New Middle Ages: Bohumil Doboš

World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures
Bohumil Doboš
New Middle
Ages
Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World
World-Systems Evolution and Global
Futures
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Bohumil Doboš
New Middle Ages

Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World
Bohumil Doboš
Institute of Political Studies
Charles University
Prague 5, Czech Republic
ISSN 2522-0985 ISSN 2522-0993 (electronic)

World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures
ISBN 978-3-030-58680-5 ISBN 978-3-030-58681-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2
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Contents
1 Introduction�� 1
2 Conceptual Framework�� 7
2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory�� 7
2.2 Concepts�� 10
2.2.1 State�� 10
2.2.2 Unrecognized State �� 12
2.2.3 Non-State Actor�� 13
2.2.4 Sovereignty �� 13
2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots�� 15
2.3 Systemic Development �� 16
2.3.1 Medieval System�� 16
2.3.2 Westphalian System�� 20
2.3.3 Globalization�� 22
3 New Middle Ages�� 23
3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism �� 23
3.1.1 Regional Integration of States�� 24
3.1.2 Disintegration of States�� 24
3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence�� 25
3.1.4 Transnational Organizations �� 25
3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World�� 26
3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation�� 26
3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs�� 26
3.2.2 Philip Cerny�� 28
3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin �� 29
3.2.4 Jan Zielonka�� 30
3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little�� 32
3.2.6 Neil Winn�� 33
3.2.7 John Rapley�� 33
3.2.8 Phil Williams�� 34
3.3 End of State System?�� 35
3.3.1 Crumbling of State System �� 35
3.3.2 Alternative Actors �� 38
v
vi Contents
3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds�� 41

3.4.1 Durable Disorder�� 42
3.4.2 Chaotic Anarchy�� 44
3.4.4 Relation �� 45
4 Analyzing the Global System�� 47
4.1 Regions �� 47
4.2 Research Design�� 51
4.2.1 Axis A �� 54
4.2.2 Axis B �� 56
5 Distribution of the Three Worlds�� 61
5.1 Regional Analysis �� 61
5.1.1 The EU+�� 61
5.1.2 Balkans�� 64
5.1.3 East Europe �� 66
5.1.4 Russian Space �� 68
5.1.5 The Caucasus�� 69
5.1.6 Central Asia�� 70
5.1.7 Chinese Space �� 71
5.1.8 East Asia�� 72
5.1.9 Southeast Asia�� 73
5.1.10 Oceania �� 74
5.1.11 Indian Space�� 74
5.1.12 AfPak�� 75
5.1.13 Iran�� 76
5.1.14 Turkey �� 77
5.1.15 Larger Mesopotamia �� 78
5.1.16 Gulf Monarchies �� 79
5.1.17 Western Middle East �� 80
5.1.18 Northern Africa �� 80
5.1.19 Northwest Africa�� 81
5.1.20 Horn of Africa+�� 82
5.1.21 East Africa�� 83
5.1.22 Central Africa�� 84
5.1.23 South Africa�� 85
5.1.24 West Africa�� 86
5.1.25 North America�� 86
5.1.26 Central America�� 87
5.1.27 The Caribbean�� 88
5.1.28 Northern South America �� 89
5.1.29 Southern South America �� 90
5.2 Analysis�� 90
Contents vii
6 Effects on the International System �� 95

6.1 Adaptation�� 95
6.1.2 Durable Disorder�� 98
6.1.3 Chaotic Anarchy�� 101
6.2 Interaction �� 104
6.2.1 Westphalian-Durable Disorder�� 104
6.2.2 Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy�� 106
6.2.3 Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy�� 108
7 Impact on Selected Regions�� 111
7.1 Adaptation�� 112
7.1.1 Al-Shabaab�� 112
7.1.2 People’s Republic of China�� 118
7.1.3 Facebook �� 124
7.2 Interaction �� 129
7.2.1 EU-Russia �� 129
7.2.2 EU-Sahel �� 135
7.2.3 Turkey-Syria �� 140
8 Conclusion�� 147
Bibliography �� 151

List of Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AQAP Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC East African Community
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU European Union
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FSI Fragile State Index
FTA Free Trade Area
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
ICU Islamic Court Union
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association
IRA Irish Republican Army
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OBOR One Belt One Road
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Worker’s Party)
PRC People’s Republic of China
PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (United Democratic Party)
RAF Red Army Faction
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
VPN Virtual Private Network
YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Forces)
YPJ Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (Women’s Protection Forces)
ix
Introduction
1
The end of the Cold War introduced significant shifts and changes to the world’s
geopolitics (end of bipolarism and establishment of the new-world order), nature of
the international system, and domestic political setting of many countries all over
the globe. Bipolar competition disappeared, the world became dominated (at least
for some time) by a single superpower – the United States (USA) – and many coun-
tries fell into the abyss of civil war that was this time not fumed by the competing
superpowers. Other states failed due to the end of financing from former superpow-
ers and lack of balancing between these behemoths inside the civil conflicts taking
place in the third world context. The world became globalized and interconnected
via the emerging cyberspace and effects of the new regionalism as in the case of the
establishment of the European Union (EU) that spread across most of the European
continent or an appearance of the free trade areas (FTAs). New non-state actors that
appeared in the new environment (violent non-state actors or nongovernmental
organizations) often utilized the caveats in the states’ territoriality and functioning
and gained prominence. From these examples, it is clear that the changes in the
international structure are systemic and profound. Consequently, a large amount of
debates regarding the nature of the post-Cold War world took place. From Fukuyama
(1992) to Huntington (1997) to Giddens (1998), many authors attempted to portray
the nature of the international system following the fall of bipolarism. This work,
however, goes even further and claims that the changes not only disrupted the bipo-
lar balance of power but that they challenge the Westphalian system as we know it.
It might even seem that the structural limits that empowered the state to become the
dominant and mutually reinforcing unit in the international system that established
itself since the end of Middle Ages (Spruyt 1994, 180) might shift toward a new
equilibrium that might not favor a global dominance of the sovereign state anymore.
This development is following the process of power diffusion (Nye Jr. 2011, 113).
It is claimed that the world is slowly turning to a new geopolitical setting – the
neomedievalism. Nonetheless, as the grand theories mentioned above all failed to
grasp the global landscape in totality, this work is not claiming that we can use a
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 1
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_1
2 1 Introduction
single concept worldwide. Instead it helps the reader understand that the global
distribution of power and organization of political space is uneven and the mutual
interactions are key for the full understanding of the contemporary geopolitics.
As noted by M. van Creveld (2000), the introduction of nuclear weapons at the
end of the Second World War dramatically changed the nature of the international
system which was for previous few centuries dominated by the integrating tenden-
cies that began in the consolidation process on the European continent1 and culmi-
nated in the establishment of the bipolar order. These trends to consolidate territory
via war effort were, however, ended by the emerging possibility of nuclear annihila-
tion and since the fall of the Soviet Empire disintegration began to lead the way –
the way that shifts the system into the neomedieval future. In this line of thought,
the following text is based on the evolutionary theory of state development.
The possible transformation into the New Middle Ages was, however, for the
first time mentioned by a different author – A. Wolfers (1962). Despite leaving just
a short comment on the topic, he scratched the possibility of a return of a system of
the new medievalism where a distinction between domestic and foreign affairs blurs
as a result of the struggle of communism against national state and transnational
movements against nationalism (Wolfers 1962, 242). As noted in the title, the book
argues that world is entering the post-Westphalian phase of its political development
and states are playing still decreasing role in the international and domestic politics.
The system is characterized by tensions and contradictions (Cerny and Prichard
2017, 3). This, however, does not mean that a state is about to disappear. The institu-
tion of state is so far prominent political actor and will in some territories and func-
tions remain dominant or at least important for the times to come.2 The end of the
Westphalian system and increased levels of instability, furthermore, do not neces-
sarily mean that the world will become a less pleasant place to live – as M. van
Creveld argues, the state-based system brought horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz
which are hardly perceivable in the neomedieval setting (van Creveld 2000).
The first scholar to adequately describe the possible global neomedieval setting
was H. Bull in his The Anarchical Society which was initially published in 1977. In
this work, he delimits New Middle Ages as an alternative stream of thought regard-
ing international politics in a post-bipolar era (Bull 1977, 254–255). The foundation
of the stream of thought and the consequent analysis are thus rooted in the realist
school of international relations. The neomedieval thinking was, however, aban-
doned as improbable until the beginning of the 1990s where it was reintroduced
either explicitly (e.g., works of J. Friedrichs (2001), P. Cerny (1998), J. Rapley
(2006)) or implicitly (e.g., by R. Kaplan (1994)). The stream thus gained some
prominence despite remaining on the side of the mainstream academic debate. At
this point, it is necessary to stress that the systemic changes presented in this work
do not portray the nature of the political activity inside the global system in its
entirety. There was no clear dramatic short-term switch from the medieval to mod-
ern system. Inside the Westphalian system, non-state actors used to play some or
See Tilly (1975).

1
See the discussion in 1999’s special issue of Political Studies 47 (3).

2
1 Introduction 3
even crucial role (e.g., the East India Company), and some, at least formally, alter-
native political units appeared (e.g., Libyan Jamahiriya). The prevalent logic of the
political conduct, however, laid in the forces that are described in relation to the
medieval, modern, and neomedieval systems as argued in the following text.
The fact that the theory is a little bit too extravagant for the mainstream debate3
is not a fault in itself. What is more problematic is the fact that the stream remained
to some extent shattered in different approaches toward the new nature of the inter-
national politics. Just by comparison of J. Friedrichs’ historical neomedievalism
and P. Williams’ New Dark Ages, we can find directly opposing ideas which, how-
ever, fall under the same basic framework. The first goal of this book is thus clear – a
proper description of neomedievalism as a stream of thought. Given the fact that the
specific authors usually dedicated only limited space to the development of their
outlooks on the theory or its application, it is necessary to carefully describe large
number of these divergent views as to find some common ground that is not rooted
only in a one-time opposition of the selected author to the Westphalian reading of
the international system. After this goal is achieved, the delimitation of the ideal
types that can be extrapolated from the theoretical analysis of the international (geo)
politics will be presented. Proper demarcation of these ideal types is essential as it
will become the basis for the whole remaining work. The work will thus devote
quite an ample space to a proper definition of basic terminology and overview of the
literature dealing with the New Middle Ages. The first research question is thus
stated as, what is the definition of neomedievalism?
New Middle Ages as somehow fluid environment, nevertheless, cannot be seen
as a rigid description of international system, and the thinking thus more resembles
continuum where each case’s position in relation to the ideal types differs. This is
why the next logical step in the attempt to examine the theory is to establish such
continuum to which the cases might be plotted into. This will enable us to place all
the cases into the complex model that presents the outlook of the neomedieval post-
Westphalian system. For a successful analysis, we need to deal with one other
issue – the nature of researched actors and scope of analysis. As New Middle Ages
are based on a presumption about the decline of state power, it seems unsuitable to
use state-based analysis as is usual in other geopolitical works. We will turn our
attention to different units usually connected to geopolitical thought – regions.
Regions are not, however, used as actors themselves but are researched as an envi-
ronment filled by different – both state and non-state – actors interacting with each
other. For region selection and delimitation, vast amount of literature by such prom-
inent figures such as S. Cohen, Z. Brzezinski, J. Zielonka, S. Huntington, or
R. Kaplan is available. Analysis of the position of the chosen regions inside the
neomedieval context is the second principal aim of this work. Nonetheless, if differ-
ent scope to macrolevel analysis is chosen, a more precise map of distribution of
different more fine-grained models of organization of political space might be gen-
erated. Regional distribution of the new international geopolitical setting is thus
3
Despite the fact that for some authors the suggestions made by neomedievalists do not go far
enough. See, for example, Bunker and Bunker (2016).
4 1 Introduction
only a step away. If it is found out that a vast majority of regions is dominated by the
Westphalian setting and is not leaning toward some form of neomedieval form
(meaning there is no evident shift toward non-Westphalian international setting), the
basis on which the whole book is based upon will fail. The second research question
thus states, what is the geographical distribution of the various geopolitical
(Westphalian and neomedieval) settings?
Once we know what neomedievalism is and how its different forms are distrib-
uted in different regions, we can move to the second goal of the book – analysis of
the relationship among actors inside different types of political space (Westphalian
and neomedieval) and relations among various actors inside these spaces and their
adaptation to it. The work will look at the options given to the neomedieval and
Westphalian actors in the new international setting with a focus on strategic options
such as economic cooperation, shatter-belt creation, state-building, waging war,
forms of external involvement, etc. It will be presented how different actors need to
adapt their strategies and setting according to the context of the environment they
are acting in4 and based on their capabilities and nature of their geopolitical setting.
In the end, we should be able to imagine the world as more than a simple political
map filled by territorial Westphalian states but as a complex structure with different
settings, different actors, and various relationships. This is the primary justification
for choosing the topic in the first place – presenting alternative to the classical geo-
political view on the international affairs and presenting practical advices on its
impact. Understanding of the changes in the nature of the global geopolitics and
reaction of different actors to such shifts are crucial for any subsequent analysis of
the actions of different actors. The third and fourth research questions state: How do
the political actors adapt to their geopolitical environments? How do the actors
inside different spaces react to each other?
Each of the questions will be researched using different methodological approach,
and each chapter will, if necessary, describe used methodology in more substantial
depth. At this moment, the basic summary of the major methodological points is
presented. In defining and characterizing neomedievalism, we will analyze existing
academic sources dealing with the issue – heuristic research. After adequately
explaining the theory, we will move to the description of its poles – ideal types.
Consequently, we will compare them to find main factors that distinguish them.
Once adequately described, the factors will be prepared for operationalization.
Operationalization will follow methodology that E. Berg and E. Kuusk (2010) used
in their article where they presented empirical approach toward understanding sov-
ereignty. Afterward, we will analyze the results and present geopolitical implica-
tions of state deterioration in a context of the empirical findings and the neomedieval
theoretical framework. The methodological framework itself is based on the
approach rooted in the systemic geopolitics – more consensual and liberal and lack-
ing geographical determinism compared to the classical geopolitics and more
focused on non-state actors as well. The selected school of geopolitics combines
elements of classical and critical geopolitics, taking the essential thoughts from
According to the Darwinist theory – see Spruyt (1994, 24).

4
1 Introduction 5
both of them. Systemic geopolitics presents tools to analyze space as a system. This
will help us with a proper delimitation and understanding of the spatial properties of
different regions in relation to the neomedieval theory. The book also holds clear
limitations regarding the empirical work. First, the global focus leads to necessary
simplifications. It is not a goal of the work to make a detailed analysis of every part
of the world and it cannot be. The book covers the evaluation of the systemic forces
inside the international order, and the application aims to better understand the geo-
graphical spread of the different types of geopolitical spaces. The second limitation
deals with the development on the ground. As the book works with the recent data
and evaluation of the contemporary events, it might not be capable of following all
the most recent developments taking place. This, however, once again does not dis-
qualify it from presenting the systemic evolution.
Structure of the book will follow the abovementioned research goals. The first
chapter deals with definitions and terminology; the second is dedicated to the theory
itself – description of both neomedievalism as an alternative to the Westphalian
system and its ideal types; the third chapter discusses the way how to apply theory
to empirical research – defining analyzed regions and presenting the research design
of the work; the fourth chapter deals with the empirical analysis itself; the fifth
chapter is dedicated to a study of the relations among different actors in neomedi-
eval world and the way political actors adapted to their environment; the sixth chap-
ter covers six case studies that illustrate the processes presented in the theoretical
sphere – their aim is not testing the model but better explaining the nature of rela-
tions and adaptations; finally, conclusion summarizes the whole work. This book
presents the world as being constructed of qualitatively different types of organiza-
tion of political space. This complication of the reading of the world map will hope-
fully bring more clarity into its understanding.
Conceptual Framework
2
Before the introduction of the New Middle Age theory and the neomedieval frame-
work that will be serving as a theoretical basis for the empirical part of this work, it
is essential to describe the basic definitions, terminology, and concepts used
throughout the book as some of the terms can be understood in several ways and we
need to establish a clear baseline for the development of the theoretical framework.
As the work problematizes our understanding of even basic concepts, it is essential
to have a basic definition of these. Lack of common understanding would hinder
any possible discussion over alternative geopolitical settings in non-Westphalian
organizations of the political map. In the first part, an understanding of geopolitics
and political geography and its applicability on neomedievalism as primarily inter-
national relations theory will be presented. The second part will focus on conceptu-
alization of the fundamental concepts, and the third part will describe medieval and
Westphalian systems as geopolitical settings from which the neomedieval system
might be described as well as the process of globalization that is by many seen as
major factor eroding modern state system.1
2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory
Despite being primarily created as an international relations’ framework, New

Middle Ages is also well applicable in the field of geopolitics, and political geog-
raphy as it in no small degree deals with the territorial dimension of politics. To
prove this, a conceptualization of these two terms must be first presented.
Geopolitics and political geography are understood as a field of social sciences
studying relation between political processes and space/geography. This
relationship, however, does include not only geographic patterns but also expertise
1
For the discussion over the role of globalization on the state system and sovereignty erosion, see
the special issue of Political Studies 47 (3) (1999).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_2
8 2 Conceptual Framework
from other fields (economy, demography, etc.), so the geopolitical analysis seeks to
research distinct cases as profoundly as possible (Glassner 1996, 11–12). These
other fields of expertise may include study of political and economic actors/agents/
systems, outlook of economic activity, or even role of ideas and ideology in the
international system. It is important to point out that the perception throughout the
book is not state-centric. A geopolitical actor is defined, by, for example, S. Mäkinen
(2014, 101), as any actor whose influence might be felt in at least two regions on
the globe, and so international organizations, individuals, etc. must also be includ-
ed.2 This definition is, however, insufficient for this research. For its purposes, it is
necessary to define political-geographical actor as well. While geopolitical actor is
defined by its impact on more regions or by its influence on the power projection
capabilities and the general dynamics of geopolitical development, regional actors
are comparably more static and follow the logic of political geography as a fixed
discipline. Actors that are part of the geopolitical processes are involved in
dynamic3 power projection efforts, while every actor that holds some power in a set
region is a part of the political-geographical analysis of more static power
distribution.
This distinction follows traditional division between political geography and
geopolitics. Both fields are subfields of human geography which specializes in
research of connection between human activity and geography in general. Political
geography, as mentioned earlier, focuses on political processes and is thus oriented
more on the state political system, while geopolitics is understood as a subfield of
political geography specifically dedicated to studying of great-power/global/inter-
national politics from the spatial perspective. To quote B. Hnízdo, geopolitics is
merely a “(s)cale picked at a global level, trying to overcome the limitations given
by the state as a territorial unit in researching the problems of political geogra-
phy(…) (Hnízdo 1995, 10).”4
Neomedievalism can be integrated into the geopolitical thinking in two ways.
The first is related to the nature of actors – neomedievalism stresses greater focus
on the non-state actors. The second is a mode of territorial control – the notion of
absolute territorial power of state is regarded as obsolete and unjustifiable. A justi-
fication for using neomedievalism in geopolitical framework is thus the focus on
territory and interaction among actors who can be defined as geopolitical/political-
geographical (although not all of them are necessarily territorial).
Finally, two concepts related to the issue and coming from the systemic stream
of geopolitical thought need to be tackled. The first is J. Lévy’s system of world
spaces. He points to the fact that the existence of world system is a myth and that
no global model is relevant for any scholar interested in honest description of a
2
Compare with the definition of a geopolitical agent in Flint (2006, 24–26).
3
“The geopolitical perspective is dynamic. It evolves as the international system and its operational
environment changes” (Cohen 2014, 5).
4
Translation by the author of these (the same is applicable for all the translations from Czech in
this book).
2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory 9
contemporary world. He proposes presence of four types of spatial models based

on the type and quality of interhuman relations – world of groupings (based on
separation), world of forces (domination), hierarchical world (transaction), and
world of society (communication). Each of these four models leads to a different
end – community, empire, market, society. Qualities of these spaces are then
leading to different territorial outcomes – horizon, borders, territorially deter-
mined network, and global network (Lévy 2000). If we fast-forward a little, we
may see that this separation will be important for two reasons:
1. Three advanced systems (other than world of groupings) are basis for the three
pillars we will examine in the description of Durable Disorder scenario.
2. Different territorial outcomes are similar to the setting of our three ideal types –
border zones (horizon) for Chaotic Anarchy, border lines and globalization (bor-
ders and territorially determined network) for Westphalian model, and global
(universal) network for Durable Disorder.
The second important concept comes from the work of G. Dussuoy who tried to
examine the composition of the world system. He shatters the idea of a single sys-
tem into parts that can be adequately examined. Dussuoy presents five components
of the world system – physical, natural space; demographic or demo-political
space; diplomatic-military field; socioeconomic field; and symbolic, idealistic, and
cultural domain. He expresses a belief that these spaces are not separate, and one
can become so important that it determines the outlook of the others. In his work,
the influence of diplomatic-military field in the Cold War is presented as an exam-
ple, or, similarly, the contemporary influence of socioeconomic field in the form of
globalization can be seen as another example of such dominance (Dussuoy 2010).
This division is essential for this study mainly because it once again points to the
two-and-half pillar structure of Durable Disorder and it specifies its field of inter-
est. We will be primarily interested in the diplomatic-military field (not only in its
effects but also in actors playing major roles), demo-political space concerning the
local political-geographic actors, or socioeconomic field as long as it affects these
two domains.
The book additionally needs to take into account the world-system theory as an
evolutionary approach to the development of the global institutions and interactions.
World-system analysis is historical, overcoming the limitations of the nation state
and mapping the global perspective with additional focus on the nature of flows –
world economy. Unlike the current study, the world-system analysis deals with the
role of the interactions in the inequality of the different parts of the system
(Wallerstein 2004). It consequently maps and conceptualizes the contemporary
capitalist system including its spatial distributions (Arrighi 2001/2; 2002; 2004;
Arrighi and Silver 2001) and historical development (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997;
Frank and Gills 1993). The historical, globalist, and system-centric approach is cru-
cial for the basis of the consequent analysis even if the world-system analysis is not
utilized as the book covers the distribution of power on the political map with only
secondary importance of the political economy.
2.2 Concepts
2.2.1 State
A proper definition of a modern state is a far-reaching task which to be done

exhaustively would, similarly to other definitions presented in this work, take
much more space than available here – in fact, it would be a goal for a separate
monography. This work will thus only briefly summarize primary arguments that
will lead us in the following text. The modern state is usually defined by a set of
objective and subjective geographic, social, and political factors. Objective fac-
tors are mainly understood as a defined territory,5 permanent resident population,
government, organized economy, and a circulation system. Subjective factors are
state sovereignty and international recognition (Glassner 1996, 45–46). A state
might be defined as a set of four types of institutions – political, security, admin-
istrative, and judiciary – with the ultimate aim of providing security for its popu-
lation in exchange for resource extraction (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 7, 16).
Furthermore, modern state is a primary component of the modern international
system, with unique position on the international scene, with an ability of prime
invention of the legal system and expected behavior patterns inside its sovereign
territory. H. Spruyt (1994, 3) identifies modern state as being defined by an inter-
nal hierarchy and external autonomy, while another definition identifies the mod-
ern international system by consisting of “(…) disjoint, mutually exclusive, and
fixed territoriality (…) (Ruggie 1993, 174)” – in effect a modern Westphalian
state. The Westphalian state is thus a manifestation of this modernity in the inter-
national system that arose due to particular conjuncture of social and political
interests in Europe (Spruyt 1994, 18–19).
Main features of the modern state are according to G. Sørensen (2005, 91–99)
these:
• Centralized system of rules based on administrative, police, and army institu-
tions, confirmed by law order, and claiming the monopoly of the legitimate use
of violence
• Presence of people on a given territory creating highly coherent community, con-
necting a nation with a state
• The existence of a national economy that consists of all major sectors needed for
its reproduction
Additionally, P. D. Miller defines state in following words: “The state is a human
institution that successfully invokes a theory of justice: (1) to claim the monopoly
of the legitimate use of physical force, the right to expropriate resources and per-
form other functions at its discretion, and sovereign authority to make and enforce
rules within given territory and over a given human population, and to serve human
life; (2) by providing (professedly) public goods to at least some of the population
in a contractlike exchange: goods for legitimacy (agreement to its claims). The
5
Sovereign state is territorially defined – there is no authority over other units (such as was the case
with Empire or Church) (Spruyt 1994, 36).
2.2 Concepts 11
kind of goods that the state provides are cast in terms of the theory of justice that
the state embodies, and the provision of just services constitute, in part, the state’s
claim to legitimacy (Miller 2013, 52).”
According to R. Cooper, three types of states are observable in the post-Cold
War world: premodern, modern, and postmodern. Premodern states are fragile and
no longer fulfill their primary functions, and this, consequently, aids the de facto
reemergence of terra nullius on maps. The existence of these states destabilizes the
world more than in the past since the areas of chaos are not only connected to the
rest of the world due to the effects of the modern transportation capabilities but
also enable a rise of potentially dangerous non-state actors.6 The modern state is a
classical state as we know it inside a Westphalian system and is intimately con-
nected to the institution of sovereignty. A postmodern system is defined by the
collapse of a modern state toward a higher order. Postmodern part of the world is
defined by a high level of openness and mutual interference. It is thus defined by
the breaking down of the distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual
interference and surveillance, rejection of the use of force,7 growing irrelevance of
borders, and security based on transparency and openness. A postmodern state is,
furthermore, oriented on individuality rather than a collective. These three kinds of
states must, however, coexist, and different territories may move from one type to
another (Cooper 2000).
Similar distinction is made by G. Sørensen. His description of a modern state
was presented above. He, furthermore, distinguishes two other forms of states –
postcolonial and postmodern. A postcolonial state is a type of state with weak
institutional basis, without proper legal system, with low societal coherence, and
without an appropriate national economy. Postmodern state is, on the other hand,
a state based on multilevel governance, connected to the supra and international
institutions, with identity of population shared between state, substate, and supra-
state levels and with developed transnational economy (Sørensen 2005,
100–107).
Another concept connected to state is the so-called state capture. Captured states
are taken over by particular groups in order to provide with some (economic) ben-
efit. We can observe this process appearing inside states that have weak institutions.
This is (was) applicable to the postcommunist part of Eurasia (Wedel 2003) or
Africa (e.g., in connection to the capture of Liberia by warlord Charles Taylor (Reno
1998)).
In our work, state is defined as an entity recognized by international community
as a state. This recognition is manifested by the acceptance of the entity into the
United Nations.8
6
For a discussion over the nature of premodern states, see also Reno (1998, 18–24).
7
Rejection of use of force is relevant only when discussing interaction between postmodern enti-
ties, not in relation to the modern and premodern entities.
8
“(…) UN membership is commonly viewed as the ‘birth certificate’ of a state” (Geldenhuys 2009,
22).
2.2.2 Unrecognized State
Understanding a concept of the unrecognized state9 is an important task since this

category consists of geopolitically important set of entities which are on one side
unrecognized by the international community but are also different from a typical
non-state actor. These entities hold many names such as quasi-state (Kolstø 2006),
de facto state (Pegg 1998), or almost state (Stanislawski 2008), but the character-
istics of these differ only slightly.10 Unrecognized state as used in this book is an
entity attempting to control specific territory and actively seeking international
recognition and able to survive for protracted period of time, and to control signifi-
cant portion of territory, it lays claim to with a capability to establish at least basic
institutions11 – concrete length of time or size of the controlled territory is not
defined as its setting is in this work seen as superfluous and artificial. Using this
definition, we can find these unrecognized states on the globe in places like East
Asia (Republic of China – Taiwan), post-Soviet space (Abkhazia, Transnistria,
etc.), Middle East (Palestine), or Africa (Somaliland). This is also why Daesh
(known also as Islamic State) is not an unrecognized state and was not one even
throughout its period of territorial control. The movement never aimed to obtain
international recognition and become part of the system. Additionally, it is impor-
tant to point out that there is no a priori stark contrast between unrecognized states
and failed states. Unrecognized states are not by definition an opposition to the
failed states, and many of these entities are failing or failed or entirely dependent
on a patron state (Pelczynska-Nalecz et al. 2008).
Furthermore, the existence of unrecognized states and their prolonged survival
highlight major changes in the international state structure. It is important to point
out that the way the regional powers incorporated unrecognized states into their
structure and connection of some unrecognized states to the system of international
(economic or security) system and flows tells us about qualitatively new phase in
the international system (Chorev 2011, 39). The ability of the international system
to accommodate these entities is of vital importance for the argument about the new
phase of the international (geo)political system.
9
Term is selected as, in the author’s view, most clearly describing the nature of these entities – to
some level undertaking state functions (indigenously or with foreign support) and not receiving
full recognition – the terminology is, as pointed out, disputed. When dealing with other authors’
description, the terminology will be unified as to follow the unrecognized state term coherently
and avoid unnecessary terminological confusion.
10
For more information on terminological confusion, see Harvey and Stansfield (2011, 14–16) and
Riegl (2010).
11
More precise definition is presented by S. Pegg who argues that unrecognized state “exists where
there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indig-
enous capability, receives popular support, and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide govern-
mental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is
maintained for an extended period of time(…)and it seeks full constitutional independence and
widespread international recognition as a sovereign state” (Pegg 1998, 1).
2.2 Concepts 13
2.2.3 Non-State Actor
In the light of definitions of a state and unrecognized state, we could easily leave a
definition of the non-state actor as the remaining set of actors – actors which are
neither recognized as states nor are trying to achieve such recognition on some
given and reasonably controlled territory. D. Josselin and W. Wallace (2001, 3–4)
point out the variety of the non-state actors and define those important for the world
politics as being mostly autonomous from the central government, operating as a
part of a network establishing transnational relations, and acting in a way that affects
the political outcomes.
For a better understanding of the term, let us now define distinct categories of
non-state actors and present basic terminological lines between separate groups of
these. The first distinction is between territorial and non-territorial actors. The for-
mer are trying to hold on to some concrete territory and to use it in achieving their
goals no matter what these are. On the contrary, non-territorial actors attempt to
promote their goals via mobility and global, or at least regional, focus and seek non-
territorial goals. The following is the differentiation based on the aim of non-state
actors: political, economic, ideological, societal, humanitarian, or other. Here we
understand political goals as those aiming at gaining power, economic as increasing
wealth, ideological as promoting ideology/religion, societal as attempting to change
society, and humanitarian as targeting to help people in need. These goals are often
interconnected as this brief overview is only a simplified model. Another distinction
is between primarily violent and nonviolent non-state actors or pre-state and mod-
ern non-state actors with the former forming without conceptual dependence on the
Westphalian state (e.g., nomads) (MacKay et al. 2014, 104).
2.2.4 Sovereignty
Attempt to define sovereignty is another difficult task that needs to be performed on

an inadequately short space. Sovereignty can be understood as an execution of
power over population on a defined territory without any control from the outside.
State power has forceful and peaceful segment. The first is a classic military, police,
and other security apparatus,12 and the second is understood as ideological and eco-
nomic power (Glassner 1996, 46).
Sovereignty is, furthermore, a judicial tool of states which enables them to escape
a rule from the outside. Sovereignty is territorially13 limited norm which lies as a
fundamental principle of the modern state system. It provides successfully sover-
eign states with final political power over given community. Sovereignty is a status,
a legal standing. This legal standing can be defined as constitutional independence
12
“…state is that kind of a human community, which holds on a defined territory (…) monopoly
for the legitimate use of violence” (Weber 2009, 244).
13
For the discussion over the notion of territoriality in its different forms, see, for example, Elden
(2013), Gottmann (1973), Kahler and Walter (2006) and Sack (1986).
which is crucial for this sovereign status (Jackson 1999, 432–434; Sørensen 2005,
171–172). It is also important to distinguish between sovereignty as a legal principle
and independence as a political reality that might but also might not be connected –
e.g., a state might be sovereign but dependent, and non-state actor might lack sover-
eignty but be independent. Independence is a prerequisite of statehood while
sovereignty is its consequence (Crawford 2007, 4–34).
R. Jackson distinguishes between two forms of sovereignty. The first is so-
called imperial and is characterized by the rule of one state on a different state’s
territory. This type of sovereignty was disregarded and ultimately made illegiti-
mate by the notion of the immorality of the control of foreign territory and popula-
tion. This claim led to the appearance of currently prevailing form of
sovereignty – popular sovereignty, a notion that sovereignty lies in consent of the
population. The final judge deciding who is and is not a sovereign state is still,
however, the state system. The sovereignty of many states is thus not based on the
principle mentioned above of popular sovereignty but rather on a historical, politi-
cal, and economic context leading to their emergence (Jackson 1999, 438–449).
Another division of sovereignty comes from A. James. He recognizes three broad
branches of sovereignty – or rather ways how the sovereignty is understood. The
first is the sovereignty in the sense of the state doing what it wants, whereas the
second is connected to the delimitation of the decision-maker and the third to the
sovereignty as an expression of the nation’s trust in state which fulfills its duties to
the nation (James 1999, 457–459).
Another distinction might be made between negative and positive sovereignty as
presented by R. Jackson (1993). Negative sovereignty is a legal entitlement upon
which the community of formally equal states rests. It is based on judicial indepen-
dence and the principle of nonintervention. Negative sovereignty lies at the basis of
the post-Second World War international law.14 On the other hand, positive sover-
eignty is a relative concept related to the capacities of states. Positive sovereignty
enables states to use their independence. Unlike negative sovereignty, this status is
not defined legally but sociologically, economically, etc. It might be stronger in rela-
tion to some states, and it is a sign of state’s overall development (Jackson 1993,
27–29). This distinction is crucial for an evolution of the internal situation in many
weak states as the personal interest of their leaders was in many cases easier to fol-
low under the disguise of negative (judicial) sovereignty than in case these actors
acted as non-state actors (Reno 1998, 222).
Finally, it is helpful to tackle the issue of sovereignty from the political-
philosophical point of view to get fuller picture of the ideas characterizing the term.
For the needs of this work, only a few major ideas that appeared in a sphere of politi-
cal philosophy are presented. First, there is an issue of legal adoption. This is one of
the important issues discussed in the famous T. Hobbes’ Leviathan. For him “(…)
the authority of the law (…) lies only in command of the sovereign” (Hobbes 2009,
190) and “(i)n all the states, the only legislator is sovereign, be it one person like in
monarchy, or a gathering of people as in democracy or aristocracy” (Hobbes 2009,
14
See also Reno (1998, 7–9).
2.2 Concepts 15
184). But not only law adoption defines sovereign. As C. Schmitt famously pre-
sented: “Sovereign is he, who declares a state of emergency” (Schmitt 2012, 9).
Schmitt furthermore defines sovereignty as “(…)the highest, non-derived power of
the leader(…)” (Schmitt 2012, 9) and “(s)sovereign stands outside the normally
valid law order while still belonging to it by holding the power to decide, when the
constitution can be suspended in toto” (Schmitt 2012, 10). For C. Schmitt, the sov-
ereignty is thus “(…)not a monopoly of coercion or rule, but rather a monopoly of
decision(…)” with “(…)a monopoly of that last decision” (Schmitt 2012, 15). Last,
but not least, it is important to point at the observation made by H. Arendt: “Amount
of the violence disposable for a certain state does not have to be a reliable indicator
of a power of that country, neither a reliable safeguard against its destruction by a
much weaker and smaller power” (Arendt 2004, 12). Consequently, the power of
the sovereign (or in this instance any other actor) is not directly derived from the
amount of violence it uses. The more violent the actor needs to use, the less of actual
power it holds (Arendt 2004).
When discussing sovereignty in the following text,15 we will understand the term
as the ability of a state to create an internal order, be independent in its decisions in
domestic and foreign policy, and maintain means of provision of security. It is
important to point out that any restrictions of the decision-making must be volun-
tary. Otherwise, it challenges the state’s sovereignty – e.g., voluntary accession to
the defense alliance is not a breach while foreign occupation is. Factors challenging
states’ sovereignty16 are thus the following: inability of a state to provide its law on
the whole territory, inability to maintain order and promote its decisions on the
entire territory, dependence on the external actors, and the constant high level of use
of violence against its population to stay in power.
2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots
Before approaching the systemic definitions, it is important to deal with two seem-
ingly interconnected geopolitical phenomena.17 The first is so-called terra nullius.
The term terra nullius can be best understood as a portion of land out of control of
any political actor. These areas were historically quite widespread, but their num-
ber significantly decreased in the nineteenth and twentieth century due to the rapid
rise of global population and technological and infrastructure developments.
Nowadays they are mostly connected to the areas defined by harsh geography
(largest terra nullius is the continent of Antarctica) and state failure. Out of
15
This is, naturally, not a case in parts where other authors’ ideas are presented.
16
J. Crawford in this respect divides formal (where power over territory of state is given to separate
authority) and actual independence (degree of actual governmental power). They differ in factors
that are (not) considered as a breach of the independence and in their impact upon the state
(Crawford 2007, 62–88).
17
This work is not dealing with definitions of other forms of anomalous geopolitical units like
states-within-states or insurgent states as these are not directly referred to throughout the text.
Antarctica, all portions of land are claimed by some state structure18 but not all of
this land is controlled efficiently, and effective power projection is in many times
virtually impossible (deserts, high mountain ranges, etc.). Terra nullius is thus a
portion of land with no (state) power efficiently controlling it. Terra nullius is a
land without control.
On the contrary, black spots are areas which are out of the control of the state
institutions which nominally provide sovereign power over them; however, they
are not without any authority. These areas are usually “hidden,” meaning that orga-
nizations that control them are not trying to bring international attention upon
themselves. These territories are thus usually controlled by the international crimi-
nal groups or terrorist organizations, and they provide them with safe haven. These
black spots are usually hardly penetrable and constantly remain out of the reach of
the state power. Black spots are dominated by criminal and illegal activities. These
black spots might thus create an illegal challenge to a state in the form of the out-
law communities or criminal entity (Stanislawski 2008, 366, 368–9).19 Black spots
are thus areas out of state control which remain hardly accessible and try to stay
out of the international radar due to the illegality of the activities of the actor(s)
controlling them.
2.3 Systemic Development
2.3.1 Medieval System
European medieval system came into existence as a consequence of the fall of Pax
Romana in the fifth century. European landscape was dominated by the barbaric
tribes which made political and social environment more chaotic compared to the
era of the Roman dominance. Newly established states faced instability due to their
incapability to properly settle and govern newly acquired local population – king-
doms which did not successfully integrate locals usually disintegrated and vanished.
This led to the incorporation of some basic properties of Roman law and Roman
structure which proved to be rather effective. It is important to realize that during
the Middle Ages we cannot speak about the modern state. The importance of per-
sonal contacts was much more important than an abstract idea of state/kingdom.
The medieval state and society are basically identical – there was no widespread
18
With minor exceptions like small part of the Croatian-Serbian border where the so-called
Liberland was proclaimed.
19
Stanislawski uses definition of black spots as follows: “(…) Black Spots constitute areas that are
neither recognized by the international community nor are they under the true governmental con-
trol of the host states; they remain in the grey area between formal international recognition and
semi-formal central control. On international security maps, they often are reflected as demonstrat-
ing that government control and authority are either uncertain, incomplete, or non-existent and that
the internal dynamics concerning what goes on in these areas are not entirely known to the outside
world. What is known is that some internal dynamics exist, so they are not empty or blank spaces,
which might suggest a form of vacuum in that location. Nor are they ‘ungoverned’” (Stanislawski
2008, 369).
2.3 Systemic Development 17
sense of impersonal institution, and there is a vast variety of contacts on both verti-
cal (feudal20) and horizontal level. On the lowest societal level, we can observe the
emergence of neighborhood communities primarily based on the common use of
the agricultural soil and other means of living. These units were primarily territorial
(Müller 2011a, 317–329; Contamine 2004, 15–49).
Another factor observable was the growing independence of cities,21 which was
later formally recognized as the city councils were created. Power of cities was
important and visible especially during the times of crisis.22 Moreover the higher
level of local affinity and the importance of the local environment for the people
were mirroring in the creation of different local communities or guilds (Herold
2011, 291–318; Müller 2011a, 317–325) – the local identities and interests were by
the time the most important ones (Strayer 1970, 14). Medieval Europe thus con-
sisted of many mutually interconnected societies with different competencies, aims,
and claims. Another important factor of the medieval European state is the presence
of king on the top of a hierarchy. The state was still understood as a personal belong-
ing of the king.23 The power of an individual, however, was not only important for
the secular powers but even for the Church. For example, appearance of weak popes
enabled the existence of the Church schism (Müller 2011a, 330–403).
The importance of a strong monarch was crucial for the strength of a medieval
state. We can see, for example, that after the end of the reign of Charles le Magne,
vast and robust Frank Empire simply crumbled. This era can be furthermore seen as
an example of unorganized medieval system with many small units competing with
each other, leaving no possibility for an effective rule over them. Another factor
characterizing medieval system is the feudal system which led to the establishment
of feudal dominions so interconnected and fragmented that in some periods vast
territories were, again, practically uncontrollable (Müller 2011a, 317–329). The
map of Europe during the Middle Ages was more a chaotic mixture of different
personal and collective governments territorially overlapping each other than a clear
system of territorially based units as we know it from the post-1648 maps (Jackson
1999, 435–438; Spruyt 1994, 12). The system, moreover, lacked a monopoly on
coercive force (Spruyt 1994, 12).
On the other hand, in many ways church hierarchy was able to work as a unifying
element. The Church was also based on a territorial principle of dioceses, while
state was until the beginning of the eleventh century mostly defined by its popula-
tion24 (Müller 2011a, 367–403). State and Church were on the one hand still more
resembling each other in a structure while on the other were fighting over who will
20
With feudals being under multiple loyalties (Spruyt 1994, 38–39).
21
The most important city-community was probably the Hanseatic League, while the most promi-
nent city-states laid in contemporary Italy.
22
For example, the power of cities during the Hussite Revolution in Bohemia (Herold 2011,
291–318).
23
As noted earlier when the development of the understanding of the word state was described.
24
J. Grygiel presents importance of control over population in opposition to control of land as one
of the defining factors of medieval system (Grygiel 2013, 7–9). Empire can also be understood as
a spiritual and military authority inside vaguely defined boundaries (Spruyt 1994, 51).
receive the major power in the contemporary society. Even before the Investiture
Contest (despite larger resemblance of the two powers compared to post-Investiture
Conflict era (Spruyt 1994, 47)), there was a struggle present between religious and
secular power over the establishment of the supreme authority based on a Roman
legacy. This led to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire on one side and the uni-
versal Church structure on the other25 (Müller 2011a, 317–403; Müller 2011b, 447–
471). By 1300, the medieval state began institutionalization and centralization of its
powers – mainly in England and France and in legal and economic domains (Strayer
1970, 3–56).
Another important factor is a power of non-state and non-Church actors. As
S. Sousedlík writes: “(…)due to the weakness of the central power, war could have
been quite easily waged by persons or groups(…)called private” (Sousedlík 2011,
538). Furthermore, with the growth of the wealth and power of the cities, these cities
were able to create strong alliances which were able to oppose the central power
effectively. Popular movements challenging legitimacy of both monarchy and
Catholic Church emerged, and even the importance and power of independent uni-
versities arose (Žemla and Dostál 2011, 94–95). Actors relevant for “international”
situation of medieval Europe were multiple – both territorial and mobile – and the
means of military conduct were cheap and easily accessible (Grygiel 2013, 5–7), so
the whole situation in Europe was more volatile. The nature of the medieval system
was not primarily territorial but dominated by the existing personal ties (Taylor
1994, 152).
To sum up, the Western and Central European Middle Ages were characterized
by the struggle between the universal claims26 of the secular Empire27 and the
Catholic Church, complicated structure of the territorial control by feudal masters,
and the vast power of smaller actors. Society was strongly territorially determined
with the exception of certain parts of elite with religious, secular, and university
background. The private violence was nothing extraordinary, and during significant
periods of time, vast territories were effectively ungoverned. Furthermore, the bor-
ders of these different actors did not necessarily respect those of others, so even
those actors with some sense of territoriality overlapped each other’s claims, and
population could have been quite easily caught in a system of multiple identity and
loyalty. This was even more problematic due to the presence of the clashing territo-
rial units loyal to a kingdom and the Church. It is important to point out that despite
the fact that the state was in 1300 the comparatively strongest political form present
in Europe, it remained rather weak by today’s standards (Strayer 1970, 57).
The shift from this medieval system to the Westphalian system presented in the
next subchapter was caused by some conditions specific to the European
25
We may observe that in an attempt to create a universal empire, both sides failed. Holy Roman
Empire reduced its claims over German “nation” only (Müller 2011a, 2011b), and Catholic Church
was in its claims held back by reformation and spread of Protestantism.
26
One of the main transformations between medieval and modern political system is in “transition
from the medieval universality founded on the unity of faith to the coexistence of a multiplicity of
sovereign states based on the diversity of geography and of religion (...)” (Gottmann 1973, 43).
27
“Secular arm of God” (Spruyt 1994, 53).
environment. In 1500, Europe was ethnically and socially more homogenous com-
pared to the rest of the world; society was stratified among peasantry, landlords, and
nobility; urbanization levels were growing; important theories of sovereignty were
already created; ad hoc assemblies begun to emerge; and everyone had, at least
nominally, at least one king (Tilly 1975, 17–21). These conditions were important
prerequisites for creation of European nation states, but the centralizing efforts of
kings were opposed not only by rivals (noblemen, bishops) but even by local popu-
lation which was subjugated by the combination of positive incentives and ruthless
crushing of rebellions (Tilly 1975, 22–24; Mampilly 2011, 31–34). The formation
of modern state was, furthermore, not the only possibility for the political develop-
ment in Europe – challenging institutions contain political federation or empire,
theocratic federation, trading network, or feudal structure (Tilly 1975, 26) with
other possible alternatives in independent city communes or urban leagues (Curtis
2016, 90; Spruyt 1994). These entities established themselves as adaptations to the
shifts in the social, political, and economic structure of Europe and established a
basis for the growth of the sovereign state (Spruyt 1994, 61–63). They also adapted
their internal methods of controlling population that allowed them to become more
efficient (Foucault 2009) – additional necessary step toward the Westphalian mode
of organization of the political map.
During the creation of the Westphalian system (1500–1900), the majority of the
states simply died and disappeared. Survivability of a state in Europe was deter-
mined by its access to resources, protected position in time and space, availability
of political entrepreneurs, success in wars, relative homogeneity, and strong rela-
tions between state and landowners (with the possibility of one factor supplement-
ing for another) (Tilly 1975, 40–41) in relation to the, by then, unparalleled
advantage in mobilizing social resources (Spruyt 1994, 185). The transformation
toward modern state system was thus characterized by a change into an increasingly
more contiguous pattern of territories. This was marked by the establishment of the
principle of noninterference and decline of the last powers of the Church and the
Empire (Taylor 1994, 153). This development, however, was not true for the entire
globe. As a large number of states came into being after the Second World War, the
new principles of state recognition abandoning the de facto statehood prerequisite
and focusing on importance of the territorial integrity of even artificial postcolonial
states enabled foundation of many states that, unlike states in Tilly’s argument
(meaning mainly states located in Europe and Americas), were unable to control
their own territory (Fabry 2010, 12–13).
Following C. Tilly’s argument, we must mention another important transforma-
tion that took place during eighteenth and nineteenth century when states gradually
abolished the utilization of the non-state violence. Use of the non-state violence was
blurring boundaries between state and non-state authority, political and economic
domain, and domestic and international realms (Thomson 1996, 19). The transi-
tional period between the medieval and modern state system was characterized by
the utilization of private violence, hiring of foreigners to the armies, and existence
of mercantile companies, all with many powers and ability to utilize a legitimate use
of violence (Thomson 1996, 31–2). With the emergence of the modern national
state, armed forces were becoming less dependent on mercenaries bought abroad
and more dependent on popular opinion (Thomson 1996, 59). Despite the fact that
there was no concentrated effort to forbid non-state violence, states were continu-
ally able to banish most of the practices that were present between the 1600s and
1800s as their interests were endangered. This process was both a sequence of unre-
lated actions against concrete non-state actors and progressive evolution in the state
system (Thomson 1996, 105, 145). Control of non-state violence thus became a
newly acquired function of the modern state. Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, the use of non-state violence can no longer be used openly, and the states
might use it only in secrecy as the practice is widely condemned as the state is per-
ceived as the only legitimate source of violence and it can use this right only through
its legitimate institutions (Thomson 1996, 149–53). The practice is thus mainly
present in the so-called proxy wars and utilization of these actors as proxies inside
many conflicts (Mumford 2013).
At this point, we can observe the first division that will become important for the
further text. As part of the world went through the specific process of development
that led to the Westphalian organization of political space, other parts did not. This
holds many reasons that are contextual for the specific regions. So as for the part of
the global communities, we can progress with the discussion over the Westphalian
evolution of the political institutions; others took different direction. This will be
more explained in the discussion over the Chaotic Anarchy part of the globe.
2.3.2 Westphalian System
We have discussed the nature of the Middle Ages and the main events that led to its
gradual transformation into the Westphalian or modern global system. Let us con-
tinue with a description of the main factors of this newly emerged global order.
First, it is useful to read a quote from H. Bull who analyzed the basics of the mod-
ern international system: “The starting point of international relations is the exis-
tence of states, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a
government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s
surface and a particular segment of the human population. On the one hand, states
assert, in relation to this territory and population, what may be called internal sov-
ereignty (…) (o)n the other hand, they asset what may be called external sover-
eignty (…)” (Bull 1977, 8).
As we can see, the key features of the Westphalian system are sovereignty, ter-
ritoriality, and state. States interact with each other in the international domain and
set different goals. These goals are not necessarily political as are the actions taken
in relation to another state. States are, furthermore, internationally active in varying
degree – from active interference to isolation (Morgenthau 1993, 29–30).
Fundamental principle of the international relations under Westphalia is the balance
of power among sovereign states (Morgenthau 1993, 183). Balancing can be
achieved by several strategies (Morgenthau 1993, 194–212), but it is unnecessary to
discuss them at this place and in context of this work. We can, furthermore, differ-
entiate states in their capabilities which enable them to equip these different strate-
gies – these capabilities are political, economic, military, etc. (Waltz 1979, 131) – and
even set up a hierarchical order of powers (Cohen 2014).
The Westphalian system is based on an existence of sovereign states which are
independent in their decision-making. The system is decentralized, and no formal
hierarchy exists. The anarchy in the relations among the states is the basic principle
of functioning of this system. Each state is responsible for its survival and other
actions on domestic or international level. Essential characteristic of every state
toward the system is its relative power which delimits the scope of its respective
area of interest. The balance of this system then lies in balancing of the power
among the individual states (Kovářová 2012, 39–41). Westphalia defined state as a
legitimate member of the European and, later of a global, international politics. The
principle of sovereignty started to be the most important attribute of an international
actor, and up to nowadays, any international organization aims primarily on the
realm of states in a definition of its membership (Philpott 1999, 578–582). For
R. Cooper, the main difference between the European medieval and Westphalian
system is its focus – medieval on universal Christendom and Westphalian on a bal-
ance of power among modern states (Cooper 2000, 10–14). The Westphalian system
destroyed the ambiguous and intermediary forms of authority (under universal
claims) and brought in the principle of sovereignty as opposed to the division of
power in the Middle Ages (Keating 2001, 11, 13).
An important feature of the modern state system is its statist and territorial nature
of the use of violence – in comparison with the previous eras, it is democratized,
demarketized, and territorialized (Thomson 1996, 4). The Westphalian system is
characterized by two major characteristics – balance of power and unification of
power which lies at the core of the system. Balancing was guided to the perfection
by the creation of bipolar system where both actors were able to destroy the oppo-
nent due to the existence of the enormous number of nuclear weapons and their
carriers. Unification of power was in effect ended by this development (van Creveld
2000). Impossibility to break the balance and to unify the power militarily led to the
economic and cultural warfare and ultimately to the decay of the Westphalian sys-
tem which now, as the argument stands, undergoes yet another transformation. The
Westphalian state system is, furthermore, challenged by stateless nationalism, glo-
balization, and transnational integration. The contemporary world is characterized
by the spread of modern means of communication, effects of globalization, and
decline of a nation-state, and we may observe that multiple territorial identities and
systems of action coexist with the alternatives that may be found in the past (Keating
2001, 1, 16, 21). “The nation state as we have known it since the nineteenth century
is merely one way of organizing the polity, and changes in the relationship among
territory, identity, political institutions, and function may open new possibilities for
the future (…). Nationality as a form of collective identity is neither more nor less
‘natural’ than others, and is constantly made and remade in the course of political
experience” (Keating 2001, 2).
2.3.3 Globalization
Globalization28 is a complex process with many meanings for the different authors
and in different contexts. The process came in the past centuries through dramatic
changes (Zinkina et al. 2019; Hall 2018). It can be defined as positive or negative
depending on whether one is gaining or losing from it, and authors usually focus
only on one specific part or aspect of globalization (economy, culture, politics,
security, health risks, etc.) (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). As pointed out by Derruder and
Taylor (2020, 2), it can be sequenced into three phases – first being the final domi-
nation of the state system on the global stage, the second following the Second
World War aiding the global corporations to flourish, and third being connected to
the development of the modern communication and information technologies.
Despite the complexity and multisectored nature of the process, N. Al-Rodhan
proposes a definition: “Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes,
course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human
and non-human activities” (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). Furthermore, as pointed out by
W. Robinson, there are many schools of thought dealing with the issue, but despite
the substantial disagreements, there are three factors these authors can agree on –
the fact that pace of social change has changed dramatically in later decades of the
twentieth century, that the process is connected to increasing connectivity among
people, and that it is multidimensional (Robinson 2008, 126–7). It is also the latest
stage of spatial expansion of capitalist system (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005, 192).
In the following text, we will specify our use of term globalization as we will usu-
ally be interested in only some part of the process. Importantly as we deal with
geopolitical framing of the neomedieval theory, we follow the work of, among
others, M. Kahler and B. F. Walter who point out that despite the fact that global-
ization led to significant changes in our thinking of territoriality, it did not dimin-
ish human attachment to territory or its importance for the human society (Kahler
and Walter 2006, 19).
Yet again, it is important to point out that the uneven effects of globalization have
a direct impact upon the organization of the political space. While parts of the world
are shielding themselves from the effects of the connectivity on the nature of the
organization of the political map, others are more opened to its effect. This again,
similarly to the shift to the Westphalian type of organization of the political map,
creates unevenness inside the development of the political map. This type of evolu-
tion will become important for the discussion over the Durable Disorder part of the
neomedieval spectrum.
28
For a discussion over globalization, see also Khanna (2016).
New Middle Ages
3
The next chapter is dedicated to the development of the theoretical framework of the
work. New Middle Ages as a theory is gaining prominence due to the fact that it
offers a systematic alternative to the Westphalian understanding of the world system
in a period when we can observe many exceptions from the Westphalian under-
standing of the international politics. In the following text, the work will first deal
with the theoretical development of the theory as it occurred in the literature of the
past four decades. Consequently, the chapter brings up some important observations
regarding the decay of state-centric system and rise of non-state actors that are cru-
cial for the subsequent analysis. Afterward, the argument moves to the description
and delimitation of Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy scenarios as challenging
geopolitical environments significantly different from the currently accepted
Westphalian norm.
3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism
Although the first author to present the term New Middle Ages in the international
relations field1 was A. Wolfers, the proper delimitation of the concept was firstly
adequately introduced by H. Bull in his The Anarchical Society. At first, the con-
cept was somewhat shallow, but in the next reprints, Bull turned the scheme into a
properly developed alternative to the Westphalian system. The overview of the
“neomedieval literature” must thus begin by presenting Bull’s ideas about the
neomedieval system.
H. Bull introduces the New Middle Ages as one of the alternatives to the
Westphalian system despite the fact that he himself does not believe that such a
1
The term New Middle Ages is presented in other fields like philosophy (e.g., Berdajev 2004) or
law (e.g., Holsinger 2007), and the book will reflect these works only to the extent they are relevant
for the study of the geopolitical setting.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_3
24 3 New Middle Ages
concept will come into existence. Neomedieval system is in his opinion defined by
a qualitative change in the state system – the disintegration of states being more than
just a fragmentation of the political map ending in the creation of the new sovereign
states (Bull 2002, 257–258). Thus, the establishment of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia out of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was entirely Westphalian development,
while disintegration of countries like Somalia, Yemen, or Pakistan is turning these
areas into the qualitatively new position.
Second, the neomedieval order requires establishment of alternative universal
pillars comparable to the medieval Christendom as a new universal actor. These pil-
lars would be its functional secular alternative sharing power with lower overlap-
ping entities struggling with each other for power. Finally, neomedievalism would
be aided by the process of regionalism which further weakens the state system (Bull
2002, 245–246).
H. Bull furthermore defined five factors which are necessary for the introduction
of the neomedieval order. These features are the regional integration of states; dis-
integration of states; the restoration of private international violence; the importance
of transnational organizations; and the technological unification of the world (Bull
2002, 254–266). As these points constitute the original principles of neomedieval-
ism, we will describe them in more detail.
3.1.1 Regional Integration of States
The first criterion consists of the wide spread of regional bodies across the globe.
For H. Bull, the first such important regional organization is the European
Community. He, however, does not connect the strengthening of regional bodies
with the issue of the loss of sovereignty as states give up their powers to the external
bodies willingly. For Bull’s neomedievalism the shift of the identification of their
population toward the inter-/supra-state body is the much important factor of
regional integration. In this respect, states might be free to leave the organization,
but their population might gain strong affection toward the new political unit, thus
weakening the power of states. While (soft) power politics inside the regional bod-
ies is not overcome, countries might in time become less relevant as the prime target
of identification for its population (Bull 2002, 255–257).
3.1.2 Disintegration of States
As noted earlier, a disintegration of states is one of the prime prerequisites of the

neomedieval system. However, this disintegration must be qualitatively changing
the mode of governance of the given territory (Bull 2002, 257–258). This means
that the dissolution of the state (e.g., the dissolution of Pakistan in 1971) does not
constitute an example of this disintegration, while crumbling of the capabilities of
the Somalian state to govern its territory does. Disintegration of states is clearly
observable in the contemporary world filled with many failed states (e.g., Somalia,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Syria), unrecognized states
3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism 25
(e.g., Transnistria, Somaliland, South Ossetia), territorial non-state actors (e.g.,

Afghan Taliban, pre-2017 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),
Hezbollah), and other non-state challengers to the state sovereignty and system as
such (e.g., Al-Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Boko Haram, Mexican narco-
cartels, etc.).
3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence
By private violence, H. Bull means violence entirely disconnected from the control
or oversight by the institution of the state. Thus, the use of force by an international
organization, for example, the United Nations, is not private because the means of
violence and military personnel are directly connected to and provided by states.
Furthermore, H. Bull distinguishes between private violence approved by (part of)
the international community aiming at a creation of the new state or regime change
inside set border (e.g., Kurdish struggle against Daesh)2 and actors who use the
force illegitimately such as pirate or terrorist groups (e.g., Al-Shabaab) (Bull 2002,
258–260).
The number of violent non-state actors rises, and the means of violence among
the non-state actors are spreading. This objectively decreases some states’ ability to
provide basic functions as security to their population. In fact, even some advanced
modern armies use private contractors to fulfill some of the missions these armies
are tasked to do (e.g., private contractors in Iraq during the US occupation). The
spread of arms still more resembles their availability during the Middle Ages
(Grygiel 2013).3
3.1.4 Transnational Organizations
As the transnational organizations relevant for the observation of the shift to the new
medievalism, H. Bull counts multinational organizations; political movements; non-
governmental organizations; religious organizations; intergovernmental organiza-
tions; and others. These organizations usually aim at goals which explicitly or
implicitly disregard state borders as they try to operate out of the state control. All
of these organizations are, however, in case a state holds sufficient power, depen-
dent on the state’s will. It is usually the state that creates a legal environment, pro-
vides security, or decides whether or not to let the organization inside its territory
(Bull 2002, 260–263). This importance of state can be, nevertheless, decreased by
both decaying power of states and growing power of non-state actors and organiza-
tions – more on this later.
2
Here we can add actors used by a state against another one in a proxy warfare (e.g., Russian troops
in Ukraine in 2014–2015).
3
For more information on the private security corporations’ power, see, for example, Rothkopf
(2008, 138–163).
3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World
Finally, H. Bull presents the technological unification of the world as a necessary

condition for the emergence of the New Middle Ages. Unification virtually shrinks
the world establishing a so-called global village while simultaneously creating new
frictions and issues. This larger closeness of interconnected population thus leads to
further fragmentations that develop new identities and interest groups that are pres-
ent in yet another complication of an already complex structure (Bull 2002,
263–266).
3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation
The end of the Cold War, crumbling of the bipolar system, and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union led many authors to change their view of the international politics
and offer different visions of the future. Among theories of unipolarism, end of his-
tory, or clash of civilizations, an idea of neomedieval world setting started to gain
prominence. The neomedieval reading of the international system – initially refused
as improbable even by H. Bull himself – begun to spur intellectual interest as a
number of civil conflicts, failed states, and non-state actors with actual economic or
political power in their region grew. Just looking at the conflicts in places like Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Afghanistan, it is easy to understand the
reasoning behind the visions of incoming instability and shift in the international
system toward lower stability. In the following subchapter, works of some of the
authors that directly dealt with the issue of neomedievalism are discussed. The pur-
pose of this chapter is not to present works of all the authors who dealt with the
theory (as this list would be likely incomplete anyway and unnecessarily long) but
to display all the main intellectual streams connected to the New Middle Ages as an
international relations and geopolitical theory.
3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs
The first author to be mentioned in this section is J. Friedrichs. In his 2001 The
Meaning of New Medievalism, the author presented the idea that might be called
“historical neomedievalism.” For J. Friedrichs the comparison of the European
Middle Ages and the New Middle Ages is essential: “For the present purpose, medi-
evalism is defined as a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, held
together by a duality of competing universalistic claims. Thus, the Middle Ages
were characterized by a highly fragmented and decentralized network of sociopo-
litical relationships, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the
Empire and the Church. Analogously, the post-international world is characterized
by a complicated web of societal identities, held together by the antagonistic orga-
nizational claims of the nation-state system and the transnational market economy”
(Friedrichs 2001, 475). J. Friedrichs dismisses the utility of modern international
relations’ theories for an understanding the post-Cold War system and rather
3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation 27
presents neomedieval order4 as much more useful analytical tool to grasp the inter-
national politics. Mainstream ideas about the working of the global system (state-
centric, weakening through globalization, split across internal lines) are in his
opinion problematic as he offers an alternative view in neomedievalism (Friedrichs
2001, 477–481).
In his concept, the Westphalian system is to be ended (it is not a final state of
international politics), and a new system is about to replace it. Neomedievalism can
explain the competing developments of fragmentation and globalization. Another
important factor vital for the neomedieval explanation is a shift of personal alle-
giance toward distinct non-state objects. This process will create a structure of mul-
tiple loyalties. J. Friedrichs furthermore alters the original Bull’s idea by adding
duality of competing claims (as inspired by the medieval European system) and thus
“stabilizes” the whole system. These universal claims are connected to the institu-
tion of a nation-state system and a transnational market economy which are per-
ceived as powerful enough to effectively counterbalance each other and bring some
relative stability into the whole system (Friedrichs 2001, 481–486). Given this
premise, the author does not see the neomedieval system as something horrific, as
he points out, “equation of the Middle Ages with the Hobbesian state of nature is
wrong” (Friedrichs 2001, 485). The system will not be as rationalized as the modern
state system, but it will not necessarily lead to the emergence of bellum omnium
contra omnes situation. For the comprehension of Friedrich’s theory, it is further-
more important to understand his ideas about the two main powers in the New
Middle Ages – nation-state system and the transnational market economy5
(Friedrichs 2001, 485–486).
The author calls the first pillar of the structure a political universalism. State
system is based on the existence of sovereign units in formally equal position in
relation to the international law. This model has been accepted worldwide, and we
might observe worldwide establishment of units trying to, at least formally, fit into
the international community. This system is self-preserving and survives by estab-
lishing a perception of the unique role the state plays in the maintenance of order
and independent action on the international level. This system thus creates units of
political action which seek control of territory, sovereignty, and place in the interna-
tional system (Friedrichs 2001, 486–488). On the other side, we will find the so-
called economic universalism. Friedrichs points out that the allocation of capital
and production is still more determined by the private non-territorial actors. The
economic liberalism of the transnational market leads to the creation of strong
actors which can interfere into the political sphere. By this process, a class of busi-
nessmen promoting free trade can ignore state borders and is capable of challenging
the power of a state just by using its production potential. Anyway, Friedrichs points
out that even though these two pillars are competing, they remain interdependent
and must coexist (Friedrichs 2001, 488–491). J. Friedrichs, furthermore, adds third
balancing half-pillar – society – into the mix.
Resemblance of some features of the post-bipolar system to those of the European Middle Ages.
4
For a discussion on the resemblance of the medieval Church and post-Cold War Market, see also
5
Reno (1998, 72–73).

These three realms create the above-presented system of overlapping identities

and multiple loyalties, but they each work on a different principle: the state as a
voice of popular decisions, the market as a holder of the means for the superior
efficiency, and the society as a promoter of substantial values. As the New Middle
Ages does not create any ultimate authority, it is necessary that each of these spheres
sticks to its targets and advantages. For the author these are – society’s attempt to
protect itself from being overcome by both other pillars – state control and market;
economy’s effort to remain independent and not being used by states for their politi-
cal targets; and finally states’ attempt to keep their political power and stay alive and
as powerful as possible between economy’s universalism and societal particularism.
Friedrichs points out that nowadays the leverage is inclined toward a more immense
power of the market over the remaining two, but this balance can be in future altered
(Friedrichs 2001, 491–493).
J. Friedrich’s commonalities between the medieval and neomedieval system thus
include system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties held together by two
antagonistic forces – church, empire, or state, and market; existence of dominant
class which is in the center of each of the systems – feudal aristocracy, or interna-
tional policymakers and bureaucrats; characterization of both church6 and market
by a high level of spatial and social mobility; propagation of both antagonistic
claims by its own set of intellectuals and writers; and the inability of both of the
challenging universal claims to prevail (Friedrichs 2001, 492).
3.2.2 Philip Cerny
P. Cerny is another author who in his work reflected upon the theory of neomedie-
valism. Cerny points out the fact that state as an institution is in many functions
replaced by non-state actors and that population is increasingly concerned about
transnational issues. States, furthermore, increasingly fail in the provision of secu-
rity as a primary good they were created to grant. Traditional balance of power
logic is in decay as the most powerful weapons available – thermonuclear weap-
ons – are useless in a low-intensity conflict such as tribal or religious clashes or in
countering terrorism or drug trade. The author presents globalization as the main
cause of the change in the international system – globalization that was enabled by
states but threatens to destroy the state system. This globalization, however, does
not create the unified world but instead increases interaction among different
groups around the globe. A state is not diminished altogether and remains an
important actor providing social net and welfare support while implementing regu-
lations on the international level. In the neomedieval world, states will not lose
their place altogether, but their legitimacy will be contested by a number of trans-
national organizations which can ignore state boundaries and are more fluid in their
activities (Cerny 1998).
6
Despite the fact that both hold important territorial dimension, for the case of the Church, see
Sack (1986, 92–126).
P. Cerny names a few major features which are or will be significant for the
neomedieval world – the existence of competing organizations with overlapping
jurisdictions; appearance of much more fluid territorial boundaries; alienation
between virtual global cities and fragmented hinterlands; increased inequality
between those able to use the opportunities present from higher mobility and those
who cannot; system of multiple and fragmented loyalties and identities; attempts to
contest property rights and legal boundaries; and spread of areas of lawlessness.
The author calls the New Middle Ages a Durable Disorder, meaning that the cur-
rent, at least formally, orderly arranged world will become much more unstable but
that this development will not lead to total chaos. The new system will contest a
right to life of every political, economic, and social organization and will lead to
the strengthening of the survival of the fittest scenario.7 P. Cerny, same as the
authors above, considers the future world as a system with an overlapping set of
different organizations. States will play just a role of “one among many” in the
international politics. The whole system will be able to survive because there will
be no strong enough exogenous pressure on it. There is a possibility that the impor-
tance of virtual spaces will overcome the significance of actual territorial ones.
People will remain localized on the microlevel, but the principle of physical terri-
toriality itself will be still less important. This emerging system cannot, according
to P. Cerny, be possibly captured by a single holistic vision and by no collective
identity (Cerny 1998).
3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin
S. Kobrin presents the transition from medieval system to the modern one as char-
acterized by territorialization of politics and by replacement of overlapping vertical
hierarchies by horizontal geographically defined sovereign states. Postmodern
world is similarly characterized by interconnectivity and growing irrelevance of the
geography due to the spread of cyberspace and global market. Technological evolu-
tion, furthermore, leads to the establishment of the global civil society united by
unregulated and non-territorial cyberspace. This non-territorial identity leads to the
emergence of multiple identities and transnational elites. Another effect of the
neomedieval setting is the privatization of public services (Kobrin 1998). S. Kobrin
thus focuses on the role of cyberspace in the emergence of the neomedieval setting,
and despite some in today’s perspective hardly justifiable claims present an impact
of the cyber-domain on the nature of international politics.8
7
It is important that Cerny does not use the social Darwinist term survival of the strongest but
rather the classical thesis about the survival of the fittest and thus gives a chance for smaller units
to survive by adaptation. For the debate on the adaptation of the social institutions, see also Spruyt
(1994).
8
Cyberspace is not entirely unregulated, and territorialisation is also possible as evident from the
Chinese, Turkish, or Russian censorship attempts. For another discussion over the role of cyber-
space on the international system, see also Nye (2011, 113–151).
3.2.4 Jan Zielonka
J. Zielonka dealt with the concept of neomedievalism in relation to the process of

the European integration. He points out that the linear concept of borders was not
known in the Middle Ages as borders were understood more like zones than lines.
Similarly, administrative, economic, military, and cultural borders rarely overlapped
unlike the Westphalian system where these borders usually follow state borders
(Zielonka 2007, 3–4). Zielonka, furthermore, points out that throughout history of
the modern era, the globe was filled by many types of states. These states turned into
a centerpiece of the Westphalian system and are hierarchical with one center of
authority. Growth in the importance of the territorial dimension was enabled by the
technological advances which allowed states to control large regions. Despite the
seeming homogeneity of the Westphalian system, it was always challenged by irreg-
ular entities. The point is that the medieval system was characterized by shared and
fragmented authority. Central authority was inexistent and competing network of
clients was in the center of the system. Multiple allegiances were common and pub-
lic authority was disunited and privatized. Jurisdiction over different areas was frag-
mented and overlapping. Government was, furthermore, multiplied by the existence
of cities with strong guilds. Territorial “sovereignty” was usually supplemented by
the universal authority of the emperor and the pope. Cultural identity was not con-
nected to the nation – which did not exist – but to the network of authority. Tasks
were not given to state – they were functionally, rather than territorially, divided
(Zielonka 2007, 9–11).9
9
“New medievalism symbolizes a break with the Westphalian era, and the failure of its modernist
institutional embodiment: the EU. However, it does not suggest a ‘back to the future’ scenario with
a computerized version of the Middle Ages. It only suggests that the future structure and exercise
of political authority will resemble the medieval model more than the Westphalian one. The latter
is about concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty and clear-cut identity. The former is about
overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, differentiated institutional arrangements and multiple
identities. The latter is about fixed and relatively hard external border lines, while the former is
about fuzzy borders with ample opportunity for entrance and exit. The latter is about centrally
regulated redistribution within a closed national or European system. The former is about redistri-
bution based on different types of solidarity between various transnational networks. The latter is
about strict rules, commands and penalties, while the former is about bargaining, flexible arrange-
ments and incentives. Nor does new medievalism mean the death of European nation-states; rather
it implies further transformation of these states and the increased importance of other polities, be
they large cities or regions. NGOs will also grow in importance, some of them defending certain
values such as environmental or minority rights, while others will represent corporate or consumer
interests. The result will be a multiplication of various hybrid institutional arrangements, and
increased plurality of political allegiances. This is a trend that has been noted by academics for
some time. The expected fall of the EU will only accelerate it and make it more pronounced. In
some fields, such as defence, states may well remain the principal actors, but in other fields, such
as market regulation, social policy or internal security, numerous local or transnational actors,
private or public or mixed, will have a chance to gain in importance. Even democracy is likely to
be less territorial with the media and NGOs monitoring politicians across Europe’s borders more
skilfully than national parliaments” (Zielonka 2014, 81–82).
J. Zielonka compares two competing visions of the European Union – superstate

and the neomedieval empire10 – and points out that the decentralized and limited
scope of the neomedieval model is a more probable scenario for the future of the
EU. Main features of such an empire are soft borders in flux; persistence of socio-
economic discrepancies; coexistence of multiple cultural identities; disassociation
between authoritative allocations, functional competencies, and territorial constitu-
encies; interpenetrations of various types of political units and loyalties; crucial but
blurred distinction between the center and the periphery; different types of solidar-
ity as a basis for redistribution between transnational networks; diversified types of
citizenship with a distinct set of rights and duties; multiplicity of overlapping mili-
tary and police institutions; and divided sovereignty along different functional and
territorial lines (Zielonka 2007, 12). Furthermore, neomedieval empire holds some
distinctions compared to the neo-Westphalian one: territorial acquisition through
invitation and not conquest; polycentric rather than centralized governance struc-
ture; control through incentives and their denial as opposed to control through coer-
cion and bribes; control by economic and bureaucratic and not military and political
means; existence of fuzzy borders between metropolis and periphery – not sharp
and clear ones; periphery gradually gains access to the metropolis and is not asym-
metrically and hierarchically controlled; the degree of universalism is low; and the
sovereignty of periphery is constrained through sharing and not denied altogether
(Zielonka 2007, 14).
Neomedieval empire is thus a voluntary union of asymmetrical units that does
not seek punishment as a mean to enlarge itself. The precondition for the entrance
is a voluntary decision and not threat or actual use of physical force (Zielonka 2007,
55–57). The EU will be inherently heterogeneous with many units in different cat-
egories (Zielonka 2007, 70). Administrative models will grow more complex, and
sharing of functions between various levels of government will increase.
Decentralized and flexible alliances over different issues will emerge. This intersec-
tion between markets and jurisdiction is in Zielonka’s work called neo-feudalism
(Zielonka 2007, 94). The system will be linked in a multilevel and multisector
arrangement with the EU as only one of the sides. Social policy effort will be in the
hands of many public, semipublic, and private actors. The role of municipalities or
welfare institutions is about to grow (Zielonka 2007, 100). The next important
actors are cities and regions which gain additional power. Cities are territories with
the major concentration of population and thus welfare, etc. – centers of human
activity. Regions are adapted to the local environment and cannot be possibly uni-
fied on such a significant level as is the whole EU – they will remain their specifics
(Zielonka 2007, 124).
However, the current system in the EU is not medieval and stands somewhere
between Westphalian sovereign state and medievalism (e.g., due to the existence of
democratic self-aware communities) (Zielonka 2007, 134) – another sign of a new
system. For J. Zielonka, European system represents Bull’s system of overlapping
The analogy between the EU and an empire is used in a larger variety of academic literature –
10
see, for example, Pänke (2019).

identities and multiple loyalties – system held together by two competing claims
(the EU and the USA), where members voluntarily integrated, where force is not
applied, where procedures are in the center of bargaining, and where intervention
into internal affairs is not an anathema (Zielonka 2007, 162). Governance in the
neomedieval empire is polycentric, diffused, non-territorial, multicentered, and
multilevel (Zielonka 2007, 179).
Even in his vision of the possible post-EU future, Zielonka follows the similar
pattern. In case of the EU breakup, he predicts an introduction of the system with
the changed balance of political and economic forces and new political geography.
In case of the weakening of the EU institutions, new challengers to state power will
rise in regions and influential cities; growing importance will be assigned to net-
works. States will take different shapes from quasi-failed states to quasi-empires,
and the power of NGOs will grow. Citizens will live under the scheme of multiple
loyalties and with increasing disrespect to traditional communal hierarchies and
values. Europe will resemble a complicated puzzle rather than a single institutional-
ized and legal entity. Europe with significantly weakened EU would thus be filled
with plural political allegiances, overlapping jurisdictions, and sociocultural hetero-
geneity (Zielonka 2014, 73–75).
3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little
As part of their monography on the development of the international system,

B. Buzan and R. Little discuss the nature of the coming postmodern international
system. They divide world system into two parts – the first postmodern without
security dilemma (so-called zone of peace) and the second filled with modern and
pre-modern entities obeying realist “laws” of international relations (so-called zone
of conflict). Important to notice is the fact that these two zones are not entirely sepa-
rated and affect each other. Even some parts of one zone may exhibit factors related
to the other (conflict in the Northern Ireland or success of regional development in
Southeast Asia) (Buzan and Little 2000, 353–358).
The new system is defined by a sectoral transformation from the military-
political sector to the economic one. This change is marked by the shift in the
nature of the dominant unit in the system as physical borders, and the principle of
sovereignty is eroding. This erosion is followed by an emergence of principles that
allow for negotiated fluid boundaries, multileveled sovereignty, and appearance of
transnational spaces such as cyberspace or commercial space (Buzan and Little
2000, 359). This process is followed by the increase in a number of dominant units
inside the political-military sector and appearance of new political units such as the
EU that do not neatly fit the traditional outlook of a modern state. Not all of these
new units – differentiated in their aims – will be necessarily territorial (Buzan and
Little 2000, 360–361).
The new international structure is thus influenced by the intensification of the
global market and international society that affects political sphere and changes
rules of the game. The emergence of new dominant units leads to the establishment
of their quasi-autonomous status and the appearance of multiple types of units –

neomedievalism. The appearance of a robust international society that might occur
in the future might be seen as a major game changer in the neomedieval zone of
peace (Buzan and Little 2000, 364–366).11
3.2.6 Neil Winn
N. Winn in his conclusion to the special issue of the civil wars journal dedicated to
the topic of neomedievalism addresses the subject of the New Middle Ages as a
theory. He points to the fact that state is degenerating from below and above and that
territory becomes a porous concept due to the effect of the increased importance of
networks and by an appearance of a number of alternative actors with blurrily
defined responsibilities. The whole structure is complicated by the presence of alter-
native identities and emergence of global social identity. Reappearance of ancient
identities leads to re-establishment of historical grievances that lay in the heart of
many civil conflicts. On the other hand, in many parts of the world, the institution
of the state is challenged by more stable effects of regionalism. Neomedieval system
is more complicated and unstable than modern state system, with the more impor-
tant role of alternative non-state actors and privatization of essential functions con-
nected to the Westphalian state (Winn 2003).
3.2.7 John Rapley
J. Rapley in his description of the New Middle Ages presents a vision based on the
example of Jamaica where gangs took over many neighborhoods previously left
11
In one of the debates regarding the nature of political system B. Buzan further explained his view.
He states that the international system is created out two or three different spheres with diverse
rules of the game. This, however, does not mean that institution of the state is going to disappear
as it still stands as a major representative of the political sphere. To quote Buzan himself: “First, as
the process of globalization unfolds, deepens and strengthens (…) this is going to raise serious
questions for political structure. I think these questions are going to be answered in different ways
in different parts of the global system. My sense is that in the most developed and most democratic
parts of the system, like western Europe and North America, there is probably going to be a layer-
ing of power so that there will be, if you like, an unpacking or disaggregation of sovereignty.
Political authority will move upwards and downwards, and will exist simultaneously on several
different levels. Hedley Bull once referred to this as neo-medievalism and that is not a bad meta-
phor in some ways. (…) There are a lot of weak states in the international system and these are
going to have much more difficulty dealing with life in the strong system. Some of them are
already falling to pieces and it would not surprise me, putting on a futurist hat, if a number of quite
substantial unstable zones opened up and became semi-permanent features of the system (…).One
could imagine there being no effective state structures, indeed no effective political structures at all
in such places except for some kind of reversion to warlordism, tribalism or gangsterism, or com-
binations thereof. (…) (I)t would not surprise me to see this phenomenon spread so that one had a
part of the world which was very highly organised, postmodern perhaps, parts of the world which
had politically collapsed and then bits in-between” (Global Transformations 1996).
abandoned by the state. State structure is supplemented by the private actors, and
failure of the state to provide basic functions increases instability but does not lead
to chaos as other actors can step in. J. Rapley uses parallel of the fall of Pax Romana.
At the time Rome fell, the whole Europe became less safe, and the development
created many forms of authority and political units but did not completely shatter.
On the other hand, the fragmentation led to the creation of localized economies,
plural identities, and multiple authorities. The system was sustained by the coopera-
tion and negotiation or conflict. The medieval system was, however, in the author’s
thought destroyed by capitalism. The spread of trade and growth of bureaucracy led
to the appointment of the richest to the offices. The need for increased military force
protecting trade routes led to the establishment of centrally controlled armies with
the significant portion of conscripts gathered around the patriotic symbols of states.
To maintain the economic growth, countries started to enforce many kinds of regu-
lations and other policies, increased education of their population, and built modern
infrastructure.
The modern system is, however, similarly transformed by the influence of glo-
balization. States continue to decrease the number of services they provide and
increasingly use private contractors for an increasing number of tasks. State’s role
as a mediator between local and world economy is increasingly useless. Some
parts of certain states are so dangerous that no country’s officials dare to enter
them. Successful companies are effectively able to evade state control. Many for-
mer soldiers and fighters are now members of gangs and mercenary militias pro-
viding security for those able to pay or just controlling parts of territory on their
own. These processes are visible in all states – more evident in less developed but
present all across the globe. In parts of the world where state never efficiently
worked, non-state actors can provide services which the population would have
otherwise never received. This existence of local authorities and transnational
actors consequently leads to re-emergence of the medieval coexistence of multiple
identities (Rapley 2006).
3.2.8 Phil Williams
P. Williams in his work shifts attention toward the emergence of the New Dark
Age – a scenario that can in his opinion easily follow the potential appearance of
neomedievalism. He challenges Friedrichs’ dualism as highly selective and sees
globalized market not as one of the two stabilizing pillars but rather as a cause of the
disorder. Furthermore, he sees Cerny’s vision of a durable disorder as an attempt to
give the dark future a silver lining and predicts that the New Middle Ages12 are just
an interim on a path to the New Dark Age. For Williams, the decay of the state might
become self-perpetuating, and the drivers causing this problem have a cumulative
impact. Among the factors weakening the state, the author counts the inability of the
12
In one of his other works, he defines current system as facing “a combination of disorder similar
to that of the Middle Ages, with modern technologies that allow dangers to spread and even mutate
in complex and unpredictable ways” (Williams 2010, 40).
3.3 End of State System? 35
most of the states to meet the needs of their citizens such as employment, redistribu-
tion, or security; the persistence of alternative loyalties which deteriorates the iden-
tification with a state, and empowers primordial division of a society,13 giving those
actors a larger credibility compared to state; the rise of “sovereign-free” transna-
tional actors which can operate without state control, providing network for illegal
activities established on a base of organized crime or the above-mentioned primor-
dial divisions which does not respect state borders; the rise of cities and the emer-
gence of alternatively governed spaces, with more than a half of the global population
living in cities with many of those cities becoming ungovernable, filled with slums
so dangerous that even police forces are afraid to enter and with a self-made system
of alternative governance leaving behind other forms of alternatively governed
spaces all around the world, with not even prisons effectively under the states’ con-
trol; and porous borders which successfully undermine the states’ territorial claim,
when state is unable to prevent a transborder flow of goods, immigrants, etc., which
is further undermined by the possibilities given to people by the Internet (Williams
2008a, 5–30).
This set of challenges is creating a number of highly unpredictable outcomes.
P. Williams visualizes that the limits of a state will be furthermore exposed by the
struggle between forces of order and disorder. Most of the states will fail and
become hollow. Formal emphasis on sovereignty will be only an illusion veiling the
fact that the state structure will be unable to contest the presence of violent non-state
actors on its territory. This process will begin in the developing world and will fur-
thermore spread into the developed world. This disorder will not only be character-
ized by the emergence of warlordism and organized crime, but also by the rise of
religious and civilization wars. For the author, a spread of transnational organized
crime, terrorism, and possible pandemics could turn Friedrichs’ durable disorder
into chaos. Even larger calamity will come if there is a nuclear state among the col-
lapsed states (Williams 2008a, 30–35). This would lead to the emergence of “loose
nukes” (Williams 2008a, 35) creating an even higher level of insecurity.
3.3 End of State System?
Before moving to the establishment of a unified neomedievalist theory of the three

geopolitical worlds, it is important to point out two issues connected to the transfor-
mation of the state system – states’ disappearance in the post-Cold War system and
the emergence of alternative actors.
3.3.1 Crumbling of State System
There are many works considering the factors and effects of the crumbling of the
international system. In this part, the aim is to point at some of the most relevant
of these in order to frame the subsequent theory into a clear context. The first
13
Tribal, religious, ethnic, etc.
author relevant to the research is R. D. Kaplan. Based on his experience from the
early 1990 Western Africa, R. Kaplan in his 1994 article presented an image of the
future world where the majority of the states is collapsed, and lawlessness spreads
across vast territories. He compares Western Africa in the 1990s to pre-1648
Europe where large portions of land are not controlled by government forces but
by local militias independent on the state’s will or national borders. Furthermore,
governments in this area are unable to run basic infrastructure, or even control
borders, which are becoming mostly useless and imaginary. Money is being smug-
gled out of the area, and this additionally impoverishes the whole area. States are,
however, trying to keep an illusion of power and are requiring high standards for
formal actions such as obtaining a visa throughout a very formal and laborious
process (Kaplan 1994).
He predicted a future of the region to follow a Somalian scenario – ungovern-
able. The region would be left without any central power with many poor and uned-
ucated people. The whole region was to sink into violence. R. Kaplan judged that
Africa would become the parallel to the pre-World War One Balkans inside the
post-Cold War world, meaning that its development will predict the future world’s
development. The world of the future was for him to be one full of authoritarian and
failed states, with a return of primordial anxieties and with only a few safe places
where the well-being will survive. Conflicts will be depoliticized and large states’
militaries useless in a number of small-scale conflicts (Kaplan 1994). It must be,
furthermore, added that many conflicts described by the author are additionally
fueled by the external state patrons leading proxy wars via support of different vio-
lent non-state actors in unstable areas – Eritrea in Somalia, Pakistan in Afghanistan,
Qatar in Libya, etc. Furthermore, many of the actors use statelessness as a success-
ful strategy for survival. In many contexts being a state may be a disadvantage in
conflict with non-state actors able to attack centralized critical infrastructure
(Grygiel 2009). While the development of the political and security situation inside
Western Africa did not follow the bleak visions of Kaplan, his overall points regard-
ing the causes of state weakening like the environmental degradation, overpopula-
tion, or presence of low-intensity conflict remain relevant up until today.
Looking at the issue from a more theoretical perspective, as noted earlier, M. van
Creveld points out that states are continually losing their most important character-
istics – they are unable to fight each other due to the impact of nuclear weapons
proliferation; their provision of security is no longer exclusive and is increasingly
shared with other actors (e.g., spread of so-called gated communities or utilization
of private contractors in missions in Afghanistan or Iraq); their financial and welfare
systems are still weaker and more dependent; and they are members of a growing
number of international organizations (van Creveld 2006). Another issue facing the
state system are the effects of globalization that is no longer controlled by states
despite the fact that states enabled globalization to emerge in the first place. The
new system created challengers to state sovereignty on both territorial and func-
tional levels. P. Khanna in his work stresses out that on the global level, the estab-
lishment of supply chains and global links slowly degenerates the importance of
political geography (division by borders) and increases the role of functional
geography (connection by infrastructure) (Khanna 2016, 28). Some of the issues

were deliberately created by some countries as they tried to achieve their goals via
creating areas of softened sovereignty or by increasing importance of virtual spaces.
States are thus likely to lose much of their influence, and their role as a guarantor of
an order will be limited. Inside this system, non-state actors will be able to fill many
functions previously provided by the state.14 This shift is observable, among other
areas, in a way nongovernmental actors are utilized in some areas to provide state-
like functions – be it NGOs and their humanitarian work or mercenaries and their
aid to military capacities of weak states15 (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, 23–30).
The most important dimension of state activity is security – the state is bound to
provide security as its basic good for society. First, many countries are dependent on
support from mercenaries or troops of other states’ armies (external support) – e.g.,
Gulf states or some African states – and, in general, mercenaries and private con-
tractors continue to be used on an ad hoc basis in many conflicts around the world
(Thomson 1996, 90–95) – e.g., 2014/2015 Nigerian Army operations against Boko
Haram. There are many reasons for the reappearance of the private military forces,16
but the post-Cold War development led to the proliferation of their activities
throughout the world (McFate 2014, 55), and, for example, Liberia was in the period
following the civil war almost entirely dependent on the presence and activities of
nongovernmental organizations and private military contractors for a provision of
services to its population (McFate 2014, 100). Second, one of the primary reasons
why the state is losing its ability to provide its basic functions lies in the growth of
importance of violent non-state actors – actors like warlords, militias, paramilitary
groups, insurgencies, terrorist organizations, or criminal organizations (P. Williams
2008b, 9–15). “Illicit cross-border global transfers” introduced by some of these
groups “can, in effect, set up covert transnational governance systems to replace
existing state-centric world order” (Mandel 2011, 64). These actors prosper well in
a situation where the state is seen as illegitimate (due to its failure or the fact that it
never correctly worked in the first place – e.g., Pashtun areas in Southern Asia) and
cannot provide basic goods. Many of such areas appear in the largest cities on our
planet where large parts are ungovernable and ungoverned by state institutions and
where the police are not present or enter them only during raids – some cities might
become one of the most unstable parts of the world.
Violent non-state actors, however, do not only fill territorial spaces but in many
cases functional spaces as well (Williams 2008b, 6–8). In some instances, these
actors and organizations create a sort of parallel state (Mandel 2011, 38). In some
parts of the world, the state is so weak that even violent criminal groups provide the
needed relief and at least some basic governance and security structure despite their
otherwise primarily predatory nature (Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012, 8–9).
14
P. Williams points at the issue of a growing number of states with functional gaps as a reason for
the empowerment of non-state actors (Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012, vii).
15
For more on this issue, see, for example, Coker (2001) and McFate (2014).
16
Despite the fact that a limited role of this type of non-state actors was evident even throughout
the Cold War, especially in African internal conflicts.
Despite the challenge these actors pose to some states, others will try to make alli-
ances with some of these groups to achieve their strategic goals on other state’s
territory (Williams 2008b, 18). This leads to the above-mentioned use of proxies in
unstable regions (Mumford 2013).
3.3.2 Alternative Actors
In the second part of this brief excurse to the topic of state weakening, it is necessary
to present some of the actors that (may) play an alternative role to the state.
Understanding of these will help us grasp the varied nature of the possible territorial
settings and the different shapes that the organization of political space can main-
tain. Looking at the topic of non-state actors, we can distinguish among territorial
and non-territorial actors (imagined on a continuum rather than as two distinct cat-
egories). It is, furthermore, necessary to point out that the distinction of the two
ways non-state actors can operate on the territory is vital for an understanding of
their role as a supplement of the state power. As observable, the more territorial
actors (especially, the more successful in their pursuit of the territorial control and
governance) are the more viable alternative in their relation to the state power as a
sovereign entity they present. Additionally, non-territorial and territorial non-state
actors can cooperate in an attempt to achieve their goals. This can be demonstrated
on the case of the pre-9/11 Afghanistan, where Al-Qaeda aided Taliban with its
money and expertise to achieve dominance in Afghanistan (territorial pursuit) while
Taliban consequently provided Al-Qaeda with a safe haven from which it could
operate its global network aiming at propagation of global jihad (non-territorial
quest) (Abbas 2014, 78–80). Given the realities and development of any organiza-
tion, it can through time move from territorial to non-territorial and vice versa. This
can be presented on the example of Al-Shabaab and its rise to territorial importance
with the consequent decline in importance of territorial control for the movement
and shift toward guerrilla, non-territorial, strategy (e.g., (Hansen 2013)) with the
return to more territorial strategy since 2016. Territorial dynamics can be alterna-
tively observable among other violent non-state actors such as narco-gangs in the
Latin America (Grillo 2016; van Dun 2017). The impact of territoriality on the
nature of the non-state actors can be well introduced on the different modus ope-
randi among the jihadist violent non-state actors as present throughout the globe
(Doboš et al. 2019).
A specific type of non-state actors establishes so-called superclass or transna-
tional capitalist class (Carroll 2010). This set of actors concentrate an enormous
amount of power and wealth in their hands and thus affects global political and
economic system in various ways. D. Rothkopf points out that the wealth of the
largest companies in the USA is enormous with two on the top having revenues
comparable to 50% of the US defense budget (in 2015 Walmart itself generated a
revenue of almost 500 billion USD17). D. Rothkopf further notices that
17
See http://www.statista.com/statistics/263265/top-companies-in-the-world-by-revenue/
concentration of power shifts not only geographically but also away from nations/
states as the major companies can force their goals on states which adapt to attract
their investments and not vice versa. Some companies also hold budgets larger than
most of the states and employ a larger number of employees (Rothkopf 2012;
Rothkopf 2008, 25). This way, the elite dominates the economies of the capitalist
societies (Carroll 2010, 6), establishing the basis of the economic pillar of the geo-
political setting. A.-M. Slaughter points out that out of the 175 largest nation-states
and private companies, 112 are corporations, and many of the largest have their
quasi-diplomatic corps. This implies that the role of the large corporations in the
international system is strong and that states need to incorporate their interests into
their decision-making. Similar power is connected to the global humanitarian
NGOs (Slaughter 2017, 22). Additionally, the privatization of supply chains to a
large degree changes the role of the state in the global politics forcing them to play
more of market regulation and co-governing role as compared to their traditional
role (Khanna 2016, 31). Companies can also play an important role in internal con-
flicts harboring profits from predatory behavior (Ganson and Wennmann 2016). Of
course, attempts to establish large corporate entities came earlier than with the end
of the Cold War, but the post-1991 proliferation of the globalized market helped this
process to spread to a size described by the above-mentioned authors.
Some private actors, furthermore, take over some state functions as setting stan-
dards or resolving disputes. This is observable on the importance of the rating and
ranking organizations, especially in the post-2008 (economic crisis) environment.
Many of such organizations are widely perceived as an ultimate authority in their
fields – e.g., Transparency International in the measurement of the level of corrup-
tion, or big three rating companies18 in financial credibility (Cooley 2015, 17).
“Over the last century, the world’s biggest private-sector organizations have come
to dwarf all but the largest governments in resources, global reach, and influence. At
the same time, even wealthy countries are now struggling with overwhelmed
bureaucracies, budget crises, and plummeting confidence in government. And gov-
ernments everywhere are compromised by the limitations of their borders in an era
when the issues that affect their people are increasingly transnational” (Rothkopf
2012). Furthermore, the newly established “superclass” might provide an impetus
for the change of identification of population from state to alternative actors as its
members are more connected to their peers in the similar group than to the place of
their origin or citizenship (Rothkopf 2008, 26). This group thus directly challenges
state as an institution by replacing some of its roles on a global level (Rothkopf
2008, 136). Emergence of the “superclass” and working of the global system, in
general, have a direct consequence in extremely disproportionate concentration of
global power in all major areas – wealth (10% of population owns 85% of world’s
wealth with 2% owning over 50% of wealth), finance, business, religion (only two
have over billion followers – Christianity and Islam), force (12% of global popula-
tion in NATO countries account for more than 80% of military expenditure), and
politics (relative strength of states is diametrically different, e.g., importance of
18
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch.
countries in the United Nations Security Council) (Rothkopf 2008, 246–247). This
all is tied to the fact that technological development is clustered in time and space
and tied to these inequalities (Thompson 2020, 75–98). Not only is world uneven,
but it is also becoming increasingly dominated by the non-state actors that can suc-
cessfully challenge states just by concentrating a large amount of power.19
Another important actor that re-emerges as an important alternative to the mod-
ern modes of government is cities.20 B. Barber points out that the newly emerging
reality of global challenges and transborder networking is incompatible with the
state system based on sovereignty, and he sees the solution of the governance crisis
in the increasing role of the prosperous cities in the global politics (Barber 2013,
20–24). Cities act as connection points as they are dependent not only on rural agri-
cultural production but are also interconnected and interdependent with each other
on a global scale. They also serve as natural centers of regions with a concentration
of working places, wealth, and power (Barber 2013, 63) – they are nodal points in
the global network (Curtis 2016, 2). These nodes are then territorial settings of the
postmodern networks inside the space of flows that is establishing in some regions
of the world (Curtis 2016, 19). Cities may overtake some of the state functions due
to their peaceful nature – they do not border each other and create a global network
that is more cooperative in comparison with the state system (Barber 2013, 113–
114). Cities might thus provide the connection point between local politics and
global economy and global and local spaces in general, thus altering the political
structure at the national level (Barber 2013, 192; Curtis 2016, 11). Moreover, world
hubs concentrate about half of the world population into an area of about 2% of
world’s surface with 66% of global economic output and 85% of scientific and tech-
nological innovations arising from 40 largest megacities (Curtis 2016, 10). On the
other hand, cities are still part of the state structure and are directly dependent on
state, so their influence is more informal, and their progress toward interconnection,
and thus disintegration of the sovereign state system, can be halted by the state poli-
cies (Barber 2013, 214–215). Nonetheless, the relevance of city policies inside the
neomedieval system is to increase (Lewicki 2016). Cities, therefore, may, despite
many setbacks, overtake some of the roles of states in relation to local governance
and networking global economy as they are at the same time a local political struc-
ture and global economic hubs. In states with failing governments, cities can, addi-
tionally, provide a functioning alternative for its citizens and mitigate the impact of
the inefficient state structure.
As we can see from this brief review, the institution of the state is losing its pow-
ers in all of the spheres of geopolitical analysis as defined by the systemic geopoliti-
cal school that serves as a basis of this work. These functional and territorial gaps
are filled by non-state actors with larger or smaller success. The economic role of
multinational corporations or international organizations is undisputed; the role of
NGOs and others in societal development holds similar status. Spheres connected to
Role of global governing agents is also, among others, discussed in Avant et al. (2010).
19
For a prolonged discussion over the importance of cities and special economic zones for the
20
global system, see Khanna (2016).

3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds 41
the politics and security might be contested, but as we may observe in the case of
the EU or regions of state failure, non-state actors might be effective both in the
political role and as guarantors of some form of security inside a given territory.
3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds
In the following chapter, the neomedieval model based on the presence of three
geopolitical ideal-type environments that appear inside the global system is pre-
sented. Before that, however, it is necessary to establish an understanding of neome-
dievalism that stands as a general theoretical standpoint from which these modes
might be derived. Neomedievalism is a system that combines factors from pre-
modern and modern era21 appearing in a context of decreased stability and impor-
tance of the state as a dominant political institution inside the international relations.
Pre-modern factors returning to the global system are increased importance and
power of non-state actors; existence of competing universalistic claims; presence of
competing overlapping identities; issue of appearance of overlapping territorial
claims in a context of reappearance of terra nullius on the map; proliferation of the
means of violence; and importance of the control over population rather than the
control of territory. Modern factors important for neomedievalism are effects of
globalization; technological unification of the world; high mobility of people, goods
(at least in the developed world), and information; effects of regionalism; the
appearance of connected cities with nonintegrated hinterland surroundings; and a
crucial role of cyberspace. The system can be described as “the emergence of mul-
tiple, overlapping and autonomous areas of sovereignty side by side with a weak
central competence” (Duffield 1998, 88), manifesting different outcomes regarding
the political, social, economic, and security context. This has been, for example,
manifested on the nature of the post-Cold War civil wars (Reno and Matisek 2018).
Neomedievalism is a system where the traditional state is challenged by non-
state actors and effects of regionalism.22 This degradation might be more orderly or
disorderly given the broader context of the region. The new system is generally less
stable with many actors holding overlapping functional, territorial, or identity
claims (or any combination of these) taking over many functions previously pro-
vided by the institution of the state. These new actors might be peaceful or violent,
the state might survive in some diminished role, new political units might arise, and
the effect of two-and-half pillars (political, economic, and societal) might stabilize
the system. There are many “mays” and “mights,” and many of the effects are hav-
ing different effects closely connected to the context inside which they take place,
establishing different models of state transformation based on the context of the
21
For an analysis of the mutual relations of pre-modern and modern factors in the international
politics, see, for example, Welsh (2016).
22
In this respect, it is important to point out that the coexistence of different types of units – even
from a historical or developmental point of view – is nothing extraordinary in the human history
(Ruggie 1993, 167).
political environment (Duffield 1998, 71). To better describe the newly emerging
system, let us now introduce the system of the three geopolitical environments:
Durable Disorder, Chaotic Anarchy, and the Westphalian model. The importance of
these three environments lies in their effect for the political units appearing inside
them – they establish an environment which is shaped by the units inside, but which
also shapes their policies and behavior. This work operates with a regional analysis
of the spread of the three types of geopolitical environment, but this does not estab-
lish a notion that the regions are homogeneous. If country level was selected, we
would observe that some of the countries do not follow the regional trend. In the
same vein, some of the countries are on a local level also split among different types
of environment or establish transitional cases (e.g., Colombia, Venezuela, the
Balkans states, or Singapore).
Similarly to the uneven and multifaceted transformation from medieval to the
modern system that witnessed many forms of adaptation to the new conditions
(Spruyt 1994), the transformation to the neomedievalism will be accompanied by an
establishment of different units reacting to their environment in order to evolve and
be successful in the new setting. The difference from a European transition to the
Westphalian era, nevertheless, lies in uneven geopolitical conditions that different
actors in different regions face. These different conditions are summed up in the
following three ideal types.
3.4.1 Durable Disorder
Durable Disorder is a nonviolent networked (postmodern) outcome of the neomedi-

eval transformation. It is connected to concepts of postmodern state/zone of peace
as discussed previously. The concept of the Durable Disorder follows Friedrichs’
historical neomedievalism and the overall Eurocentric vision of the neomedieval
development. This vision is based on the development of the state in Europe and
follows the evolutionary theory of a state toward a point of return to the model that
was in some aspects resembles the earlier period of the development of the interna-
tional system as described, for example, by M. van Creveld. Despite its weakness,
the state still exists and may provide some important goods for its citizens. As a
functional unit, it is, however, in many functions overcome by non-territorial or
regional actors. As state abandons many of its functions, alternative actors take
place and provide these functions for the population. Nature of the system is peace-
ful, and war between states in Durable Disorder is very unlikely or impossible.
Territory governed in this way is caught in a struggle between economic (globalist,
Lévy’s hierarchical world of transaction),23 political (geographical, world of
23
Here we can find a clear analogy to the medieval Church. As H. Spruyt (1994, 44–46) points out,
Church established a non-territorial means of effective capital generation, and many other actors
competed to get on good terms with the organization to tap into these resources. This is similar to
the logic of attempting to attract important market players (e.g., large companies) to conduct their
activity on one’s actors’ territory to get financial benefits.
forces),24 and societal (both local and global, world of society) pillars that are inter-
connected while still seeking to gain power over the other two pillars. This creates
a complicated structure of territorial control.
Unlike the Westphalian mode of territorial control, Durable Disorder is based on
an existence of a set of geopolitical actors that overlap in their functions and territo-
rial claims on different levels (regional, supranational). These actors are connected
through cyberspace that provides network for fast exchange of ideas, information,
and capital and modern means of transportation that allow people and goods to
travel across vast distances in a relatively short period. Population develops global
and local awareness and identities that directly challenge limitations of state-based
identity. Actors in the system need to fill functional holes or provide some goods
more efficiently than its opponents; otherwise, they perish – survival of the fittest
model. As the non-state actors usually capable of providing goods more effectively
in the environments where the provision was a norm before their takeover (e.g.,
capable state) (Mampilly 2011), these are then the follow-ups of the historical
development of the social system. Actors, moreover, usually do not incline to the
use of violence. The decreasing capacities of state regarding regulations will be
substituted by non-state actors (Schuppert 2011, 74).
The system is additionally defined by a decreased importance of borders as they
are turning irrelevant due to the effects of networking manifested in the rapid spread
of functions conducted inside cyberspace, modern means of transportation, and
effects of regionalism. An important principle of Durable Disorder is mobility as a
factor eroding sovereign territoriality. This mobility is connected to the economic
pillar, while political and societal pillars are more territorial – in case of societal
actors, their level of territorial setting depends mainly on their aims. The existence
of the societal pillar also helps to explain while the Durable Disorder actor can
overcome the previously predicted inability of the neomedieval actors to solve the
transnational issues (Duffield 1998, 70). Borders are also playing a different role.
They might be seen in a similar way to what A.-M. Slaughter based on the work of
F. Capra describes as “not boundaries of separation but boundaries of identity,”
keeping the unite distinct but connected (Slaughter 2017, 57). Actors in this envi-
ronment can succeed by opening themselves and connecting to others (Slaughter
2017, 203). They also need to get involved as nodes in the networks of the interna-
tional politics as to increase their relevance for the newly established connective
environment (Manulak 2019), thus establishing a space of concentration of the eco-
nomic activity (Duffield 1998, 72).
Territorial control is based on overlapping claims of actors on different levels of
governance. Territoriality is eroded by advanced networking in the system. Violence
is disregarded as a legitimate mean to achieve goals. Many actors are focused on
functional or identity (religious groups, etc.) level rather than on territorial25 control
24
Similar distinction to the struggle between territoriality of sovereignty and de-territorializing
effects of a capitalist economic system as noted by Curtis (2016, 2).
25
Territorial, functional, and personal delimitations of political space are three possible strategies
for political actors to mark their area of authority (Vollaard 2009, 690).
and may overcome some of the functions of the state similarly to territorial actors in
areas of no state power in pre-modern/postcolonial states. The system is less pre-
dictable than the Westphalian state system but remains peaceful with war improba-
ble not only due to the preferences of population but even due to the inability of
states to wage it due to their interconnected nature. They, however, will be, to some
extent, able to defend the region against the outside attacks and threats either via
interventions in the regions posing a threat or via an establishment of military force
capable of protecting the borders themselves or deterring a potential invader. This
protection might, however, be provided by private companies or combination of
private and public forces instead. The internal functioning of the region in a Durable
Disorder setting is defined by predominance of the socioeconomic domain. The aim
is to establish a global (universalistic) network as per Lévy’s definition.
3.4.2 Chaotic Anarchy
The second geopolitical environment discussed in this work is Chaotic Anarchy. As

the name suggests, this mode of governance is highly unstable and violent. The state
disappears into larger instability, and the environment is left with many functional
and territorial holes. Security is usually provided only on minimal level or is miss-
ing altogether. The environment is filled by predatory actors. The region defined by
Chaotic Anarchy is characterized by the emergence of state failure, disconnection
from the global network, high levels of violence, conflict between local population
and mobile predatory groups, rise of primordial tensions, decreased importance of
borders leading to emergence of J. Lévy’s border zones, spread of terra nullius,
economic decline, and general insecurity. Actors are usually unable to cooperate in
a longer run. Local communities are misused by violent non-state actors seeking
profit, and many of such actors are used as proxies by outside forces. The environ-
ment is also a target of the activities of the private military companies (Nossal
1998). The environment is also often described by harsh geographical and climate
conditions that make the sustained territorial presence even more complicated.
Territoriality is important for local communities and ethnic groups. Predatory
actors are usually mobile, and use settled population for its aims.26 There are no
actors willing or able to govern territory in a longer run other than local communi-
ties interested in their neighborhood. This inability and unwillingness to govern and
provide basic goods for the population is one of the most important defining factors
of Chaotic Anarchy, similarly to the proliferation of cheap means of violence. A
region in Chaotic Anarchy setting is easily penetrable from the outside, but any
sustained activity is challenging and requires extraordinary security measurements.
The appearance of quasi-states is possible as some actors might hide their activities
behind a veil of establishing a legitimate state structure.27 The internal setting is
predominated by the physical and demographic characteristics of space.
26
Here the examples of Boko Haram’s misuse of local communities can be named.
27
For a discussion over the use of sovereignty veil for personal enrichment, see, for example, Reno
(1998).
Despite the fact that many parts of the world shift into qualitatively new stage of
institutional organization of the international politics, the Westphalian setting is
still a viable and preferred option in some areas of the world. The system is based
on state as the central and most important geopolitical actor. The state is delimited
by its territory and population with centralized government and functions orga-
nized around its structure. As the pressures from the developing international net-
worked community grow, states that wish to sustain their relevance need to protect
their borders and their societies which leads them to an inclination toward more
authoritarian forms of rule and protection against the impact of the world net-
works – mainly the Internet, process evident from blockages of the Internet in
places like Russia and China, or throughout political turmoil in Turkey in 2016 or
Iran in 2017/2018.
The state controls most of the functions, mainly the provision of security, and it
overlooks actors that are allowed to provide functions on its behalf and are con-
nected to the state structure. The state is a sole creator and guarantor of the legal
system on its clearly delimited territory and is the only representative of its popula-
tion on the international level. The state can limit the movement of people and
goods across its borders and remains the primary holder of people’s identification
as well as sovereignty. The Westphalian system is dominated by the military-
diplomatic field with the power center being located inside political circles.
3.4.4 Relation
As geopolitics is dynamic, these three worlds are interconnected, and regions may
enter one or another if the right set of factors is met. Regions in the Westphalian
model may collapse and become areas resembling Chaotic Anarchy or start inte-
grating and connecting and enter the Durable Disorder model. The region in the
Durable Disorder might be infected by areas of lawlessness (city suburbs, neglected
ethnic groups, terrorist groups), or some catastrophe (natural disaster, pandemics,
etc.) and collapse into the Chaotic Anarchy, or by a strong populist nationalistic case
made by some local actor(s) that might re-establish a robust Westphalian state.
Chaotic Anarchy might be stabilized by actors able to provide governance and secu-
rity and developed into one of the more stable scenarios depending on what degree
these stabilizing tendencies promote strength of a state. There, however, seems to be
a sort of a barrier between the two neomedieval ideal types that disallow a region to
move from the Chaotic Anarchy directly to the Durable Disorder. First, unlike in the
era of origins of the state, the current proto-states are facing harsh competition from
external more capable actors. Second, the international community is still state-
centric and is unlikely to support alternative forms of political territoriality. In a
development toward larger stability, the region seems to be forced to move through
the state-centered period.
Table 3.1 Three modes of territorial control

Westphalian system Durable Disorder Chaotic Anarchy
Sovereignty Full Shared/pooled Judicial
Borders Borderlines Frontiers, penetrable De facto nonexistent,
border zones
State Central to system One among others None/predatory
Non-state actors Operating under Overtake state functions Predatory/local
state communities
Stability Balance of power Interdependence/ Inherently unstable
universal pillars
Nature of Peace/war Cooperative/challenging Ad hoc coalitions/
relations violent clashes
Territoriality State-centered Local/regional x global Ethnoterritoriality x
network of flows, city disconnection from
networks global network
Type of state Modern Postmodern Pre-modern/postcolonial
Provision of State State and non-state None
basic goods actors
Nature of Interventions, Economic network, Limited violent
operations out of diplomatic relations, interventions, NGO spillovers, migration,
the region balance of power activity, soft power terrorism
For a better introduction of the three modes system, the table comparing their
basic features is presented (Table 3.1).
Analyzing the Global System
4
Having a theoretical model is, nevertheless, not enough to grasp the nature of the
contemporary system. So, after the development of the theoretical foundations of
neomedievalism, it is crucial to establish a framework inside which the book
explores the geographical spread of the different geopolitical environments –
Durable Disorder, Chaotic Anarchy, and the Westphalian system. This research will
consequently lead to answer the question of whether the neomedieval setting is
overcoming the Westphalian model of international politics. The first task is the
establishment of the regional division of the world. Consequently, the research
design is being set up.
4.1 Regions
Defining regions is an intriguing task as any division will always be to some extent
subjective. This might be shown in the example of the Indian Ocean. The region
defined as the Indian Ocean (rim) region can be examined as a single geopolitical
unit with significant internal interactions and dynamics (Kaplan 2010) and with the
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as an organization attempting to unite the
area.1 On the other hand, the geopolitical nature of alternatively chosen regions
located on the Indian Ocean rim is very different, the nature of the countries even
vis-à-vis the neomedieval setting differs substantially (Doboš 2014), and many
other regional organizations are arguably more important than the IORA.2 Also, the
regional division will always lead to some generalizations that might not apply to all
of the regional countries. We, in this sense, can, for example, see a unique position
of Tunisia in Maghreb or long-term stability of Ghana inside the otherwise tumultu-
ous Western Africa. It is thus necessary to distinguish among different possible
See http://www.iora.net/default.aspx
1
For discussion over the Indian Ocean regionalism, see Muni (2005).
2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_4
48 4 Analyzing the Global System
delimitations of regions and select those that are the most suitable for the following
research. The presented approaches toward the issue as well as the final selection of
regions thus aim to delimit studied geographical areas in a way that they present
internally coherent units vis-à-vis the main factors included in the theoretical delim-
itation of the three geopolitical worlds. Any delimitation will, however, leave some
simplifications and generalizations in place.
The first regional definition that must be taken into account and that will serve
as a basis for the further specifications comes from the United Nations (UN). The
UN divides the world into the following regions: Eastern, Middle, Northern,
Southern, and Western Africa; Central, North, and South America; Caribbean;
Central, Eastern, Southern, Southeast, and Western Asia; Eastern, Northern,
Southern, and Western Europe; Australia and New Zealand; Melanesia, Micronesia,
and Polynesia (UNdata 2013). The second important idea the work deals with
while delimiting the regional division of the world is the T. Barnett’s concept of the
functioning core that divides the world into two parts regarding their connected-
ness to the globalized world. Barnett presents the world as divided between func-
tioning core and non- integrating gap – the former enjoying the benefits of
globalization while later falling into the chaotic and disorganized setting (Barnett
2004). As the connectivity to the global economy and network is also important in
the neomedieval world setting, the understanding of this division is also useful for
the delimitation of the regional setting.
R. Kaplan in his work presents a geographically and historically rooted approach
toward the description of the Eurasian continent. He points out that “as the map of
Eurasia gets smaller thanks to technology and population growth, artificial frontiers
will begin to weaken inside it” (Kaplan 2012, 125). He afterward divides the entity
into the following parts: Europe as a geographical expression of liberal humanism
(Kaplan 2012, 138); Russia as a preeminent land power with power projection strat-
egies aiming to Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and the Central Asia (Kaplan 2012,
155–177); China with its favorable geography which makes it a natural hub of geo-
politics with a power projection capabilities over artificial borders with Mongolia
and Central Asia, as well as in the Southeast Asia and Korean peninsula (Kaplan
2012, 188–211); India with its unstable neighborhood (Kaplan 2012, 228); Arabian
peninsula dominated by Saudi Arabia with a little importance in the pre-twentieth-
century geopolitics (Kaplan 2012, 261, 302); Iran as a distinct entity located between
Turkey and Indian subcontinent (Kaplan 2012, 266); and Turkey as a relatively
stable land bridge between the Mediterranean and Black Sea bordering unstable
Arab world (Kaplan 2012, 285). R. Kaplan’s division is important for our under-
standing of the geopolitical dynamics inside the Eurasian environment.
Similarly, Z. Brzezinski points at the geographic and political division of the
world. He identifies the presence of the distinct European space, Russian space,
“Eurasian Balkans” in Central Asia, and the Far East dominated by the clash
between China and its competitors in Eurasia. Despite the fact that his work deals
mainly with the US power projection, the division of Eurasia he presents is useful
for the understanding of the possible delimitation of the regions inside Eurasia
(Brzezinski 1998). We must not also forget about the work done by S. Huntington.
4.1 Regions
Despite the fact that this work does not follow the clash of civilization hypothesis,
it is useful to at least mention the distinction between core states, cleft countries,
and lone countries. Core countries are those located at the center of their respective
civilization and are those that are at the center of the global great power politics.
Cleft countries are located on the fault lines of the civilizations and have troubles
in maintaining their unity, thus becoming less stable. Lone country is a state that
lacks common cultural background with others (Huntington 1997, 136–139,
207–208).
Another relevant factor for the delimitation of regions is the presence of regional
organizations. There is an enormous amount of more or less successful regional
organizations with different functions and varying level of enthusiasm from its
member states. To mention some of the most important, we may remark subregional
units as the Economic Community of West African States, the South African
Development Community, or the East African Community; regional as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA), or Mercosur; transregional as Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO); or global like Organization of Arab States, the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and BRIC(S). Furthermore, some new joint
economic spaces are/were being set up, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. These initiatives are, nevertheless,
less geographically determined and represent a new stage of the regional develop-
ment with yet uncertain future.
We can observe that different territories are parts of different regions depending
on the criteria chosen, and even then, the possible regional delimitation overlaps.
For example, just looking at the case of People’s Republic of China (PRC), it might
be considered as a unique entity and a power center of its own, it might be part of
broader geographical region encompassing Mongolia and Koreas, and it is eco-
nomically tied to both Central Asia and the Pacific region. Similarly, is for Mexico’s
regional position more important its connection to the failing states of Central
America or its membership in NAFTA/United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement?
And what about the Turkish location between the Middle East, Europe, and
Caucasus? There are many factors that need to be taken into account – regional
cooperation, culture, geography, or power relations – and these factors are not of
uniform importance around the globe. Next step is thus an attempt to define regions
that will serve as a basis for the following analysis.
As evident regions in the world may be defined by many characteristics, they
may have different sizes and may even disregard national borders. In the previous
chapter we have explained the division of the world into the three ideal-type geopo-
litical settings, and so the purpose of the regional setting is to make the studied
entities as coherent as possible in the context of our understanding of the neomedi-
evalism. On the other hand, for the sake of data gathering, the regions will be based
on the borders of currently internationally recognized states (with an exception of
Taiwan that, nevertheless, used to constitute an internationally recognized entity up
until the 1970s) – the regional division is thus geographic and state-centric.
Following is the list of regions that will be used in the following analysis with the
short justification of the selection in each case.
The first region is an obvious case of the European Union.3 The EU will be
dealt with as a single entity together with countries of Norway, Iceland, and
Switzerland, and European microstates were added to the list as these non-EU
members are, nonetheless, intimately connected to the bloc (customs union,
Schengen zone, security aspects, etc.) and do not create any distinct regional
entity. Also, entities like Greenland or Faroe Islands (and many others) that are
not the EU members will be a part of the region as they share similar characteris-
tics with the bloc. This vast region is to some degree less homogeneous than the
others, but it is considered that the regional dynamics are so important that this
shortcoming is overcome by the strength of dealing with these countries in a sin-
gle package. Staying on the European continent, three other regions can be
defined – non-EU (Western) Balkan states; Ukraine and Moldova as the post-
Soviet countries striving to escape Russian hegemony geographically distinct
from the other post-Soviet countries that to some degree share their fate (Georgia,
Azerbaijan) and also distinct geographically and politically from the non-EU
Balkan countries; and Russia and Belarus as post-Soviet countries in many aspects
following the Soviet legacy.
The post-Soviet region also inhabits two other regions geographically located in
Asia – post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia (post-Soviet “Stans”). The remainder
of the Russian neighborhood comprises of Mongolia that is difficult to assign as it
is stretched between the influence of China and Russia and will be included into the
same region as China with the addition of Chinese protégée, North Korea. This is
due to the fact that China is more dynamic of the two Mongolia’s neighbors. The
East Asian dynamic is projected into the creation of the East Asian region compris-
ing of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (the only de facto state included in a different
region than its parent state) – all countries are in some opposition to China and
protected by the US military presence. Southeast Asia is defined by its membership
in ASEAN. Oceania comprises of Australia, New Zealand, and smaller Pacific
nations not included in other regions.
Following the Asian part of the Indian Ocean rim, the Indian region including
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka is defined
as a territory dominated by the Indian influence. Neighboring Pakistan will form a
distinct entity together with Afghanistan – as the borders between those entities are
virtually nonexistent and their regional dynamics is interconnected. Iran will be
dealt with as a single region same as Turkey. In the Middle East, we can identify
region comprising Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – places of great instability and civil
conflict; Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Gulf kingdoms – stable part of the Persian Gulf
and Israel, Jordan, and Egypt as a single security region. These three regions are
mainly established as to follow regional political dynamics.
3
S. Cohen characterizes the EU as a single geopolitical power (Cohen 2014, 52–53); J. Zielonka,
as mentioned earlier, talks about the (emerging) neomedieval Empire (Zielonka 2007).
4.2 Research Design
Moving to Africa, the issue of regional identification becomes even more prob-
lematic as the countries in many parts of the continent constitute just a fiction.
Libya will be analyzed together with Sudan, Chad, and Niger. Remaining North
African countries will establish a separate region. This is mainly to accent different
security challenges despite the fact that many of these are interconnected through-
out the whole of Sahel. The Horn of Africa is understood as comprising of Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia with Yemen included as well due to its internal
issues similar to those experienced by the countries of the Horn and its connection
to the region via migrant routes and other cultural traits. Continuing south, Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda establish the East African region as they
seek to enhance the regional cooperation in the region. The Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea
are deemed as Central Africa. All the countries south of the Central African region
are to be included in the South African region as economically connected to South
Africa as a regional hegemon.4 Western Africa will comprise all the remaining
African countries.
As we do not deal with virtually uninhabited Antarctica, the last two continents
to be parceled are Americas. There are three regions in North and Central America –
Canada and the USA as North America (Mexico is excluded as it shares more secu-
rity aspects with its Central American neighbors5) as connected through a common
cultural, security, and economic interests and similarities; countries from Mexico to
Panama as Central America as countries sharing similar geopolitical dynamics and
faith connected to a strong presence of the USA and effects of drug trade; and the
Caribbean with its specific geography being identified as following the UN delimi-
tation. South America is to be divided between Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Surinam,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Guyana; and the remaining follow the Barnetts’
division. Table 4.1 and Map 4.1 summarize the regional selection.
4.2 Research Design
Once the borders of the geographical entities that are to be researched are known, it
is possible to move to the presentation of the research design that will be used to
place these regions in a right position in relation to the global distribution of the
4
Some authorities enhance the size of the Eastern and Central Africa and decrease the size of the
Southern African region, but the influence of South Africa is so important that it constitutes the
basis of the future geopolitical region that must be taken into consideration. The delimitation also
to a large degree follows the similar delineation made by Cohen (2014, 434–437). For historical
development of the ties and their importance in the postapartheid era, see also Reno (1998, 45–78).
5
Some authors as S. Cohen (2014, 136–137) tie the Mexican geopolitical position to that of the
USA that in a major way affect the Mexican politics. Despite the fact that Mexico is apparently on
a border between the two regions, it is here placed among the Central American states for reason
of having the same security challenges such as gang violence and drug trafficking that affect state
strength in a more substantial way than its membership in NAFTA/United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement.
Table 4.1 Regions
Region Countries
EU+ EU27, United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, microstates, minor
dependent territories
Balkans Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania
East Europe Ukraine, Moldova
Russian space Belarus, Russia
The Caucasus Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
Chinese space China, Mongolia, North Korea
East Asia Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
Southeast Asia ASEAN
Oceania Australia, New Zealand, Pacific islands
Indian space India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles
AfPak Afghanistan, Pakistan
Iran Iran
Turkey Turkey
Larger Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
Mesopotamia
Gulf monarchies Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait
Western Middle Jordan, Israel, Egypt
East
Northern Africa Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Niger
Northwest Africa Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Mauritania
Horn of Africa+ Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen
East Africa Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi
Central Africa Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon,
Equatorial Guinea, Congo
South Africa Republic of South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Madagascar, Comoros
West Africa Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia
North America Canada, USA
Central America Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Belize, Honduras, Costa
Rica, Panama
The Caribbean Caribbean island nations
Northern South Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay
America
Southern South Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile
America
three geopolitical environments. As the neomedieval world can be ideally divided

among three poles, the research design will start with the idea of a triangle with each
ideal type as one of its peaks. The position of the concrete region inside the triangle
is defined by two sets of factors – one related to axis A and one to axis B as depicted
in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Research Design
Map 4.1 Regional selection
Westphalian system
Axis A
Durable Disorder Axis B Chaotic Anarchy
Fig. 4.1 Research triangle

Axis A is identifying the factors influencing the state strength and relevance
inside the selected regions, and Axis B is dedicated to the difference in the stability
of the other elements of the system. The rationale behind this distinction is that a
strong state, if it is willing to, is through its security apparatus able to mitigate the
effects of the other elements on its role in the system. As an archetypical example,
North Korea is unable to provide basic functions such as food and is totalitarian and
arbitrary but is, from a geopolitical and international politics perspective, stable and
relevant entity and a fully sovereign member using its strengths (blackmailing) and
trying to overcome its weaknesses (mainly by totalitarian control of its population).
Despite the normative issues related to the case, the government in Pyongyang acts,
unlike many failed states, as a relevant regional player fully in the context of the
traditional Westphalian geopolitics. However, due to this nature of policy conduct,
it is challenging for the country to transition into Durable Disorder that requires
openness and networking to emerge. In case of state collapse, the country will most
likely enter into some form of Chaotic Anarchy environment. It is now important to
dislodge the factors distinguishing the three ideal types into measurable units that fit
one of the two axes.
Beginning with the Axis A, the following criteria define the case’s position on
the spectrum between state failure and a presence of capable state institutions:
breaches of sovereignty, the presence of state defying non-state actors, the level of
state failure, and state as being the primary actor in international relations. Each of
the factors is further divided into sub-factors. These sub-factors are a basis for the
empirical study on the Axis A. They are regional dependence on outside agents,
border control, state failure, state as a provider of social services, presence of non-
state actors defying state on a functional level, presence of non-state actors defy-
ing state on a territorial level, and number of types of politically relevant actors in
the region.
Axis B is consequently consisting of the following criteria: overall use of vio-
lence, a level of provision of goods, connection to the global network, development
of regionalism, and nature of actors supplementing state. Sub-factors will be use of
violence, the presence of armed conflict, provision of basic goods and social ser-
vices, connection to global flows, intraregional openness, peaceful/violent nature of
non-state actors, strength of regional bodies, and a spread of weaponry. Both sets of
criteria follow the theoretical foundation as set previously.
Axis A is thus characterized by seven sub-factors while Axis B by eight. Next
step is to quantify these sub-factors to establish a framework in which selected
regions might be placed on a research triangle.
4.2.1 Axis A
Regional dependence on foreign agents To understand this factor, it must be

pointed out that a connection to the international economy and establishment of a
system that is not based on autarchy do not have equal regional dependence on
the foreign agents. What is meant here is the dependence of states’ survival on a
4.2 Research Design
provision of direct aid. Thus, giving money to a state is (at least partial) depen-
dence while being dependent on foreign trade is not. Buying army supplies from
abroad is, in this context, not making state dependent, while receiving direct mili-
tary support or being under foreign occupation is. The work will thus distinguish
these possible values: independent, minor foreign aid, major foreign aid, direct
humanitarian intervention, and occupation.
Border control State as a territorial institution with precisely demarcated borders

needs to be able to protect its boundaries in order to remain fully sovereign on its
territory. This, however, does not imply fencing the territory but rather having the
ability to ensure that borders can be closed and movement can be effectively tracked.
That is why the following values are proposed: full control, minor defects, major
defects, and complete inability to control.
State failure There are many possible ways how to measure state failure all of
them having larger or smaller problems regarding conceptualization and method-
ology.6 Despite the many problems with the term failed state,7 the book will include
the ranking as one of the categories as it points at some important systemic defects.
The scale used will follow Fragile State Index (FSI) rating where every region will
be judged according to the average value of the states included in it comparing
data8 from 2017 and 2012 to present the longer-term trends as well as 2017 scores.
Possible outcomes are sustainable, stable, warning, and alert.
State as a provider of social services Provision of basic social services is one of the
basic state functions (healthcare, social net, education, etc.). However, a state may
stop providing these or simply lose control over their provision over time. The scale
suggested is fully competent provider/controlled and regulates privatization, paral-
lel institutions, and collapse/complete loss of control.
Non-state actors on a functional level Another prominent symptom of the weak-

ening of the state is the presence of non-state actors overtaking state functions. Here
it must be pointed out that it is to some extent different whether state willingly
shares its power (liberal approach) or whether it is unable to mitigate the impact of
non-state actors. Values are thus as follows: no presence, willing sharing, overtak-
ing, and important/full presence of non-state actors.
6
See Cooley and Snyder (2015) and Dingli (2013).
7
See Ezrow and Frantz (2013, 15–43).
8
Data taken from http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/
Non-state actors on territorial level As territory is the primary manifestation of

the state’s sovereignty, any actor operating on a territorial level and effectively chal-
lenging state’s territorial control presents a direct challenge to the institution itself.
Values are no territorial competition, minor parts of territory out of effective reach,
major organized territorial units present, and large areas out of the reach of the cen-
tral government.
A number of relevant political actors Last but not least, a region with effective
states will have only these as major power brokers, while in case of less effective
states’ presence, other types of actors appear. We will differ among these situa-
tions states as only actors, states influenced by non-state actors, non-state actors
as important brokers, and state not effectively present in regional political dynam-
ics. In the case the important regional bodies are not geographically overlapping
with our selected regions, the issue will be dealt with according to the local
context.
4.2.2 Axis B
Use of violence Crucial for the nature of the system is the amount and quality of
violence conducted. No matter whether the state needs to use violence as to preserve
itself, civil war is raging, or a non-state actor attacks the population, this use of
violence significantly pushes the region toward the Chaotic Anarchy part of the
spectrum. Values selected for this sub-factor are thus no/insignificant amount of
mainly legitimate violence, manageable use of violence, and a large amount of vio-
lent attacks.
Presence of armed conflict As the violence is a crucial factor for the model,
another factor that will help project it into the neomedieval model is added. Herein,
the nature of armed conflict on the region’s territory is diversified. The following
units are used: no conflict, limited rebellion, full-blown rebellion, foreign interven-
tion/limited civil conflict, and unmitigated civil war/ethnoreligious conflict.
Provision of basic goods To help place cases on a correct position, it is crucial to

examine who in the given region provides basic social services and goods. As the
provision by the state is examined on Axis A, state provision will here be seen as
neutral as not to mingle with the outcomes: (post-)modern non-state actors, com-
bined, state, traditional actors, and no one.
Connection to global flows Region that is set up in the postmodern Durable

Disorder is to a larger degree connected to the global economy and the world of
4.2 Research Design
flows. On the other hand, Chaotic Anarchy is defined by very limited access to the
gains of economic globalization mainly via illegal flows. Values are fully connected,
limited connectedness, and minimum connection.
Intraregional openness Postmodern world is defined by a high level of interdepen-

dency and interconnectedness, so the Durable Disorder scenario is to be expected to
establish such norms that will allow free flows of capital, movement, and goods as
to provide the smoothest possible economic transactions. Also, with the role of state
significantly weakened, many barriers fall. Values picked for this sub-factor are thus
high level of openness, limited openness, closed border regime, and lack of open-
ness due to collapse of mutual relations.
The strength of regional bodies Another defining factor of Durable Disorder is an

enormous power of regional organizations that overtake part of the functions usu-
ally connected with the institution of state. The scale is political union, economic
union, free trade area, and no effective regional body.
Nature of non-state actors Whether non-state actors successfully utilize violence

is of great importance for the stability of the system. The more violent the region is,
the closer it gets to the Chaotic Anarchy part of spectrum. Variables are thus peace-
ful nature, limited amount of violence, and violent nature.
Spread of weaponry Finally, we move to the issue of spread of weaponry. As noted

earlier by J. Grygiel, the proliferation of firearms is one of the reasons many parts
of the world resemble premodern era (Grygiel 2013). It is crucial that the actual
number is not as significant as the ability of regulative institutions to limit this
spread. The analysis thus distinguishes these values: low spread of weaponry, spread
limited by state, state unable to properly control spread, and unregulated high
proliferation.
As evident, different sub-factors are divided into the different number of values;
some of them will thus provide more precise differentiation than others which is
also mirrored in the operationalization of the various factors. Some of the factors
deemed more important are given larger total values as to differentiate among more
and less determining variables. Selection of different scales is also aiming to distin-
guish among different distances between neighboring positions, as actual difference
of impact between, for example, presence of territorially bounded non-state actors
on a state territory and presence of large areas of lawlessness is for our purposes
much more significant than distance between the impact of free trade area and
establishment of the economic union. The following table presents values given to
different sub-factors (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Operationalization
Operationalization
Sub-factor Values of values
Regional Independent; minor foreign aid; major foreign aid; 3; 1; −1; −2; −3
dependence on direct humanitarian intervention; occupation
outside agents
Border control Full control; minor defects; major defects; 2; 1; −1; −2
complete inability to control
State failure Sustainable; stable; warning; alert 2; 1; −1; −2
State as a provider Fully competent provider or regulated 1; 0; −1
of social services privatization; parallel institutions; collapse/
(almost) complete loss of control
Non-state actors No presence; willing sharing; overtaking; 2; 1; −1; −2
on functional level important/full presence of non-state actors
Non-state actors No territorial competition; minor parts of territory 3; 0; −1,5; −3
on territorial level out of effective reach; major organized territorial
units present; large areas out of the reach of the
central government
Number of States as only actors; states are influenced by 2; 1; −1; −2
relevant actors non-state actors; non-state actors as important
brokers; state not effectively present in regional
political dynamics
Use of violence No/insignificant amount of mainly legitimate 2; 0; −2
violence; manageable use of violence; large
amount of illegitimate violent attacks
Presence of armed No conflict; limited rebellion; full-blown rebellion; 3; 0; −1; −2; −4
conflict foreign intervention/limited civil conflict;
unmitigated civil war/ethno-religious conflict
Provision of basic (Post)modern non-state actors; combined; state; 2; 1; 0; −1; −2
goods traditional actors; no one
Connection to Fully connected; limited connectedness; minimum 2; 0; −2
global flows connection
Intraregional High level of openness; limited openness; closed 2; 0,5; 0; −1
openness border regime; lack of openness due to collapse of
mutual relations
Strength of Political union; economic union; free trade area; 2; 1; 0,5; 0
regional bodies no effective regional body
Nature of Peaceful nature; limited amount of violence/ 2; 0; −2
non-state actors combined; violent nature
Spread of Low spread of weaponry; spread limited by state; 2; 1; −1; −2
weaponry state unable to properly control spread; high
proliferation
In the empirical analysis, cases will be placed into the research triangle accord-
ing to the values they receive, and their final position will determine their location
in the neomedieval model. A hypothetical case that receives final score of −8; −11
will thus approach Chaotic Anarchy; −10; 13 Durable Disorder; and 12; 1 the
Westphalian system. Cases will be therefore divided into groups that are close to
one of the poles – Westphalian world with cases scoring 0 – 15; 17 – −15; Durable
4.2 Research Design
Westphalian system
15
-15 Chaotic Anarchy

Durable Disorder
17 0 -15
Fig. 4.2. Visualization of operationalization
Disorder 0 – −15; 17 – 0; and Chaotic Anarchy 0 – −15; 0 – −15. These three
groups will then serve as a basis for the following analysis. Figure 4.2 presents
operationalization in the research triangle.
Distribution of the Three Worlds
5
The following chapter aims at the introduction of the map crudely presenting the
distribution of the three geopolitical environments across the globe. The actual posi-
tion of different regions, as will be visible later on, does not neatly correspond with
the ideal types, but all of them can be assigned a position inside the model. The aim
of this exercise is to test the usefulness of the application of the neomedievalist
model. It will also serve as a basis for the final analysis of the international dynam-
ics in this configuration. To this end, the previously selected criteria on the regions
are applied.
5.1 Regional Analysis
5.1.1 The EU+
The first set of criteria begins with the dependence on the outside actors. Despite the
fact that the EU is the largest economy in the world,1 the region is in no small extent
reliable on NATO for its defense. Out of the 35 (including Vatican) countries
included in this category, 24 are members of the defense organization2 that is domi-
nated by the USA who provides the most significant part of the total spending of the
alliance.3 Despite the economic strength and otherwise independent policy-making,
it is essential to establish whether the strong US presence on the old continent pres-
ents a sort of dependence or not. This is a somewhat tricky issue, but in this text, the
solution is that it does not consider the continent to be dependent as it provides an
1
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/The_EU_in_the_world_-_economy_
and_finance
2
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm
3
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/us-pays-2214-nato-budget-
germany-1465-13-allies-pay-below-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_5
62 5 Distribution of the Three Worlds
important market for the USA and has its capabilities including the nuclear weapons
and UN Security Council seats and slowly moves forward toward an establishment
of more competent defense and security policy. So, despite the fact that the US pres-
ence makes the continent’s defense more viable and stable, and the post-American
Europe would find itself in a more uncertain security environment, the first criterion
is understood as independent (3).
The issue of border control is of dual nature – country level (in some regions
influenced by Schengen agreement) and the outside borders. Leaving microstates
aside, out of the 31 states in the selected region, 26 are members of the Schengen
area,4 leaving only the UK, Ireland, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria out. Ireland
and the UK also hold no-border control regime that is likely to remain intact even
after the UK exit from the EU. This area is characterized by the abolishment of the
internal borders establishing an area of free movement of people, goods, and capi-
tal. Nevertheless, the Schengen countries have the ability to close their borders in
case of a crisis – e.g., the recent migration crisis – and from time to time (World
Cup in Germany, follow-up of the terrorist attacks in France) exercise this right
quite successfully.5 The establishment of the internal free movement regime thus
does not qualify as a breach of the border control principle. The second issue, how-
ever, to a certain degree does. Regional external borders are hardly guarded mainly
due to the complicated geography connected primarily to the long coastline of
Europe. The issue was highlighted by the inability of the EU to control the migra-
tion wave that took place as a consequence of the protracted Syrian civil war. Given
the limited ability to intern and vet the refugees, the region proved that it lacks
proper ability to control its borders. The issue, however, also proved that the short-
comings of the border protection are manageable inside the region and that coun-
tries are to a reasonable degree able to mitigate them. The final result is thus “minor
defects” (1). State failure is, in FSI methodology, not a significant issue for the
regional countries, except for Cyprus due to the Northern Cyprus issue. In 2012,
the average score was 38.6, and in 2017 it fell to 36.2. Summed up, the score is
37.4 – stable (1).
The EU+ region is globally known for the high level of social services it provides
to its population. Basic healthcare systems and insurance are available in all of the
countries and are even established on an EU level by the institution of the European
Health Insurance Card.6 European countries provide many other benefits in areas
like maternal leave, unemployment support, education (some parts of Europe pro-
vide free education on all levels), or pensions. Some parts of the service provision
are privatized, but states set standards of the quality and have reasonable control
over the most of the advanced and all basic services that are offered to the popula-
tion as a part of the goods provision and establishment of the social net (1).
4
See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/
schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf
5
More on Schengen at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/index_en.htm
6
See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=559
5.1 Regional Analysis 63
The issue of non-state actors on a functional level is somewhat complicated. We

can observe that different non-state actors play an important role in economy and
society. There are also a number of think tanks, newspapers, and other private enter-
prises that are directly affecting the political sphere. It can be argued that Europe in
many respects follows suit described by D. Rothkopf. Non-state actors thus play an
important role but arguably can still be regulated by state institutions – e.g.,
Volkswagen emission scandal.7 So despite their strong, mainly economic, presence,
their role can be best described as sharing the functions with state (1). Looking at
the issue of territorial non-state actors, the selected region, so far, does not have any
territories out of the state control with the occasional exception of parts of the larg-
est cities like Parisian suburbs. These territories are, nevertheless, not posing a chal-
lenge to the state institutions. There are also no successful territorial non-state actors
challenging the state institutions present in any part of the region (3).
Looking at the last issue, we need to assess the role of the EU structures as an
independent power broker, as well as the position of the private commercial organi-
zations on the politics of the region. First, it is hardly speculative whether one can
understand the EU structures as an independent body or as a follow-up of the
national governments. While looking at the issues crucial to the analysis, it is
observable that the basic state functions are still primarily based on state level
(police, army, right to close borders, power to declare state of emergency, etc.) but
also that the EU structures follow the national principle in most of its decision-
making. More problematic is the role of the EU toward the other regional actors
who must negotiate with the entity as a whole. The EU thus has its bargaining
potential in the intraregional politics, but the role of states is still strong enough.
Looking at the other issue, the role of corporations on some bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties is visible, but their influence is in the most important topics overrun by
the EU (e.g., Google and the right for privacy8) or state interests (e.g., sanctions
against Russia following the Ukrainian crisis). In sum, this factor is awarded as
influenced by the non-state actors (1).
Moving to the second set of factors, it is necessary to begin with the use of vio-
lence. Despite the recent surge in the number of terrorist attacks inside the region,
the number of killed is still rather low in comparison with the other regions9 and
mostly legitimate. There is no interstate armed conflict taking place, and the amount
of people dying in violent incidents is low.10 The EU+ thus receives score (2). This
factor is connected to the second variable – presence of conflict. The score is no
conflict (3). Turning to the less security-oriented factors, the provision of basic
goods in the region is primarily a responsibility of states or is regulated by states (0).
The whole region is fully connected to the global system of flows and establishes
7
See http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772
8
For example, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-eu-privacy/google-under-fire-from-regu
lators-on-eu-privacy-ruling-idUSKBN0FT1AZ20140724
9
See, for example, http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/violence/by-country/
10
Hear, for example, http://www.rozhlas.cz/plus/interviewplus/_zprava/utoky-v-evrope-je-duvod-
k-panice-evropa-neni-epicentrem-nasili-odpovida-politolog-ditrych%2D%2D1636057
one of the centers of the globalized economy (2). The level of intraregional open-
ness is high (2). Placing the region inside a regionalist framework is a daunting task.
Given the scale selected, we can easily see that the European project overcame the
free trade area phase, but the selection of a proper conceptualization is slightly prob-
lematic. This is mainly due to the issue of the uneven integration of different parts
of the selected region into different integrative projects on the European continent.
The issue can be illustrated on the various memberships of countries in structures
like the EU, Schengen area, the Eurozone, or the Nordic Council. Nevertheless, the
region will be awarded (1).
The final set of factors includes the nature of non-state actors and the spread of
weaponry. Despite the fact that the threat of terrorism inside the region is grow-
ing, many far-right groups establish their militias, and many criminal organized
groups operate in the region. It must be concluded that the nature of the vast
majority of the non-state actors in the region is so far peaceful. This is especially
true following the end of the armed struggles by groups like the Irish Republican
Army (IRA), Red Army Faction (RAF), or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (2). The
issue of weaponry proliferation is twofold. On the one hand, there is the overall
high amount of weapons present on the continent. Despite the fact that the exact
numbers differ, many regional countries are ranked as the most proliferated states
in the world (e.g., Karp 2007). On the other hand, a vast majority of these weap-
ons are licensed and legally owned so the factor is ranked as spread controlled by
state (2).
5.1.2 Balkans
The second region comprises of the remaining Balkans countries – Serbia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Kosovo is for the purposes
of this chapter not considered to be a state as it is still too intimately connected to
the Serbian politics and its open status plays a vital role in the regional dynamics.
The issue of the foreign intervention is twofold. First, there is sizeable monetary
support by the EU that since the 1990s helped the region to progress in economic
and social terms (the summary can be found in (Huliaras 2011, 422–426)). The
second issue is connected to the direct foreign intervention in Bosnia and
Herzegovina which is a de facto protectorate and Kosovo that hosts international
military and civilian mission. The outside influence in the region is thus significant
and is for the whole region ranked as major foreign aid (−1).
Border control variable shifted in the recent years. Despite the fact that the coun-
tries had their issues with border control throughout the 1990s and 2000s (first as a
consequence of the civil war and following as many non-state groups operated
across the whole region), the current migration wave put the entire border system
under enormous pressure, and after initial collapse of the border regime, the coun-
tries were able to facilitate a reasonable degree of border protection. Nevertheless,
the countries were able to react and except for the Kosovo border that is out of the
Serbian control to a reasonable degree established effective regulations. Border
control thus shows only minor defects (1). FSI ranked the region in average on
68.7 in 2012 and 65.1 in 2017. This means the score of 66.9 – warning (−1).
Despite the fact that the provision of the social goods is not as developed as in
the case of the EU+, the regional state is reasonably capable of taking care the basic
social functions of its population11 (1). The issue of non-state actors on functional
level is to a large degree connected to the presence of the organized crime in the
region.12 The issue is mostly intertwined with illegal drug trade and human traffick-
ing with the follow-up issue of corruption. There is also a limited but growing influ-
ence of the radical Islamist groups, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.13 The
variable is thus ranked as (1) as the actors do not wish to overtake the state func-
tions, only to make the space for their criminal activities, or are yet incapable of
doing so. The related issue of the territorial non-state actors is ranked as (−1.5) due
to the presence of significant Kosovo enclave that presents a substantial territorial
unit out of the state control. Despite its wide recognition14 and state-like status, it
still displays an important derogation as Kosovo is not admitted as the UN member
and fully independent and in no small degree still dependent on foreign support
(situation to some degree shared by Bosnia and Herzegovina). Finally, as for the
first part of the analysis, we can feel somewhat strong presence of the international
organizations as brokers in the region (mainly the EU or NATO). These are, how-
ever, not non-state actors in their right, so this variable is given score (1) as the
influence of Kosovo and some other non-state actors like violent non-state actors or
NGOs affects the regional policy.
Moving to the second axis, the first variable is the use of violence. The Balkans
is well-known for occasional outbreaks of localized violence as exemplified, for
example, by the 2016 attacks in Kosovo parliament,15 or other usually unnoticed
outbursts connected to politics, ethnicity, or more recently the migrant crisis. The
variable is, nevertheless, scored (2) as the comparative use of violence in the global
context after the violent 1990s is still low. Given the presence of armed conflict, the
region has been largely stabilized. After the end of Yugoslav civil war and stabiliza-
tion of situation in places like Kosovo and Macedonia, the variable can be given (3).
The next set of factors includes the provision of basic goods, in case of Balkans,
mainly connected to (unrecognized) states (0) and connection to the global flows.
This link is increased mostly, thanks to the influence of the neighboring EU. Most
of the economic cooperation is related to the European space, but the overall con-
nection can still be ranked (2).16 The level of an intraregional openness is ranked as
limited (0.5) as many barriers are decreased mainly due to the influence of the EU,
11
See, for example, http://www.socialwatch.eu/wcm/national_reports.html
12
See https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Balkan_study.pdf
13
See http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islamic-state-presence-in-bosnia-cause-for-con-
cern-a-1085326.html, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/radical-islam
ists-see-an-opening-in-bosnia/273633/
14
Current level of recognition is presented at https://www.kosovothanksyou.com/
15
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-parliament-idUSKCN0VZ26F
16
See, for example, data from http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/
while some regions (e.g., Kosovo) and issues (e.g., migrant issue) prevent the region
from a higher level of connectedness. The issue of regional bodies is ranked (0) as
the ultimate aim of all countries in the region (with certain ambiguity in case of
Serbia) is the admission into the European structures.
The issue of the nature of non-state actors currently active and relevant in the
region is hard to assess unambiguously. The Balkan region is well-known for its
spread of criminal organizations or activities of particular terrorist cells, while on
the other hand many NGOs are present, mainly connected to the regional develop-
ment (Rossi 2015). The nature of non-state actors is thus ranked as combined (0).
Finally, the issue of spread of weaponry is rated as (1) based on the research by
Small Arms Survey (2014).
5.1.3 East Europe
The two countries of Moldova and Ukraine face a difficult position vis-à-vis their
neighborhood. Both states have parts of their claimed territories carved out with an
important presence of Russian forces taking place. Following the Maidan Revolution,
Ukraine became a major target of different humanitarian and development aid
programs,17 Crimea is under Russian occupation, and Eastern Ukraine is heavily
influenced by Russian politics and de facto controlled by local militias/Russian
forces. Similarly, Moldova is a recipient of important foreign aid,18 and Transnistria
is hosting Russian armed forces. Given the different nature of foreign intervention
in various territories of the selected region, we award the first category (−1). Border
control issue is connected to the inability of both Ukraine and Moldova to control
their respective Eastern borders. The criterion is awarded (−1) – major defects.
Countries’ FSI scores were in average 73 in both years, while both countries showed
utterly opposing dynamics – Moldova toward stability while Ukraine on the con-
trary. The resulting score is warning (−1).
State functions are in both cases taken care of very problematically. First, there
is an apparent lack of provision of state functions by Ukraine and Moldova on ter-
ritories of Crimea, Donbass, and Transnistria. Second, even the functions in places
under the state’s control, this provision is somewhat problematic, while in a global
comparative perspective it is still present. The countries show some important gaps
in the provision. It is thus awarded (0) as the presence of parallel structures (oli-
garch, externally funded Transnistria, etc.) is rather strong. The presence of non-
state actors on the functional level is rather strong. This is mainly observable in case
of Ukraine and strong penetration of oligarchs into politics. This penetration cor-
rupts the whole political, economic, and social structure of the country. Another
example of the significant importance of the non-state actors on functional level is
a high level of influence of Sheriff company in Transnistria (Całus 2013). The factor
17
For example, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-jaresko-10-billion-foreign-aid/27512149.html
18
For example, http://us-foreign-aid.insidegov.com/l/115/Moldova, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/moldova_en.htm
is awarded (−1). Non-state actors on territorial level constitute a significant issue of

the region with the presence of self-proclaimed Transnistria, Donetsk and Luhansk
People’s Republics, and Crimea as an occupied territory. The region thus holds
major territorial units present (−1.5). Last, but not least, all of the above-mentioned
non-state actors are very influential in regional negotiations and politics in general.
States are thus apparently not the only power brokers (despite the fact that most of
these non-state actors are connected to and dominated by the Russian interests), and
the factor is awarded (−1).
The issue of the use of violence is diverse. The area of Eastern Ukraine is under-
going a period of active armed conflict with varying levels of violence used. The
rest of the region is rather quiet. The region is thus awarded an overall (0). This
issue is intimately connected to the next factor. The region is currently facing one
case of violent externalized conflict (Eastern Ukraine) and three instances of for-
eign intervention (Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Transnistria). Presence of armed con-
flict is thus awarded (−2). The provision of basic goods is also different across the
region. In areas controlled by the state, the state remains the most important facili-
tator of the goods no matter the origins of these. In war-torn Eastern Ukraine, the
provision of goods is, in general, very problematic. Transnistria is, as noted earlier,
de facto controlled by Sheriff and Russia, and Crimea by Russia, who claims sov-
ereignty over the region. The final grade is thus (−1).
The connection of both Ukraine and Moldova to the global flows is limited but
getting stronger as the two countries re-orient their economies toward the EU19
following the Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine. The factor is currently limited
(0). Given the issues on the East and attempts to protect the borders from the side
of the EU on the west, we can safely claim that the intraregional openness is lim-
ited by the closed border regime and the presence of territories out of the state
control (0). The region does not harbor any efficient regional organization. Both
countries to some degree, nevertheless, aim to enter the Western structures (0).
The nature of the non-state actors can be seen as combined (0) – oligarchs aim for
power, Eastern Ukrainian rebels with Russian aid use violence to create a separate
instable zone on the Russian borders, and Transnistria attempts to govern its terri-
tory without creation of the unnecessary hostilities vis-à-vis its parent state. The
spread of weaponry issue is also double-edged. First, it must be pointed out that
the area of Eastern Ukraine is flooded with arms as a consequence of the armed
conflict taking place there.20 In the other parts of the region, the spread of weap-
onry is average to other regions in its neighborhood.21 This factor is thus awarded
(−1) as the issues of the uncontrolled proliferation in regions out of effective state
control are very grief.
19
See https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/international-affairs/international-customs-
cooperation-mutual-administrative-assistance-agreements/georgia-republic-moldova-ukraine_en
20
See http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-flood-of-arms-east-conflict-smuggling/27797454.html
21
See http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/moldova, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/
region/ukraine
5.1.4 Russian Space
The region of the Russian space is in this work defined as Russia and Belarus as the
two allied and interconnected states with their power centers located in Europe.
Looking at the issue of regional dependence, we have to award the Russian space
(3), as the region is independent on foreign aid and there is no foreign intervention
taking place. As for the second criterion, the border control is ranked as (1), minor
defects, mainly given the sheer length of Russian borders and a limited ability to
control the Siberian part of the borders. On the other hand, with an ability to protect
borders at the most exposed parts like in the Baltic countries or the places of conflict
(Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), Russian troops are in control of the border
lines. FSI ranked both countries on average 76.9 in 2012 and 75.8 in 2017. In this
period Russia’s score increased, while the one of Belarus went down. The average
is 76.3 – warning (−1).
The state is the full provider of services (even if of disputable quality22) (1), and
non-state actors at the institutional level are either sharing or persecuted (1) – issue
in no small degree connected to the power of oligarchs. Ever since the end of the
Chechen wars, there are no challenging territorial non-state actors (3). Finally, the
state can be seen as the only relevant actor on the regional scene, as the important
non-state actors that influenced policy were incorporated into the state structures or
marginalized (2). These actors mainly comprise of oligarchs and insurgents in
places like the Northern Caucasus.
Regarding the second set of criteria, the use of violence is limited, and the acts of
violence are usually conducted mainly by the Russian governmental forces or pro-
Russian government elements (groups connected to the Chechen leadership) in the
society, and the same goes for Belarus (2). Any major armed conflict in the region is
currently nonexistent (3). Provision of basic goods (even of limited quality and quan-
tity) is done by the state (0), and the connection to the global flows is limited, mainly
due to the political reasons. On the one side, the region is a major exporter of natural
resources; on the other, it is a target of sanctions and cuts itself from the foreign influ-
ence by, among others, censorship of the Internet (0). Border regime in the region is
closed with attempts to incorporate Belarus closer to the Russian influence (0). Both
states are united in the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite its many problems, it is
still ranked as an economic union (1). The nature of the non-state actors must be
understood as combined (0). This is mainly due to the presence of pro-governmental
militias in the Caucasus (Souleimanov 2015), actions of pro-regime groups against
the opposition figures, or presence of terrorist and criminal groups. The issue of gun
proliferation is somewhat problematic and is awarded (1) despite the problems of the
state to tackle the spread of weaponry in some regions and among some groups. The
general number of weapons among the population is understood not to be extraordi-
nary or higher than among other countries of the wider region.23
22
For example, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-health-care-is-dying-a-slow-death-
45839
23
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/
belarus
5.1.5 The Caucasus
Caucasus region is defined as comprising of the three post-Soviet countries of

Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The issue of dependence on foreign actors var-
ies. Part of Georgia is under direct Russian occupation (Abkhazia, South Ossetia),
and Armenia is mainly dependent on foreign aid from Russia as well. On the other
hand, Azerbaijan is economically rather stable, despite the presence of Nagorno-
Karabakh region on its territory. As even Georgia receives the major level of foreign
aid,24 mainly from its Western partners, this factor is awarded (−2). Border control
has minor defects (1) as both Georgia and Azerbaijan do not control all of their
claimed borders but can to some degree enforce the de facto borders with the seces-
sionist entities. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the border is ensured by a pres-
ence of a frontline; in case of Georgian separatist entities, the borderline is stable as
long as the Russian troops do not move it as to gain some form of an advantage.
These shifts are, however, minor. The region was ranked with an average FSI score
of 78.9 in 2012 and 74.6 in 2017, totaling score 76.8 – warning (−1).
Provision of the basic services is at least to a relevant degree controlled by a state
except for the de facto states’ territories (1). The issue of non-state actors on a func-
tional level is not a grief one (1), but the issue of territorial units is (−1.5). This is
the case, once again, connected to the presence of unrecognized entities. There are
three established de facto states inside the region – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the fact that they differ in their composition, effective-
ness, level of democracy, etc. (O’Loughlin et al. 2015), they are all capable (with
external support) of denying their parent states’ access to their territory. As for the
importance of non-state actors as regional power brokers, this last factor is awarded
(1) as the de facto states present important actors affecting the regional policy-
making, but they are to a large extent controlled by the interests of the Russian
Federation – a state actor.
The use of violence in the region is primarily connected to the conflict about the
status of Nagorno-Karabakh where occasional outbursts of violence appear.25 This
accounts for a manageable use of violence (0). After a settlement of the Georgian
separatist issues by force, the presence of armed conflict is awarded (0) – limited
rebellion. Provision of basic goods is once again granted (0) as these are provided
either by a state or state-like units, with different effectiveness. Connection to the
global flows is limited, mainly given the geography, autocratic type of governance
in Azerbaijan and to a certain degree in Armenia, and the internal problems (0).
Nevertheless, Georgia attempts to connect to the Western structures, and Azerbaijan
aims to become fully connected to the global oil and gas market. Intraregional
border regime is closed (0), and there is no effective regional body present (0).
Important non-state actors use limited amounts of violence (0), be it de facto states
24
For example, https://www.usaid.gov/georgia, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/eu-neigh
bourhood-region-and-russia_en
25
For example, http://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-Karabakh-heavy-fighting-armenia-azerbaijan/276
49973.html
or criminal gangs, etc. Finally, the issue of spread of weaponry is limited by state
(1) with the regulation most effective in Azerbaijan.26
5.1.6 Central Asia
The Central Asian region is delimited by the post-Soviet “Stans” – Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The issue of dependence on
foreign actors is mostly connected to the reliance on profit from sales of natural
resources in cases of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan which is still in a
vast majority dependent on the infrastructure going through a single country –
Russia. There are also some forms of foreign assistance to the remaining two
countries,27 but the most important path of foreign intervention is via political, eco-
nomic, and security influence and/or dependence on Russia and increasingly the
PRC. The region is thus ranked (1). Given the large areas the countries claim control
of and the high level of illegal trade passing through the region (Kupatadze 2012,
140–152; Cornell 2007), the border control can be assessed as having major defects
(−1). According to the FSI, the stability of the region increased throughout the last
5 years from 81.4 in 2012 to 77.1 in 2017. This makes an average of 79.3 – warning
(−1). The provision of social services is usually not restricted to weak or authoritar-
ian states but is also largely provided by illicit means (Asia Today 2016). A signifi-
cant amount of services that are traditionally connected to state is also provided by
different non-state actors (Ziegler 2015, 137–196). The factor is ranked (0).
Similarly, the non-state actors on the functional level can be seen as overtaking not
only because of the provision of basic services but also due to the significant pres-
ence of different mafias and illicit economy actors28 (−1). There is currently no
significant territorial non-state actor present (0). Regional policy dynamics is mainly
dominated by state actors (countries geographically located in the area plus Russia,
China, the USA, European countries) with some influence by non-state actors which
is, however, not so significant (2).
The issue of the use of violence is problematic. The state actors being mainly
authoritative regimes used the veil of war against terror to crack down on opposi-
tion and minorities. Also, the use of violence by organized crime groups can be
seen as an issue. The region is thus ranked (0). The region currently undergoes no
significant violent conflict (3). As noted earlier, the provision of basic goods can be
rated as combined (0). The region has, mainly due to geographic and historical
context, only limited connection to the international flows. This link is mainly
established by penetration of the world markets via Russia or increasingly China.
Also, the authoritative character of the regimes leads to a lesser connection to the
26
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/georgia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/
armenia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/armenia
27
http://amcu.gki.tj/eng/images/FAR-2014/foreign_aid_for_tajikistan_in_figures_en.pdf; http://
www.ecrg.ro/files/p2012.2(1)7y8.pdf
28
For example, https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/download/?id=78
outside world via the Internet or other means (0). The border regime is closed
despite much inefficiency in border control (0). There are no efficient regional
organizations (0). The nature of non-state actors is dual – there are those providing
the basic services in cases the state is unable/unwilling to, and there are also violent
actors like organized crime groups and terrorist organizations (0). The spread of
arms is limited (1).29
5.1.7 Chinese Space
The countries in the Chinese region – People’s Republic of China, Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea, and Mongolia – are not dependent on the outside
actors. North Korea is in this respect largely economically dependent on the exter-
nal aid (coming mainly from China), but there is no direct foreign presence on its
territory (3). Despite the enormous length of the Chinese borders, the country is to
a relevant degree able to control the movement. Mongolia, on the other hand, lacks
human resources to control its border effectively – this border is, nevertheless, not
challenged (1). FSI scores decreased on average from 2012’s 74.9 to 77.5 in 2017.
This establishes a final score of 76.2 – warning (−1). The PRC can provide basic
services with some deficiencies especially in the hinterland regions, while the North
Korea lacks an ability of even basic provision on a continuous basis. Mongolia in
this respect once again faces an issue of enormously low population density (1).
There are no major non-state actors on both functional (2) and territorial (3) levels.
The most important non-state actors comprise of national movement in places like
Xinjiang, but these are generally successfully repressed by the central government.
States are the only main actors present in the intraregional dynamics (2).
The use of (state-based) violence is quite high. Not only is the North Korean
regime very repressive but also China is a world leader in capital punishment.30 This
factor is thus ranked (0) as the violence is almost exclusively perpetrated by the
central governments. The region does not face a major rebellion with the exception
of the Xinjiang issue that is being pacified. However, there are many flash points in
the region such as Tibet or the whole of North Korea. This factor is thus also
awarded (0). Basic goods are in general provided by a state (0). The whole region
is connected to the world markets mainly via China. The effects of closed North
Korea and hinterland Mongolia are in this respect irrelevant (2). The region oper-
ates in a closed border regime (0). There is no effective regional body in the region,
but China is an important member of some wider bodies (0). Non-state actors are
either connected to state (e.g., large businesses) or in minority comprise of rebel
movements like the one in Xinjiang. Violent non-state actors, however, remain
29
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/uzbekistan, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/
region/turkmenistan, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/tajikistan, http://www.gunpolicy.
org/firearms/region/kyrgyzstan, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/kazakhstan, http://
www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/central-asia
30
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective#interexec
successfully pacified in the major parts of the region (2). The spread of weaponry
can be regarded as managed by the state with some exceptions in the Xinjiang
region (1).31
5.1.8 East Asia
In the next section, we are going to introduce the region of East Asia which is for
the purposes of this work delimited by countries of South Korea, Japan, and de facto
state Taiwan. Taiwan is included as it used to be fully recognized state and a perma-
nent member of the United Nations Security Council that lost its international rec-
ognition purely on a political basis without any loss of effectiveness. Unlike Kosovo,
it does not affect its parent state as far as the selected criteria are considered. It is
also geographically distinct. For this study, Taiwan (or the Republic of China) is
attributed as a state inside this region.
The region is fully self-sufficient except for the security guarantees given to it by
the US military (3). It also holds full control of its borders – in case Taiwan’s claims
for a mainland China territory are disregarded as de facto irrelevant – as these are
either islands or the heavily militarized border between North and South Korea (2).
FSI (not accounting for Taiwan) gives the region averages of 40.6 in 2012 and
37.8 in 2017 – in average 39.2 meaning stable (1). The state is a fully competent
provider of basic services (1), and the non-state actors on the functional level are
part of the system not opposing it in any significant way as evident from the position
of Japanese or South Korean companies (1). There is no non-state territorial compe-
tition to states as these are capable of projecting the power throughout the whole of
their territory (3). Conceptualizing Taiwan as a state, states remain the only relevant
actors in the regional politics (2).
Despite the threat coming from the North Korean military and nuclear program,
there are currently no significant levels of violence, and the change of the internal
setting toward the appearance of violent clashes is unlikely (2). The North Korean
issue seems to remain the only possible flash point regarding the appearance of a
violent conflict as the Chinese invasion of Taiwan is improbable. There is no violent
conflict taking place (3). The state in all the cases remains the primary provider of
basic services (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2) both on the
trade and information levels. There are no barriers to the spread of communication
technologies, and the region is at a global forefront of the technological develop-
ment. The level of intraregional openness is also high due to the reasons described
earlier (2). The region is currently dealing with the establishment of the free trade
area (0.5). Predominantly, the nature of the non-state actors is peaceful (2) even as
Japan gave the world one of the most famous criminal groups – Yakuza. The spread
of weaponry is low32 (2).
31
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/china, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/
mongolia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/north-korea
32
For example, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38365729
5.1.9 Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is in this work defined by the membership in ASEAN organization

as one of the more effective regional bodies. States in the region are mainly inde-
pendent on the outside actors (3). Border control is characterized by minor defects
primarily connected to the massive waves of migration arriving mainly into
Indonesia and Malaysia mostly from Myanmar (Thom 2016) (1). The level of state
fragility overall decreased from 75.3 in 2012 to 72.7 in 2017. The average score is
74 – warning (−1). The state is to a relevant degree able to provide basic services
(1), and non-state actors on a functional level are usually cooperating except for
the insurgency movements in places like Myanmar (ethnic and religious minori-
ties33), the Philippines (connected to the presence of the IS and resistance move-
ments operating in the region for a protracted period of time34), or Indonesia
(ethnic and religious minorities35). Another problem in this respect is connected to
the effects of drug trafficking (Cornell 2007) or piracy36 (0). The same goes for the
presence of territorial non-state actors that control some territory like Shan or
Kachin in Myanmar, or Islamic uprising in Mindanao, the Philippines (0). Due to
this factor, the actions of states are to a certain degree affected by the non-state
actors but are still the dominant actors (1).
Due to the proliferation of violence in places like Myanmar (ethnic and reli-
giously based) and Philippines (violent actions against criminal activities, reli-
giously motivated insurgency), the next factor is awarded (0) despite the fact that
large swaths of the region are otherwise rather calm. The region undergoes a period
of full-blown rebellions in places like Myanmar, the Philippines, or Indonesia
(−1), and the provision of basic goods is combined, depending on the location (0).
The region is with exceptions of some subregions fully connected to the global
flows (2) and lies at the main transport routes from East Asia to the Persian Gulf
and Europe. The level of intraregional openness is of limited openness (0.5). The
ASEAN is based on economic integration without political ties – its membership
does not include any provisions regarding the political system, etc. It is in this
respect a somewhat successful organization (0.5). The nature of non-state actors
is, as noted earlier, combined (0). States in the region are unable to effectively
limit the spread of weaponry (−1) which is manifested in the ability of armed
rebellions and other violent non-state actors to challenge the state institutions.
This is a consequence of limited state capabilities and complicated geography of
the region.
33
For example, http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-rohingya-insurgents-myanmar-creates-its-
own-frankenstein/
34
For example, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/asia/marawi-philippines-isis-civil-
ians.html?mcubz=0
35
For example, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-human-tragedy-of-west-papua/
36
For example, http://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/
5.1.10 Oceania
The tenth region covered in this work comprises of Australia, New Zealand, and the
smaller Pacific Ocean states. The region is entirely independent except for the non-
sovereign territories37 located in the Pacific Ocean (3). But some of the smaller
Pacific nations are increasingly influenced by the external actors. While the histori-
cal presence of the USA is well established and institutionalized, the Chinese inter-
est might change the shape of the political landscape in the region. The states
generally provide a high level of border control (Dickson 2015) to a point allowed
by the geographic conditions (2). FSI score moved from an average 67.2 to 65.9
with Australia and New Zealand showing much better record than average. The
overall rating is 66.5 – warning (−1). States are generally capable of providing the
basic services with the exception of minority cases like East Timor (1), and the non-
state actors can be described as willing and sharing (1). Non-state actors on the
territorial level can be currently summed up in the case of Bougainville which is,
however, currently peaceful and in the process of transition to independent state-
hood (Baar 2017). The independence referendum is planned to take place in June
2019 (3). States are the chief actors in the intraregional development (2).
There is no significant amount of illegitimate violence taking place (2), nor any
significant armed conflict (3). Despite the violent past of some of the islands and
secessionist movements that took place all over the region, the situation seems to
stabilize by the time of writing of this work. States are in general providers or facili-
tators of basic services (0) with some exceptions. The provision of goods varies
between Australia and New Zealand, and the remaining less effective countries in
the region. The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). The regional setting
is mainly closed (0). This is connected to the issues of migration but also environ-
mental protection that is taken seriously by governments protecting the unique land-
scapes of Australia and New Zealand. There is no important regional organization
(0). The non-state actors are mostly peaceful (2), and the spread of weaponry is
limited efficiently (2).38
5.1.11 Indian Space
The region is to a reasonable level independent on the foreign support (1). India
plays a dominant role and while being a partner of many external players seems to
operate to a relevant degree independently. The external pressures are stronger in Sri
Lanka with a significant Chinese presence connected to the port of Hambantota.
The border defects are just minor (1) with the most substantial issues related to the
lower capacity of the smaller states to control their frontiers and many border
Examples include American Samoa, Guam, French Polynesia, Niue, New Caledonia, or Tokelau.
37
For example, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/australia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/fire-

38
arms/region/new-zealand
disputes of India with mainly China and Pakistan.39 State failure has been ranked at
87.6 in 2012 and 84.1 in 2017 making an average of 85.4 – warning (−1). Provision
of basic social services is far from ideal, while the basic functions are to some
degree provided. The developmental policy is one of the key areas of the policymak-
ing in the region (0). Presence of the functional non-state actors can be awarded as
average (1). After the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the only sig-
nificant semi-territorial actors remain in Kashmiri bid for independence and local-
ized insurgencies in Indian periphery (0). The most important actors are states. They
are, to some degree, influenced by non-state actors such as regional movements in
India or, in the near past, Maoist guerrillas in Nepal (1).
The use of violence is manageable. There are occasional riots and waves of vio-
lence along the ethnic and/or religious lines, but the situation is not outgrown to a
point of major troubles known from other less stable regions (0). There is no signifi-
cant armed conflict taking place in the region, while some smaller issues are related
to the ethnic tensions in Bangladesh,40 regional disputes in India,41 or political insta-
bility in Nepal42 (0). The main, if not always capable, provider of the social goods is
the state, with limited reach in peripheral and less developed parts of the region (0).
The region is in general connected to the global system of flows (2). The region is
defined by limited openness (0.5), and there is no effective regional body present
(0). Non-state actors, in general, use a limited amount of violence (0) – there are
many economically oriented important actors as well as secessionist and terrorist
organizations in place. The spread of weaponry can be deemed as quite high with
states unable to adequately control the spread (−1).43
5.1.12 AfPak
The so-called AfPak region (term coined by the Obama administration) is one of the
areas that remain in the spotlight of the international community. Afghanistan for a
protracted period of time (lastly since 2001) hosts foreign forces and is highly
dependent on the development assistance from abroad, while Pakistan depends on
the foreign aid from the USA and China (−2). Border control is characterized by
major defects with the border running through the Pashtun region practically invis-
ible (Synnott 2009). On the other hand, the Pakistani-Indian border is heavily mili-
tarized and hardly penetrable (−1). The region is rated rather high in the FSI. In
2012 the average score was 103.8, while in 2017 it decreased to 103.1 mainly due
to the improvement of the situation in Pakistan. The average score is thus
39
See, for example, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm
40
For example, http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2015/06/bangladesh-indigenous-ban-worse-
apartheid-150616134617804.html
41
For example, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/05/sight-india-bloody-maoist-
conflict-170508120738882.html
42
For example, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/nepals-unending-political-instability/
43
For example, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/20/world/la-fg-india-guns-20120221
103.5 – alert (−2). Both countries lost most of the ability to provide social services44
with the situation being significantly better in Pakistan (−1). Non-state actors in
many parts of the region overtake the state functions (−1) with the most prominent
actors being Taliban in increasingly large parts of Afghanistan and historically
Afghan warlords that to some degree interact with the state institutions while keep-
ing a high level of independence (Mukhopadhyay 2014). The same actors control
large swath of land in the northwest of Pakistan (−3). Non-state actors as thus in
effect important power brokers (−1) – especially Taliban and local warlords in
Afghanistan. Taliban can be considered an equal to the Afghan government and
some form of power-sharing agreement seems to be likely.
There is a significant amount of illegitimate violence being used (−2) and a long-
running ethnonationalist conflict in both countries (−2). The conflict itself has an
international dimension added via the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and
penetration of the international terrorist groups into the region to name a few. It is
not only run on the line between insurgents and the central government supported
by the external actors (both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also among the groups
themselves – most prominently Taliban and the Islamic State). Goods are in large
parts of the region provided by the traditional actors and Taliban (−1). Connection
to the global flows is limited (0). Intraregional openness is determined by the col-
lapse of the border regime between the two countries (−1). There is no effective
regional body (0). The local non-state actors are in large very violent and aggressive
(−2) and have access to abundant amount of weaponry (−2) that was pouring to the
region in high quantities since the 1980s.
5.1.13 Iran
Iran is mainly independent with a meaningful possibility of foreign assistance

blocked in the past by the application of international sanctions connected to the
Iranian nuclear program, support to groups deemed as terrorist, and testing of
rocket systems. The contemporary development seems to continue this trend of
forced isolation and indigenous power projection in the Middle Eastern region (3).
The ability to control borders is high even given the problematic geography and
demography (Marshall 2015, 116–119) (2). Scores for the FSI in 2017 is 85.8 and
in 2012 89.6. The average is thus 87.7 – warning (−1). The state is to a relevant
extent relatively capable provider of basic functions. This provision differs
throughout the territory and in relation to the extent of sanctions imposed.
Limitations in a provision of basic goods were manifested in 2017/2018 protests
that took place inside the country (0). There are no important non-state actors on
functional (2) or territorial45 (3) level. This does not mean that Iran is not facing a
threat from these actors; it is just so far capable of managing them. The state is the
only relevant actor (2).
See, for example, Thruelsen (2010).

44
For the discussion over the Iranian secessionist groups, see Czulda (2017).
45
The use of violence is mainly legitimate (meaning state-based) with some prob-
lems stemming from regions like Balochistan and Sistan (Czulda 2017) (2), and
there is no serious armed conflict taking place on the Iranian territory (3). Provision
of basic goods is mainly connected to state institutions (0). Iran’s connection to
global flows is primarily limited by the international sanctions connected to its
political and military activity (0). Currently, the level of export of natural resources
is depending on the current state of sanctions against the regime in Tehran that are
uncertain. The rupture between the US Trump administration and the European
position is well-known. Other partners like India and Russia are cooperating with
Iran on different levels and with different intensity. The issue of intraregional open-
ness is irrelevant given that the region is defined by just one country, but it can be
substituted with its relation to the surrounding countries. In this case, the factor can
be graded as closed border regime (0). There is no effective regional body in place
even if taking into account Iran’s external relations (0). The nature of non-state
actors is mixed between peaceful like different commercial or local actors and
rebellious actors in regions like Balochistan and Sistan (0). The spread of weaponry
is quite high but still manageable (1).46
5.1.14 Turkey
The next region is also defined by only one country – Turkey. Turkey is relatively
independent on the foreign actors. The example of the foreign aid provision is con-
nected to the EU financing related to the Turkish settling of the Syrian refugees47
(3). Turkish border control is affected by minor defects connected to its restive
southern border, but as evident from the reaction to the development in the conflict
and the migration crisis, the state is capable of rather effective border protection (1).
FSI highlights a trend toward decreasing stability in Turkey. In 2012 the score was
76.6, while in 2017 it raised up to 80.8. The average is 78.7 – warning (−1). The
state is quite a relevant provider of social services with exceptions in hinterland
(mainly Eastern) regions (1). The most important alternative actor on a functional
level is an army. However, the army itself can be hardly described as a non-state
actor, and its role in the society is decreasing. The second important actor, Kurdish
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or the Kurdish Worker’s Party) is a semi-
territorial group operating inside Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The
issue of functional non-state actors is thus awarded (2) as PKK does not overcome
any important state functions, and territorial groups are ranked (0) as the group’s
operations are capable of making some parts of territory hardly accessible for the
Turkish state authorities but are incapable of providing quasi-governance. State
operations are to some degree affected by the non-state actors (1), not only PKK but
also other groups that affect the country mainly since the beginning of the civil war
in Syria and Iraq.
46
See http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/iran
47
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413
The country is defined by manageable use of violence connected mainly to the

activities of the PKK and radical Islamist movements (0). There is a limited rebel-
lion taking place in Kurdish separatist movement (0). Basic goods are provided
mainly by state (0). The country is fully connected to the global flows (2). This vari-
able might change in the future if the Turkish government increases the limitations
in the access to the World Wide Web. The border regime is closed (0). There is no
effective regional body that Turkey is a member of (0) despite its long-term (fading)
interest in joining the EU and NATO membership which does not influence the
country’s sovereignty in the sense of sovereignty pooling. Despite the presence of
the PKK and other radical elements in the country, the Turkish non-state actors’
relation to violence can be assessed as combined (0). Even the PKK itself was
repeatedly willing to follow cease-fires (White 2015). The spread of weapons can
still be seen as limited by state with a possible change to less stable situation in con-
nection with the ongoing Syrian war and a potential penetration of the Turkish ter-
ritory by violent non-state actors (1).
5.1.15 Larger Mesopotamia
Countries of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq became a global symbol of instability. They
face direct intervention from countries inside and outside the Middle East (Iraq
since 2003, Syria since 2011, Lebanon for different periods of time). These inter-
ventions are manifested in a direct support for the regimes (e.g., Russia and Assad
regime, the USA and regime in Baghdad) or the use of proxy elements (e.g., Iran
and Hezbollah, the USA and YPG) (−2). The countries are unable to control most
of their borders. This is evident in places like the Syrian-Iraqi border that is pen-
etrable for a long time mainly due to the states’ weakness and complicated geog-
raphy (−2). State failure rating raised from 2012’s 94.9 to 2017’s 101.4 making
average 98.1 – alert (−2). The state is unable to provide basic services to a major-
ity of population (−1) given their institutional weakness and incapacity to control
territory. The situation is the most severe in Syria that is hit by a protracted civil
war. Many state functions on large swaths of land are overtaken by non-state actors
like Hezbollah48 or Kurdish political institutions in Syria (Iraqi Kurdish institu-
tions are incorporated into the state administration). These alternative actors often
provide much better service related to the provision of goods than the state in some
regions ever did (−2). Large areas are also controlled by these and more radical
groups like Daesh (mainly in the period 2014–2016) or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This
is once again an issue most relevant for Syria but present all over the region (−3).
Non-state actors are also important and sometimes key brokers in the regional
politics (−1).
When it comes to the use of violence, the whole region is for a protracted period
of time a center of massive atrocities and loss of lives (−2). The region is in the
48
See Avon et al. (2012).
midst of a violent civil conflict (Lebanon is highly unstable since civil war in the
1980s (Norton 2007), Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003, and Syria since 2011
(Byman 2015)) (−4). The basic goods are provided on a minimal level and only in
limited areas. Large swaths of territory are not covered either by a state or some of
the non-state actors (−2). The region has a limited connection to global flows (0) –
mainly via the oil sales and human migration. The limitations are connected to the
low capability of the states to establish the proper connection. The region is inca-
pable of cooperation due to collapse (−1), and there are no effective regional bodies
(0). Non-state actors are predominantly violent – no matter whether aggressively
like the IS or defensively like Peshmerga (−2). The spread of weaponry is high and
unmitigated (−2).
5.1.16 Gulf Monarchies
Gulf monarchies are generally independent, basing their power on wealth coming
from the oil drilling. The only exception is a form of security guarantee given to
the countries by the US military (3). The countries in the region can generate full
control over their borders. This control can be complicated by geographical fac-
tors, but given the enormous wealth available, the obstacles can be overcome (2).
The level of state fragility in the Gulf was in 2012 57.2 and 55.8 in 2017. This set
the region as stable (1) with 56.5 on average. The states are full providers of basic
services for its citizens that are also one of the leading sources of regimes’ legiti-
macy. This provision is usually connected to the citizens only, while the foreigners
working in the countries are often disqualified from these (1). Non-state actors on
both functional and territorial levels are either incorporated into the state struc-
tures/cooperating with a state (large companies) or forced out of the region (jihad-
ist groups (Hegghammer 2010)). Challenges from the non-state actors come
generally from abroad (2), (3). States are the only relevant actors in the region as
they are so far able to force the non-state actors into the surrounding regions (2).
The region is not witnessing any significant degree of illegitimate violence.
Violence is usually state-based (2). There is no significant armed conflict taking
place (3), while the regional actors are involved in conflicts in places like Syria,
Yemen, or Libya. The proxy warfare that takes place among the Gulf monarchies
and between the likes of Saudi Arabia and Iran is taking place outside of the region.
Goods are provided by the state (0). The region is, with occasional restrictions of
information flows, fully connected to the global flows. This connection is crucial for
the wealth of the region either regarding the selling of the natural resources or
import of work labor from other regions (2). The intraregional system is closed (0).
There are no effective regional bodies present – despite some common forums being
set up to deal with some particular issues like the oil production or security (like
Gulf Cooperation Council) (0). Non-state actors use limited means of violence (re-
occurring terrorist attacks, violent protests, etc.) (0). The spread of weaponry is high
with the countries able to somehow control the spread (1).
5.1.17 Western Middle East
The three countries located in the region – Israel, Jordan, and Egypt – can be called
partially independent. The most visible form of foreign assistance can be found in
military support for the regimes.49 All of the countries are recipients of some of the
largest number of foreign military support from the USA (1). The border control has
minor defects. These are mainly connected to the limitations regarding the control
over the vast Egyptian-African borders (1). The average FSI score in 2012 and 2017
was the same 82.5 – warning (−1). In all cases, we can assess the provision of basic
services as parallel. Israel is the most capable actor. However, part of its territory is
to some degree governed by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas (0). There are
important actors challenging the state on the functional level – mainly the Islamic
opposition (−1). The only important territorial non-state actor is Palestine divided
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Another problematic region is the northern
part of the Sinai Peninsula (−1.5). Non-state actors influence the regional relations,
but the central power still goes with states (1).
Use of violence is medium and can still be considered manageable. It is mainly
connected to the Palestine question and spill-over effects in combination with out-
bursts of social and other unrest mainly inside Egypt and Jordan (0). Conflict in the
region can be in terms of this work’s methodology best described as a limited
rebellion (Palestine, Sinai) (0). Basic goods are mainly provided by (de facto) state
entities in combination with post-modern (NGOs) and traditional actors (0). The
region is fully connected to the global flows with exception of some less developed
hinterland regions (2). The border regime is closed (0). There is no effective
regional body (0). The region hosts a combination of violent and peaceful non-
state actors. Some of them have their military and civil wing (e.g., Hamas) (0).
States are unable to adequately control the spread of weaponry as evident from
places like the Gaza Strip or Sinai Peninsula, or as manifested by terrorist attacks
in all three countries (−1).
5.1.18 Northern Africa
As the region usually understood as Northern Africa is too extensive for the pur-
poses of this study, it begins with examination of the part consisting of more homo-
geneous group of countries – Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, and Niger. Some
of the countries are directly affected by the foreign agents – be it attempts to use
some of the sides of the Libyan conflict for their strategic interests50 or to end the
49
For example, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-statement/u-s-israel-sign-38-billion-
military-aid-package-idUSKCN11K2CI, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/obama-signs-
law-increase-military-support-jordan, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-usa-aid/u-s-mili
tary-aid-for-egypt-seen-continuing-despite-rights-concerns-idUSKCN0T22E520151113
50
For example, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/libya-from-intervention-
to-proxy-war
South Sudanese civil war. Also, Chad and Niger are recipients of important amount
of foreign aid (Griffin 2016) (−1). Border control is usually at a very low level
mainly due to the small efficiency of the state apparatus, complicated geography of
the region, and existence of nomadic trade and smuggling routes in the area (−2).
FSI ranks the region in average at 103.5 – alert (−2) – with scores of 101.4 for 2012
and 105.5 for 2017. The state is almost completely unable to present basic social
goods to its population all over the region (Hicks 2015). The issue is not only con-
nected to the war-torn Libya and South Sudan but also the remaining three coun-
tries with limited capabilities (−1). There is an important presence of non-state
actors on both functional (nomadic tribes, alternative governments (Libya), ethnic
militias) (−2) and territorial (connected to different civil conflicts) (−3) levels. As
examples, the actors like the Islamic State in Libya, competing Libyan govern-
ments, rebels in Western Sudan and South Sudan, or other jihadist groups in Chad
and Niger might be presented. Non-state actors are important power brokers in the
region, and states are in some respect missing as their representation is unclearly
defined (e.g., Libya) (−1).
The region witnesses a widespread utilization of illegal and illegitimate violence.
States are generally unable to control the spread of violence, and also the level of
ability to conduct and control armed operations is variable (−2). The region oscil-
lates between mitigated and unmitigated civil war and ethnopolitical conflicts with
the latter being true in the majority of the region (Libya, Sudan, South Sudan). The
general level of instability is high, and the history of armed conflict is long (−4).
Basic goods are usually missing as nor the state neither the alternative actors can
provide these outsides of the main population centers controlled by the state, and
even there the situation is very problematic (−2). The connection to the global flows
is very low and mostly connected to the illegal flows. Before 2011, Libya was con-
nected via oil trade, but this link is since the beginning of the civil war largely miss-
ing (−2). Intraregional relations are mainly defined by a collapse of the ability of the
states to cooperate (once again less visible in more effective Niger and Chad) (−1).
There is no effective regional body present (0). The predominant nature of the sig-
nificant non-state actors is violent (−2). The region is a zone of high unsanctioned
spread of weaponry (−2).
5.1.19 Northwest Africa
The next region comprised of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania is
located in the Western part of the Sahara desert. States are to a relevant degree sup-
ported by the foreign powers – especially in the case of Mali with direct military
presence of mainly French army with additional presence of the EU and UN troops
(Wing 2016) (−1). Given the problematic geography and limited power of state
institutions, the border control is limited. The situation is more controlled by Tunisia
and Morocco that were capable of fencing parts of their border (−1). The estimated
level of state fragility grew from 78.8 in 2012 to 82.5 in 2017. This makes an aver-
age of 80.6 – warning (−1). States in many areas fail to provide basic services while
not losing their ability altogether. It must be pointed out that the situation differs and
is worse in locations like northern Mali or Mauritania, while the state is more effec-
tive in coastal regions of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (0). There are important
non-state actors on both functional (−1) and territorial (−1.5) levels. These include
traditional nomadic tribes as well as jihadist movements connected to both Al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State. It must be also pointed out that these actors are included in the
smuggling business that is characteristic for the region. Non-state actors like Tuareg
movements or radical Islamists are important power brokers (−1).
The region witnesses a significant amount of illegitimate violence that is, how-
ever, to a certain degree managed by either local state or foreign actors. The level of
violence is mainly connected to the Islamist insurgency as the Tuareg ethnic move-
ment is currently pacified (0). The region is an area of irregular conflict mainly
against local jihadist groups merged into Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’
(Solomon 2015) (−1). The state is the primary provider of basic goods where appli-
cable – the provision by the alternative actors in zones out of state control is report-
edly very limited (0). The region has only limited connection to the global flows,
mainly via illegal activities or tourism in the north of the region (0). The region
attempts to handle a closed border regime that is however impossible due to the
local geography and limited state capacities in some parts (−1). There is no effective
regional body present with an attempt to establish regional security cooperation in
G5 Sahel51 (0). The nature of non-state actors is predominantly violent (−2). There
is a high spread of weaponry unsanctioned by states – issue that worsened after the
fall of Gaddafi regime in Libya and return of his Tuareg soldiers to Mali52 (−2).
5.1.20 Horn of Africa+
The next region comprises of wider Horn of Africa to which Yemen is added as hav-
ing more in common with the selected African countries than the likes of Saudi
Arabia or Oman. Many of the countries are facing direct intervention (Somalia,
Yemen) or are recipients of a large amount of foreign aid (−2). Border control shifts
between major problems and absolute inability to control. The situation is better in
countries like Ethiopia or Eritrea, while Somalia and Yemen provide no control to
speak of (−1). The level of state failure according to the FSI methodology reached
99.2 in 2012 and grew to 102.5 in 2017 with an average score of 100.9 points – alert
(−2). The state is generally very weak in provision of social services even in cases
where the state institutions do not face a total collapse. The worst situation is in
Yemen and Somalia (−1). There are important non-state actors on a functional level
supplementing in many places state functions (e.g., Menkhaus 2006/7). These
include local and traditional actors as well as limited attempts by the radical jihadist
51
https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-
security
52
For example, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-
rebellion-in-mali.html?mcubz=0
movements to provide some relief to the local population (−2). Large areas are
furthermore out of the state control with examples of Al-Qaeda or Houthi-controlled
regions in Yemen, large swaths of Somalia, etc. (−3). Non-state and de facto state
actors are important power brokers and, in some locations, hold more power than
formal institution of the state (−1).
The region undergoes large excesses of violent attacks (−2) and civil conflict
accompanied by foreign interventions (−2). This was true even before the end of the
Cold War and is relevant up until today with conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Yemen and past hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Provision of basic goods
out of governmental bases is provided either by alternative pre-modern actors or by
no one (−1) – the state is better functioning in Ethiopia while being completely
missing in Somalia with the rest of the cases located somewhere between these two.
Connection to the global flows is limited at best (−2). Mutual cooperation is lacking
due to the widespread state collapse and mutual animosities (−1). There is no effec-
tive regional body (0). A significant amount of non-state actors is violent
(Al-Shabaab, AQAP, Houthi movement, etc.) (−2). The proliferation of weapons in
the region is high and mostly unsanctioned as documented by existence of many
violent non-state actors across the region (−2).
5.1.21 East Africa
Moving further south, we can identify the region of East Africa. The region has
minor dependence on foreign agents, especially in the form of humanitarian and
military assistance (1). The border control has minor defects mainly in connection
with the inability to properly control borders with Somalia and central African
region with a high level of instability present (1). The level of state failure is mea-
sured as stable, growing insignificantly from 92.4 to 92.5 between 2012 and 2017.
The final rank is thus alert (−2). States can provide basic services to a relevant
degree with some exceptions especially in remote areas. The quality of goods pro-
vided also varies (0). There is only minor presence of non-state actors connected
mainly to Al-Shabaab in Kenya and some minor rebel groups in the rest of the
region (1). There are no significant areas out of state control with possible excep-
tions in northeast Kenya and refugee camps (3). States are, nevertheless, influenced
by some tribal and other non-state actors (1).
The use of force is manageable and mainly oriented against the violent non-state
actors operating in the region. Nevertheless, the state security forces also use the
force against its own population following a political motivation (0). Despite some
incursions from bordering regions and occasional cases of terrorism, there is no
significant armed conflict taking place in the countries (3). Provision of basic goods
is connected mainly to the state (0). The region is becoming fully connected to the
global flows via high-speed Internet53 and trade. Kenya is also a popular destination
of the Western tourists. The connection can be decreased if the central governments
53
http://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-rwanda-telecoms-idAFJOE72F07D20110316
decide to apply restriction upon the access to the World Wide Web (2). Regional
politics holds limited openness (as illustrated by the attempts to establish East
African Community (EAC54)) (0.5). Despite the attempts to establish some form of
regional cooperation, there is no effective regional body in place with EAC holding
potential to change this in the future55 (0). The nature of non-state actors is mixed.
We can see the presence of violent groups like Al-Shabaab but also nonviolent like
the traditional actors or NGOs (0). The ability of states to limit historically high and
geographically determined spread of weaponry is limited (−1).
5.1.22 Central Africa
The region of Central Africa is quite profoundly affected by the foreign interven-
tion, be it a direct military presence of forces sent by the external players like Chad
or Uganda, or the United Nations missions connected to the many local and tran-
sregional conflicts and violent non-state actors (Carayannis et al. 2015). It has been
repeatedly reported that the security forces of the Central African Republic are, to
give an example, dependent on the support from the Russian state through the pri-
vate military groups controlled by the Russian government (−2). Regional coun-
tries are in most instances unable to control their borders as well as most of their
territories. The porous nature of the borders is a well-known phenomenon con-
nected to the regional geopolitical dynamics (−2). FSI ranked the region with 93.2
points for 2012 and 95 points for 2017. This establishes an average of 94.1 – alert
(−2). The state is generally unable to provide basic services to the most of its popu-
lation. Large swaths of territory are out of reach of the central institutions – for
example, the Central African Republic has never filled its territory by an effective
power projection since it gained independence (Lombard 2017) (−1). There are
important non-state actors on both functional (−2) and territorial (−3) levels (e.g.,
DRC rebels, Seleka movement, Lord’s Resistance Army, etc.). States are only one
of the regional power brokers (−1). The non-state actors thus overcome functions
of the state in many of the regions and are successful in preventing it from control-
ling the territory.
The region undergoes a period of large sustained violence dating back before the
era of decolonization (Marshall 2015, 79–97). Eastern DRC and contemporary
Central African Republic are sights of violent conflict (−2). In many places the
region witnesses a full-blown civil conflict coupled with multiple foreign interven-
tions (issue especially visible in a case of the Democratic Republic of Congo) (−4).
The provision of basic services is usually missing as the alternative actors are often
incapable or unwilling to conduct such an operation (−2). The connection to the
global flows is also very low and based on the economic exploitation (−2). Mutual
54
http://www.eac.int/
55
D. Bach, a leading expert on African regionalism, called the grouping as having the largest poten-
tial to establish an effective framework from all African regional organizations on his November
2017 lecture in Prague.
cooperation is impossible due to low capacity of states (−1). There are no effective
regional organizations (0). The non-state actors are in many instances violent, be it
separatist movements, ethnic militias, or other violent non-state actors (−2). The
spread of weaponry is very high and unmitigated (−2).
5.1.23 South Africa
The next region is a widely defined space mostly economically connected to South
Africa. As such, the region has only limited levels of foreign aid present (1). Border
control can be characterized by minor defects. These are mainly connected to a
complicated geography and limited capacity of states (1). The level of state failure
in the region was ranked as 79.8 in 2012 and 81.3 in 2017. This means an average
of 80.5 – warning (−1). The capability of states to provide basic services is limited
and usually weak in the peripheral regions. This is the case even for the Republic
of South Africa as the most capable nation in the region as well (0). Non-state
actors are generally not threatening with the exception of gangs and other forms of
criminal organizations56 with a history of civil war throughout the region. The
region has in the past witnessed solutions to many of the civil conflicts that faced
the region throughout the Cold War era, but the problem with criminality is still
present (1). There are no large regions under control of territorial non-state actors –
issue solved after the end of the Cold War proxy civil wars. Some regions, never-
theless, still hold some separatist tendencies57 (3). States are the major power
brokers (2).
The level of violence is manageable and connected mainly to the issue of crimi-
nality. The issue, nevertheless, still holds a significant potential toward worsening.
Many parts of the region can turn into no-go zones, and some of the countries might
face reappearance of civil armed conflict (0). There is no armed conflict taking
place with only limited rebellions in some peripheral regions (3). Provision of basic
goods is mainly connected to the state or limited. Currently, there are no significant
alternative actors that would take over the provision (0). The region is fully con-
nected to the global flows – mainly through South African economy (2). The region
has a closed border regime that it quite successfully enforces. Some of the regional
countries even enforced construction of border barriers (e.g., Botswana on borders
with Zimbabwe) (0). South African Development Community is established, and
its membership consists of most of the regional states. In 2008 this organization
established a free trade area around much of the region58 (0.5). Non-state actors do
not usually use violence on a mass level, but they cannot be classified as nonviolent
as well (0). States are unable to properly control the spread of weaponry (−1).
56
For example, https://www.vice.com/sv/article/4wbyqg/stars-stripes-and-blood-south-africas-
most-notorious-gang-is-called-the-americans
57
For example, https://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics%2D%2Dpower_on-the-line/
2012/10/20/separatist-movement-spreading-like-wildfire-in-zanzibar,107928541-BRE
58
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/
5.1.24 West Africa
The remaining African region comprises of the western African states not included
in other regions. As a region historically troubled by civil wars and internal con-
flicts, the level of foreign aid is quite high with direct involvement especially in the
fight against Boko Haram and developmental aid in most of the region (−1).
Borders manifest major defects in many parts of the region. This is not only con-
nected to the issues with the control over the borders with the restive regions like
Mali but also to the borders between these nations themselves (−1). According to
the FSI data, the overall level of state failure in the region is quite steady. In 2012
the average score was 89.5, and in 2017 it rose to 90. These give an overall score
of 89.7 – warning (−1). The degree of a provision of services by a state is different
across the region but, overall, rather problematic (0). Non-state actors on func-
tional level are quite important, be it NGOs helping develop the region or private
military companies providing security (McFate 2014). Also, traditional and other
local non-state actors play an important role (−1). On the territorial level, the most
prominent example of the non-state actor challenging the state supremacy is Boko
Haram in northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, areas under sustained non-state control
are on the regional level only limited (0). Non-state actors are important power
brokers (−1).
The region undergoes major periods of high illegitimate use of violence. These,
however, do not affect all of the regions as countries like Ghana, Liberia, or Sierra
Leone are currently mostly peaceful (−2). The region experiences a period of full-
blown conflict mostly connected to the fight against Boko Haram (−1). The provi-
sion of basic goods is divided between state in some areas and local actors in the rest
(−1). Connection to the global flows is limited and mainly of economic nature.
Western Africa is, however, an increasingly important region with a potential of
further connection in the near future (0). The issue of border regime and mutual
cooperation is rather problematic due to the inability of states to control their terri-
tory (−1). Despite the presence of the Economic Community of West African States,
we cannot speak of a fully functioning regional organization yet (0). The nature of
non-state actors is combined with NGOs and state-supporting organizations and
violent non-state actors located around the region (0). States are unable to properly
manage the spread of weaponry (−2).
5.1.25 North America
The region defined by territories of Canada and the USA can be characterized as
independent on outside forces (3). Despite the recent hysteria regarding the need for
increased border protection, in comparative perspective, the region holds full con-
trol over its borders (thanks to geography on the north and high state capability on
the south) (2). FSI gives the region scores of 30.8 in 2012 and 29.1 in 2017 – aver-
age of 30 makes it fit into a category stable (1). Provision of basic services is con-
ducted or regulated by state with different effectivity in both countries and inside
them (1). Non-state actors on a functional level are usually not challenging the state
capacities or undermine its basic power – be it NGOs, large businesses, or others
(1). There are no non-state actors at the territorial level challenging the authority of
state (3). The power holders in the region are states affected by large businesses and
other actors described in the chapter dedicated to work of D. Rothkopf (1).
Use of violence is comparatively low and mainly connected to the classical crim-
inality rather than civil conflict (2). There is no armed conflict taking place and an
appearance of one is highly unlikely (3). The provision of goods is combined
between state and (post-)modern non-state actors (more prevalent in the USA).
There is a debate over the nature of the provision of some of these (like healthcare)
but the score, given the US experience, remains at (1). The region is fully connected
to the global flows and establishes one of the key nodes of the globalization (2). Its
border regime is partially opened – having weaker internal protection (US-Canadian
border) while keeping strict control over outside borders (0.5). The region is part of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (renamed in 2018 to US-Mexico-Canada
agreement) and establishes other economic partnership throughout the globe (0.5).
The non-state actors are predominantly peaceful with major exception of criminal
gangs and lone-wolf attackers mainly in the USA (2). The spread of weaponry is
medium and to a relevant degree sanctioned by state with the oversight in the US
weak by design instead of incapacity (1).
5.1.26 Central America
Independence of Central America is to a significant degree historically limited by

the geographic proximity of the USA (a similar connection of Central Asia to the
Russian interests). Despite that, nowadays, the situation can be evaluated as minor
foreign assistance (primarily connected to the aid with security) (1). Border con-
trol has major defects related mainly to illegal migration and smuggling of illegal
substances in combination with high level of gang violence59 (−1). Average FSI
scores for the region were 69.8 in 2012 and 68.4 in 2017. This totals 69.1 – warn-
ing (−1). The ability of states to provide social services is limited and, in many
places, substituted by parallel institutions.60 Many of the states in the region are
losing capability to control parts of their territory. The situation is, however, con-
textual, and there are important differences between countries like Costa Rica and
El Salvador (0). There is an important presence of non-state actors on a functional
level, mainly connected to the activities of gangs and narcomafias. These are not
only acting parallel to the state but also slowly overcoming the state institutions in
regions where they developed to a third type of cartels as predicted in (Sullivan
and Bunker 2002) (−1). On a territorial level, so far, the region does not witness
the presence of any important non-state entity with parts of the territories under
the influence of criminal organizations without broader territorial ambitions.
59
See http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/tsearch?q=violence
60
See Grillo (2016).
The non-state actors are territorial only in respect to their operations not in respect
to establishment of an alternative political entity (3). States are in their dealings
influenced by the non-state actors (1).
The overall use of violence in the region is high and mainly connected to crimi-
nality and drug trade.61 Central American states for some time top the table of coun-
tries with the largest number of homicides per capita (−2). Despite the high levels
of violence, there is no civil or interstate conflict in place. The nature of violence is
in essence primarily criminal (3). Provision of basic goods is combined between
state and in some areas criminal organizations and lacking in many as well. The
situation also differs between different countries (−1). The region is fully connected
to the global flows (2). The region attempts to hold a close border regime (0).
Besides Mexican participation in the free trade agreement with the USA and
Canada, there is no effective regional body (0). Non-state actors are mainly violent
with nonviolent present but with a limited impact (−2). The proliferation of weap-
ons is high (−2).
5.1.27 The Caribbean
Caribbean region is defined by a presence of many small island states and a signifi-
cant influence of the nearby USA. The foreign assistance can be rated as minor (1).
Control of borders declares minor defects (1) mainly due to complicated geography
and weakness of some of the states. FSI scores are to some degree affected by high
level of state failure on Haiti, but due to the high number of countries in the region,
the final score is representative. In 2012 it was 68.1 and in 2017 64.3 (for compari-
son, Haiti’s scores are 104.9 and 105.3). The average for both years is 66.2 – warn-
ing (−1). The institution of state is a leading but usually inefficient provider of the
social services (0). Non-state actors on the functional level are often criminal gangs
that, nevertheless, have only limited power inside some of the states (Grillo 2016)
(1). There is no sustained territorial competition except for parts of the slums being
controlled by the criminal gangs. The sheer geographical limits prevent the occur-
rence of territorial competitor on most of the small islands (3). States are the only
relevant power brokers (2).
The amount of violence is large62 but still not overwhelming. The situation is
similarly to previous region connected to the higher levels of criminality, but the
overall issue is not as grave as in the Central America (0). There is no armed conflict
taking place out of the criminality issue (3). The provision of goods is divided
between state and in some regions local criminal actors or gang structures (−1).
Regional connection to the global flows is full mainly due to the maritime nature of
the region and proximity to the USA (2). The region attempts to hold a close border
regime. An attempt is limited by the geographical restrictions and limited capability
(0). There is no effective regional body present (0). The nature of the non-state
61
http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle/p37286
62
See, for example, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41175
actors can be best described as combined (with NGOs or church on one side and
drug gangs on the other). The relative power differs throughout the region (0).
Finally, states are unable to adequately regulate the spread of weapons around the
region (−1).
5.1.28 Northern South America
The northern part of South America, as defined for the purposes of this work, is the
generally poorer part of the continent. It is thus a recipient of minor amount of
foreign aid also historically connected to the Colombian internal conflict (1).
Border control has minor defects mostly connected to the presence of armed guer-
rillas and criminal activities but also to the failing capabilities of state in Venezuela
(1). According to the FSI data and methodology, a situation in the majority of the
countries in the region is either stable or improving. Large exception is Venezuela
and to lesser degree Paraguay. In 2012 the average score was 76.4, and in 2017 it
decreased to 74.4. The total score is thus 75.4 – warning (−1). Social services
provision is mixed with Venezuela unable to establish the basic institutions and
provide basic goods,63 Colombia having alternative actors in place (Leech 2011)
(despite the shift toward their disarmament and inclusion into the state structure)
and others capable of service provision on different rates (0). Non-state actors on
functional level present a combination of criminal gangs, relief organizations, and
other local groups. Their strength is significant but arguably, in a regional scale,
decreasing (1). With the peace agreement with FARC, the most significant territo-
rial non-state actor is to disband. Only minor parts of territories of the countries in
the region thus remain under some form of control of non-state actors. The reap-
pearance of some territorial guerrilla based either on ideology or economy is, how-
ever, possible (0). Non-state actors, furthermore, affect the local power dynamics
but do not dominate it (1).
Use of violence is manageable in the majority of the region with situation worse
in places like slums and the country of Venezuela that is on a brink of collapse (0).
The situation in the region can be described as limited rebellion (0) with a potential
for improvement once again notwithstanding the situation in Venezuela. Provision
of basic goods is (where present) mainly conducted by states with some local and
traditional actors stepping up in specific areas (−1). Connection to global flows is
limited (0) – either involuntarily as in case of landlocked Paraguay or voluntarily
as by the government of Venezuela. Border regime is closed with some irregulari-
ties connected to the ineffectiveness of state apparatus or criminal activity taking
place (0). Paraguay is part of Mercosur, but most of the region is not part of any
effective regional organization (0). The nature of non-state actors is mixed (0). The
spread of weaponry is hardly controlled by states and is quite large (−1).
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/01/09/508986586/as-venezuelan-go-hungry-the-
63
military-is-trafficking-in-food
5.1.29 Southern South America
The southern part of South America as defined here can be perceived as a region
independent of foreign aid (3). Border control shows minor defects mainly con-
nected to the complicated geography (jungle, high mountain ranges, etc.) and
length. The most well-known issue is currently the Tri-Border area smuggling (1).
The level of state failure in the region is similar to all countries, but Brazil is show-
ing somehow higher scores. On average, the scores for 2012 are 48.7 and for 2017
48.6 – total of 48.6 – stable (1). Comparatively speaking, states are quite capable of
providing basic services with exception of remote regions and parts of large cities
(1). The presence of non-state actors is connected to big businesses and in some
cases with criminal gangs establishing parallel institutions in peripheral parts of
towns. In some remote areas, traditional structures also play a role (1). On a territo-
rial level, non-state actors are active mainly in suburbs of large cities which are
mostly out of governmental control (Grillo 2016). Nevertheless, security forces are
capable of penetrating these areas in case they need to do so (0). States are the only
relevant regional power brokers (2).
Despite the issue of gang violence in some parts of the region, the amount of
violence is quite low (except for Brazil64). Also, Brazil seems to be the only country
with a potential for witnessing larger amount of violence in the future (2). There is
no active armed conflict taking place (3). The state is a primary provider of social
services with the slums without such services or locally provided supplements (0).
The region is fully connected to the global flows with exception of hinterland
regions disconnected from the state structures in general (2). It holds a policy of
limited openness related to an early stage of economic integration (0.5). With the
exception of Chile, all the countries are core members of Mercosur (0.5). The nature
of non-state actors is combined – criminal gangs on one side and church and NGOs
on the other (0). The spread of weaponry is (mostly) limited, again except for the
remote or excluded areas like slums (1).
5.2 Analysis
Table 5.1, Fig. 5.1, and Maps 5.1 and 5.2 present the outcome of the empirical part
of the research. Map 5.1 presents static results closely following the results, while
Map 5.2 presents dynamic results showing the probable shift of regions in the near
future given the current situation in them. This model takes into consideration the
major shifts in the regions and a potential of the regions to enter new or remain in
the current geopolitical environments. Despite the oversimplifications that were
necessary for the analysis to be possible, the final results offer the basic outline of
the separation of different environments.
For example, https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/

64
kenrapoza/2016/01/29/months-before-rio-olympics-murder-rate-rises-in-brazil/&refURL=https://
www.google.cz/&referrer=https://www.google.cz/
Table 5.1 Position of regions
Region RD BC SF SP NF NT NR A UV PA PB CG IO SR NN SW B
EU+ 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 11 2 3 0 2 2 1 2 2 14
Balkan −1 −1 1 1 1 −1.5 1 1.5 2 3 0 2 0.5 0 1 0 8.5
5.2 Analysis
E Eur. −1 −1 −1 0 −1 −1.5 −1 −6.5 0 −2 −1 0 0 0 0 −1 −4

RUS 3 1 −1 1 1 3 2 10 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 7
Cauc. −2 1 −1 1 1 −1.5 1 −0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Cen. As. 1 −1 −1 0 −1 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
PRC 3 1 −1 1 2 3 2 11 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 5
E Asia 3 2 1 1 1 3 2 13 2 3 0 2 2 0.5 2 2 13.5
SE Asia 3 1 −1 1 0 0 1 5 0 −1 0 2 0.5 0.5 0 −1 1
Oceania 3 2 −1 1 1 3 2 11 2 3 0 2 0 0 2 2 11
Ind. Sp. 1 1 −1 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 −1 0.5
AfPak −2 −1 −2 −1 −1 −3 −1 −11 −2 −2 −1 0 −1 0 −2 −2 −10
Iran 3 2 −1 0 2 3 2 11 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
Turkey 3 1 −1 1 2 0 1 6 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3
Mesop. −2 −2 −2 −1 −2 −3 −1 −13 −2 −4 −2 0 −1 0 −2 −2 −13
Gulf 3 2 1 1 2 3 2 14 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 1 8
West ME 1 1 −1 0 −1 −1.5 1 −0.5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 −1 1
N Afr. −1 −2 −2 −1 −2 −3 −1 −12 −2 −4 −2 −2 −1 0 −2 −2 −14
NW Afr. −1 −1 −1 0 −1 −1.5 −1 −6.5 0 −1 0 0 −1 0 −2 −2 −6
Horn −2 −1 −2 −1 −2 −3 −1 −12 −2 −2 −1 −2 −1 0 −2 −2 −12
E Africa 1 1 −2 0 1 3 1 5 0 3 0 2 0.5 0 0 −1 4.5
Cen. Afr. −2 −2 −2 −1 −2 −3 −1 −13 −2 −4 −2 −2 −1 0 −2 −2 −15
S Africa 1 1 −1 0 1 3 2 7 0 3 0 2 0 0.5 0 −1 4.5
W Africa −1 −1 −1 0 −1 0 −1 −5 −2 −1 −1 0 −1 0 0 −2 −7
N Am. 3 2 1 1 1 3 1 12 2 3 1 2 0.5 0.5 2 1 12
Cen Am. 1 −1 −1 0 −1 3 1 2 −2 3 −1 2 0 0 −2 −2 −2
Caribb. 1 1 −1 0 1 3 2 7 0 3 −1 2 0 0 0 −1 3
NS Am. 1 1 −1 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 −1 −2
91
SS Am. 3 1 1 1 1 0 2 9 2 3 0 2 0.5 0.5 0 1 9

Fig. 5.1 Position of regions inside the research triangle
Map 5.1 A neomedieval map – static
Reading the results, we can observe specific dynamics that currently occurs
inside the international system. Especially the outlook of the outcomes projected
into the research triangle establishes the notion that the weakening of a state is con-
nected to its move toward the Chaotic Anarchy part of the neomedieval spectrum,
while the strong states shift to the other pole. It remains to be seen whether the three
regions (EU+, North America, East Asia) that move most closely to the left –
Durable Disorder – and potentially Oceania where similar development can be
expected mainly due to the situation in Australia and New Zealand will in the future
undergo a state retreat as promoted by the neomedieval theory or whether their
5.2 Analysis 93
Map 5.2 A neomedieval map – dynamic
states keep their sustainably strong role in the regional geopolitical environment.
Example of the possible divergence of the development of the environment is the
EU+. In case of the strengthening of the supranational and common institutions
combined with a process of privatization, the region might move closer to the
Durable Disorder scenario. Already now we can see this shift at least at the symboli-
cal level with many places presented as identified by the combination of local,
national, and supranational identity – as is the case of the majestic aula in Karolinum,
the oldest building of Charles University founded in 1348. There we can find three
flags – regional (city of Prague), national (Czech Republic), and supranational
(European Union) – standing next to each other with none given more focus than the
other. If the populist and nationalist voices grow stronger and more powerful, the
region will be shifting back to the center of the model. This is the idea of movements
appearing throughout the Europe that were most successfully manifested in the
British vote to leave the common union in 2016. Similarly, would the USA follow
the liberalization and connectivity of the past decade, they are likely to move closer
to the Durable Disorder part of the spectrum. On the other hand, a recent rebuff con-
nected to the election of Donald Trump and his nationalizing and anti-trade initia-
tives might increase the opposing forces that would keep the USA inside the
Westphalian world. In Oceania, the future might bring a divergence between net-
working Australia and the New Zealand, and some of the Pacific Islands more
closely following relationships with and geopolitical logic of China. On the other
hand, regions with a robust political centralization like Turkey, Iran, or Gulf states
are more likely to remain inside the Westphalian world.
It can be seen that there are currently no regions firmly set inside the Durable
Disorder environment. The two regions that appear in green on the static map are on
the borders of the three geopolitical environments and constitute more anomalies
shifting toward the Westphalian world rather than genuine transfer of their geopo-
litical environment toward post-modern networked and connected setting. Many
regions are to some degree still following the Westphalian model without a visible
shift toward either one or the other neomedieval scenarios. It seems that unlike the
proposed model, states still ensure their dominance even in the liberal globalizing
part of the world while choosing different strategy compared to those in the
Westphalian world. Nevertheless, we may observe an important number of regions
located clearly in the Chaotic Anarchy part of the spectrum. This distinction among
the environments tending toward Durable Disorder, those holding to the Westphalian
model, drifting to the Chaotic Anarchy, and witnessing Chaotic Anarchy is crucial
for the following analysis of the adaptation of the political units and interaction
among the different spaces.
The empirical analysis thus points to some crucial points in relation to the pre-
sented theoretical framework. The 1990s Eurocentric neomedieval literature is not
corresponding with the global reality. Even the European space is still empirically
Westphalian, nevertheless, with a potential future (gradual) shift probable. There are
specific qualitative shifts inside the Westphalian world that set apart the closed and
opened regions. Development of some sort of a Durable Disorder environment is
still a bid for the future and will not come through some dramatic one-time event.
Decreased capacity of state institution is so far connected to the decrease in stability
and appearance of the Chaotic Anarchy environment.
Effects on the International System
6
The following chapter will present two issues that are connected to the previous
analysis and sketch the consequences of the transformation of the global system.
The chapter will present two interrelated topics – an adaptation of the political units
on the changes in the system and the interaction among different types of geopoliti-
cal spaces. In both parts, the overall trends and some examples are examined. The
analysis looks at contemporary effects of the Chaotic Anarchy, the Westphalian sys-
tem, and regions heading toward the Durable Disorder. The analysis will help us
better grasp the effects of the global system on the political activities of the mem-
bers of the international community.
6.1 Adaptation
Similar to the transformation from the medieval to the modern state system, the new
political units will appear, and the old will have to adapt to the processes that shape
their environment. Each of the environments will require a different set of factors
for the actors to survive and thrive. Every subchapter thus deals with one of the three
geopolitical environments and the adaptations that allow political units inside them
to effectively hold power or successfully survive. It will be argued that the shift of
the EU+, North America, East Asia, and (part of) Oceania toward the Durable
Disorder scenario allows us to observe at least some of these effects, despite the fact
that the empirical analysis established that in all of these three regions, the state
remains rather strong and these regions are in a transition period rather than consti-
tuting a completely separate geopolitical environment.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_6
96 6 Effects on the International System
Seemingly, there is no need for the political actors to adapt inside the part of the
world that remains embedded in a Westphalian state-based model. Nevertheless,
even this space undergoes pressures and changes upon which a state that wishes to
maintain its traditional central role must react. As noted earlier, modern state is
defined by the centralized sovereign authority over a clearly demarcated territory.
Any challenge to its sovereignty, territoriality, or ability to centralize power is thus
a direct challenge to a state as an institution.1 States attempting to keep themselves
inside the traditional Westphalian setting must thus react to effects of such factors
as globalization, regionalism, cybernatization, and state failure.
In reality, two types of reaction toward the process of globalization and regional-
ism can be witnessed among the capable and centralized states – acceptance and
defense. Those states that accept these trends slowly move toward the Durable
Disorder scenario; those who attempt to defend themselves against (at least part of)
these developments try to maintain in the Westphalian framework. The next chapter
will deal with the former option. The latter option will be demonstrated on the cases
of Russia and China. One other point taken here is that the states must also avoid a
slip to the Chaotic Anarchy – the possible survival strategy is to be examined on a
case of North Korea.
The first factor that must be taken into consideration is a reaction to the process
of globalization. As noted at the beginning of this work, globalization is a multifac-
eted issue. We can distinguish, among others, political, cultural, and economic glo-
balization (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). Political globalization is connected to the issue of
an increasing number of interrelations among political actors and growing strength
of the intergovernmental organizations and global governance, thus directly chal-
lenging the central authority of the nation-state (Steger 2009, 58). Cultural global-
ization refers to the increase of cultural flows (as music, movies, languages, etc.)
among different parts of the planet (Steger 2009, 71). Economic globalization
includes the growth of markets and interconnectivity of the various regional markets
(Steger 2009, 38). States wishing to remain in their modern form and establish a
region characterized by the modern international system will approach each of these
forms of globalization differently.
Modern Westphalian states aiming to preserve themselves in a neomedieval era
without the shift toward Durable Disorder must carefully operate between absolute
disconnection from the world flows that would lead them toward instability and
acceptance of the globalization that would increase the role of non-state actors and
flows in general. This means that the neomedieval Westphalian states are more
reserved toward political and cultural globalization while more integrated into (at
least parts of) the global market. Westphalian states do not disregard all of the
international organizations but see them as a way to propagate their goals rather
than as transformative units that would allow for a new power structure to appear.
1
As seen by the reaction on the process of cybernatization by the so-called balkanization of the
Internet in places like China (Schmidt and Cohen 2013, 67–75).
6.1 Adaptation 97
Such approach can be manifested on cases like the UNSC membership or the estab-
lishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or
former BRICS Development Bank.
The disconnection of the different parts of globalization among various political
actors in the Westphalian environment is quite important. Looking at China, we can
see that the country is connected to the benefits (as well as ills) of the economic
globalization. It acts as a large manufacturer, shipping its goods all over the globe.
It serves as a central node of some of the most important trading routes in the con-
temporary world. The most recent manifestation of this process is an establishment
of the One Belt One Road initiative that aims to connect China with Central Asia
and have Europe as its endpoint. Despite clear geopolitical motives for the estab-
lishment of this project, it is also a manifestation of the need to connect the Chinese
economy to new markets (Brewster 2016). China also holds interests according to
the lines of economic globalization in places like the Indian Ocean or sub-Saharan
Africa. On the other hand, China attempts to disconnect itself from other parts of the
globalization – mostly visible in political domain and its efforts to downplay an
existence of universal human rights or importance of Western-style democracy. One
of the projects that manifests the issue is the Great Firewall aiming to censor the
access to the Internet from the Chinese territory as to minimize the impact of the
free flow of information on its population.2 This approach of a controlled connec-
tion is evident in the Chinese strategy since the beginning of its opening to the
global market in the end of the 1970s (Friedberg 2018). This approach to the global-
ization presents a balancing act that aims at strengthening of the central power and
the state in general by economic means without an inclusion of potentially malign
effects that would lead to decreasing of this power via political shift.
Similar practices can also be identified in the Russian Federation. Russian bud-
get is on the one hand heavily dependent on the export of natural resources,3 while
on the other, the Russian political elites try to minimize impact of the outside influ-
ences on its “sovereign democracy.”4 This attempt is connected with a shift toward
a more considerable authoritarianism as well as substantial reliance on conservative
values. This shift characterizes the Putin’s government of at least the last decade.
This all aims to differentiate the country from the liberalizing and interconnected
Durable Disorder environment while keeping profits necessary to keep the state
machinery running. The two cases present a strategy of limited and mainly
economic connection to the world of flows. Somehow different model is adopted by
the political elite in North Korea. The country attempts to completely cut itself from
the globalization forces and decrease its cross-border interactions to minimum. This
is done via establishment of extremely closed authoritarian regime based on an
existence of strong security forces. It chooses very aggressive survival strategy
2
See http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/everything-you-should-know-about-the-
great-firewall-of-china/slows-down-cross-border-internet-traffic/slideshow/59864430.cms
3
See http://www.factosphere.com/pubfinance/budget/budgetstruct
4
See https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democ-
racy_4104.jsp
aiming to retain the state in the Westphalian environment with a government firmly
in control of the country. It thus presents an extreme version of willing disconnec-
tion from the globalized world.5 North Korea does not accept any form of globaliza-
tion and is thus deprived of funding that comes together with the economic opening.
It does not risk entering the Durable Disorder part of the scenario, but it might be
affected by a state failure.
Dominant political actors inside the Westphalian environment thus aim at the
different levels of disconnection from the enhanced process of globalization that
arrives in connection with cybernatization. The level of this disconnection may vary
and can dictate the success of this attempt. Among the actors that do not seek trans-
fer into the Durable Disorder part of the spectrum, we can clearly witness efforts to
limit effects of political and cultural globalization on their societies and strong
incentive to focus on issues like sovereignty, territorial integrity,6 and non-
interference (at least on a limited scale as observable from Russian actions in its
“Near Abroad”). Actors in this level, nevertheless, operate under the shadow of a
double threat. First, their need to operate on the global market may lead to further
adaptation to the networking nature of the post-modern policy and bring the rigid
regimes closer to the Durable Disorder scenario. Second, their attempt to disconnect
themselves from the effects of globalization may send their economy into a col-
lapse, and these countries may find themselves unable to control their territory and
population. Reaction to the first might be selective disconnection (e.g., the Chinese
Great Firewall), the response to the second is usually a more significant focus on the
role of security services and foreign policy (e.g., Russian actions in Ukraine/Syria
and systematic constitution of domestic perception of NATO as an existential threat;
North Korean development of nuclear weapons and support for the police state with
large military forces). Finally, there are regions that willingly strive to shift to the
interconnected post-modern environment – Durable Disorder.
6.1.2 Durable Disorder
Political actors moving into the realm of Durable Disorder need to amend their
modus operandi to be able to fully exploit the opportunities arising from the new
constellation and ameliorate threats that appear. Despite the fact that this environ-
ment is so far only more a theoretical model than practice, we can observe some
practical steps that are undertaken in regions closing to this geopolitical setting and
analyze some of the processes that characterize the transformation that takes place.
As the environment is still in the process of shaping, we can mostly observe
transformational processes that distinguish the regions from the Westphalian closed
system – embracing globalization, enlargement without clear territorial limitation,
5
For a discussion over the North Korean adaptation to the neomedievalism, see also Doboš (2013,
91–100).
6
As evident from laws strongly protecting territorial integrity that were passed in China (Tancredi
2014, 74) and Russia (Maleshin 2014).
6.1 Adaptation 99
and diffusion of functions and power. This all leads to the multiplication of a num-
ber of political actors on a local, regional, and transregional level with both territo-
rial and networking focus. All of these actors consequently need to adapt to the new
realities or risk either dying out or returning to the Westphalian model that has been
observable throughout several countries in the group of regions that closed them-
selves to the transformation to the Durable Disorder environment.
The first adaptations must come from the side of states that to a certain degree
begin to lose their authority in many aspects of the decision-making. Nevertheless,
they are still the prime holder of sovereignty and authority over means of violence.
They also still serve as a primary creator and enforcer of the legal system. In this
way, the state recalls the same institution from the Westphalian environment. The
shift, however, lies in its embrace of globalization and willingness to pool its sover-
eignty with other like-minded state actors. Additionally, the environment and its
power brokers have a limit set of tools to use in their arsenal of foreign policymak-
ing as they need to be perceived as credible and legitimate (Pänke 2019, 109); oth-
erwise, the soft-power attraction would be lost and the space would reverse to a
Westphalian state of affairs. This shift is manifesting in the establishment of many
different organizations with collective decision-making and enforceable rules (most
prominently the EU) and opening of borders for different types of flows. The pro-
cess is not straightforward (e.g., cancellation of the US participation in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership under the Trump administration), but the states realize that in
order to adapt to the new environment defined by flows, globalization, and multipli-
cation of relevant actors, the focus on strictly defined territorial sovereignty and
larger control of its political, cultural, and economic system on purely domestic
level makes them less effective. They, to a large extent, follow what A.-M. Slaughter
calls Open Order Building where the institution of state must remain relevant in
many functions (like security) but will have a decreased impact on other spheres of
social reality and decision-making (Slaughter 2017, 204–228). Similar, yet less
ambitious, course of action is also advised by (Colgan 2019).
An ability to operate on an independent level enables establishment of sociopo-
litical units and actors on sub-state or regional level. These actors address many
issues no longer sanctioned by a state. The range of actors is broad, from cross-
border initiatives to sub-state units, to cities, and to civil society groups, and covers
a large number of topics. B. Barber (2013) in his work maps some of these efforts
undertaken by cities. Nevertheless, the same can be written about other actors as
well. As a case in point, recent attempts of California in relation to the mitigation of
the climate change can be highlighted – move that was conducted despite the fact
that the Trump administration since early 2017 undermines obligations pledged by
the previous government.7 This is unthinkable in states inside the Westphalian envi-
ronment. Similar efforts are undertaken by groups and individuals empowered by
the access to the cyberspace with global agenda promoting different goals and thus
shape the nature of parts of the globalization. Economic globalization in this part of
7
See, for example, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/california-climate-change-cap-
trade.html
the world is increasingly dominated by large supranational organizations as pointed

previously by D. Rothkopf (2008), and they play a balancing game with the local
political units increasingly resembling the theorized Durable Disorder pillar system.
The power of the state and the differentiation of the pillars are, however, still not far
enough to talk about a fully developed Durable Disorder system.
On the international scene, the countries aiming for the networked model of exis-
tence attempt to increase their strength by sharing not by militarization. This coop-
eration is visible in all aspects of the international politics. In security provision,
alliances and treaties centered on the USA from both sides – be it NATO or the US
guarantees for countries like Japan or South Korea – are a clear example. In eco-
nomic cooperation, we can see unprecedented effort to harmonize markets inside
the EU and increased the amount of economic cooperation inside the newly emerg-
ing environment as professed by for now buried Trans-Pacific Partnership and
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or successfully negotiated
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Regional actors also
attempt to set the global regimes on issues ranging from trade (through the World
Trade Organization) to the outer space utilization (European proposal of Code of
Conduct). Unlike Westphalian states that cherish territorially defined sovereignty
and are skeptical about many aspects of globalization, the regions moving toward
the Durable Disorder part of a spectrum adapt to pooling of sovereignty, decreasing
role of territoriality inside the region, utilization of soft power, and networking to
achieve some of the goals and cooperation in critical spheres such as defense. These
tendencies are observable with different strength across these regions with higher
US focus on sovereignty, higher level of pooling of the same inside the EU, etc. The
shifting regions are highly dynamic, and the pooling and pillar creation is not a
completed process. The future outlook from functional, territorial, and security per-
spective is thus still not set.
What is also important for the adaptation of the political entities is the transfor-
mative nature of the environment. This shift from a clearly established Westphalian
structure to the Durable Disorder characterized by a lesser level of stability and
hierarchy brings with itself specific issues. It can be argued that troubles connected
to the stability of Euro as a currency or British exit from the EU are in sync with this
trend. Also, the unwillingness of some parts of the EU to fully support some of its
decisions (recently most notably connected to the refugee crisis) points at the
uneven structure that is directly connected to the nature of the newly emerging
space. Similarly, the backlash to globalization mirrored in the election of Donald
J. Trump as the US president points at the issues connected to the similar transfor-
mation in North America. The change to a less hierarchical and orderly environment
will not go without troubles, and it is not set that it will be completed. There are
large portions of societies that are yet to adapt to the new networked globalized
model of politics/economy, and these parts of society are often feeling left behind
supporting political streams opposing the shift toward the Durable Disorder.
Nevertheless, the irregularities and backlashes are not signs of the dissolution of
these spaces but of the steady shift to the Durable Disorder scenario. If the EU was
to establish a clear hierarchical federal state, this would mean a return back to a
6.1 Adaptation 101
form of Westphalian model. The same would be true with the end of the pooling,
sharing, and networking processes among the regional actors.
6.1.3 Chaotic Anarchy
The third type of geopolitical environment, political actors need to adapt to, is the
Chaotic Anarchy. As noted earlier, this kind of environment hosts numerous types
of different political actors with state often playing no or only limited role. The
main reason for the state existence is often keeping the head of state in power. This
is often manifested in a lack of bureaucracy and state capacity building by rulers
who fear that capable state institutions would challenge their power (Reno, Warlord
Politics and African States 1998). Many of the rulers act in a way that makes the
binary nature of geopolitics – state/non-state – de facto irrelevant. The distinction
between the two turns into a continuum with unrecognized self-centered non-state
actors on one side, recognized state attempting to establish institutions on the other,
and self-centered government not establishing institution while keeping sovereignty
protection on the international stage in the middle. The nature and adaptations of
these actors, especially to the violent environments, widely differ (Raeymaekers
et al. 2008; Staniland 2012). As an example, one may look at the development of the
Chadian army. This previously ineffective force was made comparatively gradually
robust due to the need of the ruling elite to protect itself against the attacks of east-
ern separatists capable of reaching the capital N’Djamena. Another reason was to
protect the elite from possible coup d’état held by part of the army with lower level
of commitment to the ruling clique (Hicks 2015, 16–38). This same army is cur-
rently capable of playing a part in efforts to contain Boko Haram forces in northern
Nigeria. Similarly, Pakistan is dominated by Punjabi ethnic group, and the state
institutions are predominantly established to keeping the members of this group in
power (Bennett Jones 2009, 43–75, 226–290). Another region heading toward the
Chaotic Anarchy environment is Central America, where we can observe a retreat of
a state as well. This retreat takes place in the face of the inability of the security
forces to face the growing power of narcomafias, thus protecting only limited por-
tions of state’s territory, while remaining able of limited incursions against the vio-
lent non-state actors without a capacity to hold on the territory for a protracted
period of time (e.g., slums in large cities). We can clearly observe that as the power
of the state decreases, it is not only unable to provide basic functions to its popula-
tion, but its level of territorial control will decrease, and its boundaries move closer
to the seat of power. In case of the Central American countries that yet still did not
enter the Chaotic Anarchy, this means reduced ability to control the whole territory
at all time. For Pakistan, this means abandoning parts of its territory (northwest and
part of Balochistan). In places like Mali or Afghanistan, the army controls capital,
its neighborhood, and some strategic hubs. In places like Somalia, the center of
power needed to be temporarily moved out of country altogether. In some cases, like
Sudan, the state forces rely on the utilization of violent non-state actors to provide
power projection capability on its territory (Schneckener 2017).
This outcome leaves a power vacuum to be filled by different types of non-

state actors that operate in different ways. A level of inclusion of various actors
reflects the nature of a power vacuum left for them by the state and traditional
actors. In this way, Al-Shabaab between 2009 and 2011 successfully controlled
large portions of southern Somalia, providing basic governance and legal frame-
work for its population. It also conducted a basic economic activity connected to
trade (mainly via port city of Kismayo), smuggling of sugar and charcoal around
the Kenyan borders, and other activities. Al-Shabaab was also capable of conduct-
ing semi-conventional military activity against actors connected to the Somali
government (Doboš 2016). Similarly, paramilitary groups in Colombia (despite
not being ranked as in Chaotic Anarchy region, but in specifics on local level
manifesting similar development unnoticed on a macrolevel) successfully
control(led) large swaths of land inaccessible by the governmental forces to wage
an insurgency and conduct drug production and trade operations.8 Similarly,
Ejército Zapatista De Liberación Nacional, better known as Zapatistas, was able
to fill the territorial void left by the Mexican government in the southern Mexico
(Ross 2019). The same can be repeated for many parts of the world where differ-
ent non-state actors successfully filled territorial void left by state and traditional
actors like in Syria-Iraq (Daesh), Afghanistan (Taliban), southern Lebanon
(Hezbollah), Mali (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine), and more. These
actors need to adapt their strategies in relation to the opposition pressure caused
by either domestic or external actors that to a large degree decrease the ability of
the non-state actors to hold territory. The type of the operations of the violent non-
state actors is also connected to their ability to establish some form of order
among the population on the territory of its activity and nature of this order
(Arjona 2016, 26–29). There are also nonviolent non-state actors operating in the
regions. Nevertheless, without the protection of some other actors, their reach is
very limited, as can be presented on the case of Yemen and efforts to provide
humanitarian relief to its population (Almosawa et al. 2017). Types of operation
of different actors to a large extent resemble strategies of roving and stationary
bandits as presented by Olson (1993).
There are also different ways of adapting to the local environment. These usu-
ally reflect the local environment and culture either in accepting or rejecting way.
The former might be exemplified in a case of political marketplace as described by
A. de Waal. A. de Waal convincingly argues that the political relations in the Horn
of Africa reflect the money-services relationship and that possession of funds is
key for any political actor to succeed in the area. A level of adaptation of different
actors to this environment then determines their success (de Waal 2015). Another
example is the attempt of Al-Qaeda affiliates to merge with a local population to
receive acceptance and possibly dominate the local political environment (as
exemplified by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Zimmerman 2017)). The latter
can also be illustrated by the Al-Shabaab attempts to dismantle Somali clan struc-
ture to strengthen its message of pan-Islamism and Somali nationalism (in its
For an examination of the nature of the governance inside Colombia, see Arjona (2016).
8
6.1 Adaptation 103
Table 6.1 Adaptations
Nonviolent non-state Violent non-state
Environment State actors actors
Westphalian Disconnection, territorial Submission to state Anti-state struggle,
protection state-controlled
militias
Durable Networking, Networking, functional Cooperation with
Disorder privatization, attempt to and territorial state (private military
dominate regulatory specialization, survival of companies), terrorism
framework the fittest
Chaotic Limited protection of the Provision of basic Liquid strategy
Anarchy power center functions, basic
community bound
earlier phases) (Mwangi 2012, 514). A similar process was observable in the
Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor where the Islamic State attempted to weaken the
tribal structure by imposing strict Islamic rule, overtaking security provision, and
incorporating local population into its socioeconomic structure (Heras et al. 2017).
There is also an interesting cooperation among market forces and Islamic move-
ments taking place in places like Afghanistan or Somalia. This interaction appears
to establish a mutually reinforcing novel proto-state type of social structures
(Ahmad 2017).
As this kind of environment is the most complicated one, one may find many
different forms of adaptations that took place in relation to the economic activity
as well. Given weak law-enforcement mechanisms on ground and presence of
nearby shipping lines, piracy was a large business in Somalia for a large part of the
2000s. Jihadist groups in northern Africa overtook old smuggling lines to help
them finance themselves (Boeke 2016; Caulderwood 2015). In Afghanistan,
Taliban tapped on the local production of opium and consequently heroin (Peters
2009). The whole jihadist movement in general, to name but one example, presents
quite a varied financing stream adapting to the local environment (Neumann 2017).
While the Durable Disorder pushes the political, economic, and societal actors to
operate in networked interaction with other actors and Westphalian system under
the dominance of state, Chaotic Anarchy forces these actors to utilize the local
environment. Actors do not need to adapt to a rapid movement of globalization or
sovereign dominance of state but historical, cultural, geographic, or environmental
specifics of their area of operation. Actors operating in this environment are thus
more liquid, filling the void left by stronger actors and avoiding their areas (both
geographic and functional) of dominance.9 This liquid strategy is one of the critical
factors influencing the strategies of different actors. In the absence of state power,
the extended kinship structures sometimes provide the most reliable security struc-
tures (Hudson and Matfess 2017, 11–12) putting the traditional structures back
into the central position in societies’ social and political life. Table 6.1 presents the
summary of this part of the study.
See among others (Hansen 2019).

9
6.2 Interaction
In the following section, the interaction among the different types of geopolitical
spaces will be analyzed. As we have seen in the development of the international
politics of the past decade, the fault lines along the borders of the geopolitical envi-
ronments as defined by the theoretical and empirical part of this work are deepen-
ing. Be it the troubling relation between the EU and Russia,10 European reaction to
the migration crisis,11 or election of Donald Trump with his slogan about a beautiful
wall,12 there is an increased amount of evidence about a division in the global poli-
tics. The following section will hint at some significant issues in three dyads that
logically emerge in the contemporary world as based on the above-researched theo-
retical model.
6.2.1 Westphalian-Durable Disorder
The first dyad to be introduced is the one between the Westphalian world and soon-
to-be Durable Disorder. It has been empirically examined that no region is firmly
embedded in the Durable Disorder. Nevertheless, as projected, some of the regions
head toward the Durable Disorder future and exhibit some of the features that allow
to present at least some interaction tendencies.13 By looking at the map presented in
the empirical part of the world, one can observe lines of contact in places like East
Asia and the Russian neighborhood. The following section looks at these two
regions of contact to briefly examine the selected strategies of the actors on both
sides of the divide.
To begin with Pacific Asia, there is a clear observable division between the soon-
to-be Durable Disorder region – containing Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – and
the modern Westphalian North Korea and the People’s Republic of China. Despite
the connectedness of both types of actors (besides North Korea, but including
Westphalian Russia also included in the regional geopolitics, even if only in a
smaller degree) to the global trade network, their mutual relations remain edgy.
Korean Peninsula is divided by an almost impenetrable demilitarized zone. Japan
holds many disputes with the PRC, Russia, and North Korea. But while Japan and
South Korea also have disputes among themselves, the strategic setting of the two
camps points at the difference between this type of conflict and the ones along the
line dividing the geopolitical environments.
The primary difference can be observed in a type of defensive postures both sets
of actors utilize. While the PRC and North Korea aim at self-sufficient deterrent – a
10
For example, https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-
russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en
11
For example, http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-refugees-europe-migrants-2016-2
12
For example, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/25/donald-trump-wall-
canada/100894606/
13
That is the reason why “soon-to-be Durable Disorder” is used in this section.
6.2 Interaction 105
move most recently manifested by the North Korean nuclear program – Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan share their defense with common (soon-to-be Durable
Disorder) ally, the USA. This shared defense is a significant strategy for the emerg-
ing Durable Disorder environment that holds a potential to further increase the role
of private actors in the future as well. This approach combined with this networking
approach toward security lies in the heart of the predicted Durable Disorder defense
and security logic. This is not to say that these nations do not establish their indig-
enous capabilities, but they, for example, do not seek independent nuclear
capabilities.
The defense policy is thus the best example to picture the difference between the
nature of actors in these two environments. The example of Koreas exhibits a pic-
ture of a highly centralized military-oriented institution on the one side and a com-
bination of effective military forces combined with the private initiative like the
spread of information to the North on the other.14 The case of North Korea is also an
illustrative example of the different approaches of Westphalian states toward differ-
ent types of actors. While the border to its southern neighbor is tightly sealed, its
northern frontier is much more penetrable to all types of exchanges – both legal
(trade) and illegal (migration). This concrete illustration is burdened by the histori-
cal baggage present in the region but remains the most visible realization of the
divide in the international politics between the two types of environment presented
in this subchapter.
The second set of actors worth looking at is the one defined by an interaction
between Russia and the “West” – mainly Europe. The basic logic here remains the
same – division. While in the North Korean case this division is based on clear
geographical separation by the border hardening process, Russia (given its geogra-
phy15) in recent decades prefers a strategy of shatter-belt creation. This strategy
was already manifested in many regions on the Russian border like Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, or Moldova and presents a de facto alternative to the situation
on the Korean Peninsula even though not even closely as impenetrable. Geography
(and history) once again plays a role – Koreas need tighter division due to their
small area and closeness of population, economic centers, and history of hot con-
flict; Russia attempts to prevent its neighborhood from joining the Western struc-
tures and has largely unbounded geographical scale and history of imperialism.
This shatter-belt creation comprises of setting up of unrecognized states like South
Ossetia or Transnistria and destabilization of regions like the Donbas (Riegl and
Doboš 2018).
The strategy of the Westphalian actors thus clearly follows the separation logic
of their environment. On the other hand, the soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors
seek to engage as many parts of the world as possible and enhance the post-modern
networking logic around the globe. Examples of this can be found in the Sunshine
policy of South Korea (Sundal 2014) that is to be replicated by the government
14
For example, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-23/fighting-north-korea-with-balloons/88
34730
15
See Marshall (2015, 15–32), Kotkin (2016).
elected in 2017, the EU’s Eastern Partnership,16 mediation of the Serbian-Kosovar

conflict,17 or other initiatives aiming at engaging regions outside the networking part
of the world to bring them in – thus following the logic of a neomedieval empire as
described by J. Zielonka (2007).18 While the Westphalian states aim at separating
themselves from the spill-over effects of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environ-
ment, the opposite strategy is the one of engagement and amendment of the
Westphalian actors as to pull them inside the networked world. This is the case with
the engagement of smaller states like Georgia or economically weaker countries
like Ukraine, but also the involvement of NGOs in Russia (prevention of their activ-
ities is another show of separation logic19) or information campaigns targeting the
North Korean public. In the relations between the soon-to-be Durable Disorder
environment and the Westphalian states, the selection of strategies reflects the theo-
rized nature of the actors.
6.2.2 Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy
The second dyad of actors is the one between the Westphalian world and Chaotic
Anarchy. On the above-presented maps, few lines of contact between these two
kinds of actors can be identified – mainly Russia/Ukraine, Saudi Arabia/
Mesopotamia and Yemen, Turkey and Iran/Mesopotamia, India and Iran/AfPak,
East and South Africa/rest of Africa, and potentially South and North America/
Central America.
Despite the significant differences among these dividing lines, we can observe
one re-appearing theme, an intervention of the Westphalian actors in an attempt to
prevent the negative effect spillover in one way and migration flow in the other.
Clearly, Russia/Ukraine node is different as the destabilization of Ukraine into the
Chaotic Anarchy environment was initiated by the Russian intervention and strategy
as noted above. Nevertheless, the flow of migrants from affected regions still takes
place.20 In other regions, the pattern seems to be observable, even though not uni-
form and not universally applicable on each and every case.
Saudi Arabia is directly involved in the Yemeni conflict21 and uses its proxies in
the Syrian conflict and Iraqi power struggle (Phillips 2017); Turkey is militarily
present in the northern Syria and Iraq and hosts around three million refugees from
the region.22 Iran is largely involved in Mesopotamia via its proxies like Hezbollah
16
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eastern-partnership_en
17
For example, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-facilitated-dialogue-belgrade-pristina-relations_en
18
A similar argument is also being developed in Ferguson (2017).
19
For example, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-
foreign-agents-law-to-shackle-and-silence-ngos/
20
For example, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-refugees/floods-of-ukrainian-refu
gees-seek-new-life-in-russia-idUSKCN0HW0UP20141007
21
For example, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423
22
According to http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224
6.2 Interaction 107
or Shiites militias in Iraq (Jeffrey, et al. 2017). In Afghanistan, Iran historically sup-
ports some of the warlords in the western part of that country (Mukhopadhyay
2014). India with Pakistan presents a unique case of states that fenced their border
in a way that their relationship does not follow the pattern. Nevertheless, there are
increasing attempts of India to penetrate Afghanistan.23 Afghans, on the other hand,
fled to Pakistan24 which reflects an era of enhanced stability of Pakistan that took
place in history relative to the contemporary pattern that is dominated by the attempt
to flee to other parts of the world. Westphalian interventionism, as a mean to prevent
spillover of negative effects, re-appears in Africa as evidenced by the intervention of
the Kenyan Defence Force in the Somali conflict (since 2011) or by Burundi and
Uganda (as a part of the African Union mission) forces in the same conflict. On the
contrary, Kenya is an important settling location for the Somali refugees.25
Let us look more closely at two archetypical cases – Turkey and Syria/Iraq and
Kenya/Somalia. Turkey has a long-standing conflict with its Kurdish minority, espe-
cially the PKK (White 2015). As evident by looking at the map, Kurds are settled in
areas not only in Turkey but also in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. For a longer period, Turkey
to some degree cooperated with the representatives of the Kurdish Regional
Government in Iraq who allowed the Turkish army to penetrate its territory in its
pursuit of the PKK members.26 On the other hand, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina
Gel, People’s Protection Units) that are fighting under the umbrella of the Syrian
Defence Forces hold close ties to the PKK (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2017; Gunter
2017). This led to Turkish intervention in the Syrian conflict, an intervention Turkey
long avoided despite many negative impacts related to the strengthening of the
Islamic State on its borders. The so-called Euphrates Shield27 followed by support
for the pro-Turkish opposition groups is a consequence of the interaction of the
negative effects stemming from the Chaotic Anarchy environment on the Westphalian
state. On the contrary, Turkey hosts an enormous number of Syrian refugees and
was a target of numerous terrorist attacks, exemplified by the opposite direction
relationship.
The second case that is an archetype of the pattern of interaction among the two
types of spaces is the Kenya/Somalia dyad. Kenya has been for a protracted period
of time a place of settlement for Somali refugees given its proximity to the conflict
regions, relative stability, and a presence of historical Somali regions in the north-
eastern part of the country.28 Kenyan forces entered Somalia in 2011 as a reaction to
the increased threat posed by Al-Shabaab militias and an attempt to better integrate
the frontier provinces (Doboš 2016; Anderson and McKnight 2014). Despite the
23
For example, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3437668/Why-India-
remains-power-Afghanistan.html
24
For example, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/213557-16-million-Afghan-refugees-still-in-
Pakistan
25
See Rawlence (2016).
26
Riegl et al. (2017).
27
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/syria-euphrates-shield.htm
28
See Rawlence (2016).
mixed result of the intervention (re-appearance of Al-Shabaab, increase in the num-

ber of spectacular attacks on Kenyan soil), the strategy selected follows the above-
mentioned pattern.
6.2.3 Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy
The final dyad consists of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment and the
Chaotic Anarchy. The areas of contact can be identified as the European maritime
frontier, border of the EU, and Ukraine/Moldova; possibly the USA/Mexico border
will fall into this group as well. The dyad of the EU/Ukraine and Moldova consti-
tutes a specific case as the border follows a stable part of these countries, and the
destabilization is caused mainly by a foreign intervention that leads to an introduc-
tion of the different set of policies.
Soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors seek to introduce an interconnected, net-
worked space of flows that would establish a basic logic of social, economic, and
political behavior inside the region. This, however, does not reflect its policies
toward its neighborhood in a qualitatively different geopolitical environment. While,
as presented earlier, soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors tend to spread their envi-
ronment by incorporating actors from the Westphalian world, the approach toward
Chaotic Anarchy is different – separation and stabilization.
Both reactions stem from the need to prevent spillover of negative trends into a
highly mobile internal environment of the networked societies. Separation is iden-
tifiable in the newly built/proposed border barriers that are aiming to prevent this
form of spillover. We are witnessing an appearance of this form of border barriers
all over the world with a pattern at the above-identified fault lines. Spain protects
its African exclaves Ceuta and Melilla as well as the maritime border,29 numerous
walls emerged as a consequence of the migration crisis on the Balkans, and one of
the most vocal promises of Donald J. Trump throughout his presidential campaign
contained establishment of border wall with Mexico. No matter the role or effec-
tiveness of these proposals regarding the changing border regimes or a role of
sovereignty in the affected regions,30 this search for separation is quite obvious.
This separation is not total, and there are many connecting points among the two
environments on all levels of human society, but unlike the attempt to incorporate
more stable parts of the world, the need to prevent negative spillover is quite
strongly visible.
The second strategy is that of stabilization. As the networking world seeks
enlargement, it needs to stabilize parts of the world that present a threat to the stabil-
ity of this environment and its enlargement. Durable Disorder actors are prone
toward stabilization missions in distinct areas of instability that are threatening their
security. As an example, one can mention French operations in the Sahel region
29
For example, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/02/hundreds-of-refugees-try-to-
scale-fence-dividing-morocco-and-spanish-enclave
30
See Pusterla and Piccin (2012), Rosiere and Jones (2012).
6.2 Interaction 109
against the activities of the violent non-state actors there. France intervened in Mali
following the collapse of its security apparatus in the face of the mixed Tuareg
nationalist and Ansar Dine-led Islamist uprising. Since then, the French-led
European forces operate in the area to prevent the negative effects of smuggling,
terrorism, and migration connected to the decrease of the security in Europe (Wing
2016). Similar logic can be found behind the NGO work in places like Western
Africa with the ultimate security perspective of stabilizing the region for the local
population to prevent massive migration and spread of epidemics to name at least
some threats. The EU accession requirements31 also reflect this strategy.
The strategies following the opposite direction are rooted in an unstable nature
of the geopolitical environment. Actors aiming at interaction with the soon-to-be
Durable Disorder environment seek to utilize its borderless networking nature to its
different ends. In here, two most debated ways of this interaction will be presented.
The first is the utilization of the flows to conduct acts of violence. Despite the fact
that the nature of the violent attacks planned or inspired by the violent non-state
actors has in the past decade decreased in its sophistication, it far better utilizes the
nature of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder networking world. Freedom of move-
ment and information gives disenfranchised segments of population possibility to
reach violent propaganda and instructions on how to conduct a “lone-wolf attack”
(e.g., in Inspire or Dabiq magazines). Strategy utilized toward destabilization of the
“West” than follow the path of radicalization of the local population and utilization
of the deficiencies of the democratic process that allow right-wing populists to
quickly get a strong voice and further cast fuel into the fire.32 Right timing can
indeed change the countries’ policies as evident from the impact of the 2004 Madrid
bombing on consequent Spanish election (Wright 2016, 147–166).
A similar principle can be found among the migrant population escaping con-
flicts or just thriving to improve their economic situation by moving to safer and
more prosperous regions of the networking part of the globe. A large portion of this
population has made use of the nature of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environ-
ment to move throughout the region to the parts with more hospitable policies.
Given the decreased restrictions on movement and widespread access to informa-
tion, the utilization of these possibilities to nonviolent means follows similar logic
as the previous argument.
Finally, actors holding political and military power often utilize attempts by the
soon-to-be Durable Disorder political actors to prevent negative spillovers to
increase their capital. The foreign aid given to these regimes despite their low level
of effectiveness and disregard to human and civil rights and the rule of law, not
mentioning development, strengthens otherwise very weak and challenged regimes
in places like sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt, or the AfPak region. Political actors from
networking part of the globe usually prefer stability and decrease in possible spill-
overs over values that are inherently connected with the Durable Disorder part of
the world (at least for now). Table 6.2 summarizes the interactions.
31
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en
32
See, for example, Fihsman (2016).
Table 6.2 Interactions
X Westphalian Chaotic Anarchy Durable Disorder
Westphalian X Intervention, Separation
separation
Chaotic Spillover X Utilization of internal networks,
Anarchy obtaining resources
Durable Incorporation Separation, X
Disorder stabilization
Despite a definitive distinction among strategies related to different dyads, we

can observe certain patterns of behavior that to some degree support the existence
of pillars of society as theorized by J. Friedrichs and others. First of all, it seems that
the state “political-pillar” actors in all three environments seek stability. In Chaotic
Anarchy environment, this means obtaining enough resources to stay in power and
in charge of resource redistribution. In the Westphalian world, this need is mani-
fested by an attempt of states to control economic and social spheres of life and
prevent intervention from other actors. In Durable Disorder, the same phenomenon
is demonstrated in an attempt to shield the environment from the external negative
spillovers. Economic actors, in a similar manner, seek mobility – utilizing state
weakness, attempting to obtain better deals, and using the networks to enhance its
productivity. Social actors then usually seek to improve the quality of life of the
inhabitants, no matter how they perceive the idealized end state (socially just soci-
ety, clan hierarchy, Islamic Caliphate, etc.).
Impact on Selected Regions
7
To provide a more precise and fuller picture regarding the possibilities that the
above-presented analysis of the international order brings, the next chapter is dedi-
cated to a more in-depth analysis of selected cases that point at the issues raised.
Similarly to the previous chapter, cases are divided between adaptation and inter-
action. They also follow the division of the world politics into three systems. In the
first case, cases from all three worlds are analyzed. They are also divided along the
lines of the three basic types of actors that are relevant for this study – violent non-
state actor (Somali Al-Shabaab), state actor (People’s Republic of China), and
nonviolent non-state actor (Facebook). Interactions are also presented along the
three possible dyads of relations – Durable Disorder-Westphalian (EU-Russia),
Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy (EU-Sahel), and Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy
(Turkey-Syria).
The reason for the case selection is the following: Al-Shabaab was the most suc-
cessful territorial organization connected to AL-Qaeda and also the most successful
non-state actor operating in the Somali environment that can be called a prototype
of Chaotic Anarchy geopolitical setting. The PRC is probably the biggest challenger
of the US-led system with a strong authoritarian drive strengthening under the cur-
rent Xi Jinping’s presidency. Facebook is a large private organization that estab-
lishes an entirely new product, is present worldwide, is heavily dependent on the
presence online, and is in disputes with the state administrations in all corners of the
world. All three thus provide fitting examples of the theorized adaptations.
Furthermore, the three dyads representing the relationships between the geopolitical
settings are also selected to be as illustrative as possible. As the EU is the closest
region to the Durable Disorder political organization, the two dyads related to
Durable Disorder incorporate the organization. Last, but not least, the Turkey-Syria
relationship changed dramatically throughout the twenty-first century, clearly point-
ing at the difference between state-to-state relations and Westphalian-Chaotic
Anarchy one. The aim of this section is to present the theoretical model on concrete
cases that fit the model to illustrate the argument at hand better.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_7
112 7 Impact on Selected Regions
7.1 Adaptation
This section analyzes the ways how qualitatively different actors adapted to the
nature of the political environment in which they operate. The case of Somalia is a
prototypical example of state failure, and Al-Shabaab operates inside a context that
allows for the utilization of the liquid strategy. PRC is a traditional centralizing
Westphalian state adapting to the increased levels of globalization in the world.
Facebook is a huge company that needs to operate inside regulations set by the state
actors primarily inside the Durable Disorder environment.
7.1.1 Al-Shabaab
Somalia is a prime example of state failure that is observable since at least the fall
of Siad Barre in 1991. Since Barre’s escape from the country, a wide variety of dif-
ferent actors appeared and disappeared on its territory ranging from those attempt-
ing to establish formal state institutions like in the case of Somaliland to groups
violently utilizing the situation on the ground to achieve their particular goals – e.g.,
warlords. The country began to collapse in the face of the strong internal opposition
to Barre’s policies throughout the 1980s, but the final defeat of the strongmen and
his exit from the country in 1991 moved the country into total anarchy. The opposi-
tion groups, united in their struggle against Barre, had no other common bound and
started to fight against each other. This struggle was further aggravated by the
strengthening of clan identification that further separated the population and was
utilized by armed groups with competing interests.
The former British protectorate of Somaliland located to the north of the country
and also the place where the armed rebellion against Barre’s rule was the strongest
declared independence and remains in a category of unrecognized states up until
today. The entity developed, in the regional context, somewhat effective and demo-
cratic institutions and is the most stable and sustainable part of what is internation-
ally recognized as Somalia. It is also in contact with some of the countries like
Ethiopia that uses the port of Berbera for part of its maritime trade or the United
Arab Emirates using the same port for military purposes. Bordering Somaliland
from the east is the semiautonomous province of Puntland. Despite the fact that the
region never declared independence, it acts as a de facto independent unit officially
supporting federative Somalia with Puntland as one of the parts of the federation.
Puntland declared its autonomous status in 1998 and establishes the second more
stable region inside Somalia. It is, however, weaker in all aspects of the governmen-
tal performance than Somaliland and is arguably less posited to any international
cooperation. For example, while Somaliland aided the anti-piracy operations around
Somalia, Puntland government was reportedly directly tied to the pirate leaders
(Bruton 2010).
Finally, there is the south of the country where a wide variety of actors and units
appeared. From proto-states like Jubaland to local traditional actors to roving war-
lords to Islamist groups like Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (who already in 1991 faced the
7.1 Adaptation 113
issues of inability to face the state institutions (Maruf and Jospeh 2018, 23), a rele-
vant point for the sake of this chapter), the south witnessed it all. Despite the inter-
national attempts to stabilize the situation, most prominently manifested by the UN
missions to the country that took place between 1992 and 1995, the south never had
an effective government. The attempts to set up foreign-supported, internationally
recognized government like the Transitional National Government or Transitional
Federative Government were usually either purely externally backed (to the point
that they were sometimes incapable of even being seated in the capital of Mogadishu)
or dominated by one of the clans and perceived (and utilized) as a way for that clan
to get to the power. This development opened a space for the alternative actors to
establish their hold on the territory and fill the spaces emptied by state institutions.
Clans, in this respect, play an important role as an explanation of the fault lines
inside the Somali political and social life. While the primordial nature of the clann-
ism is disputed, and the utilization of this form of identity is much more instrumen-
tal (Gaas 2019), the clans play an essential role for the Somalis. The Somali society,
while ethnically and religiously homogeneous, is divided into several clans that are
further subdivided, establishing a very complex system. The main clans include
Digil, Rahanweyn, Hawiye, Dir, Isaq, and Darod (Lewis 2011, 109), and many of
the units and governmental efforts revolve around a clan lineage.
A prominent actor operating in the twenty-first century inside anarchical south-
ern Somalia utilizing the liquid strategy is Al-Shabaab. Since the collapse of the
state institutions in Somalia, the primary security concern was the unchecked power
of warlords, maintaining a predatory strategy in order to obtain increased resources
for their self-interested goals. The local population was organizing self-protection
units in order to enhance its ability to survive in such a violent context, out of which
the so-called Islamic courts emerged as the most successful adaptation of the social
environment to the violent threat. These local initiatives that managed to organize
the political space around the traditional values based on the combination of sharia
law and the traditional Somali law code called xeer, consequently, united them-
selves in the so-called Islamic Court Union (ICU). ICU, given its ability to present
a clear legal framework and basic security combined with military capability, soon
became the dominant force in the south of the country despite the fact that it included
even some radical elements. The introduction of some form of a predictable envi-
ronment was a welcomed change for the population living in the area (see Hansen
2013; Maruf and Jospeh 2018).
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Young Fighters) is a radical
Islamist group that gained notoriety throughout the post-2006 period. Initially a
fringe, radical, and militarily effective group inside the ICU that briefly managed to
take control over large portions of southern Somalia including majority of
Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab became the primary opposing force to the activities of the
Ethiopian and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces operating
inside Somalia following the 2006 invasion of the Ethiopian troops into the southern
part of the country. Here, the first adaptation presents itself. Al-Shabaab operated as
a local opposition toward a foreign invasion (utilizing to a limited nature the Somali
nationalism), a somehow known actor with historical ties to the ICU that served as
a stabilization force in the region and an option for the locals to live in a predictable,
even if harsh, environment. Al-Shabaab of that time was no match for the regular
forces of the Ethiopian army and other forces operating in the region. It thus devel-
oped a strategy of the non-territorial armed opposition and the war of attrition that
should have led to the retreat of the foreign troops from the region. The sought-after
retreat would, afterward, allow for the power vacuum to reappear, which could be
filled by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab operated as a de-territorialized terrorist group/
insurgency that targeted the foreign troops via hit-and-run attacks without an estab-
lishment of important permanent control that would be vulnerable to targeting and
avoiding direct battles with a militarily superior enemy. By 2009, the Ethiopian
troops finally retreated, leaving behind a small number of Ugandan and Burundi
AMISOM forces and poorly trained national armed forces with a low level of
morale (Hansen 2013; Doboš 2016; Maruf and Jospeh 2018).
In this moment, Al-Shabaab went through another transformation as the political
and security environment allowed it to fill the territorial and functional holes appear-
ing in the south of Somalia that neither the remaining external AMISOM troops nor
the national institutions and security forces were capable of filling (as evident from
the Al-Shabaab’s ability to occupy the city of Baidoa near Mogadishu just after the
Ethiopian retreat (Maruf and Jospeh 2018, 78)). Al-Shabaab appeared as the ablest
actor to control territory in the region and slowly occupied major populated territo-
ries. It not only gained military dominance over the countryside but also took over
some key towns like the port city of Kismaayo or parts of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab
set up a system of roadblocks in order to control movement through its territories
that were reasonably well organized, and it set up clear, if brutal and sometimes
arbitrary, legal code and began to implement basic administrative functions – the
locals not targeted by Al-Shabaab were facing a stable and comparatively safe envi-
ronment with significantly lower levels of crime and violence involved. It also
attempted to standardize the curriculum for schools and establish educational pro-
grams for the wider population where its ideology would be presented (Hansen
2013, 84). This extremist stability was even preferred by the economic class that
could not operate in the anarchical security environment (Ahmad 2017). Despite its
radical ideology, it operated in a way that allowed for the development of basic
governance institutions. This way, it got access to important financial means as well
as population centers, and it seemed that it would be capable of replicating the ICU
feat of somewhat effective control over southern Somalia that was since the early
1990s unmatched by any other actor. While being perceived as a hostile actor from
abroad – especially in the context of the so-called War on Terror – and some local
opposition to its harsh and sometimes arbitrary punishments, increasing throughout
the time, it was still capable of generating comparatively orderly societal organiza-
tion (Doboš 2016).
Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab still did not meet the criteria of a group capable of
challenging regular state armed forces of any other state, but its own internationally
recognized government and the number of fighters and members, in general, were
for the purposes of defeating the intervening forces quite low. This limit became
apparent throughout the botched-up Ramadan Offensive in 2010 when Al-Shabaab
7.1 Adaptation 115
troops attacked AMISOM forces ending up defeated. The losses of fighters in just
this one battle caused Al-Shabaab to become less able to conduct any sustained
activity. The Ramadan Offensive thus points at one specific characteristic of the ter-
ritorial operations of the violent non-state actors in the Chaotic Anarchy environ-
ment – its limits vis-à-vis able state institutions. The event was preceded by the
internal struggle over the wisdom of attacking the conventional military forces by
conventional means; nevertheless, A. Godane successfully pushed through his idea
of attacking Makkah al Mukarramah road (connecting the seat of government in
Villa Somalia and the international airport) in Mogadishu that aimed at isolating
around 40 percent of the AMISOM troops in Somalia that were located in Villa
Somalia that would leave them surrounded by the Al-Shabaab forces. The attack
itself took place on August 23, 2010. Despite the initial success, it was soon clear
that the Al-Shabaab troops were in direct combat inferior to the regular army units.
This was especially the case following the introduction of reinforcements and
armored vehicles by the Ugandan AMISOM forces. After 2 weeks of fighting,
Al-Shabaab attacking power decreased as the time went, and when the offensive
finally stopped in mid-September, it was estimated that the group lost some 500 to
700 fighters with more being injured that meant a loss of some 25 percent of its
fighting power including many leaders. The event also costs Al-Shabaab a substan-
tial amount of finances (Hansen 2013, 100–102; Maruf and Jospeh 2018,
103–113).
Also, throughout the same period, and enhanced by the losses, the internal power
struggle led to killing or defection of many key members of the movement leaving
internationalist Ahmed Godane as the sole key leader causing Al-Shabaab to focus
on its international side (proclamation of allegiance to Al-Qaeda) and anti-clanism
even more than before. Al-Shabaab thus became part of the wider Al-Qaeda net-
work inside East Africa. In 2011, one more key event led to another redefinition of
Al-Shabaab’s modus operandi. This year was the beginning of the invasion of
another neighbor of Somalia into its territory in the context of already weakening
hold over some central regions and mishandled 2011 drought and famine crisis on
Al-Shabaab territories.1 This time, the invading country was Kenya that was threat-
ened by the Al-Shabaab in its northeast where a large community of Somalis histori-
cally lives as the region became increasingly economically important to the central
Kenyan government (Hansen 2013).
Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) led to another process of de-
territorialization as the less capable Al-Shabaab forces were unable to hold territory
over the Kenyan army incursion. Even though the Kenyan advance was slower than
generally expected, it was at the end capable of pushing Al-Shabaab from all signifi-
cant population and economic centers. This, however, does not mean that Al-Shabaab
would be completely destroyed or pushed away. Intervening troops were unwilling
to sustain territorial control away from the main population and economic centers in
the south of the country, leaving a large yet sparsely populated space for the group
to exploit. Al-Shabaab proved capable of filling the space left void for it to take over.
See Maruf and Jospeh (2018, 121).

1
It maintained a territorial presence in the hinterland and utilized cross-border smug-

gling of goods like charcoal and sugar and setting up roadblocks as means of its
economic benefit.
Security-wise it also realized that it could not force the Kenyan forces away from
the country via direct clash with the superior forces. It thus enhanced its presence in
Kenya itself, making use of the local Somali Diaspora and Kenyan policies targeting
it to go through with some of the very well-known attacks like Westgate shopping
mall shootout in 2013 (71 deaths including 4 attackers), Garissa University College
onslaught in 2015 (148 deaths), or Mogadishu bombing in 2017 when a truck
exploded on its way to its intended target reportedly killing 587 people. In this way,
Al-Shabaab aimed to force the external troops out of the country in order to reestab-
lish the void that could be filled by its own structures while simultaneously still
threatening the recognized government. The Kenyan policies also did not help its
cause as the government targeted the Somali community in the country – most
prominently the Eastleigh district of Nairobi – as a follow-up of any troubles. This
victimization of the Somali communities let the Al-Shabaab use the card of the
protector of the weak against the strong and thus get another support and recruits
even throughout the period of comparative decline. Al-Shabaab also portrayed itself
as a protector of the disadvantaged clans in southern Somalia. A combination of
territorial activity in remote, but still useful, areas with the “protector” propaganda
and utilization of the terrorist and hit-and-run attacks allowed the group to remain
significant relevant force even after the loss of its territories (Doboš 2016; Doboš
et al. 2019; Hansen 2019, 163–184).
Through the survival as hinterland/networking group, Al-Shabaab managed to
bring a fatigue to the intervening forces as the countries involved make their will-
ingness to retreat heard in increasingly strong voice with the consequent environ-
ment being left without an external (the USA is providing light footprint operations
only) or internal (beside Somaliland and parts of Puntland) alternatives. Al-Shabaab’s
areas of operations are, despite the killing of its leader A. Godane in an airstrike that
took place on September 1, 2014, since 2016 constantly moving toward the popula-
tion centers, and the group seems to be engaged in a struggle to reterritorialize once
the external actors decrease their presence in the region (Doboš et al. 2019, 551).
Al-Shabaab, with its activities, furthermore, pushes other local actors on the fringes
of the struggle. This is clearly the case of the Deash’s affiliate in the country that
was forced into retreat to the north of the country where hardly penetrable Golis
Mountains are located, providing the group a much-needed shelter (Hansen 2019,
185). Al-Shabaab thus remains a potent force in the south Somali environment, and
there is a high chance that it will regain territorial control once the intervening
forces leave or substantially decrease their presence. This is, furthermore, reflected
in the behavior of many communities that act in a way that would not leave them too
connected to the intervening forces that would in the future lead to a possible pun-
ishment by Al-Shabaab once the group regains its power over the now inaccessible
territories (Hansen 2019, 180). Furthermore, Al-Shabaab is still capable of retaining
limited judiciary and taxation systems even on territories nominally under the state’s
jurisdiction, pointing at its ability to fill the functional and territorial void left by the
incapable state institutions (Hansen 2019, 183).
7.1 Adaptation 117
These general shifts in types of Al-Shabaab’s operations and successful adapta-

tions helping it survive are also mirrored in approaches to the specific issues. In this
chapter, we will look at two of them – approach to population and ideology – to
further explore the issue at hand. The relation toward the population and ideology
evolved together with the changing internal security environment in the country.
The ICU and later Al-Shabaab throughout the Ethiopian intervention utilized the
nationalist narratives and historical disputes in order to gather strong backing from
the Somali population. It focused, besides the obligatory religious framing, on
issues of national liberation against the (Christian) forces of historical Somali
enemy (no matter that Ethiopian army in Somalia was composed largely of non-
Christian soldiers). Also, the historical geopolitical images like the vision of greater
Somalia (including predominantly Somali regions of Somalia, Djibouti, Ogaden
region in Ethiopia, and northwestern part of Kenya) were spurred. This localized
and nationalistic framing of the Al-Shabaab’s attempt to establish an Islamic State
in Somalia helped it receive funding from the Somali Diaspora (including from its
members in North America and Europe) and strengthen its position inside the coun-
try. Al-Shabaab, to a degree, also attempted to overcome the clan divisions inside
the country in order to promote unity against the infidels (Hansen 2013; Maruf and
Jospeh 2018).
Following the spread of Al-Shabaab throughout the southern part of the country,
the group’s framing of its activities much more clearly focused on the religious part
of its struggle. Nationalism was largely forgotten in its rhetoric, and the issue at
hand was the indoctrination of the population through its educational and social
activity. This shift is also connected to the process of centralization of the group’s
hierarchy under Godane’s leadership but was not abandoned even after his death.
Al-Shabaab became a part of the Al-Qaeda network, and its focus shifted from the
Somalis as a nation to East African Muslims in general. The group was increasingly
targeting civilians based on the religious principle (evident, e.g., in the Westgate
attack) and was attempting to win favor among the disadvantaged part of the popu-
lation in areas of its territorial presence. With the decrease in territorial control, this
shift grew even stronger, and the group became more interested in and dependent on
the ad hoc support from the communities it did not have to control and was inca-
pable of doing so. It also definitely framed its activities as a part of the global jihad-
ist struggle under the Al-Qaeda leadership. We can thus observe a move from more
nationalistic Somali-oriented framing of actions toward religiously oriented identi-
fication with East Africa playing the role of a province in a larger global struggle.
The approach to the population also differs according to the ability of the group to
actually control any population centers. When it does, Al-Shabaab forces through a
social and legal code based on its literal reading of sharia disregarding the tradi-
tional norms (Doboš 2016).
The case of Al-Shabaab clearly points to the behavior violent non-state actors
operating in the Chaotic Anarchy environment generally put through if they are to
survive and thrive. In case this does not happen, even the originally successful units
such as Daesh in Syria and Iraq are poised for failure. Al-Shabaab does not hide by
a transformation into a network but utilizes a process of liquid territoriality, thus
avoiding direct confrontation with stronger opponents while being able to control
some territory and controlling population when possible and when stronger oppo-
nents are not present. This in mid-2020, by the time of writing, allows the group to
be territorially present even in capital Mogadishu. The stronger the opposition, the
more the group needs to avoid any possible direct combat operation on a larger
scale, as evident from the case of Ramadan Offensive. Also, despite its highly ide-
ologized nature, Al-Shabaab showed quite a large level of pragmatism when it came
to such a contentious issue such as generating money from pirate activities or
approach to clan structure – it is evident that groups that are capable of operating in
this environment need to skillfully exploit the environment and not remain ideologi-
cally purist. On the other hand, given space, groups challenge each other over the
utilization of such territory in what resembles the power competition of the early
international system. The number of outcomes of such a challenge is very high, and
flexibility is a key factor of success.
7.1.2 People’s Republic of China
The second case study focusing on the adaptation of political units to different
types of environments concerns the PRC as a Westphalian actor attempting to
maintain centralized power against the force of political globalization without the
destruction of its economy to the point of collapse. The case thus presents the adap-
tation of state institutions wishing to maintain the status quo in the nature of inter-
actions in the international system. Even though the history of political development
in China is extremely long and complex, for the purposes of this study, it is neces-
sary to go back only to the end of the Second World War. After the defeat of the
Japanese Empire throughout 1945, the conflict in China continued with a return of
the civil war between nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and communists under
the leadership of Mao Zedong. Despite the strategic and material advantage of the
anti-communist forces, the nationalists were on the losing side of the conflict and
finally in 1949 retreated from the mainland to Taiwan, where it operated as an
internationally recognized government of China until 1979, when the status shifted
to the PRC, and the Republic of China with capital of Taipei remains an unrecog-
nized state ever since. Despite the mutual claims on their respective territories, the
two entities remain distinct, each retaining its own effective government and, as
evident from the previous analysis, each drifting toward a different type of geopo-
litical environment.
However, the process of state-building in the mainland did not wait until the
recognition from outside of the socialist bloc, meaning the acceptance of the entity
into the UN. The country’s geographical extent was formed in the following years
as the Beijing government conquered the Hainan island and annexed Tibet, while
the last territories were added to the country in 1997 and 1999 when the former
British colony of Hong Kong and later the former Portuguese Macao were trans-
ferred under the country’s sovereignty – establishing what is known as one country,
two systems. Also, the internal development came through different phases that
allow us to observe a shift from the twentieth-century totalitarianism to a
7.1 Adaptation 119
centralized authoritarian regime clearly adapting to the changes of the post-Cold

War world accompanied by a promotion of the Westphalian model of the organiza-
tion of the political space.
First, the Maoist attempts to establish a totalitarian state following the amended
Soviet approach led the country into two significant ventures. The Great Leap
Forward taking place between 1958 and 1962 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966
to 1976 were, nonetheless, both major disasters for the Chinese society and econ-
omy. This only added to the Sino-Soviet split taking place in appearing since the
late 1950s escalating in a border conflict that entered a hot phase in 1969. The issue
of border delimitation between the two entities was finally settled in the first decade
of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, the dispute between the two countries in a
context of the steep economic decline in China and a change in the US approach led
to a new phase of opening of the PRC. Realizing the negative impact of the pat poli-
cies, the country began to move in a different direction that, to a degree, affects its
policies up until today. Beginning with the 1970s, the relations between the USA
and China started to improve. The 1970s were marked by an attempt to establish the
relationship between the two countries, and the PRC was finally recognized as a UN
member in 1979. The same period was also marked by the death of Chairman Mao
in 1976 and change in the direction the country took under the rule of Deng
Xiaoping. The country turned toward an economy based on capitalist rather than a
centrally planned socialist mode of organization, however, without liberalization of
its political system as evident from the crackdown on the 1989 protests. The country
thus did not follow the wave of revolutions that shook the communist bloc in Central
and Eastern Europe. After Deng stepped down in 1992, his followers continued in
the rational policies of development of economy in order to turn the PRC into a
developed great power, making sure that their personal ambitions do not obstruct
the country’s development. The PRC was to behave in a less ideological way, pro-
moting mutual respect and principle of noninterference; however, its policies
became increasingly ambitious and its foreign policy more intrusive. This change
was rapidly fastened with the election of Xi Jinping as the new leader of the country
and the communist party. Under his term, the turn toward a more personalized rule
can be once again observed.
Indisputably, China has become a great economic power with increasing politi-
cal ambitions and interests all around the globe and with increasing capacity to meet
them. Its authoritarian setting combining with the liberal economic policies makes
it a great study of the adaptations that Westphalian states focused on the preserva-
tion of sovereignty in its nineteenth and twentieth century understanding need to
undertake in order to retain their position and focus on sovereignty. The key part of
the adaptation is a need to make use of the advantages of economic globalization
without losing sovereign control over its social and political development. This way,
a country does not collapse economic-wise while retaining the features of the sov-
ereign Westphalian state. The first illustration of this type of adaptation can be the
one state-two systems principle connected to the governance of Hong Kong and
Macao. As these enclaves (especially Hong Kong) are very important for the
Chinese economy and its access to the international market, we can see an
adaptation when political control over a limited territory is partially exchanged for
the chance to benefit from participation in economic globalization. Nonetheless, the
PRC is focused on maintaining the entities strongly inside its sphere of influence
and not allowing them to liberalize in any meaningful way, as evident from the reac-
tion on the 2019 protests taking place in Hong Kong.
Nonetheless, another initiative, that appeared more recently, also points in the
same direction. One Belt One Road (OBOR) is a set of loosely connected projects
aiming to project the Chinese economic power to the world and strengthening its
economic and often political standing. While the primary geographic direction of
the OBOR initiative was the “Heartland” of Eurasia (Riegl et al. 2018, 137), it grew
to encompass different, often disconnected, economic projects all over the world.
Besides the main corridors connecting the PRC and Europe on land and sea, the
initiative also projects as varied as the rail corridors in the Southeast Asia and Horn
of Africa and investments in the Balkans. The project in its setting aims to become
the largest infrastructural project in history (Khanna 2016, 28). It is often argued
that there are several reasons behind the initiation of OBOR. The main sets of argu-
ments are connected to the economy, internal politics, and geopolitics.
As for the economic reasons behind OBOR, we can mention the need to access
new markets (markedly in Central Asia) as a way to allow for the overproduction
inside China to be shipped to new destinations. Also, a connection of the PRC with
the Central Asian region will allow for the exploitation of the natural resources,
whose extraction is a backbone of most of the countries’ economies, to be directly
transited to China. In this way, the Chinese import diversifies, and it allows the
Central Asian autocracies to export to more markets than just the Russian. For
China, the maintenance of the safe influx of oil and natural gas establishes a back-
bone of its foreign policy. The fear of a potential cutoff from the oil produced in the
Persian Gulf is a good explanation for the Chinese infrastructural projects in
Pakistan and Myanmar. Both of the corridors planned to connect the countries’
ports with the Chinese territory via land would allow the imports to bypass the Strait
of Malacca, and the First Island Chain and the Pakistani corridor, furthermore, cir-
cumvent India. These are the geostrategic chokepoints that can be used to prevent
the import of oil and natural gas into China in case of a conflict. Direct connection
to the Central Asian countries brings China further stability in the energy domain.
The second factor is internal – land part of OBOR will connect the hinterland parts
of mainland China to its developed shore and would unite the population behind a
grand national project. Given the lower level of stability in the peripheral regions,
this step is seen as a positive move toward increasing the power projection capabili-
ties of the Chinese state inside its borders. Furthermore, it is a way for Xi Jinping to
portray himself as a great leader. Finally, there are geopolitical considerations in
place, as well. The project strengthens the Chinese presence in many parts of the
globe, including key geostrategically important locations like Djibouti. It will also
strengthen the Chinese maritime capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean region,
and allow the PRC to overcome the Pacific containment conducted by the United
States and its allies. The construction of the infrastructural projects additionally
leads some of the countries into debt traps, making them more dependent on the
7.1 Adaptation 121
PRC and turning others into the Chinese allies copying some of the practices of the
Chinese government, thus strengthening the role of the Westphalian geopolitical
setting in general (Dargnat 2016, 69–71; Herd 2015, 223; Brewster 2016).
As evident, the OBOR is a multifaceted complex and somewhat loosely con-
nected set of different, mainly infrastructural projects. While they meet the different
needs of the Chinese state, they are all connected to the process of economic global-
ization and allow the strengthening of the Chinese state as an institution. This utili-
zation of economic globalization toward nationally oriented goals lacking larger
connectivity to other units in other domains is a typical example of adaptations of
Westphalian states leaning toward autocracy inside the neomedieval framework.
Additionally, the initiative allows the Chinese government to promote its preference
regarding the political organization of space. The PRC is opened to economic glo-
balization and international trade since the end of the 1970s, so this development is
nothing new. That the state apparatus is attempting to combine economic liberalism
and its efficiency with political autocracy is clear at least since the 1989 suppression
of the protests, and it established a quite effective modus operandi for similar types
of actors inside the neomedieval twenty-first century.
Nonetheless, the external domain defined by at least limited opening to eco-
nomic exchanges while limiting political and social influences stemming from the
liberal part of the international society and connected to political and cultural glo-
balization is not the only important point to be raised. There is also a predominantly
internal, authoritarian level of adaptation. The centralized state must assure that the
transformation into a Durable Disorder is not being perceived as a preferred option
by the critical mass of the population and that its hold over the territory and people
living inside is effective. In the Chinese case, these processes can be manifested in
the so-called Great Firewall as a way to shield the environment from external influ-
ences and the Social Credit System as a purely internal coercive measure.
The Great Firewall is a part of the system deployed by the Chinese government
to promote the doctrine of cyber-sovereignty that stands as a central piece of the
Chinese approach to the Internet (Griffiths 2019, 14). Even though the Chinese
government pushed through the rapid development of the Internet connection in the
country beginning in the early 1990s, it simultaneously developed ways of control
of the network. While the network was perceived as a mean of economic develop-
ment, it was not to become an uncontrolled space (Roberts 2018, 104) – clearly
mirroring policies in other domains. The Chinese government set up a set of vague
laws and regulations that can be utilized in case a state response is seen as valuable
to protect the interests of the communist party. While the laws can be in theory used
against the whole of the population, they are more strictly utilized against actors
with more significant impacts – e.g., journalists (Roberts 2018, 107–117).
Additionally, the Chinese government passed in February 1996 the State Council
Order 195 that places total control over the Internet and its future development in
the country to the state apparatus. The supervision of the Internet was given to the
security services, and it was disallowed to use the network to incite to overthrow the
government or the socialist system – no matter how vague the regulation is (Griffiths
2019, 24). The censorship is thus both external and internal, and the Great Firewall
is the outer part of the whole system designed to allow control over the network and
promote the doctrine of cyber-sovereignty. What is also important is that the legal
system forces Chinese companies to cooperate with the Chinese state and provide it
with data if asked to do so. This provision became one of the key issues in the recent
debate in the West over the development of the 5G networks and the role of Huawei
and ZTE companies in this process.
The Great Firewall operates as a regular firewall, however, on a state level. It
blocks external selected pages, keywords, images, and so on in order to disallow
for the organization of population outside the party structure and put a higher price
on receipt of information for the Internet users inside the country. It slows down-
loading of the foreign-based websites as these need to be checked several times
before allowed to load as the data passes through one of the three locations that
connect the Chinese network to the global Internet. These are located in Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou. In case the website is censored, it produces an error
message, so it might be unclear whether the page is blocked or simply not working
(Griffiths 2019, 16–26; Roberts 2018, 60, 109–110). The PRC also set up substi-
tutes to large companies like Google (Baidu), Facebook (Weibo), or Amazon
(Alibaba) in order to decrease to incentives of the Chinese population to attempt to
avoid the system or, in general, visit pages located out of the Chinese part of the
Internet (Griffiths 2019, 68). The fact is that the Great Firewall can be circum-
vented using the virtual private network (VPN) that allows a user to operate on the
Internet via another computer located out of China, thus not being located behind
the firewall. Nonetheless, utilization of a VPN further slows down the connection,
and obtaining one is usually not for free, even if the cost is usually quite low. The
VPNs are also sometimes shut down by the government. This obstacle, in combi-
nation with the presence of alternatives inside the Chinese web, decreases the will-
ingness of the majority of the population to seek foreign-based websites blocked
by the firewall. If the censorship is not sudden, it is mostly hidden and thus more
effective as the basic population does not even feel the government’s meddling
(Roberts 2018). It is clear that the system together with the promotion of the doc-
trine of cyber-sovereignty is a tool of blocking the population from the influence
stemming mainly from the appearing Durable Disorder part of the world and the
growth of the networks that establish the multiple overlapping services, thus allow-
ing the Chinese government to centralize the system and promote its point of view
regarding the organization of political space abroad as many countries follow the
Chinese precedent regarding the Internet access.
While the Great Firewall represents an attempt to prevent spillover of Durable
Disorder and decentralization into China, Social Credit System is one of the parts
of the internal control utilized by the government in Beijing. The system is being
developed since the 2013/2014 and aims to promote “sincerity” in Chinese soci-
ety.2 By the time of writing, the system is being deployed only in a limited area.
Nevertheless, the push to expand it nationwide is continuing. The initiative is to a
2
See https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-const
ruction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/
7.1 Adaptation 123
degree similar to other rating systems used around the globe for the purposes of
private companies in areas like healthcare or insurance. Nonetheless, the Chinese
version is more intrusive and takes into account a wider number of factors. It is
projected to evaluate the behavior of Chinese citizens and allow them to utilize
selected services accordingly. To this end, the system manages a large amount of
data that should be automatically evaluated and calculated into a form of social
credit. Increasingly, technological progress should allow for as extensive automa-
tion in the data gathering process (e.g., thanks to the facial recognition process)
as possible. As mentioned, nonetheless, the system is not yet deployed and is
sometimes described as erring and confusing. Also, given a high level of already
existing surveillance, censorship, and state control, it, in fact, so far does not
bring as substantial changes as might have been expected. The expected future
shape of the project, however, will likely give the Chinese authorities a tool to
more efficiently control the population, thus further centralizing the system and
strengthening its position in the Westphalian geopolitical environment (Fickling
2019; Kobie 2019).
The abovementioned examples point at some features that characterize the
behavior of the state willing and capable of remaining in the Westphalian environ-
ment. It is crucial to point out that given the changing structure of the international
system, even the centralized Westphalian state must, to a degree, change its behav-
ior in order to adapt to the shifts. First, it needs to take into account the influence of
globalization as to maintain its internal effectiveness. If the country were to bank-
rupt, it would likely move into the Chaotic Anarchy spectrum (a notable exception
is, e.g., North Korea). China realized this even before the end of the Cold War and
began to transform its economic model to remain sustainable even in the twenty-
first century. It can also use globalization to promote its own vision of the interna-
tional order. If we look at the case of China, this means incorporation into the
economic web of the world trade and setting up the OBOR initiative. The PRC
additionally promotes its vision of the world according to the respect to the sover-
eign decisions of nations (however, often only in word and not deed) or doctrine of
cyber-sovereignty. On the other hand, the government in Beijing is successful in
shielding the internal environment from external influences that would be promot-
ing the liberal vision of international order and the spread of the emerging Durable
Disorder environment.
Additionally, it is crucial to react to the technological progress that, as evident,
is not the one-sided liberal utopia as was once presented to be. Internet was to
become a tool of the free spread of data and ideas unbound by the national jurisdic-
tion. China made use of the economic, scientific, and other benefits of the connec-
tion that is necessary for the country’s prosperity while simultaneously setting up
a system of rather effective censorship. It also utilizes increasingly advanced meth-
ods of surveillance and population control to make use of its scientific potential
necessary for its development. This smart adaptation allows the PRC to remain
relevant centralized state on the international scene and to remain in and possibly
spread the Westphalian political organization based on centralization and state
territoriality.
7.1.3 Facebook
Last, but not least, we will look at an example of the nonviolent non-state actor
primarily based on the emerging Durable Disorder environment and utilizing net-
works as its primary asset. Facebook was set up on the 4th of February 2004 as a
project at Harvard University but quickly spread to become one of the most influen-
tial social networks in the contemporary world. Only a month after its foundation,
the site opened to students of other selected universities – Yale, Columbia, and
Stanford. In quick succession, Mark Zuckerberg – one of the founders of the site –
moved to develop the network in California and improved Facebook with features it
is known for today. The potential of the company was quickly recognized, and
Yahoo reportedly offered 1 billion USD to take over Facebook. Throughout 2006,
the availability of Facebook further increased by lowering the minimum age of reg-
istration, and new features connected with increasing issues over the users’ privacy
appeared. These two – new features and privacy concerns – are to reappear through-
out the later development. In 2007 Microsoft invested in the company, and the pro-
jected value of Facebook was on the rise. What has initially been mostly a tool for
sharing details from users’ personal lives later turned out to be a powerful political
tool, as well. This became all too obvious throughout the Arab Spring in which
Facebook, in particular, and social media, in general, played a crucial role in social
and political mobilization.
In 2012, Facebook decided to go on stock markets, thus changing its ownership
structure. Furthermore, the company made a large acquisition in buying the photo-
sharing site Instagram – 2 years later – followed by WhatsApp. By the end of the
year, Facebook crossed the 1 billion active users per week landmark, pointing at its
key role in the Internet traffic. The number grew to 2 billion in 2017. Nevertheless,
throughout the same period, the company was hit with scandals connected to the
political aspect of its business – most notably the Cambridge Analytica case that
made headlines around the globe and led to a set of reactions and counterreactions
around the Durable Disorder environment (Greiner, et al. 2019) – issue discussed in
this section.
It is evident that Facebook operates as a nonviolent non-state actor clearly
embedded in the Durable Disorder environment and with an economic profit as a
primary motivation – thus being part of the economic pillar. It is also a company that
began to dominate an important and increasingly important segment of Internet traf-
fic – social media. As such, it managed to fill the functional holes, set up a new
business portfolio, and become an important global player. Nonetheless, at the time,
it clashed with the interest of political actors and needed to adapt in order to con-
tinue operating. While this is almost impossible inside the Westphalian environment
(see the previous section on the PRC) and there is not a market interesting enough
located inside the Chaotic Anarchy, the company needs to avoid a too extreme clash
with the political authorities while leaving as many business options open as pos-
sible. For the remainder of the section, we shall look at the role of Facebook inside
the Durable Disorder environment and the interaction with the political actors, espe-
cially in the post-2016 US election era.
7.1 Adaptation 125
Facebook is, first and foremost, a business venture. As such, it aims for profit
being a part of the economic pillar of the emerging Durable Disorder environment.
The characteristic of this pillar is the strive for economic efficiency and mobility
that allows the companies to move across the networked space aiming to settle
inside countries where the regulations allow for maximization of the profit. This is
clearly manifested by the rapid growth of the company not only membership-wise
as it opened to the broad public but also regarding the purchases of other platforms
like Instagram and WhatsApp. In this regard, Facebook should be a target of market
regulations and traditional economic policies of states. Nonetheless, Facebook
holds a definite impact on the political pillar itself, making it a focal point of the
discussions concerning Internet regulations.
As the membership and basic traffic on the platform is free, Facebook developed
different means of profit, not unlike other websites with varying primary function
for their users. The majority of the revenue comes from the advertisement targeting
users based on data gathered by the company. This means that Facebook is capable
of collecting and analyzing the information put on the website by the users and
monitor their behavior as to develop very specific profiles that the adverts can target.
This allows for the largest possible response from users to the adverts they see as
they are not overwhelmed by the promotion of the products that are not likely to
interest them. Such a model on one side makes the whole process more effective and
efficient. On the other, it risks the breach of privacy as the tools need to collect as
precise data about the users as possible.
So far, the issue is mostly connected to the protection of user privacy in the con-
text of customer protection. The set of policies connected to this topic is well-known
from other fields and just needs to be updated for the digital age. However, the busi-
ness model opened Facebook to a more extensive inquiry connected to the political
consequences of its operations. The same way the commercial advert aims at a
specific customer with a certain income, interests, and area of residence, the politi-
cal campaigns want to target a specific part of population with a message tailored to
their age, education, income, or occupation as to increase the chances that they will
need to spend as little funds as possible to win as much additional voters/supporters
as possible. Facebook, additionally, targets not only the advert on the personal char-
acteristics of the users and their connections but also on the likelihood that they will
like the message presented to them (Kreiss and McGregor 2019, 6). So, it makes no
sense to target firm supporters of the party from the other side of the political spec-
trum and similarly to show a message regarding the plan for pension funds to first-
time voters, usually still at high school. This approach, nonetheless, established a
toxic environment in which different and often rather specific groups of users got
access to different information without being confronted with challenging views.
The sources of information were filtered according to the same criteria, and the
most likely match was promoted by Facebook. The situation thus aided the increas-
ing polarization of the political views in the societies. Added to that, it was not
always clear who is paying for and spreading the information at hand, and the sites
were not checked for disinformation that set up a mix in which relevant groups were
targeted by a sustained influx of what can be best described as conspiracy theories,
thus further enhancing the division. Jorgensen and Desai (2017, 115–119) charac-
terized the largest issues of the company as provision of inaccurate information to
users, instability of the ability of the users to restrict access to the information on
their profiles, lack of consent with how the data are handled, sharing of information
with the third parties and tracking of the activity of users, privacy issues in general,
and data retention. In the political sphere, specifically, Facebook tends to be con-
nected to issues like fake news, targeted advertising, clickbait pages, or emotional
outrage (Kreiss and McGregor 2019, 3).
The political will to deal with the issue (following the sustained campaign by
the part of the civil society – thus connecting the social pillar and political pillar
in an effort to balance the economic one) was connected to a massive scandal
involving the company Cambridge Analytica. The scandal involved both parts of
the issues connected to Facebook activities – privacy issues and the ability to
influence the political debate. Cambridge Analytica company, as it was revealed
in 2018, harvested personal data of millions of users and without their consent and
used them for political marketing goals, thus helping with the targeting of the
political campaigns, most notably that of Donald Trump. The revelation of the
practices led to a public outcry that placed Facebook, and notably its head Mark
Zuckerberg, into the spotlight of the international attention. The issue of cam-
paigning on social media became a key point of the Internet regulations, and
Zuckerberg was testifying before the US Congress. Facebook was also penalized
for misconduct.
Nevertheless, the whole process increased the tempo of the reactions and coun-
terreactions regarding the regulation of Facebook activities. While the USA utilized
a reactive consumer protection approach, the EU took the path of the development
of specific rules guiding the activities of the company (Jorgensen and Desai 2017,
121–122). In the end, the EU set up rules concerning consumer protection and
struggle against disinformation as to better regulate the activities of the company
and other similar ventures. A closer look at these will clarify the point regarding the
position of the nonviolent non-state actors even more.
The issue of data privacy on the Internet affecting the operations of Facebook
was tackled, among others, by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) that is effective since the 25th of May 2018.3 The aim of the regulation is
to clearly establish rules connected to the utilization of personal data and punish-
ments for breaching these. GDPR also sets up a system in which the user needs to
be informed about reasons for data collection, and this information cannot be used
for any other reason. Collected data can also be stored for the minimum time
period possible to minimize the risk of misuse. The regulation also explicitly calls
for the secure handling of the collected data. In summary, GDPR established a
system in which any person’s personal data can be collected only in exceptional
instances or with the explicit consent of the person involved, for the stated
purposes only, and can be stored only for the relevant time period. Importantly, the
Full text is available at https://gdpr-info.eu

3
7.1 Adaptation 127
regulation covers the processing of data of individuals in the EU, no matter the
place of origin of the company that asks for permission.
Facebook announced that it would comply with the regulation and was prepared
to enhance the data protection capabilities.4 In addition, Facebook promised to
make the procession of the data more transparent, to increase the control of the users
over their data, and that it will increase its own accountability for following the
rules. This clearly manifests two issues. First, the ability of the company to operate
its business is tightly connected to the perception of its users that the services
Facebook provides are safe. The more active users, the larger the income from the
adverts and other sources of income. In the EU, the social pillar of the environment
for some time pushed forward the agenda of privacy, and this made the perception
of the company’s activities more negative. By attempting to portray itself as a
responsible actor, Facebook tried to pacify this form of opposition. Second, the
company was unable to struggle against such a large bloc as the EU successfully.
The functional hole regarding the utilization of private information online was
closed, and it became increasingly problematic and costly to run against the new
regulations. Despite its claims, Facebook faced numerous investigations related to
the breach of GDPR and thus manifests the struggle between the business logic of
the economic pillar – make profit on the utilization of shared and harvested personal
data – and political pillar – represent the will of the voters to increase their privacy
and control over the data they provide to the platform.
Another issue that must be raised is the attempt of the EU to fight disinformation
online. The issue of election meddling, lack of transparency regarding political mes-
sages, and the spread of disinformation increased on its importance since at least
2016. The EU, in reaction to these phenomena and in the wake of the election to the
European Parliament that took place in May 2019, attempted to tackle these and
clear the information space from the negative influences enhanced by the effect of
social media. In October 2018, the EU presented a Code of Practice on
Disinformation5 that set up the best practices as identified by the European
Commission in order to secure the online environment against malicious content.
The signatories were to take voluntary measures that would improve the situation
regarding the issue to avoid any further legally binding regulations by the EU. To
illustrate that the steps taken can hold measurable impact, it was tested that just flag-
ging the posts as disputed decreases the willingness of the users to share them, thus
decreasing the spread potential of disinformation (Mena 2019, 11). The measures
taken and the improvement will be evaluated a year after the adoption of the Code,
and then the European Commission will decide on the next approach. The whole
initiative is, additionally, only a part of the overall Action Plan Against Disinformation
aiming at the protection of the European democratic system.6
4
See, for example, https://www.facebook.com/business/gdpr
5
See full text at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation
6
See, for example, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/europe-protects-eu-steps-
action-against-disinformation
On the 17th of May 2019, the European Commission presented an evaluation of

the steps that different online platforms took in order to comply with the Code of
Practice. If we look at the part dedicated to Facebook, the report states: “Facebook
reported on measures taken in the EU against ads that violated its policies for con-
taining low quality, disruptive, misleading or false content or trying to circumvent
its systems. It started enforcing its policy on political and issue-based advertising
mid-April and removing non-compliant ads from Facebook and Instagram”
(European Commission 2019). As evident, Facebook took the warning rather seri-
ously as far as self-promotion is concerned. The actual changes are yet to be evalu-
ated, and it remains doubtful whether the EU will be satisfied with the exercised
changes in the company’s policy. The decision to allow 2020 US presidential can-
didates to share any political campaign on the network without even open lies
breaking the community rules also did not bring much optimism to the regulators.
What is observable in this case is a coordination between the representatives of the
two pillars that realize their relative strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis each other.
The nature of the environment incentives the EU to take a softer approach toward
regulation. Facebook, as well as other major online platforms, nonetheless, need to
self-regulate and adapt in order to avoid a broader confrontation with the political
power. While in the case of the violent non-state actors operating in the Chaotic
Environment, it was argued that these fill territorial and functional holes via the use
of force and establishment of alternative governance structures, and in the case of
nonviolent non-state actors in the Durable Disorder, the functional holes are filled
according to the appearance of these as a result of technological and business prog-
ress (e.g., the Facebook’s attempt to develop its own cryptocurrency Libra) and
interaction with the regulation frameworks set up by the political pillar. The adap-
tation is thus not that much a result of power confrontation as the negotiations and
innovations.
The case of Facebook thus points not only at the ways a private company adapts
inside the emerging Durable Disorder environment but also at a broader dynamic
between the political and economic pillar inside this geopolitical space. The eco-
nomic pillar aims at the maximization of profit and can be often connected to the
presence of influential billionaires shaping international affairs. Facebook founder
and chair Mark Zuckerberg, for example, donated in 2015 the vast majority of his
shares of the company to the charity. Similarly, the wealthy elite represented
famously by Bill Gates shapes the international perception of global issues. This in
no small degree decreases the democratic control over the global politics (Partzsch
2017, 11–12), but the aim of the economic pillar is not to be democratic, and the
aim of social pillar that to some degree manifests in the activities of these rich
businessmen is not a representation of the will of the majority. Representation is
the role of the political pillar that interacts with the two. In the case of Facebook,
the political pillar in both the USA and the EU acted to represent the interest in
securing the information flow and improve the data privacy and will continue to do
so. The selected case thus nicely portrays some of the main points from the theo-
rized internal working of the environment.
7.2 Interaction 129
7.2 Interaction
7.2.1 EU-Russia
As mentioned earlier, the Durable Disorder environment is not yet fully formed, and
so the proper analysis of the interactions based on the case study faces clear limits.
Nonetheless, the EU is already manifesting many of the specifics connected to the
theorized nature of the environment and is the region most directly moving to the
full transformation of the political organization of the space according to its specif-
ics. It will thus be used in the next two sections dedicated to the cases of relationship
between different types of environment – the nature of interactions is already very
close to what is expected by the theoretical framework as space increases its size
through the power of attraction, and this causes counterreaction in the neighbor-
hood. The first line of contact examined here is that with the Westphalian state. In
the case of the EU, the clear choice is Russia as the main actor of this type in the
European neighborhood. Russia, moreover, clearly manifests all the theorized adap-
tations of the Westphalian state (utilization of economic globalization (mainly natu-
ral resources trade), protection against other forms of globalization (protection of
“traditional” values and illiberalism, development of alternative regional bodies),
focus on sovereignty and centralization, attempts to disconnect from the global
Internet by the establishment of a connection working independently inside Russia
only, etc.). The Russian government, furthermore, pursues a doctrine of the so-
called sovereign democracy for its internal development that is somewhat close to
what Fareed Zakaria (2003) called an illiberal democracy – once again a develop-
ment in line with the theorized nature of the environment.
The theorized types of interaction are basically contradictory to each other and
highlight the level to which the traditionally thinking Westphalian-oriented govern-
ments are skeptical of many facets of globalization and networking. As already
pointed out earlier, and as thoroughly described, for example, by Zielonka (2007)
on the European case, the Durable Disorder environment naturally attracts its neigh-
boring territories that attempt to enter the economically efficient and politically and
socially liberal world of flows and movement in what can be called a “normative
imperialism” (Pänke 2019, 102). The soft-power attraction of the environment pulls
the stable actors in the neighborhood as they adapt their internal setting and behav-
ior in order to be allowed inside the common framework and further economically
develop. They get bound in the system of overlapping institutions and multiple loy-
alties and arrange their inner workings according to the decentralized Durable
Disorder model. The attraction of the environment for the population of the neigh-
boring regions has been manifested, among others, in the so-called colored revolu-
tions that are negatively perceived by the Russian government. The attraction also
works for the actors coming from the less stable parts of the neighborhood, but these
will be dealt with in the next section.
The politics of incorporation and harmonization is thus a clear policy of the
Durable Disorder geopolitical environment. It is directly connected to the impact of
globalization and embraces its effects. On the contrary, the Westphalian states that
are wishing to remain in their current geopolitical setting proceed with separation
policies based on conservative and statist thinking that would disallow for the spread
of the Durable Disorder environment into its neighborhood and thus challenge its
mode of government. Both of these tendencies are clearly visible in the relationship
between Russia and the EU and especially in the shatter belt dividing the two, mani-
festing as a tension between the liberal normative European space and the sphere of
influence that Russia aims to develop (Raik 2019, 52). For this reason, this case
study will look at the interaction in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Balkans, starting in
2008, that definitely put an end to the attempts to involve Russia inside the liberal
part of the world following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The year was
selected due to its tumultuous nature that was marked by the wide US-led recogni-
tion of Kosovo and followed by the war in Georgia, leading to the recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia and several other countries.
Georgia and Ukraine,7 as the post-Soviet countries seeking closer alignment with
the West in general, faced a strong Russian opposition that materialized in their
destabilization via an establishment of the geopolitical outposts on their territory
and destabilization of the internal political and security situation preventing any
meaningful discussion over their potential entrance into the Western structures
(Riegl and Doboš 2018). While the Baltics constitute a very specific case in the
post-Soviet context, other former Soviet countries attempting to enter the EU,
NATO, or both were actively prevented to do so via the direct or indirect Russian
involvement aiming at the separation of its sphere of Westphalian political organiza-
tion from the networking space defined by the presence of the EU, NATO, and other
institutions and formats of collaboration. While the Westphalian centralized initia-
tives aim at the establishment of a map covered by other similarly centralized units,
Durable Disorder aims at defusing the power among different entities and setting up
the system of multiple loyalties and overlapping institutional settings. This is why
all the regional initiatives and connections between the post-Soviet states and the
institutions inside the emerging Durable Disorder region can be perceived as a
threat by the Westphalian actors.
The first case that is illustrative of the relationship is one of Georgia. The
Caucasian country is since the dissolution of the USSR one of the most vocal pro-
ponents of a closer cooperation with the West, including NATO and the EU. It is
also a country that faced internal instability and was not very capable of managing
the ethnic tensions that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading to the
emergence of two breakaway regions on its territory as soon as the beginning of the
1990s – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is a situation that was mirrored, for
example, in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Moldova (Transnistria), or Russia
itself (Chechnya) and was tied to the unthawing of the political map in general. The
third separatist region of Adjara was successfully incorporated into the state struc-
tures and is not a cause of any major disputes. While it is undoubtedly true that these
entities are a manifestation of the distinctiveness of the entities from the Georgian
For an overview of the situation in these two countries, see, for example, Toal (2017).
7
7.2 Interaction 131
state and often poor policy choice toward their administration and representation of
non-Georgian minorities (Hoch et al. 2017; O’Loughlin et al. 2015), they were
increasingly instrumentalized as to become the de facto Russian proxies on the
Georgian territory. The final straw that broke the camel’s neck was the wide
US-supported recognition of the Kosovar bid for recognition in 2008 that led to an
escalation of the previously frozen conflict in Georgia followed by the incursion of
the Russian troops and recognition of the two entities as sovereign states by Russia.
While up until today the entities hold only marginal level of recognition (as of the
time of writing only five countries maintain their recognition – Russia, Nicaragua,
Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria), their presence disqualifies Georgia from entering any
of the two organizations and thus establishes a separation zone between the
Westphalian actor and the growing soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment. As
the Russian soft power in the face of the attraction of the Western liberal institutions
cannot compete over the geopolitical orientation of Georgia in a way China shapes
the international order, it utilizes more traditional forms of great power influence to
project its goals. It thus, maybe paradoxically, strips Georgia of its full Westphalian
sovereignty, in order to prevent it from integrating into the Durable Disorder envi-
ronment and shields itself from the possible attraction of this environment to its
population. If the bordering regions visited by the Russian population exhibit a
more attractive alternative to the current state of affairs inside Russia, this might
lead to a heightened level of discontent and possible strengthening of the public
displays of opposition to the regime.
The second example of the separation reaction to the tendencies to incorporate
additional territory via the attraction of the networking space is that of Ukraine and,
in its nature, a very similar situation to that in Georgia. Ukraine faces many internal
and external issues connected to its geographic location (unclear borders, Crimean
issue), population characteristics (language differences), history (part of the USSR,
often challenged statehood rights), economy (high levels of corruption, low wages,
unemployment), and other factors. For the purposes of this study, one geopolitical
detail is crucial – Ukraine establishes a shatter belt between the two spheres of influ-
ence (Ferguson 2017). This location on a dividing line between the two geopolitical
spaces with their inherent power rivalries leads to sustained internal disputes over
the orientation of the country’s foreign policy and internal setting. While for a long
time, this dispute was manifested in electoral politics or internal protests like the
so-called Orange Revolution of 2004–2005, this changed in early 2014.
Another in waves of protests that shape the modern Ukrainian politics followed
the refusal of the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to sign the agreed
Association Agreement with the EU in November of the previous year in Vilnius.
While first announcing that he will join the agreement, Yanukovych was, in the end,
pushed by the Russian government to abandon the plan and instead focus more on
integration with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. The following period is
known as the Euromaidan and was manifested by the outpouring of the people into
the streets demanding signature of the document and a return to the pro-European
course of the foreign policy. This, combined with the demand to change the govern-
ment, specifically focused on the person of the country’s president. In this sense, we
can observe another manifestation of the Durable Disorder appeal. Once again, the
EU did not try to force its membership upon Ukraine. Instead, the appeal of the
membership was enough to set up a very volatile and, in the end, violent situation.
The reaction of the Westphalian environment did not take long. Once the protes-
tors succeeded in ousting Yanukovych, despite the extensive use of violence by the
pro-regime forces, the concealed Russian forces, together with the pro-Russian
militias, initiated violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine and annexed the Crimean pen-
insula. While the situation on the peninsula is now pacified with the Russian pres-
ence de facto uncontested while widely perceived as illegal and illegitimate, the
Donbas region in the east along the Russian borders is still a site of active hostilities
with the end of fighting improbable in the near future. At the beginning of the fight-
ing in the eastern part of the country, there was a fear that the Russian-supported and
Russian-led forces will attempt to occupy a broader swath of territory. In the end, it
became clear that the destabilization of Ukraine is enough for the goals of the
Russian government, as this sets up another barrier against the spread of the Durable
Disorder environment. The fighting got off the radar of the majority of the interna-
tional community as the Russian-backed fighters have successfully managed to
avoid major blunders and mistakes like the downing of the Malaysia Airlines’
Boeing 777 on the 17th of July 2014 on its way from Amsterdam, the Netherlands,
to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The intensification of the Syrian conflict and the migra-
tion crises also overshadowed the Ukrainian issue. While the EU is promoting
reforms and consolidation of the Ukrainian state that would allow it to enter the
soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment, Russia is preventing this by destabiliz-
ing the country and further separating itself from the EU. The persistent, if com-
paratively low, levels of violence in Donbas thus follow the separation logic.
Finally, there is the case of the Balkans. The Balkans is the central region of the
EU integration processes in the post-2004 era. In 2007, two eastern Balkans coun-
tries of Romania and Bulgaria were admitted into the union, and in 2013, Croatia
followed suit. The region also witnessed an expansion of NATO membership as
Croatia and Albania joined the pact in 2009, and Montenegro did the same in 2017.
North Macedonia is likely to become the next member state by the end of 2019. As
of the time of writing, all of the countries in the Balkans, with the exception of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (whose status as a state is, however, disputed),
are in a category of the EU candidate country. The encroachment of other Western
institutions into the region further moves the countries from centralized to Durable
Disorder mode of the organization of political space.
Montenegro and North Macedonia, nonetheless, witnessed the counterreaction
from the Westphalian power in their vicinity and can present another case of chal-
lenge between the two geopolitical spaces. Montenegro was in October 2016, pre-
ceding its entrance into NATO, targeted with a plotted coup d’état reportedly
originating from abroad. The attempted coup was, nonetheless, unsuccessful, and
the country, in the end, joined the alliance and thus stepped closer toward incorpora-
tion into the emerging Durable Disorder structures. In 2019, the Montenegrin High
Court in Podgorica confirmed that the plotters were connected to Russia and Serbia
and actually sentenced two Russian citizens, identified as Eduard Shishmakov and
7.2 Interaction 133
Vladimir Popov, to jail terms of 15 and 12 years, respectively.8 However, they
remain outside Montenegro. The aim of the attempt to overthrow the government
was to prevent the accession of the country to NATO, a move opposed by Russia
that brings Montenegro closer toward a union with the Euro-Atlantic space.
Montenegro is already using Euro as its currency and is thus on the way toward the
EU membership. It is willingly and increasingly incorporating itself into the Durable
Disorder system of multiple and overlapping authorities with a view of the utiliza-
tion of the presence in the networked space to enhance the living, economic and
social conditions in the country or, alternatively, enhance the business opportunities
for some of its citizens.
A similar picture was observable in the case of North Macedonia. The country’s
membership in both NATO and the EU was blocked by Greece due to the name
dispute that dates back into the era of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The
country claimed the name Macedonia while Greece stated that Macedonia, as a
historical region, is located in the contemporary northern part of their territory, and
the name suggests the Macedonian claims over the Greek land. For almost 30 years,
the country officially used the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The
name dispute became a central focus of many nationalist movements and parties. As
an example, the renovation of the center of the city of Skopje can be named. The
newly constructed buildings and statues – part of the Skopje 2014 project – hold a
substantial connection to the ancient Greek architecture, thus reminding the visitors
of the perceived historical heritage connected to Alexander the Macedon.
Nonetheless, by 2018 the governments in Skopje and Athens reached an agreement
that would unblock the accession process by renaming the former Yugoslav country
to the Republic of North Macedonia. The deal was to be confirmed by voters in the
referendum taking place in September 2018 around the Balkans country. As the
Russian side was firmly opposed to the plan, it attempted to block the affirmative
vote. The resulting propaganda effort succeeded in persuading the majority of vot-
ers not to participate, thus invalidating the otherwise pro-change referendum results.
The deal was finally confirmed by the parliament on the 11th of January 2019. A
similar issue was observable in the Greek parliament, where the Russian-supported
nationalist voices tried to block the ratification process, also unsuccessfully. The
path toward NATO and possible future EU membership is thus opened for North
Macedonia.
Finally, there is the case of Serbia that does not strive for the NATO membership
but is positive about the possible accession to the EU, thus limiting its willingness
to get fully included into all of the Durable Disorder institutions for mainly histori-
cal reasons – issue, nonetheless, predicted by the theory of neomedievalism.
Historically, the EU has been active in the regime change in the country that in 2000
took down the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic – an exceptional move by
the EU (Raik 2019, 57). A year earlier, NATO bombed the county in connection to
its war in Kosovo leaving to deep resent toward the alliance ever since. While,
8
See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-court/russians-opposition-figures-sentenced-
over-role-in-2016-montenegro-coup-attempt-idUSKCN1SF144
economically, the EU offers the most important level of support to Serbia, Russia
plays on a nationalistic and symbolic card, attempting to persuade the public opin-
ion and the political leaders not to pursue the pro-Western course. There are reports
of many types of cooperation, mainly on a symbolic level (rides of pro-Putin motor-
cycle gang the Night Wolves, joint military drills called the “Slavic Brotherhood,”
etc.), while we cannot omit the Chinese economic influence, framed as a part of the
One Belt One Road initiative, as well. Repeatedly, we can see the Russian attempt
to decrease the attractiveness of the European project for the inhabitants in order to
overcome the limited ability to match the EU economic influence. The outcome of
this endeavor is to be seen.
The relationship thus clearly follows the theorized nature of the interaction.
Europe acts, in Zielonka’s words, as a neomedieval empire, setting up standards
for entry and allowing the territories on its periphery to join the common project.
By setting the standards, it increases the territory that is shifting toward the inter-
connected, post-modern Durable Disorder. The growth is one of soft-power attrac-
tion and economic incentives. In this sense, the example of Eastern Partnership as
an initiative aiming to improve the relationship with some of the nonmember
countries (as of 2019, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine) – officially aiming at building a common area of shared democracy,
prosperity, stability, and increased cooperation9 – is a case in point. On the con-
trary, the Russian government, utilizing the Westphalian arrangement of the polit-
ical space, is attempting to separate itself from this slowly growing networked
space. It does so mostly by setting up instability that, by nature, disallows the
Durable Disorder environment to spread. The EU-type democratic model of gov-
ernance is a direct threat to the current Russian elite (Raik 2019, 58). The pres-
ence of Russian-supported separatist conflicts and entities on the territory of
potential candidate EU members – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan –
points at a strategic level of thinking in the initiation of instability in the Russian
neighborhood.
Russia also attempts to destabilize the Durable Disorder environment itself via
the support for the nationalist movements, support for and spread of disinforma-
tion, and other methods of the so-called hybrid campaign. In this sense, it is inter-
esting to map the development of the portraying of the EU by the Russian
government (Foxall 2019) that allows us to visualize the way how the government
felt increasingly threatened by the European soft power, thus presenting the domes-
tic audience with an alternative and increasingly negative view of the European
project to decrease the power of attraction. It is also illustrative how the post-2008
normalization of the relations between the West and Russia was in the Kremlin
perceived as a gratification of the privileged role to Russia in the post-Soviet space
by the Western institutions, while this was certainly not the case and the EU clearly
opposes any such behavior (Raik 2019, 62). It is highly likely that we will witness
this type of interaction for the time to come.
See https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en
9
7.2 Interaction 135
7.2.2 EU-Sahel
The interaction between Europe and the Sahel region is long, rich, and complex.
The western Sahel served as a connection between the Mediterranean and West
Africa as early as the control of the North Africa ports by ancient Rome (Naylor
2009), and the routes transiting Sahara are used until the present days. Additionally,
the region faced a period of colonization by the European countries. Looking at the
countries that are of the largest interest for this section (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Chad), they all witnessed an era of the French presence, while we can-
not disregard the Spanish presence in Western Sahara and Italian in Libya or the
British colonization of parts of West Africa. This factor is essential for the nature of
the relations between the Chaotic Anarchy and Durable Disorder environment up to
date as the French foreign and security policy stresses the importance of the inter-
ests in the region. Additionally, it needs to be pointed out that the region is defined
by a presence of a physical environment – mainly desert and savanna – that is not
conducive toward a sustained settlement of the larger regions that become hardly
controllable. The land without population disallows power projection. The popula-
tion was traditionally mostly nomadic, and the low levels of territoriality are visible
even today. The low population density combined with structural issues of the
Sahelian states establishes a political space that is characterized by a low level of
stability and presence of violent non-state actors inside weak states located in the
vicinity of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment.
The theorized nature of the relationship is as follows: Durable Disorder actors
aim to stabilize the Chaotic Anarchy environment and separate itself from the nega-
tive spillover. To this end, they will intervene both militarily and also via humanitar-
ian assistance and development aid. The Chaotic Anarchy environment remains too
institutionally weak to be incorporated into the growing networking space, and so
the aim is to help the local actors overcome this deficiency and secure the borders of
the Durable Disorder part of the world. On the other hand, the actors in the less
peaceful region attempt to make use of the stabilization efforts (especially state
administration) and utilize the networks inside Durable Disorder as to meet their
goals (e.g., profit, political goals, etc.). This approach manifests itself either in
increased calls for humanitarian assistance and other forms of cooperation by the
ineffective regimes or in the attempt of the criminal group terrorist organizations to
penetrate the Durable Disorder environment. All of these can be identified in the
relationship between the EU and the Sahel region.
First, let us start with the issue of negative spillover and utilization of the internal
networking of the Durable Disorder environment by the Chaotic Anarchy actors.
The EU has generally seen three types of movements perceived as negative that
originate in or pass through the Sahel. The first is terrorism. Looking at the modern
history, the main spread of the terrorist groups in the region is connected to the era
of Algerian civil war in which the Islamists, who previously won the first competi-
tive elections but were ousted by the army, waged a violent insurgency against the
state. The civil war began in 1991 and originally poised the Algerian government
mainly against the Armed Islamic Group. The organization utilized a very violent
strategy that, in time, led to its discreditation and split inside the movement. The
splinter groups stood against the targeting of civilians and, in the end, aided with the
defeat of the group. The civil war ended in 2002, but the terrorist issue was not
resolved. After the civil war ended, the remaining militants began to operate in
southern Algeria under the name Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat that later
affiliated itself with Al-Qaeda. Despite the shattered institutional setting of jihad in
the Sahel, the emerging groups (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun,
Ansar Dine, etc.) posed a clear danger both inside and to the external environment.
This danger increased with the beginning of the 2013 Malian civil war that started
as an ethnic conflict but was hijacked by the Islamist militias – most importantly
Ansar Dine. Facing the external intervention, the Sahelian groups united inside
Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin. Additionally, the situation is made even
more complex due to the clientelist networks present in the region. The loyalty of
many of the local leaders thus shifts as evident from the case of Iyad ag Ghaly – cur-
rent leader of the group. He previously acted as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia.
So not only are the relations inside the violent non-state groups dynamic, but the
state is basically one of the many actors as well. Currently, the region (most impor-
tantly central and northern Mali and border regions in Niger and Burkina Faso) is
facing activities from both Al-Qaeda (beside already mentioned also Burkinabe
Ansarul Islam) and Daesh – who also established its own regional branch called
Islamic State in Greater Sahara – related groups that cause high levels of instability
while simultaneously posing a threat to the EU itself. The spread of militancy south-
ward also threatens to enter the populous West Africa region, which might further
cause another migration wave that might target the EU.
This threat is most acutely felt by France that was already targeted by the attacks
connected to groups active in the Algerian civil war that later morphed in the current
Islamist insurgencies. However, given the principle of free movement inside the
Schengen area, the attacks might migrate elsewhere as well if not disrupted by
rather efficient security services. Another issue is spreading propaganda via the
digital networks that are widespread in the emerging Durable Disorder EU to inspire
so-called lone-wolf attacks. So far, this propaganda, nonetheless, originated from
other sources than the Sahelian groups. To name some examples of the attacks stem-
ming from the Chaotic Anarchical Sahel, we may first name the Armed Islamic
Group hijacking an Air France flight 8969 in 1994 in Algiers, which was flown to
Marseille with an intention to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. The plane was, nonethe-
less, taken over by the French security services. Second, there was a wave of bomb
attacks inside France conducted by in 1995 the same group. These two events por-
tray the historical connection between the two environments. Additionally, both
Al-Qaeda and Daesh already conducted attacks inside the EU, so there exists a risk
that the Sahelian groups might get involved in additional attacks on the continent (as
of the time of writing, the affiliates did not yet participate at any successful attack)
if strong enough. This is the reason for fierce opposition to an establishment of any
safe haven in the region that would territorially root the groups in question. This all
unifies with the other two issues – smuggling and migration – that connect the mili-
tants to the utilization of the transit routes in Sahel and networks inside the EU.
7.2 Interaction 137
Smuggling is mainly a local issue with a lesser direct impact on the EU but is
also relevant for the purposes of this section. First of all, there is a close and com-
plex connection between the Islamist groups and smuggling. The leaders of the
militant groups are very often participating in the smuggling business as well
(Boeke 2016) as one of the prominent figures of the Sahelian jihad, Mokhtar
Belmokhtar, holds a nickname Mr. Marlboro due to his participation in the ciga-
rette smuggling. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish whether a certain group is a
criminal smuggling organization or a terrorist group or an Islamist insurgency.
The combination of criminality aiming at self-profit and propagation of violent
Islamism goes hand in hand. The activity thus presents a welcomed income for
many of the jihadists/warlords active in the conflicts relevant to European security.
Additionally, the smuggling also includes the movement of weapons and other
dangerous substances, which became especially prominent with the collapse of
the state structures in Libya and the subsequent opening of the army arsenals. The
routes transit the Sahel and Sahara, ending at the Mediterranean shore. We can
thus identify not only a flow of goods and people northward but also a flow of
weapons to the south, which further enables the insurgencies in the studied region.
The possible breach of the external EU border additionally presents a risk for the
EU that can be faced by the influx of these goods that further spread inside the
space of free flows, where the movement is less monitored. One of the substances
that are smuggled into the EU via the mentioned routes is cocaine that is report-
edly transported from Latin America via West Africa and the Sahel to Europe. This
way, it can overcome the increased monitoring of the goods coming directly from
Latin America to Europe (Stambøl 2016) and utilize clandestine networks and
internal openness of the Durable Disorder. It was estimated that in 2015, cocaine
was used by around 3.6 million adults inside the EU (EMCDDA 2016) – the
demand is thus present on the continent. This smuggling also connects different
militants in the Sahel and North Africa, further strengthening the potential for
planning the attacks inside the EU. The same methods to penetrate the environ-
ment as used for the drug business might be utilized for other purposes as well.
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the security and intelligence services inside
Durable Disorder so far seems to prevent many of these negative effects. Last, but
not least, smuggling also brings additional financial means to the Al-Qaeda con-
nected group – currently most importantly Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Musli-
min – whose leaders are the most experienced in the smuggling business. The
smuggling is one of the major sources of financing of the radicals (together with
kidnapping for ransom) (Clarke 2015) and strengthens the armed groups that
might pose a direct threat to the EU.
Finally, there is the issue of illegal migration. The Sahel is both a source region
of migration and, more importantly, a transit region mainly for migrants coming
from West Africa. The city of Agadez in Niger is, in this sense, a focal point of the
transit routes going through Sahara north to the Libyan coast and a transit hub for
the people attempting to reach the EU. The (mostly regional or internal) migration
in the Sahel is primarily connected to the numerous local conflicts taking place
mainly in Mali. Another cause of migration are the environmental factors as the
region is facing periods of droughts connected to famine, exacerbating existing ten-

sions and leading to additional conflicts among the local communities.
The issue of illegal migration is first and foremost felt like a negative spillover
itself inside the EU. The topic of illegal migration was raised by many political
actors as a consequence of the increased number of people resettling mainly from
Syria. It became, for some time, the main topic of the political debates on the conti-
nent and remained one of the key topics for the right-wing populist parties. Inside
the mainstream thinking inside the EU, the topic of illegal migration (and often
migration in general) was connected to that of terrorism and other negative effects.
While the migration into the EU is mainly connected to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, the migration from Africa is not overlooked as well. The more impor-
tant part of this distinction is that unlike war refugees coming from the abovemen-
tioned countries, migrants from West Africa rarely qualify as asylum seekers. In this
sense, the Sahel is given priority status for two reasons connected to migration.
First, the EU wants to prevent the current illegal migration coming from West Africa
as the migrants do not qualify for asylum status. Additionally, the smuggling routes
are very hostile and present numerous risks to the migrants that clash with the nor-
mative framework of the EU. Second, the EU seeks to prevent further spillover of
the conflict in the Sahel into West Africa with its high population and tensions
among ethnic and religious communities. This would increase the flow of people
that would at least partially target Europe.
Additionally, the migration routes follow the old smuggling routes and are oper-
ated by a similar type of militants, thus connecting all three issues together, even in
reality. So, while it is rarely the case that migrants conduct the cases of terrorism or
plan to do so, the smugglers indeed often hold ties to radical groups in the Sahel. It
must also be noted that there exists a threat perception regarding the possible
entrance of the EU by the militants masking themselves as refugees. While this is
not the most efficient way of entry and is used in order to stigmatize the refugees,
and while the issue is mostly connected to migration originating from the Middle
East, it should not be overlooked in this case as well. As evident, the three issues of
negative spillovers are interconnected, and all utilize the weak state control in Sahel
and Sahara region plus, if they succeed in entering the EU, make use of the network-
ing nature of the space reaching different parts of the union given to fulfill the aim
of the group. It is thus clearly observable that the interaction among the two envi-
ronments follows, in this case, the theorized model.
The reaction of the emerging Durable Disorder actors also follows the approach
as modeled above. First, there is a stabilization effort. EU in this respect holds sev-
eral instruments that are available in relation to different types of entities according
to their internal sovereignty and level of international recognition (Noutcheva 2020,
456). A clear case of such stabilization effort is the intervention of the EU countries
in the western Sahel following the destabilization of Mali connected to the begin-
ning of the latest internal conflict beginning in 2014. The conflict began as the
Libyan regime collapsed, and the Tuaregs serving for the Qaddafi regime returned
to Mali, reigniting the secessionist movement that is present in the country since
independence. The first reaction upon the march of Tuareg rebels supported by
7.2 Interaction 139
Islamist radicals on Bamako following the coup d’état in the country came from
France. As the national government and armed forces were unable to face the armed
opposition, and there was a fear that the country would turn into a jihadist state, the
external troops stabilized the country and successfully militarily stopped the threat
(Ludvík 2016) turning the conflict into a lower-intensity insurgency that is on the
time of writing still present in not only Mali but Niger and Burkina Faso as well.
Throughout the conflict, the Tuareg nationalist rebels disconnected themselves from
the jihadist movements that hijacked the rebellion, turning it from the self-
determination struggle into a part of the global jihadist insurgency.
Following the operation Serval that aimed and succeeded at stopping the most
threatening phase of the rebellion, the French set up operation Barkhane that aims
at further stabilization efforts inside the region (Griffin 2016), including special
operations mission Takuba. This long-term mission, part of the broader interna-
tional effort to pacify and stabilize the western Sahel, is the French contribution to
the stabilization of its former colonies that hold potential for a negative spillover
into the Durable Disorder environment generally and France specifically.
Nonetheless, there are other stabilization efforts taking place. One of them is not
conducted under the EU umbrella, even though the EU countries participate in its
operations. The UN operates the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali as a peacekeeping mission in the country.10 The mission is one of the many
UN missions as set up around the globe. The purely Durable Disorder reaction is the
establishment of the European Union Training Mission Mali that aims to develop
the capabilities of the Malian Armed Forces in order to ensure that the state admin-
istration can prevent the negative effects on its territory.11 The Europeans are also
supporting local initiatives like G5 Sahel that aims at the increase of interoperability
of the five Sahelian countries – Mauretania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad –
in order to increase their effectiveness in countering armed threats to the region. The
region is also a recipient of humanitarian aid on a multilateral and bilateral basis.
There is also a significant number of NGOs operating in the Sahel in order to
increase the living standard in the countries. Just for the EU itself, it was noted that
the union provided humanitarian assistance worth 152 million euros in 2019 alone.12
The focus of the EU regarding migration is additionally on education as an essential
mean of enhancing the living conditions of the local population.13
The separation logic is also in effect. The EU strengthens its activities in the
Mediterranean and cooperates with the actors located on the shoreline of the sea to
decrease the number of attempts to cross into the EU. Additionally, provinces of
Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African continent while being an integral part of
Spain, are physically separated from their neighborhood by border barrier in order
to prevent the influx of migrants seeking asylum in the union. The union also acts to
prevent the influx of smuggled goods, thus separating itself from the clandestine
10
See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma
11
See https://eutmmali.eu/en/aboutus/
12
See https://eutmmali.eu/en/aboutus/
13
https://dw.com/en/eu-focuses-on-sahel-region-in-containing-migration/av-49721956
networks. The process of strengthening of the external border further continues and
remains one of the priorities of the common security policy of the EU.
Finally, we can see how the actors in the region utilize the aid in order to
strengthen themselves and play on fears of the Durable Disorder actors in order to
generate additional funding. Looking at the selected region, Sudan played a role in
stopping the migration from sub-Saharan Africa northward, and similarly, Libyan
factions utilized money coming from abroad in relation to the issue. These funds are
consequently used for enhancing the position of these actors inside the unstable
environment in which they operate. The French and other external troops stabilized
and basically saved the otherwise weak government in Bamako and are supporting
similarly weak Nigerien regime. The government of Burkina Faso that took power
in the 2014 protests is also targeted by the increasing amount of foreign assistance
as a consequence of the spread of militancy connected to the Islamist groups on its
territory. The leaders of the states in question or other actors capable of generating
external support thus see a utility in aiding the European security needs in exchange
for additional resources that help them to stay in power.
7.2.3 Turkey-Syria
The relations between the two Middle Eastern neighbors of Turkey and Syria are
rich and complex and in their last phase, starting with the 2011 revolution in Syria,
entered a new qualitative period – shifting from relations between two Westphalian
countries into a relation between spaces characterized by different type of geopoliti-
cal environment as the territory of Syria succumbed into a Chaotic Anarchy envi-
ronment. The relationship between the two countries was historically strained. Be it
over the sovereignty over the Hatay province or the issue of provision of safe haven
for the PKK fighters to the participation of Turkey in NATO, the history presented
many of the issues that are in different configurations observable across the region.
Before moving to the manifestation of the bordering of the two qualitatively differ-
ent types of environments, it is necessary to briefly sketch the issues between the
governments in Ankara and Damascus that, to a degree, establish the conditions
playing out in a different setting today. As the nature of the political environment in
the Chaotic Anarchy in no small degree depends on the context, the information sets
up the scene for the post-2011 development.
The first topic, that to a limited degree reappeared after the civil war in Syria
began, is that of the control over the Hatay province. The region was transferred
under Turkish sovereignty in 1939. However, this move was never officially
accepted by the Syrian regime, which still considers it as a part of its territory. The
issue was important for the delimitation of the airspaces throughout the conflict
periods. The second historically contentious issue is that of a relationship to differ-
ent Cold War camps. While Turkey in 1952 entered NATO and for a protracted
period of time actively attempted to enter the European communities in their differ-
ent institutional settings, Syria was a Cold War Soviet ally. The animosities were
then translated into mutual distrust even after the end of the Cold War. Then, there
7.2 Interaction 141
is an everlasting topic of the Kurdish independence movements. The movement in

Turkey morphed into the shape of the radically leftist PKK. The group for some
time operated from Syria, which allowed the group to use its territory as a base and
provided it with military training, using it as an asset in its regional struggle with
Turkey (Strategic Comments 2017). The improvement of the relations between the
two governments in the late 1990s and 2000s is connected to the expulsion of the
PKK from Syria and the consequent jailing of its leader Abdullah Öcalan. The
Syrian Kurdish militias of YPG are tightly connected to PKK – are sometimes
regarded as a Syrian branch of the party – which explains many of the post-2011
developments (Pusane 2018, 75–79). The post-2011 situation is further compli-
cated by the existence of a de facto nonaggression pact between the Kurdish mili-
tias and the Syrian government (Ergun 2018, 156). Other thorny issues included,
for example, water sharing or broader regional dynamics.14
The situation, nevertheless, changed with the collapse of the state in Syria fol-
lowing the 2011 protests, themselves part of the Arab Spring. The history of the
state collapse and the beginning of the internal conflict was described in many pub-
lications (e.g., Lister 2015). We will thus briefly look at just three moments relevant
for the relations between the two spaces and the reaction of the Turkish state –
spread of Daesh inside the proxy conflict, migration, and Kurdish autonomy. The
spread of radical jihadist Daesh set up a context that was enormously complex,
further destabilizing the already complex and violent situation. The significant lev-
els of violence inside the Syrian theater, combined with the introduction of the radi-
cal organization, threatened the neighboring countries. With the exception of Israel,
the bordering countries were increasingly targeted by some level of violence origi-
nating in the group ranging from the 2015 immolation of the Jordanian pilot to the
2017 terrorist attack in Istanbul to sporadic fighting in Lebanon to a full-scale war
in Iraq. The group was in the context of the shattered battlefield for some time rather
successful and presented a clear danger to its neighborhood. The presence of unsta-
ble, dangerous, and violent environment directly at the borders as one of the defin-
ing features of the relationship was thus clearly present. This is, even more, the case
as the Syrian civil war was targeted by many regional and global player, turning it
into enormous proxy warfare.
The second issue, that of migration, also affected the nature of the Turkish
response to the situation unfolding on its neighbor’s territory. The conditions inside
the worn-torn country forced a significant part of the population to flee their homes
and settle elsewhere to increase its chances to survive the period of fighting. While
the medially attractive part of the migration movement targeting Europe made head-
lines, the majority of the resettled population stayed in the region – mainly in Syria
itself or the neighboring countries. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
informed that by mid-2019, there were around 6.2 million internally displaced peo-
ple inside Syria.15 Additionally, there were over 5.5 million registered refugees in
For an overview, see, for example, Bishku (2012).

14
https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people
15
the neighboring countries. Out of these, 3.6 million settled in Turkey.16 The high
number of refugees settled in Turkey creates additional strains to Turkish society
and economy. Despite the signature of the agreement with the EU on 18th of March
2016 that provides Turkey with economic aid and gives the Syrian refugees a pos-
sibility for being legally resettled to the EU countries,17 the situation is perceived as
increasingly negative. Turkey thus aims to act in a way as to decrease any potential
for additional refugee resettlement inside its territory.
Finally, there is the last significant threat as perceived from Ankara – an emer-
gence of the autonomous Kurdish region on the Syrian-Turkish borders. The topic
of the Kurdish autonomy and self-determination is a thorny one, and its many mani-
festations in a context of disputes inside the ethnic community establish a very
complex picture. As for the studied subject, it is crucial to point out just a few
important points. The autonomous region of Rojava established in the north and
northeast of Syria is governed according to the ideology of democratic confederal-
ism as developed by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The YPG is directly tied to
the PKK, which is perceived as one of the most actual threats to the Turkish state
(Pusane 2018, 75–79). Turkey thus feels insecure as a consequence of the emer-
gence of the autonomous, not to say independent, Kurdish region on its borders that
would, in its point of view, further fuel the independence movement inside Turkish
Kurdistan. The evolution of the Syrian militias, to some degree, reflects the need to
settle any potential disputes without unnecessarily antagonizing the actors located
in the region. Originally, the Kurdish population was mainly represented by the
YPG, together with the women protection units (YPJ) and the political party known
in English as the United Democratic Party (PYD). Later on, the military branch
renamed itself to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to portray the inclusive nature
of the forces that were composed of a non-Kurdish element as well. While this is a
largely simplified picture, it is sufficient for our current purposes. The amount of the
territory under the Kurdish control sustainably grew following the 2015 defense of
Kobani, and the local opposition to the Daesh activity was united under the Kurdish
umbrella (Ünver 2018, 40). This tendency was another issue in the eyes of the
Turkish policymakers and resulted in the reaction from Ankara.
The nature of relations between Westphalian and Chaotic Anarchy environments
are theorized as follows – the Westphalian actor attempts to stabilize a region in the
Chaotic Anarchy by intervening and, at least to some degree, separates itself as to
prevent spillover of the negative trends; the Chaotic Anarchy environment tends to
spill over into the Westphalian space and destabilize it. We can see the processes
appearing in all three sketched main topics of the mutual post-2011 relations. In the
first case, it was the issue of general instability and the presence of Daesh as the
most aggressive violent actor operating in the Syrian civil war. While the interven-
tion of the Turkish forces is more directly connected to the Kurdish issue and will
be covered later, the attempt to separate Turkish territory from the violence was
16
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria
17
See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/
file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan
7.2 Interaction 143
evident. The pictures of the Turkish tanks standing on the borders with Syria were
very famous, and the presence of the Turkish troops followed the perceived threats
appearing in the neighborhood. Turkey, additionally, constructed a border barrier
that should further allow for the separation of its territory from Syria, thus limiting
the spill over the potential of the environment. Once again, this separation process
begun only after the Syrian environment shifted from the Westphalian into a Chaotic
Anarchy setting. Additionally, the Turkish government attempted to protect its ter-
ritory by acting very rationally and self-centered regarding the different parties in
the conflict. While it supported the Free Syrian Army as a first important actor
opposed to the Assad government and the Turkic communities on living along the
borders, it also tied itself to the Ahrar al-Sham, an Islamist umbrella organization,
with a potential to become a dominant actor in (parts of) Syria. This support follows
the logic of the Turkish foreign policy in the region in general as Turkey supports
political Islamist forces, usually connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ahrar al-
Sham was, in this respect, an obvious choice as it was politically Islamist, not con-
nected to either Al-Qaeda or Daesh and relevant on the ground. Turkey also
attempted to manage its relations with the actors in the conflict as not to become an
unnecessary target of an attack – issue evidently present in its dealing with Daesh,
to name just one example. It thus made sure that its proxies can intervene in a way
to shape the conflict to an image welcomed by the Turkish foreign policy and that
the level of spillover will be minimized. This worked to a point as Turkey was tar-
geted by Daesh only in a limited yet still significant, way. On the other hand, none
of the two main proxies successfully defeated the Assad government, thus not
achieving another strategic objective of Turkey. The Kurdish question was, as men-
tioned, later on, dealt with by the Turkish forces themselves.
On the other hand, the actors operating in the conflict conducted spillover opera-
tions that directly involved Turkey. First, Turkey entered into an opened conflict
with Russia as a backer of the Assad government to a point when it shot down the
Russian jet fighter Su-24 that on 24th of November 2015 appeared in the Turkish
airspace. The relations with Russia, nevertheless, improved rapidly since that point.
Another example of spillover can be named in the cases of terrorist attacks con-
ducted or inspired by Daesh on the Turkish territory. Of these, the two prominent are
2016 attack on the Atatürk Airport in Istanbul and the January 2017 attack on the
night club in the same city. PKK operations on the Turkish territory may also fall
into this category. There thus exists a tendency to spread the zone of conflict across
the border into the Turkish territory. Turkey is thus directly engaged in a conflict
with more sides of the conflict while utilizing the proxy warfare itself in order to
shape the outcome of the civil war. The physical separation is clearly present, and
the spillover tendencies are observable.
The second issue presented in this section is the migration crisis that affected the
Syrian neighborhood. The spillover effect is, in this case, clear. The neighboring
countries, including Turkey, needed to take care of the massive number of people
fleeing the civil war incapable of finding a safe refuge inside Syria itself. Such a
movement brings with itself not only economic costs but also tensions related to the
cohabitation of the local population with the incoming refugees. The presence of the
refugee camps becomes increasingly problematic. Even if the actual connection of

the refugees to the violent actors is minimal, the presence itself brings economic
and security risks on its own that are further aggravated by the reaction of the local
population. On the other hand, the neighboring countries are well aware that it is
currently impossible to relocate the settled Syrians back to their country as this
would establish a very dangerous situation for them and on the lowest level would
bring enormous negative attention to the country refusing to help.
Again, this spillover was matched by an adequate policy along the theorized
lines as Turkey intervened in the conflict in the Idlib province, attempting to manage
the crisis in the region and thus prevent another additional movement of the civilian
population. Idlib is, as of the time of writing, the last bastion of opposition to the
Assad regime containing a mix of groups from Islamist connected to Al-Qaeda to
more or less secular outfits. According to the outcomes of the sixth Astana peace
talks held in a city nowadays known as Nur-Sultan in Kazakhstan in September
2017, Turkey is one of the parties responsible for the securing of the status quo in
the deescalation zone setup in the region and did deploy the troops in the region.18
The second reason for this deployment is clearly the mitigation of the potential
impacts on the civilian population that remains in the region. Idlib is a target of
Assad forces supported by Russia, Iran, and their proxies, and the potential full-
scale invasion would surely lead to another deterioration in the living conditions of
the local population and massive movement of the inhabitants located on its terri-
tory. As of the time of the writing, Turkey basically prevents the Syrian government
troops supported by Russia and Iran from entering the zone and, despite the appear-
ance of active hostilities, keeps the zone safe from the worst impacts of the potential
full-scale invasion. This development would trigger another massive movement of
people and increase the number of migrants in Turkey. Once again, the double logic
of mutual relations appears.
Finally, we come to the Kurdish question. This is probably the thorniest issue
related to the Turkish foreign and security policy in the region. It is also one
tightly connected to the presence of non-state actors in the Chaotic Anarchy envi-
ronment in both Syria and Iraq. Not discussing the effectiveness of the domestic
approach to the Kurdish population (that could be successfully challenged), the
government feels threatened by the existence of an independent Kurdish entity in
the Middle East. While Turkey is in contact with the Iraqi Kurdish regional gov-
ernment, the situation in Syria is different. Due to the internal tensions inside the
Kurdish community, the Iraqi Kurdistan is rather hostile toward the activities of
the PKK and its leftist ideological setting. While the Iraqi Peshmergas aided their
Syrian counterparts in defense of Kobani, such an interaction was rather an
exception. On the contrary, the YPG as a military wing of PYD is basically a
Syrian offshoot of the party and is tightly connected to its activities ideologically
as well as personally. Prior to its expulsion in the late 1990s, PKK was operating
from the Syrian Kurdistan, setting up YPG once it was forced out of its territory
18
See https://www.astanacalling.com/6th-astana-process-talks-produce-de-escalation-zone-agree
ment/
7.2 Interaction 145
(Pusane 2018, 75–79). Turkey regularly objects to the cooperation of the USA
and other allies with the group and presents the Kurdish autonomous movement
as a terrorist organization. The spillover is connected to the PKK connection. The
utilization of northern Syria is a precedented action as the PKK was allowed to
operate from the region by the Syrian regime in the past. Northern Syria and the
Turkish Kurdistan may develop into a single zone of conflict that might lead to
the creation of a unified region of unrest – something feared by the Turkish
authorities.
Turkey, however, yet again utilizes the theorized response. First, it once again
protects its territory in the same way mentioned before by separating the territories
of the two countries in question. Second, it conducted two interventions –
Operation Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch – that first allowed the Turkish army
to take control of the part of northern Syria along the Euphrates river – thus pre-
venting connection of the Kurdish enclaves in the region (Ünver 2018, 40) – and
then led it to conquer Afrin region in the northwest. It thus took over one part of
the territory the Kurdish militias took over throughout the civil war. Consequently,
Turkey threatened a full-scale invasion into Rojava located on the eastern bank of
Euphrates under the pretext of fighting the Kurdish terrorism. It would thus
directly take over the potentially threatening regions and attempt to pacify them by
a similar means it does in Turkey. It is questionable what would be the result of
such endeavor given the long-lasting struggle against the PKK, but it would be a
course of action in line with the general type of interaction between the two envi-
ronments. As of the time of writing, it seems that Turkey will negotiate with the
USA as a guarantee of the Kurdish militias an introduction of the demilitarized
zone along the border to decrease its anxiety regarding the situation. This would
enable Turkey to further separate itself from the perceived threat without the need
to intervene, which is more costly in both economic and personal terms. This
could also be a solution more acceptable to the Kurdish representation and popula-
tion itself and might allow for less violent relations to develop. Nonetheless, a
prospect for the nonviolent solution to the Kurdish issue was put to an end on 9th
of October 2019 when the Turkish forces entered the province of Rojava, begin-
ning a military action against the SDF. The separation-and-intervention logic is,
nonetheless, once again present.
Conclusion
8
The geopolitical environment in the post-Cold War world came through a continu-
ous transformation. The end of the bipolar competition connected to the final demise
of the attempts to unify the political map of the world had a clear impact on the
nature of the outlook of the world system. Many authors attempted to capture the
ongoing changes in unified theories that were to explain the new nature of the global
geopolitics. This book dealt with one of these approaches – neomedievalism. Its
primary goal was to look at the nature of the post-Cold War geopolitics through the
lenses of the neomedieval thinking and evaluate to what degree is this approach
justifiable and what consequences does it bring to the nature of the political activity
and our understanding of it.
The first, seemingly straightforward, question dealt with a conceptualization of
the neomedievalism as a theory. After an in-depth literature review, it turned out that
the stream of thought is significantly shattered. Set on a continuum between a his-
torical neomedievalism based on the European Middle Ages and almost apocalyptic
New Dark Ages or Coming Anarchy, each author presented a little different vision
of the neomedieval future. This points to the most important defining feature of the
neomedievalism – an unequal level of development. As the theory is based on the
assumption of the multiplication of authorities and establishment of competing
global authorities, it is only natural that, unlike the seemingly homogenized
Westphalian system, it will create systematically different outcomes. In the pre-
sented model, three poles – geopolitical environments – are described as ideal types
that establish a continuum within which the real-world examples oscillate. These
three poles are the Westphalian system, Durable Disorder, and Chaotic Anarchy.
To summarize the main features of the three ideal types, let us begin with the
Westphalian system that, despite the visible shift in the nature of global geopolitical
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_8
148 8 Conclusion
setting, is still appearing on the map of the world and is unlikely to disappear. The
first important factor (as summarized in Table 3.1) is the nature of sovereignty, in
which the Westphalian environment is full, territorial, and based on the modern
nineteenth/twentieth-century idea of a state and the post-Second World War interna-
tional practice based on the respect for the territorial integrity and negative sover-
eignty. The nature of borders is that of border lines and state is a central political
unit in the system. Non-state actors are operating under the authority of a state.
Stability of the system is based on a balance of power with the most likely outcomes
of the relations among the important actors inside the system being peace or war.
The nature of territoriality is connected to the nature of borders and the overall
political setting and is state-centered. State in the Westphalian environment is,
according to R. Cooper and G. Sørensen, modern. A state is the primary provider of
the function and services inside its territory and the main conductor of the interac-
tions with the external environments.
Durable Disorder’s first characteristic is the pooling and sharing of sovereignty
among the states located inside the networked region. Borders are more penetrable,
and many political, territorial actors will deal with the borders as frontiers rather
than borderlines. This is, however, the case for the internal borders only as the envi-
ronment attempts to some degree protect and close its external borders. The state
has its defined role inside the system but is only one among the many relevant actors
with limited reach and power. Non-state actors overtake many of the state functions
while refraining from the use of violence. The stability is based on an existence of
three universal pillars – political, economic, and societal – that challenge and check
each other out. Nature of the relations inside this environment is defined by coop-
eration and challenge rather than war or another form of the physical armed conflict.
The nature of territoriality is influenced by networking that to a large extent defines
the environment and localization which is a natural outgrowth of the connection and
degradation of the identification with the state. The nature of the state is postmod-
ern, and the basic services are provided by either state or non-state actors. Outside
interests are to a large extent propagated by commercial actors and NGOs as is clear
from the presentation of the interactive effects among the different environments
presented in Chap. 6.
The final type of geopolitical environment identified in this model is the Chaotic
Anarchy. The nature of sovereignty is judicial or negative. Borders are de facto
defined as border zones or are nonexistent. The state is present only at a level needed
to protect the ruling elite and bring it enough resources to buy off the needed sup-
port. The environment is highly unstable and defined by a presence of ad hoc coali-
tions and many violent clashes. The nature of territoriality is variable with control
over population usually more important to the control over territory. The nature of
the state is premodern/postcolonial. The basic goods are usually unavailable, and
the connection to the external environments is characterized by spontaneous spill-
overs whether in the form of violent outgrowth or migration. Neomedievalism is
thus a system combining defining characteristics of the premodern, modern, and
postmodern system that manifests itself in different ways inside different
territories.
8 Conclusion 149
This answer to the first research question brings the work toward the second one,
the one regarding the geographic distribution of the presented geopolitical environ-
ments. As evident from the analysis, none of the regions is currently firmly set
inside the Durable Disorder environment. The only two regions that appear to be
located inside this framework constitute borderline situations, and it can be expected
that they will shift toward the Westphalian model. The rest of the globe can be sepa-
rated between the remaining two types of environment. The nature of the environ-
ment, in this case, follows the capability of the state institutions. We still cannot
experimentally observe the decrease of the state power toward larger stability as
predicted by the model. Nevertheless, the transformative effects can be found in
some of the regions (EU+, North America, East Asia, part of Oceania), and without
a strong backlash, these regions will probably establish a core of the future Durable
Disorder part of the world.
Knowing the distribution of the geopolitical environments, it is important to
understand how do the different political actors act inside them and how do the dif-
ferent environments affect each other. The emphasis on different structural factors
inside the three types of spaces and varying level of stability affects the possible
courses of action inside the different regions. As for the Westphalian system, states
try to disconnect from the part of the flows that it perceives as threatening for their
power. They also strictly follow a principle of territorial protection of its borders (as
clear from the Russian experience, this does not necessarily involve the same for
other countries). Nonviolent non-state actors are operating under the power of the
state and are limited by the state. Violent non-state actors consequently either chal-
lenge the state (separatist movements, insurgencies) or are captured by the state and
used as paramilitary forces (e.g., kadyrovtsy in Chechen conflict (Souleimanov
2015; Williams 2015, 153–205)).
The state inside the Durable Disorder, on the contrary, accepts the globalization
in all its forms and a transformation into networking setting defined by the privatiza-
tion of a large portion of services. It, nevertheless, still provides some of these and
acts as a territorially bound provider of the basic regulation framework. Nonviolent
non-state actors attempt to utilize the possibilities of the functional caveats to maxi-
mize their chances of survival inside the new system. They also overcome many
functions formerly provided by states. Violent non-state actors, consequently, either
cooperate with the systemic forces – e.g., private military companies – or utilize its
nature to penetrate it, e.g., terrorist groups.
Last, but not least, the state in the Chaotic Anarchy is mostly interested in the
protection of the power center against possible challengers, and its impact on most
of the territory is very limited or nonexistent. It adopts strategies of regime survival
not of the development of the state institutions. Nonviolent non-state actors mostly
act as protectors of the local communities with a limited ability to challenge the
violent competitors. They also attempt to provide some basic services based primar-
ily on the traditional societal structure. Violent non-state actors follow the liquid
strategy of expansion into the functional and mostly territorial spaces lacking effec-
tive power. When faced with a strong counterpressure or exhausting local resources,
they will leave these spaces. They are rarely interested in sustained development.
150 8 Conclusion
Exceptions are formed by hybrid groups that hold both traditional or nonviolent part
and violent segment (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon). These actors can present the most
effective domestic political actors as evident from 2009 to 2011 activities of
Al-Shabaab inside southern Somalia.
Final question deals with the interaction of the three geopolitical environments.
Different environments can react on each other in three logical dyads. The first is the
interaction between the Westphalian system and Durable Disorder (or what is here
called soon-to-be Durable Disorder) space. Political actors in the Durable Disorder
follow the notion of connection and enlargement of the space via the power of
attraction and economic and soft-power potential. The Westphalian space, on the
other hand, attempts to separate itself from the spillover of this notion via border
creation or establishment of shatter belts. The reaction of the Westphalian system
actors vis-à-vis the Chaotic Anarchy system is the one of the prevention of a spill-
over of the negative effects via intervention and separation, while the Chaotic
Anarchy actors to some degree conduct such spillover activities connected to the
destabilization of the Westphalian states. The final dyad of Durable Disorder and
Chaotic Anarchy establishes an interaction in which the Chaotic Anarchy actors
seek to utilize the security specifics of the Durable Disorder actors, and these actors
try to diminish the possible threat. While the Chaotic Anarchy actors either utilize
networks and the free movement to its (often predatory) goals or attempt to obtain
resources (mainly states) to seemingly prevent this effect, Durable Disorder actors
try to separate themselves from the environment and stabilize via different
projects.
The nature of the post-Cold War geopolitics is complex and more disorganized
than in the pre-1991 system. Any attempt to theorize the nature of the global rela-
tions that aims at oversimplification will undoubtedly fail to understand some of the
important phenomena crucial for certain regions. This said it must be noted that this
work has its large share of simplifications as well. The real-world cases will surely
show lower level of cohesion than presented, and many anomalies will appear. It
nevertheless presents a possible first step toward a clearer understanding of the dif-
ferent processes that affect the behavior of political actors around the globe. By
separating it into the three types of spaces, the neomedieval framework allows
researchers to better grasp the different logic behind the actions of seemingly simi-
lar actors in separate regions. This understanding can stand at the beginning of a
more nuanced and localized research that would present a clearer picture of the
impacts this division of the globe holds for the future of power, politics, and security
in the twenty-first century.
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World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15714

New Middle Ages

ISSN 2522-0985 ISSN 2522-0993 (electronic)

3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds������������������������������������������������������������ 41

6 Effects on the International System ������������������������������������������������������ 95

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

See Tilly (1975).

See the discussion in 1999’s special issue of Political Studies 47 (3).

According to the Darwinist theory – see Spruyt (1994, 24).

2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory

Despite being primarily created as an international relations’ framework, New

contemporary world. He proposes presence of four types of spatial models based

A proper definition of a modern state is a far-reaching task which to be done

2.2.2 Unrecognized State

Understanding a concept of the unrecognized state9 is an important task since this

2.2.3 Non-State Actor

Attempt to define sovereignty is another difficult task that needs to be performed on

2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots

2.3 Systemic Development

2.3.1 Medieval System

2.3.2 Westphalian System

3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism

3.1.1 Regional Integration of States

3.1.2 Disintegration of States

As noted earlier, a disintegration of states is one of the prime prerequisites of the

(e.g., Transnistria, Somaliland, South Ossetia), territorial non-state actors (e.g.,

3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence

3.1.4 Transnational Organizations

3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World

Finally, H. Bull presents the technological unification of the world as a necessary

3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation

3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs

Reno (1998, 72–73).

These three realms create the above-presented system of overlapping identities

3.2.2 Philip Cerny

3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin

3.2.4 Jan Zielonka

J. Zielonka dealt with the concept of neomedievalism in relation to the process of

J. Zielonka compares two competing visions of the European Union – superstate

see, for example, Pänke (2019).

3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little

As part of their monography on the development of the international system,

of their quasi-autonomous status and the appearance of multiple types of units –

3.2.6 Neil Winn

3.2.7 John Rapley

3.2.8 Phil Williams

3.3 End of State System?

Before moving to the establishment of a unified neomedievalist theory of the three

3.3.1 Crumbling of State System

geography (connection by infrastructure) (Khanna 2016, 28). Some of the issues

3.3.2 Alternative Actors

global system, see Khanna (2016).

3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds

3.4.1 Durable Disorder

Durable Disorder is a nonviolent networked (postmodern) outcome of the neomedi-

3.4.2 Chaotic Anarchy

The second geopolitical environment discussed in this work is Chaotic Anarchy. As

3.4.3 Westphalian System

Table 3.1 Three modes of territorial control

4.2 Research Design

three geopolitical environments. As the neomedieval world can be ideally divided

Map 4.1 Regional selection

3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds�� 41

6 Effects on the International System �� 95

2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory

2.2.2 Unrecognized State

2.2.3 Non-State Actor

2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots

2.3 Systemic Development

2.3.1 Medieval System

2.3.2 Westphalian System

3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism

3.1.1 Regional Integration of States

3.1.2 Disintegration of States

3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence

3.1.4 Transnational Organizations

3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World

3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation

3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs

3.2.2 Philip Cerny

3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin

3.2.4 Jan Zielonka

3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little

3.2.6 Neil Winn

3.2.7 John Rapley

3.2.8 Phil Williams

3.3 End of State System?

3.3.1 Crumbling of State System

3.3.2 Alternative Actors

3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds

3.4.1 Durable Disorder

3.4.2 Chaotic Anarchy

3.4.3 Westphalian System

4.2 Research Design

5.1 Regional Analysis

5.1.1 The EU+

5.1.3 East Europe

5.1.4 Russian Space

5.1.5 The Caucasus

5.1.6 Central Asia

5.1.7 Chinese Space

5.1.8 East Asia

5.1.9 Southeast Asia

5.1.11 Indian Space

5.1.15 Larger Mesopotamia

5.1.16 Gulf Monarchies

5.1.17 Western Middle East

5.1.18 Northern Africa

5.1.19 Northwest Africa

5.1.20 Horn of Africa+

5.1.21 East Africa

5.1.22 Central Africa

5.1.23 South Africa

5.1.24 West Africa

5.1.25 North America

5.1.26 Central America

5.1.27 The Caribbean

5.1.28 Northern South America

5.1.29 Southern South America

6.1.1 Westphalian System

6.1.2 Durable Disorder

6.1.3 Chaotic Anarchy

6.2.1 Westphalian-Durable Disorder

6.2.2 Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy

6.2.3 Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy