 Ramos v. Manalac, 89 Phil.

270;

FACTS:

On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose
and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their
brother Eladio Ramos. This gave Eladio Ramos authority to mortgage a parcel of land.
On August 09, 1934, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a
mortgage on the aforesaid property, together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the
payment of a loan he obtained from Mr. Rivera. Because of his failure to pay, Mr. Rivera
filed an action to foreclose the property mortgaged. Eladio Ramos engaged the services
of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and
submitted an answer in their behalf. On August 24, 1939, the court issued a decision that
if he fails to pay within 90 days from the day the decision becomes final, the said
property will be foreclosed. Since Eladio failed to pay, the court order the sale of the
property at the public auction. Now, the petitioners are questioning the validity of the
decision issued by the Court of First, foreclosing the said property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the lower courts is valid?

RULING:

The Court decided that the decision is valid. The claim of the petitioners cannot be
sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which
on its face is valid and regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that
a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in a separate
action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717)

Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served with
summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service was cured when
the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of
record, Lauro C. Maiquez, who appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case.
Since an attorney is presumed to be authorized by his client in a case in which he
appears (section 20, Rule 127), Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners
must be presumed to have been authorized by them when he appeared in their
behalf in all the stages of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings
require that the evasions and tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received
with undue favor to overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This
is specially so when, as in the instant case, it is only after the lapse of more than nine (9)
years after the judgment has been rendered that the petitioners thought of challenging the
jurisdiction of the court.
 In re David, 93 Phil. 461

FACTS:

Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession for a period
of five years from November 09, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in his
written report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within
the period of suspension, November 09, 1949 to November 08, 1954. On February 28,
1950, the respondent filed a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs. Sy not as a lawyer but as an
agent. The Court of First Instance, decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently, Atty. Felix
David, filed a motion for execution. In another Civil Case of the Court of First Instance
called Malayan Saw Mill vs. Tolentino, he filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts of Atty. Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that Respondent Felix P. David practiced law attorney intentionally
disobeying the decision of the Court of September 30, 1949, administrative case No 35.

The court further stated that the practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of his
profession. The prepare and submit motions asking for the execution of the judgment, the
demolition of the homes of the defendants, asking the court to order the Shereiff to betray
him the amounts collected are acts that are part of the exercise of the profession of
abogacioa; the present allegation and memorandum to the Court of Appeal is to exercise
the profession of lawyer, because an agent cannot do; the charge of issuing 35,109
defendants receipts and signed as lawyer for the plaintiff, is to exercise the profession.

Therefore, he is ineligible to practice as a lawyer in the Philippines, it is declared

cancelled the certificate issued in their favor to practice and is ordered to return it to the
Clerk of this Court.
 People v. Villanueva, 14, SCRA 109

FACTS: 

On September 04, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio
Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of
the said Municipality. The complainant in the case was represented by City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as the private-prosecutor,
after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his apppearnce
is that every time he would appear at the trial case, he would be considered on official
leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused invoking Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that “no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advice to clients.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Att. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes
private practice.

RULING:

The court ruled in favor of Atty. Fule. “Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides
that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney
of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not
by the City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of
Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private
prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect
her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
 Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293;

FACTS:

The case involves a disbarment filed on June 3, 1981 by Herminio R. Noriega against
Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison (admitted to the Bar on March 31, 1976) on the ground of
malpractice through gross misrepresentation and falsification. Complainant Noriega
alleges that respondent Sison is a regular and permanent employee of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as a Hearing Officer and as such, “is mandated to observe
strictly the civil service rules and regulations, more particularly x x x the prohibition of
government employees to practice their professions”; that to circumvent the prohibition
and to evade the law, respondent assumed a different name, falsified his identity and
represented himself to be one “Atty. Manuel Sison”, with offices at No. 605 EDSA,
Cubao, Quezon City, “at the times that he will handle private cases”; that “Manuel Sison”
is not listed as a member of the Bar in the records of the Supreme Court; that under his
said assumed name, respondent is representing one Juan Sacquing, the defendant in Case
No. E-01978 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, submitting
pleadings therein signed by him (respondent) under his assumed name, despite his full
knowledge that “Manuel Sison” is not a member of the Bar and that his acts in doing so
are illegal and unlawful. 1 Xerox copies of pertinent documents, pleadings, orders and
notices are annexed to the complaint to support the material allegations therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Sisoon should be disbarred on the ground of malpractice through
gross misrepresentation and falsification.

RULING:

The court decided in favor of Atty. Sison. The Court held that —There is no violation of
the Civil Service rules and regulations for his appearance as counsel for the defendant in
the JDRC Case No. E01978 was with authority given by the Associate Commissioner of
SEC. Julio A. Sulit, Jr.

The Court also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the annexes and the
answer of respondent, likewise sustained by annexes attached thereto and the reply of the
complainant, the accusation that respondent with malice and deliberate intent to evade the
laws, assumed a different name, falsified his identity and represented himself to be one
“ATTY. MANUEL SISON” with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the
times that he will handle private cases, is not meritorious. Neither is the charge
substantiated. The only case referred to is that pending the JDRC, Case No. E-01978
wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant. It being an isolated case, the
same does not constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent did not derive any
pecuniary gain for his appearance because respondent and defendant therein were close
family friends. Such act of the respondent in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a
close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment
against respondent.
  Lingan v. Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014;

FACTS:
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007, suspending him
from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights Regional
Office for Region II.  According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty.
Baliga's suspension from the practice of law prevented him from assuming his post as
Regional Director for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law
is suspended.
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions
as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director.  According to Atty. Baliga, his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office.
On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. Alleged that Atty.
Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as
Attorney VI.  Since the court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty.
Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer and was disqualified to hold the position of Regional
Director during the effectivity of the order of suspension.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation, arguing that his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, to
stretch the coverage of his suspension from the practice of law to his public office would
be tantamount to violating his constitutional rights to due process and to the statutory
principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded.
ISSUE:

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension
should be granted.

HELD:

The court find that Atty. Baliga violated the court;s order of suspension.  The court
therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of
law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the
Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights.”
Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of
Attorney VI.
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession.
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on
Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process.  First, he was only
suspended after investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and
Investigation Office. Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be
heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constituted practice of law.  Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position
as Regional Director.
WHEREFORE, the court further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of
law for six (6) months.  Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months
of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy
of the resolution.
 Eustaquio v. Navales, A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016;

FACTS:
Complainants claimed that respondent, atty. Navales violated the terms and conditions of
the lease contract when he failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of
P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased premises despite repeated oral and written demands.
Further, complainants filed the instant case before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed
to exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and refused to
fulfil his obligations to complainants.
In a Report and Recommendation dated February 8, 2011, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended
that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely.
In a Report and Recommendation dated February 10, 2016, the Office of the Bar Council
(OBC) recommended that respondent be further suspended from the practice of law and
from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a period of six (6) months,
thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately.
In this relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a position, which
requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and practice of law, i.e.,
Assistant City Prosecutor, he should have ceased and desisted from acting as such.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the respondent is administratively liable. It is settled that the Court
has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all
functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension.
This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law.
The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes
performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession or rendering any kind of
service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the government
office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law.
Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of
law and thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension against him
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months from his original six (6)-month
suspension, totaling one (1) year from service of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
 Fajardo v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016

FACTS:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to
defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health. He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, Atty. Alvarez did not
enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez said
that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances
working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita dismissed.
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal
complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she
gave. Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise. Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to
heed.
ISSUES:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is
authorized to engage in the private practice of law.
RULING:
The court find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case,
his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice,
but his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center
for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and
against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of
interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the
requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
the Philippine government as a whole
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of
government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against
the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore
to serve.
Likewise, the court find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it
appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could
help them get a favorable decision in complainant's case.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01,
and 1.02 prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his
personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is
unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of
influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome
for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records,
we rule that there is enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.
Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal
interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.