1. Republic vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 90482 August 5, 1991

Topic: Definition

Doctrine: It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. An
administrative agency is defined as a government body charged with administering and
implementing particular legislation.

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against respondents for the nullification of the
Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 86-35880 based on many grounds. CA dismissed
the petition stating that petitioner (SRA) may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines since under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18 dated 28 May
1986, which created it, it simply was to take over the functions of the defunct PHILSUCOM;
also that (SRA) may not lawfully represent the Government of the Philippines in any suit or
proceeding such as the present petition for administrative agencies may only perform such
powers and functions as may be authorized by the laws which created or gave them existence.

Issue: Whether or not SRA can bring an action on behalf of the Republic as well as represent the
Government in a suit or proceeding. – NO

Whether or not the OGCC can represent SRA. - NO

Ruling:

1. Sugar Regulatory Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines and that the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel does not have the
authority to represent said petitioner in this case.

Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 and which took effect immediately,
abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and created the Sugar
Regulatory Administration (SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President. Under
the third paragraph of Section 13 thereof, the PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a
juridical entity for three (3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or
against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the functions for
which it was established, under the supervision of the SRA.

Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but it
does not specifically include the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in
suits filed by or against it, nor the power to sue and be sued although it has the power to
"enter, make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to the
attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms, public or private, and the
Government of the Philippines" and "[t]o do all such other things, transact such other
businesses and perform such functions directly or indirectly incidental or conducive to
the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar Regulatory Administration."
 Section 4 thereof provides for the governing board of the Administration, known as the
Sugar Board, which shall exercise "all the corporate powers" of the SRA. Its specific
functions are enumerated in Section 6; however, the enumeration does not include the
power to represent the Republic of the Philippines, although among such functions is
"[t]o enter into contracts, transactions, or undertakings of whatever nature which are
necessary or incidental to its functions and objectives with any natural or juridical
persons and with any foreign government institutions, private corporations, partnership or
private individuals.

It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An administrative
agency is defined as "a government body charged with administering and implementing
particular legislation. The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit
by or against it having been withheld from SRA, it following that the latter cannot
institute the instant petition and the petition in C.A.-G.R. No. 17188 on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines.

2. The Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the OGCC can represent neither the SRA nor the
Republic of the Philippines. We do not, however, share the view that only the Office of the
Solicitor General can represent the SRA.

The OGCC, availing of P.D. No. 1415, the law creating it, particularly Section 1 which,
as quoted by it on page 16 of the Petition,26 reads: SECTION 1. The Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel shall be the principal law office of all government-
owned and controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries except as may otherwise
be provided by their respective charters or authorized by the President

Since the SRA is neither a government-owned or controlled corporation nor a subsidiary

thereof, OGCC does not have the authority to represent it.
 CASE NO. 2

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

TOPIC: CREATION AND ABOLITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

DOCTRINE: It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only
be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
SUMMARY: Petitioner in this case challenged the abolition of Career Executive Service
Board (CESB) done through a resolution issued by the herein respondent. Accordingly
Petitioner in this case has a pending appointment in the CESB. After exhausting all the
administrative remedies, she filed petition for certiorari in the SC. In the SC, the Court ruled that
the abolition was not valid. CESB was created through Presidential Decree No. 1 Series of
1974, thus it was created by law and the abolition thereof can only through legislative
enactment.
FACTS: First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research
Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on
August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended
to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. However, Resolution
No. 93-4359 was passed which abolished the CESB where she was recommend as an Civil
Service Officer, Rank IV. The pertinent provision was written as follow:

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service

Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board,
shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the
Office for Career Executive Service.

Petitioner filed an appeal to the office of Executive Secretary; however Hon. Antonio Carpio,
wrote a letter to the petitioner to bring the matter in the Court.
Hence, this present case.
ISSUE: Whether the CSC Chairman has the power to abolish CESB?
RULING: No, the CSC Chairman has no power to abolish the CESB. In deciding the merit
of the case, the SC opined as follow:

It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
 Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or
convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and
become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is
wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the
office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CES.
Furthermore, the SC also explained that CESB is not part of the offices listed under the CSC.
Accordingly the SC explained the principle of autonomy of CESB an d the principle of Attachent
in this case, to wit:

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's

power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in
Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission.
As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." 6 The essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control
of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose
of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to
attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the

department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency
or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights,
if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide
general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
Therefore, CSC has no power to abolish CESB because it was created by law and it can only be
abolished through legislative enactment. Furthermore, the CESB is an attached office to CSC
which has an autonomous function.
FALLO:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the
respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
 3. Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
677 SCRA 408 (2012)

Topic: Sec. 31 in relation to Secs. 21-23, Book III, Administrative Code

Doctrine: The President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive
department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President."

Facts: On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio
Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred
Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v.
Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial
function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.

Held: NO. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O.
292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority
to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by
the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President."

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31
(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and
Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also
insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions
undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O.
12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential
Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the
other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

What actions does reorganization include?

The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA,
which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more
than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third
division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could take on the
additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve
cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and
duties xxx, of PAGC."
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño
v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi- judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the
earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the
Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases
refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation
being conducted by another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman
Act of 1989.

While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is
limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until
acted upon by the President.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the
President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA.
Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must present
substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the
investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the
performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant
consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner
has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid
exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
 4. BIRAOGO vs. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192935
December 7, 2010

TOPIC: Creation and Abolition of Administrative Agencies; Section 31 in relation to Sections

21-23, Book III, Administrative Code

DOCTRINE: “Restructure" means an "alteration of an existing structure."

The power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that the provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

ISSUE:. Whether or not the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize
as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code. NO.

RULING: To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
"restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book
III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration
of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create
public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
 5. Mondano vs. Silvosa
G.R. No. L-7708 (1955)

Topic: Control of Administrative Action

Doctrine: Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Facts: Petitioner Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and
concubinage.1 The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate
the matter. Consequently, Governor Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Silvosa
suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue of
the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a
committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.

Issue: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor.

Ruling: No. The Governor CANNOT exercise power of control over the mayor. (Note: Silvosa was asking as the
agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).

The Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted
only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President
has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c)
of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by
him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.

Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law.

If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that
reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.

Control Supervision

Overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to

The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
performance of his duties and to substitute the action as prescribed by law to make them perform their
judgment of the former for that of the latter. duties.

1
(1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a
place other than the conjugal dwelling.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by
final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question.” Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.

In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is not
related to his office but involves a crime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must
first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not
because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the Revised
Administrative Code.
 6. Phil. Gamefowl Commission v IAC
G.R. No. L-72969-70
December 17, 1986

TOPIC: Control of Administrative Action

DOCTRINE: The power of supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the
subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the
subordinate performs his duties in accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to
determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is
necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the
instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after
his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review
over him.

FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and
the municipal government of Bogo, Cebu, both of which claim the power to issue licenses f or
the operation of cockpits in the said town. The issue arose when Hee Acusar was ordered to
relocate the the lone cockpit in Bogo pursuant to the Cockfighting Law of 1974 on the ground
that it was situated in a tertiary commercial zone which was a prohibited area. Acusar failed to
relocate and his cockpit was considered phased out.

In a petition to compel the municipal mayor to issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu declared that he had waived his right to a renewal thereof
because of his failure to relocate. As such, Santiago Sevilla, the private respondent, was grated a
license to operate a cockpit by the Mayor of Bogo with the authority of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Bogo. As only one cockpit is allowed by law in cities or municipalities, Acusar sued to revoke
this license which was dismissed eventually by the Supreme Court.

Acusar then went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his cockpit
license and the cancellation of the license of Sevilla. His license was renewed and was allowed
to operate again. This was challenged by Sevilla and the Municipal Government of Bigo in the
RTC of Cebu which granted a temporary restraining order on Acusar. The Philippine Gamefowl
Commission issued a resolution ordering the Mayor to issue the necessary mayor’s permit in
favor of Acusar and to cancel the permit of Sevilla. On Appeal, this was declared null and void
by the CA.

ISSUE:. Whether or not the Philippine Gamefowl Commission has the power to order the
issuance of the permit

RULING: According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to
"grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and
revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which 15 they have been granted," and the
Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training
of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission."

It is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary
power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is
vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited only to international derbies and does not
extend to ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but
only of review and supervision.

The Court has consistently held that supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps 17 as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties." Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power of
the officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of 18 the former for that of the latter." Review, on the other
hand, is a 19 reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction.

As thus defined, the power of supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the
subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the
subordinate performs his duties in accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to
determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is
necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the
instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after
his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review
over him.

In the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, the choice of the municipal
authorities should be respected by the PGC and in any event cannot be replaced by it simply
because it believes another person should have been selected. Stated otherwise, the PGC cannot
directly exercise the power to license cockpits and in effect usurp the authority directly conferred
by law on the municipal authorities.

If at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority
to substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound
discretion. In the instant case, the PGC did not limit itself to vetoing the choice of Sevilla,
assuming he was disqualified, but directly exercised the authority of replacing him with its own
choice. Assuming Sevilla was really disqualified, the choice of his replacement still remained
with the municipal authorities, subject only to the review of the PGC.

In ordering the respondent municipal officials to cancel the mayor's permit in favor of Santiago
A. Sevilla and to issue another one in favor of Acusar, the PGC was exercising not the powers of
mere supervision and review but the power of control, which had not been conferred upon it.
 7. Macalintal v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

Topic: Administrative Agencies; Control of Administrative Action.

Doctrine: . (1) COMELEC should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free, orderly and honest
elections.

(2) Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189 follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to
implement a law – the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and
regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that
agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and complete.

Facts: Romulo B. Macalintal sought to declare certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as unconstitutional. Here, the Court ruled that Sections 19, 25
and portions of Section 17.1 of said law are unconstitutional as Congress, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee, went beyond the scope of its authority when it vested upon itself with the powers
to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
Meanwhile, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) and Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with
respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators
and party-list representatives.

Issue: Whether or not the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is constitutional. No.

Held: Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of
Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible
amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.

However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the
following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations"
(IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC
[Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any
country determined by COMELEC.

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent
COMELEC, the Court has held that" [w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on
Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other
departments of the Government." 44 In an earlier case, the Court elucidated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so
may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free, orderly and honest
elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and
political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory. The
Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and
its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to decide complex political questions. 45 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body “except
those specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. 46 In
the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers over its rule-making authority.

By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from
the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and
regulations to implement a law – the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the
rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise
of that agency in its particular field of operation. 47 Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress
relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but
certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the
Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.

The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that" [t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that" [i]t
shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically
vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first
sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than
three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are
unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries
wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions
provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. 48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its
constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
 8. Abakada Guro vs. Purisima supra
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Topic: Control of Administrative Action

Doctrine: Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the
law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.

Facts: Petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners seeking to prevent the respondents from
implementing and enforcing R.A 9335, which intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. The DOF DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil
Service Commission were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of R.A
9335 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose Petitioners
invoked their right as taxpayers filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of R.A 9335.

Issue: Whether or not Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Yes. In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight
and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the
Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a
Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and
 (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of
its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. In the latter
case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their
legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In this case, in exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the
IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.
 9. ELISEO SORIANO V. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies

SUMMARY: Petitioner, host of Ang Dating Daan, was slapped by MTRCB with a preventive
suspension order for uttering cuss words in his program. The preventive suspension was in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7,
Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. Petitioner claims that the order was invalid because
PD 1986 did not expressly empowered MTRCB to issue a preventive suspension order. The
Court ruled in favor of MTRCB, stating that MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the
possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of
preventive suspension.

DOCTRINES:
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain
powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority
given should be liberally construed.

As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are
implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act.

FACTS: In his Ang Dating Daan program, petitioner uttered the following cuss words:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang
babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa
sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x

After a preliminary conference, the MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating
Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court to nullify the
preventive suspension order thus issued. Subsequently, the MTRCB issued a decision finding
petitioner liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan".

Petitioner contends that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR
provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the
MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTRCB is empowered to issue preventive suspension against
petitioner. YES.

RULING:

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,

investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining
whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once
ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.
A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And
this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation
and supervision.
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority
and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted
above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits
for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs
and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be
x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory
and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or
implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise,
or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if
granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred
under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose
preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of
imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of
the IRR
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would
not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall
that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials
and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither
amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the
assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the
MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of
whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of
the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on
MTRCB.
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the
MTRCB’s assailed action. Petitioner’s restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to
functions within the literal confines of the law, would give the agency little leeway to operate,
stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a
wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise such
powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and
objectives of this Act x x x." Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the
implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those
that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair
implication of the enabling act. As we held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a
general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary
implication. Clearly, the power to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is
one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
 10. Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) vs. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003

Topic: Powers of Administrative Agencies, In General

Doctrine: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

Facts: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Among its pertinent provisions are the
following:
1. (1)The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone service not later
than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case the statement is received beyond this
period, the subscriber shall have a specified grace period within which to pay the bill and the
public telecommunications entity (PTEs) shall not be allowed to disconnect the service within the
grace period.
2. (2)There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded
message or similar facility excluding the customer’s own equipment.
3. (3)PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards.
Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use.
Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date the prepaid SIM card is fully
consumed but not beyond 2 years and 45 days from date of first use to replenish the SIM card,
otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of an invalid SIM card, however,
shall be installed upon request of the customer at no additional charge except the presentation of a
valid prepaid call card.
4. (4)Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call
using the cards.
5. (5)The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service whether postpaid or prepaid shall
be reduced from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The authorized rates per minute shall
thus be divided by 10

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M.
Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6,
2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the
prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular
will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the
validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of
prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing
Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: Did the petitioners violate the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies? (NO)
Who has jurisdiction, Regular Courts or NTC? (Regular Courts)

Ruling: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with
the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the
purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

As regards exhaustion of administrative remedies, the cause of action in this case is the challenge to the
Constitutionality of the Admin Memo Circular. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

Regarding the jurisdiction, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. This is not the case in this matter. Hence the
regular courts have jurisdiction in this matter.
 11. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA
166 SCRA 533. No. L-76633. October 18, 1988.

a. Doctrine of Delegation of Legislative Power

DOCTRINES:
 Delegated power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute is called
power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide.
 Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated; What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced.
 2 tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

FACTS:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband, Vitaliano Saco who
was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan.. The decision is challenged by the petitioner, as owner of the vessel, on the principal
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker, and argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social
Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

Issue 1: Was Vitaliano Saco an overseas worker? YES

Ruling 1 :
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is
defined as “employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board
vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract.” A contract worker is described
as “any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and
shall include seamen” or “any person working overseas or who has been employed by another
which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment
contract and shall include seamen.” These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not
disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
petitioner’s vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2. This circular prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino
seamen for overseas employment.

Issue 2: Whether POEA has authority to promulgate the regulation - Memorandum Circular
No .2. YES.
Ruling 2:
Petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of EO No. 797,
reading as follows:
“x x x The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).”

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No.
797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos
and to protect their rights. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested
with “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen.” These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations
on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include “claims for death, disability and other
benefits” arising out of such employment.

Issue 3: Whether legislative discretion as to substantive contents of law cannot be delegated.

Ruling 3:
Yes it cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.

The two tests to determine whether or not this a valid delegation of legislative power are:
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power. The reason is the
increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
“power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The power of the POEA
(and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to
“fair and equitable employment practices.”

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards “public interest”
in People v. Rosenthal, “justice and equity” in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, “public
convenience and welfare” in Calalang v. Williams, and “simplicity, economy and efficiency” in
Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the “sense and
experience of men” was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and “national
security” in Hirabayashi v. United States.
 12. KMU vs. Garcia
239 SCRA 386 (1994)

Topic: Delegation of Powers; Power of Subordinate Legislation

Doctrine
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas delegate non
delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable because a delegated power constitutes not only
a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power
is a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to
give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave
the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or
when they deem it necessary.

Facts
 DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to allow provincial bus
to change passenger rates w/ in a fare range of 15% above or below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period.
 This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the transport sector which the government intends to
implement and to make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
 Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires publication and
notice to concerned parties and public hearing.
 Provincial Bus Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB.
 DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement
the Department Order & to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o
benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.
 Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB which was
denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily granted by the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 
W/N authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above existing authorized fare range is
unconstitutional and invalid.

Decision
Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with
the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987.
Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB “to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review
and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation
services provided by motorized vehicles.”

Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and ratemaking for the transport sector,
the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation, under which such
administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the
Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. Such delegation of legislative power to an
administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for
governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in
legislation has become necessary.

Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector,
the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an
administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in”
the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide.

However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and
above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tanta-mount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.

A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.
 13. BOC vs. TEVES
G.R. No. 181704. December 6, 2011

Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Requisites and Limits of Permissible
Delegation/Tests for Valid Delegation

Summary:
R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). BOCEA contends that
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the
criteria for termination, the manner of allocating targets, the distribution of rewards and the
determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of collection, which is tantamount to undue
delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of petitioner. The
Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 9335 passed the completeness test and the sufficient standard test
(See 1st doctrine).

Doctrines:
1. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
2. The Supreme Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare”.
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.”

Facts:
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005.
 R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of
Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the
BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate
personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau
of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file employees of the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) filed the present petition before this Court against respondents
Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF),
Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC
Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR).

BOCEA contends that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because
Congress granted to the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion
of formulating the criteria for termination, the manner of allocating targets, the distribution of
rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of collection, which is
tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue:
Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board. NO.

Held:
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, the Supreme Court mentioned that:
“In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the
volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday
life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked to
execute laws in their specialized fields—the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test.”
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law:

“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is the policy of the State to optimize the

revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets.”

Section 4 “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing” the delegated power to the
President to fix revenue targets:

“SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund.—A Rewards and Incentives Fund,

hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of
the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection   Percent (%) of the Excess
[Over] the Revenue Collection to Accrue to the
Targets Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus 20%
of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following
the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the
same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of
the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures
and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR
and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as
 allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in
the case of the BOC.

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC
and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination
of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of
the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the
conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

“SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board.—The Board in the agency shall have the
following powers and functions:

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a
half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level
of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject
to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding

two years in operation, and has no historical record of collection performance that
can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in
the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue
targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered
by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes
as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after
careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately
executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be
without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of
public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public
interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy
and welfare”. In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.”

Thus, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335,
as evident from Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides
for the incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph
of Section 5 provides that “[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall
likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation
Board,” Section 7 (a) of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board
by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund
shall be in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A.
No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue
delegation of legislative power to the Board.

14. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA

G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988

Topic: Administrative Law; Requisites and Limits of Permissible Delegation/ Tests for
Valid Delegation

DOCTRINES:
Administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of “law.”

FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, a Chief Officer of a ship owned by Eastern Shipping Lines, was killed in an
accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines
with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated
death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even
with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and
decided the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-
delegation of powers. NO it is valid.

RULING:
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).”

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the
rule and its non-delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the
employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Filipino workers to “fair and equitable employment practices.”
 15. Tatad vs. Secretary
G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Topic: Requisites and Limits of Permissible Delegation/Tests for Valid Delegation

Doctrine: The words “as far as practicable”, “declining”, “stable” are considered to pass the
sufficient standard test. However, the word “depletion” is not considered as sufficient in
standard.
NOTE: Look for the specific words in the law to identify if it can pass the sufficient
standard test.

Facts: Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted
R.A. No. 8180, entitled the “Downstream oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.” The President
implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.
Petitioners contest the contest the constitutionality of Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides: “Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation.—Pursuant to
Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided
herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: x
xx
In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners says that section
15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to
guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable
for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full
deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices
of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Issue: Whether or not Section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation.
NO.

Ruling: The attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation
of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that
full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event.
Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date
of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President—he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should
have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards.
The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words
are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines
“practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a
downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless.
To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other
case.
 16. US vs. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122, Feb. 27, 1922

Topic: Quasi-Legislative / Rule-Making; Requisites and Limits of Permissible Delegation/Test

for Valid Delegation

Doctrine: The law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Summary: Act No. 2868 passed a law authorizing the Governor-General to issue the necessary
rules and regulations, and specify the price of rice over which shall constitute monopoly.
Thereafter, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price of palay, of which Ang
Tang Ho exceeded. The Court ruled that the proclamation was undue delegation of legislative
power as it has left the power to legislate and determine the price in favor of the Governor-
General.

Facts: In 1919, legislature passed Act No. 2868 authorizing the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making
an appropriation for this purpose," Section 3 thereof defines what shall constitute a monopoly or
hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of
rice or define any basic for fixing the price. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with
the sale of rice at an excessive price. He was charged, tried, found guilty, and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500.

Provisions of the statute:

1. It authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.
2. The promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the
Governor-General.
3. It does not specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General
shall issue the proclamation
4. Proclamation may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any
cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.
5. "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn."
6. The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to
the discretion of the Governor-General.
7. It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long
such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they
shall take effect.

Issue: Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. YES.
Ruling: The Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was
and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced,
how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended.

The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which
the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed.
The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or
qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of
eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime. Thence, it is unconstitutional.

What is more showing of unconstitutionality is that the proclamation undertakes to fix one price
for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine
Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the
Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their
deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating
from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of
the above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the
Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub
delegation of that power.
 17. Ynot v. IAC
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Topic: III.C(1)(c) – Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Quasi-

legislative/Rule-Making; Requisites and Limits of Permissible Delegation/Tests for Valid
Delegation

Doctrine: There is invalid delegation of legislative powers to the administrative officers when
they are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Summary (Recit): In this case the Supreme Court ruled the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in Executive Order No. 626-A. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. In this case, there is a wide and sweeping authority or unlimited discretion and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Facts: The petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January
13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The
court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial
court, and then elevated the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid delegation of powers to the administrative agencies in
the disposition of confiscated carabao and carabeef. NO.

Ruling:
There exist questionable manner on the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
Executive Order No. 626-A. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
 18. Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. vs. Energy Regulatory
Commission G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012
Topic: Rules

Doctrine: The general rule is that administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. There
are however exceptions first, an interpretative regulation. Second, a regulation that is merely
internal in nature. Lastly, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning
rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Facts: ASTEC’s members are questioning the validity of the rules issued by the ERC which was
not published and sent to the UP Law Center since it is the basis of the order for them to refund
to the consumers the over-recoveries they made..

Issue: Whether or not the rule is valid despite its non-publication. Yes and No.

Ruling: Yes, although the general rule is that administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. There are however exceptions, first, an interpretative regulation. Second, a regulation
that is merely internal in nature. Lastly, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties.
In the case of the ERC’s order stating that the claims of the electric cooperatives can and maybe
reviewed by the agency is valid despite non-publication since it is merely interpreting the IRR
and it does not add to it. As for the rule on the grossed up factor mechanism however it cannot be
said to be under the exception since nowhere in the IRR was the grossed up factor mechanism
found and therefore it is new and thus amends and adds to the existing IRR. The latter therefore
requires publication. It should also be noted that even if those were published the same still
cannot apply to claims of the electric cooperatives this is because they were the rules are not
retroactive in nature.
 19. Board of Trustees of GSIS and Garcia v. Velasco and Molina
G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011

TOPIC: Kinds of Rules

DOCTRINE: Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed
with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed.
According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and
regulations, “interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public,” need not be filed with the
UP Law Center.

FACTS: On 23 May 2002, GSIS and Winston Garcia (who was GSIS president and general
manager) administratively charged Albert Velasco and Mario Molina (respondents) with grave
misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days. Respondents were
charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees
denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of Garcia.

Respondents tried to claim their employee benefits. However, GSIS denied the claim, pursuant
to the following board resolutions:
Resolution No. 372: Due to pending administrative case, step increment (meaning: increase in
salary from step to step within the salary grade of a position) would remain withheld until a
decision on the case has been rendered.
Resolution No. 306: Christmas raffle benefits denied due to pending administrative case.
Resolution No. 197: Those with pending administrative case shall be disqualified from
promotion, step increment, performance-based bonus, and other benefits and privileges.

Respondents asserted that the denial of the employee benefits because of their pending
administrative cases violated their right to be presumed innocent and that they were being
punished without hearing. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were ineffective
because they were not registered with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center
pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

The RTC found that the assailed resolutions were not registered with the UP Law Center, per
certification of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). Since the
resolutions were not registered, the RTC declared that the assailed resolutions have not become
effective citing Sections 3 and 4, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

ISSUE: Whether or not internal rules and regulations would require publication with the ONAR
for their effectivity. NO.

RULING: Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 need not be filed with the UP Law Center ONAR
since they are, at most, regulations which are merely internal in nature – regulating only the
personnel of the GSIS and not the public. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary
structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and
Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed
resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There
was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.
 20. Republic vs. Drugmaker’s Laboratories
G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Topic: Quasi-Legislative/ Rule-making; Kinds of Rules

Doctrine: Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law
which delegates these powers to them. The rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting
statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in
the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. 

1. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general,
extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in
existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.
2. interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under
which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute
being administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what
the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to
the same class which may be covered by the said rules.
3. contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts
or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive Order
No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,” on prior notice, hearing, and
publication in order to be valid and binding.

Except when the same is merely an interpretative rule because “when an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law.”

Facts:
1. FDA was created pursuant to R.A. No. 3780, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug, and Cosmetic,”
primarily in order “to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for foods, drugs and
devices, and cosmetic products.”
2. DOH, thru then-Secretary Bengzon, issue Admin. Order No. 67, entitled “Revised Rules and Regulations
on Registration of Pharmaceutical Products.”
3. It required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with the FDA before they
may release the same to the market for sale.
a. In this relation, satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a
manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products.
b. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there
was no local facility capable of conducting the same.
4. The issuance of Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued
Circular No. 8, s. 1997 which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing
requirement on drug products.
5. Respondents manufacture and trade a “multisource pharmaceutical product” with the generic name
of rifampicin —branded as Refam — for the treatment of adults and children suffering from pulmonary and
extra-pulmonary tuberculosis.
 6. Respondents applied for and were issued a CPR for such drug, valid for five (5) years, or until November
15, 2001.
a. At the time of the CPR’s issuance, Refam did not undergo BA/BE testing since there was still
no facility capable of conducting BA/BE testing.
7. Accordingly, respondents engaged the services of the University of the Philippines’ (Manila) Department
of Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Medicine to conduct BA/BE testing on Refam, the results of
which were submitted to the FDA. 
a. The FDA sent a letter to respondents, stating that Refam is “not bioequivalent with the
reference drug.”
b. However, FDA still revalidated respondents’ CPR for Refam two (2) more times. The second of
which came with a warning that no further revalidation shall be granted until respondents submit
satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam.
8. Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for prohibition
and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8 before the RTC
9. They alleged that it is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the authority to issue and implement
rules concerning R.A. 3720. As such, the issuance of the aforesaid circulars and the manner of their
promulgation contravened the law and the Constitution. They further averred that the non-renewal of the
CPR due to failure to submit satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only affect Refam, but their other
products as well.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and thereby declared Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 null and void. The RTC
issued a Writ of Permanent Injunction enjoining the FDA and all persons acting for and under it from enforcing
Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 and directing them to approve the renewal and revalidation of respondents’ products
without submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results.
 It held that there is nothing in R.A. 3720 which granted either the FDA the authority to issue and
implement the subject circulars, or the Secretary of Health the authority to delegate his powers to the FDA.
It concluded that the issuance of Circular Nos 8 and 8 constituted illegal exercise o legislative and
administrative powers.

The FDA sought direct recourse to the SC through the instant petition with an urgent prayer for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of the
RTC’s Order.
 The FDA contends that it has the authority to issue Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 as it is the agency
mandated by law to administer and enforce laws, including rules and regulations issued by the DOH, that
pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products.
 Respondents maintain that under RA 3720, the power to make rules to implement the law is lodged with
the Secretary of Health, not with the FDA. They also argue that the assailed circulars are void for lack of
prior hearing, consultation, and publication.

Issue: Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 – YES.

Ruling: Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law
which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the
granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details
in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of
separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. 

1. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations
pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects
individual rights and obligations.
2. interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the
administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being administered and
purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single
person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said
rules.
3. contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive Order No.
292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,” on prior notice, hearing, and publication in
order to be valid and binding.

Except when the same is merely an interpretative rule because “when an administrative rule is merely interpretative
in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law.”

RA 3720, as amended by Executive Order No. 175, s. 1987 prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture and sale of
pharmaceutical products without obtaining the proper CPR from the FDA. In this regard, the FDA has been
deputized by the same law to accept applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or
reject such applications. The said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the recommendation of the
FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products.

ADMIN ORDER 67, S. 1989, required that certain pharmaceutical products undergo BA/BE testing prior to the
issuance of CPR, contrary to respondents’ assertion that it was Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 that required such
tests. AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule that originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of
applications for the issuance of CPRs covering certain pharmaceutical products. As such:
1. it is considered an administrative regulation — a legislative rule to be exact — issued by the Secretary
of Health in consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture and
sale.
2. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989
complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of
regularity accorded to the government in the exercise of its official duties.

CIRCULAR NOS. 1 AND 8 are not administrative regulations because they do not:
(a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof;
(b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or
(c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends.

The only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions
of AO 67, s. 1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA
3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the
substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern — as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative
regulations in the first place — no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.

The petition was granted and RTC ruling was set aside.
 21. Abakada Guro v. Ermita (supra)
G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005

Topic: Administrative Law; Kinds of Rules

Doctrine: It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are
intrinsic in any legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power
did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either
at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order."  Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of
the Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant
to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the
respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference
Committee.

Facts: R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555
and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.

Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a committee conference on the
disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills. The Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having
met and discussed in full free and conference," recommended the approval of its report, which
the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next
day, May 11, 2005. On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate
version was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus,
came R.A. No. 9337.

July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. When said date came, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.

G.R. No. 168056

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied, to wit:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of

its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

G.R. No. 168207

On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise
assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.

Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT
rate to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power,
petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two
conditions being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people. Petitioners
further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral
Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of a bill laid
down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 168461

A petition for prohibition was filed by the Association of Pilipinas  Shell Dealers, Inc., et al.,
assailingSection 8 and 12 of RA 9337 are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive,
excessive, and confiscatory. It violates due process and equal protection clause embodied in
Article III of the Constitution.Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but
progressive, violative of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller
businesses with higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it
wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make.

G.R. No. 168463

Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed
this petition for certiorari . They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the
following grounds: 1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution; 2) The Bicameral
Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on provisions present in
Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and 3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference
Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121, 125, 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which
were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution,
which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives

G.R. No. 168730

On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
on July 20, 2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the
creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the
taxes they collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely
allocated for public purposes and expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing
these establishments to pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI,
Section 28(1) of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article
VI, Section 24, and b. Article VI, Section 26(2).

Ruling: Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference
Committee.

It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any
legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it
would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at
least with decency, deliberation, and order."  Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the
Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to
this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the
respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference
Committee.

Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as
follows:

Sec. 88. Conference Committee. – In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference
committees of both chambers.

In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere
to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they
materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latter’s
appropriate action.

Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. – . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

...

The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report
prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the
same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading.

Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:

Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The
President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the
approval of the Senate.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the
members of each House panel, voting separately.

A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled
version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to
the report.

...

The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not
addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in
disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill.
Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement
its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the
details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of
passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the
rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but
whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both
houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.

Akin to the Fariñas case, the present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by
the conference committee on matters regarding Congress’ compliance with its own internal rules.
As stated earlier, one of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to
formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge
of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is
also the sole concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference
committee if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal
operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a
co-equal branch of government.

Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance,  the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the
practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house."  To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It
seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be
very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the
Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile"
and "harmonize." To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b)
decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be
carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the
disagreeing provisions.

All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane
to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does
not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Court recognized the long-standing legislative
practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that:

. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the
Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
(Emphasis supplied)

Issue: Whether or not RA 9337 Violate Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution on the No
Amendment Rule.

Held: No. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the
"No-Amendment Rule"

Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states: No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Petitioners’ argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to
add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three
readings is in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino  case
that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .

Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the
first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective
houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment .
Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one
house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of
Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said
bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction
by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
 22. SM Land, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion and Development Authority
G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015

Topic: Kinds of Rules; Sec. 2(2)(3), Book VII, Administrative Code

Doctrine: Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of the President providing for rules of a general
or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in Executive Orders (EOs). In other words, it is through these orders that the President
ensures that laws are faithfully executed, by handing out instructions to subordinate executive officials
and the public, in the form of implementing rules and regulations, on how the law should be executed by
subordinate officials and complied with by the public.

Facts: For reconsideration is the Decision of this Court dated August 13, 2014, which granted the petition
for certiorari filed by SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) and directed respondent Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) and its president to, among other things, subject SMLI's duly accepted unsolicited
proposal for the development of the Bonifacio South Property to a competitive challenge.

The gravamen of respondents' motion is that BCDA and SMLI do not have a contract that would bestow
upon the latter the right to demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge.
Assuming arguendo the existence of such an agreement between the parties, respondents contend that the
same may be terminated by reasons of public interest.

The Court is not convinced.

Issue: Whether or not the NEDA JV Guidelines has the force and effect of law. YES.

Ruling: The NEDA JV Guidelines has the force and effect of law.

Aside from the agreement between the parties, the ruling in favor of SMLI is likewise based on the
NEDA JV Guidelines. As mandated by the rules, the Joint Venture activity, upon the successful
completion of the detailed negotiation phase, shall be subjected to a competitive challenge. While it is not
disputed that respondents failed to comply with the pertinent provisions of the NEDA JV Guidelines, the
dissent postulates that it is justifiable since it is a mere guideline and not law.

The Court regretfully disagrees.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in Executive Orders (EOs). In other words, it is through these orders that the President
ensures that laws are faithfully executed, by handing out instructions to subordinate executive officials
and the public, in the form of implementing rules and regulations, on how the law should be executed by
subordinate officials and complied with by the public.

For government contracts and procurement in the Philippines, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
adopting the recommendation of the NEDA, issued EO 109 on May 27, 2002. As its title indicates, EO
109 streamlined the rules and procedures on the review and approval of all contracts of departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. This executive issuance was, however, later amended by EO 109-A,
to conform to RA 9184 which was enacted barely two months after the issuance of EO 109. Two years
later, or on April 30, 2005, EO 423 was issued, repealing EO 109-A and simplifying the procurement
process. Section 4 of EO 423 was later amended by EO 645.

Amidst the changes effected on procurement rules, the NEDA’s duty to issue a JV Guidelines under the
said executive orders remained unaffected. Through Section 5 of EO 109, Section 8 of EO 109-A and
now Section 8 of EO 423, the President effectively delegated her inherent executive power to issue rules
and regulations on procurement to her subordinate executive officials, her alter egos, the most recent of
which reads in this wise:

Section 8. Joint Venture Agreements. The NEDA, in consultation with the GPPB, shall issue guidelines
regarding joint venture agreements with private entities with the objective of promoting transparency,
competitiveness, and accountability in government transactions, and, where applicable, complying with
the requirements of an open and competitive public bidding.

Pursuant to said repeated directives from no less than the Chief Executive, the NEDA issued the JV
Guidelines providing the procedures for the coagulation of joint ventures between the government and a
private entity. In this regard, attention must be drawn to the well-established rule that administrative
issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power
granted by statute, have the force and effect of law. As elucidated in the August 13, 2014 Decision:

x x x Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines, therefore,
has the same binding effect as if it were issued by the President himself, who parenthetically is a
member of NEDA. As such, no agency or instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly
deviate from the mandatory procedures set forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or
not.
 23. Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix
664 SCRA 666 (2012)

Topic: Requisites and Limits of Rule-Making

Summary: Commissioner of Customers (COC) issued CMO 23-2003. Under the Memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee;
(2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. (5) The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Hypermix filed
a petition for declaratory relief with RTC. Court held that CMO 23-2003 is invalid and of no
force and effect. Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO
27- 2003. CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights
of petitioners and other importers and that the petitioners should have observed the requirements
of notice, hearing and publication. 

Doctrine: Interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines in the law which the admin
agency is in charge of enforcing. In considering a legislative rule, a court is free to make three
inquiries:
1. whether rule is within delegated authority of admin agency;
2. whether it is reasonable;
3. whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure

But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for
the legislative body (delegation of administrative judgment) has committed those question to
admin judgments and not judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is
not into the validity but into the correctness or proprietary of the rule. As a matter of power a
court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to
i. give the force of law to the rule;
ii. go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or
iii. give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule

Rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. Required that regulation be germane to
the objects and purposes of law, and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.

Facts: On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under
the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided
an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of
origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade.
The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.

CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles
that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff...
differential.
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the
implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was
issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of... the Philippines
Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier
without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food
grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing...
them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason
at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in
nature.

Issue: WON CMO 27-2003 is valid? NO

Ruling: Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an  
importer of wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of
Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the CMO. 

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
 24. DOH v. Philip Morris
G.R. No. 202943, March 25, 2015

Doctrine: WHILE pursuing its campaign to curb the prevalence of smoking among Filipinos, the
Department of Health (DOH) has no authority to impose a total ban on activities promoting the
vice after all. However, in the proper exercise of its rule-making authority, nothing precludes the
IAC-Tobacco from designating any of its pilot agencies (which, for instance, may even be the
DOH) to perform its multifarious functions under RA 9211.

Facts:

DOH - Adminstrative Agency’s Ruling: PMPMI (Tobacco Company) filed for sales promotions
activities, which was denied, and when questioned with the DOH, the DOH maintained the
denial. The DOH ruled that the intent and purpose of RA 9211 (the law on advertising for
cigarettes) was to completely ban tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as
promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship. As such, if RA 9211 completely
prohibited advertisements and sponsorships, then it is clear that promotion, which is necessarily
included in both activities, is likewise prohibited, explaining further that the provisions of RA
9211 should not be interpreted in a way as would render them ridiculous or meaningless.

CA Ruling: The CA granted the petition and nullified the Consolidated Decision of the DOH
upon a finding that the provisions of RA 9211 were clear when it distinguished promotion from
advertising and sponsorship, so much so that while the latter two (2) activities were completely
banned as of July 1, 2008, the same does not hold true with regard to promotion, which was only
restricted. The CA held that the DOH cannot exercise carte blanche authority to deny PMPMI’s
promotional permit applications, adding that “[w]hen the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, only for application.”

Furthermore, it ruled that the DOH is bereft of any authority to enforce the provisions of RA
9211, in view of the creation of the Inter-Agency Committee–Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco) under
Section 29 of the said law, which shall have the “exclusive power and function to administer and
implement the provisions of [RA 9211] x x x.”25 Thus, even though PMPMI originally applied
for sales promotional permits under Article 116 in relation to Article 109 of RA 7394, from
which the DOH derives its authority to regulate tobacco sales promotions, the said provision has
already been repealed by Section 39 of RA 9211 (it basically says DOH orders are repealed).
Hence, the CA ruled that the DOH wrongfully arrogated unto itself the authority given to the
IAC-Tobacco to administer and implement the provisions of RA 9211, which includes regulation
of tobacco promotions.

Issue: Is CA correct that DOH has no authority? YES, SC agreed with CA.

Held:

At the core of the present controversy are the pertinent provisions of RA 7394, i.e., Article 116
in relation to Article 109, to wit:
Article 116. Permit to Conduct Promotion. – No person shall conduct any sales campaigns,
including beauty contest, national in character, sponsored and promoted by manufacturing
enterprises without first securing a permit from the concerned department at least thirty (30)
calendar days prior to the commencement thereof. Unless an objection or denial is received
within fifteen (15) days from filing of the application, the same shall be deemed approved and
the promotion campaign or activity may be conducted: Provided, That any sales promotion
campaign using medical prescriptions or any part thereof or attachment thereto for raffles or a
promise of reward shall not be allowed, nor a permit be issued therefor. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 109. Implementing Agency. – The Department of Trade and Industry shall enforce the
provisions of this Chapter and its implementing rules and regulations: Provided, That with
respect to food, drugs, cosmetics, devices, and hazardous substances, it shall be enforced by the
Department of Health. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The DOH derives its authority to rule upon applications for sales promotion permits from the
above-cited provisions. On the other hand, Section 29 of RA 9211 creating the IAC-Tobacco
provides:

Section 29. Implementing Agency. – An Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco),

which shall have the exclusive power and function to administer and implement the
provisions of this Act, is hereby created.

After a meticulous examination of the above-quoted pertinent provisions of RA 7394 and RA

9211, the Court finds that the latter law impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of the former
with respect to the authority of the DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotions.

At this point, the Court notes that both laws separately treat “promotion” as one of the activities
related to tobacco: RA 7394 defines “sales promotion” under Article 4 (bm), while RA 9211
speaks of “promotion” or “tobacco promotion” under Section 4 (l).

“Sales promotion” is defined in Article 4 (bm) of RA 7394, to wit:

“Sales Promotion” means techniques intended for broad consumer participation which contain
promises of gain such as prizes, in cash or in kind, as reward for the purchase of a product,
security, service or winning in contest, game, tournament and other similar competitions which
involve determination of winner/s and which utilize mass media or other widespread media of
information. It also means techniques purely intended to increase the sales, patronage and/or
goodwill of a product. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Identifying its Gear Up Promo and Golden Stick Promo to be activities that fall under sales
promotion as contemplated in the said provision, PMPMI filed its permit applications under
Article 116 of RA 7394 before the BFAD.

Meanwhile, Section 4 (l) of RA 9211 defines “promotion” as follows:

l. “Promotion” – refers to an event or activity organized by or on behalf of a tobacco
manufacturer, distributor or retailer with the aim of promoting a brand of tobacco product, which
event or activity would not occur but for the support given to it by or on behalf of the tobacco
manufacturer, distributor or retailer. It may also refer to the display of a tobacco product or
manufacturer’s name, trademark, logo, etc. on non-tobacco products. This includes the paid use
of tobacco products bearing the brand names, trademarks, logos, etc. in movies, television and
other forms of entertainment. For the purpose of this Act, promotion shall be understood as
tobacco promotion[.] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As adverted to elsewhere, the IAC-Tobacco shall have the exclusive power and function to
administer and implement the provisions of RA 9211, which includes the conduct of regulating
promotion.

The Court has judiciously scrutinized the above definitions and finds that there is no substantial
difference between the activities that would fall under the purview of “sales promotion” in RA
7394, as well as those under “promotion” in RA 9211, as would warrant a delineation in the
authority to regulate its conduct. In fact, the techniques, activities, and methods mentioned in the
definition of “sales promotion” can be subsumed under the more comprehensive and broad scope
of “promotion.”

In order to fully understand the depth and scope of these marketing activities, the Court finds it
necessary to go beyond the ambit of the definitions provided in our laws.

Outside RA 7394, “sales promotion” refers to activities which make use of “media and non-
media marketing communication for a pre-determined, limited time to increase consumer
demand, stimulate market demand or improve product availability,”33 “to provide added value
or incentives to consumers, wholesalers, retailers, or other organizational customers to stimulate
immediate sales” and “product interest, trial, or purchase.” 34 Examples of devices used in “sales
promotion” are contests, coupons, freebies, point-of-purchase displays, premiums, raffle prizes,
product samples, sweepstakes, and rebates.35

On the other hand, “promotion” is a term frequently used in marketing which pertains to “raising
customer awareness of a product or brand, generating sales, and creating brand loyalty”36 which
utilize the following subcategories: personal selling, advertising, sales promotion, direct
marketing, and publicity.37 The three basic objectives of promotion are: (1) to present
information to consumers as well as others; (2) to increase demand; and (3) to differentiate a
product.38 “Promotion” can be done through various methods, e.g., internet advertisements,
special events, endorsements, incentives in the purchase of a product like discounts (i.e.,
coupons), free items, or contests.39

Consequently, if “sales promotion” is considered as one of the subcategories of “promotion,” it is

clear, therefore, that “promotion” necessarily incorporates the activities that fall under “sales
promotion.” Considering that the common and fundamental purpose of these marketing
strategies is to raise customer awareness in order to increase consumer demand or sales, drawing
a demarcation line between “promotion” and “sales promotion” as two distinct and separate
activities would be unnecessarily stretching their meanings and, accordingly, sow more
confusion. Moreover, the techniques, methods, and devices through which “sales promotion” are
usually accomplished can likewise be considered as activities relating to “promotion,” like raffle
contests, which necessarily require prizes and drawing of winners, discounts, and freebies.

Concomitantly, while the Court acknowledges the attempt of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
through its DOJ Opinion No. 29, series of 2004,40 (DOJ Opinion) to reconcile and harmonize
the apparently conflicting provisions of RA 7394 and RA 9211 in this respect, to the Court’s
mind, it is more logical to conclude that “sales promotion” and “promotion” are actually one and
the same. The DOJ, in fact, referred41 to “product promotion” in RA 9211 as “promotion per se”
which, therefore, can be taken to mean an all-encompassing activity or marketing strategy which
may reasonably and logically include “sales promotion.” Besides, the DOJ Opinion is merely
persuasive and not necessarily controlling.42

Furthermore, the declared policy of RA 9211 where “promotion” is defined includes the
institution of “a balanced policy whereby the use, sale and advertisements of tobacco products
shall be regulated in order to promote a healthful environment and protect the citizens from the
hazards of tobacco smoke x x x.”43 Hence, if the IAC-Tobacco was created and expressly given
the exclusive authority to implement the provisions of RA 9211 in accordance with the foregoing
State policy, it signifies that it shall also take charge of the regulation of the use, sale,
distribution, and advertisements of tobacco products, as well as all forms of “promotion” which
essentially includes “sales promotion.” Therefore, with this regulatory power conferred upon the
IAC-Tobacco by RA 9211, the DOH and the BFAD have been effectively and impliedly
divested of any authority to act upon applications for tobacco sales promotional permit, including
PMPMI’s.

Finally, it must be stressed that RA 9211 is a special legislation which exclusively deals with the
subject of tobacco products and related activities. On the other hand, RA 7394 is broader and
more general in scope, and treats of the general welfare and interests of consumers vis-à-vis
proper conduct for business and industry. As such, lex specialis derogat generali. General
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other
words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed therefore should prevail.44

In fine, the Court agrees with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which
has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities as explained in the
foregoing discussion. As such, the DOH’s ruling, including its construction of RA 9211 (i.e.,
that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as
promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void,
which, as a necessary consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the same.
As it stands, the present applications filed by PMPMI are thus remanded to the IAC-Tobacco for
its appropriate action. Notably, in the proper exercise of its rule-making authority, nothing
precludes the IAC-Tobacco from designating any of its pilot agencies (which, for instance, may
even be the DOH45) to perform its multifarious functions under RA 9211.
 25. Tatad v. Secretary, supra
284 SCRA 330 May 3, 2006

Topic: Requisites and Limits of Rule-Making

Summary: Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of several provision of R.A. 8180 or the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.

Sec. 15.Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the
DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as
provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of
Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the
President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be
declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF
fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market"
and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent and unclear in meaning. They
submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that
E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion
of the OPSF fund as a factor.

Doctrines: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must
be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

Issue: Whether Sec. 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
No.
Ruling: "As far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market," "and stability of the
peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are sufficient standards but depletion of the oil price is not in the law
and cannot be added.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.

Given the groove of the Court’s rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down Section 15 on the
ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in
R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation.

The Court holds that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. A perusal of Section 15 of
R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department
of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation
to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be
given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress
will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that
the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow
faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the
OPSF fund.

The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department
considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the
exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the
Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to
alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws.
To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of
separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate
is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-
mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the
world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is
impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund.
It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an
equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early
deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
 26. Hypermix, supra
G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012

Topic: Administrative procedure in rule-making

Doctrine: It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power
to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not
in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

Summary: Respondents questioned the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003, issued by the

Commissioner of Customs. The Court held that petitioners violated respondent’s right to process
in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and
determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately,
CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to
examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the
Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs
officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.

Facts: In 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, was classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. CMO 27-2003 further provided for
the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee cases. Under
this procedure, the release of the articles that were the
subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover tariff differential.

Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief. It anticipated the implementation of the
regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.
Respondent contended that:
1) CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
2) The regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior
assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
 subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than
was proper.
3) The equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated non-
flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
4) The retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

Issue: Whether or not CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs is

constitutional

Ruling: No. The assailed regulation must be struck down. Petitioners failed to follow the
requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code.

Petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules
in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any
party of persons.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Public Participation.—(1) If not otherwise required by law, an

agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption
of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the
rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the
classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-
2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to
examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by
the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required
the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the
wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

In sum, petitioners violated respondent’s right to process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when
they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners
likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an
unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner
of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers
of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
 27. Quezon City PTCA vs. DepEd
G.R. No. 188720 (2016)

TOPIC: Administrative Procedure in Rule-Making

DOCTRINE: Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power.

FACTS: The DepEd through Former Sec. Lapus, issued D.O. No. 54, Series of 2009, entitled Revised Guidelines Governing
Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.

The D.O. sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23, S. 2003 and was issued in response to
increasing reports of malpractices of officers or members of PTAs, such as, but not limited to (1) officers absconding with
contributions and membership fees; (2) nondisclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of financial statements; and (3)
misuse of funds.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS in the ASSAILED DEPARTMENT ORDER

(1) The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for PTAs to be organized:
 
II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level
....
2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school year the Homeroom Adviser and the Parents/Guardians shall organize
the Homeroom PTA with the approval of the School Head.16

(2) The terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of directors:

 
II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level
....
3. The elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs and their respective Homeroom Advisers shall elect the Board of Directors
within thirty (30) days from the start of the school year. The Board of Directors shall immediately elect from among themselves the
executive officers of the PTA on the same day of their election to the Board.17
....
IV.   Board of Directors and Officers
1. The administration of the affairs and management of activities of the PTA is vested [in] the Board of Directors and its officers in
accordance with these guidelines or their respective Constitution and By-Laws, if any, which shall adhere to the following:
....
e. The term of office of the Board of Directors and its Officers shall be one (1) year from the date of election. In no case shall
a PTA Board Director serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms. 18
 
(3) The cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs) and of their federations effective school year 2009-
2010. The Department Order gave them until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit financial reports, and turn over all documents to
school heads and schools division superintendents:
 
X. Transitory Provision
Existing and duly recognized PTCAs and its [sic] Federations shall no longer be given recognition effective School Year 2009-2010. They shall cease
operation at the end of School Year 2008-2009 and given until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit their financial reports and turn
over all documents to the School Heads and Schools Division Superintendents, respectively.

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present petition in the belief that the above quoted provisions undermine the
independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and bylaws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its
constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as well as other existing laws.

Petitioner assails the Department Order as an inordinate exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-making power. It claims
that the Department Order contradicts the provisions of the Education Act of 1982 and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the
statutes that provide for the creation of PTAs. It also alleges that the Department Order was issued without prior consultation and
publication, contrary to the requirements for regulations issued by administrative agencies.

Noting that the Department Order lends recognition only to PTAs and not to PTCAs, petitioner assails the Department Order as
being contrary to the purposes of Republic Act No. 9155,40 otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001,
and of Republic Act No. 8980,41 otherwise known as the Early Childhood Care and Development Act.

Petitioner further claims that Article II(2) of the Department Order, which provides for the organization of the Homeroom PTA
with the approval of the School Head, infringes upon the independence of PTCAs and PTAs. It asserts that this provision gives
“unbridled discretion [to the school head] to disapprove the organization of a PTA.”42 Petitioner likewise assails the Department
Order’s provisions on the terms of office of PTA officers as being violative of the right to due process.

RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no public consultations were (supposedly) held
before its adoption, and/or as it was not published by the Department of Education.
RULING:
(1) The adoption of the Department Order is not tainted with fatal procedural defects.
(2) Petitioner decries the supposed lack of public consultations as being violative of its right to due process.
(3) Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power.

(a) In Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel: Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a
past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise.

"It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of
hearing is not required by due process of law. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if
vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in
the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual.’ . . .

(b) Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of
the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety
of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative,
or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and
its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing."

(4) In any case, petitioner’s claim that no consultations were held is belied by the Department of Education’s detailed
recollection of the actions it took before the adoption of the assailed Department Order

(5) Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the non-publication, by the Department of
Education itself, of the assailed Department Order.
(a) This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is evident from the provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the
filing of three (3) certified copies with the University of the Philippine Law Center. Within 15 days of filing,
administrative rules become effective.

KEME EKLAT ADDITIONAL ISSUES

Whether the issuance of the Department Order was a valid exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-
making powers.
Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to promulgate rules. As noted in Gerochi v.
Department of Energy and ABAKADA Guro v. Purisima, two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued by
administrative agencies may be considered valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test and the sufficient standard test, the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Administrative Code) requires the filing of rules adopted by administrative agencies with the University
of the Philippines Law Center. Generally, rules filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center become
effective 15 days after filing (Chapter 2 of Book VII of the Administrative Code).

The Education Act of 1982 vested in the ministry of Education, Culture and Sports “the administration of the education
system and… the supervision and regulation of educational institutions. Section 70 of the Education Act of 1982 rule-
making authority in the Minister of Education, who under Section 5552 of the same statute, was the head of the
Ministry. Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code provides for the rule-
making power of the secretaries heading the departments that comprise the executive branch of government.

It was pursuant to this rule-making authority that Former Secretary of Education Jesli A. Lapus promulgated
Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. As its title denotes, the Department Order provided revised guidelines
governing PTAs at the school-level.

The Department Order does not exist in a vacuum. As underscored by the Department of Education, the Department
Order was issued "in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs."53 Among these
"malpractices" are those noted in a resolution adopted by the "Regional Education Supervisors in-charge of THE [sic]
Student Government Program (SGP), selected Teachers-Advisers and the Officers of the National Federation of
Supreme Student Governments (NFSSG)"54 during a conference held from February 4 to 8, 2008. This same
resolution formally sought to "review and [revise] the Guidelines Governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level as
contained in DepED Order No. 23, s. 2003."
 28. GMA Network vs. COMELEC
G.R.No. 205357 (2014)
Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Legislative/Rule-Making;
Administrative Procedure in Rule Making

Doctrine: See ruling.

Facts: During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions
implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a
candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per station." 7 For the May 2013 elections,
however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing
the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or
advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis.

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty
(120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage
as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forth coming elections.

In addition to the foregoing, petitioner GMA further argues that the Resolution was promulgated without
public consultations, in violation of petitioners' right to due process. 

Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with
R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media
during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing field between
candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without much. Moreover, the COMELEC's
issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests
on the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other
public utilities, as well as mass media,

Lastly, respondent contends that the public consultation requirement does not apply to constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC, pursuant to Section 1, Chapter I, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Indeed, Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of said Code provides, thus:

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

Issue 1: Whether or not COMELEC has reasonable basis for changing the interpretation and
implementation of the airtime limits. - NO

Ruling: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is not free to simply change the rules especially if
it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to
enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could
not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it
might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised
within the bounds and intent of the law.
The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a
legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be
properly explained with sufficient basis.

What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and
accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability and acceptability. Those
governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any changes in
those rules by which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the
previous ones.

Issue 2: Whether prior notice and hearing is indispensable in this case. - YES

Ruling:
Due Proc ess; It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically in relation to its substantive component,
that any governmental rule or regulation must be reasonable in its operations and its impositions.

Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to the purpose or objective of the
government in a manner that would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry.

Court observed that the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency’s
quasi-legislative or rule making power generally does not require prior notice and hearing except if the
law provides otherwise.

A patent characteristic of this provision is its permissive language in requiring notice and the opportunity
to be heard.

The non-mandatory nature of a prior hearing arises from the nature of the proceedings where quasi-
legislative power is exercised:

 the proceedings do not involve the determination of past events or facts that would
otherwise have to be ascertained as basis of an agency’s action and discretion.
 On the contrary, the proceedings are intended to govern future conduct.

Accordingly, the requirement of prior notice and hearing is not indispensable for the validity of the
exercise of the power.

A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing.

Court held that while an interpretative rule does not require prior notice and hearing (since “it gives no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed”), “an administrative rule x x x that
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed [requires] the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance
is given the force and effect of law.”

Facts of the case however reveal that the CIR was not actually wearing its quasi-legislative hat when it
made the disputed classification; it was in fact exercising its quasi-judicial power when it issued the
memorandum circular. As discussed elsewhere in this Opinion, prior notice and hearing was in fact
indispensable.

When an agency issues a legislative rule, the issue of whether compliance with the notice and hearing
requirement was “practicable” under the circumstances might depend on the extent of the burden or the
adverse effect that the new legislative rule imposes on those who were not previously heard.

Effectively, this is the rule that assumes materiality in the case, not the misdirected ruling in the cited CIR
case.

In the present case, the requirement of prior notice and opportunity to be heard proceeds from the nature
of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as a legislative rule whose new provision on airtime limits directly
impacts on the petitioners as a distinct group among the several actors in the electoral process.
 29. NEA vs. Gonzaga
G.R No. 158761, December 4, 2007

Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Quasi – Legislative;

Administrative Procedure in Rule-Making

Summary: Respondent, disqualified from running for a membership in the Board of

ZAMSURECO, filed a petition for prohibition and damages with RTC. The RTC said the
petition was dismissible for failure to exhaust all remedies as required by the ECEC. Respondent
contested saying that the ECEC is null and void since it had not been published. Issue: Whether
ECEC should be null and void. Held: YES. NEA failed to comply with Sec. 2 of the New Civil
Code.

Doctrines:
 Where the issue centers on the validity of National Electrification Administration’s (NEA’s) rules
in light of the publication requirement of the Administrative Code and New Civil Code, the same
is cognizable by regular courts.
 Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
 Since the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC) applies to all electric cooperatives in the
country, and it is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates, then it should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987 relative to the publication requirement.

Facts: On November 13. 2000, the respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacv for a
membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc
(ZAMSURECO). Per the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC) ,promulgated by NEA, a
candidate whose spouse occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain
is not allowed to run as director of the cooperative. The spouse of the respondent was an
incumbent member of Sangguniang Bayan of Diplaha, Zamboanga hence the respondent was
disqualified from running for the said position.

November 21. 2000, the respondent filed a petition for Prohibition and damages CC 4282-2K
with the Pagadian City RTC. The RTC said that petition was dismissible because the failure of
the respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies required by the ECEC guidelines.
ZAMSURECO filed a motion to dismiss and answer but was denied by the RTC and was
ordered to refrain from conducting the election for directorship on December 2, 2000. On
December 12.2000, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the amended petition and claimed a
second petition that the ECEC was null and void because it had not been published.

RTC admitted the second petition of the respondent and summoned NEA to comment if the
ECEC was published in any newspaper in general circulation .NEA filed an extension of time to
file an answer and filed a motion to dismiss NEA questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioner said that per PD 269 Sec 59, only the supreme court has the power to review any order
or ruling of NEA.
RTC denied the petitioner's motion and cited the lack of answer from the petitioner whether the
ECEC was published in a newspaper of general circulation. Under Sec 2 of the new civil code,
failure of this will make the ECEC null and void. Regarding the petitioner's claim of the validity
of the jurisdiction of RTC. NEA erroneously relied on SEC 51 to 58 of PD 269. The RTC
favored the respondent and ordered ZAMSURECO to accept the COC of the respondent. RTC
also denied NEA's motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and sad that NEA was not
exercising its quasi-judicial powers but it's rule making authority.

Issue 1:
Whether or not the rule-making authority of NEA under the jurisdiction of the RTC? YES.

Ruling 1:. Where the issue centers on the validity of National Electrification Administration’s
(NEA’s) rules in light of the publication requirement of the Administrative Code and New Civil
Code, the same is cognizable by regular courts.

It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to „order, ruling or decision‰ of NEA. What is being
challenged in this case is the decision of the screening committee of ZAMSURECO to disqualify
respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the ECEC, particularly, whether the requirement
of publication was complied with. The ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making
authority, not its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over
respondent’s disqualification and the question on the ECEC’s validity are within the inherent
jurisdiction of regular courts to review. Petitioner’s reliance on NEA is misplaced. The subject in
that case was the electricity rates charged by a cooperative, a matter which is clearly within
NEA’s jurisdiction. The issue in the present petition, however, centers on the validity of NEA’s
rules in light of the publication requirements of the Administrative Code and New Civil Code.
The present issue is cognizable by regular courts.

Issue 2: Whether or not the nullification of the ECEC valid. YES.

Ruling 2: Effectivity of Laws; Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

The Court found no error in the appellate and trial courts nullification of the ECEC. The CA
correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the code
with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in the
Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance with the
requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced
and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal
memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should
comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. In
previous cases involving the election of directors for electric cooperatives, the validity of the
ECEC was not put in issue. The ECEC then enjoyed the presumption of validity. In this case,
however, respondent directly questioned the validity of the ECEC in his second amended
petition. The trial court thus required petitioner to show proof of publication of the ECEC.
Petitioner could have easily provided such proof had the ECEC actually been published in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in the country. This simple proof could have
immediately laid this case to rest. Petitioner’s failure to do so only implies that the ECEC was
not published accordingly, a fact supported by the certification from the National Printing Office.
30. ASTEC vs. Energy Regulatory Commission
G.R. No. 192117 |September 18, 2012

Topic: Administrative Procedure in Rule-Making

Doctrine:
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation.

Facts:
Petitioners are rural electric cooperatives and are members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc.
(ASTEC). When R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was
enacted, it imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their
consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB),
on or before 30 September 1995, an application for approval of an amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Clause
incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates.

On 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was also enacted. Section 38 of the law
abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that rural
electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the actual cost of power purchased from power
suppliers. The ERC also ordered the electric cooperatives to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-users. In addition,
the ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric
cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the same. On appeal, the CA upheld the
validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the
U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive application.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center and for their
retroactivity?

Held: Yes. Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order to be effective. In
Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1986), this Court articulated the fundamental requirement of publication, thus: We hold
therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered
by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative regulation does not require
publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an interpretative regulation “needs nothing further than its bare issuance
for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.” It “add[s] nothing to the law” and “do[es]
not affect the substantial rights of any person.” Second, a regulation that is merely internal in nature does not require publication
for its effectivity. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. Third, a letter of
instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance
of their duties does not require publication in order to be effective.

In this case, it does not appear that the grossed-up factor mechanism was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus,
it is ineffective and may not serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the over-recoveries arising
from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid. Furthermore, the application of the grossed-up factor mechanism to
periods of PPA implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders the said mechanism invalid for having been applied
retroactively. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 293 SCRA 440 (1998), this Court recognized the basic rule “that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.”
 31. People v. Que Po Lay
94 Phil 640; March 29, 1954

Topic: Administrative Procedure in Rule-Making; Sec. 1, 2(1), 3, 7-9, Book VII Administrative
Code.

Doctrine: 1. Penal laws and regulations imposing penalties need be published in the official gazette
before it may become effective.
2. Circulars and regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes
a penalty for its violation, should be published before becoming Penal Regulation needs to be published
effective. Before the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.

Facts:  Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him
guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265,
and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular
No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette
prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and
effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be
published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have
force and effect.

Issue: Whether the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not being a statute or a law should be subjected
to publication requirement stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Yes.

Ruling: Laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein
mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws,
resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law
to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the
Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall,
in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of
the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No.
386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.

32. Peralta v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141966, June 30, 2005

Topic: Powers of Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Legislative/Rule-Making; Enforcement

Doctrine: The Regional Offices of the CSC are empowered to enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies
and standards on personnel management or personnel actions of national and local government agencies
within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the
conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to issue
opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local government agencies.

Facts: Israel G. Peralta is the Director of the Parole and Probation Administration (PPA), Regional Office
No. XII, Cotabato City. On the other hand, Nida Olegario holds a permanent position of Budget Officer I
in the same office.
In 1993, the Central Office of the PPA inadvertently reported to the DBM that the position held
by Olegario was an unfilled position. Consequently, the DBM did not release any allotment or funds for
the position. Peralta caused the payment of Olegario’s salary and other benefits from the savings of the
office. Thereafter, Peralta, brought the matter to the attention of the DBM and requested for allotment for
the position of Budget Officer I, but the same was not released for some time.
Peralta then issued an Order directing Olegario and a co-employee to cease and desist from
performing their duties and functions and to ‘go on leave with or without pay, as the case may be’, on the
ground of insufficiency in the release of allotment under the plantilla of the office.
Olegario sought the opinion of the CSC Cotabato City anent the legality of the aforesaid Order. In
a letter, the CSC informed Peralta that Olegario, being a government employee holding a permanent
appointment, cannot be removed or separated from the service without valid cause. In the same letter, the
CSC declared that the assailed Order is illegal. Despite the CSC ruling, Peralta persisted in enforcing the
void order. The CSC ordered Peralta to allow Olegario and her co-employee to report for work. However,
Peralta obstinately refused to obey the CSC directive.
Olegario then filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) against Peralta for
grave abuse of authority. The Ombudsman found Peralta guilty of grave abuse of authority.
Peralta contends that the letters he received from the Office of the Regional Director of the CSC
are mere opinions or technical advice which are not binding on him. He argues that the power of the
Regional Director of the CSC does not include the authority to render opinion and rulings on all personnel
and other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments, offices and agencies.

Issue: Whether the letters Peralta received from the Office of the Regional Director of the CSC are
binding. YES.

Ruling: It is clear from Section 13 of P.D. No. 807 2 and Section 16(15), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of E.O. No. 2923 that the Regional Offices of the CSC are empowered to enforce Civil Service
laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel management or personnel actions of national and local
2
SEC. 13. Regional Offices. – Each regional office of the Commission shall exercise the following authority:
a. Enforce Civil Service Law and Rules in connection with personnel actions of national and local government agencies within
the region, and the conduct of public officers and employees;
b. Conduct recruitment and examination for government-wide positions in the regions;
c. Provide technical advice and assistance to public agencies within the region regarding personnel administration; and
d. Perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Commission.
government agencies within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards
with respect to the conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily flows the
authority to issue opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local
government agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned government
agencies, otherwise, the authority given by law to these Regional Offices would become useless and said
Regional Offices can be rendered impotent by government agencies which can simply choose to ignore
their opinions and rulings on the convenient ground that they are not binding.
In the present case, the provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office of the CSC is
Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide that no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
after due process. Hence, the ruling of the CSC Regional Office that the Order of Peralta directing
Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties and functions and advising her to go on leave
with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil Service law and rules, is binding upon petitioner.

3
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. – The Commission shall have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by an official
with at least the rank of an Assistant Director. Each Regional Office shall have the following functions:
(a) Enforce Civil Service law and rules, policies, standards on personnel management within their respective jurisdiction ;
(b) Provide technical advice and assistance to government offices and agencies regarding personnel administration; and
(c) Perform such other functions as may be delegated by the Commission.
 33. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, supra
Quasi-Legislative / Rule- Making, Enforcement

DOCTRINE:

The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective
of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of
free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation
must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation
may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.

Facts:

Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was
neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH
Law but were not candidates for that election.

Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated
this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order.

HELD:

Exhaustion of administrative remedies:

The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe administrative agency
concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) whenthe
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention."

On regulation:

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their
political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its
principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message
in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section
3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this
case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any
relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters
measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
 34. Smart Communications v. NTC
408 SCRA 768, 2003

Topic: Sec. 2 (5, 9, 10) and 9 (3) Admin Code. Powers of Administrative Agencies (Quasi-Judicial/
Adjudicatory)

Doctrine: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies
only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. (see
ruling)

Facts:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the
incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October
6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:

This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond
shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.

In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid
cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of
first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000. For
strict compliance.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC, Commissioner Joseph
A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an
action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and
the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer
goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law;
that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly
prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Globe Telecom and Smart filed a joint
Motion for Leave to Intervene which was granted by the trial court. On October 27, 2000, the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.

In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Subsequently, the trial court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an
Order dated February 1, 2001.

Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
which was granted and annulled the injunction issued by the lower court.

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated January 10, 2002 for lack of
merit. Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel.

Issue 1 (previous topic): Whether or not the respondent court erred in holding respondents failed to
exhaust administrative remedy. YES.

Ruling 1:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature
to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle
applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-
judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records
reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Petitioners were able to register their
protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth
their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was issued,
petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and
reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the
requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

Issue 2: Whether or not NTC has Jurisdiction over the case. NO.

Ruling 2:
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. The objective of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by
an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.

Issue 3: Whether or not Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional. YES.

Ruling 3:
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As
such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in
dismissing the case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 35. Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970)
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

Topic: Quasi-Judicial/Adjudicatory: a. In General

Doctrine: It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi-judicial acts, and
there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right
to a writ of certiorari. it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial,
in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are
quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their
public character.

Facts:

The appellant, Teodoro Santiago Jr. was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As the
school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted
by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating
class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated and finally
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days
before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-
mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee members along with the
District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
Issue: Whether or not the Committee on Rating of Students for Honors exercised Quasi-Judicial/Judicial
Authority. NO.

No applicable law covers function of the committee.

Before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise Judicial or Quasi Judicial acts, it is necessary that there
be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before tribunal, board, or officer w power
and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate respective rights of contending
parties. As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that
provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating
them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been
appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools
appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the
performance of that committee's duties’.

Judicial action?
Adjudication upon rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before tribunal by notice or
process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. Implies impartiality,
disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent w discretion on the one hand or w
dictation on the other.

Judicial function?
To determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of the parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy and whenever a officer is clothed w that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions

It is the nature of the act to be performed that determines whether it is the discharge of a
Quasi-Judicial/Judicial function. Not essential that proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial,
in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice but is sufficient if they are quasi-
judicial. Enough if officers act judicially in making their decisions, whatever may be their public
character.

Judicial power does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the
nature of a suit or action between parties.

Test to determine whether tribunal or board exercises judicial functions

(1) specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination
(2) tribunal must have power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision
(3) tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least not
the legislative nor executive)

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS?

It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi-judicial acts, and there is
considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ
of certiorari. it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office,
board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the
sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi
judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character.

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial
functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance
of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in
a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter
in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.

36. MONETARY BOARD VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK (2015)

TOPIC: ADMIN LAW: QUASI-JUDICIAL/ADJUDICATORY

DOCTRINE: Decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of petition for declaratory relief.

FACTS:
A pension loan product for bona fide veterans or their surviving spouse, as well as salary loan product for
teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to its mandate RA 3518 and 7169 to provide financial
assistance to veterans and teachers. Respondent devised a program by charging a premium in the form of
higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from the borrowers. Special Trust Funds were
established by respondent for the pension loans of veteran-borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-
salaried employees. These funds were managed by respondent’s Trust and Investment Department, with
respondent as beneficiary. The fees charged against the borrowers were credited to the respective trust
funds, which would be used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of borrowers in case of death. Upon
examination, the BSP found that respondent’s collection of premiums from the proceeds of various salary
and pension loans of borrowers to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54 of RA
8791 which states that banks shall not directly engage in insurance business as insurer. Respondent wrote
letter to justify the existence of CRF. BSP notified respondent that the Insurance Commission opined that
the CRF is a form of insurance. Thus, respondent was requested to discontinue the collection of said fees.
BSP MB issued Resolution directing respondent to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF
and to preserve the records of borrowers who were deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds pending the
resolution of BSP. Accordingly, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with RTC Makati.

ISSUE:
Is the filing of declaratory relief proper?

HELD:
NO. Jurisprudence held that in the same manner that the court decisions cannot be the proper subject of
petition for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of petition for
declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of
law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.

Here, the decision of BSP MB cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since
it was issued by BSP MB in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers/functions.

37. Basiana Mining vs. Secretary

G.R. No. 191705, March 7, 2016

Topic: Administrative Law; Quasi-Judicial/Adjudicatory

Doctrine: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicator/ power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. A government agency performs
adjudicator/ functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties,
which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the court

Facts: Petitioner Basiana Mining Exploration Corporation (BMEC), headed by its President Basiana,
applied for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the DENR for the extraction of nickel
and other minerals in Tubay and Jabonga, Agusan del Norte. Pending approval of its application, BMEC,
assigned to Manila Mining Corporation (Manila Mining) all its rights and interest in the MPSA. Manila
Mining, in turn, its rights and interest to SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI). Basiana and SRMI executed a MOA
where SRMI agreed, among others, to undertake technical and geological tests, exploration and small-
scale mining operations of the site subject of MPSA. Necessary permits and certificates were then issued
by the DENR and the Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte to SRMI, San R Construction
Corporation (San R) and Galeo Equipment Corporation (Galeo). Consequently, SRMI, using BMEC's
application, applied for an MPSA for the extraction of nickel, iron and cobalt in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.
The DENR Secretary issued a cease and desist order against the mining operations due to excess in
annual production, maximum capitalization and labor cost to equipment utilization.

Basiana then filed a complaint before the RTC of Butuan City for rescission of contract, abuse of rights
and damages against SRMI. For its part, BMEC, then already known as Basiana Mining Development
Corporation
(BMDC), also filed a complaint for breach of trust, accounting and conveyance of proceeds, judicial
confirmation of declaration of partial nullity of contract and termination of trust, and abuse of rights with
damages against SRMI, San R, Galeo, et al.

Subsequently, the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) recommended the approval of
MPSA filed by SRMI. Thus, BMEC and Basiana filed with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (MGB-POA) a
petition to deny and/or disapprove and/or declare the nullity of the application for MPSA and/or
cancellation, revocation and termination of MPSA. Pending resolution of the protest before the MGB-
POA, the Republic of the Philippines entered into MPSA with SRMI for the development and
commercial utilization of nickel, cobalt, iron and other associated mineral deposits in Tubay, Agusan del
Norte. Hence, the herein petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the issuance of
MPSA on the grounds that (1) "there was clear violation of due process and the entire proceedings was
railroaded and suited for the benefit of [SRMI]," and that (2) the approval of the application is a patent
nullity and/or absolutely without any factual and legal basis. The CA ruled that the approval by the
DENR Secretary of SRMFs application does not involve a quasi-judicial function since both the
petitioners and SRMI are still applicants and there was yet an adjudication of rights between them. 

Issue: Whether or not the determination by the DENR Secretary as to the propriety of the MGB Director's
recommendation of approval and SRMFs qualification to undertake development and its compliance with
the law requires an exercise of its quasi-judicial function. - NO.

Ruling: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicator/ power is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. A government agency performs
adjudicator/ functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties,
which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the court.

In the case of the DENR Secretary, its power to approve and enter into a MPSA is unmistakably
administrative in nature as it springs from the mandate of the DENR under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which provides that "[t]he [DENR] shall x x x be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources." Contrary to the petitioners' position, the determination by
the DENR Secretary as to (1) the propriety of the MGB Director's recommendation of approval, and (2)
the qualification of SRMI to undertake development and its compliance with the law, does not involve the
exercise of quasi-judicial power. In approving an MPSA, the DENR Secretary does not determine the
legal rights and obligations of adversarial parties, which are necessary in adjudication. In fact, it is only
after an application is approved that the right to undertake the project accrues on the applicant's part, and
until then, no rights or obligations can be enforced by or against any party. Neither does the DENR
Secretary resolve conflicting claims; rather, what is involved here is the determination whether a certain
applicant complied with the conditions required by the law, and is financially and technically capable to
undertake the contract, among others.
 38. Rosales vs. ERC
G.R. No. 201852 (2016)

Topic: Quasi-Judicial/Adjudicatory; In General

Doctrine: Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the

promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegation of powers flowing from the separation of the branches of the government.
ERC exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial function. In issuing and implementing the
RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14, it was not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Instead,
RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were done in the exercise of the ERC’s quasi-legislative and
administrative functions

Facts:
Petitioner filed for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) Members ' Contribution
for Capital Expenditures (MCC), later renamed as Reinvestment Fund for Sustainable Capital
Expenditures (RFSC), which is being imposed by on-grid Electric Cooperatives (ECs ), pursuant
to the following Rules and Resolution of the Energy Regulatory Commission(ERC): 1. Rules for
Setting the Electric Cooperatives’ Wheeling Rates (RSEC-WR), which was adopted in
Resolution No. 20, Series of 2009 and 2. Resolution No. 14, Series of 2011. The issue for
petitioners is not about the nomenclature of MCC/RFSC or how such funds are utilized but in the
ERC's treatment of MCC/RFSC as a subsidy/funds for capital expenditures (CAPEX) or
contribution in aid of construction (CIAC) instead of patronage capital, which is an equity or
investment that must be accounted for and could be withdrawn by the member-consumers upon
termination of their contract with respondent ECs

Issue: Whether or not ERC is exercising quasi-judicial function to warrant the remedy of R65.
NO

Ruling:
Their choice of remedy to question the validity of RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 is
inexcusably out of place.
Rule 65, SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions…

The Court agrees with respondents that RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were issued by the
ERC in its quasi-legislative power. A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where
he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and
then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties.

As defined above, the ERC exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial function. In issuing and
implementing the RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14, it was not called upon to adjudicate the
rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial
nature. Instead, RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were done in the exercise of the ERC’s quasi-
legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated in the exercise of its delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers flowing from the separation of
the branches of the government.

Law Granting ERC its rule-making power. Particularly, the ERC applied its rule-making power
as expressly granted by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136 ("Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001" or EPIRA), to wit:

SEC. 43. Functions of the ERC. - The ERC shall xxx be responsible for the following key
functions in the restructured industry:

xxxx

f. In the public interest, establish and enforce a methodology for setting transmission and
distribution wheeling rates and retail rates for the captive market of a distribution utility,
 39. PSALM Corporation vs. SEM-Calaca Power Corporation
G.R. No. 204719 December 5, 2016

Topic: Quasi-Judicial / Adjucatory

Doctrine: It is general practice among the courts that the rulings of administrative agencies like
the ERC are accorded great respect, owing to a traditional deference given to such administrative
agencies equipped with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters. Actions of an administrative agency may not be
disturbed nor set aside by the judicial department sans any error of law, grave abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit
of the law.

Facts: PSALM put on sale the Calaca Power Plant which DMCI bought through an Asset
Purchase Agreement (APA). DMCI then transferred all its rights and obligations under the APA
to SEM-Calaca Power Corporation. Issues arose about the actual distribution to Meralco to
which SCPC contends that it is obliged to supply 10.841% of MERALCO's total requirement but
not to exceed 169,000 kW in any hourly interval. PSALM contends that SCPC is bound to
supply the entire 10.841% of what MERALCO requires, without regard to any cap or limit.
SCPC filed a petition for dispute resolution with the ERC to which it ruled in favor of SCPC
stating that SCPC's obligation under Schedule W of the APA is to deliver 10.841% of
MERALCO's energy requirements but not to exceed 169,000 kW capacity allocation, at any
given hour. CA upheld the findings of the ERC. CA stated that the findings of administrative or
regulatory agencies on matters within their technical area of expertise are generally accorded not
only respect but finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. According to
PSALM, given the allegedly erroneous rulings, the CA should not have relied on the principle of
upholding the findings of fact of administrative agencies, like the ERC, and instead, should have
reversed the latter's findings.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred un affirming the ERC’s interpretation of the APA. - NO

Ruling:

It is general practice among the courts that the rulings of administrative agencies like the ERC
are accorded great respect, owing to a traditional deference given to such administrative agencies
equipped with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly
disputes on technical matters.Factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.
Although there are instances when such a practice is not applied, such as when the board or
official has gone beyond its/his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly
acted arbitrarily without regard to its/his duty or with grave abuse of discretion, or when the
actuation of the administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to
abide by the command of the law, none of such instances obtain in the present case which would
prompt this Court to reverse the findings of the tribunal below.
ERC acted within its statutory powers as defined in Section 43 (u), RA 9136, or the EPIRA Law,
which grants it original and exclusive jurisdiction "over all cases involving disputes between and
among participants or players in the energy sector. Jurisprudence also states that administrative
agencies like the ERC, which were created to address the complexities of settling disputes in a
modern and diverse society and economy, count among their functions the interpretation of
contracts and the determination of the rights of parties, which traditionally were the exclusive
domain of the judicial branch. Such broadened quasi-judicial powers of administrative agencie.
The need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions
of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private
parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that
the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

As the foregoing imply, the ERC merely performed its statutory function of resolving disputes
among the parties who are players in the industry, and exercised its quasi-judicial and
administrative powers as outlined in jurisprudence by interpreting the contract between the
parties in the present dispute, the so-called APA and specifically its Schedule W.
 CASE NO: 40
SUBIDO V. CA (SUPRA)

DOCTRINE: the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible
money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not
transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA,
authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to procedural
due process

SUMMARY: This case stemmed from the alleged corruption of the then Vice-President of the
Repubic of the Philippines, Jejomar Binay and his family. In line with that, Anti-Money
Laundering Council, AMLC asked the CA to allow the its office to inspect the bank accounts of
the Binays. The following are cited in the case as follow.

xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow
the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law
office where a family member was once a partnerxxxxAlso the bank accounts of the law
office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm,
where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

The CA granted the said application, which the partners of the said law office challenged the
validity of it in the SC. The law office partners of (SPCMB) opined that their right to due
process was violated.

The SC stated that there was no violation of due process in this case because the AMLC does not exercise Quasi-
Judicial power. Accordingly, the Court held that:

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its

determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry
into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into
an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of
the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to
violate SPCMB's constitutional right to procedural due process. 4

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain
bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any
form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property. From this cite,
we proceed to examine whether Section 11 of the law violates procedural
due process. As previously stated, the AMLA now specifically provides for
an ex-parte application for an order authorizing inquiry or examination into
bank deposits or investments which continues to pass constitutional muster.

4
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended,
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular
deposit or investment with any banking institution or non bank financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of
violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 hereof, except that no court order
shall be required in cases involving unlawful activities defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire into or examine any deposit of investment
with any banking institution or non bank financial institution when the examination is made in the course of a periodic or special
examination, in accordance with the rules of examination of the BSP. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: Whether AMLC exercises Administative bodies exercising Quasi-Judial Power?

RULING: NO, AMLC does not exercise Quasi-Judicial function. The said administrative body only exercises
an investigatory function. Accordingly the pertinent opinion of the Court were cited in the case as follow:

The SPCMB alleged that the AMLC’s bank inquiry is akin to an evaluation process in the
extradition proceeding. The case cited the pertinent words which discussed the nature of
Quasi-Judicial Proceeding:

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings, proper belongs to a class
by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say
that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and
on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and
(c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation. Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial
process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's
quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of

evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order
or decision supported by the facts proved. Inquisitorial power, which is also known as
examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative
body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority. This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of
persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise.

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or
tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably,
investigation is indispensable to prosecution.

The submission of AMLC requires a determination whether the AMLC is an administrative body with
quasi-judicial powers; corollary thereto, a determination of the jurisdiction of the AMLC.

In this instance, the grant of jurisdiction over cases involving money laundering offences is bestowed on the
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan as the case may be. In fact, Rule 5 of the IRR is
entitled Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases and Money Laundering Investigation Procedures:

Rule 5.a. Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases. The Regional Trial Courts shall have
the jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those committed by public officers and
private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money Laundering Offenses. - The AMLC shall investigate:

(1) suspicious transactions;

(2) covered transactions deemed suspicious after an investigation conducted by the AMLC;
 (3) money laundering activities; and
(4) other violations of the AMLA, as amended.

The confusion on the scope and parameters of the AMLC's investigatory powers and whether
such seeps into and approximates a quasi-judicial agency's inquisitorial powers lies in the
AMLC's investigation and consequent initial determination of whether certain activities are
constitutive of anti-money laundering offenses.

FURTHERMORE THE COURT CLAFRIFIED THAT THERE IS NO LAW THAT VESTED THE
AMLC THE QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTION, ACCORDINGLY THE COURT HELD THAT:

Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations can we glean that the
AMLC exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the actual preliminary investigation is done simply at
its behest or conducted by the Department of Justice and the Ombudsman

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money
laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not
transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA,
authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to
procedural due process.

HENCE, AMLC is not administrative office which has quasi-judicial function.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is
declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

41. SEC vs. Universal Rightfield

G.R. No. 181381, July 20, 2015

Topic: Quasi-Judicial/Adjudicatory

Doctrine: SEC has both regulatory and adjudicative functions. The revocation of registration
of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not an exercise of the SEC's quasi-judicial
power, but of its regulatory power.

Relative to its adjudicative authority, the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide controversies and cases involving –

a. Intra-corporate and partnership relations between or among the

corporation, officers and stockholders and partners, including their
elections or appointments;

b. State and corporate affairs in relation to the legal existence of

corporations, partnerships and associations or to their franchises; and
 c. Investors and corporate affairs particularly in respect of devices and
schemes, such as fraudulent practices, employed by directors, officers,
business associates, and/or other stockholders, partners, or members of
registered firms; x x x

Facts: Petitioner is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Respondent is Universal
Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc. (URPHI).

URPHI is a corporation duly registered and existing under Philippine Law which is engaged in
the business of providing residential and leisure-related needs and wants market.

SEC issued and Order revoking URPHI's Registration of SEC for failure to timely file its Year
2001 Annual Report and Year 2002, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Quarterly Reports which required pursuant
to Section 17 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). URPHI Filed a motion to set aside the
revocation order and reinstate registration after complying with its reportorial requirements. SEC
granted the motion to lift the revocation order.

URPHI failed again to comply with the same reportorial requirements. In a NOTICE OF
HEARING, SEC directed URPHI to show cause why its registration of Securities and Certificate
of Permit to Sell securities to the Public should not be suspended for failure to submit said
requirements in violation of SRC Rule 17.

On July 6, 2004, the scheduled hearing, URPHI through its Chief accountant, informed SEC why
it failed to submit the reportorial requirement, viz:

(1) it was constrained to reduce its accounting staff due to cost-cutting measures;
thus, some of the audit requirements were not completed within the original
timetable;

(2) its audited financial statements for the period ending December 31, 2003
could not be finalized by reason of the delay in the completion of some of its audit
requirements.

SEC suspended URPHI's registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the public for
failure to submit the reportorial requirements DESPITE THE LAPSO OF THE EXTENTION
PERION, and due to lack of sufficient justification.

SEC informed URPHI that it failed to submits its 2004 2nd Quarter Report in violation of the
amended IRR of the SRC Rule 17.a (1)(A)(ii). It directed URPHI to file the said report and show
cause why it should not be held in violation for the said rule. On December 8, 2004, SEC
revoked URPHI's Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the Public for its
failure to submits its reportorial requirements within the final extension period.

On December 9, 10 and 14, 2004, URPHI finally submitted to the SEC its Quarterly Reports.
URPHI appealed the SEC Order of Revocation dated Deember 8, 2004 by filing a Notice of
Appeal and a Memorandum both dated January 3, 2005. On December 15, 2005, SEC dennied
URPHI's appeal through a resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the Order of Revocation was issued by SEC without affording URPHI due
process due to absence of notice and hearing.

Held: CA granted the petition of URPHI to set aside. SEC appealed to the SC. SC granted the
petition as meritorious stating that there is not dispute that the violation of reportorial
requirements under Sec 17.1 of the Amended IRR of the SRC is a ground for suspension or
revocation of the registration of securities pursuant to Sec 13.1 and 54.1 of the SRC to wit:

13.1. The Commission may reject a registration statement and refuse registration
of the security thereunder, or revoke the effectivity of a registration statement and
the registration of the security thereunder after due notice and hearing by issuing
an order to such effect, setting forth its findings in respect thereto, if it finds that:

a) The issuer:
xxx xxx xxx

(ii) Has violated any of the provisions of this Code, the rules promulgated
pursuant thereto, or any order of the Commission of which the issuer has notice in
connection with the offering for which a registration statement has been filed;

54.1. If, after due notice and hearing, the Commission finds that: (a) There is a
violation of this Code, its rules, or its orders; (b) Any registered broker or dealer,
associated person thereof has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to
preventing violations, another person subject to supervision who commits any
such violation;

(c) Any registrant or other person has, in a registration statement or in other

reports, applications, accounts, records or documents required by law or rules to
be filed with the Commission, made any untrue statement of a material fact, or
omitted to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading; or, in the case of an underwriter, has
failed to conduct an inquiry with reasonable diligence to insure that a registration
statement is accurate and complete in all material respects;

or (d) Any person has refused to permit any lawful examinations into its affairs, it
shall, in its discretion, and subject only to the limitations hereinafter prescribed,
impose any or all of the following sanctions as may be appropriate in light of the
facts and circumstances:

(i) Suspension, or revocation of any registration for the offering of securities;

SC further held that the essence of due process is simply giving an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and
the lack of opportunity to be heard.

The due notice of revocation given to URPHI through the SEC Order dated July 27, 2004. Due
notice simply means the information must be given or made to a particular person or to the
public within a legally mandated period of time so that its recipient will have the opportunity to
respond to a situation or to allegations that affect the individual's or public's legal rights or duties.

Furthermore, the SC notes that SEC has both regulatory and adjudicative functions. The
revocation of registration of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not an exercise of
the SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its regulatory power.

The case used by URPHI which is the Globe Telecom ruling is different from the case at hand.
The SC in Globe Case ruled that the fined imposed by the NTC without notice and hearing was
null and void due to the denial of petitioner's right to due process. The revocation of URPHI's
registration of securities and permit to sell them to the public cannot be considered a penalty but
a withdrawal of a privilege, which regulatory power the SEC validly exercised after giving it due
notice and opportunity to be heard.

In Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, the Court has held that the SEC has both regulatory and
adjudicative functions, thus:

Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon applications for, or may
suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of registration of
corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners
associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct
inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised
Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may
be warranted.

Relative to its adjudicative authority, the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide controversies and cases involving –

d. Intra-corporate and partnership relations between or among the

corporation, officers and stockholders and partners, including their
elections or appointments;

e. State and corporate affairs in relation to the legal existence of

corporations, partnerships and associations or to their franchises; and

f. Investors and corporate affairs particularly in respect of devices and

schemes, such as fraudulent practices, employed by directors, officers,
 business associates, and/or other stockholders, partners, or members of
registered firms; x x x

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted ruling, the revocation of registration of securities and
permit to sell them to the public is not an exercise of the SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its
regulatory power. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.33 Although Section 13.1 of the SRC requires
due notice and hearing before issuing an order of revocation, the SEC does not perform such
quasi-judicial functions and exercise discretion of a judicial nature in the exercise of such
regulatory power. It neither settles actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, nor adjudicates private rights and obligations in cases of
adversarial nature. Rather, when the SEC exercises its incidental power to conduct administrative
hearings and make decisions, it does so in the course of the performance of its regulatory and law
enforcement function.
 42. DOH vs. CAMPOSANO
G.R. No. 157684
April 27, 2005

TOPIC: Incidental Powers; Secs. 13, 17, Book VII, Administrative Code

DOCTRINE: 1. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the
authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the former’s jurisdiction. 2. "Power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint."

FACTS: On May 15, 1996, some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the
DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis (hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against
Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and
[respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of
Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth ₱330,000.00
from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

"On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary
of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents.

"On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents] and
their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On October
25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298
(hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed
against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996. The same found them
guilty of the charged cases.

Appeals to the CSC and the Secretary of Health were denied. Upon appeal to the CA, it ruled
that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential
appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents.6
Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of health
failed to comply with administrative due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate
and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely
performed a mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government
service.

RULING: Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the
jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint."17 While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he
nonetheless recognized the health secretary’s disciplinary authority over respondents when he
remanded the PCAGC’s findings against them for the secretary’s "appropriate action."18
As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the
secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO
298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to
conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to
impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to
imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case
and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered
in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved.20

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present
factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health
secretary’s Order dismissing the respondents.

Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action
should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement
results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigator’s recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.
There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of
the person administratively charged.

In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in
comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his
seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even
noted a violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC.22 On the other hand, Health
Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the
Commission’s Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation
with regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
 43. Salazar vs. Achacoso
183 SCRA 145 (1990)

Topic: Incidental Powers

Doctrine: In this case, the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest.

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

Facts: In 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed a complaint with the POEA wherein she charged petitioner Salazar for illegal
recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner a
telegram directing him to appear. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Achacoso issued the challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE
ORDER NO. 1205 ordering the CLOSURE of Salazar’s recruitment agency. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Although the acts sought to be barred have already happened, thereby making prohibition too late, the Court
considered the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

Issue: May the POEA (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article 38 of the Labor Code?

Ruling: No. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.5

In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power: No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the LGC, conferring
this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. The constitutional proscription has thereby been
manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of
arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the
counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations
and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants.

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his
legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor
arrest and closure powers. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and
seizure powers as well.

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. The decrees in question, it is well
to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

5
The Constitution provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is
clearly in the nature of a general warrant. The respondents were ordered to return all materials seized as a result of
the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
 44. Public Hearing Committee of LLDA vs. SM Prime Holdings
G.R. No. 170599
September 22, 2010

TOPIC: Incidental Powers

DOCTRINE:
The LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.

The intendment of the law, as gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O. No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA
not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but,
nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and
functions.

FACTS:,

The results of the laboratory tests from an inspection conducted on February 4, 2002 by the
Pollution Control Division of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) of the
wastewater collected from herein respondent’s SM City Manila branch showed that the sample
collected from the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water
imposed in accordance with law.

LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation, directing the same to perform corrective
measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the said company and ordering the latter to
pay a penalty of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to
be computed from 4 February 2002, the date of inspection, until full cessation of discharging
pollutive wastewater.

SM requested the LLDA to conduct a re-sampling of the effluent claiming that they already took
measures to enable their sewage treatment plant to meet the standards of the LLDA. In an Order
to pay, LLD required SM to pay a fine of P50,000 which represents the accumulated daily
penalty computed from Feb 4 to March 25, 2002. SM requested for a waiver of the fines assessed
as they already undertook corrective measures which have lead to a minimal damage to the
environment. The LLDA denied the request for the waiver of the fines.

SM Filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA praying for the nullification of the Order to pay by
the LLDA. The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the Orders of the LLDA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LLDA had the power to impose fines under its charter. YES

RULING: The Court held the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such
as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB
assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of
pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.

In the earlier case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority, this Court affirmed the ruling of the CA which sustained the LLDA’s Order requiring
the petitioner therein to pay a fine representing penalty for pollutive wastewater discharge.
Although the petitioner in that case did not challenge the LLDA’s authority to impose fine, the
Court acknowledged the power of the LLDA to impose fines holding that under Section 4-A of
RA 4850, as amended, the LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure
to meet established water and effluent standards.

In addition, Section 4(d) of E.O. No. 927, which further defines certain functions and powers of
the LLDA, provides that the LLDA has the power to „make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished. Likewise, Section 4(i) of the same E.O. states that the
LLDA is given authority to exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be
necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Executive Order. Also, Section
4(c) authorizes the LLDA to issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions
of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and
hearing.

Indeed, how could the LLDA be expected to effectively perform the above-mentioned functions
if, for every act or violation committed against the law it is supposed to enforce, it is required to
resort to some other authority for the proper remedy or penalty. The intendment of the law, as
gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O. No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA not only with the express
powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are
necessary or essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions.
 45. Atienza v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

Topic: Quasi-Judicial; Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases; Administrative Due Process.

Doctrine: The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.

Facts: The case involves a leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question
their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by
the respondents. On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the
Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party
members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his
party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the
LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon
immediately filed a petition1 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He
claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National Executive Council
(NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also
claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term
that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO
attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to
"people power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action.
Atienza also said that the amendments to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving
LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and
the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent Drilon’s
petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under
COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid
since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the
amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon’s term may be deemed to
have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were
elected.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party
membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of
law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before
summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are
the equivalent of administrative proceedings20and are, therefore, covered by the due process
requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.21

Issue: Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to
due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party. NO.
Held: The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political
parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state
and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function." The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the
state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s powers are found in Article III of the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property,
or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state’s powers in relation to
the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary
government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the
specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked
in private controversies involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the
state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by
a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due
process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his
removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other
party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through
their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter
may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a
due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership
and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs,
pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that
judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to
operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open
party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.
 46. Ang Tibay v. CIR
69 Phil. 635, February 27, 1940

Topic: Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

Doctrine: For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented. (3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached. (4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5)     The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (6)     The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that
the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National
Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio
was merely busting NLU. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and
NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing for the
CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue: Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

Ruling: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of due process.
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1)     The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2)     Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3)     While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4)     Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)     The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)     The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth hereinabove.
 47. AIR MANILA V. Hon. MARCELO BALATBAT
G.R. No. L-29064, April 29, 1971

Topic: Administrative Law; Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

DOCTRINE:
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations
and trials. And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to
notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent Jurisdiction; and
(4) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.

FACTS:

Philippine Air Lines petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) for approval of a proposed
schedule introducing seven night flights and the adjustment of the flight schedule. The Board
passed Resolution No. 109 (68), referring PAL's petition to a hearing examiner for economic
justification. The designated hearing officer set the initial hearing thereof for 30 April 1968 but a
day before the hearing, PAL moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 109 (68). The Board
deferred action on this later motion.

It appears, however, that on 15 May 1968, PAL filed an Urgent Petition for approval of a
consolidated schedule of jet and jet prop flights, with an interim DC-3 schedule to different
secondary and feeder points (DTS-35). On 28 May 1968, the Board issued its Resolution No.
139 (68), approving DTS-35 for a period of 30 days, effective 1 June 1968, subject to the
conditions that (a) the flight between Manila and San Fernando, La Union, F210/211 of the same
timetable, be operated daily instead of twice a week as proposed and (b) that all schedules under
DTS-35, for which no previous approval has been granted by the Board, are to be referred to a
hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic justification. After the examiner's
report, several of the proposed flights were approved for 30 days from 31 July 1968.

Air Manila, Inc., filed the instant petition claiming that the Board's approval of said Domestic
Traffic Schedule without receiving the evidence of the parties constituted a deprivation of
petitioner's right to be heard; and that such authorization to PAL to operate the proposed
schedule without economic justification amounted to a capricious and whimsical exercise by the
Board of its power amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional approval by the Board of PAL's proposed DTS-35
violates the requisites of administrative due process. NO.

RULING:

It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of
certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials. And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right
to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's
legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and
relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of
honesty and impartiality, and one of competent Jurisdiction; and (4) a finding or decision by that
tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
records or disclosed to the parties affected.

In the present case, it cannot truthfully be said that the provisional approval by the Board of PAL's
proposed DTS-35 violates the requisites of administrative due process. Admittedly, after PAL's proposal
to introduce new Mercury night flights (in CAB Case No. EP-1414) had been referred to a hearing
examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of flights, DTS-35,
that included the same Mercury night flights involved in Case EP-1414, and this was allowed by Board
Resolution No. 139 (68). According to respondents, however, the Board's action was impelled by the
circumstance that at the time, the authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed but were
incorporated in DTS-35 were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule had to be approved
temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to were not to be suspended. In short, the temporary
permit was issued to prevent the stoppage or cessation of services in the affected areas. This point
petitioner has failed to refute.

Neither can the provisional authorization of DTS-35 be said to have done away with the requisite hearing
and investigation of the new flight schedules and, consequently, to have deprived the petitioner of its right
to be heard. Note that in allowing the operation or effectivity of PAL's consolidated flight schedule, it was
precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35 for which no previous approval has been
granted by the Board, are hereby referred to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic
justification." It has not been denied that such hearings were actually conducted by the hearing examiner
and a report on the result thereof was submitted to the Board. And the Board, considering the report of the
hearing examiner, passed Resolution No. 190 (68)  approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July
1968, only three or four frequencies of the seven proposed new flights (F338, F591, F531/532, F555/556,
F527/528, F561/562, and F515/516). There is no proof, not even allegation, that in all those bearings
petitioner was not notified or given opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition.

It may be true that the temporary approval of DTS-35 resulted in the immediate operation of the opposed
flights before the existence of economic justification therefor has been finally determined. But this fact
alone would not work against the validity of the provisional authorization thus issued. For, under the law,
the Civil Aeronautics Board is not only empowered to grant certificates of public convenience and
necessity; it can also issue, deny, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, any
temporary operating permit, upon petition or complaint of another or even at its own initiative. The
exercise of the power, of course, is supposed to be conditioned upon the paramount consideration of
public convenience and necessity, and nothing has been presented in this case to prove that the disputed
action by the Board has been prompted by a cause other than the good of the service.

48. Go vs. Colegio de San Juan de Letran

G.R. No. 169391. October 10, 2012

Topic: Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases, Admin Due Process

Doctrine: In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644 (1993), the Court held
that Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), not Ang Tibay, is the authority on the
procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as follows: [I]t bears stressing that due
process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases
may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the
strict judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kim’s
denial of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the
disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form
in which the notice is given.

Facts: Petition involves a request to set aside the RTC ruling and affirm the CA decision regarding the
dismissal of Kim Go after being accused of recruiting HS students into the Tau Gamma fraternity,
violating school policy. George Isleta, head of the Letran’s Auxiliary Services Department reeived
information that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among Letran’s high school
students. An incident report was also filed alleging that Tau Gamma had violated its covenant with
Letran by recruiting members of the high school, and among the members in the list of members
in the high school, Kim Go was there, further reinforced by the neophytes who had identified Kim
Go as one of the senior members of the fraternity present at their hazing. Kim was asked to respond
to the issue, and after finding probable cause for such allegations the admin suspended Go and
other students. Letran requested the students and parents to sign an agreement to signify their
conformity with their suspension, of which Mr. and Mrs. Go refused to sign, alleging that their son
was not a fraternity member and that he was denied due process. Go and parents sought and were
rewarded damages in the RTC claiming that the admin had denied them due process for failing to
adduce sufficient evidence of his membership and that the school had no authority to dismiss
students on this ground.

Issue: What rule should be used, Ang Tibay or Guzman? (Guzman)

Ruling: The RTC’s statement that Letran has no authority to impose a dismissal or any disciplinary
action on students who violate its policy against fraternity membership is restrictive, and it is clear
from the intent of the DECS that it includes all elementary and high schools, both private and
public. Also, private schools are given the authority to enforce similar prohibitions to establish
rules and regulations, as recognized by the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
Considering the nature of the activities associated with fraternities, such regulations were justified,
and the respective penalties are clearly stated from the enrollment contracts in the Student
Handbooks given to the students at the start of every year.

Regarding due process, Court affirmed that it is the Guzman ruling and NOT the Ang Tibay
ruling that follows procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, the minimum
standards satisfying due process are (1) students must be informed in writing of the nature of the
accusation, (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges with counsel, (3) they shallb e
informed of the evidence against them, (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence, and (5)
evidence must be considered by the investigation committee or official authorities. It has been
ruled in De La Salle v. Court of Appeals that not allowing to cross-examine the witnesses and
testimonies IS NOT a valid ground to claim prevention of due process. Such documents and
testimonies amount to substantial evidence to support proceedings. The reason of the notice is to
inform the student of the charge against him and to enable him to prepare a defense. Letran gave
the parents two notices seeking help in correcting Kim’s problem yet they did not attend. In
addition, administrative due process is not fully equated with due process in a strict juridical sense.
What matters is what is to be explained and not the form of notice. Kim had been heard and his
explanation was well received by the respondents. Court AFFIRMS the CA ruling.
 49. Acuzar v. Jorolan
G.R. No. 177878.  April 7, 2010

i. Administrative Due Process

Secs. 50-51, Book V, Administrative Code

DOCTRINES:
 Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints
against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.

 SECTION 51, Book V, Administrative Code. Preventive Suspension.—The proper disciplining

authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

 Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.

FACTS:
Respondent Jorolan filed an administrative case against petitioner before the PLEB charging the latter of
Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondent’s minor daughter.

Respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner for violation of the Child Abuse Act.

Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit before the PLEB vehemently denying all the accusations leveled
against him. In support thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of complainant’s daughter, who denied
having any relationship with the petitioner.

Petitioner then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the
criminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a hearing
of the case was conducted. After due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision finding respondent, SPO1
Acuzar GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse) which is punishable by DISMISSAL effective
immediately.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that the decision was issued without giving him an opportunity
to be heard, and, that the Board acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the
petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB
Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative case
considering that the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one (1) for grave
misconduct. Subsequently, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the PNP.

The trial court annulled the Decision of the PLEB noting that the petitioner was not given his day in
Court.

Respondent appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether the PLEB should have waited for the resolution of the criminal case before conducting a
hearing on the administrative charge against the petitioner.

Ruling:
NO. The petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent’s
minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to
convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated
by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error
of judgment. On the other hand, “violation of law” presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that
criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required. Administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has
jurisdiction over the case.

Moreover, Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975, is explicit, thus:

“SEC. 43. People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB).—x x x
(e) Decisions—The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a decision
involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional
appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.”

The remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to
petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, if a remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency,
then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable
such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and
so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

Petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted his counter-affidavit
and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together with his counsel and even asked
for several postponements. He therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of
justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, the petitioner had more than enough
opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot claim that
his right to due process has been violated. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

50. Ganappao vs. CSC,

649 SCRA 594 (2011)
Topic: Administrative Proceedings; Due Process
Doctrine
While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does
not necessarily require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise
this right if desired by the party entitled to it.
Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall
take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination.
Facts
 Respondents Barien, et al. who are stockholders and board members of United Workers
Transport Corp. (UWTC), filed a verified complaint before the PNP Inspectorate Division at
Camp Crame, charging petitioner with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer
for Preventive Suspension and Disarming.
 At about the same time, petitioner was allegedly employed by Atty. Roy G. Gironella, the
general manager appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard with
compensation coming from UWTC.
 Barien, et al. representing the majority stockholders of UWTC sued Atty. Gironella and five
other members of the UWTC Board of Directors for gross mismanagement.
 Barien, et al. further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly driven by
them and others were confiscated by a "task force" composed of former drivers, conductors
and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons, petitioner and his group
intimidated and harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses.
 Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to act as
bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the drivers/stockholders and the bus
passengers. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
confiscation of his firearm and his termination after due hearing.
 Before the SC, Petitioner contends that he was denied due process in the proceedings before
the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP since no notice and summons were issued for him to
answer the charges and no hearing was conducted. He claims that his dismissal was not proper
and legal as there was no introduction and presentation of evidence against him and he was
not given the opportunity to defend his side. Also, petitioner assails the penalty of dismissal
 imposed upon him by the CSC, alleging that it was improperly imposed considering the
mitigating circumstance of his length of service.

Issue
W/N Petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

Decision
The essence of due process is simply: (1) an opportunity to be heard, or (2) as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
On the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not
lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process.
While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does
not necessarily require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise
this right if desired by the party entitled to it.
In this case, while Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of
witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination,
petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for
the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing
officer considered the case submitted for decision.
And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with copy of complaint
and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead
filed a motion to dismiss reiterating the previous recommendation for dismissal made by
Atty. Casugbo. Moreover, after the PNP Director General rendered his decision, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He was also able to appeal from the
decision of the PNP Director General to the DILG Secretary, and eventually to the CSC. We
have held that the fact that a party filed motions for reconsideration and appeals with the
tribunals below, in which she presented her arguments and through which she could have
proffered her evidence, if any, negates her claim that she was denied opportunity to be
heard.
 51. Nacion vs. COA
G.R. No. 204757 March 17, 2015

Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial/Adjudicatory;

Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

Summary:
Atty. Janet D. Nacion was found guilty by COA of grave misconduct and violation of
reasonable rules and regulations. The Supreme Court ruled that Nacion was given due process.
The constitution of a separate fact-finding team specifically for Nacion’s case was not necessary
for the satisfaction of such right.

Doctrines:
1. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any
evidence he may have in support of his defense;
2. A written complaint under oath is demanded only when the administrative case is
commenced by a person other than the Commission on Audit (COA) Chairperson; and
3. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence that is necessary to declare a person
administratively liable is mere substantial evidence.
Facts:
From October 16, 2001 to September 15, 2003, Nacion was assigned by the COA to the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS) as State Auditor V. 4 On June 27, 2011,
when Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA, National Government
Sector, a formal charge against her was issued by COA Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-
Tanfor acts found to be committed when she was still with the MWSS. The Administrative Case
Evaluation Report dated June 21, 2011 of the Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO),
Legal Services Sector (LSS) as well as the Investigation Report submitted by the Team from the
FAIO disclosed the following reprehensible actions:

1. Receiving benefits and/or bonuses from MWSS in the total amount of P73,542.00 from 1999
2003;
2. Availing of the MWSS Housing Project;
3. Availing of the Multi-Purpose Loan Program — Car Loan.
On June 14, 2012, the COA rendered its Decision finding Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and
violation of reasonable rules and regulations.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion guilty of
grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. NO.

Held:
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to explain
one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met
when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Given this
and the circumstances under which the rulings of the COA were issued, the Court finds no
violation of Nacion’s right to due process. As the Office of the Solicitor General correctly
argued, the constitution of a separate fact-finding team specifically for Nacion’s case was not
necessary for the satisfaction of such right.

It bears stressing that Nacion was formally charged by Chairperson Tan, following evidence
that pointed to irregularities committed while she was with the MWSS. Being the COA
Chairperson who, under the law, could initiate administrative proceedings motu proprio, no
written complaint against Nacion from another person was necessary.

The power of the COA to discipline its officials then could not be limited by the procedure
being insisted upon by Nacion. Neither is the authority of the Chairperson to commence the
action through the issuance of the formal charge restricted by the requirement of a prior written
complaint. As may be gleaned from the cited provision, a written complaint under oath is
demanded only when the administrative case is commenced by a person other than the COA
Chairperson.

Contrary to Nacion’s claim, the COA also did not act beyond its jurisdiction when her case
was considered by the FAIO investigating team, notwithstanding the fact that the office order
which commanded an inquiry upon MWSS personnel merely referred to alleged unauthorized
receipt of bonuses and benefits from the agency by Atty. Norberto Cabibihan (Atty. Cabibihan)
and his staff. Since Nacion’s stint in MWSS was before Atty. Cabibihan’s, she argued that the
team should not have looked into the records and circumstances during her term. In including
benefits received during her term, Nacion claimed that the investigating team acted beyond its
jurisdiction and deprived her of the right to due process.

The contention fails to persuade; a separate office order was not necessary for the audit
team’s investigation of Nacion’s case. It should be emphasized that prior to the issuance of the
formal charge, the investigations conducted by the team were merely fact-finding. The crucial
point was the COA’s observance of the demands of due process prior to its finding or decision
that Nacion was administratively liable. The formation of a separate fact-finding team that
should look specifically into Nacion’s acts was not necessary to satisfy the requirement. The
formal charge was as yet to be issued by the COA Chairperson, and Nacion’s formal
investigation commenced only after she had filed her answer to the charge. It was undisputed
that Nacion, despite a chance, did not request for such formal investigation, a circumstance
which the COA later considered as mitigating. In any case, she was still accorded before the
COA a reasonable opportunity to present her defenses, through her answer to the formal charge
and eventually, motion for reconsideration of the COA’s decision.
 
The Court also finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in holding Nacion
administratively liable for the offenses with which she was charged.

In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence that is necessary to declare a person

administratively liable is mere substantial evidence. This is defined under Section 5, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 5. Substantial evidence.—In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,

a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
 
It is settled that the factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported
by such substantial evidence. In resolving the present petition, the Court finds no compelling
reason to deviate from this general rule. Three separate acts were found to have been committed
by Nacion, all sufficient to support the COA’s finding of grave misconduct and violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations.

Nacion’s receipt of the prohibited benefits and allowances were duly proved by documentary
evidence. The presentation of documents bearing Nacion’s signature to prove her receipt of the
money was not indispensable. Recipients of unauthorized sums would, after all, ordinarily evade
traces of their receipt of such amounts. Resort to other documents from which such fact could be
deduced was then appropriate. In this case, the claims control indices considered by the COA
were supported by journal vouchers and entries, which constitute public records. No evidence
that could sufficiently challenge the correctness of the contents thereof and the COA’s
conclusions therefrom was presented by Nacion.
 52. LUMIQUED V. EXEVEA
G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997

Topic: Administrative Law; Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

DOCTRINES:
The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.

FACTS:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the DAR-CAR until he was dismissed brought by the
three complaints filed against him. These includes malversation through falsification of official
documents, non-liquidation of cash advances, and oppression and harassment.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) for appropriate action. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days
from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days
from its conclusion.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted but Lumiqued was not assisted by
counsel. In the said hearing, despite appraisal by the committee of his option to avail of a
counsel, Luminqued confidently replied that he can represent himself. On the second hearing
date, the committee again informed him that he can avail of a counsel but guaranteed that he can
represent himself. On the last hearing, Luminqued nor his counsel did not appear.
 Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, alleging that he suffered a
stroke. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because the
investigation had already been terminated.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued’s dismissal or
removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against
him. Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon
adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos.
All his motion for reconsideration having denied, Lumiqued filed a second motion for
reconsideration before the OP alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional
right to counsel during the hearing. However, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued
died.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. In a nutshell, it prays for the
“payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by
law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to
the time of his death.

ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER:

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his
right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee
should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to
secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
ISSUE:

1. Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry? – NO.
2. Whether the DOJ conducting the proceeding clothed the same as criminal proceeding and
thus requires assistance of a counsel. – NO.

RULING:
1. Petitioner is not short-changed with his right to due process.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It
is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with
more reason, in an administrative inquiry.
In the instant case, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to
have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings. The investigation conducted by the committee created
was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for
the complaints filed against him.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
 Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued
clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself.

2. Petitioners’ misconception on the nature of the investigation conducted against

Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it.
While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall “administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional
system,” conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to “perform
such other functions as may be provided by law,” prosecutors may be called upon to conduct
administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by was duty-bound to conduct the
administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the
person being investigated with counsel.
 53. Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014

Topic: Administrative Due Process

Doctrine: Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule,” meaning
a finding of guilt in an administrative case may and would issue if supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint.

Facts: PNP-CIDG conducted an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged nefarious
activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of Customs, among them petitioners Flor Gupilan-
Aguilar Aguilar was then receiving a basic annual salary of PhP 249,876. Her SALNs for the
years aforementioned do not reflect any income source other than her employment. The spaces
for her spouse’s name and business interest were left in blank.
Following weeks of surveillance and lifestyle probe, the PNP-CIDG investigating team,
headed by Atty. Virgilio Pablico, executed a Joint-Affidavit, depicting Aguilar, who, in her
Personal Data Sheet, indicated “Blk 21 Lot 8 Percentage St. BIR Vill, Fairview, QC” as her
home address, as owning properties not declared or properly identified in her SALNs.
During her four-year stretch Aguilar, per the Bureau of Immigration (BI) records, took 13
unofficial trips abroad, eight to Los Angeles, California, accompanied most of the time by
daughter Josephine. During the same period, her two other daughters also collectively made nine
travels abroad. Per the PNP-CIDG’s estimate, Aguilar would have spent around PhP 3,400,000
for her and her daughters’ foreign travels.
In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between Aguilar’s acquired assets and
what she spent for her four year overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other, the
PNP-CIDG, through in a letter-complaint, with enclosures, on a finding that she has violated
Republic Act No. (RA) 1379[9] in relation to RA 3019[10] and 6713[11] — charged her with
grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Issue: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to convict the petitioner. YES.

Ruling:
Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule,” meaning a
finding of guilt in an administrative case may and would issue if supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise. Its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence, direct or
circumstantial, on record.
In the case at bar, the required evidence sufficient to justify holding petitioner Aguilar
administratively liable has been, to us, as to the CA, satisfied. Not only did she fail to declare in
her SALN the residential lot located at Panicuason, Naga City, she likewise failed to
satisfactorily explain her beneficial ownership of the Antel Seaview Towers four-bedroom
condominium unit and her use of the two BMWs registered in the name of different corporations,
which, as the records show, are both based in Olongapo City.
 54. Ombudsman vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 170512, Oct. 5, 2011

Topic: Quasi-Judicial; Administrative Due Process

Doctrine: Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following
cardinal principles:
(1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the
facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and
(7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and
the various issues involved.

Summary: Acero filed an affidavit against Reyes and Peñaloza for the discrepancy in the receipt
vis-à-vis his payment therefor. Peñaloza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation
in the illicit transaction complained of, but pointed to Reyes as the main culprit; Reyes did not
receive such affidavit of Peñaloza. The Court ruled that it was in violation of his due process in
administrative proceedings. Reyes must be properly apprised of the evidence offered against
him, which were eventually made the bases of Ombudsman’s decision that found him guilty of
grave misconduct.

Facts: Acero applied for a driver’s license in LTO; took the required examination therefor by
Peñaloza; and, thereafter was informed he failed the examination. Hence, he sought that my
application be reconsider. He paid for the assessment in the amount of 1000 and was handed a
change of ₱320.00 however, the receipt showed only for ₱180.00. Hence, Acero executed an
affidavit against Reyes and Peñaloza.

After the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, Reyes and
Peñaloza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged
against them. While Peñaloza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit
transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the main culprit. Peñaloza thereafter submitted
the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses who would substantiate his accusations.
However, the records reveal that only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were
furnished copies of the said affidavits. Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the affidavit of
Acero.

Issue: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by
substantial evidence. NO.

Ruling: Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were
eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
Reyes had no idea that Peñaloza, a co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an
accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said
affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioner’s Decision dated
September 24, 2001.

There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a
copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision
dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to
squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
***Basis is in doctrine***
 55. Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA
G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991

Topic: III.C(2)(c) – Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial

Adjudicatory; Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

Doctrine: Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where
such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That
such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process
clause of the Constitution in situations like in this case.

Summary (Recit): In this case, the Supreme Court held that a subsequent public hearing is
precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and
desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the
basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that
is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like in this case. The
Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to
the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Facts:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution
source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to
the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
The Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant. That Solar's wastewater
treatment plant was non-operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of
wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through
Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's
effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under
P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
After filing a motion for reconsideration before the Board, Solar was allowed to operate
temporarily to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's
wastewater treatment Consequently, Solar filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction against the Board before the RTC. The RTC dismissed Solar’s petition. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Solar, in questioning the ex parte cease and desis order, is correct in filing
a petition for certiorari before the RTC. NO.

Ruling:
Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness
of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such
establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such
an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of
the Constitution in situations like in this case. The Board's decision rendered after the public
hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with
Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A
subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to
seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the
Court of Appeals.
 56. American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents
G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975
Topic: Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

Doctrine: Although the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made.

Facts: ATC questioned the authority of the delegated hearing officers to hear the inter-partes
case because under the law only the Director of Patents can decide on the case.

Issue: Whether or not the hearing officers have the authority to hear the case. YES

Ruling: Yes, although the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made. In this case the hearing officers have the
power to hear the case because the law does not require that the deciding officer is the same as
the hearing officer for in doing so the law will only hinder the fulfillment of all the duties of the
Director of Patent because attending to all the cases before his office personally will unduly eat
his time leaving nothing left for his other duties. It should also be said that what the due process
clause requires is merely the fact the parties be given substantive trial and not the hearing officer
be the same as the deciding officer.
 57. DOH v. Camposano
G.R. No. 157684, April 27, 2005

TOPIC: Administrative Due Process

DOCTRINE: Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions,
the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its
face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions.
While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of
officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate
the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the
sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the
sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles:
(1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the
law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and
(7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it
and the various issues involved.

FACTS:
Respondents in this case were DOH-NCR employees who held the following positions:
 Priscilla B. Camposano - Finance and Management Officer II
 Imelda Q. Agusin - Accountant I
 Enrique L. Perez - Acting Supply Officer III

An administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct was filed against respondents,
out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of “1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg
with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules” worth ₱330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the respondents. AO No. 298 was
indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The PCAGC
found respondents guilty and recommended the penalty of dismissal from the service. The DOH
Secretary adopted the said finding and recommendation from the PCAGC, and then dismissed
the respondents.
Respondents filed an appeal with the CSC which was denied. However, when the case was
elevated to the CA, the CA held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints
pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, it had no power to investigate the charges against
respondents. Moreover, there was violation of due process due to simply and completely relying
on the PCAGC’s findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOH Secretary failed to comply with administrative due process.
YES.

RULING: Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed.
The DOH Secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should be taken
against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated.
However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement
results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority (DOH Secretary) should not merely and
solely rely on an investigator’s (PCAGC) recommendation, but must personally weigh and
assess the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the
reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively charged. See requisites in
Doctrine. In the instant case, the sixth requisite was missing.
 58. Solid Homes vs. Laserna
G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008, Chico-Nazario, J.

Topic: Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

Doctrine: The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied.

In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings,
as follows:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. The decision must have something to support itself.
4. The evidence must be substantial.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.”

As can be seen above, among these rights are “the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected”; and that the decision be rendered
“in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered.” Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on
evidence and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the
decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

Facts:
1. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the Decision of the CA, which denied and dismissed the Petition
filed before it by the petitioner for lack of merit; and (2) the Resolution, which denied the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
2. Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as
buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a corporation engaged in the
development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller.
a. The subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II,
Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less.
b. The total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to
be paid in the following manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down payment should be paid upon the
signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of P166,421.88 was payable for a period of
three years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83 beginning 1 April 1977.
c. The respondents made the down payment and several monthly installments. When the respondents
had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the
Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final
payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents.
3. Respondents filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale
with Damages, dated 28 June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In their
Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only P5,928.18, they were already
demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final
payment of the said amount.
4. The petitioner asserted that the respondents have no cause of action against it because the respondents
failed to show that they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the
respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the said non-
 payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in
accordance with the provisions of the same contract.

HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean denied respondents’ prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and the delivery
of the TCT.
 He, however, directed the petitioner to execute and deliver the aforesaid Deed of Sale and TCT the moment
that the purchase price is fully settled by the respondents.
 Further, he ordered the petitioner to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees from the
respondents other than those authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 and similar statutes.

Petitioner appealed the aforesaid Decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

HLURB Board of Commissioners modified the decision of HLURB Arbiter Dean.

 Respondent is directed to pay the balance of P11,585.41 within the thirty (30) days from finality of this
decision.
 Petitioner is hereby directed to execute the necessary deed of sale and deliver the TCT over the subject
property immediately upon full payment and is hereby directed to cease and desist from charging and/or
collecting fees other than those authorized by P.D. 957 and other related laws.”

Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, it appealed the same
before the Office of the President.

Office of the President affirmed in toto the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the CA by way of Petition for Review under Rule 43 raising the
following issues, to wit: (1) the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in merely adopting by reference
the findings and conclusions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners in arriving at the questioned decision; and (2)
the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.

CA denied and dismissed the petitioner’s petition for lack of merit, thus affirming the Decision of the Office of the
President dated

Contention of Solid Homes: In its Memorandum, the petitioner alleges that the Decision of the Office of the
President, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which merely adopted by reference the Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners, without a recitation of the facts and law on which it was based, runs afoul of the mandate
of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: “No decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” The Office of
the President, being a government agency, should have adhered to this principle.

Issue: Whether or not the decision by the Office of the President violates Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. – NO.

Ruling:
8. The constitutional mandate that, “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,” does not preclude the validity of
“memorandum decisions,” which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained
in the decisions of inferior tribunals. 
a. In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use of “memorandum decisions,”
a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of
Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience
and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that “memorandum decisions”
comply with the constitutional mandate.
9. In Francisco v. Permskul, this Court similarly held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City did not transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1997 Philippine Constitution:
 “MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

10. Hence, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.
11. However, also in Permskul, this Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions,
to wit:
a. “The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized
under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.
12. It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the
lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law
on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption
will rectify its violation.
13. All memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the form
prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict
enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a
lawless disobedience.”
14. IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Court quote verbatim the decision of the Office of the President which
adopted by reference the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners: “This resolves the appeal
filed by [herein petitioner] Solid Homes, Inc. from the decision of the HLURB. After a careful study
and thorough evaluation of the records of the case, this Office is convinced by the findings of the
HLURB, thus we find no cogent reason to depart from the assailed Decision. Therefore, we hereby
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the aforesaid Decision, copy
of which is hereto attached as “Annex A.”
15. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered
in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in
judicial proceedings.
16. The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied.
a. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in
administrative proceedings, as follows:
i. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
in support thereof.
ii. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
iii. The decision must have something to support itself.
iv. The evidence must be substantial.
v. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
vi. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
vii. The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.”
 b. As can be seen above, among these rights are “the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected”;
and that the decision be rendered “in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.” Note that there is no
requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence
and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases
of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
17. At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient,
and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing
concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already
contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB
Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.
18. Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the
said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative due process and
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
19. The Office of the President did not violate petitioner’s right to due process when it rendered its one-page
Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-
informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the laws
and the issues involved therein because the Office of the President attached to and made an integral part of
its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were
otherwise, the petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and
make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues involved in
its case.

59. Marcelo v. Bungbung

G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008

Topic: Administrative Law; Judgement

Doctrine:

 In Montemayor v. Bundalian, this Court laid down the following guidelines for the judicial
review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
power:

First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in
his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government,
the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third,
administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside
on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an
administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to
 receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned.

 In Gaviola v. Salcedo, which involved an administrative case for suspension or disbarment

against a lawyer, this Court gave probative value to the Affidavit of Desistance of the
complainant, pronouncing that while the filing of an Affidavit of Desistance by the complainant
for lack of interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of the administrative case, it was
constrained to dismiss the charges since such charges cannot be proven without the evidence of
the complainant and her witnesses. Such is the case at bar. Essentially, the administrative case
against Bungubung was based on the allegations made by Doromal in his Affidavit-Complaint,
without which, the case against Bungubung collapses.

Facts: The Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo represented the Ombudsman, with powers and functions
provided under Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Bungubung is the Manager of the Port District Office (PDO) of Manila, Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA), South Harbor, Port Area, Manila. He is also the Chairman of the Ports District
Security Bids and Awards Committee (PDSBAC) of the PPA.

Roberto C. Doromal (Doromal), the President of Combat Security & Executive Protection
Agency (CSEPA), a security agency that participated in the bidding for security services for the
PPA, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Bungubung before PPA Resident Ombudsman Manolo
M. Mabini, alleging that her wife was responsible for negotiating and concluding a security
contract with PPA. After the contract was signed, Bungubung and other PPA officials would ask
for certain amounts from his wife. His wife directed their staff, particularly the Billing and
Collection Clerk and Cashier to include in the records and books of account that disbursements
be named as "Representation expense.” His wife died and he continued dealing with PPA. On the
next bidding, Bungbung asked for a Pajero, which Doromal failed to delivered. He was then
served a Notice of Award of the winning bidder which is STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN &
DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.

In support of the allegations in his Complaint-Affidavit, Doromal submitted an affidavit of his

secretary Evalyn Cruz (Cruz) and an alleged "blue book" of CSEPA. Cruz recounted in her
affidavit another incident wherein she personally handed over the amount of P50,000.00 cash to
Bungubung at his office. The CSEPA blue book purportedly detailed
monthly balato or payola paid to PPA officials from July 2000 to February 2001, recorded
therein as representation expenses. It was allegedly prepared by a certain Evalyn M. Ebora
(Ebora), and approved by Doromal.

Thereafter, PPA Resident Ombudsman Mabini released a Memorandum/Investigation Report

recommending the following: a. That criminal complaint be filed against Mr. Leopoldo F.
Bungubung for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019; Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 and Art. 211 of
the RPC for demanding and receiving "balato" from COMBAT in the total amount of P320,000
more or less; b. That likewise, an administrative complaint be filed against Mr. Leopoldo F.
Bungubung for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
arising from the above criminal act; c. That Mr. Leopoldo F. Bungubung be placed under
Preventive Suspension for a period of six (6) months without pay pursuant to Section 24 of R.A.
6770.

From the foregoing, the following complaints were filed against Bungubung before the
Ombudsman: (1) an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 (OMB-0-01-0793); and (2) a
criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
docketed as OMB-0-01-0793.

After the parties submitted the required pleadings, a preliminary conference was held on 21
February 2002 in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502, the administrative case. Bungubung manifested
therein that he was submitting the case for resolution. Doromal, however, was still undecided on
whether to opt for the conduct of a formal investigation or to submit the case for resolution at
once. In a Manifestation Doromal informed the Ombudsman that he was opting instead for the
conduct of a formal investigation for purposes of submission of evidence and affidavits of
witnesses.

Doromal's aforecited manifestation notwithstanding, the Ombudsman, in an Order through Graft

Investigation Officer II Joselito P. Fangon, ordered the submission of the case for resolution. He
then drafted a Decision which recommended the dismissal of the administrative case against
Bungubung, without prejudice to its re-filing.

However, Ombudsman Marcelo disapproved Graft Investigation Officer II Fangon's Decision,

and issued another Order finding Bungubung liable for grave misconduct (which absorbed the
lesser offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service) and ordering Bungubung's
dismissal from service, together with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and respondent's perpetual disqualification from reemployment
in government service.

In the interim, the Ombudsman issued an Order dated 10 September 2003 in OMB-0-01-0793,
for the filing of the criminal complaint against Bungubung, after finding that there was probable
cause to indict him for violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Ombudsman took into consideration its aforementioned 10 September 2003 Order in OMB-
0-01-0793, when it found in OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 that Bungubung took advantage of his
position as Chairman of the PDSBAC of the PPA, using it as leverage in soliciting cash and a
Mitsubishi Pajero van from the bidders as consideration for the award of the security contract.
According to the Ombudsman, such actuations constitute conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. It rejected Bungubung's denial and instead gave credence to the attestation
of Cruz that she personally delivered the P50,000.00 to Bungubung.

Bungubung then sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43
and granted the Motion for the TRO.
In the meantime, Doromal executed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Complaint dated 18 August 2005 and an Affidavit of Desistance dated 23 August 2005, which he
filed before the Ombudsman. In his Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint
and Affidavit of Desistance, Doromal expressed his desire to withdraw his Complaint-Affidavit
against Bungubung and desist from the continuance of both OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 and OMB-0-
01-0793. Doromal explicitly admitted in said documents that his allegations in the administrative
and criminal complaints against Bungubung were all fabricated. He further confessed that
Bungubung never demanded or received any balato from him or his wife in exchange for the
award of the PPA security service contract; nor did Bungubung ask for a Mitsubishi Pajero van
from him. The CA ruled in favor of Bungbung.

Issue : Whether or not the administrative offense for grave misconduct against Bungbung is
supported by substantial evidence.

Held: No. The administrative offense for grave misconduct against Bungbung is not supported
by substantial evidence.

In Montemayor v. Bundalian, this Court laid down the following guidelines for the judicial
review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial power:

First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the

allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the
executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be
respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for
the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency
with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the
reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative
case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive
additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.

As stated above, the fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has
the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Conversely, therefore, when the findings of
fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be
binding upon the courts.

Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence
beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion. There is none here.

Being guided accordingly by the aforementioned evidentiary rules and jurisprudence, this Court
finds that the evidence on record in the present case does not constitute substantial evidence of
Bungubung's administrative culpability for grave misconduct.

Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-
judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the
basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.

This Court cannot ignore Doromal's Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint

dated 18 August 2005 and Affidavit of Desistance dated 23 August 2005, which he filed with the
Ombudsman. In both documents, Doromal expressed his desire to withdraw his Complaint-
Affidavit filed with the Ombudsman and desist from the continuance of the criminal and
administrative complaints against Bungubung. Doromal explicitly admitted therein that he
merely fabricated all his allegations against Bungubung. While this Court looks with disfavor on
affidavits of desistance, still, its effect on the instant case cannot be ignored. Doromal's Affidavit
of Desistance includes an explicit admission that he fabricated the charges against Bungubung.
Therefore, Doromal's Affidavit of Desistance is an express repudiation of the material points
alleged in his Complaint-Affidavit, and not a mere expression of his lack of interest to pursue his
complaints against Bungubung. Since Doromal willfully and knowingly executed his Affidavit
of Desistance, there being no showing that he was made to do so fraudulently or under duress,
then it may be admitted and considered as evidence which considerably puts into question the
probative value of the Affidavit-Complaint he executed earlier and he now repudiates.

In Gaviola v. Salcedo, which involved an administrative case for suspension or disbarment

against a lawyer, this Court gave probative value to the Affidavit of Desistance of the
complainant, pronouncing that while the filing of an Affidavit of Desistance by the
complainant for lack of interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of the
administrative case, it was constrained to dismiss the charges since such charges cannot be
proven without the evidence of the complainant and her witnesses. Such is the case at bar.
Essentially, the administrative case against Bungubung was based on the allegations made
by Doromal in his Affidavit-Complaint, without which, the case against Bungubung
collapses.
 60. Santos-Concio vs. Department of Justice
G.R. No. 175057, January 29, 2008

Topic: Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases; Judgment

Doctrine: Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be
another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

Facts: In the days leading to February 4, 2006, people started to gather in throngs at the Philsports Arena
(formerly Ultra) in Pasig City, the publicized site of the first anniversary episode of "Wowowee," a
noontime game show aired by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN).

Hours before the show and minutes after the people were allowed entry through two entry points at six
o’clock in the morning, the obstinate crowd along Capt. Javier Street jostled even more just to get close to
the lower rate pedestrian gate. The mad rush of the unruly mob generated much force, triggering the
horde to surge forward with such momentum that led others to stumble and get trampled upon by the
approaching waves of people right after the gate opened. This fatal stampede claimed 71 lives, 69 of
whom were women, and left hundreds wounded which necessitated emergency medical support and
prompted the cancellation of the show’s episode.

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through then Secretary Angelo Reyes,
immediately created an inter-agency fact-finding team to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
stampede. The team submitted its report to the DOJ.

By Department Order No. 90, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez (Gonzalez) constituted a Panel
(Evaluating Panel) to evaluate the DILG Report and "determine whether there is sufficient basis to
proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted."

The Evaluating Panel later submitted to Gonzalez a Report concurring with the DILG Report but
concluding that there was no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation  in
view of the following considerations:

a) No formal complaint/s had been filed by any of the victims and/or their relatives, or any law
enforcement agency authorized to file a complaint, pursuant to Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure;

b) While it was mentioned in the Fact-Finding Report that there were 74 deaths and 687 injuries,
no documents were submitted to prove the same, e.g. death certificates, autopsy reports, medical
certificates, etc.;

c) The Fact-Finding Report did not indicate the names of the persons involved and their specific
participation in the "Ultra Incident";

d) Most of the victims did not mention, in their sworn statements, the names of the persons whom
they alleged to be responsible for the "Ultra Incident". 9

Respondent National Bureau of Investigation-National Capital Region (NBI-NCR), acting on the

Evaluating Panel’s referral of the case to it for further investigation, in turn submitted to the DOJ an
investigation report, by a transmittal letter (NBI-NCR Report), with supporting documents recommending
the conduct of preliminary investigation for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries against petitioners and seven others as respondents.

Acting on the recommendation of the NBI-NCR, Gonzalez, by Department Order No. 165, designated a
panel of state prosecutors (Investigating Panel) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case,
"NCR-NBI v. Santos-Concio, et al.," and if warranted by the evidence, to file the appropriate information
and prosecute the same before the appropriate court. The following day, the Investigating Panel issued
subpoenas directing the therein respondents to appear at the preliminary investigation.

In the meantime, the Investigating Panel found probable cause to indict the respondents-herein petitioners
for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries, and recommended the
conduct of a separate preliminary investigation against certain public officials.

Issue: Whether or not respondents to have lost the impartiality to conduct the preliminary investigation
since they had prejudged the case. NO.

Ruling: Responding to the claim of prejudgment, respondents maintain that the above-cited statements of
Gonzalez and the President merely indicate that the incident is of such nature and magnitude as to warrant
a natural inference that it would not have happened in the ordinary course of things and that any
reasonable mind would conclude that there is a causal connection between the show’s preparations and
the resultant deaths and injuries.

Petitioners’ fears are speculatory.

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue
haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with
particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work.
Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence
other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift
completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without
discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.

As for petitioners’ claim of undue haste indicating bias, proof thereof is wanting. The pace of the
proceedings is anything but a matter of acceleration. Without any objection from the parties, respondents
even accorded petitioners a preliminary investigation even when it was not required since the case
involves an alleged offense where the penalty prescribed by law is below Four Years, Two Months and
One Day.

Neither is there proof showing that Gonzalez exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor their
decision with his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined result. The Evaluating Panel in fact
even found no sufficient basis, it bears emphatic reiteration, to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, and one member of the Investigating Panel even dissented to its October 9, 2006
Resolution.

To follow petitioner’s theory of institutional bias would logically mean that even the NBI had prejudged
the case in conducting a criminal investigation since it is a constituent agency of the DOJ. And if the
theory is extended to the President’s declaration, there would be no more arm of the government credible
enough to conduct a criminal investigation and a preliminary investigation.

On petitioners citation of Ladlad v. Velasco where a public declaration by Gonzalez was found to evince
a "determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause,"61 their attention is drawn
to the following ruling of this Court in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the
case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule x x x enumerated in Brocka vs. Enrile (192 SCRA 183, 188-
189 [1990]) x x x. In these exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or
non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation x x
x.63 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ case falls under the exceptions enumerated in Brocka, any
resolution on the existence or lack of probable cause or, specifically, any conclusion on the issue of
prejudgment as elucidated in Ladlad, is made to depend on the records of the preliminary investigation.
There have been, as the appellate court points out, no finding to speak of when the petition was filed,
much less one that is subject to judicial review due to grave abuse. At that incipient stage, records were
wanting if not nil since the Investigating Panel had not yet resolved any matter brought before it, save for
the issuance of subpoenas. The Court thus finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in
dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and prohibition and in refraining from reviewing the merits
of the case until a ripe and appropriate case is presented. Otherwise, court intervention would have been
only pre-emptive and piecemeal.

Oddly enough, petitioners eventually concede that they are "not asking for a reversal of a ruling on
probable cause."

A word on the utilization by petitioners of the video footages provided by ABS-CBN. While petitioners
deny wishing or causing respondents to be biased and impartial, they admit that the media, ABS-CBN
included, interviewed Gonzalez in order to elicit his opinion on a matter that ABS-CBN knew was
pending investigation and involving a number of its own staff. Gonzalez’s actuations may leave much to
be desired; petitioners’ are not, however, totally spotless as circumstances tend to show that they were
asking for or fishing from him something that could later be used against him to favor their cause.

A FINAL WORD. The Court takes this occasion to echo its disposition in Cruz v. Salva where it censured
a fiscal for inexcusably allowing undue publicity in the conduct of preliminary investigation and
appreciated the press for wisely declining an unusual probing privilege. Agents of the law ought to
recognize the buoys and bounds of prudence in discharging what they may deem as an earnest effort to
herald the government’s endeavor in solving a case.
 61. Rivera vs. CSC
240 SCRA 43 (1995)

Topic: Administrative Appeal and Review

Summary: Rivera was charged with various offenses related to the acts he committed as
manager of Land Bank. He was found guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and was consequently dismissed from service. MSPB modified the penalty
to 1 yr suspension. When he appealed to CSC, CSC ruled that he should be dismissed. Rivera
now assails the decision of CSC as violative of due process as it turns out that Commissioner
Gaminde participated in the resolution of the case under both MSPB and CSC.

Doctrine: Citing Zambales Chromite Mining v CA - “In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other
than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that
he was mistaken in his first view of the case.”

Facts: Rivera was the Manger of Corporate Banking Unit of Land Bank. Rivera allegedly told
Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that
he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a 10%
commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of
the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in
Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket
money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel
accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong.

He likewise acted, without authority, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in
various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances
approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers

He was charged by the Land Bank President with the following offenses on the basis of
affidavits of Lao and Perez: 

 Dishonesty;
 Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official
duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by
any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that
accorded other persons;
 Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;
  Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by
Civil Service Rules and regulations;
 Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service

Rivera was preventively suspended. He was found guilty of grave misconduct and acts
prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank
and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the
Revised Civil Service Rules; and prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended).

The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon
imposed on Rivera. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) modified the decision to the extent
that he was only suspended for 1 year.

Land Bank filed an MR which was denied by MSPB. Land Bank and Rivera appealed to CSC.
CSC set aside MSPB decision and ruled that Rivera should be dismissed.

Rivera averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion but was dismissed by SC for
failure to sufficiently show that CSC indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion

Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly
asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier
participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action
on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the
resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.

Issue: WON Rivera was denied of due process/CSC committed grave abuse of discretion? YES

Ruling: Given the circumstances in the case at bench, CSC should have behooved Commissioner
Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to
give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that
Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is
not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994,
denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.

Since Hon. Thelma Gaminde participated as Board Chair of MSPB also participated in LBP’s Motion for
Reconsideration as CSC commissioner

Citing zambales Chromite Mining v CA: “In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of
the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.”
 62. Solid Homes v Laserna
G.R. No. 166051 April 8, 2008

Doctrine: Rights of parties in an administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the
decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has
been satisfied.

Facts: On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe, as buyers, entered into a
Contract to Sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a corporation engaged in the
development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The subject of the said Contract to Sell was a
parcel of land in Quezon City. The respondents made the down payment and several monthly
installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they
demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not
comply with the demands of the respondents.

The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title
and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). In their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only
P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the
TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said amount. The petitioner filed a
Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the
respondents have no cause of action against it because the respondents failed to show that they
had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondents had not yet
paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the said non-payment, the
petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in
accordance with the provisions of the same contract.

HLURB decision: Petitioner is hereby directed to execute the necessary deed of sale and deliver
the TCT over the subject property immediately upon full payment.

Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus,
it appealed the same before the Office of the President. OP and eventually, the CA agreed with
the HLURB.

Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the decision of the HLURB? Yes.

Held:

The rights of parties in an administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the
decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has
been satisfied. Thus:
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section applies only
to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled “Judiciary,” and all of
its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government.
Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or
administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid
down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in
support thereof.

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3) The decision must have something to support itself.

4) The evidence must be substantial.

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.

7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.

As can be seen above, among these rights are “the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;”
and that the decision be rendered “in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.” Note that there is no
requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and
expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the
decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and
sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the
product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision
noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need
only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court
rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative
due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The Office of the President did not violate petitioner’s right to due process when it rendered its
one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including
petitioner, were well-informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived
at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the
President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would not
have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a presentation of its
arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues involved in its case.

Since respondent repeatedly refused to answer the administrative charge against him despite
notice and warning by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the OP, attaching the same to his motion for reconsideration. That the OP denied the
motion by sustaining the PAGC’s findings without any separate discussion of respondent’s
arguments and belatedly submitted evidence only meant that the OP found the same lacking in
merit and insufficient to overturn its ruling on respondent’s administrative liability.
 63. Penafrancia v. Shipping
G.R. No. 188952 September 21, 2016

Topic: Administrative Appeal and Review

Doctrines:

 Rule 43 governs all appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi- judicial functions. Resort to the Court of Appeals
(CA) is authorized by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 which provides that the CA shall
have jurisdiction over the decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. The Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA) is a quasi-judicial agency, and though it is not among the enumerated agencies
in Rule 43, the list is not meant to be exclusive
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President (OP) to
review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires,
an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
 Under Section 38, Chapter VII, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, there are three (3) kinds
of administrative relationship: (1) supervision and control; (2) administrative supervision; and (3)
attachment..
 The decisions of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) are not subject to the review of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary. This is not to say, however,
that decisions of the MARINA are not proper subjects of appeal to the Office of the President (OP)

Facts: On September 28, 2007, respondent 168 Shipping Lines, Inc. filed with the MARINA Regional
Office V (MARINA RO V), Legaspi City an application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) to operate M/V Star Ferry I, a roll-on-roll-off vessel, in the route Matnog, Sorsogon
to Allen, Northern Samar, and vice versa. Petitioners Peñafrancia Shipping Corporation and Santa Clara
Shipping Corporation existing operators who own and operate ferry boats serving the ports of Allen,
Northern Samar and Matnog, Sorsogon, intervened in the proceeding and opposed the application on the
following grounds: (1) respondent failed to submit a Certificate of Berthing as required under MARINA
Memorandum Circular No. 74-B; (2) the proposed schedule of trips in the original application is
physically impossible to perform by the applicant's lone vessel, the M/V Star Ferry I; and (3) there exists
an overtonnage in the route applied for by the respondent, thus warranting the intervention of MARINA.
Respondent countered that under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9295 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR): (1) an application for CPC is not adversarial in character and thus, a motion to
intervene and opposition are not allowed; and (2) there is no requirement for the CPC applicant to secure
a Certificate of Berthing from the Philippine Ports Authority.

The MARINA RO V, in its Decision dated February 1, 2008, denied due course to respondent's
application. Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied. Petitioners appealed to
the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of the
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, hence, for lack of cause of action. Petitioners' failure to
resort to the DOTC Secretary and then the Office of the President, in case of an adverse decision, and the
filing of the herein petition before this Court is a premature invocation of the Court's intervention which
renders the instant petition without cause of action, hence, dismissible.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Petitioners, relying on the IRR
of R.A. No. 9295, argue that: (1) a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the
immediate and direct remedy from the adverse rulings of the MARINA; (2) the proper forum for review
of the decision rendered by a quasi-judicial agency is the CA; (3) the decision and resolution subject of
the Rule 43 petition were acts of the MARINA Board, and not merely by the Administrator;  (4) assuming
an appeal to the DOTC Secretary and the Office of the President is necessary, this case is an exception
because an appeal would be a superfluity; (5) the doctrine of qualified political agency applies because the
DOTC Secretary, who is the chairman of the MARINA Board, is the alter ego of the President; and (6) it
would be impractical to file an appeal with the OP because an individual from the OP is also a member of
the MARINA Board.

Issue: Whether the decision of the MARINA Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function should be
appealed first to the DOTC Secretary, and subsequently to the OP, before appeal to the CA. No but
decisions of MARINA Board must be appealed to the OP first.

Ruling: The DOTC Secretary does not have supervision and control over the MARINA, which is an
attached agency to the DOTC. Consequently, it cannot review the decisions of the MARINA Board.
However, decisions of the MARINA Board are proper subjects of appeal to the OP, having been made by
its members in their ex officio capacity, and not as his alter egos. Failing to avail of such appeal,
petitioners' petition for review with the CA was properly dismissed.

Petitioners claim that this provision of the IRR shows that "the appropriate remedy against the adverse
ruling of; the MARINA Board is a petition for review to the Honorable Court of Appeals under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court." However, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule
XV of the IRR applies only to an appeal of the order, ruling, decision or resolution of the MARINA
Administrator. There is no procedure for appeal of the decisions of the MARINA Board. Hence, the IRR
cannot be the basis for petitioners' appeal. Moreover, no procedure for appeal before the courts is
provided by R.A. No. 9295. Rules and regulations issued to implement a law cannot go beyond its terms
and provisions.

Rule 43 governs all appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial1 agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Resort to the CA is authorized by
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides that the CA shall have jurisdiction over the
decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. The MARINA is a quasi-judicial agency, and though
it is not among the enumerated agencies in Rule 43, the list is not meant to be exclusive.

However, while Rule 43 provides for the appeal procedure from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, the
aggrieved party must still exhaust administrative remedies prior to recourse to the CA. Thus, Executive
Order No. 292 provides for the framework of administrative appeal prior to judicial review.

Decisions of the various agencies of government have been appealed to the OP, consistent with the
President’s power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. We defined the
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government as “the power of [the President] to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies empowers the OP to review any determination or disposition of a department
head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the
administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the
same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts · for reasons of law, comity, and convenience · will not entertain a case unless
the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been
given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain
instances, we find, however, that the case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptional
circumstances. Petitioners claim that appeal to the DOTC Secretary, who is already the chairman of the
MARINA Board, is a needless superfluity, the latter being the alter ego of the President. Moreover,
petitioners state that filing an appeal with the Office of the President would be impractical because a
member of the MARINA Board also came from the Office of the President. Both arguments fail to
convince.

A quick look into the nature and functions of the MARINA is necessary to understand its nature, powers,
and relationship to the executive department, and in turn determine the applicability of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The MARINA was created under Presidential Decree No. 474 as
an agency under the Office of the President. Under Executive Order No. 546, the MARINA was
designated as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. Under
Executive Order No. 1011, the MARINA was granted the quasi-judicial functions formerly exercised by
the Board of Transportation pertaining to water transportation. The Administrative Code of 1987
reiterated that the MARINA is an attached agency of the DOTC

The status of the MARINA as an attached agency of the DOTC is crucial to the determination of whether
the DOTC has the power to review the decisions of the MARINA Board. Under Section 38, Chapter VII,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, there are three kinds of administrative relationship: (1)
supervision and control; (2) administrative supervision; and (3) attachment. Among the three, the
relationship of supervision and control between a department and a subordinate agency is the most
stringent since the department has the power to review the decisions of the subordinate agency. This
power is not available in administrative supervision as Section 38 expressly states that the department
shall have no power to review the decisions of regulatory agencies in the exercise of their regulatory or
quasi-judicial functions. As to the relationship of attachment, while the law is silent on the presence or
absence of such power to review by the department, Section 38(3) would indicate that the Legislature did
not intend that the decisions of an attached agency be subject to review by the department prior to
appealing before the proper court. Section 38(3) indicates the most lenient kind of administrative
relationship since the lateral relationship is limited to policy and program coordination.

Reading Section 39 together with Section 38, the decision of an attached agency such as the MARINA in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is not subject to review by the department. Section 39 makes it
clear that the supervision and control exercised by the department over agencies under it with respect to
matters including the exercise of discretion (performance of quasi-judicial function) do not apply to
attached agencies. Thus, in this respect, petitioners are correct in saying that the decisions of the
MARINA are not subject to the review of the DOTC Secretary. This is not to say, however, that decisions
of the MARINA are not proper subjects of appeal to the OP.

The decisions of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) are not subject to the review of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary. This is not to say, however, that
decisions of the MARINA are not proper subjects of appeal to the Office of the President (OP). The
DOTC Secretary does not have supervision and control over the MARINA, which is an attached agency
to the DOTC. Consequently, it cannot review the decisions of the MARINA Board. However, decisions
of the MARINA Board are proper subjects of appeal to the OP, having been made by its members in their
ex officio capacity, and not as his alter egos. Failing to avail of such appeal, petitioners’ petition for
review with the CA was properly dismissed.
 64. Heirs of Derla vs. Heirs of Hipolito
G.R. No. 157717, April 13, 2011

Topic: Administrative Res Judicata

Doctrine: While it is true that the Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers,
the Court have also limited the latter to proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore,
when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res
judicata certainly applies.

Facts: Petitioners are the surviving heirs of the late Maximino Derla. Respondent Catalina Vda.
de Hipolito is Derla’s cousin. The respondents are the registered owners of a fishpond area in
Tagum, Davao. Derla executed an SPA in favor of Hipolito to represent him in all matters
related to this fishpond area. Derla stated that Hipolito owned one-half of the fishpond area, and
that it was only for convenience that the permit was issued in Derla’s name. Derla executed a
document (“Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit”) wherein he transferred all his rights in the
fishpond area to Hipolito. Subsequently, Hipolito filed his Fishpond Application over the
fishpond area, which was approved. 6 years later, Derla filed his own Fishpond Application over
the fishpond area adjoining Hipolito’s. Hipolito charged Derla with Qualified Theft before the
then Justice of the Peace Court of Panabo for gathering and carrying away fish from Hipolito’s
fishpond. Derla, in his defense, claimed that he was still part-owner of the fishpond when he
harvested the fish.
 The Director of Fisheries approved Derla’s application. This was set aside by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (SANR) and declared that the fishpond area Derla applied for
was included in the area covered by Hipolito’s fishpond permit. The Office of the President
affirmed the decision by the SANR on the fishpond application. Thus, the Commissioner on
Fisheries issued Hipolito an amended fishpond permit.
 The Municipality of Panabo opposed Hipolito’s application on the ground that it will disrupt the
development of Panabo.
o February 11, 1972 Decision: This was dismissed by the OP. The OP ruled in favor of
Hipolito since Hipolito had already acquired a vested right over his fishpond area.
o November 2, 1972 Decision: The OP denied the MR filed by the Municipality of
Panabo
 Appeal by Derla to the CA and SC denied. SC decision became final and executory.
 The Municipality of Panabo filed for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction to assail the
application of Hipolito, In the midst of the case, President Marcos commented via a letter to Sec.
Zamora (SANR) that the sale of the fishpond area will affect the developments in Panabo.
o OP revoked its former decisions on granting the application to Hipolito. The latter
then filed for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction.
 After EDSA, Hipolito filed a petition with the OP saying she was a victim of the Marcos regime’s
schemes, as to her fishpond application. It was referred to the Secretary of Agriculture who found
for Hipolito, saying that she was not afforded due process in denying her the sales application.
o OP CASE 4732 – November 11, 1991 Order by the OP: Decided in Hipolito’s favor,
the Office of the President held that the late Hipolito, having complied with all the
terms and conditions for an award of the subject fishpond area, had already
 acquired a vested right therein. The Office of the President also applied the doctrine
of res judicata in its previous decision rejecting Hipolito’s fishpond sales application
was based on then President Marcos’ marginal note, which it found to be legally and
constitutionally suspect for having been issued after the February 11 and November
2, 1972 decisions had become final and executory.
 Petitioners once again came into the picture but both the RTC and Court of Appeals denied the
petitioners’ claims on the ground of res judicata. The lower courts have similarly held that the
annulment of the titles, as sought by the petitioners, relied on the same facts and evidence that
were already presented and passed upon in the earlier O.P. Case 4732; thus, barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
 Petitioners argue that res judicata cannot apply because OP case 4732 is an administrative case.

Issue: Whether or not res judicata applies

Ruling: Yes. Res judicata applies. While it is true that the Court has declared that the doctrine
of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of
administrative powers, the Court have also limited the latter to proceedings purely administrative
in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the
doctrine of res judicata certainly applies.

Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment. It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.

In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same
parties.

Petitioners assert that there can be no res judicata as the November 11, 1991 decision in O.P.
Case No. 4732 is null and void for having overturned an earlier final and executory decision and
for not giving them an opportunity to be heard.
 The SC ruled against the petitioners. The Nov. 11, 1991 Decision in O.P. Case No. 4732 has
attained finality (20) years ago. It is valid and binding. The SC has held time and again that a
final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court.
 There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in this case.
o The parties, although later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, have
been the same from the very beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subject
fishpond area.
 o The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the rights to the
subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the actions
associated and related to it.
o The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same subject matter involved in O.P. Case
No. 4732 and the petition now before the Court.
o With regard to the identity of the causes of action, the similarity between the two causes
of action cannot be impugned. The facts and evidence which supported Hipolito’s
petition for revival of Hipolito’s fishpond sales application in O.P. Case No. 4732 are the
same facts and evidence now before the SC. Hence, the difference of actions in the 2
cases is of no moment.

The petitioners also argue that if res judicata is to be applied in this case, then it should be
applied to bar O.P. Case No. 4732 as it overturned the final and executory decisions of the same
office.
 The petitioners are forgetting the fact that before these 1974 decisions were made, the February
11, 1972 decision of the OP had already become final and executory and the rights conferred to
Hipolito by virtue of that final and executory decision had already become vested in him.
 To follow the petitioners line of argument therefore, would lead the Court to the conclusion that if
there is any one decision that should be retained, then it should be the first decision that had
attained finality.
 This reasoning finds support in Collantes v. Court of Appeals, where the Court held that: “When
faced with two conflicting final and executory decisions, one of the options the Court can take is
to determine which judgment came first.”
 The first judgment to become final and executory is the February 11, 1972 decision of the OP,
which is still in favor of Hipolito and the respondents. To nullify however the November 11,
1991 decision to give way to the reinstatement of the February 11, 1972 decision, would not in
any way help in resolving this tedious and protracted debate.
 Thus, the most prudent thing to do is to retain the more exhaustive and factually updated version
of the decision of the Office of the President, which is the November 11, 1991 Decision in O.P.
Case No. 4732.
 Assuming arguendo that the finality of O.P. Case No. 4732 will not trigger the application of the
doctrine of res judicata to bar the petition now before the Court, the petitioners’ cause must still
fail because the petitioners hinge their claim on the alleged fraudulent transfer to Hipolito of their
father Derla’s right to the Fishpond Permit. The controversy over the subject fishpond area has
long been debated in many actions and in various forums. The Court puts all the issues in this
case to rest, with finality, in this Decision.
 65. Cariño vs. CHR
204 SCRA 483 (1991)

TOPIC: Fact-Finding and Investigatory

DOCTRINE:
1. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in
extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
2. The grant of investigatory power does not imply the grant of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
3. Matters relating to discipline of teachers are under the original Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, and may be
appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and lastly to the Supreme Court (Note: Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, appeals from the Civil Service Commission must first go through the Court of Appeals).

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of
the Secretary of Education (Hon. Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the
basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety
(90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" (the Civil Service Decree) and temporarily replaced.

The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Secretary Cariño, which
was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on
the alleged violation of the striking teachers’ right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra.
After their petitions were denied, respondent teachers thereafter submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of
their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. The
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance
therein. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

The Commission on Human Rights had earlier made clear its position that it does not feel bound by the Supreme Court's joint
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, making plain its intention to hear and resolve the case on the merits. Hence, this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or
official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter
for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

RULING: No. The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the Commission does not have.

It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
"Investigate," means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding
or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

"Adjudicate," means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle, to settle finally (the rights and duties
of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a
case of controversy . . . ."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and
also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education had already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the
Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. The Commission on Human
Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter
and making its own judgment on the questions involved.

Reversal can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by the Supreme Court. The only thing the Commission
can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal
for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.

Petition GRANTED; CHR Order ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent CHR and the Chairman and Members thereof
PROHIBITED from hearing and resolving the case (Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits.
 66. Department of Health vs. Camposano
457 SCRA 438 (2005)

Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Fact-Finding and Investigatory

Doctrine: Department Secretaries are authorized to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
actions for officers and employees under their jurisdiction. As a matter of administrative procedure, a
department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision
may be based; Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under
AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly—their authority was limited to
conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations

Facts: "[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of Health–National Capital Region
(hereinafter DOH-NCR).

On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident
Ombudsman Rogelio Ringpis against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III
Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of
1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth
₱330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

On August 6, 1996, the Ringpis submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against
[respondents] and their co-respondents.

Then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298)
creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(hereafter PCAGC).

The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution
finding the respondents guilty as charged and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V.
Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed thereon.

President Ramos issued [Administrative Order No. 390 which stated that respondent Dr. Rosalinda U.
Majarais is meted the Penalty of dismissal from the service. The records of the case with respect to the
other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica, Department of Health for
appropriate action.’

Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order dismissing the respondents from the
service.

On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the CSC, but was denied. Not satisfied with the
denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their appeal, respondents brought the matter to the CA.
The appellate court held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against
respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of
health failed to comply with administrative due process.
Issue: Whether or not the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. - YES

Ruling:
Department Secretaries are authorized to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions
for officers and employees under their jurisdiction.— The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers
and employees under the former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents. Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction
of the President, in line with the principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.”
While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health
secretary’s disciplinary authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGC’s findings against
them for the secretary’s “appropriate action.”

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to

investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based; Neither the PCAGC under EO 151
nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any
administrative sanctions directly—their authority was limited to conducting investigations and
preparing their findings and recommendations.— As a matter of administrative procedure, a department
secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be
based. In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had
the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting
investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions
belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the department secretary has the competence and the authority to
decide what action should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively
charged and investigated, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and the facts, and failure to comply with this requirement results in
an invalid decision.— The health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action
should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an
invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts,
because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.
In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison
with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision,
President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even noted a violation that had not
been considered by the PCAGC. On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and
blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commission’s Resolution. She even misquoted it by
inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q.
Agustin.

Lecture Notes: Whether admin agencies can discipline their employees? YES. Inherent power DOH v
Camposano
 67. Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President
G.R No. 207355, February 3, 2016

Topic: Administrative Law; Powers of Administrative Agencies; Fact-Finding and Investigatory

Summary: This is a case of insubordination where the Overall Deputy Ombudsman (ODO) is
accused of tolerating procedural lapses in the prosecution of the case, and so instead of following
the former’s order to file oppositions or comments to the Motion to Quash of certain
respondents, they instead filed a Memorandum containing their findings of irregularities against
the Deputy Ombudsman before the Special Prosecutor, which shared it to the Deputy Special
Prosecutor (DSP), and which likewise shared it to the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. Issue: Is
their right to due process violated when the Office of the President decided the case without the
recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Afffairs (ODESLA)?
Held: No. There is nothing in EO 13 which states that the findings on the complaints against a
presidential appointee, such as a Deputy Ombudsman, must be issued by a collegial body. The
ODESLA is merely a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, and thus, it does
not have the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. The investigative authority of
the ODELA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the president. Its absence does not negate the
validity of the decision of the OP.

Doctrine: The Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) is merely
a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President; and thus, it does not have the power to
settle controversies and adjudicate cases.

Facts: Petitioners are Assistant Special Prosecutors III of the Office of the Ombudsman, who
have been assigned to prosecute cases against Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Leopoldo S. Acot (Acot), Bgen.
(Ret.) Ildelfonso N. Dulinayan (Dulinayan) and several others before the Sandiganbayan for
alleged ghost deliveries of assorted supplies and materials to the Philippine Air Force amounting
to about Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P89,000,000.00).

Sometime in early 1995, the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against Acot, Dulinayan and several others
for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019
[RA No. 3019]) and/or for Malversation through Falsification. This was filed in a Resolution
dated 12 April 1996 which was signed and approved by Casimiro who was then the Director of
the Criminal and Administrative Investigation Division of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
immediate supervisor of Almazan and Falcis. Casimiro indorsed the same to Bgen. (Ret.)
Manuel B. Casaclang, then Casimiro's immediate superior. However, Special Prosecution Officer
III Reynaldo L. Mendoza recommended the modification to charge Acot, Dulinayan and several
others only with the violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Special Prosecutor Leonardo
Tamayo (Tamayo) recommended that the charges against Acot and Dulinayan be dismissed for
lack of evidence. Affirming the recommendation of Tamayo, on 2 March 1998, Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto approved the 12 April 1996 Resolution with the modification to dismiss the
charges against Acot and Dulinayan.
In a Memorandum dated 25 June 2007, the OLA noted that the 12 April 1996 Resolution had "no
force and effect because it was never promulgated." The OLA recommended, among others, the
filing of Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several others. In a Memorandum dated 23
February 2009, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Terence S. Fernando of the Office of the
Ombudsman Proper recommended the approval of the OLA's Memorandum. On 3 March 2009,
acting pursuant to delegated authority, Casimiro approved both the 25 June 2007 and 23
February 2009 Memoranda. The Informations were thereafter filed against Acot, Dulinayan and
several others with the Sandiganbayan.

Acot and Dulinayan filed their respective Motions to Quash/Dismiss and to Defer Arraignment
mainly on the grounds that: (1) the right of the State to prosecute had already prescribed; and (2)
given the amount of time the case was filed after the preliminary investigation was started almost
15 years, their right to speedy disposition of case had been violated. Dulinayan further alleged
that a clearance had been issued by the Office of the Ombudsman stating that there were no
pending cases against him. The Sandiganbayan required petitioners, the assigned prosecutors for
this case, to comment on the motions filed by Acot and Dulinayan.
Based on their evaluation of the records, petitioners found that there were procedural lapses in
the handling of the cases, which they attributed to Casimiro. Thus, instead of filing the required
Comment and/or Opposition with the Sandiganbayan, petitioners submitted a Memorandum
dated 5 January 2010, which contained their findings against Casimiro. However, the
Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several others were subsequently dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of the case.

On 3 November 2010, petitioners filed their own Complaint before the OP, alleging that
Casimiro and Turalba committed the following administrative infractions: (1) grave misconduct,
(2) gross negligence; (3) oppressions, (4) conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service; (5) violation of the rules on confidentiality; (6) violation of Office Order No. 05-18, and
Office Order No. 05-13; and (7) violation of Section 35 of RA No. 6770, amounting to
dishonesty and gross misconduct.

In a Decision dated 14 June 2011, the OP dismissed the complaint filed against Casimiro and
Turalba. Casimiro, as a mere Director of a Bureau of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military and other Law Enforcement Offices and who was thereafter appointed Deputy
Ombudsman only on December 16, 1999, he had every right to presume regularity in the
investigation of the case. In fact, no less than the Office of Legal Affairs of the Office of the
Ombudsman, concluded that the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 had never become final. No
delay, therefore, may be attributed to respondent Casimiro who came across the records of the
case nine (9) years after he signed the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 recommending the filing
of informations to his superior, if the Office of the Ombudsman itself never considered that the
Resolution dated 12 April 1996 as final and executory.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision rendered by the OP. The CA ruled that respondent
Casimiro cannot be faulted in the delay, if any, in filing the appropriate criminal Informations
against Acot and Dulinayan considering that Ombudsman Desierto overruled the
recommendations and concurrence by the Investigators and Casimiro as to the finding of
probable cause against the said military officials.
Issue : Whether or not their right to due process was violated when the Office of the President
decided the case without the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Afffairs (ODESLA)? NO.

Ruling : As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in EO No. 13 which
states that findings on the complaints against a presidential appointee, such as a Deputy
Ombudsman, must be issued by a collegial body. The ODESLA is merely a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President; and thus, it does not have the power to settle
controversies and adjudicate cases. In Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, the Court held:

“Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to “investigate or hear administrative cases
or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government” and to “submit its report
and recommendations to the President.” The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and
adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, and later
reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as
such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.”

x x x x

While the Ombudsman’s function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause
and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the
IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation
of the Ombudsman’s constitutional duties.

Moreover, as the report of the ODESLA is merely recommendatory in nature, its absence does
not negate the validity of the decision of the OP. There is nothing in EO No. 13 which states that
the lack of recommendation of the ODESLA renders the OP’s decision in an administrative case
void. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process.
68. Sañado vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108338 | April 17, 2001

Topic: Licensing

Doctrine:
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or
certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi- judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision
is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. As such, the decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act
of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely
falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its
principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.

Facts:
Sañado was issued an Ordinary Fishpond permit covering an area of 50 hectares by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries
Commission. On July 16, 1973, Sañado executed a contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of
the 50 hectares covered by Sañado's fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties modified this earlier agreement by excluding the
area of 10 hectares already cultivated and fully developed and providing that the contract is renewable on terms acceptable to
both of them.
On September 28, 1979, the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources
the conversion of Sanado’s fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of 26.745
hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.
On July 17, 1981, Sañado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages, alleging
that Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sañados share of the net harvest among other things. While this case was pending, the then
Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of
government. Later, said order was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that
his improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the government.
Sañado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision
over Sañado's complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President in cancelling petitioner's lease agreement should be given weight

Held:
Yes. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or
certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi- judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision
is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. As such, the decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act
of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely
falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its
principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.

The issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned by an
ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter — the Ministry of
Agriculture and Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of the executive
branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in
the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor. Such respect is based
on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate
rank as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.

Moreover, the reasons given by the Office of the President in this case on dismissing the petitioner’s appeal are quite clear.
Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the administrative body
concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the
cancellation of one’s license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have
elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter’s exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in the
record do we find such action on petitioner’s part.
 69. Philcomsat v. Alcuaz
G.R. No. 84818; December 18, 1989

Topic: Rate-fixing; Sec. 2(3), Book VII Administrative Code.

Doctrine: Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes
a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by
the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and
just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness,
this standard may be implied. 

Facts: Petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz, Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on
June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC.

On September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue
operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since
1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been
providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the
above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.

On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging.

The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for
another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge
modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground:

The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an initial evaluation
by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization Department of the financial
statements of applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further
reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further evaluation that more reduction should be
effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the case.

Issue/s: 1. Whether NTC has the power to fix rates for public service communications and does provide
the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. YES.
2. Whether E.O. 546 violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of
a violation of substantive due process. YES.

Ruling: 1. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency
concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and
must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 

It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the
manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to
determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which
necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under
Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of
public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private
entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides
for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over
respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or
components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable
rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude
that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

2. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although
the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character.
Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the
fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other.

In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which
provides:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission
shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and
provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed
and followed thereafter by any public service; ...

There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being
no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first
giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the
same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the
present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in
NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them
"under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this application,
the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 

While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information
or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence
before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in
evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
 70. Soriano v. Laguardia
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

Topic: Powers of Administrative Agencies; Administrative

Doctrine: Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if
granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation,
to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.

Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., Soriano, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
made the following remarks: “Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael,
masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito]
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”
Two days after, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were filed before the MTRCB
against Soriano in connection with the above broadcast. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent Soriano a notice of
hearing in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating
Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which Soriano appeared, the MTRCB preventively suspended
the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of PD 1986,
creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII
of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
The following day, Soriano sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order but it was
withdrawn two days after. Soriano instead filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
preventive suspension order thus issued.

Issue: Whether the preventive suspension imposed against Soriano and the relevant IRR provision
authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue
preventive suspension. NO.

Ruling: Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated,
expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry
should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally
construed.
A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of
the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority
stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory
and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied
from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline
illusory.
 Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted,
carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to
preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred
under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as Soriano insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive
suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would
not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the
MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the
exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for
violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an
administrative sanction. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the
enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement.

Additional Note: The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.70
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
 71 - Cipriano vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007
Administrative

DOCTRINE: The COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans
Roger’s certificate of candidacy. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not
file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due
course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy.

Facts:

Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for
Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification
of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna made a false material representation in her certificate of
candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued,
Abra. Private respondents also claimed that Luna’s certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because
the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was
only 20 years old on election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be
substituted by Luna.

The COMELEC First Division granted the petition and denied due course to the substitution of Luna for
Hans Roger. It ruled that, while Luna complied with the procedural requirements for substitution, Hans
Roger was not a valid candidate for vice-mayor. The COMELEC First Division pointed out that Hans
Roger, being underage did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, Hans Roger was not a valid
candidate for vice-mayor who could be substituted by Luna.  The COMELEC First Division also ruled
that Luna was not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra and that this was sufficient to disqualify Luna from
running as vice-mayor. Luna filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc that there
was a violation of her right to due process because she was not given the opportunity to present evidence
on her behalf with the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the finding that
Hans Roger, being underage, may not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC En Banc also ruled
that Luna’s right to due process was not violated because Luna was notified of the petition and was given
the opportunity to be heard.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid
substitution by Luna for Hans Roger? – YES.
HELD:

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without
the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.
When Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC
had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy.

Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code) provides:

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.- The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt
of the certificate of candidacy.

The Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the
usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to
his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a
verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel
Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings,
cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Roger’s
certificate of candidacy. For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy after the
proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Roger’s certificate of
candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC.

Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that
he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due
course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s certificate of
candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna. Since Hans Roger withdrew his
certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
requirements for a valid substitution Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.
 72. Reyna v. COA
G.R. No. 167219, 2011

Topic: Sec. 1 Art. VIII; Sec. 23 & 25 Book VII Admin; Rule 43 ROC. Judicial Review of
Administrative Action

Doctrine: Certiorari; In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact cannot be raised in a
petition for certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court; Any resort to the said petition under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional
issues. ; It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Commission on Audit
(COA), are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial
evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.

Facts:
 Land Bank of the Philippines was engaged in a CATTLE-FINANCING PROGRAM wherein loans
were granted to various cooperatives. Land Bank’s Ipil Branch went into a massive information
campaign offering the program to cooperatives.
 Cooperatives who wish to avail of a loan under the program must fill up a Credit Facility Proposal
(CFP) which will be reviewed by the Ipil Branch as mandated by the Field Operations Manual. One
of the conditions stipulated in the CFP is that prior to the release of the loan, a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) between the supplier of the cattle, Remad Livestock Corporation (REMAD),
AND the cooperative, shall have been signed
 Petitioners alleged that the terms of the CFP ALLOWED FOR PRE-PAYMENTS or advancement of
the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD. However, the very contract
entered into by the cooperatives and REMAD, or the "Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing
Agreement" DID NOT contain a provision authorizing prepayment.
 Three checks were issued by the Ipil Branch to REMAD to serve as advanced payment for the cattle.
REMAD, however, FAILED TO SUPPLY the cattle on the dates agreed upon.
 In post audit, the Land Bank Auditor (Auditor) DISALLOWED the amount of P3,115,000.00;
grounds:
 non-delivery of the cattle.
  advanced payment was made in violation of bank policies and COA rules and regulations –
“Payment thereof will only be effected upon delivery of asset, inspection and acceptance of the
same by the borrower”
 The Auditor also found that NOWHERE in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment
scheme with REMAD, the supplier/dealer
 Meanwhile, petitioners were also MADE RESPONDENTS in a Complaint filed by the COA
Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, before the Office of the Ombudsman for Gross
Negligence, Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Bank and Giving Unwarranted Benefits to persons, causing undue injury in violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
 Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the issuance of the Notice of
Disallowance WAS PREMATURE in view of the pending case in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Motion was DENIED by the Auditor.
 Petitioners filed an appeal with the DIRECTOR of COA Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City.
Regional Director AFFIRMED the findings of the Auditor. Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED
 Petitioners DID NOT FILE a Petition for Review or a Notice of Appeal from the COA Regional
Office Decision as required under Section 3, Rule VI15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of
the COA. Thus, the Decision of the Director of COA Regional Office No. IX BECAME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY
 Director of the COA Regional Office No. IX directed the Auditor to require the accountant of the Ipil
Branch to RECORD in their books of account the said DISALLOWANCE.
 Petitioner sent a Letter to COA Regional Office No. IX, seeking to have the booking of the
disallowance SET ASIDE, on the grounds:
 that THEY WERE ABSOLVED by the Ombudsman in a February 23, 1999 Resolution, and that
 the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas had approved the writing off of the subject loans
 COA Regional Office No. IX endorsed to the Commission proper (COA National)
 Petitioner’s Reply: the Ombudsman Resolution is a SUPERVENING EVENT and is a sufficient
ground FOR EXEMPTION from the requirement to submit a Petition for Review or a Notice of
Appeal to the Commission proper
 COA AFFIRMED the rulings of the Auditor and the Regional Office
 dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of the complaint DID NOT AFFECT the validity and
propriety of the disallowance WHICH HAD BECOME FINAL and executory.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, DENIED by the COA
 Thus, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 64,
raising the following issue, inter alia:
 RESPONDENT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING THE PREPAYMENT STIPULATION IN THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BANK AND REMAD PROSCRIBED BY SECTION 103 OF
P.D. NO. 1445, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE STATE AUDIT CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

Issue: Whether or not the not the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 is proper. NO.

Ruling:
 In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact CANNOT BE RAISED in a
petition for certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The office of the petition
for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of judgment; any resort to the said petition under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution
of JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES. 
 Accordingly, since the validity of the prepayment scheme is inherently a question of fact, the
same should no longer be looked into by this Court.
 Even assuming that factual questions may be entertained, the facts DO NOT HELP petitioners' cause
for the following reason, among others: the supposed Annex "I" DOES NOT CONTAIN a stipulation
authorizing a pre-payment scheme.
 Recall that the Auditor noted that "NOWHERE in the documents reviewed disclosed about
prepayment scheme with REMAD." 
 It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are
GENERALLY ACCORDED RESPECT and EVEN FINALITY by the Court, IF SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under
their jurisdiction.
 To emphasize, the Auditor noted that „nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about
prepayment scheme with REMAD. It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if
supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under
their jurisdiction. If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have
produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, as
stated before, even this Court is at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as
a review of “Annex I,‰ the document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance
payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision.
 If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the document to
prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, even the Supreme Court was at a
loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as a review of "Annex I," the document to
which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, DOES NOT CONTAIN such a
stipulation or provision.
 Highlighted also is the fact that petitioners clearly violated the procedure in releasing loans found in
the Manual on Lending Operations which provides that payments to the dealer shall only be made
after presentation of reimbursement documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative
that the same has been delivered.
 73. Remolona vs. CSC,
G.R. No. 137473 (2001)

Topic: Judicial Review of Administrative Action

Doctrine: The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this
Court. Courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.

Facts:

Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa
Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of Infanta inquired
about Nery’s Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed
that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a
passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was eventually revealed that Nery Remolona’s
name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in
her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%. Estelito Remolona in
his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his
wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was no
vacancy when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked
for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America was able to
receive 6 checks at 2,600pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On recommendation of
Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and
imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion for Reconsideration, only Nery
was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and
denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.

Remolona is arguing: (a) There was no counsel when he rendered the extra-judicial counsel (b) He
should not be dismissed because his acts was not in connection with his official acts as postmaster.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of an Administrative body may be subject a Judicial Review. No.

HELD:

The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are
binding on this Court.

It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the
sufficiency of evidence.

Thus, when confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative
agency concerned in the exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on
the basis of the evidence received.

The rule is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they
have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an
excess of jurisdiction.

Right to Counsel in Administrative Proceedings. None.

-While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative
proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.

Not in connection with office.

- And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are
not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.
 74. OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES, SUPRA

TOPIC: ADMIN LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

DOCTRINE: General Rule: Court will not analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again in
reviewing administrative decisions. Exception: serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of
justice would result if court simply accepts the administrative body’s full findings.

FACTS:
Acero went to LTO Camiguin to apply for driver’s license. He failed the exam but Angelito, a clerk in
said office, informed him that if he is willing to pay additional assessment then they will consider his
application. Acero paid the said assessment fee but later alleged that Antonio and Angelito are fraudulent
in that they failed to issue receipt for the payment. Consequently, Acero filed a charge against the guilty
parties. Angelito and Antonio denied these allegations. The Ombudsman found respondent guilty of
simple misconduct. On appeal, CA reversed the OMB’s judgment for the evidence submitted by Acero
was self-serving. Hence, OMB filed a petition assailing the said Order.

ISSUE:
Is CA correct in ruling that Reyes is not guilty of the crime charged?

HELD:
As a rule, it is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again in
reviewing administrative decisions. An exception to this rule is when there is serious ground to believe
that a possible miscarriage of justice would result if the Court simply accepts the administrative body’s
full findings.
Here, the exception applies. Hence, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case should be made in
order to arrive a just resolution. There is violation of respondent’s right to due process. OMB plainly
disregarded respondent’s protests without giving him an opportunity to be belatedly furnished copies of
the affidavits of Angelito, Amper, and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. The OMB rendered
its decision on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. A judgment in an administrative
case imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also
rendered with due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.
NOTE:
Substantial evidence is amount of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. In administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against
the party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.

75. Palao vs. Florentino III International

G.R. No. 186967, January 18, 2017

Topic: Administrative Law; Judicial Review of Administrative Action

Doctrine: Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.

Facts: In its assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the September 22, 2008 Order of
Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. and reinstated respondent Florentino
III International, Inc.'s (Florentino) appeal from Decision No. 2007-31, dated March 5, 2007, of the
Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office. Decision No. 2007-31 denied Florentino's
Petition for Cancellation of Letters Patent No. UM-7789, which the Intellectual Property Office had
issued in favor of Palao. Letters Patent No. UM-7789 pertained to "A Ceramic Tile Installation on Non-
Concrete Substrate Base Surfaces Adapted to Form Part of Furniture, Architectural Components and the
Like.
In its Petition for Cancellation, Florentino claimed that the utility model covered by Letters Patent No.
UM-7789 was not original, new, or patentable, as it had been publicly known or used in the Philippines
and had even been the subject of several publications. It added that it, as well as many others, had been
using the utility model well before Palao' s application for a patent. In its Decision, the Bureau of Legal
Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office denied Florentino's Petition for Cancellation. Florentino
appealed to the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office. This appeal's
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. John Labsky P. Maximo
(Atty. Maximo). However, Florentino failed to attach to its appeal a secretary's certificate or board
resolution authorizing Balgos and Perez to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping. Thus, the Office of the Director General issued the Order requiring Florentino to submit proof
that Atty. Maximo or Balgos and Perez was authorized to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping.

In his Order, Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr. (Director General
Cristobal) dismissed Florentino's appeal. Florentino then filed before the CA a Petition for Review under
Rule 43. In its assailed Decision, the CA faulted Director General Cristobal for an overly strict
application of procedural rules. Thus, it reversed Director General Cristobal's Order and reinstated
Florentino' s appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Order of Intellectual Property Office Director
General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., and in reinstating respondent Florentino III International, Inc.' s appeal. -
NO.

Ruling: The need for a certification of non-forum shopping to be attached to respondent's appeal before
the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office is established. However, the
Intellectual Property Office's own Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings specify that the Intellectual
Property Office "shall not be bound by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence.” This rule is
in keeping with the general principle that administrative bodies are not strictly bound by technical rules of
procedure. Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered
by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.

In conformity with this liberality, the Intellectual Property Office's Uniform Rules on Appeal expressly
enables appellants, who failed to comply with some formal requirements, to subsequently complete their
compliance. Given these premises, it was an error for the Director General of the Intellectual Property
Office to have been so rigid in applying a procedural rule and dismissing respondent's appeal.

As pointed out by the CA, respondent's counsel has been representing respondent (and signing documents
for it) "since the [original] Petition for Cancellation of Letter Patent No. UM-7789 was filed." Thus, its
act of signing for respondent, on appeal before the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office,
was not an aberration. It was a mere continuation of what it had previously done. It is reasonable,
therefore-consistent with the precept of liberally applying procedural rules in administrative proceedings,
and with the room allowed by jurisprudence for substantial compliance with respect to the rule on
certifications of non-forum shopping-to construe the error committed by respondent as a venial lapse that
should not be fatal to its cause.
 76. Smart Communications vs. NTC
408 SCRA 768 (2003)

Topic: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary/Prior Restraint

Doctrine: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory
statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the court.

Facts:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued a Memorandum Circular promulgating rules and regulations on the
billing of telecommunications services. The NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally
eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another
Memorandum addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC, Commissioner an action for
declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
Memorandum with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order at the RTC-QC.

Issue: Whether NTC has Jurisdiction over the case. NONE

Ruling:
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory
statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in
such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to
assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances.
 77. Republic vs. Lacap
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007

Topic: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary/Prior Restraint

Doctrine: Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Facts: The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an Invitation To Bid to
which respondent submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract for the concreting of
Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the
materials and payment for labor costs. Upon completion, respondent sought to collect payment
for the completed project. DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the COA disapproved
the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at
the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH
Legal Department on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction for various Mount Pinatubo
rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its contractor’s license had already
expired when the projects were contracted. Respondent filed the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC. OSG filed its Answer invoking the
defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the
State. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff ordering payment. CA upheld RTC ruling stating that
since the case involves the application of the principle of estoppel against the government which
is a purely legal question, then the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply; that by its actions the government is estopped from questioning the validity and binding
effect of the Contract Agreement with the respondent; that denial of payment to respondent on
purely technical grounds after successful completion of the project is not countenanced either by
justice or equity. Petitioner contends that the proper remedy was to appeal the District Auditor’s
disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to Section 48, P.D. No. 1445; that the COA has
primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money claim against the government under Section
2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the principle of primary
jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action. - NO

Ruling:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail
of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative
agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after
due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as:

1. where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2. where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
3. where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
4. where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
5. where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice
6. where judicial intervention is urgent;
7. when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
8. where the controverted acts violate due process;
9. when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot
10. when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. when strong public interest is involved; and,
12. in quo warranto proceedings.

There was a presence of 3 and 5 in the case at bar.

Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994
that payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained
unpaid for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay
and official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent. Furthermore, whether a contractor with
an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for completed
projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the
administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the
courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.
The Court holds that, in view of exceptions 3 and 5 narrated above, the complaint for specific
performance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to
resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
 Case No. 78

G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N.

PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners, vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, Respondents.

TOPIC: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

DOCTRINE: It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that
the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court

The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for
their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence
and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.

SUMMARY: This case stemmed from the ethics complaint filed against Senator Villar for his alleged involvement
to a double entry of fund pertaining to one infrastructure project – SUCAT Expressway. The Senate decided not to
lodge the investigation in the Ethics Committee, but rather the investigation should be done by the Senate as a
whole. The investigation proceeded despite of absence of publication of the new rules relating to the investigation
done by the senate as a whole. Thus the said investigation prompted herein petitioners to file a case in SC. The
Respondents in this case opposed the said case by assailing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. However the court
did not apply the doctrine of primary Jurisdiction the case at bar. (please see the ruling for the Court’s agument)
FACTS: This case involves an alleged double entry of fund in 2008 GAA. Accordingly the 200 Million
infrastructure project particularly the ₱200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P.
Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way
(ROW), and another ₱200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW.
Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it
was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail
leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
Pursuant to that, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 70. Which statest that:
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS
AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR
USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD
EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE
OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS
CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations
against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another
privilege speech where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the
accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole.
The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present,
and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the
determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics
Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments
were adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S.
Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all
Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent
declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference
was set on 26 May 2009.
Pursuant to that, Senator Pimentel filed this case in the SC. Respondent on the other hand argued that case to be
dismissed under the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

RULING: The Court ruled that the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is not applicable in the case at bar.

The Court held that:

Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of administrative
questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of
justice."Citing Pimentel v. HRET, respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the
Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the
government.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:

x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions
of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x

The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their
resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and
jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.

As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of
separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people."20 Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on
this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look
behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers." 21 The Court, therefore, is not precluded from
resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On
the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court

Hence, pursuant to doctrine of Judicial review the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is not applicable in the case at
bar. Furthermore, the case does not require expertise of administrative agency. Hence this case can be tried in the
SC.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics
and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole
 79. Philippine Telegraph vs. Smart, Inc.
G.R. No. 189026 (2016)

Topic: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary/Prior Restraint

Doctrine: To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative
tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the
administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme.

Facts: Petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT &T) and respondent Smart
Communications, Inc. (Smart) entered into an Agreement for the interconnection of their
telecommunication facilities. However, PT &T had difficulty meeting its financial obligations to
Smart. Thus, the parties amended the Agreement, which extended the payment period and
allowed PT &T to settle its obligations on installment basis. Thereafter, PT&T filed a letter-
complaint with the NTC raising the issue that the access charges imposed by Smart were
allegedly "discriminatory and not in conformity with those of other carriers." The NTC ordered
Smart and PT&T to attend mediation conferences in order to thresh out the issues. After the
mediation efforts failed, the NTC directed the parties to file their respective pleadings, after
which it would consider the case submitted for resolution. But before the parties were able to
submit the pleadings, Smart filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(RTC) against PT&T. Smart alleged that PT&T was in breach of its contractual obligation when
it failed to pay its outstanding debt and denied its liability to Smart. Smart also asked the RTC to
issue a temporary restraining order against the NTC and PT&T, which the RTC granted. PT &T
sought for the dismissal of the civil case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, non-observance
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, litis pendentia and
res judicata. After several hearings, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
Smart. The RTC reasoned that allowing the NTC to proceed and adjudicate access charges
would violate Smart's contractual rights.

Issue: Whether or not the NTC has primary jurisdiction over questions involving access charge
stipulations in a bilateral interconnection agreement

Held: Yes. RA 7925 recognizes and encourages bilateral negotiations between PTEs, but it does
not strictly adopt a laissez-faire policy. It imposes strictures that restrain within reason how PTEs
conduct their business. The law aims to foster a healthy competitive environment by striking a
balance between the freedom of PTEs to make business decisions and to interact with one
another on the one hand and the affordability of rates on the other. However, one can speak of
healthy competition only between equals. Thus, consistent with Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution, RA 7925 seeks to break up the monopoly in the telecommunications industry by
gradually dismantling the barriers to entry and granting new industry entrants protection against
dominant carriers through equitable access charges and equal access clauses in interconnection
agreements and through the strict policing of predatory pricing by dominant carriers.

In San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, we held that:

 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters
demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at
the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its
determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative
board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact,
relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the
courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the
court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the
administrative body are threshed out and determined.

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an
administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special
competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that
instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative
body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a
question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the
resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper.

Here, it would be more proper for the RTC to yield its jurisdiction in favor of the NTC since the
determination of a central issue, i.e., the matter of access charges, requires the special
competence and expertise of the latter. "In this era of clogged court dockets, administrative
boards or commissions with special knowledge, experience and capability to promptly hear and
determine disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review
in case of grave abuse of discretion, are well-nigh indispensable. Between the power lodged in
an administrative body and a court, therefore, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."
 80. OBIASCA vs. BASALOTTE
, 613 SCRA 110 (2010)

TOPIC: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of
law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative
review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in
the administrative forum.

FACTS: On May 26, 2003, City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso appointed
respondent Jeane O. Basallote to the position of Administrative Officer II of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay.

Subsequently, the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo, advised
School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales that the papers of the applicants for the position of
Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of respondent, were being returned and
that a school ranking should be accomplished and submitted to her office for review. In addition,
Gonzales was advised that only qualified applicants should be endorsed.

Respondent assumed the office of Administrative Officer II on June 19, 2003. Thereafter,
however, she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz, Human Resource Management Officer I
of the City Schools Division of Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could
not be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because of her failure to submit the
position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales.

Respondent tried to obtain Gozales’ signature but the latter refused despite repeated requests.
When respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead advised to return to her
former teaching position of Teacher I. Respondent followed the advice.

Meanwhile, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin B. Obiasca to the same position of Administrative
Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by the CSC. Upon learning
this, respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against
Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz.

In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for
withholding information from respondent on the status of her appointment, and suspended them
from the service for three months. Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing.

The CSC, upon appeal by the respondent, approved her appointment and recalled the approval of
petitioner’s appointment as Administrative Officer II. The petitioner, without filing petition for
reconsideration of the CSC resolution, she filed a petition for review in the CA. The CA upheld
the decision of the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC to recall the appointment of the petition has
become final and executory. YES.

RULING: Section 18 of Omnibus Rules of the CSC provides that failure to file a protest, appeal,
petition for reconsideration or petition for review within the prescribed period shall be deemed a
waiver of such right and shall render the subject action/decision final and executory.

In this case, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated
November 29, 2005 before filing a petition for review in the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on
petitioner’s part allowed the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and
executory. Hence, for all intents and purposes, the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 has
become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. A final and definitive judgment
can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed. Thus, in praying for the reversal of the
assailed Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the final and executory CSC resolution dated
November 29, 2005, petitioner would want the Court to reverse a final and executory judgment
and disregard the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.

True, a dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from availing of remedies
other than those provided in Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules. This is precisely the purpose of
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the filing of a petition for review as a remedy
to challenge the decisions of the CSC.

While Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules does not supplant the mode of appeal under Rule 43, we
cannot disregard Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules, which requires that a petition for
reconsideration should be filed, otherwise, the CSC decision will become final and executory,
viz.:

The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is filed within
fifteen days from receipt thereof.

Note that the foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC decisions involving its
administrative function, that is, on matters involving "appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service," as opposed to its quasi-judicial function where it
adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity
and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and
provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities
have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum. In Orosa v. Roa, the Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within
the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.
While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions,
these are not present in this case.
Thus, absent any definitive ruling that the second paragraph of Section 16 is not mandatory and
the filing of a petition for reconsideration may be dispensed with, then the Court must adhere to
the dictates of Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules.

81. Republic vs. O.G. Holdings

G.R. No. 189290 (2017)

Topic: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Doctrine: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be made with the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available,
with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide a controversy, a party should first exhaust
such remedy before going to court.

The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and
submitted to a court without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues.

Facts:
Respondent O.G. Holdings’ ECC6 was suspended by the EMB because of their continuous failure to comply with
the condition that they will secure a foreshore lease in line with the man-made island they were constructing. O.G.
Holdings moved for reconsideration. It pleaded that the suspension of the ECC would hinder its application with the
PRA, as it required an existing ECC for the special registration of the man-made island. The plea prompted the EMB
to visit the project site and advise respondent not to take any activity over the area. However, local fisherfolk
reported to the bureau its continued activity. After investigation of the incident, the Office further ordered
respondent to submit the required tenurial instrument for the foreshore area and other documents relevant
thereto within 72 hours from receipt hereof, subject to the evaluation and review of this Office. If found
compliant, the Order suspending the efficacy of the ECC will be lifted, however, if the documents will be found
insufficient, the CEASE AND DESIST ORDER will be implemented immediately by this Office.

O.G. Holdings no longer moved for the reconsideration of this second order. Instead, it filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA. The petition for certiorari prayed for the annulment of the orders and claimed an "extreme urgency"
in the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the orders. The petition
also asked that "a condition" in the subject ECC be annulled and/or modified.

The petition insisted that certiorari was the proper remedy against the suspension of the project's ECC. Appealing
the suspensive orders to the Secretary of the DENR, it argued, would not stay the subject suspension. The petition
claimed that four exceptions existed to prevent the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies: (1) to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (2) the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (3) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, as
when public interest is involved; and (4) there is irreparable injury. Regarding the fourth point, the petition claimed
that cancellations of local and foreign guest bookings, as a consequence of the suspension, were harming the
economic well-being of O.G. Holdings, its employees, and the Province of Bohol. The petition also claimed that
they had imposed "an impossible condition [to be complied with] within an impossible 72 hours."

Issue: Whether the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the orders of EMB.

Ruling: Yes. The CA erred in granting O. G. Holdings' petition when they had failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies before seeking certiorari. [see doctrine]

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies closely echoes the reason behind the rule providing that
before resort to the special civil action of certiorari is allowed, a motion for reconsideration should first be filed with
the public respondent concerned. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is obliged pursuant to comity and

6
Environmental Compliance Certificate
convenience which in turn impel courts to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court without first giving the agency the
opportunity to dispose of the issues.

O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine. Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of the subject
ECC, made available via DENR A.O. No. 30, which was prevailing at the time of the suspensive orders. The DENR
may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances between proponents and
aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action.

The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances between
proponents and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific
implementing guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to be appealed, the petitioner
could have been easily guided in that regard by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the Director
of a line bureau, such as the EMB, shall have supervision and control over all division and other units, including
regional offices, under the bureau. Verily, supervision and control include the power to "review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units." Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the
EMB Regional Director's decision to the EMB Director, who exercised supervision and control over the former.
 82. Aala vs. Uy
G.R. No. 202781 January 10, 2017

TOPIC: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

DOCTRINE: Parties are generally precluded from immediately seeking the intervention of
courts when “the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body,
or officer.” Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved taxpayers who
question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to file an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice before they seek intervention from the regular courts.

FACTS:
Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel Jorge P. Ferido (Ferido), both residents of Tagum
filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an Opposition/Objection to City
Ordinance alleging that the newly passed ordinance, which sought to adopt a new schedule of
market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City, violated the Local
Government Code, as the ordinance divided Tagum City into different zones, classified real
properties per zone, and fixed its market values depending on where they were situated without
taking into account the “distinct and fundamental differences and elements of value” of each
property.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte issued Resolution No. 428 31 declaring as
invalid Section III(C)(1), (2), and (3), Section III(D)(1) and (2), and Section IIIG(1)(b) and (4)(g)
of City Ordinance No. 558, S-2012. However, on July 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Tagum City passed Resolution No. 874, S-2012 declaring City Ordinance No. 558, S-2012 as
valid. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City argued that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Davao del Norte failed to take action on City Ordinance No. 558, S-2012 within 30 days from its
receipt on April 12, 2012.Hence under the Local Government Code, the City Ordinance in
question enjoys the presumption of validity.

Aala filed a petition for Certiorari, and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to nullify the ordinance on the ground that the
respondents enacted the ordinance with grave abuse of discretion. They claim that the ordinance
imposes exorbitant real estate taxes because of the Sangguniang Panlungsod’s erroneous
classification and valuation of real properties. Petitioners are concerned residents of Tagum City
who would be directly affected by the implementation of the questioned ordinance. They are
well aware of the doctrines on the hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies,
and they beg this Court’s indulgence to allow immediate and direct resort to it. According to
petitioners, this case is exempt from the application of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. They
anchor their claim on the ground that the redress they desire cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts. Furthermore, petitioners assert that the issue they have raised is purely legal
and that the case involves paramount public interest, which warrants the relaxation of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether this case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies;

Basically, whether or not the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Agencies are applicable
with Local Government Units - YES

RULING:

Parties are generally precluded from immediately seeking the intervention of courts when “the
law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer.” The
practical purpose behind the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to provide an
orderly procedure by giving the administrative agency an “opportunity to decide the matter by
itself correctly [and] to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.”

Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved taxpayers who question
the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to file an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice before they seek intervention from the regular courts.

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 143 this Court declared the mandatory nature of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code of 1991:

[T]he law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a
tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from
effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is
allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon,
after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. These
three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking
redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as
enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason the courts
construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, like the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, is
not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-defined exceptions. Province of Zamboanga del
Norte v. Court of Appeals 147 has held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be dispensed in the following instances:

(1) [W]hen there is a violation of due process;

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and
unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant;
(12) when no administrative review is provided by law;
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.

Thus, in Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of Cebu, 149 this Court excluded the case
from the strict application of the principle on exhaustion of administrative remedies, particularly
for noncompliance with Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that
the issue raised in the Petition was purely legal. In this case, however, the issues involved are not
purely legal. There are factual issues that need to be addressed for the proper disposition of the
case. In other words, this case is still not ripe for adjudication.

To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first filed an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify direct resort to this Court on the ground that
they are entangled in a “catch-22 situation.” 7 They believe that filing an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice would merely delay the process and give the City Government of Tagum
ample time to collect real property taxes.

The questioned ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners immediately filed an
appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have had enough time to render a decision. Section 187 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 gives the Secretary of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal.
Within 30 days from receipt of an unfavorable decision or upon inaction by the Secretary of
Justice within the time prescribed, aggrieved taxpayers may opt to lodge the appropriate
proceeding before the regular courts.

The “catch-22 situation” petitioners allude to does not exist. Under Section 166 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, local taxes “shall accrue on the first (1st) day of January of each
year.” When the questioned ordinance was published in July 2012, the City Government of
Tagum could not have immediately issued real property tax assessments. Hence, petitioners had
ample time within which to question the validity of the tax ordinance.

Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to dwell
on and resolve the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners
could have been properly addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of
hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were established for a
reason. While petitioners’ enthusiasm in their advocacy may be admirable, their overzealousness
has further delayed their cause.

7
No escape situation
 83. Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004

Topic: Judicial Review of Administrative Action; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Doctrine: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of
the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of Administrative agencies are not courts; they
are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED
does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before
the Commission.

Facts: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college
mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-
2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance
Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was
allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their
test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations,
Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final
examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad
-- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her
logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing
to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics
examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's
pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint5 for damages against PCST,
Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as
moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of
litigation and attorney's fees.

On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss6 on the ground of petitioner's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been
initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
In her Comment to respondents' Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for
damages arising from respondents' breach of the laws on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with
the courts. On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.

Issue: whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable. NO.

Held: First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In
Factoran Jr. v. CA,12 the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine:

"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for

reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x.13 "

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to
allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A
reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances,
the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part
of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of Administrative agencies are not courts;
they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED
does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before
the Commission.

Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely
legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for
the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
 84. Maglalang v. PAGCOR
G.R No. 190566, December 11, 2013

Topic. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Doctrines:
 Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her.
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following
exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount
to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable
delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is
provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. The instant case falls
squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for
administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules
and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. Section 37 (a) and (b)
of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the
unavailability of any appeal: Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 of
E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC.

Facts: Petitoner Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December 2008,
he committed an error counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose between the two,
they were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. He was
required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was issued a memo charging him with
Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension was imposed. He filed MR
seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents relative
to the case. Both were denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He
ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in
adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its
decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not
appeal to the Civil Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day
suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
recourse from the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: No. CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there
is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and
(14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. The case falls
squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for
administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D.
No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the unavailability
of any appeal: Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 of E.O. No. 292 essentially
providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC.

The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely
distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment
despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
 85. VIVENCIO, EUGENIO, JOJI AND MYRNA, ALL SURNAMED MATEO vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017

Topic: Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

DOCTRINE: One of the exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that irretrievably
prejudices a complainant.

FACTS: A portion of the land owned by petitioners was brought under CARP coverage. The
Land Bank of the Philippines valued the land at fifty-two thousand pesos (₱52,000.00) per
hectare. The Mateos rejected the valuation. Petitioners then filed a complaint against LBP, DAR
and the farmer beneficiaries of the land for just compensation. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-6331 and raffled to the SAC. The SAC ruled the just compensation for the land at
P71,143,623.00 Pesos for the land owned by the Mateos.

The LBP and the DAR both filed notices of appeal and in its decision, the CA set aside the
SAC's judgment and dismissing without prejudice the complaint of the Mateos. In its decision,
the CA noted that the DARAB, which has the quasi-judicial authority to make a preliminary
determination of just compensation of lands acquired under R.A. No. 6657, had not yet taken
cognizance of, and passed upon the issue of just compensation when the Mateos prematurely
filed with the court the complaint for determination of just compensation. Thus, failing to
exhaust the prescribed administrative remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in
this case. NO.

RULING:

Alfonso v. LBP is unequivocal that administrative remedies cannot be dispensed with and direct resort to the SAC is
proscribed. However, the foregoing rule cannot be applied in the case at bar for reasons discussed below.

While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in our
judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the principle admits of exceptions, among which is when there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that irretrievably prejudices a complainant. This exception  is attendant
herein where the LBP and the DAR entered  the property of the Mateos sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and
Agrarian Reform Bonds as payment therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997. The LBP and the
DAR were indisputably aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just compensation for the subject
property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit before the SAC, no summary administrative proceeding was yet
initiated by the DAR to make further valuation. The SAC even had to issue no less than three orders dated
November 12, 1997, January 7, 1998 and March 18, 1998 for the DAR to conduct the necessary proceedings. DAR's
delay and inaction had unjustly prejudiced the Mateos and precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC
shall result in an injustice, which the law never intends.

It bears stressing as well that on December 21, 2000 and March 22, 2001, while trial before the SAC was underway,
the DARAB rendered decisions in the summary administrative proceedings upholding the valuations previously
made by the LBP and rejected by the Mateos. At that point, referring the case back to the DAR would have been
completely moot as any challenge raised against the valuation shall be cognizable by the SAC. Clearly, there were
no more administrative remedies to exhaust.

Prescinding from the above, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the Mateos' complaint before the SAC. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application in the instant case where the DAR took no
initiative and inordinately delayed the conduct of summary administrative proceedings, and where during the
pendency of the case before the SAC, the DARAB rendered decisions affirming the LBP's prior valuations of the
subject property.
 86. Mangune vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 182604. September 27, 2016

Topic: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Doctrine: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must first avail
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her before he or she is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s
cause of action. However, the doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which is when the issue involved is
purely a legal question. As the issue in this case involves the legality of E.O. No. 567, a purely legal
question, the filing of the petition without exhausting administrative remedies is justified.

Facts: R.A. 7842 established the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital under the administration and
supervision of the said hospital.

On September 8, 2006, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. E.O. No. 567 provided that it was issued
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. No. 7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 (Local Government Code) and the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the offices under
the executive department.

City of Taguig issued E.O. No. 053 to formalize the plan for the City of Taguig’s takeover of the
operations of TPDH. 

In the meantime, petitioners, who were employees of the DOH assigned to the TPDH, submitted a
position paper to the then Secretary of Health, respondent Hon. Francisco Duque III (Secretary Duque),
expressing their objections to E.O. No. 567. The position paper was received by the Office of the
Secretary on November 6, 2006. However, the DOH did not act on the Position Paper. Petitioners also
wrote a letter to the Office of the President requesting the deferment of the implementation of E.O. No.
567, which also took no action.
Thereafter, on January 3, 2007, Mayor Tinga issued Executive Order No. 001 (E.O. No. 001) creating the
TPDH Management Team which will implement the MOA and directing the creation of an audit team
which will conduct an inventory of all the medical supplies, materials, equipment and other documents to
be turned over from the DOH to the City of Taguig.

On January 15, 2007, petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against respondents in the RTC of
Manila. On January 26, 2007, petitioners filed an amended Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for Ex-Parte Issuance of 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), 20-day TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The petition prayed that E.O. No. 567 be
declared unconstitutional, illegal and null and void for having been issued in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies? (NO)

Ruling: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must first avail
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her before he or she is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s
cause of action. However, the doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which is when the issue involved is
purely a legal question. As the issue in this case involves the legality of E.O. No. 567, a purely legal
question, the filing of the petition without exhausting administrative remedies is justified.
 87. SEC v. CJH
G.R. No. 210316. November 28, 2016.

1. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

DOCTRINES:
 Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
 Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine
a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of
the administrative tribunal.
 Whether respondents’ scheme of selling the subject condotel units is tantamount to an
investment contract and/or sale of securities, as defined under the SRC, requires the
expertise and technical knowledge of the SEC being the government agency which is
tasked to enforce and implement the provisions of the said Code as well as its
implementing rules and regulations.

FACTS:
On October 19, 1996, CJHDC entered into a Lease Agreement (Agreement) with the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) for the development into a public tourism
complex of a 247-hectare property within the John Hay Special Economic Zone in Baguio
City.

Sometime in May 2010, the BCDA and the CJHDC entered into an agreement for the
restructuring of the latter’s rental payments and other financial obligations to the former.
Subsequently, the BCDA acquired information regarding CJHDC and CJHSC’s (a wholly-
owned subsidiary of CJHDC) scheme of selling “The Manor” and “The Suites” units through
“leaseback” or “money-back” terms. Hence, the BCDA requested the SEC to conduct an
investigation into the operations of CJHDC and CJHSC on the belief that the “leaseback” or
“money-back” arrangements they are offering to the public is, in essence, investment
contracts which are considered as securities under Republic Act No. 8799, the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC).

SEC En Banc issued an Order, that there being a prima facie evidence that respondents CJH
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and its wholly-owned subsidiary CJH SUITES
CORPORATION, are engaged in the business of selling securities without the proper
registration issued by this Commission in violation [of] Section 8 of the SRC, the
respondents, their respective officers, directors, representatives, salesmen, agents and any
and all persons claiming and acting for and in their behalf, are hereby ordered to
immediately CEASE and DESIST from further engaging in the business of selling securities
until they have complied with the requirements of law and its implementing rules and
regulations.

CJHDC and CJHSC then filed a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the CA
questioning the above CDO and praying that the same be reversed and set aside.

CA ruled in favor of CJHDC and CJHSC and disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The Cease and Desist Order issued by the SEC En Banc is
[ANNULLED] and SET ASIDE, and SEC-CDO Case No. 05-12-006 is DISMISSED. The writ of
preliminary injunction per Resolution dated November 8, 2012, enjoining respondents
from enforcing the June 7, 2012 Cease and Desist Order, is MADE PERMANENT. SO
ORDERED.
CJHDC and CJHSC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether respondents failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to

them. YES.

Ruling:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s
cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical
and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.

Exceptions to the above doctrine, to wit:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary who acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval
of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule
of qualified political agency applies; and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.26

However, the Court does not agree with the CA in its ruling that the present case falls under
the first and second exception.

The main issue, as to whether or not the sale of “The Manor” or “The Suites” units to the
general public under the “leaseback” or “money-back” scheme is a form of investment
contract or sale of securities, is not a pure question of law. it involves a question of fact that
falls under the primary jurisdiction of the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, which under a regulatory scheme have been placed within the
special competence of such tribunal or agency.

If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the
latter’s proper jurisdiction.

Whether respondents’ scheme of selling the subject condotel units is tantamount to an

investment contract and/or sale of securities, as defined under the SRC, requires the
expertise and technical knowledge of the SEC being the government agency which is tasked
to enforce and implement the provisions of the said Code as well as its implementing rules
and regulations. After the issuance of the CDO, the SEC is yet to hear from respondents and
receive evidence from them regarding this issue. Nonetheless, respondents prematurely
filed an appeal with the CA, which erroneously gave due course to it in disregard of the
doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the present case does not fall under the exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as there is no violation of respondents’ right to due
process. The Court does not agree with the CA in sustaining petitioners’ contention that the
investigation conducted by the EPD necessitated the participation of petitioners and that
they should have been given opportunity to explain their side prior to the issuance of the
questioned CDO. Sections 64.1 and 64.2 of the SRC provide as follows:

64.1. The Commission, after proper investigation or verification, motu proprio, or upon

verified complaint by any aggrieved party, may issue a cease and desist order without the
necessity of a prior hearing if in its judgment the act or practice, unless restrained, will
operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to cause grave or irreparable injury or
prejudice to the investing public.

64.2. Until the Commission issues a cease and desist order, the fact that an investigation
has been initiated or that a complaint has been filed, including the contents of the
complaint, shall be confidential. Upon issuance of a cease and desist order, the Commission
shall make public such order and a copy thereof shall immediately be furnished to each
person subject to the order.

64.3. Any person against whom a cease and desist order was issued may, within five (5)
days from receipt of the order, file a formal request for lifting thereof. Said request shall be
set for hearing by the Commission not later than fifteen (15) days from its filing and the
resolution thereof shall be made not later than ten (10) days from the termination of the
hearing. If the Commission fails to resolve the request within the time herein prescribed,
the cease and desist order shall automatically be lifted.
Upon issuance of the CDO, nothing prevented respondents from filing a motion to lift the
said Order wherein they could have amply explained their position. However, they chose
not to avail of this remedy and, instead, went directly to the CA via a petition for review.

Lastly, the Court neither agrees with the ruling of the CA that there is nothing in the
assailed CDO which shows that the acts sought to be restrained therein operate as a fraud
on investors. The SEC arrived at a preliminary finding that respondents are engaged in the
business of selling securities without the proper registration issued by the Commission.
Based on this initial finding, respondents’ act of selling unregistered securities would
necessarily operate as a fraud on investors as it deceives the investing public by making it
appear that respondents have authority to deal on such securities. As correctly cited by the
SEC, Section 8.1 of the SRC clearly states that securities shall not be sold or offered for sale
or distribution within the Philippines without a registration statement duly filed with and
approved by the SEC and that prior to such sale, information on the securities, in such form
and with such substance as the SEC may prescribe, shall be made available to each
prospective buyer. The Court agrees with the SEC that the purpose of this provision is to
afford the public protection from investing in worthless securities.

88. KMU v. Aquino

G.R. No. 210500 (2019)
Topic: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Doctrine
Here, respondent Social Security Commission qualifies as an administrative tribunal, given
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. This is
evident from the qualifications of its members and its powers and duties under Sections 3
and 4 of the Social Security Act.
Exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
(12) when no administrative review is provided by law,
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.

Facts
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the labor group Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al., to
annul the Social Security System (SSS) premium hike, which took effect in January 2014.
Social Security Commission issued resolution No. 262-s. 2013 which provided an increase
in the contribution rate of its members from 10.4% to 11%, and the maximum monthly
salary credit.
Issue for Class
W/N Petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies
Decision
In connection with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Courts may only take cognizance of a case or
controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to it under the law. The
doctrine ensures that the administrative agency exercised its power to its full extent,
including its authority to correct or reconsider its actions. It would, thus, be premature for
courts to take cognizance of the case prior to the exhaustion of remedies, not to mention it
would violate the principle of separation of powers.
Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners
allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the
ordinary course of law except through the instant Petition."
However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that the Social Security
Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage,
benefits, contributions, and penalties. The law further provides that the aggrieved party
must first exhaust all administrative remedies available before seeking review from the
courts.
Here, nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a case before the Social Security
Commission or asked for a reconsideration of the assailed issuances. Moreover, petitioners
did not even try to show that their Petition falls under one (1) of the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
(12) when no administrative review is provided by law,
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures that this legislative power is
respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore Congress' determination that the Social Security
Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security
Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.
Here, respondent Social Security Commission qualifies as an administrative tribunal, given
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. This is
evident from the qualifications of its members and its powers and duties under Sections 3
and 4 of the Social Security Act.
Thus, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, petitioners should have
first filed their case before respondent Social Security Commission.

89. Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, supra

G.R. No. 205728. January 21, 2015

Topic: Administrative Law; Judicial Review of Administrative Action; Doctrine of Exhaustion of

Administrative Remedies.

Summary:
Diocese of Bacolod posted two tarpaulins about RH LAW and the tarpaulins contain the
list of candidates as Team Buhay and Team Patay. Election Officer Atty. Majarucon issued a
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials. The Diocese asked for a definite ruling regarding the
matter but the COMELEC issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin or else
it will be constrained to file an election offense. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner.
The petitioner did not violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies because the
impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. Exhaustion of
their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation
of their freedom of speech.

Doctrine:
Sovereignty resides in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.

Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6’)
by ten feet (10’) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay”.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election
Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal
within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides
for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’). On February 25, 2013, petitioners
replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain. On February 27, 2013,
COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of
COMELEC Law Department was silent on the remedies available to petitioners.

Issue:
Whether petitioners violated the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. NO.
Held:
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Respondents insist that petitioners should have first brought the matter to the
COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions but the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the
respondents.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of government]
before a court may come into the picture.” Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to
curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies
as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order.

In Chavez v. Gonzales, Justice Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized: “[i]f ever there is a
hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and
among different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would
be at the top.” Sovereignty resides in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the
sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to
protect this fundamental right. Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions to
the principle.

In Chua v. Ang:

“On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with
and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of
due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is
irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; (j) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.”
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners
allege that the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle
of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of
the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the
RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative
remedies in this case would be unreasonable.

Finally, the Supreme Court mentioned that it “has the power to relax or suspend the rules or
to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose
of justice requires it, and when what constitutes as good and sufficient cause that will merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court.” Certainly, this case of first impression
where COMELEC has threatened to prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the
elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by the public in the manner they feel
would be effective is one of those cases
90. OCAMPO V. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016

Topic: Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

DOCTRINES:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative
processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought

FACTS:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to
the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order
of President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army
(PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section
3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act
of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as
members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as
member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims
and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former
President Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human
rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the
Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and
on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of
the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and

hierarchy of courts. YES

RULING:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative
processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with,
so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case. While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and
directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be
given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375
was issued upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand
the exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still
be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office
of the President which has control and supervision over the Department of National Defense
(DND).

Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in
this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a
trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone. Even if we decide
the case based on the merits, the petitions should still be denied
 91. CSC vs. Moralde
G.R. No. 211077, August 15, 2018

Topic: Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action (Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments as

Applied to Administrative Decisions)

Doctrine:. When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no
longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court.

Facts: Moralde's services were engaged as a Dental Aide in the Province's Provincial Health
Office in Misamis Oriental. He was assigned to the municipalities of Villanueva and Claveria.
According to the Province (Misamis Oriental), he had a history of falsifying public documents
by forging his immediate supervisor's signature onto his Daily Time Record. The Province also
noted that he had a track record of "frequent absences without leave, and . . . habitual tardiness."
Eventually, Moralde was formally charged with falsifying his Daily Time Records. After
conducting an investigation, the Provincial Attorney noted that Moralde had previously
committed the very same infraction. Thus, he recommended that Moralde be dismissed from
service.
The Provincial Governor found Moralde guilty of Falsification of Public Documents and
dismissing him from service. Moralde filed a notice of appeal of his dismissal before the CSC.
CSC issued a Resolution setting aside Moralde’s termination. When the Province was processing
Moralde’s papers for reinstatement it was found out that he filed an application for retirement in
the GSIS.
The Province filed before the CSC a Motion for New Trial and/or Modification of
Judgement. Upon discovering that Moralde bypassed his administrative case through
retirement. It specifically noted that "Moralde ha[d] already retired from government service and
had already received all his benefits from the GSIS." Thus, it emphasized that "the judgment
contained in Resolution No. 061984 should be modified to reflect the fact of his retirement.
The CSC issued Resolution No. 080805, denying the Province's Motion for New Trial
and/or Modification of Judgement. It explained that "the Resolution sought to be modified
already attained finality."  It also conceded, however, that "the issue of Moralde's reinstatement
to t. he service with payment of backwages [has become] moot and academic"
Moralde filed a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting on the immutability of the Civil
Service Commission's prior ruling. Moralde filed a Petition for Review before the CA. He
maintained that the CSC's ruling on his reinstatement was immutable and that, in any case, he
had never retired, but merely received separation pay.
In response, the Civil Service Commission conceded that generally, a final and executory
decision could not be modified. However, it noted that jurisprudence had entertained exceptions
"where facts or events transpire[d] after a decision has become executory constituting a
supervening cause that would render the final judgment unenforceable, or when its execution
becomes impossible or unjust."

Issue: Whether or not the CSC’s decision had attained finality. NO.

Ruling:
 Social Security System v. Isip articulated the basic parameters of and the rationale for
adhering to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment:
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact
when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As
a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case
or modify a decision that has bec[o]me final.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no
longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The
doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time.
In staying its own hand in disturbing final judgments, this Court emphasized that the
immutability of final judgments is not a matter of mere technicality, "but of substance and
merit."
The doctrine of immutability of judgments applies as much to decisions of agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers as they do to judicial decisions. Jurisprudence is categorical:
"the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the
judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial
powers had been conferred.
The [Civil Service Commission] has no power or authority to reconsider its decision
which has become final and executory.. Even ordinary courts may not, as a rule, set aside or even
modify its decision that have become final and executory. The duty of the [Civil Service
Commission] is to enforce its final decision rather than disturb it.
The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies to decisions rendered by the Civil
Service Commission. A decision of the Civil Service Commission becomes final and executory
if no motion for reconsideration is filed within the 15-day reglementary period
Jurisprudence enumerates instances in which a final judgment's execution may be
disturbed: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) nunc pro tunc entries that do not prejudice a
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever supervening events or circumstances transpire after
the decisions' finality, making the decision's execution unjust and inequitable.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
This Court acknowledges the need to temper obdurate insistence on black letter
mechanics. To strangle a party's access to legitimate exceptions to the immutability doctrine
would be to frustrate the higher ends of justice and to condone the triumph of hollow, procedural
niceties. While maintaining restraint, this Court, nevertheless, rightly esteems itself in not being
"precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality."
 92. GSIS vs. CSC
G.R. No. 96938, Oct. 15, 1991

Topic: Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Action

Doctrine: The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to
enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. The CSC's
exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases.

Summary: GSIS dismissed 6 employees which CSC found to be dismissed illegally. When the
employees sought the execution of the judgment, GSIS contended that it did not have the power
to execute its judgments. The Court ruled that the CSC has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. Likewise, it
has the power to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before
any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see
that what has been decided is carried out.

Facts: GSIS dismissed (6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly
been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five of
these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the
dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed or an
opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS
for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

GSIS appealed to the CSC which ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and
directed the GSIS to reinstate them with payment of back salaries. Upon appeal, SC declared that
reinstatement of said five employees was proper but eliminated the payment of back salaries to
the until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known.

After the Resolution became final, the heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for
execution of the CSC Resolution. The CSC granted the motion for execution. The GSIS
contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments.

Issue: Whether the CSC has power to execute its judgments and final orders. YES.

Ruling: The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional commission invested by the

Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also
with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. The Commission
shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for on certiorari by any aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.

The rules provide, among other things, that decision in "administrative disciplinary cases" shall
be immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. If the decision
of the Commission is brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, the same shall still be
executory unless a restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the High Court." This
is similar to a provision in the former Civil Service Rules authorizing the Commissioner, "if
public interest so warrants, ... (to) order his decision executed pending appeal to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals." The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or
responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by
the Commission, "to enforce decision on administrative discipline involving officials of the
Commission," as well as with Section 37 of the same decree declaring that an appeal to the
Commission” shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal."

It would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been
exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is
inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.
 93. MMDA v. Concerned Residents
G.R. No. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Topic: III.E – Administrative Law; Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Action

Doctrine: Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A
ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It
connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a
"simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."
Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Summary (Recit): In this case, the Supreme Court held that Petitioners’ obligation to perform
their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA and other government
agencies’ mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. The enabling laws and issuances related to the petitioner government
agencies are clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each
agency/petitioner under the law and that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Facts:
Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management
Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No.
34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or
the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed
the Decision of the RTC

Issue: Whether or not the clean-up or rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by
Mandamus YES.

Ruling:
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial
duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an
act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite
duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are
to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of
the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law
or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out
in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA.

Likewise, the MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not
only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience. A discretionary duty is one that "allows a
person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform."

Further, a perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent
laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay.

The enabling laws and issuances related to the petitioner government agencies are clear,
categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner
under the law and that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

93. MMDA v. Concerned Residents (Resolution)

G.R. No. 171947-48, February 15, 2011

Topic: III.E – Administrative Law; Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Action

Doctrine: With the final and executory judgment in the 2008 Decision, the writ of continuing
mandamus issued in that case means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance
with the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution
of the judgment.
Summary (Recit): In this case, the SC’s resolution requiring the government agencies to submit
action plan, data and status reports is not an encroachment over the powers and functions of the
Executive Branch. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Supreme Court is simply an
exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the
Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. Further, with the final
and executory judgment in the 2008 Decision, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in that
case means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the
Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.

Facts:
On February 10, 2009, the Court En Banc approved a resolution creating an Advisory Committee
"that will verify the reports of the government agencies tasked to clean up the Manila Bay." It is
composed of two members of the Court and three technical experts.

An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous
quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a
uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no
definite deadlines have been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies’ timeframe for
their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both the
national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with
the Court’s directives.

In order to implement the 2008 Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the Court to
address the said concerns.

Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court required these
government agencies the submission of plans of action, data or status reports.

Issue: Whether or not the SC’s resolution requiring the government agencies to submit action
plan, data and status reports is an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive
Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. NO.

Ruling:

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power
under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part
of the adjudicative function of the Court.

While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or
status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision
under Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
 Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.––The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."
Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily
encompassed by said judgment.

Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental cases:

Sec. 7. Judgment.––If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of
continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts
until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be
warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court
shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and
execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner
or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The
petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the
judgment.

Sec. 8. Return of the writ.––The periodic reports submitted by the respondent

detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the
writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been
fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket.

With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in
MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders,
the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.