10 u 2 B 18 6 ” 13 » Ey THEMES AND ISSUES cope the aye 1a pdr whieh ses any pa of we which damaged (Diels Kranz, Die Fagmente der Vorsotraiker, 12. erable, fag. sent Fer peteagy, 3,26 ; The we of te trm volvement suggest ik withthe Pyehlogy of Eg. moh! by Manic Shen and Haaey Ceol GUL WIE ere Saeko) mae my aoa enemne, ne photomenoncd dilson‘otthe suse Involvement is undertaken, and eg0-identfcation'is not even enone ‘ie eat ne eanny of enteaon i eey tiles aie te Benn Saget on ent eneatas S Thay Roche ioe Review of Eusoanr Poecloy and Poche 160.18 (98) DS es Nenchen Gale 1959, cecal 93 wi Th oveaiae of th body i elation to ove pssble boyonsounes may ny hol pal itu wane of Ein Sans avo anon osteo phenomenclogts Wy si ttn emopleg te vic dine seme fom ths toy have no sane ee uct yt HEUTE i et eek tne he igh ae at ent nt Tn cooaeat acer ethcnscdnsr es ltandarer sbsid heme serneee wi 5 See, eg,, Nicolas Beets, “The Experience af the Body in Sport” (Jokl,E., and E Sinan ca, Imomeatonal Reset Sport and Pye Edacaton Spin fel is ge). Dar, Ror The Four Mite Mle, New York; Do, Mes, and Co te See Ducasse’ chapter on ‘The At of Pesonal Rest in. Ar the Cie and You few vont) See siptallyPehoose der menschishen Wet, p. 42 For the beings ola mort shiettis roewsaclogul rclogy t muses cont Remy Ingen Gtersotangen or Ong dr Kine. Ting: Max Nesey 158 orkape eos sting though pyehopeeay une) e {casing to phenomenology of mine ca be ound fs Ba arth, Miia Shloge nd Bin ; ete hc dy ab Tate fs omeven, a mach more expt secoast of su cxpsriectsnHicins Werhen ‘Das them dey Bmpfnons onde tno Sehr experineraienPiton’ 2ach jr Pstoogs 8 W930) See iene Werner's subject {opp 150," by a ependot resonant te matt a {had Become von o a Gell whch 8 beg dyed 33 EDMUND HUSSERL’S CONTRIBUTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS I! Elizabeth A. Behnke Source: Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree (eds), feses in Huser’ ideas If (Dondecht: Kiuwer Academic Publisher, 1995) pp. 135-160, L Introduction Like the history of much of Husser!’s work, the history of his contribution toa phenomenology of the body is in part a history of understandable m: understandings and subsequent reevaluations concerning the scope and significance of his achievements. To a certain extent, this is due not so much to what he actually said on this topic, but to the circumstances under which he said or wrote it—university lecture course? unpublished book draft? published work? research manuscript? conversation noted down by others?—and to the sequence and manner in which this work gradually became available to the larger phenomenological community. For example, it was widely held at one time, primarily on the basis of Ideas J Gee, e.g., IVI: §§ 39, 53-54), that Husserl dealt only with a disembodied and desituated consciousness, and that it was only with the advent of exis tential phenomenology that the body truly became an important phenom. enological theme. However, we now know how heavily Merleau-Ponty, for example, drew upon Husserl’s manuscripts for many of the descriptions and insights developed in the extensive and influential discussions of the body in Phenomenology of Perception (see Van Breda 1962/1992), More over, though it is now more readily acknowledged that Husserl did indeed take/the body into account, some still assume or imply that he did so only foward the end of his life. Yet a closer examination of material published to date reveals that Husserl was concerned with bodilihood in texts from ‘many different periods.* A fuller appreciation of the range and richness of Husserls work in phenomenology of the body is nevertheless emerging 25THEMES AND ISSUES conscious of objects” (McKenna 1982, 173). Since the presentation below will approach the question of the “way” of being conscious of objects ugh the notion of atte (znstllng), {sal brie review how Hower eapots the motion of ate” in Ideas before inating how Thal be apphne the notion in sorting out what he say about the body “The two cinetng “ties” Huse is ost onsened with dt euising an desing in rs ane the "natal stud and the Eferoaie” tue (distinction that is nuoduced in IV: 834, bu net fy exploit un $9 0). They may also be vetesed taste tide of he matralstenceson the one band andthe tite of he ela o human scence on the othe. Thus in bth he dst pat of eo 1, Constution of Matera Natre” andthe second par, “The Const St Animal Natures Huser dealing primarily wh te physal materia Stottne ofthe ntaal scence In cata, the third parte Conti Son of the Spal World” takes vp the human word f mesrings nd motivations the cultural word of semmvoites and Stations —the Shore sureunding world win hich and abt whith we communist Sith ott human beings. And Huser's main point at fs presely when human subjects adopt the one or the other “attitude” or “frame of mind” that the correlative reality—the physical world of material nature ‘or the cultural world of lived meanings—comes into view. But other contrasting attitudes may also be pointed out. On the one hand, there is a naive-dogmatic “attitude” that is in no way aware of itself 230 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS It as an “attitude,” or as one attitude among others, but simply takes what fone expetiences within this attitude to be “reality.” On the other hand, there is a phenomenological attitude within which one brings “attitudes” per se into view, while holding in abeyance any naive commitment to this oF that attitude and suspending judgement about whether the reality dis- closed within any particular attitude is “the” tue reality. Such a phenome- nological attitude is, of course, often contrasted with what is usually called the “natural attitude"—the taken-for-granted way in which we deal with, maneuver within, and indeed, belicve in the everyday world as simply existing, as simply “there for us. Husser! is especially concerned with the contrast between the mundane, natural attitude and a transcendental phe~ nomenological attitude in Ideas I (see HV: §§ 276), In dens 11, however, he seems more interested in using a phenomeno- logical attitude to overcome the naive dogmatism of the natural-science altitude of his day. According to Hlusserl, researchers in the natural sch, ences typically fail so realize that this attitude is not the only one, and remain blind to other possiblities (IV: 179/189, 183/193). In contrast, the Phenomenological attitude is “educational,” he says, for “it henceforth makes us in general sensitive toward grasping other attitudes” (IV: 179/189). Such other possible attitudes axe assumed by specific acts of per- ceiving, willing, valuing, handling et, along with their correlative objects, yet cannot be equated with individual acts; rather, attitudes inform act, lending them a general style while opening coherent horizons that function 48 typical frameworks of meaning for the objects of these acis 28 well as contexts for further motivated acts, etc. Phenomenology, however, fune~ tions as a meta-attitude, investigating reciprocal essential corselations between constituting attitudes on the one hand and constituted objectivi ties (and their horizons) on the other, understanding any given attitude ‘froin within” (though without actually “adopting” it) and maintaining a igofous awareness of which attitude is in TV: {80/189-60). (ne way to approach a phenomenology of the body, then, would be to notige that the way we expetience “the body" ot “the bodily” is shaped by the attitude we have taken up, knowingly or unknowingly, toward it Thus, for example, we might study the differences between investigating certain event in terms of, ay, “biochemical processes occurring at cellular levels” and investigating the same event in terms of “the human meaning of life-threatening illness.” And indeed, ideas I! provides a number of desctiptions of the very different ways in which the human body is seen play at any given moment (see or ultualatinade on the other. In addition, however, thete are paseones that Seem to stem from setting aside the naive, everyday attitude toward the Body and turning instead to a phenomenological description of the usually unnoticed, taken-forgranted structural features of bodily 237THEMES AND ISSUES PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN JDEAS 11 experience per se. Moreover, the way the body is given in the “inner atti- tude” is distinguished from the way iti given im the “outer attitude” (see especially IV: 161/168-69). And finally, there are some hints toward yet another contrasting pair of ways in which to approach the whole question of the bodily. One can consider the body an object of a certain distinctive type and inquire how such an object is constituted, ie, how itis given to “matter” even though its in fat also a physical thing consciousness as this type of object, or one can take note of the constitu- Nevertheless, this use of the term Leib in Ideas IT creates a real tive role the body oF bodilihood plays in the givenness of other objects | problem for anyone attempting to discuss the work in English, As I have (notably perceptual objects). ‘mentioned, Leib is usually translated as “Iived body,” but this sinappro- ‘All four pais of contrasts—naturalisticipersonalistic, naive‘phenome- _ priate for the passages dealing with the living body as a natural reality. nological, outerfinnes, and body 2: constituted/body as constituting-—must The alternative term “animate organism” (suggested in Cimns 1973) nivhe be taken into consideration in understanding the full sense of what is said suit such passages better, but is less satisfactory for passages dealing with about the body in any given passage. But the text does not always expli ‘one’s own body as experienced from within. Lester Embree has proposed ity state which attitude i in play, in addition, the pairs sometimes overlay | translating Leib as “soma,” a solution that finds an echo in the Beld of and intersect in ways that are not immediately clear. This means that in __“somaties” (see Part DI of the present essay). Yet this too presents some following the sense ofthe text, the reader must not only attempt to follow difficaties for anyone attempting to survey Husserl’s phenomenology of along with the relevant experiential evidence itself, but must also follow the body as a whole, since in other texts, Husser! himself reserves the along with the shifting play of attitudes in order 10 appreciate just wat words “soma” and “somatological” for certain specific, mote limited kind of evidence is appropriate at any given point. It turns out, in short, senses thatthe single word “body” is made to bear a multitude of senses, depend |. Richard Rojoewice and André Schuwer have coped with this problem ing on the attitude(s) at take. And this brings up a crucial point. in their translation of ideas II by rendering Leib as “Body,” with a capital 'By now, itis part of the received tradition of phenomenology itself 1 "BY and Korper as “body,” with a lower case “.” It is true that such think the body in terms of a distinction ususlly traced to two German {orthographic distinctions appeal only to the eye and are cumbersome t0 words fer body, “Leib” and “Korper.” Within the framework of this dis- 444 make when speaking. But they have the advantage of tanelating te text tinction, Leib is usualy translated as “ved body” (or sometimes a “living = _consistently—and of making it the xesponsbility of the reader him/herself body”), while Korper may be translated as “physical body” or as “thing: _ to discern which sense of Leib is at stake in any given passage. Though 1 body.” The distinction can be presented in several ways—e.g, in terms of __have obviously not been following this convention up to this point, I shal the contrast between the immediate “inner consciousness” of my own | sdopt it for the rest ofthis essay. It will not be possible to give an exhaus- lived body, directly experienced by me as “maine,” and the “outer percep: “tive account here of each and every point Husser! makes about the Body tion” of any physical thing whatsoever; in terms of the contrast between in Ideas 11 (or in those passages of Ideas 11 that were originally contin. someone's” body, ic, the body of an existing situated person, and “the” | 01s wlth passages in Ideas Z/). But I shall attempt to set forth his main body as the abstract, impersonal thing studied by such sciences as anatomy ___ themes and findings (and in some instances, to indicate how his themes and physiology; or simply in terms of the contrast between the “body- have been taken up by later researchers) before returning to the question subject” and the body as object Husser! was certainly aware of the dis. _ of the importance and relevance of Husserls work today. tinction between one's own body, as directly experienced, and any “physical body” whatsoever, including the human body considered as just \ bodies have special properties above and beyond those propetties they share with all other physical things and are investigated accordingly by the sciences concerned. At the same time, the use of a single term emphasizes __ the richness and complexity of the human body, which has its subjective, expetiential side, and thus cannot simply be assigned to the realm of mee fone more thing among. things; passages pertaining to this distinction ‘Husser’s findings regarding the Body already appear in his mitings even before the initial draft of Ideas 17 in 1912" But inthis text itselt, the word Letb is often used to refer to both the “lived body" of later pheaomenologists and the “animate” (tater than “inanimate") object stadied by the biologist or the physiologist” By using Leib in both eases, rather than using KOrper when it isa question ot the lumen or animal body seen by the naturel sciences, the text is abe preserve a distinction important 10 these seiences themselves, since Bivng 4. The Body in the naturalistic attieude __ With the naturalistic or natua-scienceatitude, the Body sa certain _ ¥pe of spatiotemporal, material abject that ha «psyche statu sown __ foi v.25, 32-3935-36) in such a vay that Bauy and payee ae net ___eefally joined, bat “most imimately Interwoven aod i's certain way _ rally penetrating” IV: 010 ct. 121/129), standing ina tence 238 239THEMES AND ISSUES connection of reciprocal dependence” (IV: 132/140). Thus by virtue of the inseparsbility of Body and psyche, everything pestaining to the psyche is “localized” and “naturalized,” inserted into the causal nexus of physical nature. The psyche too is accordingly constituted as a theme for natural- scientific investigation, e.g., into psychophysical dependencies (or, as Hiusserl also says, “physiopsychie” dependencies—see, e.g., IV: 135/142, 139/147, 182-83/192, 2597272) For instance, the Body has the psychophysi- cal property of “sensitiveness” (IV: 155/163), and this “eapacity to be stim- ulated in general” IV: 157/164) can be studied with regard to, say, “normal” vs. “anomalous” states of the various sense organs (see, IV: §§ 18b and 18e), Since the natural-scientific approach to the Body is still so familiar to-us today, no more needs to be said about it here. b. The Body in the personalistic attitude ‘As Husserl points out (see, e.g, IV: 242/254), we can enter into the natural-science attitude at any time. But the Body is experienced very dit- ferently within the personalistic attitude, which no longer treats humans (and animals) as “mere things” (IV: 190/200) of a cextain kind. Here one main theme is the Body as expressive of the person and personal life. The person him/herself is expressed in hisaer Bodily gestures, ways of moving, facial expressions, tones of voice, and so on (see, e.g., 1V: 235/246-47, and see especially § 6h, particularly 240/252). Hlusseri’s presentation in Ideas 11 tends to contrast the personalistic attitude as we find it in everyday ‘experience with the naturaliaing attitude of the natural seieatst, who tums the Body into a biological or physiological object rather than taking it 2s expressing an experiencing, communicating person (see IV: § 49e, espe- cially 182-83/192-93), The text does not go into any detail here about how 4 human science conducted within the personalistic attitude could make this expressing Body itself into a topic for investigation (but cf. IV: 166/174-75). This, however, is just what the field of non-verbal communi- cation has done Moreover, much of the thrust of Husser!’s discussions of the world con- stituted in the personalistic attitude is geared toward showing that in this attitude we are not just organisms reacting to stimuli. Rather, we are imiembers of social communities, and we stand in complex relations of motivation to one another and to social institutions. We influence one another, and this influence “determines personal development, whether or not the person himself [or herself] subsequently realizes it, remembers it, or is capable of determining the degree of the influence and its character" (IV: 268281). Whet I have “‘taken over’” from others in this way becomes my own “actualized habitus” in spheres ranging from the “demands of morality" to the way in which “ ‘one’ has to hold {one’s} fork” (IV: 269/281-82). Thus Bodily comportment is expressive not merely 240 a PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS 17 of the individual concerned, but of the culturalsocialfamilial miliow that has shaped this person through what Marcel Mauss, lecturing in 1934, ‘would call “techniques” of the Body (Mauss 1968/1973). The present inte est in the “social construction” and “history” of the Body (cf. Behnke 1992) takes up this theme in a way that goes far beyond what Husser] actu ally says in Ideas H1. Yet such investigations can be seen as carrying out lines of research already indicated by this text, even where there is no direct influence of Jdeas IJ upon the researchers. And current phenomeno- logical research into “intercorporeity” explicitly takes up, by way of Merleau-Ponty (sce, e.g, 1959/1964a, 1964/1968), Husser's notion that socialty “presupposes a certain Bodily intersubjectivity” (IV: 297/341). Nevertheless, many of the most interesting and influential contvibutions ‘Husser! makes to the phenomenology of the Body in Ideas II do refer to the Body of an individual subject. Relevant passages are to be found both in the parts devoted to the constitution of material nature and of animate nature in the naturalistic attitude, and in the part dealing with human reality @s constituted in the personalistic/auman-science attitude. But Hlussex!’s descriptions themselves are perhaps best categorized as stem- ning from a phenomenological attitude interested in elucidating structures of lived experience and in disclosing essential features pertaining to what. ‘ever phenomenon is under investigation. 6 The Body as a theme for phenomenological investigation Much of what is sid about the Body in Ideas 11—which, as 1 have men- tioned, was rst drafted in 1912—scems to pick up and elaborate material presented at the besinning of Husser's lecture course on “Basie Problems Gf Phenomenology” given in Gottingen during the Winter Semester of 1910/1911 (See XIIL: Nr. 6, and cf. XIII: 77 n3, on the use of other manu scrips from this period in Ideas 1). The material on the Body appeas early in the lectures (XIIL: 113-20) im the context of an inital deseription ofthe “natural attitude.” Husserl then goes on to describe the attitude of the natural sciences and that of sciences such as mathematics, geometry, or logiclbefore contrasting the “natural atitide” withthe “phenomenological attitude” (XII 1494f.), Here—as in Ideas / and elsewhere (and cf. also IV: 97/103, 121/128)—Husserl assumes that he must set everything Bodily asid¢ in order to enter the phenomenological attitude that will disclose the pute ego or consciousness that is not a part of nature, but posits nature (XID 140ft, 1495 6.174). But the Body that is thus excluded is--as Zdeas 11 will make clear—the Corporeal body (Leibkbrper) that is grasped asa psychophysical reality in the naturab-science attitude (sce, eg, IV: § 49a; c& 293-204/214-15), Though Hussert docs not explicitly say so io these carly lectures, iis clear that his 1910 deseription of the “natural attitude” assumes that our everyday experience already incorporates some elements 2aTHEMES AND ISSUES of an empirical, naturalistic attitude (see especially XIN: 141; f,, e.g., VIE § 34e). However, if this attitude is seen for what it is and suspended by the phenomenological reduction (IV: 179/189}, the Body reemerges as @ pos- sible theme for phenomenological investigation in its own right. ‘This phenomenologically thematized Body first enters Husser!’s text in the context of a discussion of the world of things prior fo any scientific the- orizing about “nature.” For Husserl, the things of sensory perception are the most primal objects of all? But as he points out, every “thing-appeat- ance” is correlative to certain “perceptual cixcumstances”—-more specifi: cally, to kinaesthetic “circumstances” such as directing and moving my eyes in seeing, moving my arms, hands, and fingers in touching, bringing my ear closer in order to hear better, et. (IV: 2022, 56161). Moreover, “cireumstances” and “appearances” stand in a coherent “if-then” relation: if, for example, I tum my head in thus and such a way, then this object ‘comes into view, and so on (IV: 57 “orgun of perception” (IV: 56/61), then, the Body is necessarily “involved” (mit dabei—IV: 144/152; ef, 56161) as the “partner” and “counter-part™ (IV: 157/165) of all sensuous perceptions of things." In the natural atti tude, we are normally occupied with the things we perceive rather than explicitly aware of the Bodily circumstances of perceiving (IV: 20/22; ef Caims 1976, 62). But when we do make this perceiving Body itself a theme for phenomenological investigation, what stands out, according to Husserl, is that the Body is freely movable (IV: 56161). Here the word “freely” refers to my normal ability to move “immedi- ately” and “spontaneously” (IV: 152/159), in a “ ‘natural and free’ way” (IV: 254/266), without automatically implying that 1 can perform any movement I please at any moment. Instead, what emerges in Husser!'s descriptions is a sense of the Body as a coherent kinaesthetic system—a “practical kinaesthetic horizon" whose “familiar order” (IV: 51/63) means, for instance, that I can consistently accomplish the same thing in the same way, freely moving then freely returning to the same base posi- tion (IV: 68/73). And this holds true not only for the movements that accomplish perception, but also for the “normal praxis” of “getting hold of, and working upon,” the things around me (IV: 68/73; ef. 152/159, ” 282/295). My Bodily capabilites, then, function as a domain of “practical ‘o-be-able-to” (IV: 261/273), encompassing both original and acquired potentialities for perception and action (IV: 255/267). These capabilities are not fixed and static, but develop in a “normal typical style following the stages of infancy, youth, maturity, old age” (IV: 254267; cf. 266-67/279). However, there is great leeway within this typicality for individual differences, including not only, say, differ- ences in movement style from one person to another, but also differences possibility,” a realm of 1 arising from the conscious cultivation of Bodily skills and abilities (IV: 254/266). For example, I may want to play a certain piece on the piano 202 S8162-63, 226238; cf. 128/136). As ‘Lill (IV: 259-60/272): PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS 11 with ease, and set about acguiring-—and maintaining—the appropiate skills through practice (IV: 253-54/65-6; ct. 33018), Hussetl suns the whole question of our “capabilities” under the tile of the “lm ‘Andin this connection, he refer tothe Body both as the organ ad av the field of freedom forthe wil (sc, eV: 151-52/138-60, 47238, 282095 283/297, 310/323; cf. 96/102, 216/228). : : ‘But this must be qulied in several regan, Inthe fst place, not every _ Bodily movement involves the active, explicit “far” of the will (ef. XIV: 447ff.) one example is moving one’s hand involuntarily because its posi- sion was uncomfortable (IV: 260/272), another is “the involuntary ‘I reach __ for my cigar” (IV: 258/270). Thus “action” and “affection” can be func- tonal interwoven, especily inthe ase of yielding to one’ habe incnatons (1V.3855959-50) Moreorea1 do nat teed fo kaon hoe inthe word T can doi” in order to peaform Body activites Reseach in plysiology is indeed always posible when one adopts the appropriate | natural-scientific attitude and method, but no knowledge of physiology is presupposed for me to make use of my pawers of Bodily movement in the simply “execute my ‘fia,’ and my band moves” (IY: 283/297). What Husser! does not make fully explicit, however. is that even a “voluntary,” actively willed Bodily action—for example i ly action—for example, picking up a book and holding it—involves a host of Bodily adjustments and “accom. ‘modations” (sce IV: 282/295) that are “involuntary” in the sense that I eed not give specific “orders” concerning them, for they happen “auto- ‘matically (cf. Cairns 1976, 64). Yet they are not necessaiily “uncon. _ scious,” in the sense of being completely out of awareness, for with the appropiate shit of etiude (hey from being oospied with getting the book to focusing on the conelative kinesthetic “crcumstances") con begin to fect how wy ene Body and not jus sy, the sranping hogd ce _ Iahorates in the act (cf Juhan 1987, 114, 278Ef). [aus even where my Bodily movements are explicitly willed, 1 find aysef relying on a tacit Bodily know-how, a general capability not merely to move, but to move coherently and responsively—a theme taken up and explored at greater length in Mcrleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Percep- ‘io}. Furthermore, ifthe notion of the Body as field of free movement for the will is qualified in one way by the intertwining of “action” and “affec- _ tion” and the implication of the “involuntary” in the “voluntaty,” it is | qualified in another way by the “I cannot” that sets limits to the “I can,” Here itis a matter not only of the resistance of things and the limits of our ‘customary capabilities—“the ‘it won’t budge,” “I cannot, ‘I do not have the power’ " (LV: 258/271)—but also of temporary limitations arising from my rote porary limitations arising from my Iva etc” (1V:2597271, And even our customaly,endusng Boal obi Se can be compromised for example, | may have to lat how wal —“my hand is ‘asteep’; I cannot move it, itis momentarily para gan after being confined to my bed during a long illness, or perhaps I 243THEMES AND ISSUES “have a nervous disorder and lose the mastery of my limbs; ‘I can’t do it atall, and in that respect, “I have become an other” (IV: 254/266). However, one of the most interesting limits to the domain of my “I can” comes into view when I begin to reflect on the various ways in wihich my own freely moving Body is not merely my “organ of perception,” but is, also itself something that can be perceived. I can readily see my own hand, for example, Yet certain other Body parts—for instance, my own head-— are almost completely invisible to me, and I can see still others “only ina peculiar perspectival foreshortening” (IV: 1591167; of. XVI: 282), for “the same Body which serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me im the perception of it itself and is a remarkably imperfectly constituted thing” (IV: 159/167) When I am looking at other things, I am free to change my vantage point in relation to them, bringing previously hidden sides into view, and so forth. But I cannot gain enough distance from my own Body to do this; I cannot jump out of my own skin and walk around myself in order to get a good look at my own Body from all sides (cf. XVI: 280). Thus to a certain extent, the very standpoint from which I sce” remains an empty “hole” in the visual space I survey (XVI: 367), which “ruptures” the homogeneity of external, geometrical space (XIII: 239). ‘This is due to yet another essential structural feature of Bodily experience: the Body is the bearer of the “zero point” (Nullpunkt) of ori- entation, “One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here” (IV: 158/166)” in terms of which all else is not only “there,” but “near” or “fax” “above” or “below,” “right” or "lef," "infront" or “in back” (Gee also’ IV: $6-S7/61-62, 83/88, 127-28/135, 158-59/165-66). It is thus by virtue of the Body that things appear in a certain orientation relative to the perceiver.!* And when I arrange my work “in front of me,” with the tools of my trade “within reach,” I am ensconced at the center of a lived space whose directions and dimensions all radiate fom “here,” where I myself Bodily am, Moreover, itis by virtue of my Bodily capability for free movement that by “moving on,” I make what was formerly a “there” into a new “here” (IV: 83/88), As Husser] and other phenomenotogists have pointed out, this is fundamental for the constitution of a shared spatial world as an intersubjective “system of locations” into which individual “merely subjective” perspectives ft; though I myself am always “here,” I ‘can exchange standpoints with another person so that naw I have the same thing-appearances the other formerly had, and so on."° But I will never be able to see my own Body directly “from the outside” in the same way the other can (of. 1V: 148n/155n.). can, however, touch myself all over in the same way as I'can touch any other physical thing. And when I do this, [find that although my visual perception of my own Body may be limited compared to the range of views I can obtain of other objects, it has unique modes of givenness of its 244 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS IT own. When, for example, I explore my left hand by touching it with my right hand, my right hand does indeed perceive the thing, “left hand,” as having such and such a shape and texture. But the left hand is not a mere physical thing: *ir becomes Body, it senses” (IV: 145/152), and I can feel touch-sensations on my Jeft hand precisely where I am being touched by my right hand. The touching hand too has its own touch-sensations wher- ever it touches, or is touched by, the other part of my Body (IV: 145/152-53).® Even if 1 am not actually touching myself, pethaps “I sense, extended over larger Bodily areas, the pressure and pull of my clothes” (IV: 145/153), or ean feel where I am being touched by the surface that supports me (cf. XV: 304n.1), and so on. Husserl lays great emphasis on the importance of being touched in the constitution of one’s own Body precisely as a “lived” Body rather than mere physical body, a thing "among things. But the experience of being touched is just one example of group of “specitically Bodily occurrences of the type we call sensings” (IV: 146/153). These localized “sensings” include not only contact and pressure in touch, but also warmth and cold, pain, weight, and movement (IV: 1451/1534). I is of interest here that the “sensings” are not confined | 10 the surface of the Body, but play a role in the localization of the Body's _ interior as well. For example, “kinetic” sensations (Bewegungsempfindun: __gen)® are localized within the moving Bodily member, and can be felt __ ven if 1 am not touching anything, though such sensations may receive __ “only a rather indetetminate localization” compared to those of touch (IV. 151/158) But other interior sensings can be elicited as well. The follow- ing passage (IV: 165/174) is remarkable in that Husser! does not simply allude to the phenomenon in question, but tells us in some detail how to locate for ourselves the rather unusual kind of experiential evidence he wants to refer to here: For example, 1 “feel my heart” When I press the surface of the Body “around the hear,” I discover, so to say, this “heart sensa- fion,” and it may become stronger and somewhat modified. Tt oes not itself belong to the touched surface, but its connected with it Likewise, if T not only simply contact the surface of my Body but press on it mote strongly, press into the flesh, ie. with Jny touching finger “feel through” to my bones or inner organs... then particular new sensations, which are attributed to the rele. ant feltthrough Bodily parts, join to the general sensations of pressure and touch, ‘Thus the lived, felt Body is more than skin deep. Fain, of course, strikes below the surface much of the time. For Husser!, however, pain tums out to be just one of yet another group of localized sensations (i.e. sensings) that include not only the “sensuous” feelings of 2485THEMES AND ISSUES pleasure and pain, along with “the sense of well-being that permeates and fills the whole Body, the general malaise of ‘corporeal indisposition,’etc.,” but also “sensations of energetic tension and relaxation, sensations of inner restraint, paralysis, liberation, ete.” (IV: 152-53/160).” Husserl goes on to tellus that such sensings function as a primazy stratum for the consti- tution of values and feelings on the one hand and desire and will on the other (cf. Lotz 2002). Al the sensings, then, play a key 10le in the constitu- tion of the Body precisely as subjectively lived Body—ie., as something that is not a “mere material thing” (IV: 153/160), but is one’s own Body, felt from within in its qualitative depth and not merely perceived from the outside like any other visible, tangible object. Thus each subject not only ‘has his her own “here” and relies upon hisfher own capability for free movement, but can sense hishet own “phenomenal Body—i.e, the phe- nomenon, my own lived Body” directly experienced from within through th vrs sand seins (IV 202015) An af hs expe nced as holding good in the case ofthe other person as wel when I recog. fue the other san expetiencing person With hisher own subjective ie, Tather than apprebending the other as thing ot an organism fo be studied within the naturalistic atitade 4 Summaries We may summarize Husser’s work on the Body in Ideas 77 in various ways, and the text itself provides two sorts of summaries. At the end of the chapter devoted to the Body in the second part of the work, the Body as given in the “inner attitude” is contrasted with the Body as approached in the “outer attitude” (IV: 161/168). Considered “from ‘within,’ it appears. as the subject’s freely moving organ of perception and as the bearer of sensations (which are intertwined with the subject's psychic life as a whole). Approached “from the outside,” it presents itself as a material ‘hing of a special kind: it is not only “a center around which the rest of the spatial world is arranged” (IV: 161/168-69), but is also the “turning point” (or “point of conversion”) where physical-causal relations are converted into psychophysical-conditional relations (IV: 164/169: f, 286/299)” Another summary appears in the final chapter of the third part (see § 62). Here the Body is described as a “double reality” having, like Janus, ‘two faces, one looking 2s it were toward the world of nature and the other toward the world of spirit (see IV: 2841.29). The Body itself is consti- tuted as an “aesthesiological unity” rather than merely as a physicalistic thing, but it is more properly the “Body for the wil, the freely moving Body” (rather than the aesthesiological Body) that pertains to the mind or spirit (IV: 283-84/207) 2 Yet the soul or psyche also has two faces, for it is conditioned both by the Body as a physical reality and by mind or spirit: “thus we have avo poles: physical nature and spirit and, in between them, 246 “night be termed PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS IJ Body and soul” (IV: 284-85/298). What Husser!’s research shows, in other |words, is that the Body does not fit neatly into a dualistic ontology where ‘everything must be assigned to either one or the other of two mutually exclusive categories such as “mind” or “matter,” “spirit” or “nature” (see, ©» IV: 139/146; ef, 247/259). And although Husser] himself does’ not explicitly say so, I might suggest that the evidence of the Body not only places into question these particular inherited dualistic schemes, but also the dichotomous, “either-or” habit of thinking itself. Finally, we might also sum up the results of Husseat's work on the Body in this text by pointing out that two “branches” of phenomenology of the Body-—two ditections of research—are indicated. On the one hand, we san study the Body as an essential structural “moment” of wold: experience; here, for example, we might include investigations that refer to the Body in the course of phenomenological reseaich into lived space or place (see, €.g,, Seamon 1979; Casey 1993). On the other hand, we can study the distinctive phenomenon, “my own Body,” itself, as it is lived ‘from within, using the resources of an eidetic phenomenology to study its ‘essential structural features as well as investigating the phenomenon con- stitutively and genetically. And as I have already mentioned above, we ‘an follow the program Husserl has indicated in Ideas 7, but not fully catried out, by supplementing a phenomenology of the “solo” Body (cf. __ XIV: 121) with an intercorporeal approach. It is beyond the scope of this __ essay to trace in any more detail the way the lines of inquiry opened up in ‘Ideas I! have already been taken up by other researchers in phenom- ‘enology of the Body. But I would at least like to point toward some of the ‘Ways in which the themes Husserl was dealing with remain relevant today, | besinning once more with the entire question of the “attitude” within | Which one considers the Body. | 111. Implications and applications ¢ the time Hussr] was writing dens 1, the power and prestige of the panalsinces was amet completely unquestioned, and pat ofthe tak this text was to demonstrate the legitimacy of a completely siffercnt prosch—the personalise, human-scientic, or eultaral-scientife fpproach, Thus on the one hand he had to trace the “nature” of the tural sciences back to a cortelative “naturaizing” attitude i, he had to fnake the structural covrelation between “attitude and “domain. of Feseaich” visible in ts own right, using the reigning attitude or paragon fs an example; on the other hand, he also needed 19 describe the "person, istic” attitude that stands in contrast othe “naturalistic” atitude, and he __ had to specify what sort of phenomena belong to this alternative attitude’s fomain of research. By doing this, he inaugurated a fleld of work that shenomenologically inspired or oriented human 247THEMES AND ISSUES science,” and the detailed results of research in this fleld (and in the cul- tural disciplines in general) have long since outstripped what Husserl himself could accomplish in Ideas HI. Yet Husser!’s investigations into “attitude” are still applicable today, for there are still cultural institutions dominated by a naive-dogmatic, naturalizing attitude. Current medical practice, for example, stands as a formidable example of the amount of work yet to be done before patients are routinely and consistently treated as persons. Ideas IT is thus stil a very significant text for those engaged in laying the theoretical foundations for such a possibil- ity and seeking practical ways t0 implement it (sce, eg, Toombs 1992, 2001, and Kirkengen 2001; ef. Behnke 1993c). This is all the more true in that Hussen!’s text does not take up an “anti-scientific” stance, but opens, the way for complementary, collaborative relations between a “third person” science and disciplined sensitivity to “first person” experience. ‘This kind of collaboration is particularly important in such areas as psy- choneuroimmunology, healing visualization techniques, and the placebo effect, as weil asin the field of somatics (cf. Behnke 19%3a). The latter not only speaks from # personalistic attitade while maintaining friendly rela- tions with natural-scientific research, but quite deliberately sets out to complement the “outer attitude” in which research on the Body is usually conducted with an “inner attitude.” Thus the “soma” of somatics is not merely the living or animate organism in interaction with its environnte but is also the lived Body—the Body as experienced from within. And 1! is especially crucial in practical somatic education, including the many “Body work” and “Body awareness” approaches, since these approaches do not merely address the client’s physical body, but touch the whole person and affect his/her life in myriad ways, ‘There are in fact many areas in which Husser!’s work on the Body in {Ideas 11 might be brought into fruitful dialogue with the work of practical somatic educators. Issues of common concern include, for example, the Body as a “double reality” (LV: 284/297) or “point of conversion” (IV: 2867299; cf. 161/169) between the world describable in terms of material substance and physical causality and the world describable in terms of lived actions, situations, meanings, and motivations (cf, €.., Juhan 1987, 103ff,, 220, 2504); Body temporality, including questions of enduring abil- ities and other Bodily habitualities (ef, eg, Bergmann and Hoffmann 1984, § 5), as well as the possibility of transforming the Bodily habitus (cf Schiies 1994); the Body as a center of orientation that is implicated in all experience, so that radical changes in Bodily styles reverberate through one’s entire life (¢f, eg, Behnke 1982); and the entire issue of what counts as Bodily “normality”. Here, however, T would like to focus on the ‘question of the direct experience of one’s own Body. ‘As Ihave already mentioned, Husserl recognizes that we are typically involved with the things we are pereeiving or manipulating, and seldom 248, PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS 11 comes to my attention when it breaks down or fails me in some way, so allehatng, disruptive ettect there are also ways to foe! myself Body now Within, im lucid awareness, without necessarily making my own Body into a m9THEMES AND ISSUES remain open within the field of somatics. For example, many somatic edu- ‘ators teach some version of “experiential anatomy” designed to relate what we can learn from natural-scientific anatomy and physiology to Bodily experience as we live it dizectly (see, e.g., Olsen 1991). But in this connection we must also be able to recognize to what extent concepts and. interpretive frameworks stemming from the naturalistic attitude have already become part and parce! of the everyday experience of one’s own. Body in the natural attitude, I have noticed, for instance, that when I adopt the inner attitude Husserl mentions and attend carefully to my own Bodily sensings, I often tend to import an “anatomical apprehension” into. the experience: I find myself thinking, sensing, and describing the experience in terms of, say, “muscles,” “bones,” “tendons,” and “connec tive tissuc,”™ However, there is much to be gained fom setting this famil- jar, habitual framework out of play and staying with the sensings themselves—which may then reveal anorter order than the anatomical (ee, eg, Behnke 1993p). And when I let other, experiential orders emerge in their own terms, sometimes the experience itself changes in illuminating and healing ways. For example, I may notice that at first I am framing a certain kind of experience in terms of “having tight neck and shoulder ‘muscles.’" But then I may let go of this way of looking at it, and begin instead to sense the actual Bodily feelings in as much detail as possible—ihe precise quality, the spread and depth, the ongoingness of the experience, the incipient movement tendencies and the places where movement seems hampered or restricted, and so on. This kind of awareness “from within” may well allow my postute to shift subtly and spontaneously as tightness releases of its ‘own accord and static rigidity begins to move toward dynamic balance. "The simple act of Bodily awareness, then, can help Improve health and ‘enhance functioning in a remarkable number of ways. Though few somatic, ‘educators would trace their explorations of such matters back to Huser), there is a sense in which such efforts pick up and carry forward Husses!'s recognition that the kinaesthetic processes and the sensings are not only important and worthy of attention, but are immediately accessible to us “at any moment” (IV: 146/153) without necessarily paralyzing the activity in progress or alienating us from ourselves. ‘And I would like to suggest that the recovery of one’s own Body as sensed from within has ethical and political implications as well as poten: tial health benefits. If Huser! is at all correct that my perception of another human being as a living, feeling petson—a fellow creature who suffers, for instance, when in pain, “just as T do”—is based on my own ability to feel my own Body (cf. e.g., IV: 198/208), then we may expect 2 culture of violence to be based on practices of disembodiment. And this is in fact what we find in military training, for example, as well as in the per- petuation of violence by some victims of child abuse, who were able to 250 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS 11 survive only by not feeling their own pain (cf. Moyers Gove 1990). Con- versely, itis also possible—certainly on an individual basis, and perhaps even on a communal basis—to cultivate a Body of compassion, an embod- ied othics, a culture of peace, in which a genuine “co-existence in the flesh” would be possible. Husser!’s /deas 11 is most fundamentally a theoretical work, and an unfinished one at that. But it is a generative text even today in that it ‘opens up lines of implication in many directions—more than could be carried out and “finished” in a single book, or even a single line of rescarch, It has indeed already proved to be a founding text in phenom- enology of the Body, inspiring much further theoretical work by several generations of researchers, Yet it has practical implications as well. Consti- tutive phenomenology is not merely some sort of abstract intellectual enterprise; it is a demonstration that at very deep levels, the world we encounter is traceable to the attitude we bring to it. This is not to deny the resistance of reality, the intractability of things. But it is to say that our oven style of comportment hes somethin to do with the kindof world we And at the heart of this partnership is the moving, sensing Body. What ever the limits of the “I can” may turn out to be, there is at least some. leeway within which to choose and to change. If Ideas If can awaken us to 4 new appreciation for Bodily experience and a new intercorporeal sensi- bility, perhaps it will also help awaken a correlative shared world where compassion and mutual understanding—not violence and blind dogma- tism—will prevail. Notes ‘elas Naor ct Sayre ogc Mees de 150935 but nde come atonal eee denen udm oerange esr maea eo one way Spsed onthe historically elective version of he text as it has come down ous ie fasenpeced Many Stones pbs 132 2, Pace eka wn ont vor le Fete cio 251THEMES AND ISSUES edition will be followed after a slash by the page number(s) in the English translation (note thatthe latter also inchides the Husseriana pagination in the riargin). See the let of works cited for currently available English translations ff Husserligna volumes cited in the present essay. 3 To trace Husser!s work ia phenomenology of the body as it appears in cur- Fenllyavollablepubied tents, one say consul for instance, Dg wd Raw (GeV 35 4,6 ond supplementary enays onthe body, passin onthe kinas- {eves den 1 GV: epocialy $5 18a-b, 36-43, a8 $9-€0asIdeen UT (V9 2, Supplement 1&4): Analysen cur paste Sonthes (XK especialy § 3, the fk ot the elated essays” ond Appenix XXV): Ente Phalosophe 1 (Vill: Lee tares 35 and 37a wel a 91-36): Phnomenologtiche Poyhologe OX: 815, Bi, and 39, Bellage VI [aot inthe English onltion)): Cacstanische Med taioncn (i Sth Medstion, especially $5 44 and SI-S0); Huss! 1940195, {bud il, 1945-46198]; Die Kets der europtschen Wiesonrchjen (VE $8 28, 427, and 62) and the three volumes of texts conceringintesubjectvty QXD iv. XY; pas) See alo Clesges 1964 for eitations fom as ye unpublished For secondary sources concerning Hussett'sweatment of the body in Ideas Tse xg th rica) oppraial fo Schnit 197, and see also Walton 1999, fe well at many of the essays in Tymieniecka 1983: Tor escusions of Husssl's wreatmeatof the Kindestheses in Ding und Rou, se, e 5, Drum oad 1979-80, 1985, and et. Beraet etal. 19897983, Ch. 4, $3: for general fecouats concerning, Husse's phenomenology of the body, see, by Mohanty 1985, Zahav 1994; for more substaal resents in Droadet philosophical contexts, see, eg, Franck 1981, Dodd 1991, Depren 1995, 4001. (Further sources can be traced by consulting the Keyond “Body” in Spices 1999) Pldge 1957/1970; cf Zaner 198, SSE) pont out that once we have retioved the Body as phenomenon by distinguthing the sabjectvely expenenced body trom the objective body of the natural stences, we must recognize that ines, jury, fatigue, ste, I miay well experience my own bods 4 physical thing, Thus although one might want to propose tha the body is Korper inthe nalsraliseatitade and Let nthe personas atte, closer exaoination within the phevomenoloicl aitide reveals thatthe body ean be decly experienced as either (see also Toombs 1992). See eg, XVE-6547 ond 83 (1907): XIIE Ni 2 (before 1902, lates reworked; Ziti: Ni. 3 (4908, later seworked), NIL Ne, (190). Xi Nr. 8 (1910 Sete sometinesexediied (ee, e9., Gurwitach 1985, x) wit being the fist to ake the Lib Rovger distinction, se Soler 1960/1973, Pat Ie Ch ‘Vi-A,3e for his 916 refctions on the distinction, to which he seo alludes in Tol (ee 196Gb, 212U19730, 31). Note that since Scheler was in repeated ontace with Hussers studenis in Getiingen in 1910 and 1911 ee Spiegelberp 1982, 68, 269) the possibly that Flsons work influenced Scheer inske tence on the Leib-Norper distinction cannot be enced note aso the role Paved ty the ditintion in Edith Stein's 1016 dtertation on empathy (st published in 1817—see Stein 1958, Ch IT.) sla nc thet Lake orto te Hed bya ppetng exterally ie, a8 something appearing inthe snrounding world, se, eg, 1 154-55/161-62, 285/299. pee 7 : ‘That "Zeid is a broader notion than “son” for Husterl i suggested ine, XIV: 6h for what Hocserl thinks of asthe “specially somatoloyical cy 2. Ve 2a and XIV! 77, 90, 462 252 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN /DEAS II Heelan 1983, 12-13 and pas, uses a similar convention. See Depraz (1997) fora review of ways n which hs problem has been approached in French, For a helpful exemple ofa later (1921) text on te constitution of the Body ia the naturalistic aude, see XIV: 55-73, ch also, egy XIV: 454-59. Sal ater tent situate the epeciclsue ofthe “naturallzation® of the Body within the broader context of is “mundanization” leading fo what fin effect » Bodily version of te paradox of subjectivity see, ep, Seebohm 1992, 160, 162-63: Lingis 1971, 78, and Mohanty 1985, 132-33, 188, = wel as Landgrebe 198, 4, Sit, 63, where the question is framed in terms of the contrast between the Body as constituting and the Body as constituted), Relevant passages include, eg XV 282-95 (especially 286-89), 923-28, 72-73, 507-308, 544-46, 644-47 {atid ct. aso Deprac 200, 68-79), The problem involves, among other things, retaining Kinaesthete capability as an etental dimension of “elfective” tran: feendental subjectivity, wile igorously distinguishing transcendental analyses from mundane, psychological enes, which inevitably lead to psychophysical accounts localizing experience in physial organisms ae parts ofthe world—see, eg, XVIL 65 98-95, eopeially 254,259; one might also point to the tension between an epistemic account of functioning Kinaesthere, of the one hand, and a regional ontology ofthe material Body on the otter (see, eg, VIL 219-28). Cb also Stoker 1965, 168711987, 148-51. Its tempting to thnk that it Tdeas 17had been structured as Huser originally eavisoned it (rather than according o Stein's editor interventions), some of these fsoues might have Surfaced in this ext ae wellimagine, for instance,» presentation focusing on {te constitution of the "peychoptiysical™ Body in Section One: turing to 2 phecomenologialpsychological account of the sructures of ved Bodily Experience in Section Two, and culminating in an account of the Kinacstbetic Iie of constituting transcendental consciousness islfin Setion Three Research in inereorpority sms 10 me to be proceeding in atleast two Ways. ‘The term is often taken as onneting investigations whose pint of departure 2 complely arteilated intercorporeal context, event, oF station; athough Snaividual” Bodily partkjpants may emerge, in some cases.and (0 some degree, as distinguishable (but not seperable) nodes within this intercorporeal netvork, in oer eases tere to question of separate “indiduae ata, land here the “intercorporeat” is understood as “aonymous" and “pre-per- sonal” (se, eg. Waldenfels 1971, 163). Among works drawing on this frst general sense of the term are Mever-Drawe 1984, Coenen 1985, and Yama uch 1997. However, a second sort of investigation into itereorporety may So be recognized one that aeed not contradict or conflict with the fst kind but in fact nay complement it. Here the emphasis i on deseribing concrete phenomena in which intecorporety fs particulary evident. See, eg: Mickunas 1987; Behnke 1997, 199, 20086, srork tn proses This notion, ot forth n TV: 6 i taken Up by Mesteau-Ponty is his general thesis of the “ptimacy of perception"; see MerleasPonty 1945 and a6, bea “The notion that sensuous perception sa thoroughly Bosly affairs also taken si by Nea Font ne Set ye conga tha of he Primacy of pereption: for Merleau-Ponty (1943), not onl i perception fo be Lnderstood a at accomplishment ofthe Body, but this Body itel is correla: tively to be understood as the “subject of perception.” Chy eg, XV: 311-12, 400-40, and see also Fngis 197; Melle 198, part IV, Gendit 1992. XE 15; ck 13-14. See also XVI on Kinaesthete systems in general, nd on various Kinacsthetic systems functioning coherently together, see. 8, XVI 253,16 ” 18 THEMES AND ISSUES 200-203, 208-209, 283,209 and 324, 315 and 535-36. The caliest writings in ivhich Fiusser thematizes the Kinsesthetc circumstances of perception are from around 1893 and 189 (see XML 275-83, 416-17, 41819), and this remains an iyportant theme throughout bis Work: for an example of how his terminology and research atitude shift, compare the 1890s tents just mea- tioned with, eg, the December 1931 text in XXXIV: 371-72. On kinnesthetic ‘Consciousness i general, ae Claesges 1954, especialy part Il, and ef Land- gree 1963, 16th: 320 also Behnke 200La ‘The nation of the “Tean” emphatically includes, but is not necessarily limited to, Bodily capabilities: see, eg, TV: $8 5,59, 60, and cf. Mohanty 1984, 26-28. ‘And though the term "I-can” implies o focus on agency, Husterl routinely ouples references to “action” and activity” with eferences 0 “affection” and “aifectvty” especially in Inter texts (eg, XIV and. XV, passim: cl 1V: 3370/5481), which implies that the pracical possibilities Of “doing” are lays entwined with corresponding types of “undergoing.” : Merleau-Ponty seizes upon this notion of the Body. as an “imperfectly” (uavollkommen) os, as be say, "incompletely" constituted thing, and does in tially ete Laoae IP asthe source ofthe phrase. However, he assigns i a signifie- nce beyond Huseer's own rather taightforvard descriptive statements, ‘which simply point out that if 1 consider my” own Body purely as a visual ‘hject, thas “"mising pats,” so to speak, which I can move and touch but not see (cl, egy IV: 147"51/153-89). See Metleau-Ponty 1945, 108, 485, 474, 31%; 1 1958, 20519640, 165, and se also Behnke 2000, 2602 In bis caller ectes on vitally perceiving spatial things, Musser! suggests that this central poin is focated somewhere inthe head, ia r behind the eyes (Gee XVI 227-28): the same point is mtade in § 150 of Ideas (350). This sway of speciffing the location of the “central here” s connected with other key Jrsues, eg, the question of the Body as over against “me” (ch 29 below)— "itt there" relative tothe privileged “here” in my head—and the question of taking vison asthe paradign forall experience. (For some alternatives (9 this pespectval perception of one's own Body from a “vanishing pol” some- were inside one's head, see Behnke 1984, 198811995.) Fora somewhat ditfer nt account of the nullpoint™ in Hussorl, see XVE 368, where he ‘haracteries movements of individual Bodily members (eg my hands oF my feet) a6 movements relative 0 the “core Body” (Kerietb)--a term that sug 463 to me that i this context its the torso, not the head, that counts the {also XE- 356 (Note that Leib can aso mean “bell” ‘and “tronk.”) Huszerl points out (LV: 56-57461-62) that this orientation of appearances toa ‘central “nul” from which the lived coordinates of spatial experience Unfold holds good for imagination as Well as for perception: mareaver, in the same pasage, he also veers to the Body as the bearer not only of the here, but of the now, For earlier references to this structure of experience, se, 0, XI: 253 (1908), XVI eg 10, 80, 148, 227-28, 232, 238, 24}~42, 270-80 1907}; XE 45 (1909), 116-17 (810). Husserl also reers toa "null position” (Nudseltun) or “nullposture™ (Nihal) of the visually perceiving Bods—the head is upright and the eyes are straight ahead (see, eg, XVI: 303,308, 314), 1s ess ‘obvious what the normal “null” position—the base position (Grozdstellung) Irom which movements ate gauged (ef, TV: 68/73)—would be for the tactually perceiving Body; see XVI 306 and XIII: 284 (and cf. also Husser! 1940-1, 28-30, 225), Related Husserlian locutions include, for example, “null-system” (IIL 280), “nullsphere” (XIV; 513), “null-Body" (XIV: 511-12), and even 254 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS 17 “nullapparanc” (oe, XII 255t, 274-80, XIV: SIO, whih eters not laa "er0 of ppasrise inthe some af ek of er tte ar Ot the en “ea hull ete tat Hollen 072059 alee he a the Body as oeataonl center tobe equivalent to the caster once, Body saimoye the domiaing cena eure of expert reac she provides nuns countrexaplen But een sss he ease ose ks the donating central etre ofthe ved pace of lt eno ee th ab ove about the ey see the ease now to my te aoe teen and so owl sain ave. ed “her (cE IIE 353 oa sock yes fre eventhough i he ete (and not my Bed) tat domaates th Sone 19 Theexchangesbiliyoftndpoint andthe concomitant reiproity of perspec tes fof eau, an import phenomenological hans ands cach er necced with that of the“hormaiy" of experisee. Seep ALG TSA $05 Shute 182 eg fle. 1a 313-1; and Specialy ae Flee oe 2 The achicha ih oa” sematan (1: S155, Teaser op by in umber of passages nota) fe 21. See IV" 36,37, 39, soe epeily 1501/1889, and ee as, og, XV: Beilage XVUIL For further phenomenological descriptions of tactlity i= rela. Sea Katie caer ease aren eH 1, eee portance ftv see hen 18, ep 22 Hiwerls language consis Enpfndungen, or “sensations” an Enpfndnstanited deaf! “sensing and Idea chan (cee Suplement I #4 lesser point om IV: Mbt) tat ore ee the same sensuous event can be experienced as setallon pron of Ng, te sui oo abe Tan teucing ors dec dseten itn’ mas sensing (eeprossre ny touche fase 2 References in dea 1! 0 "sensations of movement of "ean seasatons GV: 282255, 517330)—Bevegungsompindungen ake Seed ee English edion of Hens ite “musi senatong® vs MSeasle) ods “neti tenntions (V.130136, se 15115) Sst be cca ae | ented fom Huser! ec noon of Kinsetat eapeibtee des | Sreay mentioned, he anges conse sae to hes ote | thee ctmmtancers (IVE 2004) we concate 0 the nem ae | nce” of things in oter nord, phenonenoloneal eee nese | Me Sivonen of leclzed ensatom of movemete wih pena 2s ose, fom iy frm ey Ram ul ope eee otinaestne potentialities the dopo ofthe ok ae eee ea ty Sia ten, ct secomnetatonn et) Soesmes he ae teler to thie constiunne naesneue “proceuce” Ge nae S025 or eonteltons” IV 670) a Unaestitc ‘ens: eps, cil IV: s6-S06-43, and c/s) or enone Ce IEW) and in one patsage CV 151138) the wre eae yen appeats to be (ned Sysonymouly With the tem cea Bewepingsenphndungen), Ths somewhat supe sere ate tes He apy aes the om “Bovelgonpnnge na dese fraely chooses the tr Kinase Enpehesger Pour te) aes the consitutve Knaesthete ercunstance in both texts howeoee nee | ting encumbered with the sbguous and mabieading soar he | Musse"ates peat care to detngush he tee See ema 25524 THEMES AND ISSUES functioning “sensations” from the “sensations” that present feature: of things for example, “sensation colore” (IV: 51162}—and im other contexts {Geer eg, Cains 1976, 6), he distinguishes the constitutive Kinaesteses not only irom physical bodily events (Se, e.g, XV: 568: et. abo XIV: 347), but from any actual Bodily felings of movement whatsoever: although kinaes thette capability can, indeed be localized in comaesthetic sensibility (eee Behe 2008, 4 4), the sheer capability for motility can still be experientally distinguished irom the specially somsesthetic dimension, especialy in the lived experience of potential movement. (For another spprosc to these sues, 00, og, Kersten 1988, § 54.) EE Michotte 1963, 2046, on the Huidity and indeterminate lis of what he {erms the “kingestheic amoeba," Le, one's own Body appreciated purely Kinaesthetically. Note that inthe pascage referred to here (IV! 150-51/158), he tex dosnt flow Hiss own trminolgiel dnetion fo Gu ton ot tocalized"sensings" (not "setsations") of movement and 10 ‘Other seming: could be mentioned as well se, eg, Galaghe 1986, 10. As Straker points out, however, the Body asa whole functions a3 0 “phenomenal background” for any particular individual Voclized sensing, moreover, with fesch ectual sensing mp Body i co given a8 already esting and 23 reducible to any particular momentary event of being sensed (Stoker 1965, 1601987, Lats ef. Guritsch 1985, 38) and see aso Behnke 201b, part}. See, e 1V: Supplement Ail, part TT, especially 3477358 Its of interest that Huser! also refers in this connection to "tbe fundamentally esential role of the vocalization of one's own sellprodiced vlee, elated to one's own rigin- ily even kinaestheses of the vocal muscles,” so that ii the link between the Guid ova feed voir aa the head oe of the other that provides he “fist bridge” to experiencing the other person before thee can be any ques tion of a sensory “analogy” betveen the chilis visual Body andthe seen Body ot the other, and even before the child can ascribe a“tactual Body" ara "Body Incarnating the vill” to the other. See TV: 95 n/101 ns ef. XIV: 327,337, and (606. For a mote detailed description of the pasive syntheses invelved in the givenness of another, see Secbohn, 2004, § 12. Note that under the heading of the "outer atude,” this summary includes both a feature Ihave characterized ae emerging when one adopts a phenome nological attitude-—the Body a8 bearer of the “null” of orsntation--and tmatrial derived from considering Body and psyebe inthe naturalistic atiude. Why would the Body as central "here belong in this category rather that tunder the heading of the “inner attitude"? Perhaps because one can experien: tinlly confirm that one’s own Body is the orientational center for dimensions such as near-far,right-eft et, without ever “feeling one’s Body” (ie. turning fone's attention to the various “sensings” in the inner attitude). Note that Marly Biemel’s editorial notes (IV: 426) da not specify @ surviving mianuseript it “HRuscer!’s own hand asthe bass for either of the summaries, {In Ideas Il, the notion of the “aesthesiological Body” asthe “appearing Body" (GV: 2857288) that “belongs to the presupposed surrounding world of every ‘personal subject” (IV: 288/297) would seem to be based in parton the descip- tion, gained by adopting a phenomenological attitude, of the phenomenal Body constituted via the localized sensings. This would imply thatthe "Body {for the wil, the feely moving Body.” which is “identical” across the various possibilities for movement (IV: 284/297). isto be identified with the Body as constituting and che “aesthesiological Body” with the Body as constituted (cf Landgrebe. 1981). However, the chapter in question is not concerned with 256 PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY IN IDEAS 11 these sorts of plienomenclogical distinctions, but with granting. adequate Fecognition to the special and essential connection between spin and Body (Gee IV: #62), walle atthe same time setting limits to the naturalization of spirit (sce IV: 68), As a result seems 10 me that what emphasized about the appearing Body here is that it has « natureside-Le, it can readily be incled inthe domain of “reality” that constitutive analysis reveals to be cor telative to a naturalist attitude (ef. IV: 203-204/214); meanwhile, the posto. ly of performing the phenomenological reduction in order to investiga sential features ofthe phenomenal Body a ied “tom within” slips inte the background, with the emphasis instead on developing, on the One hand, tat. fed ontotogy of material thing ~ Bodylsoul ~ spe in which spirit shown #0 have 4 foundation in nature (with the animated Body as the middle term), while also maintaining, onthe other hand, the abscluteness and originasty of onsciousness or spilt, without which there would be no. constitution. of “nature” in the fist place. (For some possible clarification of these tensions, see Sawicki 1997, e.g, Tale, 159-61.) 29 Here one ofthe most interesting Teseareh questions concer the degree to Which, the occasions on which, and the atitudes in which my own Body is experienced as over agzinst “mé"—ie, i an “object” of "ty" experience in contrast to the Zespects in Which “T” and "Body" are identified (ete, Claes. 88 1964, 121-22, Sudker 1965, 17-TU/1967, 150-51), For Husset's varying, comments on the isu ofthe Body as “subjective” onthe one hand or as “over gaint me" on the other in Ideas I, eeo,e TV: 153160, 159165, 20821314, 212-13/203-24, 2157226, 24254, 247199, 392-49796, 283. 84297, 317829-30, 318251. For similar issues in Mavce, see Zaner 1964, 21 ff See also the ceroful work in Mouris 1952, Related questions are tceated in Spiegelbers 1965/1986, Gallagher 1986; and Behnke 1988/1995 foe also a. 17 above) 430 See TV: 20/22, 28/136. Many somatic educators also explicitly recognize the fundamental imporcance of these Bosbly “ercumstances” of perception and action, For instance, F. M, Alexander's distinction Between an “en anita” attude and an appreciation of the “means whereby” is independent confira- tion of Hussex!'s distinction between being occupied with the object of per ception and action in the natural atitude and thematicing the Kinasibetic citcumstances themselves in phenomenological reflection, theteby reviving them from anonymity (et XV! 540}. 31 See Sartre 1945/1956, Part Thee, Ch. 2, ot Leder 1990, 2 For a more postive and more detailed aczount of the expesientaly absent Body in te intertwining with ts environment see, ©, Gallagher [9860, and ct Biesker and Mulder} 1992; on various ways my ovm Boy eles my arasp and Jhaingains a certain distance and incompretensibliy, see Waldenels 1994, 44-66 33 One of the most fully developed approaches is Sensory Awareness, based on the work of Elsa Gindler (sce Behnke 1969) cf also the dance form known a8 ‘Contact lmprovisation (see Behnke 2003b). Note, however, that such practices do not focus exclusively on the movin, felt Body itsel, but necesary also saplore the relational Body—the Bod in dialogue with things and with other, {ith gravity and the surface dat supports me, andso on 3M Readers ate invited to explore for themselves how they experience their own “musces”—what direct experional evidence involved? CE XIV: 427 35 Here I am borrowing Huset's phrase “co-existence in the flesh,” which trans- Ibs “eibAafen Mitdasein (AV: 198/208, to imply a healthy intercorporeal community and to allude tothe siles of Hodily comportinent that could make 257THEMES AND ISSUES it come true. On embodied ethics, see Behnke 1997, 1999, 2001b, 2008; ef Kirkengen 2001, and see also Hamrick 2002, eg, 3-4, 192; San Martin and Pintos 2001; Weiss 1999, Ch. 7; Lingis 1994, 1998, Works cited Behnke, Elizabeth A. “The Philosopher's Body.” Somaties 3:4 (Spring/Summer 1962), 44-40. 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