EVIDENCE Cases
Delfin de la Torre, who was
II. Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions
CASE 1: G.R. no. 12449 PP vs Alido
G.R. No. L-12449 May 30, 1961
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL., defendants.
INOCENCIO HERVAS and MARCELO HERVAS,
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Hon. F. Imperial Reyes, presiding, finding accused-
appellants Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas guilty of
the murder of their cousin, Francisco Hervas, and
sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay
1/3 of the indemnity of P6,000. Espiridion Alido was also
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Francisco Hervas 1/3 of the sum of P6,000, and to
pay a proportionate share of the costs, but he did not appeal.
On or before May 29, 1955, Francisco Hervas, his wife and
their children were living in their house on a land situated in
the barrio of Dagami, Municipality of Maasin, Province of
Iloilo. At about 6:00 in the evening of that day, Francisco
Hervas seemed to have heard some noise coming from his
cornfield near their house, so he went to
the batalan adjacent to their house to find out what was the
noise about, but suddenly a shotgun exploded from the
neighboring field, and the shot from it hit Francisco on the
chest and he fell down dead. The following morning, the
widow, Concepcion Laserna sent her eldest child, Ofelia
Hervas, to the house of Inocencio Hervas, one of the
accused, which was nearest their house, and to the house of
the brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, farther away,
to inform them of the incident. The brother of the deceased
happened to be away from home and as Ofelia returned, she
passed by the house of Inocencio Hervas, informing him that
the brother of the deceased could not come, so Inocencio
went to the house of the victim, accompanied by three
individuals who helped him dig the grave some distance
away from the house and there interred him.
No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the
deceased to Investigate who the author of the crime was.
But news of the killing came to the ears of the Philippine
Constabulary. So one day the Philippine Constabulary had
the remains of the deceased exhumed. Those present at the
exhumation were the investigator of the Constabulary, Sgt.
Pelagio Agraviador the Chief of Police, the sanitary inspector
and the municipal mayor. They proceeded to the barrio of
Dagami, passing first by the house of Inocencio Hervas, and
with the latter they went to the place where the body of the
deceased had been interred. The grave was dug and the
dead body was brought out. They found out that there were
nine pellet holes.
Thereafter, the Constabulary began questioning the widow,
Concepcion Laserna. Her statement was taken at the
municipal building and she declared that she was able to
recognize Espiridion Alido as the one who shot her husband,
accompanied at the time of the shooting by two persons
whom she could not recognize. This statement (Exhibit "1"
Alido, 2 Hervas), of Concepcion Laserna was made on June
13, 1955. A similar statement was made by her daughter,
Ofelia Hervas, and to the same effect.
The municipal police of Maasin could not effect the arrest of
Alido, but before July 13, 1955, he surrendered to the
Philippine Constabulary at Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He
surrendered to Sgt. Silverio Balmaceda at the barracks.
Balmaceda referred him to Cpl.
then investigator of the company. Alido's statement was
taken down in writing and was presented in court during the
trial as Exhibit "C". According to this statement, Inocencio
Hervas invited him on May 29, 1955 to the house of one
Carlos Camral, on the occasion of the killing of a pig that in
the afternoon of that day, Inocencio, he and Marcelo
proceeded to the house of Francisco Hervas, armed as
follows: Inocencio, with a shot gun (paltik), Marcelo with a
rifle, and he with a bolo; that once near the house of
Francisco Hervas, he heard one shot and upon hearing it he
ran away, returning to the house of Carlos Camral that about
9:00 that evening, Inocencio Hervas came back to the house
of Camral with a shotgun, boasting that they could now live
in peace because the arrogant man is already dead
(referring to the deceased Francisco Hervas.) .
As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation
petitions were made. Concepcion Laserna was again
examined this time before the Justice of the Peace of
Maasin, and she then, declared in her affidavit (Exhibit I,
Alido, 3 Hervas) dated July 20, 1955 that it was Inocencio
Hervas who fired the shot that killed her husband, and that
Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido were with Inocencio at
the time of the shooting. On July 20, 1955, the information
was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Maasin,
charging the three accused with the murder of the deceased.
The information charges the accused with having committed
the crime with treachery and evident premeditation.
Concepcion Laserna testified at the trial that three persons
had approached their house on the afternoon of May 29,
1955, namely, Inocencio Hervas, Marcelo Hervas and
Espiridion Alido that Inocencio was provided with a paltik,
Espiridion had a rifle and Marcelo had a bolo; that she
actually saw that it was Inocencio who fired the shot that
killed her husband; and that as soon as her husband had
fallen down after the shot, the three persons ran away. She
further declared that she saw the assailant because she was
at the time of the shooting at the window of their house.
Demetrio Hervas, a son of the deceased, also testified and
declared that when his father went to the batalan attracted
by a noise in the cornfield, he (witness) was at the door of
the house; that when he heard the shot which felled his
father, he immediately directed his eyes towards the place
where the explosion had come and saw the aggressor,
Inocencio Hervas, and his companions, Marcelo Hervas and
Espiridion Alido.
Upon being asked why in her statement made before the
Municipal Mayor on June 13, 1955 (Exhibit "2" — Hervas;
Exhibit "1" — Alido), she declared that she saw Espiridion
Alido fired the shot that killed her husband and that she did
not recognize Alido's companions, she explained that at that
time she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio
Hervas. Explaining this, she declared that the morning after
the shooting she sent her daughter Ofelia to the house of
Inocencio Hervas to tell him that she should bury her
husband; that Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if she
should disclose or point to him as the author of the death;
that he just suggested to her that she should explain that the
cause of her husband's death was his having bolo wounds,
instead of gunshot wounds. Upon being asked the probable
reason why her husband was killed by the accused, she
declared that it was because the accused had taken away
bamboos from the land which the deceased was taking care
of, and her husband had denounced them to the owner of
the land, namely, Eugenio Maquiling.
The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador, who
had seen the exhumation, corroborates this alleged fear of
Inocencio Hervas of Concepcion Laserna. He testified that at
the time he was investigating Concepcion Laserna,
Inocencio Hervas was present, and that every time
Page 1 of 25
Concepcion was asked a question she would first look at
Inocencio before answering the question. Further elaborating
on the matter, this witness declared that when the
investigation was being made in the building of the
puericulture center, the persons who were present were
Concepcion Laserna, her daughter Ofelia Hervas, Inocencio
Hervas, a policeman and himself, and that he observed that
every time a question was directed to Concepcion Laserna,
she would look at Inocencio who, in turn would look at her
with sharp eyes; that he noticed such interest on the part of
Inocencio that in the middle part of the questioning of
Concepcion, he had to ask Inocencio to go out. He also
declared that when Ofelia Hervas was investigated,
Inocencio Hervas again went inside the room where the
investigation was being conducted and again he had to ask
him to go out of the room, because he wanted to have
secrecy in the investigation.
All of the three accused denied having participated in the
commission of the crime, including Espiridion Alido, who did
not appeal from the decision. Inocencio Hervas declared that
he was always in good terms with Francisco Hervas and his
wife; that he was living at a distance of one-half kilometer
from the house of Francisco Hervas, and that the one
carrying the work of the family was the wife, Concepcion
Laserna, because one of the hands of Francisco Hervas had
been cut in a fight during the Japanese regime; that about
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the shooting, he
had to go to the house of one Carlos to help in the slaughter
of a pig, and did not know of the death of Francisco Hervas
until the following morning when the daughter of the
deceased, Ofelia, informed him thereof; that when she went
to the house of Francisco there was no one there except the
wife and the children, and when he asked her if she
recognized the persons who killed her husband, she
answered she did not because it was very dark; that
thereafter she left the house and went home, with the
instruction that when the brother of the deceased would
arrive he (the accused) would be called. Further testifying,
he declared that he returned at about 4:00 in the afternoon,
and that since the younger brother of the deceased, Proceso
Hervas, did not come, they buried the deceased with the
help of his children, namely, Carlos, Martin and Juan.
Testifying on the exhumation, he declared that the mayor,
the Chief of Police and some policemen came on the
Sunday following the burial on Monday; that the Chief of
Police and the mayor called for him at his house; that the
son of Francisco Hervas, named Demetrio Hervas, Juan and
Martin were also called; that some Philippine Constabulary
soldiers were also with the party, and that it was he and the
son of Francisco that indicated to them where the body was
buried; that they did not make any investigation that
afternoon because it was already very late when the
exhumation was finished; that they passed the night at his
house and the following morning the party returned back to
the poblacion together with the wife of the deceased. He
also testified that he, the widow and her children were
brought to town, as the Mayor had asked him to accompany
the widow. He denied that at the time the widow was being
investigated, he used to look at her with sharp eyes. On
being asked the possible reason why he was being accused,
he declared that he had an altercation with one Estong
Amorte and Fabian Resano, because when a certain parcel
of land was surveyed, he stopped them because his brother
Marcelo was not present. (It is important to note that the land
which was supposed to be surveyed appears to be the
cause of the trouble, as it is the very land occupied by
Francisco Hervas. Francisco Hervas was the one named by
the original owner, Eugenio Maquiling, to cultivate and stay
on the land. Later, Maquiling transferred it to Estong Amorte
and Fabian Resano.)
The accused Marcelo Hervas also denied the imputation,
declaring that on the day of the shooting, he was away from
his house, and that he learned of the death of Francisco
Hervas only when he arrived home on Tuesday (killing
occurred on Monday). He stated. that he had come from the
poblacion because he was engaged in the business of
making gold teeth for his patients, so he had to go to the
poblacion very often; that on the day following his arrival on
Tuesday, he asked for the wife of the deceased, and he
inquired from her what was the cause of her husbands
death, and she had answered that the deceased had
stepped on a bolo; that she told him that at the time of the
wounding of her husband she had heard a sound similar to a
falling can. Asked if there was any ill-feeling between
Francisco Hervas and his family, he declared that there was
none and the deceased even frequented his house to
drink tuba, the deceased being his first cousin. Asked what
the probable reason was why the widow had pointed to him
as one of the authors of the death of her husband, he
declared that she acted under the advice of their enemies
Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano. Explaining this matter
he said that Fabian Resano had purchased a piece of land
from Arcadio Maquiling, the son of Eugenio Maquiling and as
Resano surveyed the land, he (Resano) tried to include the
land belonging to him (Marcelo), and that he (Marcelo), did
not agree to this. As to the charge that he had been stealing
bamboos, he answered that the bamboos were not
Maquiling's but his own.
A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both
by the prosecution as well as by the defense, indicate that
the probable cause of the killing is, as indicated by the
widow, Concepcion Laserna, that is, Inocencio Hervas and
Marcelo Hervas resented the act of Francisco Hervas in
denouncing them for cutting bamboos on the land of
Maquiling. The land on which the house of Francisco Hervas
is erected belonged to Eugenio Maquiling. Marcelo Hervas
claimed that the bamboos that he cut were his own; that
when the land of Maquiling was sold to Fabian Resano and
the latter was trying to survey it, Marcelo objected to the
survey on the ground that Resano was including a portion of
his own land. Both accused-appellants Inocencio and
Marcelo, both surnamed Hervas, admitted that the
relationship between them and the deceased and his family
was cordial. There is, therefore, no reason why the widow
should point out to Marcelo and to Inocencio as the authors
of the death of her husband, unless she and her children had
actually seen them do the criminal act.
Her statement when she was brought to the municipal
building for investigation on June 13, 1955 pointing to
Espiridion Alido as the one who killed her husband and that
his companions could not be recognized by her must have
been due to the fact that she was then under the influence of
fear of Inocencio Hervas. The conduct of Inocencio Hervas,
a first cousin of the deceased, in not initiating the move to
have the authors of the death of his cousin investigated and
his advice of a prompt burial, in locate a guilty conscience —
he must have had part therein and he wanted to be saved
from being held to account for he murder. His advice that the
widow should declare hat the deceased had been killed by a
bolo wound, also attests to his interest in suppressing the
truth, certainly to save himself. The testimony of Marcelo to
the effect hat the widow had told him that the deceased died
of a bolo wound is the very explanation that was taught by
Inocencio Hervas to the widow. Both of them, Inocencio and
Marcelo, must have thought of pretending that the death of
Francisco Hervas was due to a bolo wound, not from a
gunshot wound, to suppress or prevent the investigation of
the crime. Marcelo Hervas was the barrio lieutenant. Why
did he not take steps to have the matter reported to the
authorities for investigation? His only excuse was that the
Page 2 of 25
widow supposedly told him that he lied of a bolo wound. If he
was satisfied with this false explanation, it must have been
because he wanted to shelter he culprits from investigation,
which fact in turn shows also a guilty mind.
The statement of the widow on June 13, 1955, when
examined by the municipal mayor, is explained away by he
testimony of the sergeant of the Constabulary who was
resent at the time of the taking of the statement, to the effect
that every time a question was asked the widow, he would
look at Inocencio for an answer. This corroborates the story
of the widow that she was then under influence of Inocencio
and her fear of him.
We are satisfied with the above circumstances and
explanation of the widow that her statement on June 13, was
induced by her fear of Inocencio. Proceeding now to the
consideration of the direct evidence, we find that both
Demetrio Hervas, 15 years old, and his mother, Concepcion
Laserna, positively asserted that they saw the three accused
Espiridion Alido, Marcelo Hervas and Inocencio Hervas near
their house on May 29, 1955 and that they recognized the
latter as the one who fired the shot from the "Paltik", that
killed Francisco Hervas. Demetrio Her was testified that it
was in the afternoon when the assault was made. The
statement of the widow before the mayor on June 13, 1955
placed the time of the assault at 6:10 in the afternoon. We
take judicial notice of the fact that in the month of May and
June, the days are long and the sun sets after 6:00 in the
afternoon, for which reason even though it was actually 6:00
in the afternoon, when the assault was made, both Demetrio
Hervas and his mother could easily see and recognize the
assailants of the deceased because it was not yet dark. The
assailants are well known to them, two of them being first
cousins of the deceased; so was Alido known to them. It is
not that their faces were clearly seen a person can
necessary easily be recognized from his stature, by the way
he stands and moves. We are, therefore, satisfied that the
two witnesses, — the widow and her son, actually
recognized the assailants as Espiridion Alido, Inocencio
Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. The testimony of the boy,
Demetrio, could not be impeached on the cross-examination.
His testimony was positive and direct, leaving absolutely no
doubt as to the circumstances under which he saw the
shooting and the certainty of his identification of the
accused-appellants. As to the widow, the explanation given
as hereinabove stated, to the fact that she was under the
influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas, sufficiently explains
why in her statement before the mayor on June 13, 1955,
she pretended not to have recognized the companions of
Espiridion Alido on the evening of May 29, 1955.
There was one other last incident which proves the
consciousness of guilt of Marcelo Hervas. This is the fact
that he pretended to be away and was not in his house when
Ofelia went to notify him of the death of her father. W hen the
Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was
investigated, after the surrender of Alido, he again was not at
home. As a barrio lieutenant, he should have been the first
to make steps to report the crime, but he pretended to be
away. These are the circumstances which show
consciousness of guilt on his part.
With the above circumstances and the testimony of two
witnesses identifying the two accused-appellants and the
finding of the trial judge who heard the witnesses and the
appellants testify, that the appellants are guilty, we are
forced to the conclusion that the said accused-appellants
participated in the commission of the offense charged, jointly
with Espiridion Alido and are guilty thereof. The crime
committed is that of murder, qualified by the circumstance of
alevosia, as the attack was unexpected and the victim was
even no opportunity to defend himself. As to the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, it is true that the
confession of Espiridion Alido, Exhibit "C" is to the effect that
Inocencio had invited Alido, to go with them to kill the
deceased, and that he provided his companions with
requisite arms. However, this confession of Alido is not
admissible in evidence against Inocencio Hervas and
Marcelo Hervas. We therefore had no sufficient evidence of
the evident premeditation.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below
finding the appellants guilty of murder and the sentence
imposed upon each of them with costs of this appeal against
the appellants.
CASE 2: G.R. no. 16664 PP vs Ayonayon
G.R. No. L-16664 March 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN AYONAYON and GASPAR
ACERADOR, defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, presiding,
finding Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador guilty of
murder, for the killing of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo and,
frustrated murder, for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo, and
sentencing each of them to death for the crime of murder,
and to an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years of prision
mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, for the frustrated murder,
with the proper indemnities and the accessories of the law,
and to pay each his proportional part of the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 5,
1959, while Florentino Lazo and members of his family,
namely, his wife, Juana Resuello, his children, Jose Lazo, 25
years, Pergentino Lazo, 17 years, Genoveva Lazo, 21 years,
Samuel Lazo, 7 years, and Juan Lazo, 12 years, were taking
their supper around a low table in the bamboo kitchen of
their house at barrio Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal,
Ilocos Sur, their two dogs suddenly started barking and
running to and fro, below and near the house. Genoveva
Lazo called the attention of her father to the unusual
behaviour of the dogs and commented that there must be
some persons on the ground. So she stood up and peeped
thru the window of the kitchen and saw a man dressed in
dark green fatigue clothes, standing on the ground on the
opposite end of the kitchen, peeping at the southwestern
part thereof in a semi-stooping position, with his gun pointed
thru the corner of the kitchen. The kitchen floor was about
four feet eight inches from the ground. The wall of the
kitchen was made of bamboo split and flattened as in
"sawali". She heard a burst of gunfire (parac-pac-pac) and
she felt that she was hit on her left shoulder. She fell to the
floor of the kitchen wounded, and lying flat on the floor hid
herself near the stove.
With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose Lazo was also hit and
he fell dead on the floor of the kitchen. Pergentino Lazo,
upon observing the gunfire and what had happened to his
brother and sister, promptly ran away from the kitchen,
crossing the batalan that separated the kitchen from the
sala, and to the sala, towards a side beside a wardrobe.
Here, behind the wardrobe, he hid himself. From this
position, behind the wardrobe, he heard gunfire from
the batalan near the stairs of the house, and, directed his
eyes to the place where the gunfire came from, he saw
through the opening of the window just above the stairs, the
accused Juan Ayonayon and his companion, the other
accused Gaspar Acerador. From the top of the stairs, the
accused fired at his father who had run to the sala, but who
fell down on the other side opposite the
wardrobe.1äwphï1.ñët
Page 3 of 25
Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan
and Samuel, and tried to run away from the kitchen also. It
so happened, however, that her husband Florentino was
already ahead of her and was already crossing
the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, running
to escape from the gunfire.
As she was about to cross the batalan to the sala, she saw
towards the left the two accused Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar
Acerador. At that time, Ayonayon was already on top of the
stairs, while his companion was on the last rung of the stairs.
The prosecution also proved that, that same evening, upon
receipt of news of the murders in the barrio of Namalpalan, a
group of Constabulary soldiers stationed in the poblacion,
together with the municipal health officers and others, went
to the scene of the murders. The soldiers found 30-calibre
empty shells on the ground near the kitchen, also on
the batalan above the stairs. They also found that the walls
of the kitchen and a wall of the sala was pierced by bullet
holes. The dead body of Florentino Lazo was found lying on
the floor of the sala, and that of Jose Lazo also in the
kitchen, both of them riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo
was found near the stove. Pergentino Lazo, upon being
questioned by the Constabulary sergeant, gave details of the
incident, also already described by the witnesses for the
prosecution, and pointed to the two accused herein as the
ones responsible for the assault.
It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands
of both accused and the casts, upon examination in the
National Bureau of Investigation, had positive traces of
nitrate.
Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased
Jose Lazo and another was also extracted from that of
Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon examination, were found
to have been fired from a semi-automatic or an automatic
.30-caliber carbine, from the same gun firing the empty
shells.
It was further shown that upon learning who the assailants
were, as per information by Pergentino Lazo, two soldiers
went to the house of accused Gaspar Acerador. He was not
in his house and as he was then wearing undershirt and
drawers, he had to be taken to his house so he could put on
his clothes, before being brought to town for examination.
The constabulary men who accompanied him to his house
saw that a green fatigue suit and poncho were hanging on
the wall. On the other hand, Juan Ayonayon was arrested by
a Constabulary captain and his company that same evening
in the house of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo, about
seven kilometers from Magsingal.
As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused
Gaspar Acerador had been accused of the murder of Pablo
Resuello, the brother of Juana Resuello, wife of Florentino
Lazo, the deceased. On the other hand, Florentino Lazo
used to drive a carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was
accused of the murder of a relative of a cousin of Ayonayon,
usually rode in going to court. While nobody could testify as
to the motive of the murder, it is apparent from these
circumstances that enmity must have existed between
Florentino Lazo and his wife Juana Resuello on one hand,
and the accused Gaspar Acerador and Juan Ayonayon, on
the other.
The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to
by their respective relatives. Juan Ayonayon stated that at
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day in question, he
was in the house of his cousin Engineer Uberita in Santo
Domingo, with whom he was living then. But the barrio of
Santo Domingo is only seven kilometers from the house of
the Lazos, the victims, and he could easily have gone from
his place of residence to the house of the Lazos in 10
minutes by jeepney. For his part, Acerador was living in a
barrio of Panay, which is only a kilometer away from the
scene of the crime. The fact, therefore, that the relatives of
the accused stated that they were in their respective houses
around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day of the crime,
does not discount the possibility that the accused
themselves had actually gone to the house of their victims at
about the time of 6: 00 o'clock in the evening. It must be
noted that the time given was merely a calculation, and what
may have been considered by one witness as six o'clock
may actually have been 5:30, etc. So that the defenses of
alibis appear to Us as of very little weight or value, especially
in view of the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution
clearly identified the accused, such identification being
positive and immediate because given as soon as the
officers of the Constabulary arrived.
We will now proceed to the principal issue, namely, whether
the three witnesses who testified to having identified the
accused were really in a position to and did actually identify
them. The first witness was Genoveva Lazo who said that
she peeped out of the window and saw the face and figure of
a man who later she identified as Gaspar Acerador. The
description that she gave at the trial coincides with the
physical features that the court saw in the person of the said
accused at the time of the trial. Gaspar Acerador was also
identified by the wife of the deceased, Juana Resuello, who
declared that Acerador was seen by her on the last rung of
the stairs leading to their batalan. Pergentino Lazo also
identified both accused when, looking thru the window near
the stairs, he saw them firing their guns at the deceased
Florentino Lazo.
With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana
Resuello is beyond question. As Juana was going to cross
the batalan, she saw Juan Ayonayon already on
the batalan and was about to speak to him. He, Ayonayon,
was known to her, consequently, the identification was
prompt and immediate. It is a fact that when one meets a
person known to him, identification takes place at first sight,
so the testimony of Juana Resuello that she identified
Ayonayon, who was known to her, should be accepted. The
same fact of identification is true as to the accused Gaspar
Acerador, also known to Juana Resuello..
As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is
being attacked, it is to be noted that he saw the two accused
while the latter were already on the batalan. From a diagram
of the house, We note that place where the accused were
standing, while firing at the decease Florentino Lazo, was
visible through a window from the place beside
the aparador where Pergentino Lazo, had stationed himself.
But the fact that Pergentino Lazo, when the officers came in
the same evening, declared to the Constabulary officers that
the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this readiness,
shows that he was able positively identify them at the time of
the assault, the accused being known to him.
Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the
assault, which was 6:00 o'clock in the evening, it was
already dark, the accused could not have been identified by
Genoveva Lazo, Juana Resuello or Pergentino Lazo. We
checked the time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and
We have been informed that the sun set on that date at
about 6:38 in the evening, which shows that at 6:00 o'clock,
the surrounding of the house where the victims were shot,
were not yet dark. The use of a kerosene lamp inside a
house does not mean that outside the house, where the
assailants were seen, was also dark. The inside of a house
is necessarily darker than the outside; so the use of a
kerosene lamp while the inmates are taking supper, does not
mean that persons outside cannot be identified from within
the house.
Capital is made of the fact that the witness Genoveva Lazo
said that during the day there were stars. She did not say
that during the daytime there were stars; she must have
Page 4 of 25
meant that during the time when the assault was made there
were stars in the sky at night. Beside we take judicial notice
of the fact that while it is true that the month of August is
characterized by showers or rains, they generally are
passing showers and rains, after which the atmosphere
becomes clear.
But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the
prosecution must be believed as to the identification of the
accused by them, is the fact that they had no cause or
reason to charge or point out the accused as the ones
responsible for the offense, there being no strong reason
why they should violate their oaths and declare falsely.
After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the
two accused were really the ones who assaulted and fired at
Genoveva, Florentino and Jose Lazo, and killed Florentino
Lazo and Jose Lazo, and that their guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed by
the lower court is that of death for the murders of Florentino
Lazo and Jose Lazo. There is no question that the murders
were committed with the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, and with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and dwelling of the offended party. But while the
penalty imposed appears justified by the aggravating
circumstances, there is no sufficient number of votes to
affirm the penalty of death for the reason that it does not
appear from the evidence that the accused-appellants were
so perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty. Hence, no
sufficient number of Justices voted to affirm the imposition of
the death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified by imposing upon each of the accused-appellants
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Florentino
Lazo and Jose Lazo, but the judgment is hereby affirmed in
all other respects. The judgment and sentence imposed
upon them for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo is affirmed,
with costs against accused-appellants. So ordered.
CASE 3: G.R. no. 35133 PP vs Madera
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V.
ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @
"Ross", defendants-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants
from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them
guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the cost proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early
morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep
of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio
Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on
the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots
from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping
on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot
wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the
one that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not
die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his
brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house.
The victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned,
the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already
brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was
carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the
assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he
was brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he
died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo
Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino
Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at
the time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was
awakened by the gunfire and saw the appellant Raymundo
Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45
caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres
and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a
distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife
of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madem as
the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were
then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the
prosecution presented the dying, declaration of the victim
Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the
Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the
way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from
Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain
Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting
incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman
Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have to take down
his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and
the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then
3:00 o'clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was
asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera
and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to
the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on
their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that
he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said
policeman has been an investigator in the police force since
1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving
his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he said
earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman
Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only
Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to
the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to
reveal right away the identities of the appellants to the Victim
himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco
Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no
evidence on record that they were asked by their relatives
about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked,
they would have readily revealed appellants' identities as
they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of
Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a
formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of
Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20,
1970, subscribed and sworn on the same date before the
Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana
categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo
Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were
downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be
familiar with their house. He testified on direct examination
that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross
examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That
does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because
on further questioning, he said that the balcony referred to
by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he
heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back
Page 5 of 25
portion of their house. The falsity of this statement has not
been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it
which apparently show that there was no such opening, can
be explained by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure
the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was
located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when
he heard the burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that
he failed to recognize the appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of
another whom he would otherwise have observed.
Under some circumstance, however, excitement
may whet the attention to a keen edge. In some
other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that
the emotion incident to the impending peril may
not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but
that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the
circumstance of the threatened danger in order to
2
avoid it.
3
The appellants asserted in their briefs that "the evidence on
record does not show that there was a moon shining in the
early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence,
Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized
the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of
4
nature" and, under this rule, of the time when the moon
5
rises or sets on a particular day. This not withstanding and
for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification
6
from the Weather Bureau which shows that the moon was
bright at the time of the shooting incident. It reads:
To whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that, based on the computations
made by this office, the following astronomical
data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and
correct:
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19,
1970 and set the following day, April 20, at 4:27
A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon
was at an altitude of 34 degrees above the
western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees
West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00
A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon having occurred
at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr.
Estanislao Fernandez, Associate Justice,
Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on
the part of the appellants for there is no doubt as to their
identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic
chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo Madera was found
negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that,
the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after
the incident, the test could have given a negative result even
if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier,
because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been
washed off by washing or could have been removed by
perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of
appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away
from that of the victim Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres because
the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We
agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind
appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana,
did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no
proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three
appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help
Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the
crime did not make them liable either as co-principals or
accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court,
penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy
presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan
or agreement and in order to establish the
existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough
that the persons supposedly engaged or
connected with the same be present when the
crime was perpetrated. There must be established
a logical relationship between the commission of
the crime and the supposed conspirators,
evidencing a clear and more intimate connection
between and among the latter, such as by their
overt acts committed in pursuance of a common
design. Considering the far-reaching
consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime
is required to support a finding of its presence that
is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.
The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To
hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an
accomplice, it must be shown that he had
knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal,
which may be demonstrated by previous or
simultaneous acts which contributes to the
commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v.
Tamayo: "It is an essential condition to the
existence of complicity, not only that there should
be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary
that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal
intent, should cooperate with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of
the crime in an efficacious way." ... From our view
of the evidence it has not been convincingly
established that appellant cooperated in the
commission of the offense, either morally, through
advice, encouragement or agreement or materially
through external acts indicating a manifest intent
of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in
an efficacious way. Such circumstances being
absent, his mere passive presence at the scene of
the crime certainly does not make him either a co-
principal or an accomplice in the commission of
7
the offense.
This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in
charge of the prosecution of criminal cases that the
prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when,
overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he
stands up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction
of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble
task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the
innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and
Page 6 of 25
Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly
recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed with respect to the appellant Raymundo Madera
alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and
it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres
alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are
hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate
costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.
CASE 4: G.R. no. 45857 PP vs Sison Y
G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES, defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J:
In her sworn complaint, complainant Violeta Begino y Aquino
accused defendant-appellant of forcible abduction with rape
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1973, in
Quezon City Philippines, the above-named
accused with lewd design, and then and there
wilfully, unlawfully appeal feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation abduct the undersigned, by
then and there forcibly dragging her into a tricycle,
after which the undersigned was brought to a
house located at Novaliches. this City where said
accused by means of force and intimidation had
carnal knowledge of the undersigned, all against
the will and without the consent of the
undersigned, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law (p. 2, rec.).
The trial court convicted him of the charge and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
accessories of the law, to indemnify the complainant in the
sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs,
crediting him however with the entire period of his temporary
detention.
Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab
Catanduanes, was about 15 years and 10 months old on
July 15, 1973, a Sunday. About 4 feet and 7 inches tall and
weighing about 93 lbs., she was the housemaid of Jose
Baruela of Galas, Quezon City.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15,
1973, Violeta was standing at the corner of Luzon Avenue
and Union Civica St., Galas, Quezon City, waiting for a ride
to Quiapo, Manila to buy slippers for her employer. Appellant
Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was courting
her, approached her and invited her to take the tricycle then
driving. When she refused, appellant allegedly drew 7-inch
knife and poked it at her abdomen, threatening to kill her if
she did not board his tricycle. He allegedly seized her and
forced her to get into the tricycle.
This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon,
with many people passing by or walking in the vicinity, as
Galas is thickly populated by low-income and middle-class
groups - of which fact the Supreme Court can take judicial
notice - she could have resisted and shouted for help. It was
not easy for appellant to grab her and force her into the
tricycle without being noticed by passersby and bystanders.
She claims that after she was seated inside the tricycle,
appellant drove his tricycle to the España Rotonda, a busy
intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon Avenue, España
Extension (now E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog
St. going towards Galas, Quezon City. Said rotonda is over
one kilometer from Galas, with several street corners to pass
along the way.
With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have
shouted for help while seated in the rear compartment for
passengers behind him, since as aforestated, from the
corner where she was allegedly forced to board the tricycle
up to España Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many
houses and several persons along the way. And children
would be playing on the streets. Or she could have jumped
out of the tricycle for a tricycle does not run fast and the
tricycle is always open at its right side just behind appellant
who was on the driver's seat. Appellant could not be poking
a knife with one hand at Violeta and driving the tricycle with
the other hand.
From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney
for Balintawak, Quezon City. They were allegedly the only
passengers of the jeepney, with appellant holding her hands
and telling her that he would kill her if she tried to go home.
From España Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about
five kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably
took the usual passenger jeepney routes. It would be
unbelievable that all throughout the distance of about five
kilometers, a Sunday afternoon, no other passenger boarded
the jeepney between España Rotonda and Balintawak. The
route of said jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards
North Cemetery beside Balintawak. But even assuming that
they were the lone passengers of the jeepney throughout the
distance she could have shouted for help or created a
commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It is also possible that
she must have seen policemen along the route, especially
near the gate of the North Cemetery. The various jeepney
routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor
Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue,
Dapitan, Laong-Laan St., and from Manila to the North
Cemetery then to Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and
coming from Rizal Avenue Extension and passing the
Chinese General Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the
busy intersection in front of the North Cemetery gate, with a
lot of people around, including employees of the gas station
just across the gate of the North Cemetery, she could have
screamed for help, but she did not.
At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house
of his aunt, to whom he allegedly introduced her as his
girlfriend. After talking to her aunt, he and complainant left
the house and rode in a passenger jeepney bound for
Novaliches, passengers inside the jeepney Quezon City.
There were other pass but she did not make any outcry nor
ask help from the other passengers during that long trip from
Balintawak to Novaliches, which is a lot farther than from
España Rotonda to Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy
street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub connecting to
Novaliches) and there are many houses' and shops along
the way - more so upon reaching the busy market near the
Clover Leaf. And then from Clover Leaf through Quirino
Avenue towards Novaliches, there must have been
numerous persons that Sunday afternoon, because Quirino
Avenue is likewise a busy avenue, being the only route to
Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the traffic along that
thoroughfare is heavy at all hours of the day because of the
numerous passenger buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and
private cars on the road. But she did not cry for help.
At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another
aunt, Maria Aviles Reyes and took her purse containing
P12.00. After eating their supper, appellant allegedly brought
her to a room and ordered her to lie down. She resisted and
appellant slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious
and upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked
with appellant on top of her and his penis inside her vagina
"up to her stomach." If she resisted as she claimed, there
Page 7 of 25
should have been some commotion and maybe pieces of
furniture like chairs and tables being pushed or the sound of
shuffling feet, accompanied by her cries or screaming
indicating resistance. When he slapped her repeatedly, she
must have shouted in pain and even cursed him aloud with
the usual vulgar rivectives With such commotion, screaming,
cries of pain and vulgar purses it is unthinkable that the aunt
and the rest of the inmates of the house would not have
heard the same. They could have been curious about the
commotion and could have frustrated whatever criminal
Intention appellant might have towards her.
She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three
times that July 15 even as she was experiencing pain. The
following day (July 16), he had sexual intercourse with her
four times. Then on the third day (July 17), he did the same
to her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July 21,
1973. .Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other
inmates of the house about what appellant did to her. During
those six days, she must have gone out of the room to eat or
to attend to personal necessities in the bathroom. During
those six days too, his aunt and the other members of the
family would have noticed her painful expression or her
moaning in pain and would have asked her the cause of the
same.
In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother
and his aunt Maria, brought Violeta to his house in
Sampaloc, Manila, and from there, to Violeta's mother at 11-
B Luzon Avenue, Galas, Quezon City. All the mother did was
to slap her.
It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court
sitting in Metro Manila, can take judicial notice of the
geography of said metropolis, and the approximate distance
from Galas to España Rotonda, from España Rotonda to
Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the
passenger routes to said place, the nature of traffic along
said routes, the heavy population in Metropolitan Manila, and
the habits of the residents therein.
There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her
mother and her employer did not look for her during the six
days that she was missing from the house of her employer
and why they did not report to the police authorities said fact
of her being missing for almost a week. Neither is there any
intimation that her employer inquired about the money he
gave to her to purchase slippers, which is quite unnatural.
All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the
conclusion that she was sexually assaulted by appellant
against her will, but also affirm that she went willingly with
the appellant and submitted to his lewd design.
Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she
voluntarily went with appellant on that six-day tryst with him.
for which appellant could have been convicted of consented
abduction as Violeta was then over 12 but under 18 years of
age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the essential
elements of abduction with consent Valdepeha vs. People,
16 SCRA 871, April 30, 1966; U.S. vs. Asuncion, 31 Phil.
614, Oct. 2, 1915). Unfortunately, the complaint as
aforequoted does not allege that the offended party was a
virgin, over 12 years and under 18 years of age Barba vs.
People, 89 SCRA 112, March 28,1979; People vs. Castro,
58 SCRA 473, Aug. 19, 1974; People vs. Samillano, 56
SCRA 573, April 22, 1974; People vs. Magat, 94 Phil. 118,
Dec. 29, 1953).
Hence, the appellant should be acquitted of the charge.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES
IS HEREBY ACQUITTED. WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.
HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED
UNLESS HE IS HELD FOR SOME OTHER VALID
CHARGES.
CASE 5: G.R. no. 159467 Sps. Saguid vs. Security Finance
G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005
SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P.
SAGUID, Petitioners,
vs.
SECURITY FINANCE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
1
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 dated 31
January 2003 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No.
98-1803, dated 07 July 2000, ordering respondent Security
Finance, Inc. to pay petitioner Spouses Nora and Rolando
Saguid the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle as well
as damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit, and its
2
Resolution dated 10 June 2003 denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of
Possession with Replevin with Alternative Prayer for Sum of
Money and Damages against petitioners and one John Doe
in whose possession and custody the mortgaged property
3
may be found. It alleged that petitioners, for value, jointly
4
and severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note in the
amount of ₱508,248.00, payable in monthly installments per
schedule indicated therein. To secure payment of the
Promissory Note, petitioners executed a Chattel
5
Mortgage over a motor vehicle particularly described as
follows:
MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying
with the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note and
Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several monthly
installments on the Promissory Note. As provided for in the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the
petitioners to pay any installment when due shall make the
entire balance of the obligation immediately due and
payable. The total obligation of petitioners amounted to
6
₱756,634.64 as of 15 May 1998.
7
Despite demand for payment or the surrender, if in good
order and condition, of the mortgaged motor vehicle,
petitioners failed and refused to comply with the demand.
Thus, respondent was constrained to file the instant case
praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the
seizure of the afore-described vehicle, complete with all its
accessories, and that same be delivered to it; or (2) in the
event that manual delivery thereof cannot be effected, order
the petitioners to pay the amount of ₱756,634.64 exclusive
of accruing interest and penalty charges thereon at the rate
of five percent (5%) per month until fully paid. In either case,
to order petitioners to pay respondent the amount of
₱189,158.66 as and for attorney’s fees, replevin bond
premium and other expenses incurred in the seizure of the
motor vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding
Judge, Branch 135, RTC, Makati City, issued an Order
directing the branch sheriff to seize the aforementioned
vehicle upon filing of a bond in the amount of ₱1,513,270.00
which is double the value of the property to be seized, and to
8
take it into his custody upon further orders from the court.
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for
9
Clarification that the reasonable estimated value of the
vehicle involved is ₱150,000.00, the RTC lowered the
10
Replevin Bond to be filed to ₱300,000.00 which respondent
filed on 12 August 1998.
Page 8 of 25
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure
ordering the Branch Sheriff to seize the vehicle, to keep it in
his possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it to
11
respondent.
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the
copy of the summons with the complaint and annexes,
affidavit, writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle subject of this
case was repossessed by the sheriff upon issuance of the
corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle was
12
delivered to respondent.
13
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioners
specifically denied the allegations in the Complaint. They
maintained they, whether individually or as spouses, did not
and never executed a Promissory Note and Chattel
Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they bought
the car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the
14
Vehicle Sales Invoice of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. dated 15
March 1996. Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged that she could
not have physically executed the Promissory Note on 23
April 1996 as she was in Australia when the same was
supposedly executed. On the part of petitioner Rolando
Saguid, he admitted that he signed the promissory note in
preparation for an application for loan upon the request of
one Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for
the purchase of another motor vehicle to be converted into a
taxicab, but not with respondent. As compulsory
counterclaim, they ask that respondent be ordered to pay
moral, exemplary and actual damages, as well as attorney’s
fees and costs of suit.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing
the following stipulation of facts:
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the
amount of P508,248.00 in favor of plaintiff was signed by
defendant Rolando Saguid; and
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant
15
Rolando Saguid; . . .
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are
substantially summarized in the decision of the RTC.
Evidence of the Petitioners:
The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G.
Maghirang, Jr., 43 years of age, married, Assistant Vice-
President for Marketing of the plaintiff, and a resident of No.
140 J. Molina Street, Marikina City; and 2] Antonio B.
Placido, 37 years of age, married, an employee of the
plaintiff, and a resident of 263 Santo Cristo Street, Angat,
Bulacan.
It can be culled from plaintiff’s evidence that an application
[Exhibit A] for a loan to finance the purchases [of] a new car
was filed with the plaintiff. The application was not signed by
any of the defendants. The signature appearing on the
application [Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia, a
Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The application was
evaluated and investigated and was approved. The
Promissory Note No. 96-01447 dated April 23, 1996 [Exhibit
B] and the Chattel Mortgage Contract dated September 3,
1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff were
postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited
these checks were dishonored for the reason that the
account was already closed. The dishonored checks were
replaced with P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No. 12467
dated June 27, 1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment made on
June 27, 1996, the checks that subsequently bounced were
not replaced. The case was referred to counsel for
collection. A demand letter was delivered by witness Placido
to the residence of the defendants. There being no response
from the defendants this case was filed against them.
Placido conducted a surveillance of the place where the
vehicle could possibly be found. He accompanied the sheriff
in implementing the writ of seizure. After seizure of the
vehicle it was stowed at the warehouse of plaintiff in Las
Pinas.
On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr.,
Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the plaintiff, it was
established that the mortgage of subject motor vehicle was
not registered with the LTO because the dealer did not
submit to plaintiff the certificate of registration. In
transactions of this nature, loan applicants are required to
submit the original certificate of registration and the official
receipt. The dealer, Toyota Balintawak, did not send to the
16
plaintiff these documents.
Evidence of the Respondent:
Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida
Marquinez Maralit, 33 years of age, single, a resident of
Orlon Street, Litex Village, San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal, and
the Credit and Collection Head of Toyota Balintawak testified
for the defendants. Defendant Rolando bought in cash the
subject motor vehicle from Toyota Balintawak. He was
issued Vehicle Delivery Invoice No. 7104 [Exhibit1] and
Vehicle Delivery Note No. 7104 [Exhibit 2]. The same vehicle
was registered [Exhibit 3]. He identified his signatures in the
promissory note [Exhibit B] and in the chattel mortgage
[Exhibit D]. He was asked by one Sonny Quijano to sign
these documents in blank on the representation of the latter
that he will help him secure additional capital to enable him
to purchase another taxi.
Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in
January 1996 at Toyota Quezon Avenue. Rolando was then
planning to purchase two units of taxi colored white. But at
that time there was only one available unit at Toyota Quezon
Avenue. Quijano approached Rolando informing him that
there are units colored white available at Toyota Balintawak
and that he will help him secure one. Rolando was able to
secure one. In the month of May, Quijano went to the house
of defendants and asked Rolando if he is still interested in
getting additional capital to purchase a taxi. Rolando was
asked to sign documents in blank. The name of the plaintiff
does not appear in these documents. When Rolando asked
Quijano why the documents are in blank, Quijano told him
just to sign and that he will take care of everything. Nora did
not sign the documents because at that time she was in
Australia. Rolando do (sic) not know what happened to the
documents he signed. He read from the papers that Quijano
was shot. He denied the issuance of the checks [Exhibits E,
E-1 to E-12]. Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8] dated
February 21, 1997 from De Castro Law Office. Rolando went
to this Law Office and presented his documents evidencing
payment of the subject motor vehicle. He was told by Atty.
De Castro that everything is okay and that he will take care
of everything.
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2]
units of taxi including subject motor vehicle were seized by
the sheriff assisted by three [3] SWAT members. The
boundary of the subject motor vehicle, which is a taxi, is
P750.00 for every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to
October 1999 defendants lost P180,000 in income.
Defendants retained the services of counsel for P100,000
plus P1,500 per appearance. With this incident on October
28, 1998, Rolando was embarrassed in front of his
neighbors. For his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1
Million in damages plus P3 Million in exemplary damages.
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that
the subject motor vehicle was purchased in cash and not
through financing. Had subject vehicle been purchased
through financing the original Certificate of Registration and
Certificate of Registration would have been transmitted to
the financing company marked by the LTO "encumbered".
This did not happen in this case. Security Finance, the
plaintiff in this case was not accredited by Toyota Balintawak
not even in one transaction. The appearance in both Exhibits
Page 9 of 25
1 and 2 of "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" as purchaser of the
subject motor vehicle was satisfactorily explained by witness
Maralit. The subject motor vehicle was initially reserved by
SPQ Center but later on it waived its right in favor of Nora. It
is for this reason that "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" appears as
17
the purchaser of the vehicle.
18
In its decision dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
plaintiff SECURITY FINANCE, INCORPORATED to pay
defendant-spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID:
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor
vehicle computed from the date of its seizure on October 28,
1998 up to its return to the defendants, at the rate of
P750.00 daily;
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages;
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages;
4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and
5. The Costs.
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory
note and the deed of mortgage were not valid contracts and
were not binding on petitioners. It explained that respondent
failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned to
petitioners the money used in the purchase of the subject
motor vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was
preponderance of evidence showing that the motor vehicle
was purchased in cash by petitioners from Toyota
Balintawak, Inc.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of
19
Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.
On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision. It reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC and ruled in favor of respondent. It disposed of the
case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.
20
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that
there was no valid contract entered into between the parties
on the ground there was no cause or consideration when
they executed the same, and that respondent failed to show
with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to
petitioners which was used to purchase the subject motor
vehicle, to be bereft of factual and legal basis. It relied
heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during
pre-trial and during his direct-examination that he signed the
promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the chattel
mortgage dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to
petitioners’ bare denial that they never transacted with
respondent for the subject loan and that they never executed
the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage
because it belied the admission made by petitioner Rolando
Saguid.
21
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 24
February 2003 while respondent filed a Motion for
22
Clarificatory Judgment dated 17 February 2003.
In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and granted the
Motion for Clarificatory Judgment. It amended the dispostive
portion of its 31 January 2003 decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant
ordering the defendants-appellees:
1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle
described as follows:
MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described
motor vehicle is not feasible, to pay the plaintiff appellant the
amount of ₱508,248.00 plus interest and penalty charges at
the legal rate per annum until fully paid, in line with the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Medel vs.
Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and
23
3) To pay the costs of suit.
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS ENTERED INTO A TRANSACTION WITH
RESPONDENT CONCERNING THE SUBJECT MOTOR
VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND
CHATTEL MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUID’S ADMISSION OF
HAVING SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS MERELY IN
PREPARATION FOR A LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED
TO HIM BY THE LATE SONNY QUIJANO, A CAR SALES
AGENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE DEED OF
MORTGAGE ARE NOT VALID AND NOT BINDING ON
THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING PETITIONER
ROLANDO SAGUID’S EXPLANATION REGARDING HIS
ADMISSION AND THE SOLID AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE
PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE
SAID DOCUMENTS BUT WAS IN AUSTRALIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND THE
EVIDENCE WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENT’S
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT AND
ORDERED PETITIONER TO DELIVER THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE TO RESPONDENT AND TO PAY
RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF P508,248.00 PLUS
INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE MANUAL
DELIVERY OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE,
OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT MOTOR
VEHICLE WAS ALREADY FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND
SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF BY VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF
SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND DULY
ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE
SHERIFF FROM THE PETITIONERS.
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is
a valid Contract of Loan between it and petitioners, and that
the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the vehicle
involved in this case. In support thereof, it offered, among
24
other things, a Promissory Note dated 23 April 1996 and
25
Chattel Mortgage dated 03 September 1996 over the
subject vehicle which served as security for the payment of
the amount indicated in the former. On the other hand,
petitioners contend that they neither entered into any
contract with respondent nor did they receive any money
from it that was used to buy the subject car. Though
petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted that the signatures in the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage are his, he clarified
that when he signed said documents upon the prodding of
Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora
Saguid, on her part, denied signing said documents. She
claimed that the signatures purporting to be hers are
forgeries since she was in Australia when said documents
were executed.
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that they entered into a transaction with respondent
based on the promissory note and chattel mortgage despite
Page 10 of 25
petitioner Rolando Saguid’s explanation of the
circumstances surrounding his signing thereof, and in not
holding that these documents are not valid and binding on
them.
To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the
promissory note and chattel mortgage, it must be
established that all the elements of a contract of loan are
present. Like any other contract, a contract of loan is
governed by the rules as to the requisites and validity of
contracts in general. It is basic and elementary in this
jurisdiction that what determines the validity of a contract, in
general, is the presence of the elements constituting the
same, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2)
object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
26
(3) cause of the obligation which is established. In this
case, petitioners insist the third element is lacking since they
never transacted with respondent for the proceeds of the
loan which were used in purchasing the subject motor
vehicle.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with
respondent and are bound by the promissory note and
chattel mortgage they signed. It anchored its ruling on the
admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said
27
documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, it reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguid’s bare
denial cannot qualify the admission he made during pre-trial
and during trial that they transacted with respondent and
executed the aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the
explanation made by petitioner Rolando Saguid that he
signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan
application presented to him by Sonny Quijano.
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando
Saguid admitted was only his signatures in the
aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In
petitioners’ Answer, Rolando Saguid admitted signing the
promissory note in preparation for an application for loan
upon the request of Sonny Quijano who promised to
facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle
to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent.
During trial, Rolando Saguid explained the circumstances
under which he signed the documents with emphasis that he
signed them in blank.
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it
closed its eyes to the clarification made by petitioner
Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his
admission. The rule that an admission cannot be
contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made will not apply under the circumstances obtaining in this
case. It does not follow that the admission of the signatures
carries with it the admission of the contents of the
documents especially when the person who affixed his
signatures thereon questions its execution and the veracity
of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could have been
bound by the terms and conditions of the promissory note
and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted
not only his signatures but also as to what are contained
therein. This is not to be in the case before us. Petitioners
can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify or
invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel
mortgage. In other words, they can show that the elements
of the contract of loan are wanting.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position
to entangle itself in resolving the matter as regards the
qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on his
admission because whatever the documents he signed in
favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the court as the
same is not one of the issues presented before it, and that
Mr. Quijano is not a party in the case. Petitioners claim that if
only the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have
ruled in their favor and sustained the decision of the trial
court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being
the primal defense of petitioners. It should not have wholly
disregarded the qualification made by petitioner Rolando
Saguid considering that said defense can easily be
supported by other competent evidence. Instead of relying
heavily on the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated
other evidence that could have either bolstered or disproved
the defense of petitioners.
This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals
conveniently did not mention in its decision the testimony of
Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of Toyota Balintawak, Inc.,
who testified as to the circumstances on how the subject car
was bought, and the documentary evidence that originated
from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an
impartial witness whose testimony is vital in the proper
resolution of this case.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the ruling of the trial court that the promissory note
and the deed of chattel mortgage are not valid contracts and
are not binding on them on the ground that the contracts did
not contain the essential element of cause. The Court of
Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in
categorical terms the absence of cause in the aforesaid
contracts and that petitioners failed to disprove that they are
debtors of respondent since it is presumed that the cause
exists in the contract.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that
28
consideration exists and is lawful unless the debtor proves
29
the contrary. Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, it is presumed that there is a sufficient
consideration for a contract. The presumption that a contract
has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
30
assertion that it has no consideration. To overcome the
presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of
consideration must be shown by preponderance of
31
evidence.
In proving that there is no consideration for the
aforementioned documents, petitioners proffered in evidence
the following documents that showed that they bought the
subject vehicle in cash and not in installment basis: (a)
32
Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104; (b) Vehicle Delivery
33 34
Note; (c) Official Receipts No. 208646 and No.
35 36
208648; (d) Certificate of Registration No. 32862328; and
37
(e) Official Receipt No. 40459605. In addition, Ms. Zenaida
Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that the subject
car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing for
the reasons that the originals of the Certificate of
Registration and the Official Receipt of the subject vehicle
have not been marked as encumbered by the Land
Transportation Office and are in the possession of the buyer.
She added that respondent is not accredited in Toyota
Balintawak, Inc. She testified:
Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was
purchased in cash or through financing?
A: It was purchased in cash.
Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in
cash?
A: There was an invoice cash return.
Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection,
what are your duties and functions?
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the
documentation with LTO, insurance and financing
documents.
Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what
is your specific duty?
A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the
documents.
Page 11 of 25
Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in
case the vehicle is purchased from your office through
financing?
A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the
requirements based on the credit advice issued by the
financing company. So together with the documents and all
the requirements, valid ID, post dated checks, we are the
one transmitting them to the financing company and after
processing, the financing company gave us the proceed two
to four days after the release of the vehicle.
Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipt are concerned, what did you do with them if the
vehicle was purchased through financing?
A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and
Certificate of Registration goes to the financing company.
We are the one transmitting them. Only the xerox copies of
the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration go to the
client through financing transaction.
Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it
comes to purchase of vehicle through financing, what do you
do with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration?
A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was
mortgaged to that particular financing company.
Q: Where it was marked?
A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked
encumbered.
Q: On the face?
A: On the face.
Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is
concerned with regards to the purchase of vehicle through
financing?
A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your
company?
A: No, not even in one transaction.
Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the
Certificate of Registration and the corresponding Official
Receipt is in the possession of the buyer?
38
A: That means it was on cash transaction.
On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G.
Maghirang, Jr., Vice-President for Marketing, said that it paid
the dealer in checks and that they have proof of payment.
He testified:
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form
did you pay the dealer?
A: In checks, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?
39
A: Yes, sir.
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and
not through financing via respondent. We find the evidence
presented by respondent to be unreliable and erratic. The
testimony of Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid
Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by
competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how
come it never presented the checks it used to pay Toyota
Balintawak, Inc.? Even assuming arguendo that respondent
released the loan proceeds to petitioners, the same would
be inconsistent with its allegation that it was the one that
paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that
strengthens the claim of petitioners that they did not transact
with respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged
40
loan/credit application was not signed by any or both of
them.
Respondent’s contention that petitioners did not deny
drawing postdated checks in its favor is untenable. Petitioner
Rolando Saguid categorically denied issuing the check and
41
claimed that the signatures appearing thereon were not his.
As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the
promissory note, evidence points that she could not have
signed the document she being in Australia when she
allegedly executed said document on 23 April 1996 as
42
established by a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration that she left for Sydney, Australia, on 30
September 1995 and returned to the country on 15 June
1996.
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners’
allegation of absence of consideration has been
substantiated and the presumption of consideration
disproved and overcome. We are of the mind that petitioners
bought the car with their own money. There being no cause
or consideration in the contract of loan allegedly entered into
by the parties, the promissory note is not binding on the
petitioners.
As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage
is a mere accessory contract and its validity would depend
43
on the validity of the loan secured by it. The chattel
mortgage constituted over the subject vehicle is an
accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the
promissory note. It cannot exist as an independent contract
since its consideration is the same as that of the principal
contract. A principal obligation is an indispensable condition
44
for the existence of an accessory contract. Since it has
been sufficiently established that there was no cause or
consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the
chattel mortgage has no leg to stand on. Hence, it must be
extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on petitioners.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage
are not binding on petitioners, the return of the subject
vehicle to petitioners is in order. In case the vehicle can no
longer be delivered in the condition when it was seized,
respondent shall pay petitioners the amount of
45
₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed
46
from 13 October 1998, the date when said vehicle was
seized, until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall
become 12% per annum until actual payment.
We now go to the award of damages.
It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must
be proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A
party is entitled only up to such compensation for the
47
pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. It cannot be
48
presumed. Absent proof of the amount of actual damages
sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations,
conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have been suffered by the injured party and on the best
49
obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.
In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual
damages the amount of ₱750.00 per day as daily earnings
of the seized vehicle from 28 October 1998 until its return.
Same should be deleted for lack of competent proof. The
bare assertion of petitioner Rolando Saguid that the subject
vehicle was earning ₱750.00 a day before it was seized is
inadequate, if not speculative, and should not be accepted
because it is not supported by independent evidence.
Petitioners should have at least presented a record or
journal that would clearly show how much the vehicle earned
in a specific period. This, petitioners failed to do. Instead,
they relied on mere allegations that do not prove anything.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered
undue embarrassment when the subject vehicle was seized
from their home. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably
50
and scandalously excessive. We find the amount of
₱500,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive. In
our view, the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is
reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
Page 12 of 25
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
51
damages. When moral damages are awarded, exemplary
52
damages may also be granted. We, however, find the
₱1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive
and should accordingly be reduced to ₱50,000.00.
Moreover, attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest
53
by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. Petitioners
are entitled thereto because they were compelled to litigate
in order to protect their interest. Moreover, there being an
54
award for exemplary damages, it follows that there should
be an award thereof. An award of ₱20,000.00 will be
sufficient as the award of ₱200,000.00 by the RTC is too
much.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Security Finance, Inc. is
ordered to deliver the possession of the subject vehicle to
petitioners, or, in the alternative if such delivery can no
longer be made, to pay petitioners the amount of
₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed
from 13 October 1998 until finality of judgment after which
interest rate shall become 12% per annum until actual
payment. Respondent is also ordered to pay petitioners
₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages and
₱20,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
CASE 6: G.R. no. 148273 Simon vs Canlas
G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006
MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, Petitioners,
vs.
GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
1
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 23, 2001
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62789 which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac City dated
July 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. 7384.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a
complaint for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and her husband, Liborio
Balatico (petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges that:
on September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a loan from him
in the amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate
2
mortgage over her paraphernal property, a 748-square
meter parcel of land located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884;
the loan was payable within a period of three years or until
September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted in the payment of
the loan and repeated demands for payment went
3
unheeded, prompting the filing of a case in court.
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with
Counterclaim, alleging that Milagros never transacted any
business with Edgar and she did not receive the
4 20
consideration of the alleged mortgage.
On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim, reiterating validity and due execution of the
5
real estate mortgage.
6
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court, petitioners filed
a Third-Party Complaint against Virginia Canlas (Virginia)
and Aurelia Delos Reyes (Aurelia), claiming that they duped
Milagros to part with her title and sign the mortgage
documents without giving her the consideration and refusing
7
to return her title when demanded.
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their
Answer with Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint, alleging
that the complaint states no cause of action against them
since they are not privies to the real estate mortgage and
8
Aurelia is only a witness to the mortgage document.
On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and
Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating their claims in the third-
9
party complaint.
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December
10
4, 1991, upon proper motion, the RTC ordered that Edgar
be substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas (respondent), as
11
plaintiff.
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating
that the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. However, they
agreed to stipulate on the following: "[t]hat the defendant
executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the
plaintiff involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
12
139884 located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac."
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent
presenting her witnesses, namely: Nelson Nulud, the records
custodian of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac; Aurelia, the
third-party defendant and one of the instrumental witnesses
to the real estate mortgage; and respondent herself. When
petitioners’ turn came, they presented Crisostomo Astrero,
the other instrumental witness to the real estate
mortgage. 1avvphil.net
On April 15, 1998, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Norberto De
Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte Urgent Motion for Postponement
since he is busy campaigning as a candidate in the coming
13
elections. There being no objection from respondent, the
14
RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998.
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to
appear in court. The RTC reset the hearing on June 17,
1998 with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail to
appear on said date, they will be considered to have waived
15
their right to present further evidence.
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court
but petitioners were present. Milagros informed the RTC that
Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel. In
view thereof, the RTC directed petitioners to secure the
services of another counsel and the hearing was reset to
June 24, 1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail
to present evidence at said hearing, they will be considered
16
to have waived their right to present further evidence. On
June 23, 1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of
Appearance as Counsel for the Defendants with the
17
conformity of Milagros.
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they
18
have retained Atty. Alejo Y. Sedico as new counsel. The
hearing was again reset to July 2, 1998 with the final
warning that should petitioners’ witnesses fail to appear at
the said hearing, they would be considered to have waived
19
their right to present further evidence.
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of
Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Reset, praying
that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset to
August 12, 1998 due to conflict of schedule and his trial
calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as to give him
more time to study the case since he had just been
retained.
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice,
the resetting of the hearing for presentation of petitioners’
evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998. The RTC
directed petitioners to secure the services of a counsel of
their choice to represent them in the said hearing
considering that it postponed motu propio the hearing in the
interest of justice over the vigorous objection of the
respondent due to failure of petitioners’ counsel to appear for
three successive times. It warned petitioners that in case
they would be unable to present evidence in the next
Page 13 of 25
scheduled hearing, they would be deemed to have waived mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the
21
their right to present further evidence. exclusive property of Milagros which she could validly
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent.
the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998 due to a previously The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of
scheduled hearing on the same date of Criminal Case Nos. petitioners’ third-party complaint and without any further
6463 to 6510 for Estafa entitled "People of the Philippines v. discussion, dismissed the third-party complaint in the
Eddie Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, dispositive portion of its decision, to wit:
Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for the whole WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby
month of July is fully occupied and requested the hearing be AFFIRMED in toto as to the main case. The third-party
22
reset to August 10 or 19, 1998. complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
28
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was SO ORDERED.
apprised of the Urgent Motion to Reset filed by petitioners’ Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored
counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of respondent’s on the following Assignment of Errors:
counsel on the ground that the case has been postponed 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
several times at petitioners’ instance, the RTC denied the ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
motion to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
their right to present evidence. The case was then JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
23
considered submitted for decision. JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONED REAL ESTATE
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE WAS LACK OF
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim CONSIDERATION AND THAT THE SAME WAS
by a preponderance of evidence, this Court hereby renders EXECUTED THROUGH FRAUDULENTLY [sic]
judgment in her favor, ordering the defendants to pay the SCHEME;
plaintiff within a period of ninety (90) days from the entry of 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
judgment hereof, the following sums of: ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
obligation plus interest thereof of 12% per annum JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
(2) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and DUE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE
(3) The costs of suit. MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE WHAT
It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in WAS ADMITTED ONLY IS ITS EXECUTION;
the payment of the above determined amounts, Lot No. 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
2763, with an area of 748 square meters situated in San ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac and covered by Transfer Certificate DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
of Title No. 13984 – Tarlac Registry, particularly identified JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
and described in the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exhibit JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
"A"), shall be sold at public auction to satisfy this judgment. SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS PARAPHERNAL
24
SO ORDERED. EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate JURISPRUDENCE HAD CONSIDERED IT
mortgage in favor of Edgar and she received the CONJUGAL OR ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
consideration for the mortgage in the amount PROPERTY;
of P220,000.00; that petitioners’ inaction for three years 4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
before the filing of the complaint against them to protest the ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
alleged non-receipt of the consideration for the mortgage DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
casts serious doubts on their claim; and that the deed of real JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
estate mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT
character of a public instrument. DESPITE OF [sic] HAVING DENIED PETITIONER
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for TO BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A COUNSEL OF
29
Reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due CHOICE DUE PROCESS IS SATISFIED.
process when the RTC decided the case without petitioners’ Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was
25
evidence. On October 16, 1998, the RTC denied the fraudulently executed and there was lack of consideration
motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were but material facts relating thereto were not fully ventilated
given ample opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial because the RTC denied petitioners’ motion to reset the
and adduce evidence, which they took for granted and they hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the due
26
should bear the fault. execution of the real estate mortgage, but only its execution
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May or existence. They further insist that the mortgaged property
27
23, 2001, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could
ruled that petitioners were not denied due process since they not dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent;
30
were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and and the CA disregarded Article 99 of the Family Code
present evidence to substantiate their defense but they which provides that all the property owned by the spouses at
forfeited their right for not appearing in court together with the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired
their counsel at the scheduled hearings; that since Milagros thereafter forms part of the community property. Lastly, they
admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity and submit that while they were given the opportunity to secure
validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre- the services of a new counsel to defend them, the RTC’s
Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of consideration apathy to the plight of petitioners’ counsel on the latter’s
is no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount conflict of schedule amounted to stripping such right to
of P220,000.00 was actually received by Milagros per the counsel and denial of due process.
testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners slept on their rights, if For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be
they had any, since they never lifted a finger to protect and dismissed outright for impleading the CA as respondent,
preserve their alleged rights and interests; and that the despite the clear directive of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Page 14 of 25
Procedure against it. She further points out that the petition
lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping, a
copy of the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any
specific question of law but only presents and discusses an
"assignment of errors."
In any event, even if these procedural defects are
disregarded, respondent argues that petitioners were not
denied due process when the RTC denied their motion for
postponement since they were duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present their evidence to
substantiate their defense but they forfeited this right for not
appearing in court together with their counsel at the
scheduled hearings. They also aver that the real estate
mortgage is valid and duly executed and the mortgaged
property is the paraphernal property of Milagros such that
she can validly dispose of or encumber it without her
husband’s consent.
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the
Court agrees that the correct procedure, as mandated by
Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed
31
decision. However, impleading the lower court as
respondent in the petition for review on certiorari does not
automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely
32
authorizes the dismissal of the petition. Besides, formal
defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has
encountered previous petitions for review on certiorari that
erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court
merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects and
33
proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same
liberal treatment in this case. While unquestionably, the
Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being
defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose
of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the
34
latter approach may result in injustice. This is in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
35
Procedure which encourages a reading of the procedural
requirements in a manner that will help secure and not
36
defeat justice.
As to respondent’s claim that the petition lacks verification, a
certification against forum shopping and a copy of the
assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully examined the
rollo of the case and found them to be attached to the
37
petition.
Anent respondent’s submission that the petition failed to
raise a question of law, the Court disagrees. For a question
to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
38
any of them. Petitioners’ contention that they were denied
39
substantive due process is a pure question of law.
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should
always be predicated on the consideration that more than
the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the
case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served
thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part
and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing
40
justice." When no substantial rights are affected and the
intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding
motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly,
it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end
41
that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Thus, in
considering motions for postponements, two things must be
borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2)
42
the merits of the case of the movant. Unless grave abuse
of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered
43
with either by mandamus or appeal.
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify
postponement of the July 15, 1998 hearing. Atty. Sedico had
only been formally retained as petitioners’ new counsel as of
July 1, 1998, or merely two weeks before July 15, 1998. Atty.
Sedico also had a previously intransferable hearing in a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela scheduled on the same date of July 15, 1998.
The distance factor, from Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough
consideration to call for postponement. Moreover, Atty.
Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for
July is already full such that he requested specific dates in
44
August for the hearing. The motion to reset the hearing has
not been shown to be manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for
45
the May 28, 1998 scheduled hearing, petitioners have
always been present in court. They cannot be said to have
lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that
Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel
and petitioners had to look for new counsel to take their case
on short notice. Absolutely wanting from the records is any
evidence that the change of counsel was intended to delay
the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from the
46
time Atty. De Jesus failed to appear on May 28, 1998 to the
time when Atty. Sedico’s motion to reset was denied on July
47
15, 1998. Such intervening time cannot be said to have
greatly impaired the substantial rights of respondent. Thus,
absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent to employ
dilatory tactic prejudicial to the respondent and trifling court
processes, Atty. Sedico’s request for resetting should have
been granted.
It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since
48
February 11 1991, or more than seven years until
petitioners were able to start their presentation of their
49
evidence on March 11, 1998.
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy
disposition of cases. However, it must be emphasized that
speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the
careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of
justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence
to this Court’s standing admonition that the disposition of
cases should always be predicated on the consideration that
more than the mere convenience of the courts and of the
parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby. These are more important than a race to
50
end the trial. Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the
search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by
which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce
51
proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.
Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the
litigation and unnecessarily delayed the case, in the process,
causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Instead of
unclogging dockets, it has actually increased the workload of
the justice system as a whole. Such action does not inspire
public confidence in the administration of justice.
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party
complaint which the RTC simply disregarded. On the other
hand, the CA, while stating in its Decision that "[a]ll thus told,
we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court,
except that it failed to dispose of the third-party
52
complaint," it simply proceeded to dismiss the third-party
complaint in the dispositive portion of herein assailed
decision, without giving any reason or justification therefor.
As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution
of the real estate mortgage during the pre-trial conference, it
must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of
53
Appeals, this Court ruled that the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document simply
means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another
for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of
the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
Page 15 of 25
and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him. However, it does not preclude a party from
arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and
want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred
from presenting evidence regarding their claim of want of
consideration.
It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration
and alleged fraudulent scheme perpetuated by third-party
defendants, being evidentiary, should be threshed out in a
proper trial. To deny petitioners their right to present
evidence constitutes a denial of due process, since there are
issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on
the merits.
Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court
to enable it to resolve the fundamental issues, the Court will
dispense with the regular procedure of remanding the case
to the lower court, in order to avoid further delays in the
54
resolution of the case. However, a remand in this case,
while time-consuming, is necessary, because the
proceedings had in the RTC are grossly inadequate to settle
factual issues. Petitioners were unduly deprived of the full
opportunity to present evidence on the merits of their
defense and third-party complaint.
Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the
other issues raised by petitioners. Suffice it to say that such
matters are best decided by the RTC only after full reception
of petitioners’ evidence.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 23, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals and the Decision dated July 31, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City in Civil Case
No. 7384, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the said Regional Trial Court for reception
of petitioners’ evidence and further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
CASE 7: G.R. no. 165987 Alfelor vs. Halasan
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S.
ALFELOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify
1
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
2
No. 74757, as well as the Resolution dated June 28, 2004
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late
spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
3
Partition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her
two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be
the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of
the deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed
4
a Motion for Intervention, alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of
litigation in the above-entitled case for partition
between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary
compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the
children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I.
Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein
special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a
single centavo from the share of her late husband
Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo
K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to
intervene in this case and to submit attached Answer in
5
Intervention.
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in
6
Intervention, claiming that she was the surviving spouse of
Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was
void ab initio for having been contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged
that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s
children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment
of a special administrator to take charge of the estate.
Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage
7
contract which indicated that she and Jose were married on
February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the
motion for hearing. Josefina presented the marriage contract
8
as well as the Reply-in- Intervention filed by the heirs of the
deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the
previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the
9
herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956. However, Josefina
did not appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13,
10
2002. She narrated that she and the deceased were
married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on
February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married
in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966.
Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s
own relatives–Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother, and
11
Valentino Halasan, her father. While she did not know
Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been
previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live
together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left
Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s)
marriage with Jose because there had been no news of
Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the
marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for
her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose
failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained
unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not
have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed
in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having
seen her for more than seven years. This opinion was
shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also
declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter
narrated that she had been married three times, was now
happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United
States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued
12
an Order denying the motion and dismissed her complaint,
ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The
trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to
testify in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no
witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to
the existence of an original copy of the document or any
public officer who had custody thereof. According to the
court, the determinative factor in this case was the good faith
of Teresita in contracting the second marriage with the late
Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did
not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow the
13
intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, the RTC
ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the
marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the
accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial
Page 16 of 25
manifestation or formalities required by law could not be
equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and
legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that
the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the
oppositor did not present evidence to dispute the same. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina
(sic) Halasan through counsel, not sufficient to prove a
preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic
rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant
issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the
deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention
is ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita
Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel sufficient to
proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in
accordance with duly supporting and prevailing
jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her
children, Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are
declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate
estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all properties
in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or intestate
proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive
such inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the
13
other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).
15
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that
under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita
admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22,
1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous marriage to
her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of
16
the previous marriage. Since the existence of the first
marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules of
evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New
Civil Code, the second marriage was void from the
beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that the person entitled
to claim good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the
deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if
the validity of the second marriage were to be upheld, and at
the same time admit the existence of the second marriage,
an absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would
then be survived by two legitimate spouses.
17
The trial court denied the motion in its Order dated October
30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her
marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage
valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the
deceased. Josefina also stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of
the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any
subsequent marriage is null and void. She insisted that no
evidence was presented to prove that she had been absent
for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that
anyone who claims to be the legal wife must show proof
thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any
of the following to prove the fact of the previous marriage:
the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of
children during such union, and other subsequent
documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s
alleged admission of the first marriage in her Reply in
Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it
was mere hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of
the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to
Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own
personal knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina did
not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after
their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the
first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of
the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed
out that Josefina does not even use the surname of the
deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina,
paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of
the Family Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this
time brought to question her claim that she had not been
heard of for more than seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the
ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already
admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had
been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission
no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need
to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to
18
the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos, the
appellate court ruled that an admission made in a pleading
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission,
and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or
inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made the
admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed
by the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial
court thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed
orders, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to
admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to forthwith
conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
19
SO ORDERED.
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant
petition, assailing the ruling of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or
not the CA erred in ordering the admission of private
respondent’s intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98.
They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court,
dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA
completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that
while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof,
such admission may be contradicted by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s
statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22,
1999, admitting knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is
without probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters
involved in this case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial
admission which does not require proof. Consequently, the
CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her
favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted
knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to private respondent
in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified
during the hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was
merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be
considered hearsay. They also point out that private
respondent failed to appear and substantiate her Complaint-
in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a
machine copy of a purported marriage contract with the
deceased Jose Alfelor.
Page 17 of 25
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a
decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to
be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an
action for partition involving the share of the deceased
"husband" in the estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-
heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first
marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to
wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the
previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the
20
herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several
times that she knew that her late husband had been
previously married to another. To the Court’s mind, this
admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal"
statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial
21
admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
22 23
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
24
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all
proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
25
not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in
a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
26
inconsistent with what was pleaded.
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for
intervention, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of
Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person
has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the
success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the
27
custody of the court or an officer thereof. Intervention is "a
proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or
uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or
demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of
a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings,
by which such person becomes a party thereto for the
protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
28
affected by such proceedings."
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother,
the Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently
established her right to intervene in the partition case. She
has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in
litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of
29
Appeals:
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a
suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties
to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law.
The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest
in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the
intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the
complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could
30
not recover.
31
In Uy v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed petitioners
(who claimed to be the surviving legal spouse and the
legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate
proceedings even after the parties had already submitted a
compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of
execution. In setting aside the compromise agreement, the
Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and
that "in the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy,
petitioners’ inclusion in the action for partition, given the
circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in
32
the proper disposition of the case."
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v.
33
Court of Appeals is not in point, as the Court therein did not
discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention,
but resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the
merits of the complaint for partition, the Court ultimately
determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein
and her entitlement to a share in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is
ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s
Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
proceedings with dispatch.SO ORDERED.
CASE 8: G.R. no. 190321 PP vs Umipang
G.R. No. 190321 April 25, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009
1
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the 24 July
2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-
2
TG. The RTC Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul
(Umipang) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as
follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person
named Sam was selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street
in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the
[Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Force
(SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on
April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer
(PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he
was given a ₱ 500.00 marked money. The operation was
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential
informant sauntered the length of the street while the other
Page 18 of 25
members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing
near a store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then
approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said
"Sam, pa-iskor kami." Sam replied "Magkano ang iiskorin
nyo?" The confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos."
Sam took out three (3) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance with various price tags–500, 300, and
100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked
₱ 500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took
off his cap as the pre-arranged signal that the sale had been
consummated. Sensing danger, Sam attempted to flee but
PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few
seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised of their
team leader, Police Senior Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong,
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3
Maglana, PO3 Salem, and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1
Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets
containing the same white crystalline substance were
recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the
initials "SAU" [which stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the
complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-
appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police station
where he was booked, investigated and identified as
accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid
then brought the confiscated items to the crime laboratory for
testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant
himself and his brother Nash Rudin Umipang. According to
them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping,
accused-appellant and his family were awakened by loud
knocking on the door. The persons outside shouted "Mga
pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung hindi gigibain namin
ito." Accused-appellant obliged and opened the door. Five
(5) policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at
him. Against his will and amid the screams of his wife,
accused-appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle and
brought to the police headquarters. At the Taguig Police
station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him ₱ 100,000.00 for
his release. He denied the charges and that the alleged
3
evidence were all "planted" by the police.
Consequently, the following charges were brought against
Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of
Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having
been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell deliver and give away to
poseur buyer PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white
crystalline substance, which substance was found positive to
the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known
as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount
of ₱ 500.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of
Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having
been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody
and control five (5) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets,
each containing 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04 gram
and 0.04 gram with a total weight of 0.23 gram of white
crystalline substance, which substances were found positive
to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also
known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.
RTC Ruling
In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found
accused-appellant guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale,
Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165.
The RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the
arresting officers on how they conducted the buy-bust
operation than to accused-appellant’s claim of frame-up by
the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No.
14935-D-TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱ 500,000. For violating
Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-D-TG), he was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to fourteen (14) years one (1) day as maximum
and to pay a fine of ₱ 300,000.
CA Ruling
In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24
July 2007 Joint Decision of the RTC. According to the
appellate court, the elements necessary for the prosecution
of the illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs were
present and established. Thus, it no longer disturbed the
RTC’s assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found that there was no
showing of improper motive on the part of the police officers.
With the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties, it ruled against the denials of accused-
appellant, and his defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual
findings of the lower courts is not a function that is normally
undertaken in appeals before this Court. However, after a
careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we find it proper to
reevaluate the factual issues surrounding the present case,
especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the
proper implementation of the strict procedural safeguards
laid down in R.A. 9165 was established.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses were
sufficient to convict accused-appellant of the alleged sale
and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which
are violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A.
9165.
Discussion
4
Accused-appellant argues that since there were two
versions presented during trial – one, that of the prosecution;
and the other, that of the accused – the latter version must
be adopted, because the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties should not take precedence
over the presumption of innocence of the accused. He also
contends that a surveillance of just 30 minutes was
insufficient to establish that Umipang was engaged in the
sale of illegal drugs. Lastly, accused-appellant claims that
the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was
not clearly established, and that the evidence allegedly
5
confiscated from him was merely planted. Alluding to the
testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that the former did
not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet was
shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
prays for the affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all
respects, as it was decided in accord with law and
6 7
evidence. The OSG argues that the necessary elements to
convict a person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It then contends that, absent
independent proof and substantiated evidence to the
contrary, accused-appellant’s bare-faced denial should be
deemed merely as a self-serving statement that does not
Page 19 of 25
hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no
evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the
testimony must be given full faith and credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural
safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed
from a buy-bust operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. We
thus recall our pronouncement in People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While
this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way
to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted
covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a
significant downside that has not escaped the attention of
the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the
most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In
People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very
nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment
procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the
ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can
be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial
hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been
exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly, specific
procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have
been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to
strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that
these procedures have been followed in proving the
8
elements of the defined offense. (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory
9
procedural safeguards that are applicable in cases of buy-
bust operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be
issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when
the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion
of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued
stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs
still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification shall be issued on the completed
forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the
Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct
an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, including the
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, and through the PDEA shall within
twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the
destruction or burning of the same, in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, civil
society groups and any elected public official. The
Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner
of proper disposition and destruction of such
item/s which shall be borne by the
offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful
commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be
donated, used or recycled for legitimate
purposes: Provided, further, That a representative
sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification
as to the fact of destruction or burning of the
subject item/s which, together with the
representative sample/s in the custody of the
PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having
jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the
representative sample/s shall be kept to a
minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative
or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe
all of the above proceedings and his/her presence
shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case
the said offender or accused refuses or fails to
appoint a representative after due notice in writing
to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-
two (72) hours before the actual burning or
destruction of the evidence in question, the
Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the
public attorney's office to represent the former; x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard
through Section 86 of R.A. 9165, which requires the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine National Police
(PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain close
coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related
operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All
Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and
Transitory Provisions. – x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the
investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other
crimes as provided for in their respective organic
laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being
conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task
force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or
Page 20 of 25
any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to
the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with
the PDEA on all drug related matters. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
9165 (IRR) set the following procedure for maintaining close
coordination:
SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All
Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and
Transitory Provisions. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other
Agencies — The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other
law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-
drug operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the
said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the
PDEA prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in
any case, said agencies shall inform the PDEA of their anti-
drug operations within twenty-four (24) hours from the time
of the actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said drugs
and substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport
equipment used in illegal activities involving such drugs
and/or substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on
the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug
operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and
other anti-drug operations conducted by the PNP, the NBI,
and other law enforcement agencies prior to the approval of
this IRR shall be valid and authorized; Provided, finally, that
nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law
enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests
and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting
preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165,
courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the
testimonies of those who conducted the operations.
Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural
lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso
facto fatal to the prosecution’s cause, so long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been
10
preserved, courts must still thoroughly evaluate and
differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural
lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or
deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law.
Consequently, Section 21(a) of the IRR provides for a saving
clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1) of
R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those
procedural aspects that may be relaxed under justifiable
grounds, viz:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — x x x:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items; (Emphasis supplied.)
We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses,
and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds" after
which, "the prosecution must show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
11
preserved." To repeat, noncompliance with the required
procedure will not necessarily result in the acquittal of the
accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds;
and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
12
items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the
13
performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we
stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A.
9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The
provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions
to address potential police abuses, especially considering
that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. In
14
People v. Coreche, we explained thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for
tampering with evidence found legislative expression in
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized
dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a
three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of
inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs the duty to
"immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied.)
15
Consequently, in a line of cases, we have lain emphasis on
the importance of complying with the prescribed procedure.
Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal
laws shall be construed strictly against the government and
16
liberally in favor of the accused. Otherwise, "the procedure
17
set out in the law will be mere lip service."
Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust
operations
In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the
following:
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under Republic
Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of
proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the
obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the
State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the
State does not establish the corpus delicti when the
prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or
when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the
prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the
authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as
evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State
less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves
exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of
frame-up became plausible in the face of the weakness of
18
the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt. (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)
Page 21 of 25
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with
defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items from
accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of
the seized items. According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid
used the initials of the complete name, including the middle
initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated
sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang
was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony
of PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge of the
complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the
latter’s full name, was not clearly established. Thus, doubt
arises as to when the plastic sachets were actually marked,
as shown by PO2 Gasid’s testimony:
A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April
1, 2006.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Against whom did you conduct this
buy-bust operation?
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What prompted you to conduct this
operation against this alias Sam?
A: We received information from our confidential informant
that one alias Sam is selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro
Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Aside from this information that you
received from your informant, was there anything more that
your informant told you about the real identity of this alias
Sam?
19
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after you have taken the item and
paid alias Sam and then you executed the pre-arranged
signal that you have already purchased from him, what
happened then?
A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung
mata ni alias Sam, para ho bang balisa, siguro napansin nya
na hindi lang kami dalawa (2), aakma syang tatakbo,
sinunggaban ko na po sya.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you held Sam already during that
time?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened after that?
A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I
arrested him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What about your companions who
serves [sic] as your immediate back up, what happened to
them when you were already hold and arrested [sic] this
alias Sam?
A: I noticed my companions approaching us.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what did your colleague Ragos do
when he arrived at your place?
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam,
he was the one who handcuffed him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything more that was
done in that place of occurrence during that time, Officer?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us please?
A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining
items he showed me and the buy-bust money I gave him.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything that you and your
team did in the items that you confiscated from the
possession of the accused during that time and the shabu
that you bought from him?
A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.
PROSEC. SANTOS: How did you marked [sic] the item that
you bought from this alias Sam?
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what does that stand for? That
SAU?
A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Is that the only thing that you placed on
the plastic sachet containing the shabu that you bought from
this alias Sam during that time?
A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the other five (5) plastic
sachets containing the suspected shabu, what happened to
that?
A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and
20
SAU-6.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked and
inventoried the items that you bought and confiscated from
this alias Sam during that time, what else happened?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them over
to the investigator.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Where did you turn these items to your
investigator?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that
time?
A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you turn these items to your
investigator, where were you?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened to these items that you
turn it over [sic] to your investigator?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the
21
items confiscated.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, Officer, this Sam when you have
already arrested him, were you able to know his real name?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What was his real name?
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Is he present here in Court?
22
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you arrived at the place, by the
way, where was your target area, Mr. Witness?
A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig
City.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you were there, you did not buy
[sic] anybody to buy shabu from the accused?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not conduct any test buy?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Nor did you make any inquiry with
Cagayan De Oro Street regarding the accused?
A: Not anymore, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: At that moment, you don’t have any
idea regarding the identity of the accused and also whether
he was engaged in illegal activity?
A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the
informant.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was only the informant who knows
the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also your other members, they
did not know the accused?
23
A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)
A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust
operation, from the marking of the confiscated items to the
arrest of accused-appellant, is provided by the testimony of
PO1 Ragos:
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what is the effect to you of the act
of Gasid taking off his cap?
A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.
Page 22 of 25
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid acting that way, A: Yes, sir.
being the back up of him during that time, what did you do? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: After that Mr. Witness, you brought
A: I run [sic] towards them. the accused together with the items to your office?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Were you able to go near him when PROSEC. SANTOS: Already answered, Your Honor. We are
you run [sic] towards him? just repeating the same pattern, Your Honor.
A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you investigated the
A: I saw him holding Sam. accused?
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid already holding A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.
Sam, what did you do? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not ask the full name of
A: I handcuffed Sam. the accused?
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir.
A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was PO1 Saez who got his full
initials. name and on you [sic] part, that was the first time that you
PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you see Gasid marking those were able to learned [sic] the full name of the accused?
things that he took from this Sam during that time? A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Because you knew him only as alias
xxx xxx xxx Sam?
PROSEC. SANTOS: What marked [sic] did he put on these A: Yes, sir.
plastic sachets? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: How about Officer Gasid, it was also
A: SAU, sir. the first time that he learned the full name of the accused?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what SAU connotes? A: Maybe not, sir.
A: Yes, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us? was Officer Saez who delivered the items to the crime lab?
A: Sammy Abdul Umipang. A: No sir, it was Gasid.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: But you were not with him when he
A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights. delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory?
PROSEC. SANTOS: After this person was apprised of his A: Yes, sir.
rights, was there anything more that was done? ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No further question, Your Honor.
A: We went back to the office. PROSEC. SANTOS: No re-direct, Your Honor. x x
26
PROSEC. SANTOS: All the members of the team went back x (Emphasis supplied.)
to the office? The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized
A: Yes, sir. items are suspect. From their testimonies during the trial,
PROSEC. SANTOS: And together with this alias Sam? PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they only
A: Yes, sir. knew their target by the name "Sam." They both testified
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened in your office? that, after accused-appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and
A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator. read his rights, they immediately brought him to the police
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that precinct. They then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who
time? investigated him. In fact, in their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid
A: PO1 Saez. and PO1 Ragos stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after the team has turn [sic] over pagsisiyasat at pagtatanong tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang
the evidences to your investigator in the person of Officer pagkatao at sa layuning masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo
27
Saez, was there anything more that transpired in relation to sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165. (Emphasis
this event, this incident? supplied.)
24
A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest. Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had
xxx xxx xxx prior knowledge of the complete name of accused-appellant,
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information regarding the including the middle initial, which enabled the former to mark
accused was relayed to you by your immediate superior? the seized items with the latter’s complete initials. This
A: Yes, sir. suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of the
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information was the first items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know
information regarding the accused, is that correct? about the initials of Umipang prior to the latter’s statements
A: Yes, sir. at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: What was told you was that your the issues of where the marking really took place and
target person was alias Sam? whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
A: Yes, sir. items were preserved. All that was established was that it
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No photographs of alias Sam was was PO1 Saez who asked accused-appellant about the
shown to you? latter’s personal circumstances, including his true identity,
A: None, sir. and that the questioning happened when accused-appellant
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no derogatory records of was already at the police station. We thus reiterate:
this alias Sam in your office? Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the
A: None, sir. seized drugs or other related items immediately after they
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no warrant of arrest? are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the
A: None, sir. starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: This alias Sam was not included in seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because
your watch list? succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
25
A: No, sir. as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
xxx xxx xxx separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, the markings were placed on the similar or related evidence from the time they are seized
plastic sachets? from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of

Page 23 of 25
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting", or
contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has
consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately
mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the
authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related
prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v.
Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs
immediately after they were seized from the accused casts
doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on
reasonable doubt. These rulings are refinements of our
holdings in People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that
doubts on the authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned
by the prosecution’s failure to prove that the evidence
submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one
seized from the accused suffice to warrant acquittal on
28
reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted.)
It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the
seized items at the place of arrest does not by itself impair
the integrity of the chain of custody and render the
29
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. We have
already clarified that the marking upon "immediate"
confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even that
which was done at the nearest police station or office of the
30
apprehending team. We will analyze this possible seed of
doubt that has been planted by the unexplained marking of
the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang, together
with the other alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and
sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives
enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the
law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must
be conducted in the presence of a representative from the
media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any
elected public official. The testimony of PO2 Gasid, as
quoted below, is enlightening:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you also made the
certificate of inventory, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And since this is a drug operation, you
are required by law to make a certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And that inventory, you are required
by law that there should be a signature of any representative
from the media, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also representative from the
Department of Justice, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also elected official, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: I’m showing to you Mr. Witness your
certificate of inventory, do you confirm that there are no
signatures placed by any member of the media,
representative from the Department of Justice and any
elected official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And there appears to be an initial of
RS above the type written name Sammy Umipang, who
wrote this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Who refuse [sic] to sign?
31
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why was the certificate of inventory not
witnesses [sic] and signed by any members of the media,
the DOJ and elected officials, Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available
representative of those officers or persons in the certificate
of inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the media,
Your Honor.
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?
A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?
A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?
32
A: No, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the
physical inventory and the marking of the seized items does
not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in
evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the
SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay
chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There
is no indication that they contacted other elected public
officials. Neither do the records show whether the police
officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative.
Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for
failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient
time from the moment it received information about the
activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort
on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for the
said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.
A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable –
without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy
excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the
positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed
in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section
33
21(1) of R.A. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for
34
failing to do so.
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the
Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized
items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out
35
by the defense during trial, the Certificate of Inventory did
not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the
36
arresting officer who prepared the certificate – thus making
the certificate defective. Also, the prosecution neither
submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered
any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that these
requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be
37
implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would
not automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of
38
which he or she was convicted. This is especially true when
the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in
39
terms of [] justifiable grounds." There must also be a
showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the
procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable
40
consideration/reason." However, when there is gross
disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the
substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated
about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution
41
presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be
remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or
deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively
produces an irregularity in the performance of official
42
duties. As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have
failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged,
creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the
43
accused. 1âwphi1
For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable
grounds, we are led to conclude from the totality of the
Page 24 of 25
procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting
officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under
R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts
on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in
the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing
reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-
appellant, "as every fact necessary to constitute the crime
44
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt."
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the
authorities "to exert greater efforts in combating the drug
menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have
deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our
45
society." The need to employ a more stringent approach to
scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution – especially
when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust
operation – "redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice
system by protecting civil liberties and at the same time
46
instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors."
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision
affirming the 24 July 2007 RTC Joint Decision is SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is
hereby ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Cases No.
14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE accused-
appellant from custody, unless he is detained for some other
lawful cause.SO ORDERED.

Page 25 of 25