Midterm in Consti Law Review

1) No, the Comelec’s ruling is incorrect.

Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, among the COMELEC’s
powers and functions include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and
its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. Also, it was expressly settled in a case
decided by the SC that the Comelec possesses the authority to resolve intra-party
leadership disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to
enforce election laws and register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Hence, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it.

2) The assumption of office by Santos on the basis of the ad interim appointment issued by
the President does not amount to a temporary appointment. An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment, because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office
[Art. VII. Sec. 16, second paragraph of the Constitution; Matibag v. Benipayo, 380
SCRA 49(2002)].
3) The argument is not tenable; since this is an essential component of legislative power,
it cannot be made subordinate to criminal and civil actions. Otherwise, it would be very
easy to subvert any investigation in aid of legislation through convenient ploy of
instituting criminal and civil actions (Standard Chartered Bank [Philippine Branch] v.
Senate Committee in Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 541 SCRA 456)
4) No, it will not prosper.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent only when it enters into a business contract. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
other words, the test is not the conclusion of a contract by the state but by the legal
nature of the act. Thus, it has been held that there is no waiver of state immunity where
the contract is a necessary incident of its prime government function. By engaging in a
particular business through a governmental agency or corporation, the state divests
itself of its sovereign character and makes itself amenable to suit, for in the conduct of
such business, there can be no one law for the sovereign and another for the subject,
and both should stand upon equally before the law (Philippine National
Railways v. IAC, 217 SCRA 401 [1993]).
5) No, the Congress cannot, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments to government officers in addition to those which require confirmation
under the Constitution.
Under the Constitution, the officers whose appointments require confirmation
from the Commission on Appointment are exclusive. Those who are appointed by the
President as authorized by the law do not require confirmation from the Commission
on Appointment.
In this case, the government officers not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16 Art VII of the Constitution, do not need confirmation from the Commission on
Appointment.

6) Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including

Cabinet members, completes exhaustion of administrative remedies, except in the
instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies, in which case the
decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the President, and
there is no need to appeal to the decision of the President in order to complete
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

7) I agree with the contention of Representative X. As held in Bondoc v. Pineda, 201

SCRA 792, the members of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are entitled
to security of tenure like Membership in it may not be terminated except for a just
cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Its members must discharge their
functions with impartiality and independence from the political party to which they
belong. members of the judiciary.

8) The proviso is unconstitutional. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 provides for an

indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a set by the legislative authority.
The courts are thus given wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may
range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the
accused. This cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially
legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers (People v.
Judge Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989).
9) Yes.

In Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,  SC held that preventive suspension is not violative of

the Constitution as it is not a penalty; and a person under preventive suspension
remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability
must still be established.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of
preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case
is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions —
including preventive suspension — should be acknowledged as within the competence
of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment.

10) A. the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the

Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of
notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements," which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement.

B. No because of the physical inability for them to attend a quorum.