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Ruffy vs.

Chief of Staff (1946)
Posted on 2021-01-09
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-533 | August 20, 1946 | 75 SCRA 875 | En Banc | Justice Tuason

Constitutional Law | The State | Executive Department | Military Power

Rule that laws of political nature are deemed suspended during military occupation governs only
civilians.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff

Courts martial are simply instrumentalities of the executive power provided by Congress for the President
as Commander-in-Chief. Their only object: to aid the President in commanding and enforcing discipline in
the Armed Forces.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff

FACTS:

At the time of war with the Japanese, Lt. Col. Jurado was Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro. When
he was murdered, petitioners Maj. Ruffy et al. were charged therefor before the General Court Martial. Having resulted in
the conviction of four of them, they now pray to prohibit the respondents Chief of Staff and the Gen. Court Martial from
further proceeding. They aver, among others, that:

1. they are not subject to military law at the time the offense was committed.

2. the 93rd Article of War, which states that “any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct,” contravenes Art VIII, sec 2(4) of the 1935 Constitution¹
in that it provides no review to be made by the SC.

ISSUES:

1. Are Maj. Ruffy et al. subject to military law at the time the offense charged against them were committed?

2. Is the 93rd Article of War unconstitutional?

RULING:

1. Yes. The rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for
and does not bind the enemies in arms.

2. No. The petitioner’s error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority for
their creation. Courts martial are agencies of executive character. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.
And they may be convened by the President as Commander-in-Chief independently of legislation. They are, in fact, simply
instrumentalities of the executive power provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein. In the British law: “xxx the only legitimate object
of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army.” Petition dismissed.

¹ Now modified in Art VIII, Sec 5(2)(d): The Supreme Court shall have the xxx [power to] review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in
xxx all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher

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