G.R. No.

127500               June 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
NOEL SANTOS y CRISPINO and FELICIANO FUNCION alias JON-JON, accused, NOEL
SANTOS y CRISPINO,accused-appellant.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
117, 1 convicting accused-appellant of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, also known
as the Anti-Carnapping Act, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, on the
basis of an Information the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means
of violence employed against RUEL VALENTINO MORALES, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away from the latter a Toyota Tamaraw, bearing
Plate No. UAM 540, Engine No. 2-C 2928663 and Chassis No. CF50-0012454 valued at
P387,000.00 and belonging to TEODULO NATIVIDAD y DELA CRUZ, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the amount of P387,000.00; that as a result of the violence
employed on the person of RUEL VALENTINO MORALES, the latter sustained injuries
which caused his death.2

The above Information, which named as accused Noel Santos and one John Doe, was amended on
July 31, 1995 to cancel the designation of John Doe and substitute in its place the name of Feliciano
Funcion, alias Jon-jon.3 Up to the time of the rendition of the assailed decision, however, accused
Funcion remained at large.

The prosecution presented ten witnesses during trial, consisting of the apprehending and
investigating officers of the Pasay City and Magalang, Pampanga police stations, the medico-legal
officer, and the family and friends of the victim. Also submitted in evidence were the articles
recovered at the scene of the crime, including the murder weapon and personal belongings of both
the victim and accused-appellant.

PO3 Alfredo Galang was manning the traffic at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at
around 2:30 in the morning of June 19, 1995 when he noticed an "overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw
FX. He signaled for the vehicle to pull over to the side of the road, approached the vehicle then
asked the driver for his license. The driver, who turned out to be accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion,
handed him an expired driver's license without plastic cover issued in the name of the victim, Ruel
Morales.4 Observing that the driver and his companion, herein accused-appellant, were acting
suspiciously, PO3 Galang asked them to turn on the lights inside the vehicle, to which accused-
appellant complied. He then borrowed the key to the rear door of the FX from the driver. While PO3
Galang was opening the rear door, the driver fled unpursued towards a nearby sugarcane field. The
rear portion of the FX, as PO3 Galang found out shortly thereafter, contained the dead body of victim
Ruel Morales wrapped in the seat cover and curtains of the vehicle.

This account was corroborated by Ernesto Gonzales, one of two traffic aides then stationed at the
traffic outpost in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, and who assisted PO3 Galang in the inspection of
the FX and the apprehension of accused-appellant.
PO3 Galang took custody of accused-appellant, who all through out the incident remained seated in
the front passenger seat of the FX. He called a funeral parlor to collect the corpse, brought the FX
and accused-appellant to the Magalang police station, and immediately executed an affidavit of
arrest5 against accused-appellant.

The next day, accused-appellant was brought by one SPO2 Nuqui of the Magalang police station to
the Pasay City police station and indorsed to the officer on duty, SPO2 Renato Guzman. It was
SPO2 Guzman who interviewed accused-appellant, who in turn denied responsibility for the death of
Morales and pointed all the blame at accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion.

Also delivered to the Pasay City police were an autopsy report of the body of the victim, a gray
Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UAM 540, and the items recovered therein. SPO1 Manuel
Abenoja, the evidence custodian of the Pasay City police station, identified in open court the articles
recovered from inside the FX, namely: a deformed and blood-stained kitchen knife, a stone
measuring about 3 to 4 inches across, a Certificate of Registration pertaining to the Toyota Tamaraw
FX issued in the name of Teodulo C. Natividad, a pair of checkered short pants, a wrist watch, a
brown scapular necklace, two leather wallets, a PCIBank card in the name of Ruel Valentine
Morales, a Makati Public Safety Office badge, three pictures of Ruel Morales, a pair of denim long
pants, a leather belt, three pairs of shoes, and assorted identification papers in the name of Ruel
Morales.6

Dr. Ma. Lourdes Natividad, rural health physician of Magalang, Pampanga, conducted the post-
mortemexamination of the body of the victim. Based on her findings, the cause of death was
hemorrhage as a result of the victim's fractured skull. Dr. Natividad testified to the presence of the
following injuries on the victim's body: fracture of the frontonasal bone (between the victim's eyes7);
multiple lacerations, incisions and hematoma on the face and arms, abrasions on the face and lower
extremities, and ligature extending horizontally from right to left and covering almost two-thirds of the
neck.8 In her testimony, the doctor stated that the fracture between the victim's eyes and the
contusions were likely caused by a blunt instrument, while the lacerated and incised wounds were
inflicted by a sharp instrument. The ligature across the neck could have been caused by strangling
with a rope.9

Three of the victim's friends who last saw him alive were also presented as prosecution witnesses.
Elizalde Claridad declared that at around 11:00 in the evening of June 18, 1995, he was drinking
with his friends at the corner of Lim and M. Reyes Streets in Makati City when Ruel Morales drove
by in a Toyota Tamaraw FX. Morales called to him and asked that he accompany him in looking for
his (Morales's) brother, Hoppy. Morales was wearing a T-shirt, shorts, slippers and a lady's Rolex
wrist watch with gemstones. They drove around Barangay Bangkal in Makati then proceeded to
Padi's Point, a restaurant-bar at Pasay Road, also in Makati; unable to locate the brother, Morales
dropped him off at the corner of Lim and M. Reyes Streets and drove back to Pasay Road. The next
time he saw Morales was the next day, when they fetched his body in the morgue in Pampanga.

Meanwhile, Arnie Bordeos testified that on the night of June 18, 1995, between 10:00 to 11:00, he
saw Ruel Morales in a Toyota Tamaraw FX along M. Reyes and General Luna Streets in Makati
conversing with two persons by the side of the road. Earlier to this conversation, these two persons
approached him and his friends and talked to them in a drunken and rude manner. One of them,
whom he identified as herein accused-appellant, even bragged that he was the nephew of a city
mayor. He then saw Morales opening the passenger doors to let the two persons in, then Morales
drove away with the two on board. Leo Soriba, who was with Arnie Bordeos at the time,
corroborated this account.
Teodulo Natividad testified that he was the owner of the Toyota Tamaraw FX where the victim's
body was found. He stated that on June 18, 1995 he lent the FX to the victim, Ruel Morales, who
was a good friend of his and who often borrowed the FX from him. The vehicle was recovered and
restored to him by the Pasay City police. It had a dent on the roof and the seat covers and curtains
were missing, but it was in otherwise good condition. 10

Antonio Morales, Jr. presented receipts covering the expenses incurred by his family for the wake
and burial of his brother. The total costs reflected in the receipts amounted to P56,319.30. He also
stated that his brother worked as an entertainer in Japan, earning US$1,000.00 a month. 11 He was,
however, unable to submit documentary evidence to support this.

In contrast to the ten witnesses presented by the prosecution, defense presented as its sole witness
accused-appellant himself. In his version of the story, accused-appellant was at the Malvar Sports
Complex in Bangkal, Makati City on June 18, 1995 at around 10:00 in the evening. He was playing
darts with accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion and two other friends, when Jon-jon told them that he
was in need of money as he needed to go to Tarlac to see his girlfriend. Because no one among
them could lend him money, Jon-jon asked accused-appellant to accompany him to the house of
one Councilor Ferdie Eusebio from whom he intended to borrow money. Upon reaching Eusebio's
house, however, Jon-jon decided against it because it was already late at night and it seemed as if
the occupants of the house were already asleep. They returned to the Malvar Sports Complex where
one of their friends, Jeffrey Abigabel, suggested they try borrowing money from his friend, Joel. Jon-
jon left with Funcion to go to Joel, but they returned shortly after. Jeffrey then said he was going
home, and as Jeffrey was walking away from them a Toyota Tamaraw FX stopped beside him.
Accused-appellant saw Jeffrey converse with the driver of the FX, then Jeffrey went on his way and
the FX went towards Mabolo Street. Accused-appellant then said that Jon-jon asked him who the
driver of the FX was, but he answered that he did not know. Then Jon-jon left towards the direction
of Mabolo Street, saying "didiskarte raw siya ng pera." 12

At this point, accused-appellant decided to go home. While walking along Macabolos Street he met
the FX, being driven by Jon-jon, which stopped beside him. The person on the front passenger seat
opened his window, and he observed that the person was "gay". Jon-jon asked him where he was
going, and when he said he was on his way home, he and the "gay" passenger invited him to ride
with them and that they will drop him off at his house. He identified the passenger as "Sharon", or
the victim Ruel Morales in the instant case. Accused-appellant accepted the offer and boarded the
FX.

However, instead of dropping him off at his house in Malibay, Pasay City, Jon-jon drove to PICC,
where they parked in a dark area where the trees screened off the light of the electric lamps. Jon-jon
then asked accused-appellant to step out of the FX, saying that he and "Sharon" had matters to
discuss. He consented, walking about 8 meters away from the vehicle. Because it was dark, he
could not see the interior of the FX but he observed that it was "umuuga", or rocking lightly, for about
10 to 15 minutes. He came to the conclusion that the two were having sex.

Then Jon-jon called him and alighted from the middle right-side door of the FX. When accused-
appellant approached, Jon-jon placed his right arm on the right shoulder of accused-appellant, and
the latter noticed from the open car door that someone was lying inside the FX. He asked Jon-jon
what happened and he reportedly replied, "Don't ask anymore, you might be the next one." 13 Then
he felt something poke him sharply on the neck, and Jon-jon said in an angry voice, "Just follow
what I instructed (sic), if not, I will kill you." 14 Jon-jon then told him to remove the seat covers of the
FX and as he did so, Jon-jon went behind him leveling the knife on accused-appellant's neck with
one hand while holding to the waistband of accused-appellant' pants with the other. 15 Jon-jon made
him cover the dead body, with the seat covers; then Jon-jon tied both of accused-appellant's hands
behind his back, took his wallet and made him sit on the front passenger seat of the FX. He then
placed a seat belt around him, locked the door at his side, started the engine and drove to Buendia
Avenue and north to Pampanga. All the while Jon-jon reportedly threatened to kill him if he
attempted to escape or to alert anyone, such as the toll booth personnel, of what was
happening. 16 Throughout his testimony, which ran the course of four hearings, accused-appellant
insisted that he had no opportunity to escape and that he was overcome by fear of accused-at-large
Jon-jon Funcion.

When they were accosted at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, accused-appellant
testified to the following chain of events: Jon-jon pulled over to the side of the road, unfastened the
seat belt around accused-appellant, untied accused-appellant's hands, threw something at the back
of the vehicle, turned on the light, told accused-appellant to remove his (accused-appellant's)
sweatshirt, wore the sweatshirt to cover the blood stains on his arms, turned off the light, threatened
him some more, took money from accused-appellant's wallet, then alighted. 17 All of this presumably
transpired during the interim that it took for PO3 Galang, who was at a distance of about 30 meters
away, 18 to approach the FX.

At some point in his testimony, accused-appellant said that while the policeman and Jon-jon were
talking, he called to one of the traffic aides and said that there was a dead body at the back of the
car. 19 This, however, was not in the testimony of Ernesto Gonzales, one of the traffic aides present
at the time.

After Jon-jon Funcion fled and the police officer found the dead body at the back of the FX, they
approached accused-appellant who remained seated at the front passenger seat and led him to the
nearby police outpost. He was then brought to a police station where he was placed under
investigation.

The trial court viewed with disbelief the version of accused-appellant. In its decision rendered on
October 25, 1996, it declared:

The Court believes that Jon-jon alone could not inflict all the wounds on
Morales alias Sharon which caused his death. So that the claim of Santos that he had no
participation in the killing of Morales is not credible. Santos himself testified that his friend
Jon-jon was in need of money as he was to go to his girlfriend in Tarlac. When they were not
able to borrow money from Councilor Eusebio, Morales came along and invited them to
PICC. Morales alias Sharon being a gay wanted to use Jon-jon and Santos who were
teenagers. While there is no direct evidence in the killing of Morales, the presumption is that
the person found in the unexplained possession of the stolen effects is the author of the
aggression and death of the victim and the robbery committed on him. (People vs. Prado,
G.R. No. 95260, March 8, 1996) At the time they were committing the crime, their action
impliedly showed a unity of purpose between them and a concerted effort to bring about the
death of Morales. (People vs. Ferrer, et. al., G.R. Nos. 114931-33, November 16, 1995)20

Thus, the trial court made a finding of implied conspiracy and meted out a judgment of conviction.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision is quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Noel Santos y Crispino
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended (Anti-
Carnapping Act). There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the Court
sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Ruel Valentino
Morales in the amount of P50,000.00; the amount of P56,319.30 as damages, and to pay the
costs.
 SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

1. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos is guilty of violating Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended (the "Anti-Carnapping Act"), considering that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of Noel Santos beyond reasonable doubt.

1a. The trial court gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy between Funcion
and Noel Santos, and that their actions showed unity of purpose and a concerted
effort to bring about the death of victim Morales.

1b. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos participated in the forcible
taking of the Tamaraw FX and the killing of victim Morales.

1c. The trial court erred in finding that Funcion alone could not inflict all the wounds
victim Morales sustained.

2. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish the presence of Noel Santos in the vehicle when the crime was committed by
Funcion.

2a. The trial court gravely erred in finding Noel Santos guilty based on a presumption that
the person found in the unexplained possession of the stolen effects is the author of the
aggression and death of the victim and of the robbery committed on him, considering that
Noel Santos was able to fully explain his presence in said vehicle where the body of the
victim Morales was found. 22

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things: the fact of the crime, i.e.,
the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. In the instant case we find the prosecution unable to
discharge on both aspects, leaving us with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

"Carnapping", as defined by Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, is the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 23 By the
amendment in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now
reads:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken,
be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more that seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less
than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, what the carnapping
is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall; be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
On the last clause, three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act: (1) the change of the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the
inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." 24 This third amendment
makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of
analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. 25 Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the
prosecution not only has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or
murder of Ruel Morales 26 but more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the
culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Needless to say, where the elements of carnapping are not
proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or
murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

In the herein case, we find the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to
prove an unlawful taking. The application of the presumption that a person found in possession of
the personal effects belonging to a person robbed or killed is considered the author of the
aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to
cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. 27The rebuttal of such presumption,
invariably employed in cases of robbery and theft under the Revised Penal Code, validly applies to a
case of carnapping, for indeed the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the
same, and had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. 28

However incriminating the circumstances of accused-appellant were — having been apprehended in

an "overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX, which later turned out to be owned by the victim's friend,
and where the victim's body and a blood-stained knife were found — he did in fact set up a defense
of duress on which, as the records plainly show, he had been subjected to exhaustive cross-
examination by the prosecution. During cross-examination, accused-appellant adhered to his version
of the story, insisting that his presence in the FX was for no reason other than as a captive of
accused-at-large.  While we are not prepared to say that the explanation of accused-appellant is
1awphi1

seamless, the point we want to make at this juncture is that once an explanation is offered for the
possession of the stolen effects, the presumption arising from unexplained possession may not
anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that
would render the defense of accused improbable. On this burden we find the prosecution in the
instant case unable to discharge.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of Ruel Morales may not be treated as an incident
of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised
Penal Code, we find that the guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable
doubt.

The trial court itself admits that there is no direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant
for the killing of Ruel Morales. Following are the circumstantial evidence relied upon for his
conviction: first, accused-appellant was in the Toyota Tamaraw FX containing the victim's body and
a blood-stained knife; second, the FX was caught "overspeeding" at 2:30 in the morning at a
provincial intersection, and the occupants were acting suspiciously; third, earlier accused-appellant
was seen with accused-at-large in Pasay City, appearing drunk and behaving rudely; and fourth, he
was seen with accused-at-large boarding an FX being driven by the victim, the same FX where the
victim's body was subsequently found.
For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 29 On the latter, decided cases expound that the circumstancial evidence presented and
proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 30

The circumstances abovementioned do not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with the guilt
of accused-appellant. Quite to the contrary, we observe that while the arresting officer was
preoccupied with opening the rear door of the FX, at which time accused-at-large took the
opportunity to flee, accused-appellant remained seated on the front passenger seat, a behavior quite
uncommon for a guilty man faced with the inevitability of arrest. Although no one corroborated
accused-appellant's allegation that he volunteered the information that there was a dead body at the
back of the car, his demeanor all throughout the search of the FX and during his arrest was, to say
the least, not inconsistent with the hypothesis of innocence. He did not resist arrest, and during his
testimony he did not waver in insisting that it was accused-at-large alone who was responsible for
the crime.

Thus, even if we accept as credible all the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it does not rule
out the probability of accused-appellant's story — that it was accused-at-large who killed Morales
then threatened him at knife-point — having taken place, for there were no eyewitnesses to the
killing itself, and all the prosecution was able to show were the events before and after the killing of
Morales.

A situation as this calls for the application of the equipoise rule, which requires that where the
inculpatory circumstances are capable of two inferences, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence and the other compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must acquit the
accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and therefore is insufficient
to support a judgment of conviction. 31

Our ruling to acquit does not hold a corollary upholding of the credibility of the testimony of accused-
appellant. The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of
the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral
certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and
does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to
establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish
the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable
probability. 32 An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's
innocence may be doubted, 33 for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. 34

Having resolved against the individual culpability of accused-appellant in this manner, the theory of
implied conspiracy of the trial court must likewise fail.

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 95-7258 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellant Noel Santos y Crispino is ACQUITTED on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from
detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds for his further detention exist. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.

Footnotes

1
 Presided by Judge Leonardo M. Rivera.

2
 Rollo, 3.

3
 Amended Information; Records of the Case, 40.

4
 TSN, July 24, 1995, 5, 10.

5
 Records of the Case, 6.

6
 TSN, October 3, 1995, 3-8.

7
 TSN, July 24, 1996, 24.

8
 Autopsy Report; Records of the Case, 165.

9
 TSN, July 24, 1995; 26.

10
 TSN, August 15, 1995, 5-6.

11
 TSN, December 13, 1995, 9.

12
 TSN, May 22, 1996, 16.

13
 TSN, June 10, 1996, 6.

14
 Ibid., 7.

15
 TSN, June 26, 1996, 12.

16
 Ibid., 18.

17
 TSN, June 10, 1996, 29-34.

18
 Ibid., 32.

19
 Ibid., 36-37.

20
 RTC Decision; Rollo, 33.

21
 Ibid.; Rollo, 33-34.
 22
 Accused-Appellant's Brief; Rollo, 85.

23
 Sec. 2, RA. No. 6539, a amended.

24
 Prior to the amendment, the last clause of Section 14 of RA. No. 6539 read: ". . . and the
penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed. in the commission of the carnapping."

25
 People vs. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127.

26
 In People vs. Mejia, supra, the Court stated that since Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping
Act uses the words "is killed, no distinction must be made between homicide and murder
insofar as the penalty is concerned. It is, however, required that the felony of either murder
or homicide be consummated for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death to set in;
otherwise, or when the murder or homicide is merely attempted or frustrated, it must be
deemed to fall under the clause "when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person", also in Section 14 of the same law.

27
 People vs. Geron, 281 SCRA 36.

28
 See People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 135904, January 21, 2000.

 Sec. 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court; cited in People vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124;
29

People vs. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705; People vs. Bato, 284 SCRA 223.

 People vs. Geron, supra; see also People vs. Quitorio, 285 SCRA 196; People vs.
30

Llaguno, supra.

31
 People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267; People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94.

32
 People vs. Geron, supra.

33
 People vs. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000.

 People vs. Fronda, supra; People vs. Crispin, G.R. No. 128360, March 2, 2000; People vs.
34

Rugay, 291 SCRA 692.

EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187044

                Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
         CORONA, C.J.,
- versus -               Chairperson,
        LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
        BERSAMIN,
        DEL CASTILLO, and
        VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
RENATO
LAGAT y GAWANa.k.a. RENAT Promulgated:
GAWAN andJAMES
PALALAY yVILLAROSA, September 14, 2011
                       Accused-Appellants.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 
This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat),
also known as Renat Gawan, and James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge
the Court of Appeals’ October 8, 2008 Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02869, for affirming with modification the March 19, 2007 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Carnapping in Criminal Case
No. 21-4949.
 
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of
Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 14[3] of
Republic Act No. 6539. The accusatory portion of the Information,[4] reads:
 
            That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, conniving with each other, and mutually helping one another and with
intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit
YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and Motor No.
LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued
at ₱70,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.
  
            That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion
thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving confederating and
helping each other, and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack  and
wound the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows
against the vital parts of the body of the latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple
stab and hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the said JOSE BIAG.
 
 
Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005.[5]  Palalay, on
the other hand, did not enter any plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by
the RTC for him.[6]
 
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser
offense.[7]  In their plea-bargaining proposal,[8] they asked that they be allowed to
plead guilty to the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to
commit so grave a wrong be considered in their favor.  They also asked that
damages be fixed at ₱120,000.00.  This proposal was rejected[9] by the prosecution;
thus, the pre-trial conference proceeded.  The pre-trial Order contained the
following facts as admitted by the parties:
 
1.      That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and
Sn. Guillermo road by members of the police together with Barangay Captain
Heherson Dulay and Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
 
2.      That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly
stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
 
3.      That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack
wounds as described in the Autopsy Report and death certificate which shall be
submitted during trial.[10]
 
 
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
 
The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim
Jose Biag (Biag), to testify on the circumstances leading to Biag’s disappearance
and the discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag’s tricycle, and the expenses she
incurred and the income she had lost as a result of her husband’s death.  Florida
testified that her husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.
[11]
  On April 12, 2005, at around two o’clock in the morning, her husband left to
operate his tricycle for public use.  It was around 11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005,
when news reached her that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of the Municipality of Alicia and that her husband had figured in an
accident.  After learning of the incident, Florida sought the help of their
Barangay (Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately left for Angadanan
without her.  At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy. Captain Dulay informed[12] Florida of
what had happened to her husband.[13]  Florida then presented in court the
receipts[14] evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her husband’s wake and
funeral and for the repair of their tricycle, which was recovered with missing
parts.  She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer, a tanod,
and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless nights.[15]
 
The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay
Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa).  He testified that on April 13, 2005, after he
and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Florida’s report, they immediately went to the
Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biag’s tricycle.  The PNP of Alicia
showed them the identification card recovered in the tricycle and told them that the
tricycle was used in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan, Isabela that
belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay
were also told that the owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road.  They were thereafter shown the two
suspects and the place where Biag’s body was dumped.  Rumbaoa said that he was
able to identify the body as Biag’s, which was almost unrecognizable because it
was bloated all over, only because Biag had a mark on his right shoulder, which
Rumbaoa knew of.[16]
 
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia,
took the witness stand next.  He testified that on April 13, 2005, he was on duty
along with other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report
from Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay
Buying Station in Alicia, Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified
male persons.  PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their Chief of
Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2
Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of the report.  At Alice Palay Buying Station,
they saw the tricycle described to them by their chief, with thecavans of palay, and
the two accused, Lagat and Palalay.  PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team
were about to approach the tricycle when the two accused “scampered”[17]to
different directions.  After “collaring” the two accused, they brought them to the
Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents.  PO2 Salvador
asseverated that when they reached the station, they asked the two accused if they
had any papers to show for both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two
accused did not answer.  They allegedly kept silent even after they were informed
of their rights not only to remain as such, but also to have counsel, either of their
own choosing, or to be assigned to them if they cannot afford one.  PO2 Salvador
then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle, they discovered bloodstains
inside and outside the sidecar.  He also personally found a wallet containing the
tricycle’s Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt[18] issued by the Land
Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag.  When they asked the two accused
about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in
the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle.  PO2
Salvador alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they again informed Lagat and
Palalay that anything they say would be used against them, and that they had a
right to counsel.  Thereafter, they coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police
Station, and together with the two accused, they proceeded to Angadanan-San
Guillermo Road, where they found Biag’s body in a ravine just after the bridge
near the road.[19]
 
The prosecution’s last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvador’s
testimony on the events that led them to the tricycle, the palay, the two accused,
and the body of Biag.  He also confirmed PO2 Salvador’s claim that they had
informed the two accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence,
they continued with their investigation.[20]  PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused
also told them how they killed Biag, to wit:
 
A-                They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to
Angadanan.  And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to the driver
and the driver ran away.  They chased him and stabbed him, sir.[21]
 
 
 Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to
recover the murder weapon despite diligent efforts to look for it and that they had
questioned the people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that the two
accused had no other companion.  PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they
informed Lagat and Palalay of their constitutional rights, the two were never
assisted by counsel at any time during the custodial investigation.[22]
 
The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report[23] on Biag
of Dr. Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang, the Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal
Officer of Santiago City.  The Report showed that Biag was likely killed between
12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab
wounds, an incise wound, two hack wounds and an “avulsion of the skin extending
towards the abdomen.”[24]
 
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss
on Demurrer to Evidence[25] without leave of court[26] on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Lagat and Palalay
averred that their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly
violated as they were interrogated for hours without counsel, relatives, or any
disinterested third person to assist them.  Moreover, the admissions they allegedly
made were not supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed that
Rumbaoa’s testimony showed that he had a “swelling above his right eye” and “a
knife wound in his left arm,” which suggests that he was maltreated while under
police custody.[27]
 
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was not sufficient to convict them.  They averred that aside from the
alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing else: they had no
object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder
weapon was never found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was
presented to show that they were in possession of the tricycle at the time they were
arrested.  Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus,
they were entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of innocence absent
proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
 
 As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they
in effect waived their right to present evidence, and submitted the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.[29]
 
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
           
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds
the accused Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of
them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.  They are also ORDERED TO PAY
Florida Biag the sum of Twelve thousand three hundred pesos (₱12,300.00) as
actual damages plus Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) for death indemnity and
another Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) for moral damages.[30]
 
 
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed
with the accused that their rights were violated during their custodial investigation
as they had no counsel to assist them.  Thus, whatever admissions they had made,
whether voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible
in evidence.[31]
 
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the
prosecution was able to establish enough circumstantial evidence to prove that
Lagat and Palalay committed the crime, to wit:
 
1.     The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biag’s
tricycle, loaded with stolen palay;
2.     The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching
them;
3.     The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag’s wallet with
documents to prove that Biag owned the tricycle;
4.     The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a
Jose Biag, and this was how the barangay officials of Santiago City and
Florida found out that Biag’s tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;
5.     Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;
 6.     The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay
and Rumbaoa to where they dumped Biag’s body.[32] 
 
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified
by the killing of Biag, which, according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in
the course of the carnapping.[33]
 
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds
that it erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses and in relying on the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution.[34]
 
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied[35] this motion, holding that the
testimonies of the witnesses were credible and supported by the attending facts and
circumstances, and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the
accused.
 
Lagat and Palalay went[36] to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt
was not established beyond reasonable doubt.[37]  They averred that circumstantial
evidence, to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, “must exclude each and
every hypothesis consistent with innocence,”[38] which was allegedly not the case in
their situation.  They elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC
enumerated could not be taken against them:
 
1.     The accused’s possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its
owner; 
2.     Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the
subject of this case), and not the tricycle;
3.     No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the
tricycle to Biag himself.  They could have easily been Palalay’s, who was
shown to have a knife wound; and
4.     The accused’s act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the
ravine where Biag’s body was dumped was part of their interrogation
without counsel, which the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in
evidence.[39]
 
 On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the
following dispositive portion:
 
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch
21, Santiago City, in Criminal Case No. 21-4949, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James
Palalay y Villarosa are ordered to pay to private complainant the increased
amount of ₱14,900.00 as actual damages.[40]
 
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the
elements of carnapping were all present in this case.  The Court of Appeals pointed
out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing tricycle when they
were apprehended by the Alicia PNP.  Moreover, they failed to offer any
explanation as to how they came to be in possession of the tricycle.  The Court of
Appeals also agreed with the RTC that whatever confession or admission the
Alicia PNP extracted out of the accused could not be used in evidence for having
been done without the assistance of counsel.  The Court of Appeals nonetheless
affirmed the RTC’s judgment as it was “convinced” that the following
circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of the accused for qualified
carnapping:
 
1.     Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;
2.     Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle
on April 13, 2005;
3.     The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood
inside it, together with the original receipt and certificate of registration
of the vehicle in the name of Jose Biag;
4.     Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented
him and Lagat to Brgy. Capt. Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;
5.     Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP
recovered his corpse in a ravine; and
6.     Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the
bloodstained tricycle immediately after their arrest.[41]
 
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they
posited before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
 
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[42]
 
 
Ruling of the Court
         
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified
carnapping under Republic Act. No. 6539[43] or the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972.  Section 2 of the Act defines “carnapping” and “motor vehicle” as follows:
 
            “Carnapping” is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
 
            “Motor vehicle” is any vehicle propelled by any power other than
muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley
cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run
only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used
exclusively for agricultural purposes.  Trailers having any number of wheels,
when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall
be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.[44]
 
 
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:
         
1.        That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2.        That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; 
3.        That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; and
4.         That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.[45]
 
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present
and were proven during trial.
 
 The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as
evidenced by the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalay’s
possession.  Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat
and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at
the palay buying station.  To top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed to give any reason
why they had Biag’s tricycle.  Their unexplained possession raises the presumption
that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle.  Section 3(j),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
 
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful
act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. 
 
 
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,[46] we said that for such presumption to arise, it
must be proven that: (a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c)
that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the
accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.[47]  As mentioned above,
all these were proven by the prosecution during trial.  Thus, it is presumed that
Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle.  In People v. Bustinera,
[48]
 this Court defined “unlawful taking,” as follows:
 
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle
without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.[49]
 
 
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also
proven as they were caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle,
which they obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and
were going to sell at the station.  In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of
“intent to gain” and said:
 
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.  Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain.  The term “gain” is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
 derived or expected from the act which is performed.  Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.[50]
 
 
Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case,
we now go to the argument of the two accused that they cannot be convicted based
on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
 
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
 
(a)    There is more than one circumstance;
 
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
 
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
 
 
In People v. Mansueto,[51] we said:
 
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of
facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.  Such
evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts
sought to be proved.[52]
 
 
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[53]
 
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding
those that are inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as
a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable
doubt.  We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:
 
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same
day that it, together with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
 
 Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the
stolen tricycle packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
 
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and
ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
 
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they
were in possession of Biag’s tricycle.
 
Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the
tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia PNP.
 
Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem
autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
 
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that
Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle.  Direct proof
that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their
conduct before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted
with a common purpose and design.[54]  The pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution are consistent with one another and the only rational proposition that
can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his
tricycle.
 
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
 
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective
of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four
months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
 or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.  (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.)  (Emphasis ours)
 
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of
the crime, the RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of Jose Biag and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his
untimely death.  However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial
amount to less than ₱25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages
for ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.[55]  Thus, an
award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of ₱14,900.00
that the Court of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.
 
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article
2206 of the Civil Code, the accused are also jointly and severally liable for the loss
of the earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his heirs.
[56]
  In People v. Jadap,[57] this Court said:
 
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity.  By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws.  In this case, no documentary evidence was
presented to prove the claim of the victim’s heirs for damages by reason of loss of
earning capacity.  However, the victim’s father testified that at the time of his
son’s death, he was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly
income of ₱3,000.00.  We find the father’s testimony sufficient to justify the
award of damages for loss of earning capacity.[58]
 
 
Biag’s widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and
tricycle driver, and that his income amounted to ₱40,000.00 per cropping season as
a farmer, ₱2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and ₱300.00 per day as a tricycle
driver.  However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining
to Biag’s appointment as atanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall
consider only his earnings as a tricycle driver.  According to the death
certificate[59] submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the time of his
death. 
 
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased is based on two factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the
damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the
heirs of the deceased should be fixed.  The first factor is based on the formula (2/3
x 80 – age of the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is
adopted from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality.[60]  Net income is
computed by deducting from the amount of the victim’s gross income the amount
of his living expenses.  As there is no proof of Biag’s living expenses, the net
income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income.[61] Thus, the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased is computed as follows:
 
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income – living expenses]
[62]

                                    = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income -

50% of gross annual income]
                                     = 2/3 [80-56] x [₱109,500.00 - ₱54,750.00]
                                     = 16 x ₱54,750.00
                                     = ₱876,000.00
 
 
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869.  Accused-
appellantsRenato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.  They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Biag
the following: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) ₱876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity;
and (e) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment.
 
 SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
 
 

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
                                                            Chief Justice
 

[1]
               Rollo, pp. 2-17; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, concurring.
[2]
               Records, pp. 126-133.
[3]
               As amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
[4]
               Records, pp. 1-2.
[5]
               Id. at 22.
[6]
               Id. at 21.
[7]
               Id. at 28.
[8]
               Id. at 38.
[9]
               Id. at 41.
[10]
             Id. at 39.
[11]
             TSN, January 9, 2006, p. 10.
[12]
             Records, p. 4.
[13]
             TSN, January 9, 2006, pp. 3-6.
[14]
             Records, pp. 98A-98I.
[15]
             TSN, January 9, 2006, pp. 7-13.
[16]
             TSN, April 20, 2006, pp. 3-6.
[17]
             TSN, September 18, 2006, p. 5.
[18]
             Records, p. 8.
[19]
             TSN, September 18, 2006, pp. 4-16.
[20]
             TSN, November 15, 2006, pp. 4-10.
[21]
             Id. at 9.
[22]
             Id. at 13-21.
[23]
             Records, pp. 94-96.
[24]
             Id.
[25]
             Id. at 104-110.
[26]
             Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 23.
[27]
             TSN, April 20, 2006, p. 10.
[28]
             Records, pp. 108-109.
[29]
             Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 23, paragraph 2.
[30]
             Records, p. 133.
[31]
             Id. at 130-131.
[32]
             Id. at 131-132.
[33]
             Id. at 131-133.
[34]
             Id. at 135-138.
[35]
             Id. at 141-142.
[36]
             Id. at 143.
[37]
             CA rollo, p. 29.
[38]
             Id. at 34.
[39]
             Id. at 35-36.
[40]
             Rollo, p. 16.
[41]
             Id. at 14.
[42]
             CA rollo, p. 33.
[43]
             As amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
[44]
             Republic Act No. 6539, Section 2.
[45]
             People v. Bernabe and Garcia, 448 Phil. 269, 280 (2003).
[46]
             G.R. No. 151400, September 1, 2004, 437 SCRA 488.
[47]
             Id. at 502.
[48]
             G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 284.
[49]
             Id. at 295.
[50]
             Id. at 296.
[51]
             391 Phil. 611 (2000).
[52]
             Id. at 629.
[53]
             People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 417 (2003).
[54]
             People v. Sube, 449 Phil. 165, 176-177 (2003).
[55]
             People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. 151251, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 529, 543.
[56]
             People v. Sirad, 390 Phil. 412, 426 (2000).
[57]
             G.R. No. 177983, March 30, 2010, 617 SCRA 179.
[58]
             Id. at 196-197.
[59]
             Records, p. 9.
[60]
             People v. Librando, 390 Phil. 543, 559 (2000).
[61]
             People v. Templo, 400 Phil. 471, 494 (2000).
[62]
             People v. Verde, 362 Phil. 305, 321 (1999