Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Alegre Henderson - CH 6 - It Is My Husband
Alegre Henderson - CH 6 - It Is My Husband
Same-Sex Marriage
International Perspectives since 1789
Edited by
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Mark Seymour
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Acknowledgments vii
Notes on Contributors viii
Foreword xi
Index 237
When the Ecclesiastical Court of the Archdiocese of Lima granted Josefa Murillo her
divorce in 1847, allowing her to separate after thirty years of marriage, she finally freed
herself from her husband Juan Calderón and his male lover. Well before the dissolution
of civil marriages was legalized in 1930, and even longer before the campaign to legalize
same-sex unions in twenty-first-century Peru, under Spanish colonial rule separations
like Josefa’s were called “divorce,” even when they did not represent full dissolution of
the marital union. Although rarely granted, this type of ecclesiastical “divorce” was a
relatively common request in Spanish colonial Latin America, especially during the
emergence of independent Latin American nations in the first part of the nineteenth
century. Josefa’s unusual allegations about her husband’s extramarital relationships with
a man constituted the type of extreme circumstances under which an Ecclesiastical
Court might approve the separation of a married couple. In a roundabout way, it also
provides a unique opportunity to understand some of the dynamics of a male same-sex
couple in mid-nineteenth-century Peru.1
The lifestyle Juan Calderón shared with his partner, the younger Martín Hurtado,
was part of a dying tradition in the city of Lima. In the middle of a crowded
neighborhood, Juan and Martin’s daily life testified to the lack of interest of the city
authorities in prosecuting same-sex sexuality. In fact, the harsh punishments against
sodomy prescribed by colonial criminal legislation were seldom enforced during
the first part of the nineteenth century. After Peruvian independence, when the first
Republican Penal Code was written in 1862, it reduced the maximum sentence for
male–male sexual acts from death to a term of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment.2
However, long-term lack of enforcement contributed to the fame of the city of Lima
as rich with effeminate characters, particularly in regard to the notorious “sociability”
of those known as maricones, and in this respect the Peruvian capital differed from
comparable cities in Latin America. Maricón was the derogatory term given to men
who partially cross-dressed and sought sexual attention from other men.
The press, pamphlets, and even paintings provide evidence of the abundance of
maricones in the city.3 One writer whose accounts have come down to us was the French
traveler Maximilien Radiguet, who lived in Lima during the early 1840s. Radiguet was
very much impressed with the vestiges of “the misconducts and licentiousness of the
oft-persecuted society of maricones.” According to one of Radiguet’s articles, included
in his Souvenirs de l’Amérique Espagnole, this ancient society of maricones had emerged
in Lima in opposition to women and was visible enough even to have a favorite meeting
place, in the Plaza Mayor, the city’s main square. Radiguet defined maricones by their
antagonism to women, highlighting in particular the spontaneous arguments that
flared up between maricones and women in the Plaza Mayor and other public areas,
where witty and malicious tirades were exchanged to defy or ridicule the opponent.4
A decade before Radiguet’s visit to Lima, in 1827, a pamphlet entitled “The Journey
to Amancaes” also represented a group of maricones sitting in the same plaza and
poking fun at young women, sometimes even insulting or gossiping about them, as
suggested by the following verse:
This extract suggests that it was not only French visitors who described maricones
using public space in the Plaza Mayor to contest loudly the public reputations of female
passers-by. They were part of life in the city in the 1820s.
As suggested above, it was not uncommon for maricones to express some sort of rivalry
with women over the love of a particular man.6 The most noteworthy example of such
rivalry was the lawsuit Josefa Murillo filed against her husband Juan Calderón, whereby
she accused him of having an “illicit relationship” with another man, the young Martín
Hurtado.7 With the advice and support of one of her sons, Josefa Murillo presented
her case against her lawful husband Juan Calderón before Lima’s Ecclesiastical Court
in September 1846, pleading “divorce for the mistreatment against her person, which
makes the marital union unbearable, and therefore requests separation from habitation
and bed.”8
Since colonial times and until 1897, all marriages in Peru were celebrated and
registered only by the Catholic Church, without civil records being kept. Civil marriage
was introduced in 1897, but it was to be more than thirty years before President
Luis Sánchez Cerro approved, in 1930, a Law of Absolute Divorce allowing the full
dissolution of civil marriages. In Josefa’s time there were three legal possibilities, mostly
sought by women, for ending an ill-suited matrimonial union: annulment, separation
(or temporary divorce), and permanent ecclesiastical divorce. An annulment was
extremely difficult to obtain, as it was tantamount to declaring the marriage as
never having existed. Separations and divorces, also rarely granted, but much more
so than annulments, provided ecclesiastical and civil approval for the temporary or
permanent separation from the spouse, respectively, but not for the dissolution of the
marriage. Therefore, these dispensations did not grant the freedom to remarry, which
was possible only in case of annulment (and, after 1930, in case of civil and absolute
divorce).9
During an ecclesiastical divorce process, and if the request was granted, women
were compelled to relocate to the residence of a reputable person, usually a relative.
Another option was to take up residence in a recogimiento, a lay house founded with
the approval of the local ecclesiastical authority, which served as a refuge for women
contesting ill-suited marriages and for wayward women to repent.10 To ensure their
sustenance for the duration of the separation, the husband was obliged to pay alimony
to his wife unless he could prove that he did not to have the means to do so.11
Josefa was not in need of being placed in a recogimiento thanks to the material
and moral support of her son, José Jiménez, who most likely encouraged his mother
to request divorce from her husband. After a failed attempt at reconciliation by the
Ecclesiastical Justice of the Peace, during which Josefa claimed mistreatment due to
Juan’s failings as a provider for her and their children, she decided to present her case
before the Ecclesiastical Court, making the following claim:
Last year, Calderón completely neglected me and my children. He lived away from
us for a year, in order to [be able to] indulge in vice and immorality, which is the
main and true cause of everything. I would not like to explain further because it
embarrasses me. After all, it is my husband who has such weaknesses.12
Josefa accused Juan of having abandoned her to indulge in vice and immorality,
implicitly referring to his relationship with another man. Instead of simply accusing
him of sodomy, since it was too shameful even to utter the word, she only indirectly
referred to the same-sex relationship she believed her husband was conducting. Josefa
evidently had turned to the Ecclesiastical Court in utmost despair, after nearly thirty
years of marriage. Her sufferings had become unbearable and she was finally convinced
that her husband was not about to change his ways:
I have suffered much, always hoping that one day my husband would change and
reform his ways; but I am already disillusioned and convinced that I am fighting
against hope, and even against evidence itself.13
First, she requested a temporary, four-year ecclesiastical divorce (separation) “to try
to convince him to change his conduct and become disposed to fulfil the obligations
expected of him.”14 Rather than having any real hope, Josefa’s intention was in fact to
bring to a temporary end her ill-suited marriage in a discreet manner. Ecclesiastical
divorce seemed to be a better solution in comparison to, for instance, denouncing her
husband for sodomy.
Three decades after independence from Spain (about the time Josefa filed for divorce),
Peru continued to be ruled by Spanish colonial law, and sodomy was considered a
criminal offence. A vast collection of codes, from the Fuero Juzgo (Spanish medieval
code) to the Novísima Recopilación (Latest Compilation in 1567, 1775, 1805), in
addition to the Leyes de Indias (Laws of the Indies) and the cédulas reales (royal orders),
constituted the Spanish colonial legislation that prescribed harsh punishments for the
“nefarious sin,” including death by burning.15 Despite the harsh legislation, sodomy was
often left unpunished, as the scant colonial and republican criminal cases prosecuting
same-sex sexuality may attest. Accordingly, even if Josefa decided to overcome her
shame and consider denouncing her husband for sodomy, she would have found little
interest within the police and judicial system for enforcing the law against him.
Ecclesiastical divorce was not an easy solution either, since Juan Calderón was
bluntly opposed to the idea of divorcing his wife. In fact, throughout the trial, he took
every possible step to delay the procedure, even at the risk of exposing the real nature
of his relationship with Martín. His reaction was consistent with most husbands’
responses to divorce demands. According to historian Luis Bustamante, in this period
there were three typical male reactions to nullity, separation, and ecclesiastical divorce
processes: conciliation and regret, conflict denial, and defamation against the opposing
party.16 As such, in his first reply to Josefa’s demand, her husband Juan insinuated that
it was she who had abandoned their marital life by moving not to a recogimiento or
convent—a condition for requesting the divorce provided by ecclesiastical law—but to
the home of his stepson, José Jiménez.
Juan specifically denied the charges of mistreatment of his wife and provided no
response to the allegations of indulging in vice and immorality which was Josefa’s
strategy for denouncing the illicit male friendship she believed was her husband’s
weakness. Moreover, Juan declared himself to be of limited means, arguing that in
truth it was his poverty and not his flaws as a husband or father which had recently
become an irritation to his wife and the source of her intention to divorce, particularly
now that her wealthy son (and not his own) was able to provide her with more comfort.
Josefa had indeed brought to her marriage to Juan two sons, José Jiménez and
Francisco Balero. Despite Juan’s claims, Josefa declared that she had been responsible for
the education and support of her elder children. By the time the divorce was requested,
her son José had made a fortune, which allowed him to bring his mother and all her
family from Guayaquil to Lima—a journey of at least 1400 km—on two occasions. José
Jiménez estimated that the first trip of the family from Guayaquil and the cost of settling
in Lima amounted to 3000 pesos, including clothing, accommodation, furniture, and
working tools. A further 1000 pesos, plus travel costs, José claimed, had been wasted
by Juan Calderón in taking his family back to Guayaquil. In addition, 600 pesos had
been spent in settling the family back in Lima in 1843. Finally, several times José had
lent money to Juan to start a new trade, which never prospered. Even at the beginning
of the divorce proceedings, Josefa revealed the economic reasons behind her husband’s
opposition to the divorce, but also the motivation for her son’s support during the trial:
My good son cannot offer me sustenance apart from his own house and table, and
neither can I neglect the only means left for obtaining food. My husband does not
accept this because what he wants is money to spend, and a separate house that he
cannot afford, or shall I say he does not want, as he does not work.17
In sum, in supporting his mother’s divorce, José Jiménez was protecting his own
finances by relieving himself of the burden of sustaining his mother’s husband.
However, beyond possible financial motivations, the evidence provided by Josefa also
pointed to her husband’s relationship with another man.
Josefa’s witnesses, neighbors, and friends all provided testimony about the illicit
friendship between Juan Calderón and Martín Hurtado. One such witness was Manuel
de Jesús Varas, husband of one of Josefa and Juan’s daughters. Manuel declared that he
had come to Lima three years before with Calderón and his family aboard a ship from
Guayaquil, where he had been born. According to Manuel, Calderón brought with
him a young man named Martín Hurtado, with whom he was very close. On arriving
in Lima, they initially decided to stay in the same house. Manuel was given the same
room where Juan Calderón and Martín Hurtado shared a bed, while Josefa and her
children slept in another room.
This arrangement lasted for more than two months, until Calderón and Hurtado
opened a candle shop with the means provided by Josefa’s son José Jiménez, and moved
out together. Juan and Martín worked together in the candle shop, and Manuel claimed
he had seen them embracing and caressing each other. He also acknowledged that
there were widespread rumors about the illicit relations within that family. Manuel
believed the rumors because Calderón, his own father-in-law, had tried to caress him
as well, but he had rejected his advances. Manuel had also heard once from the family
that they had had to call a doctor to assist Josefa after Juan had beaten her.18
Another witness, Félix Hurtado, a 25-year-old shoemaker, also declared in favor
of Josefa despite being a relative of Martín Hurtado. Félix declared that three years
earlier, when he moved to Calderón’s house, the neighbors had warned him that Juan
and Martín were having an illicit liaison. Thus informed, Félix decided to observe
them, and the result was that “he saw between them an extraordinary union and they
provoked and harbor jealousy as it is commonly done among the people of different
sexes.” Félix also claimed to have been a direct witness of the physical relationship
between Juan and Martín. Juan had once asked if he could borrow Félix’s room in
order to rest. Félix returned shortly afterward and spied on Juan through a window
above the door. He observed Calderón and Martín on the same bed, “indecorously
caressing each other,” and was very disgusted and upset. Félix declared that he knew
that Juan Calderón had moved to live alone with Martín for a while. Félix had then
tried to separate Martín from “that life” by having Martín live with him. However,
Calderón seduced Martín anew and enticed him to return.19
Here it is worth noting that the words “extraordinary union,” “illicit relations,”
and “indecorous caressing” were used to refer to what up to half a century before had
been known as the “abominable vice,” “nefarious crime,” and “sin against nature.” For
instance, it was acceptable for Archbishop Barroeta in the mid-eighteenth century to
use the term maricas—a short form for maricones—in his edict banning cross-dressers
of African descent who danced in local festivities celebrated in honor of patron saints.20
But this was not the case in Josefa Murillo’s petition, where “shame”—in the sense used
by Norbert Elias—pervades all the depositions submitted in this lawsuit.21
Although ashamed by her husband’s actions, Josefa refused to term her husband a
maricón, his deeds notwithstanding. The witnesses Manuel and Félix also resorted to
using euphemisms to refer to their claims about Juan Calderón’s behavior. The Murillo
v. Calderón case is in this regard markedly different from the criminal and Inquisition
cases registered during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where depositions
required detailed descriptions of nakedness, terms of endearment, seduction
techniques, types of caresses, and even the findings of medical examinations.
This case was different: the reserve and modesty of the ecclesiastical trial suggests
the development of a “civilizing process” that prevented witnesses from accurately
describing male-to-male sexual practices. Following Michel Foucault, it would be valid
to ask if repression had cast a veil of censorship over sex or if the several testimonies
on Josefa’s defense exemplified a new regime where the multiplicity of discourses of sex
contributed to expressing the “nonexistence, nonmanifestation, and silence” of male-to-
male sexuality. In this ecclesiastical trial, the word maricón was carefully suppressed. A
“civilizing process,” which had begun with the development of the Enlightenment press,
had begun to take root in Peruvian society, ultimately relegating maricones to the private
domain, removing them from the public eye, and ostracizing any reference to them from
the domain of what could be uttered. The “disappearance” of maricones may well also have
gone hand in hand, as it were, with the emergence of a hegemonic bourgeois masculinity.22
The discretion shown by Josefa Murillo and her witnesses was such that, after a few
of them had made their depositions, she felt forced to amend and specify her own
statements regarding the conduct of her husband. Her shame once more comes
through in her deposition:
Up to that moment, and out of shame, Josefa had preferred to remain silent on her
main motivations for requesting a divorce: “so well-known was my intention … that I
did not even dare to give them [the real causes for requesting her divorce] their proper
name nor explain them with clarity.”24 She made this statement a month after initiating
her claim, as part of a process by which she changed her petition from temporary
separation to permanent divorce. She acknowledged that her husband did not intend
to change his ways, and she also named those ways as “sodomitical” for the first and
only time during the course of the trial. Revealing the true cause of her divorce plea,
Josefa expressed her readiness to request a permanent separation from her husband.
Besides the discretion shown by the witnesses when testifying about the true nature
of the friendship between Juan and Martín, the other significant element in the Murillo
v. Calderón case is the role of neighbors in mediating domestic quarrels, as well as
in providing information about the daily life of families and couples. As historian
Christine Hunefeldt has shown, the personal physical proximities found in a Lima
home or callejón (alley) enabled neighbors to witness all sorts of conjugal quarrels.25
I would add that neighbors were also aware of the domestic life, occupations, and
relations of sodomites and maricones. For instance, Manuel was aware of Josefa’s and
Juan’s sleeping arrangements, and Félix was close enough to Juan’s daily life to be able
to spy on him while he was in bed with his lover.
Allowances must be made for exaggeration, which —as Delfina González del Riego
has remarked—was a common aspect of many divorce processes.26 But beyond any
exaggeration, by the time Josefa’s divorce proceedings were concluding, Juan Calderón
had been unable to convince the Ecclesiastical Court of his innocence regarding the
charges presented. He used three main arguments in his defense. First, that in almost
thirty years of marriage he had fulfilled his matrimonial obligations without giving
Josefa the slightest cause for grievance. Second, that he had always relied on his own
work and trade to sustain himself and his family. And third, that Martín Hurtado had
left his company on several occasions and expressed the intention to marry; and that
at the moment he was living with doña Dominga Bedoya in her house under promise
of marriage.
In spite of exposing his friendship with Martin Hurtado, and although he was
accused of neglecting and abandoning his own three children, Juan called several
witnesses on his behalf to attest to his great concern for the future and wellbeing of
Martín Hurtado, whom he treated as a son. According to Juan, he felt obliged, as
Martín’s parents had entrusted him with bringing the young man to Lima, to have
him learn a trade and even insisted on marrying Martín to one of his own daughters.
Juan also asked his witnesses to state that on several occasions, Martín had departed
because of his intention to marry. Although the witnesses called by Juan, including
Josefa Murillo herself, confirmed Juan’s care for the young Martín, they all excused
themselves for not knowing if Martín had indeed left his company or had given
promise of marriage to anyone.27 Thus, the testimonies given by the witnesses called
on Juan’s behalf and his own denial of the charges were deemed insufficient.
Hardly in his favor was the deposition of José Jiménez, who, when called by his
stepfather’s defense, claimed that Juan expressed his regret for having abandoned his
family and his intention to amend his conduct with these words:
[I am] convinced of the mistake I have made in abandoning my family, and how
futile my work is without your [José’s] aid; because in nothing have I been able to
make any progress, and on the contrary I am indebted to many creditors to whom
I am not able to make payment, as I have nothing left. It is because of this that I
implore you, as well as your mother and my wife, to admit me and Martín again
to your house, and to forgive us the faults committed until today. I hereby give my
word of honour that I will not provide the slightest cause for complaint, and that
from now on I will be the best father and the most faithful husband.28
After the statement provided by José Jiménez, who had been the main force in
promoting the legal separation of the couple, Juan’s fate was sealed. In November 1847,
over a year after the lawsuit began, the Ecclesiastical Court ruled in favor of Josefa
Murillo, granting her a permanent separation from her marriage to Juan Calderón
“for the crimes of cruel treatment and sodomy.”29 The Ecclesiastical Court ruled the
separation of habitation and bed, so that the couple could live separately, honestly and
religiously, as they ought to do.
While ecclesiastical divorce was often requested by women, it was rarely granted.
As proceedings were usually lengthy and complicated or did not produce a sentence,
charges were often dropped by the petitioners.30 The most common ground for
requesting divorce was cruel treatment in the form of physical violence, but a few
wives argued, like Josefa Murillo did, about the inclination of their husbands toward
persons of the same sex. An earlier example is the case of doña Josefa Gallegos, wife of
don Lorenzo Neira, who in 1801 asked for ecclesiastical divorce on grounds of marital
cruelty. Josefa Gallegos was frequently beaten by her jealous husband. Besides, she
claimed to have witnessed her husband locking himself up with a maricón in a room
of their own house. Spying through a window, she had found her husband committing
“the most atrocious crime”: caressing his male lover. Furthermore, throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, several other women also accused their husbands
of seeking to commit the “nefarious sin” with them, but in none of these cases was the
divorce granted.31
Divorce was granted only when it was evident that the abuse had become unbearable
for the petitioner, usually the wife, such that it prevented the couple from continuing
to live under the same roof.32 In the case of Josefa Murillo, the Court also ruled that,
during the divorce, Juan should not molest, disturb, or trouble his wife, and warned
him that, if he did, legal procedures would be initiated against him. Finally, although
the Ecclesiastical Court stated it had proof of “the suspicious and illicit relation that
said Calderón had maintained with Martín Hurtado,” they only recommended to
both spouses, Josefa and Juan, to behave according to their conscience.33 No further
action was taken against Juan’s illicit relations, nor was Martín charged with sodomy or
sanctioned in any way whatsoever.
In line with Foucault’s dismissal of the “repressive hypothesis,” the testimonies
expressed in this lawsuit represented a multiplicity of discourses about the illicit
friendship between Juan and Martín, even though there was a reluctance to name it.
These omissions were nonetheless decisive evidence in demonstrating Josefa’s case for
divorce. Throughout the divorce proceedings, nobody had dared to call Juan or Martín
maricones, nor were they charged with sodomy, even though some of the witnesses in
the trial were themselves law enforcers. Furthermore, this discourse of the omissions
regarding the illicit relations between Juan and Martín allowed what Foucault has
called “an affirmation of nonexistence,” granting Josefa a divorce on the grounds of
sodomy, but at the same time preventing criminal prosecution because no one was
arrested nor imprisoned.34
Conclusion
A decade after this ecclesiastical divorce case, the new Peruvian Penal Code of 1862
included sodomy as a private offence. Instead of following the Spanish legal tradition
that considered it a crime against the king and the nation, the 1862 Penal Code
included sodomy among the “offences against honesty” (Bk. 2, Sec. 8, De los delitos
contra la honestidad), meaning moral outrage.35 Article 272 equated the punishment
for those who committed sodomy with that for those guilty of rape or statutory
rape, with a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison, depending on aggravating
circumstances.36 The Code transformed the consideration of sodomy as a crime
concerning the nation (based on the Catholic fear of unleashing God’s wrath) into
a crime belonging to a more intimate sphere pertaining to a person’s moral honesty.
In so doing, the 1862 Penal Code revealed a shift to making same-sex sexuality
invisible, by transforming it into private offence. Just as the presence of maricones in
the city was no longer a matter of public complaint—in contrast with the concern
expressed by the press in the 1790s—so it was that sodomy became a matter of private
concern. In short, once sodomy was no longer of interest for public prosecution, it
became a viable cause (although in veiled terms) for requesting ecclesiastical divorce.
By the early nineteenth century, the scant official interest in prosecuting sodomites
and maricones in Lima contrasted with the public statements in the press, pamphlets,
and travel writings that showed concern about the abundance of maricones in the
city.37 Half a century later, the interest in prosecution had fallen even further, but the
legend of a city once full of maricones had also almost faded away. It only survived
in some diffuse references to vice and immorality as in Josefa and Juan’s divorce case
and in some travel accounts that described the maricones as characters of the past.
This was the case of the French traveler Maximilien Radiguet, who described their
gradual disappearance from the Plaza Mayor by the 1850s as a sign of the extinction of
the “strange society of the maricones.” Emphasizing the impression that the maricones
were the ones who were voluntarily abandoning the public scene, Radiguet gives
testimony of a process of veiling same-sex relationships starting in mid-nineteenth-
century Peru in which the transformation of sodomy into a private matter instead of a
public problem was the beginning of their journey into a silence that was to last until
the twenty-first century.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Carlos Pereyra Plasencia and Javier Flores Espinoza for copy-editing my
text, to Dir. Laura Gutiérrez Arbulú and Melecio Tineo Morón for their invaluable help
at the Archivo Arzobispal de Lima, and to my husband Norberto Barreto Velázquez,
who persuaded me to present a preliminary version of this research in London in 2015.
I also thank Dr. Pepi Patrón for her continuous encouragement and the Office of the
Vice President of Research at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, for their
generous support of my research.
Notes
1 Archivo Arzobispal de Lima, Causas de divorcio (henceforth AAL, CD), 1846, Leg. 90,
Exp. 912; Código Civil del Perú (Lima: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1852), Lib. I, Sec. III;
Decreto Ley N° 6889 (October 8, 1930); Ley N° 6890 (October 8, 1930); Código Civil
del Perú—Ley N° 8305 (1936), Lib. II, Sec. III.
2 Código Penal del Perú. Edición Oficial (Lima: Imprenta Calle de la Rifa, 1862), 82.
Available online: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044061588901;view=1u
p;seq=88 (accessed July 10, 2017).
3 Costumbrista-style paintings privileged portraying local characters and traditional
festivities, including maricones, as shown in the Juan Carlos Verme collection at
the Art Museum of Lima. For an analysis and portfolio of the various costumbrista
watercolors of maricones held in this collection, see Natalia Majluf, ed., La creación del
costumbrismo. Las acuarelas de la donación Juan Carlos Verme (Lima: Museo de Arte
de Lima, Instituto Frances de Estudios Andinos, 2016).
4 Max Radiguet, Lima y la Sociedad Peruana (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional del
Perú, 1971). Available online: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/
SirveObras/90253950982392717243457/p0000001.htm#2 (accessed November 21,
2016). (Emphasis added).
Maximilien Radiguet (1816–1899), a French writer and illustrator, traveled
to South America and Oceania as secretary to Admiral Abel du Petit-Thouars in
1841–1845. His visits to Peru and Chile (1841–1842) were described in captivating
narratives and several drawings, published under the title Souvenirs de l’Amérique
Espagnole (1856), which revealed the complexities of both postcolonial societies.
Estuardo Nuñez, “Estudio preliminar,” in Lima y la Sociedad Peruana.
5 El Paseo de Amancaes y prisión de los maricones (Imp. Republicana por J.M. Concha),
Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Pamphlets, 1820 box.
6 Archivo General de la Nación (Peru), Real Audiencia, Causas Criminales, 1797, Leg.
84, Cuad. 1032.