morals is immune from such
It admits of no doubt therefore that there imputation of nullity resting purely on
being a presumption of validity, the necessity conjecture and unsupported by anything of
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless substance. To hold otherwise would be to
the statute or ordinance is void on its f ace, unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
which is not the case here. The principle has power which has been properly characterized
been nowhere better expressed than in the as the most essential, insistent and the
leading case of O'Gorman & 3
Young v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the
_______________
American Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up 2 US. v. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There
the matter thus: "The statute here questioned was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of
deals with a subject clearly within the scope municipal ordinance as announced in the leading
of the police power. We are asked to declare it Salaveria decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
void on the ground that the specif ic method 3 282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
858 4 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p.

1163. AIso: 'To Frankfurter the police power, true to its
etymology, is the power to shape policy. It def ies legal
definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of
ANNOTATED
society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases. it
Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila must not fall back upon sterile claims; its judgments are
4
not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and the
least limitable of powers, extending
5
as it does police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and
"to all the great public needs." It would be, to large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic
paraphrase another leading decision, to social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is more
destroy the very purpose of the state if it than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no
could be deprived or allowed itself to be higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented
deprived of its competence to promote public by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society,
health, public morals,
6
public safety and the new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social
general welfare. Negatively put, police power consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one
is "that inherent and plenary power in the cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of
State which enables it to prohibit all that is truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how f
hurtful to7
the comfort, safety, and welfare of ragile in scientif ic proof is the ultimate validity of any
society." particular economic adjustment. Social development is a
There is no question but that the process of trial and error; in the making of policy the f
challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to ullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of
minimize certain practices hurtful to public the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not
morals. The explanatory note of the then regulate, laissez faire—not the individual—must be the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as regulator. (Hamilton, Pre view of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale
annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the Law Journal, 819).
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, 5 Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable 6 U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
in great part to the existence of motels, which 7 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
"provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and 859
thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859
________________
Association, Inc. vs, City Mayor of Manila
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then On the legislative organs of the

"proposes to check the clandestine harboring government, whether national or local,
of transients and guests of these primarily rest the exercise of the police
establishments by requiring these transients power, which, it cannot be too often
and guests to fill up a registration form, emphasized, is the
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to
public view at all times, and by introducing ________________
several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that 8 U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
characterizes the registration of transients 9 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also
and guests." Moreover, the increase in the Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v.
licensed fees was intended to discourage Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
"establishments of the kind from operating for 10 U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
purpose other -than legal" and at the same 11 U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs.
time, to increase "the income of the city Joson, (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People vs. Chan Hong, (1938) 65
government." It would appear therefore that Phil. 625
the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining 12 U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
any attack against the validity of the 13 U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
ordinance, argues eloquently for it, 14 Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969;
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
invariably stamped with the seal of its 15 U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and8
860
classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;
providing a license tax for and regulating the
maintenance
9
or operation of 10public dance 860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
halls; 11prohibiting gambling;
12
prohibiting ANNOTATED
jueteng; and monte, prohibiting playing of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
panguingui on13 days other than Sundays or Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
legal holidays; prohibiting
14
the operation of
pinball machines; and, prohibiting any
power to prescribe regulations to promote the
person from keeping, conducting or
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place 15
general welfare of the people. In view of the
where opium is, smoked or otherwise used,
requirements of due process, equal protection
all of which are intended ,to protect public
and other applicable constitutional
morals. ,
guaranties, however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, _______________

liberty or property of any person is subject to
16 There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the prohibition
power may be considered as either capricious,
against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of
the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable
due process or a violation of any other
defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who
applicable constitutional guaranty may call
has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies
for correction by the courts.
on, the facilities, services and accommodations offered by
We are thus led to considering the
petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business
insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the
not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no
objection16 is raised to the question of due
legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to
process. There is no controlling and precise
the case as it has been developed.
definition of due process. It furnishes though
a standard to which the governmental action 861
should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate.
case, be valid. What then is the standard of VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861
due process which must exist both as a Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
procedural and a substantive requisite to free Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty
17
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to "to those strivings for justice" and judges the
spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the light of reason drawn from considerations of
dictates of justice. Negatively put, fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness 18
legal and political thought." It is not a
avoided. To satisfy the due process narrow or "technical conception with fixed
requirement, official action, to paraphrase content unrelated to time, place and
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of 19
circumstances," decisions based on such a
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due clause requiring a "close and perceptive
process is thus hostile to any official action inquiry 20into fundamental principles of our
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it society." Questions of due process are not to
has been identified as freedom from be treated narrowly21 or pedantically in slavery
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of to form or phrases.

It would thus be an affront to reason to 19 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to 20 Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
meet what a municipal lawmaking body 21 Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
considers an evil of rather serious proportion
862
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would 862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
amount to an abdication of the power to ANNOTATED
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To
be more specific, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of both hotels and motels, 150% for the former
the challenged ordinance. A strong case must and over 200% for the latter, f irst-class
be found in the records, and, as has been set motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual
forth, none is even attempted here to attach fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It
to an ordinance of such character the taint of has been the settled law however, as far back
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due as 1922 that municipal license fees could be
process requirement. Nor does it lend any classified into those imposed for regulating
semblance even of deceptive plausibility to occupations or regular enterprises, for the
petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 regulation or restriction of non-useful
on due process grounds to single out such occupations or22 enterprises and for revenue
features as the increased fees for motels and purposes only. As was explained more in
hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2)
to contract, and, in certain particulars, its Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
alleged vagueness. incidental to the police power and the right to
Admittedly there was a decided increase of exact a fee may be implied from the power to
the annual license fees provided for by the license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
challenged ordinance for the license fees the municipal corporations
are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside
________________
from applying the well-known legal principle
17 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme that municipal ordinances must not be
Court, (1938) pp. 32-33. unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
18 Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. courts have, as a general rule, declined to
420, at 487. interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
number of persons who might otherwise
engage in non-usef ul enterprises is, of course, Moreover, 24in the equally leading case of Lutz
generally an important factor in the v. Araneta this Court affirmed the doctrine
determination of the amount of this kind of earlier announced by the American Supreme
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the Court that taxation may be made to
nature of privilege taxes for revenue have implement the state's police power. Only the
frequently been upheld, especially in cases of other day, this Court had occasion to affirm
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the that the broad taxing authority conferred by
latter cases the23fees have rarely been declared the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
unreasonable." municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover
a wide range of subjects with the only
________________ limitation that the tax so levied
25
is for public
purposes, just and uniform.
22 Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
As a matter of fact, even without reference
23 Citing Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621; Dennehy v.
to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
City of Chicago, 120 111. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it
Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 111. 19; Drew
has been explicitly held in one case that
County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v.
"much discretion is given to municipal
Fleming, 111 Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City
corporations in determining the amount,"
Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville,
here the license fee of the operator of a
19 Ind. 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v. City of
massage clinic, even if it were
26
viewed purely
Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586;
as a police power measure. The discussion of
Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646;
this particular matter may fitly close with
People ex rel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17
this pertinent citation from another decision
Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the
62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of
Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch the ordinance could deprive them of their
Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. lawful occupation and means of livelihood
829-830. because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are
863
also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863 markets under certain conditions is
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators permitted. x x x And surely, the mere fact,
that some individuals in the community may
be deprived of their present business or a common inn or the like, to lease or rent any
particular mode of earning a living cannot room or portion thereof more than twice every
prevent the exercise of the police power. As 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue payment shall be charged, call for a different
occupations which may in the public need and conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be
interest be affected by the exercise of the viewed as a transgression against the
police power embark in these occupations command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was
________________ intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such
24 98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. premises could be, and, according to the
v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, explanatory note, are being devoted. How
297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when
Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed there appears a correspondence between the
in Republic v. BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, undeniable existence of an undesirable
1966. situation and the legislative attempt at
25 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be
L-24322, July 21, 1967. unaware that every regulation of conduct
26 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
(1957) 101 Phil. 1142. pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
864
through all these different conceptions of
liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty'
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS as understood in democracies, is not license; it
ANNOTATED is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators term is restraint by law for the good of the
Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general
wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he
subject to the disadvantages which may 27 pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
result from the legal exercise of that power."
license. The right of the individual is
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
general law for the common good. x x x The
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
keeper or duly authorized representative of
interest of the public health, or of the public
any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
order and safety, or otherwise28 within the because then the individual will fall into
proper scope of the police power." slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in
_______________ his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established
27 Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. the resultant equilibrium, which29means peace
649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. and order and happiness for all."
Ann. 417. It is noteworthy that the only decision of
28 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, this Court nullifying legislation because of
citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie- undue deprivation30 of freedom to contract,
Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66. People v. Pomar, no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of
865
laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865 right of intervention even in contractual31
relations affected with public interest."
Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, What may be stressed sufficiently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of
A similar observation was made by Justice governmental acts is much more rigorous and
Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the affects at the most rights of property, the
state in order to promote the general welfare permissible scope of regulatory
may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.
________________
Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to 29 Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-
secure the general comfort, health, and 734
prosperity of the state x x x. To this 30 46 Phil 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under
fundamental aim of our Government the American sovereignty, American Supreme Court
rights of the individual are subordinated. decisions hav-ing thus an obligatory effect. No
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a alternative was left to this Court except to follow the
misery, but liberty should not be made to then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital
prevail over authority because then society (1924), 261 U.S. 525, which subsequently was overruled
will fall into anarchy. Neither should in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), 300 U.S. 379
authority be made to prevail over liberty
31 Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 from their standpoint would require a guess
Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring opinion of Justice as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be
Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496. charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may
866
be asked, do these allegations suffice to
render the
ANNOTATED _______________
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators 32 Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is
important to distinguish between the due process clause
32 of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for
measure is wider. How justify then the transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and
allegation of a denial of due process? those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
ordinance on another due process ground by Amendment, because it also collides with the principles
invoking the principle of vagueness or of the First, is much more definite than the test when
uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of
the petition itself that what seems to be the the due process clause disappears when the specific
gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the prohibition of the First become its standard. The right of
provisions are too detailed and specific rather a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power
however, point to the requirement that a to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may
guest should give the name, relationship, age have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of
and sex of the companion or companions as speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well
indefinite and uncertain in view of the be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
necessity for determining whether the susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate
companion or companions referred to are danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."
those arriving with the customer or guest at (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v. Barnette, (1942), 319
the time of the registry or entering the room U.S. 624, at 639).
with him at about the same time or coming at
any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso 867
in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867
motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which Acuña vs. Yatco

ordinance void on its face for alleged Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the official leave.
question is to answer it. 33From Connally v.
General34 Construction Co. to Adderley v. Judgment reversed.
Florida, the principle has been consistently
___________
upheld that what makes a statute susceptible
to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act
that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. Is this the situation before
us? A citation from Justice Holmes would
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prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit, but there is no
canon against using common sense in
construing laws35 as saying what they
obviously mean."
That is all then that this case presents. As
it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity
of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly
held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by
this Court compels a reversal of the appealed
decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court
is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon,

J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.

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2/3/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020 2/3/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020

ordinance which is not void on its face, the

representatives of the people cannot be lightly of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and

858 4 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p.

thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then On the legislative organs of the

police power insofar as it may affect the life, _______________

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Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon,

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