PEOPLE v NELMIDA

G.R. No. 184500 | September 11, 2012

TICKLER: Mayor Tawan-Tawan ambushed.
DOCTRINES:
1. When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes.

2. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime,
thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is
known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other.

FACTS:
Mayor Tawan-tawan was with his security escorts composed of some members of the
PNP with civilian aides while the appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously
waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. The moment the vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by them, the appellants and their co-accused opened fire
and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms. Both Macasuba
and PFC Tomanto saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road with an
armalite rifle. Macasuba was also able to identify other appellants as among the
ambushers. On the occasion of the ambush, two security died, while others
suffered injuries.
Defense: Denial and alibi.
CRIME CHARGED: Amended Information: DOUBLE MURDER with MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER and DOUBLE ATTEMPTED MURDER.

RTC: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple

frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Was there complex crime?

RULING: NO.
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the
eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one
crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime.
The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death
of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct
acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding
of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the
appellants and their co-accused. Appellants and their co-accused performed
not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in the commission
of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it
speaks only of a "single act."
DECISION: Appellants should be convicted of SEPARATE CRIME – two (2)
counts
of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder – and NOT of a COMPLEX
CRIME.

PEOPLE v ARTURO PUNZALAN

G.R. No. 199892 | December 10, 2012
TICKLER: Philippine Navy in Zambales. “All-in-One” to “Aquarius.” “Patayin ang ilaw”
into “Sinong papatayin?”
DOCTRINE:
1. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

2. In view of the enactment of RA 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.

FACTS:
In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1
Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang
were among the members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval
Education and Training Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales.
On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the “All-in-
One” Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they
transferred to a nearby videoke bar, “Aquarius,” where they continued their drinking
session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant
ensued regarding a flickering light bulb inside “Aquarius.” When SN1 Bacosa suggested
that the light be turned off (“Patayin ang ilaw”), appellant who must have misunderstood
and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking, “Sinong
papatayin?,” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried
to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in
behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling
unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table.
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to
the NETC camp. They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the
first group, followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and
SN1 Duclayna in the last group, with each group at one arm’s length distance from the
other. Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned
by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and
SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding
to follow their companions.
Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN
Dimaala flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number
DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was
reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, “kasi chief, gago ang mga
‘yan!,” while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group. Even before he
was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while
uttering, “papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!”
While F1EN Dimaala was writing the van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he
suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking
navy personnel prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, “chief, binangga ang
tropa!” SN1 De Guzman then asked permission to go to the scene of the incident and
check on the navy personnel.
When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were
thrown away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost
consciousness. When they came to, they saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the
ground. SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase
the van. SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was
pushed away from the path of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicle’s plate
number. He also tried to chase the van with SN1 Bacosa but they turned around when
the vehicle made a U-turn as they thought that it would come back for them. The
vehicle, however, sped away again when other people started to arrive at the scene of
the incident.
CRIME CHARGED: Complex Crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with
Multiple Attempted Murder attended by aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle
RTC: GUILTY of Complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with multiple
Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Defense: Art 11, par 4 and no treachery
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder?
SC: YES, the felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime
contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 48. Penalty for complex
crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed
a single act
of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through
the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the
same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and
SN1 Domingo. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies as
the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death)
for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63[56] of the same Code provides that if the penalty
prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there is
an aggravating circumstance the higher penalty should be imposed. Since use of
vehicle can be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself,
being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable penalty the higher sanction is
death. In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of
the death penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
DECISION: Complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder: reclusion
perpetua

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v DANTE DULAY

G.R. No. 194629 | April 21, 2014
TICKLER: Orlando Sr. and Jr., grenade thrown.
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to RA 9346, the penalty of death which would have been
imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in the
body of the decision that Dulay was guilty as well of “frustrated murder” as charged in
the Information with respect to the bomb-injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr., and yet
convicted him in the dispositive part only of “attempted murder”.

FACTS:
In the evening of December 30, 2002 at around 6:30 in the evening, Orlando Jr.
(Junior), was outside the kitchen of their house in Aglipay, Province of Quirino. His
father, Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the yard. Junior was then playing with a
flashlight and directed its beam towards the grassy area where he discovered his Uncle
Dulay, whom he recognized because of the characteristic “mumps” below his left ear.
Melanie, Junior’s sister, also saw Dulay as he was staring at their father. Thereafter,
their uncle, suddenly threw something that resembled a ball towards the cemented part
of the yard. It turned out to be a grenade and it landed seven meters from where Junior
and his father were. Dulay then went away on his bicycle towards the direction of his
house. When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father
was fatally hit by shrapnel, causing his death.
Defense of the accused: Alibi

CRIME CHARGED: Murder (Orlando Legaspi Sr.); Frustrated Murder (Orlando Legaspi
Jr.)
RTC: GUILTY of Complex Crime of Murder with Attempted Murder and is sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua
1. He is further ordered to pay the heirs Orlando Legaspi Sr., the sum of 50,000 as civil
indemnity and moral damages in the amount of 50,000;
2. Also, he must pay 30,000 pesos as moral damages to Orlando Legaspi Jr.;
3. 115, 956 as actual expenses/damages for the hospitalization of the two victims
namely: Orlando Legaspi Sr. and Orlando Legaspi Jr.

CA: AFFIRMED conviction with MODIFICATION. Complex Crime of Murder and

Frustrated Murder
Sentenced to suffer:
1. Penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. The award of actual damages in the amount of 115, 956 for the hospital expenses of
the two victims;
3. The award of civil indemnity for the death of Orlando Sr., in the increased amount
75,000;
4. The award of moral damages in the respective amounts of 75,000 and 55,000 for
Orlando Senior and Junior; and
5. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000 each for both Orlando
Senior and Junior.

The CA held that pursuant to RA 9346, the penalty of death which would have been
imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in the
body of the decision that Dulay was guilty as well of “frustrated murder” as charged in
the Information with respect to the bomb-injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr., and yet convicted
him in the dispositive part only of “attempted murder”. The prosecution was able to
establish that all acts of execution, not merely preparatory acts, were performed to
produce the felony as a consequence, but Junior nevertheless survived for reasons
independent of the will of the perpetrator; that is, the timely medical assistance to him.
ISSUE: Is the amount of indemnities to be paid to the victim as determined by the CA
proper?

RULING:
YES. The Court retains the award by the CA of 75,000 as moral damages, exemplary
damages at 30,000 and civil indemnity at 75,000 to the heirs of Orlando Legaspi Sr., in
conformity with our Ruling in People v. Barde. Next, the Court awards moral and
exemplary damages to Junior in the amounts of 50,000 and 20,000. (*Before the CA
Moral 55,000 and Exemplary Damages 30,000). The Court upholds the CA’s decision
with regard the amount of 115, 956 as actual damages.
The Court imposes an interest of six percent per annum on the award of civil indemnity
and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence.
DECISION: The Court thus AFFIRMS the CA decision, with modification on the
awarded indemnities.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v HON. JUSTICE GARCHITORENA

G.R. No. 109266 | December 2, 1993
TICKLER: Unqualified aliens, Anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
DOCTRINE: For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
 criminal purpose or aim.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside:
(a) the Resolution in Criminal Case No. 16698 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and
(b) the Resolution of said court promulgated inwhich deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended
Informations against petitioner.
Petitioner was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Program. Petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as
she was then a presidential candidate. Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena. Criminal case was set for arraignment. Petitioner
moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars to which the
Sandiganbayan denied. Petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars alleging that
petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect
benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner,
unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not
properly plead and prepare for trial. At the hearing, the prosecution filed a motion to
admit the 32 Amended Informations. Justice Garchitorena denied the motion for his
disqualification. Sandiganbayan admitted the 32 Amended Informations and ordering
petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds. Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division): Acting on the petition for the issuance of a
restraining order issued a resolution ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to
CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is
finally resolved by this Court.
CA: N/A.
ISSUE:
1. Should Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice be disqualified?
2. Was there a denial of due process?
3. Is petitioner guilty of a crime delito continuado?

RULING:
1. Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the

publication of is letter issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the
validity of the information filed against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice
Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has subconsciously
drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . .
." The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's
column in the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing a hold-departure
order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of
the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice. In particular,
petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena
 that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored
unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program." The statement
complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. It appears that petitioner
tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan,
prompting it to issue the hold-departure order. The letter of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan,
merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have
to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the
charge against petitioner ever touched. It should be taken into consideration that the
Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity
among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D.
No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders
baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena.
2. Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by
reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. Here, there was a
continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity of
the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the
attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in an issue of the Manila
Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for
the filing of the charge. Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of
delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in the
petitions filed. Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts
complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324. She concludes
that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations.
Petitioner claims that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused
"undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference.
3. Delito continuado

The public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after

manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information.
We also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information. Technically, there was
only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be
one information to be file against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what is
known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as
"continuous crime." For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration
 of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delito continuado consists of several crimes but
in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator. Such offense as
consistitutes of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. Under
Article 10 of the RPC, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the
latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles in RPC may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws. Here, the original
information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed
by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324, (ii) caused an undue
injury to one offended party, the Government,
and (iii) was done on a single day. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim
the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the
original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose
stay was legalized. At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public
prosecutors manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying
the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the
offenses were committed on the same period of time. The strong probability even exists
that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was
done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same
document. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a
bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. Sandiganbayan
stated in its resolution that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law
itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in
granting citizenship to those not qualified.
DECISION: The Decision of Sandiganbayan (First Division) was affirmed is resolution
in Criminal Case No. 16698 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32
Amended Informations into one information charging only one offense under the
original case number. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED
insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

MORENO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 168550 | August 10, 2006

TICKLER: Petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running as Punong

Barangay. Arbitrary Detention, previous crime.

DOCTRINE/S:
1. Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace
and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. Thus, the Probation
Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for
probation.
2. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers
offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which
also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not
specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This
omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to
treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.

3. The Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local

Government Code.

FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Urbano M. Moreno from
running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by
final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4)
Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August
27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action
because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of
Baclayon v. Mutia,the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge
of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a
result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July
15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Samar for preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer
recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
COMELEC 1st Division: ADOPTED the recommendation of the investigating
office. MR was filed with the Comelec en banc.

COMELEC En Banc: AFFIRMED the resolution of the Comelec 1st Division

citing Sec

40 (a) of the Local Government Code which provides “that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position.”
Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The
grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence
but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
Comelec en banc further held that the provisions of the Local Government Code
take precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutiacited by Moreno and the
Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting
forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
1. The disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those
who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read
as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which
applies only to probationers.
2. Even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the COMELEC, the Office
of the Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec
definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense
involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation.
The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists
and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

ISSUE: How should the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence found
in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code should be construed?

RULING:
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. SC held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage. SC thus deleted from the order granting probation the
paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated
with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically
provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real
issue in this case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of
conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the
question of whether his sentence had been served. The Comelec could have
correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of
one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their
sentence by reason of the grant of probation which should not be equated with
service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local
elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno
fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he final
discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. Thus, when
Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him,
including the right to run for public office.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by
law for the offense of which he was convicted. Thus, the Probation Law lays out
rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For
instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to
those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6)
years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offens
punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day
and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation;
and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of
this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for
a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse
into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders
not covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was
enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided.
When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our
ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification
from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the
purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to
disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be
construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local
Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special
legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing
a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens
the scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an
egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified
to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15,
2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of
his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a
fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July
15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice
now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec where he said
that it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right
in complex but little understood legalisms.

ARNEL COLINARES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182748 | December 13, 2011
TICKLER: Huge stone.
DOCTRINE: The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of
liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. With a higher court’s finding that the accused
is guilty only of a lesser crime, the accused, with the new penalty should be allowed to
apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
FACTS:
Prosecution:
Rufino Buena testified that at around 7:00pm, he and Jesus Paulite went out to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with
Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice
on the head with a huge stone (15 inches diameter). Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus
fled.
Ananias Jallores testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the
right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him
Paciano Alano testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.
The Medico-Legal Certificate showed that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the
forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious
and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
 Defense:
Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening
when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino
where he supposed the Mayor was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing
his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to
stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck
Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried
to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the
same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. He voluntarily surrendered at
the Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party
on the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home,
Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
CRIME CHARGED: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
RTC: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. The Court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
from 2years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the
law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
CA: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. Arnel argues that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the
Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
ISSUES:
1. Is Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide?
2. If Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationablepenalty, may he still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court?

SC: Attempted Homicide, entitled to apply for probation.

1. NO. Arnel is guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. Indeed, Rufino had
two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred
fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds

were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in 7 or 8
days. There is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecutions
claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention.

2. YES. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to
imprisonment of 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of
prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow
him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be
deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel
has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to
apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2
years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the
lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the
privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the
judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.
But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to
instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the
probation law.
DECISION: PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correccional, as maximum, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been
remanded for execution to the RTC.