Thought Reform During The Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Case of Deng Kesheng

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Thought Reform During the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Case of Deng
Kesheng
Conference Paper · August 2016
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Eggli, M. and Hasmath, R. (2016) “Thought Reform During the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Case of Deng
Kesheng”, Paper Presented at American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (Seattle, USA), August 20-23.
Thought Reform During the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Case of

Deng Kesheng
Mirjam Eggli, University of Oxford

Reza Hasmath, University of Alberta
Abstract: This article looks at a Maoist era thought-reform model through the
experiential prism of Deng Kesheng’s ‘Report Back’ – a series of confessional writings
crafted from 1966 to 1969. The article analyzes the language utilized by Deng with
reference to three main facets: (1) the trust bestowed upon different political agencies; (2)
an evolving Mao cult; and, (3) the distinction between the political and intellectual Self.
Keywords: Cultural Revolution, thought reform, trust, Deng Kesheng, Mao Zedong

Introduction
In his infamous speech, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, just months prior to
the official foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao proposed allowing the
“reactionaries” to live and remould themselves through labour into new people (Mao 1949).
While this practice was generally intended to be applied to former Guomindang military
officers after the Communists solidified control of China, it ultimately became a widespread
tool for control by the new party-state.
The Communist model of thought reform (sixiang gaizao) was based on an examination
of one’s own past (fanxing zizhuan), in criticism and self-criticism sessions (piping he ziwo
piping), documented through confessional writings. Serious offenders were additionally sent
to partake in reform-through-labour (laodong gaizao). These methods were seen as an
important means to achieve national unity throughout the Maoist period, with the most
tumultuous interval occurring between the early years of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution from 1966 to 1969 (see Smith 2013). In fact, Mao, at the cusp of the Cultural
Revolution, outlined his understanding of thought reform in the following manner: “The first
thing is struggle, the second is criticism, the third is transformation. Struggle means
destruction, and transformation means establishing something new” (Mao 1966).
Mao subsequently launched a nationwide campaign to clear the party ranks. Leadership
factionalism required a new generation of revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries within
the ranks of the party, thereby bestowing an unseen emphasis upon the re-education
processes. Criticism and self-criticism sessions, which were formerly held in a small group
context, were now extended to be public struggle sessions. The masses were called upon to
administer the re-education processes.
One of the most prominent party officials who underwent thought reform during the
Cultural Revolution was Deng Kesheng (1911-1976). He was best known as a senior cadre
and former deputy minister of the Propaganda Department of the Jiangsu Provincial
Committee.1 Deng was an economist who wrote extensively on Marxist political economy. In
1966, in his capacity as Deputy Minister, he was responsible for the promotion of the
“February Outline”, a text created by the Five Man Group led by Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen.
However, the Outline, together with its authors, was condemned by Mao. This, in turn, led to

1
During his career, he assumed the roles of Provincial Party School vice principal, head of
the Provincial Economic Research Institute and Party Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial
Institute of Philosophy/Social Sciences Scientific Research.
1
Deng being accused and subsequently, found guilty of revisionism. On the eve of receiving
the verdict on September 9, 1966, Deng attempted suicide. The attempt failed and he was sent
to undergo three years of thought reform.
The ‘Report Back’ document Deng crafted over this three year period contained
information about the tasks that constituted his re-education process: a weekly report, self-
examinations of his past, and subsequent confessions and self-criticisms on his crimes. The
‘Report Back’ thus offers an excellent analytical opportunity to examine the language utilized
by Deng, and what it suggests in terms of three main issues: (1) the trust bestowed upon
different political agencies; (2) an evolving Mao cult; and, (3) the distinction between the
political and intellectual Self. This study analyses the ‘Report Back’ text within this three
prong lens, and places a strong emphasis on the ways in which language was applied. As
noted by Ji (2003) the Cultural Revolution used language as a tool, and was marked by “a
society in which language divorced itself so thoroughly from meaning, particularly in relation
to terms that contained value judgements … [it became a society] that also ended up
abandoning responsibility” (Mitter 2004: 208-209).
Framework
Two Opposing Views of Inner-Party Struggle
When engaging in the study of thought reform and its relationship with inner-party
struggle, one needs to consider the key writings of prominent Chinese actors on the topic.
Most significant, are the works of Mao and Liu Shaoqi. The two leading figures of the
Communist Party of China (CPC) were influenced by their respective geographical area when
they formulated their ideas on struggle sessions. Mao, who spent most of the war years in the
relative security of Communist-held areas, promoted a radical form of struggle. In an all or
nothing manner he would call for drastic approaches when he felt the inner-Party unity and
solidarity was threatened by sectarian tendencies (Mao 1929). In this vein, Mao had a
particular concern for revolutionary intellectuals, who he regarded as being,
… subjective and individualistic, impractical in their thinking and irresolute in action

until they have thrown themselves heart and soul into mass revolutionary struggles, or
made up their minds to serve the interests of the masses and become one with them …
The intellectuals can overcome their shortcomings only in mass struggles over a long
period (Mao 1939).
This emphasis on mass participations in matters of the party stood in stark contrast to
Liu’s centralized approach of inner-party struggle. From 1936 to 1942 Liu was based in
enemy occupied areas, where he described a centrally-led approach to thought reform. For
him the distinction between “inner” and “outer” was essential to achieve successful
resolutions (Liu 1952). Deviant viewpoints or sectarian tendencies were to be resolved
between party comrades, without the involvement of external resources or people. For
instance, the Yenan-style inner-party struggle bore potential risks, as it created great
difficulty in judging who was right and wrong in particular disputes. As a result, Liu asserted
that, behind enemy lines, one lacked the time to commit to the time-consuming struggle
sessions that Mao promoted (Dittmer 1973b).
In order to study the processes of thought reform during the Cultural Revolution, an
awareness of these two opposing views of inner-party struggle is essential. As we move
forward in our analysis, it becomes clear that Liu’s approach was abolished in favour Mao’s
more radical ideas.
2
We can also analyze the two opposing views of inner-party struggle within a Marxist and
functionalist framework. Marxist and functionalist societal outlooks tend to be regarded as
opposites in social theory. Marxism is based on a conflict model of society that accentuates
class struggle. The functionalist approach focuses on the integrating role of a society,
whereby individuals are seen to be part of groups or institutions that form consensus with yet
other groups and institutions. The struggle versus consensus outlook is at the root of the
presumed binary opposition between the two models. In Marxism, social classes are said to
evoke class-struggle, with society only advancing when it engages in such struggle (hence the
term, conflict-based model of society). In functionalism, on the other hand, the main aim of
the classes (especially the dominant class) is to reproduce dominant societal structures,
through education and regulation. Despite these obvious differences, the two outlooks share
an emphasis on the collective. The individual in the Marxist model acts upon objective class-
based interests, and not subjective individualistic interests. This is similarly the case in the
functionalist model. Thus, the view that these models are in opposition to each other,
potentially can be challenged by the underlying similarities that exist between the two.
This theoretical synthesis of Marxist and functionalist viewpoints holds central in the
works of Bourdieu, who challenged this oppositional outlook, and pronounced the
interconnection of society and language – most notably in his theory of linguistic and
symbolic capital. Bourdieu theorizes that discourse functions like a market, whereby
language is influenced by both sender and receiver. The ‘Report Back’, for example, is
drafted under circumstances relating to the inferiority of power of the writer in relation to the
recipient. Such power relations are potentially reflected in the language used. According to
Bourdieu, language does not merely obey linguistic rules, but is influenced by power
relations that prescribe who, when, and what can be expressed:
Quite apart from the literary (and especially poetic) uses of language, it is rare in
everyday life for language to function as a pure instrument of communication. The pursuit
of maximum informative efficiency is only exceptionally the exclusive goal of linguistic
production and the distinctly instrumental use of language which it implies generally
clashes with the often unconscious pursuit of symbolic profit (Bourdieu 1991: 66-67).
Bourdieu argues that the symbolic profit adds to the symbolic capital inherent to some people
and certain classes (in Bourdieu’s work the bourgeoisie). Symbolic capital is a term often
used to describe prestige and social honour (see Jenkins 1992: 53). Though there exists some
ambiguity as to what the term specifically represents in Bourdieu’s work, his overall focus on
non-material social advantages marks an important advancement in Marxist theory. In
Huang’s (1995: 109) words, Bourdieu takes
Marxist structural analysis from the objective into the representational (or symbolic)
realm, most especially through the notion of symbolic capital. Capital may be not only
material but also symbolic. Class becomes not only a matter of objective social structure
but also a matter of representational structure, of distinctions and predilections of thought,
style, and language. By extension, agency also becomes not only a matter of the choice of
objective action but also a matter of the choice of representational ideas and attitudes.
It can therefore be concluded that – as is the case with linguistic capital – symbolic capital is
a desired means to gain more social influence. Individual agents with low capital of both
kinds are interested in attaining more capital by siding with the actor who is seen to possess
much of it.
3
Bourdieu’s (1973) functionalist interpretation of the education system is noteworthy to

discuss in our analysis. His notions of pedagogic action and pedagogic authority summarize
all the mechanisms (actions) employed in education systems to reaffirm the culturally
dominant class (authority), thereby a feeling of legitimacy is simulated. Education is here a
means to perpetuate the power-position of the dominant class. Thought reform is often
described as a re-education process, and it is thus positioned in the wider framework of
educational processes influencing societal power relations.
The Role of Trust
Much of the previous theoretical work has regarded trust as an important feature,
predominantly in democratic political systems (Hetherington 1998). Yet, trust is equally
essential to authoritarian regimes as a means of social control, and as such, an instrument of
power (Barber 1983: 20). Freitag and Traumuller (2009: 782) describe trust “as the
expectation that others will contribute to the well-being of a person or a group, or at least will
refrain from harmful actions.” Trust in this iteration is regarded as the engine that allows a
social and political system to run properly.
The literature further defines two kinds of trust. A generalized trust which “transcends the
boundary of intimate personal relationships” and is applied on a societal level (Steinhardt
2011: 3). Generalized trust can be both socio-cultural and institutional qua political. It is
distinguished from particularised trust, or the form of trust only granted to people known
through personal interaction (the in-group). With respect to China, there are a variety of case
studies that examine generalized trust (Shi 2001; Li 2004).
Maoist Mobilization Tactics and Emotional Control
A body of work have considered thought reform in the framework of Maoist mobilization
tactics as a mode of discourse for generating revolutionary emotions (Perry 2002; Liu 2010).
Self-criticism is regarded here as one aspect of controlling people by eliciting a feeling of
original sin committed against the revolution (Liu 2010). These approaches frequently make
use of specific ritualistic, religious vocabulary to explain the function of inner-party struggle,
thereby recognizing the doctrinal nature of the discourse. Erren (2008) rejects the relation to
religious confessional practices, and situates the Marxist-Leninist confession wholly within a
Stalinist system of pressure to conform. There are however some parallels between these
views, as both outlooks are based on the post-structuralist, post-modernist ideas of confession
and the panoptic state-apparatus (described in Foucault 1975, 1984).
To fully understand state-control and group control in the wider framework of Marxist-
Leninist and Maoist practices, detailing the methods utilized to gain emotional control of both
masses and individual is paramount. Emotion control, as Perry (2002: 111) states, has been a
“largely neglected feature of the revolutionary process”. Her study filled this gap by
explaining the organizational methods used by the CPC to make use of the emotions of the
masses. Cold War historians have also emphasized the role of emotional control by
documenting the emergence of specific, Chinese Communist practices of thought reform
which allowed the CPC to control, and coerce intellectuals through a feeling of guilt (Chen
1981). Other scholars sought to approach the topic from a purely psychological perspective,
from the ideologically loaded term of ‘brain-washing’ (Hunter 1951; Lifton 1989). Of
particular interest for researchers was the Yan’an Rectification Movement, well documented
by Apter and Saich (1994). Their study was centred on the discursive practices that Mao
himself employed in his attempt to control the region. This emphasis on control was
consequently extended once the new party state emerged.
4
The Cultural Revolution marked a watershed moment, as the masses became engaged
directly in the process of thought reform of party cadres. The case that most famously
highlighted the new mass participation of inner-party struggle was the fall of Liu Shaoqi. His
fate is of considerable importance when evaluating the effect of outside forces acting on
inner-party struggle during the Cultural Revolution (Dittmer 1974); and, more broadly how
mass participation during the Cultural Revolution influenced the process of criticism and self-
criticism of party cadres. Suffice to say, this process ushered in structural changes that had
the effect of obstructing the reintegration of ‘deviant thinkers’.
Methodology
The confessional writings of Deng extend over three years, and are approximately 130
pages in length. This body of work allows for a careful first-hand analysis into the process of
Deng’s re-education process, and for us to understand the broader analytical query of this
study looking at the function of the language used in the ‘Report Back’.2 Suffice to say, both
textual and content analysis was the most prudent methodological approach for analysis.
Deng’s original text in Chinese was retrieved from the Cultural Revolution database of
the Chinese University of Hong Kong. It was edited and uploaded in 2014. The analysis –
conducted with corpus linguistic software – was conducted on the original Chinese text.
Textual analysis was conducted to reveal the larger structural features of the text. The five
core components of the text (namely disclosures about other party members, reports about
incidents in the small-group, recollections of public struggle sessions, the study of
revolutionary texts, and his progress in manual labour) are analyzed separately. This allows
for consideration to be given to Deng’s assessment of the discrete parts of the thought reform
process.
A qualitative content analysis is also performed. In particular, this focuses on the words
employed to describe the Self in relation to the Other, as well as how these two lexical
categories operate in opposition to one other. With the aid of corpus linguistic software, an
analysis is carried out of all textual samples that refer to Deng’s position towards the party
and vice versa (wo, ziji, stands within one sentence of dang). Similarly, as Mao Zedong and
his writings are a central topic in the confessional writings, Deng’s position towards Mao or
the writings of Mao (wo, ziji, stands within one sentence of Mao, zhuxi, or any writings
composed by Mao) was considered.
This methodological strategy allows us to discern main themes underlying these
relationships and over a period of time. As the text is written in diary form (with entries by
date) a general rise or decline of certain themes can be traced. This allows one to ascertain
essential trends and patterns. These trends can be seen to highlight the existence or absence of
processes underlying the relationships described in the report on Deng’s thought reform.
It should be acknowledged that there are various samples that can potentially fail to
appear in our sampling, as the Chinese language has a tendency to drop both subjects and
objects. Yet, it is important for the sake of methodological rigour that no speculations be
made about non-written (non-textually-based) relations. Only those instances in which the
above types are clearly documented are considered.

2
It is important to note that the language used by the ‘sender’ (in the Bourdieuian sense) –
i.e. Deng – is heavily influenced by the recipient(s); and, reflect an unbalance power relations
between Deng and the receiver. The language analyzed must thus be regarded as a testimony
of its time, and not as the personal language of Deng.
5
Background, Structure and Content of the ‘Report Back’
The ‘Report Back’ drafted by Deng during his three years of thought reform consists of
five parts. In the first part, Deng writes about the disclosures he has to provide to those
investigating his surroundings. In the second, he reports on the small group sessions he
attended. The third part is concerned with the (public) struggle sessions he either views or
takes part in, while the fourth describes the insights gained through the study of revolutionary
texts. The fifth and final part is concentrated on manual labour. These five parts represent the
essential components of Communist thought reform practices.
While Deng’s though-reform process began on September 19, 1966, the fivefold structure
of his reform programme commenced in 1967, after the full implementation of the Cultural
Revolution in Jiangsu. The most rigorous period of his thought reform began in mid-October
of 1968, when Deng was sent to the countryside for four months to engage in reform-
through- labour and struggle sessions with low and middle class peasants. After his return, his
guilt and level of contrition were evaluated in order to ascertain a verdict. It was at this point
determined that Deng would be excluded from the Party.
Initially, in 1967, Deng’s accounts were primarily concerned with writing disclosures
about the provincial Party committee and the research institute he had worked in. Despite his
attempts to engage in self-criticism, his small-group supervisors encouraged him to expose
the deeds of others before examining himself. By March 1967, Deng had become
uncomfortable with this situation:
The more I expose other people's problems, the more I want to refer to myself, expose
flaws in my own thinking, take lessons therefrom, and undergo thorough self-questioning.
If one is assigned to expose the problems of others, one cannot wash oneself clean and
put the dirt aside, this is not right … (Deng 1967: 9).
During this period, it became apparent that people from different factions came to Deng’s
home in order to question him about colleagues he had formally engaged with. Not only did
he have to report to the different rebel factions and red guards located in Nanjing, Deng was
interrogated by numerous unnamed comrades arriving from other provinces to gather
information. These interrogations hindered him from carrying out a critical evaluation of his
own past (a task that Deng described as his primary motivation).
During this stage of the thought reform process, Deng was placed in a small-group
partially composed of his former colleagues at the research institute. The reader is not further
informed about the composition of this small-group, though Deng mentions his discontent
with its members and atmosphere. Deng speaks of being reluctant to disclose sensitive
information in front of the “rightists and scoundrels” in his group (Deng 1967: 8), and reports
a deteriorating atmosphere: “There was again a very embarrassing incident during the small-
group’s meeting at Thursday, it was as if they wanted to play ‘martial arts’”’ (Deng 1968:
26). From his accounts it became apparent that Deng was avoiding the group members and
taking a more passive position in meetings.
With respect to his interaction with his supervisors, Deng sought their criticism and
advice, though he reports rarely receiving any. By the end of 1968 he is criticized for being a
mere “yes-man”, leaving Deng devastated, and feeling willing but incapable of changing his
behaviour (Deng 1968: 38).
After this intense period focused on the writing of third party disclosures, the struggle
sessions commenced in mid-1967. Deng was unsure about his role in these sessions, as they
appeared to him chaotic in nature. In April 1967, for example, Deng was ordered to join a
6
struggle session. He “guessed that this meeting would be about exposing the old provincial
party committee” (Deng 1967: 13), after several of his former comrades made speeches
revealing the revisionist line of former party committee cadres. Excited, Deng reportedly
spent all night preparing his own speech to be given during the next session, only to find,
once he arrived at the session, that he was sent away: “I was quite confused after this turn of
events, especially because I was first told to take part, and then told to leave” (Deng 1967:
13).
It was only after he was sent to the countryside, in 1968, that the struggle sessions became
seemingly more purposeful. For the first time in more than two years, his reports were read,
and criticized. After a thorough confession, Deng was accused of trying to reverse his verdict,
because Deng merely confessed to have “a capitalist mind-set”, instead of the more serious
charge of “being a capitalist” (Deng 1968: 40).
Before his four months in the countryside, Deng spent most of his time reading
revolutionary texts. This comprised the fourth stage of the thought reform process. While his
readings at the time primarily consisted of the writings of Mao, he also makes mention of
newspaper editorials, character posters, and texts by various influential CPC members (such
as Lin Biao and Yao Wenyuan). From January 1967 to October 1968 these readings
constituted the largest part of his re-education. He used the readings to critically evaluate his
own past wrongdoings, and the faults in his previous publications. Through the study of these
texts, Deng cultivated the theme of trust, which would become prominent throughout his
thought reform: “[I will] remember what Chairman Mao told us: ‘We must trust the people
and the party, these are two core principles. If one is to doubt these two principles, nothing
can be achieved’” (Deng 1967: 14).
The fifth part of the process – Deng’s reform-through-labour – takes up a comparatively
small portion of the text. This stage was carried out directly following his suicide attempt and
is seen to have helped him stabilize his mood (Deng 1966: 3). The experience of working in
the countryside brought about a transformation of mind. He found his experiences with his
host family to have been a positive step in his thought reform, evoking a change in attitude
towards peasants: “They showed me the affection of the working class, which moved me
deeply. In the past, I have eaten their food and not done anything good for them, to my
embarrassment, I even did bad things” (Deng 1968: 34). The evaluation carried out by his
supervisors took an opposing view. In 1969, Deng was criticized for his attitude during his
time in the countryside, which elicited a re-examination of his achievements during this
period:
My performance lacked initiative and enthusiasm, I did not actively look for a job, waited
for people to make arrangements; and I was afraid of heavy work, always picking up light
work to do. I hoped that people would consider my age being high and my strength being
weak, and distribute only light work to me … Therefore in these four months, I harvested
too little, and in consequence, I did not learn anything through the labour (Deng 1969: 8).
The stay in the countryside, especially the struggle sessions with peasants, evoked far-
reaching self-criticisms, and confessions. Yet, his inability to engage in hard manual labour
was to become a decisive factor in his verdict.
In sum, when reading through the ‘Report’, one can grasp the turbulence brought about
through the thought reform process. Over an extensive period of time, Deng found himself
interrogated and influenced by various people from different backgrounds. Moreover, his
documented reports of his experiences received seemingly little attention until the later stages
of the thought reform process. It is only in his time in the countryside that his reports become
7
relevant, as they were used against him as evidence. Thus, what should have been Deng’s
pathway back into society became the means to exclude him further.
Analysis and Discussion
The following analysis will present and interpret the three main focusses exposed by our
content analysis. The first result concerns the question of trust bestowed upon different
political agencies, while the second involves the growing Mao cult. The third set of findings
regards the distinction between the political and intellectual Self.
Political Trust
Amongst the most prevalent findings of the content analysis was a repeated emphasis on
trust. Deng expresses his trust towards the party, the people and Mao Zedong on numerous
occasions. Initially, trust is expressed infrequently in the form of a wish: “I want to trust the
Party”. This is later replaced by the more definitive statement: “I trust the Party”. It is
observable that the latter formulation became ever more frequent following the citation of
Mao’s words: “We must trust the people and the party, these are two core principles. If one is
to doubt these two principles, nothing can be achieved” (Deng 1967: 14). Following the
recital of this statement, Deng further begins to indicate that the masses were deserving of
trust, alongside the Party. Lastly, he expresses his trust in the Chinese triumvirate system that
includes the masses and the party, under the leadership (and/or thought) of Mao Zedong. To
Deng this triumvirate is crucial when it comes to his verdict. He expects to be judged by the
masses and the Party, who act under the guidance of Mao Zedong. As such, he states his trust
in receiving a fair judgment by them.
While this emphasis on trust within the context of thought reform may appear misplaced,
it is less jarring when considering the political context of the time. The notion of trust is
triggered by a central directive, issued by Mao himself in June 1967: “Trust the majority of
the cadres and the masses. This is essential” (Mao 1969). This phrase would be regularly
invoked throughout the Cultural Revolution. At this time, power relations became blurred,
and stable political conditions could no longer be upheld. In order to retain an amount of
social control within this unstable political environment, it was necessary to reconstruct a
generalized trust in the central government. As Barber (1983: 20) suggests: “For power to be
sufficiently or even maximally effective … there must be trust in power.” Thus, by granting
generalized trust, Deng intentionally or unintentionally signifies that he is subject to, and
willing to accept, social control.
Despite the term social control often being used as a negative term – near synonymous to
a restriction of behaviour – it should further be considered in a more neutral sense, or in
Barber’s (1983) intentionality, as a mechanism for the achievement of social system
requirements. This need to reinstall social stability (i.e. generalized social trust) was
particularly highlighted in the case of Nanjing where, due to the failed revolution, political
power relations were left in an ambiguous state for an extended period of time (Dong 2010;
Dong and Walder 2012). The circumstances of prolonged power struggles are a topic of
reflection in Deng’s writings. Deng repeatedly provides the reader with a negative assessment
of the failed unification of political power in the capital of Jiangsu, and identifies this as
undesirable for the cause of revolution (for example Deng 1967: 44). Social control, as
achieved through political power, was a desirable outcome to Deng, particularly under the
prevalent historical circumstances of the Cultural Revolution in Jiangsu.
The unstable political conditions are mirrored in the overall process of Deng’s thought
reform. Deng’s process appeared to lack definitive supervision, as he routinely had to explain
8
himself to various parties. Trust, as a consequence, shifts from the local government to Mao.
This is expressed by Deng in the shift from initial trust in the party, towards trust in the party
and the masses under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Indeed, trust in Mao is increasingly
expressed as separate from the party. With this emphasis on trust, Deng clarifies a need for
social order that can only be achieved through control exerted from the political centre, which
is represented by the persona of Mao. In early literature on generalized trust, Luhmann (1980:
72) emphasized that to achieve stability, one needs to uphold political trust: “[r]elatively,
trust is the easier option [than distrust], and for this reason there is a strong incentive to begin
a relationship with trust.” In the context, where there is a decrease in generalized trust in the
local government, it is understandable that trust became placed instead on the perceived
construction of Mao.
The role of the addressee of trust is of vital significance when considering the relationship
between government officials and the state, as was observed in Hetherington’s study on the
implications of political trust:
[H]igher levels of trust are of great benefit to both elected officials and political
institutions. More trust translates into warmer feelings for both, which in turn provides
leaders more leeway to govern effectively and institutions a larger store of support
regardless of the performance of those running the government (Hetherington 1998: 803).
These insights, need to be reconsidered under the political circumstances of the Cultural
Revolution. Although the political system was not a democratic one, representatives and
institutions were nevertheless subject to distrust. In the case of Deng’s reports, the
incapability to restore order resulted in a decrease in generalized trust towards the local
government. Yet, Deng was still exposed to a system of thought reform that was essentially
ruled by this local government. His reluctance to participate in the small-group sessions
organized by agents of the local party branch (comprised of members of the former local
party branch) is a consequence of this lack of trust. It thus highlights the problematic
consequences of a lack of generalized trust during the process of thought reform that resulted
from ambiguous power relations. .
Unlike the clear reduction of generalized trust in Deng’s Report, the expression of trust in
Mao in the text increases over time. Yet, the quality of this trust is not in accordance with
descriptions generalized trust (for example Steinhardt 2011). Through Deng’s relentless study
of Mao’s literature, Mao becomes an almost familiar persona that bears the potential for a
positive influence on his verdict. This kind of trust, brought about by charismatic leadership
and persistent propaganda, shows many of the characteristics of particularized trust.
Nevertheless, the text allows no answer as to the question of the sincerity of this bestowed
trust. It is crucial, however, that this expression of trust in Mao emerges while the generalized
trust in the local government appears to diminish. These findings contradict the general
tendency outlined by Freitag and Traumuller (2009), who observed that particularized and
generalized trust tend to exhibit a strong positive correlation.3 A possible explanation for
these seemingly discordant results is found in Li’s (2004: 228) analysis, who asserts that the
Chinese tend to “trust that the Center’s intent is beneficent, but distrust its capacity to ensure
faithful implementation of its policies”. This analysis, despite being conducted in
contemporary China, might apply to Maoist China as well, notably as Deng’s text repeatedly
pronounces this difference between local government and Mao (who is not a central
government, but a central leader).

3
This means that persons who have trust, usually trust in both familiar persons and strangers,
and persons who feel distrust in the one, also distrust the other.
9
This line of argument – especially the exhibited distrust in the local government – extends
to Dittmer’s (1973a) findings concerning structural changes within inner party struggle
during the Cultural Revolution. Dittmer notes that heightened mass participation rendered
small-group sessions (and thus thought reform) inefficient, the organization of the sessions
were no longer clear. This in turn rendered the potential reintegration impossible. As a
consequence, the final function of small-group sessions (the re-integration of the deviant) was
impeded. Yet, Dittmer’s analysis does not take into consideration the role of the deviant. The
behaviour towards the small group session, reflected in Deng’s Report, clearly exemplifies
that the deviant too, plays an active role in accepting or rejecting the process. When writing
about the supervisors of the small-group sessions or any locally organised struggle session,
Deng never speaks of trust. Consequently, his openly adverse stance towards the small-group
sessions might also be inspired by the lack of trust in a local party that fails to achieve
political unity. Based on the results of the study of Deng’s case, the mismanagement of the
small-group sessions may have led to a lack of trust in this facet of the thought reform
process. This inability to reintegrate the deviant needs to be considered as both a consequence
of lacking trust on the side of the deviant, and the opaque nature of the process (due to
heightened mass participation).
In short, the repeated use of the word trust is a means to express conformity, even
coercion. Yet, the shift from trust in the party to trust in Mao signifies the loss of generalized
trust on one hand, and the development of particularized trust on the other. While Deng did
not know Mao personally, the leadership cult brought about a feeling of personal familiarity
with Mao nonetheless. In the prevailing political climate of the time, this pronunciation of
trust in the centre can also be read as an expression of a wish for political and social stability.
In this sense, Deng reaffirmed the pre-existing power relations by emphasising trust.
However, as we shall see in the following discussion, because of Deng’s bourgeois class
background, his constant endorsement of Mao (although a precondition for reintegration) was
rejected by the Marxist system. While Deng’s acquiescence earned him the derogatory label
of “yes-man” (Deng 1968: 38), to challenge the charges against him would have resulted in
harsher punishments still. This lack of viable options exemplifies the inherent contradiction
of the system.
The Mao Cult
The rising Mao cult has to some extent been introduced in the section above. Since it is,
in itself, a central topic in Deng’s writings, however, it warrants closer examination. In
Deng’s re-education process Mao plays a crucial role, both as a person and through his
writings and instructions. This is underlined by how they dominate many of Deng’s entries.
Over the three years of thought reform, Mao became increasingly represented as an Uber
Mao. In Deng’s writing, Mao was designated the “benefactor”, the “great leader”, and
eventually the “great teacher of all generations”. Furthermore, over time, the
characterizations of Mao become more religious in nature. Deng regularly praises Mao’s
writings and evaluates them as “correct”, “the best”, “rationale”, and “moving”. The
oftentimes ritualistic or religious language employed during thought reform has been
highlighted elsewhere (see Riegel 1985). Yet it is notable that in the case at hand, the use of
religious language is solely directed at one person.
The construction of a leadership cult centred on the personality of Mao is common
knowledge amongst China historians, and has been well documented (see Gao 1987;
Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 2006; Liu 2010). As Leese (2011) has shown, at the peak of the
Cultural Revolution, Mao’s support could lead to enormous revolutionary credit. The cult
brought about ritualistic worship and the expression of loyalty towards Mao, which was often
10
used in the pursuit of political power.4 Actions like these, allowed for the accumulation of
symbolic capital, and thus frequently resulted in very real political influence. In light of the
emergence of the Mao cult during the time of Deng’s thought reform, the language that Deng
employed to describe Mao was a rational choice. The expression of worship used by Deng
was however not aimed at pursuing political power but was, rather, a means to bargain for a
more lenient verdict.
Deng was accused of following the Liu-Deng-revisionist line. Coupled with his bourgeois
family background, his stature during the Cultural Revolution was almost inexistent. Once he
had delivered the necessary material to expose other members of the old provincial party
committee, his usefulness to the Party was exhausted. A strong indicator suggesting this is the
lack of feedback from his group supervisors after the initial denunciation stage of his thought
reform. The only means available to him, to attain a lenient verdict, lay in expressing his
devotion as a “socialist new man”, who “prioritiz[ed] collective interests above private needs
and absolute political loyalty to the party and Mao” (Liu 2010: 344).
Individualism was earlier described by Chen (1981: 66) as a target of the collective
communist society. Accordingly, expressing loyalty to Mao, often followed such a confession
of individualistic thoughts or behaviour. In order to promote his social and political stature,
Deng attempted to align himself with the revolutionary line of Mao. As Deng’s Report
reflects, the way to prove his loyalty was to engage in the prevailing Mao cult – reaffirming
Mao’s uncontested leadership and expressing trust in Mao.
Aside from worshipping Mao himself, the alignment with the revolutionary line was
achieved by reading, reproducing, and praising Mao’s writings. Of course, the study of the
“Quotations” of Mao was everyday business for any exemplary revolutionary during the
Cultural Revolution, and an important component of the re-education of the time. Yet, in July
1968 the small group supervisor criticized Deng’s approach as a mere summary of the
opinions of others (Deng 1968: 21). This again highlights the innate conflict within the
process of thought reform during the Cultural Revolution. The process required Deng to
study this revolutionary work and to subsequently report on the state of his ideological
thoughts. It was mandatory to comply with, and express worship for Mao’s writings. By
following these orders, Deng was engaging in a bargaining strategy and conforming to the
prevailing Mao cult. The recipients of his reports, however, were acting from within a
Marxist system of class struggle that was designed to exclude the deviant from the ranks of
the people. Suffice to say, Deng was incapable of satisfying the criteria of a system that was
inherently contradictory. His bargaining strategy was thus unable to attain a lenient verdict.
Mao’s policy of “leniency for those who confess, severity for those who resist” (Deng
1968: 41-42) led Deng to believe in his potential re-integration into the party ranks. He did
not only confess his supposed crimes, but also engaged in a bargaining strategy that was
characterized by an increasingly religious worship of Mao, and internalization of Mao’s
writings and ideas. His effort to profit from Mao’s symbolic capital proved inefficient,
however, and his submission to the cult inevitably led to criticism. Predictably, within this
climate, the bargaining strategy did not result in a lenient verdict. The contradiction between
what society asked from deviants and how it reacted to them, rendered the re-integration into
the ranks of the Party impossible not only for Deng, but for many other Party members as
well.

4
The most famous example for the pursuit of political power by employing the Mao cult is
the case of Lin Biao, Mao’s designated successor (see Teiwes 1996).
11
The Intellectual and Political Self
Apparently, despite his opposition towards the small-group sessions, Deng hoped for a
positive outcome to the process of thought reform. When analyzing his characterization of the
Party’s behaviour towards him, it is noteworthy how his wish for a harsh punishment changes
over time into one for a lenient verdict. Despite this trend, his statements remain
contradictory. For instance, on January 5, 1969, he still asserts, “someone like me must be
expelled from the Party”, just one week later, he is hopeful and pleased about the possibility
for a lenient verdict (Deng 1969: 1-3).5 The wish for a lenient verdict is further underlined by
the strong distinction he makes between his intellectual and political Self. Beginning with the
two-line struggle in which Deng becomes associated with the revisionist line, he distances
himself from all his theoretical writings in order to reduce further political damage.
The evaluation of Mao’s writings stands in sharp contrast to Deng’s own writings on
political economy. When writing about his publications in relation to Mao’s writings, Deng
creates a dichotomy of right and wrong. All writings produced by Mao, or the political centre,
are good; all of his writings (and writings of Liu Shaoqi) are bad. The use of medical
language further accentuates the contrast between right and wrong. The “poison” Deng
admits to have spread through his revisionist theories, can only be cured by the “medicine” of
Mao’s writings. Additionally, he compares the “cure” for the revisionist line to treatment for
a heart disease, asserting, “if an ideological disease is very severe, one has to accept the
criticism of the people and use Mao Zedong thinking as the suitable drug” (Deng 1968: 12).
These polemic descriptions draw upon dichotomous imagery that is very common in the
language of the Cultural Revolution (Dittmer 1977: 77). Likewise, as outlined by Foucault
(1984), in a situation of confession the parties involved often describe their experiences with
medical terminology. In this way, erroneous behaviour can be cured like an illness. Applying
medical terminology to former mistaken behaviour, signifies that a cure is possible. As such,
for the deviant (or sinner) there is still the possibility for rehabilitation, or, as Deng (1969: 7)
puts it, a “way out”. Distancing himself from, and condemning, his intellectual Self was seen
as a way to reconstitute his political Self.
When describing the actions of the political Self, Deng commonly attributes his misdeeds
to his former superiors. While not mentioning names, he describes his work for the
propaganda team as a purely administrative force (which only followed orders), and not as an
active decision-making entity. Only after prolonged struggle sessions in the rural Zhulin
commune (beginning in late 1968), did Deng admit active “violation” of Mao’s instructions
(Deng 1968: 39). This change of heart was apparently evoked by this change of location. In
the Zhulin commune, his language stood out. His description of their use of language as
“direct and frank” (Deng 1968: 33), highlighted the differences between him and the locals.
This difference put Deng in a position of relative inferiority. As an outsider within the
linguistic community, he no longer had the linguistic capital to defend himself. The
problematic of language was further highlighted by Deng’s inability to understand the local
dialect (Deng 1969: 6). As a consequence of being subject to the re-education system, Deng
had to obey the prevailing rules of the Zhulin commune, and was eventually forced to admit
responsibility for both his political and intellectual faults.

5
The exclusion from the Party is regarded as harsh punishment. Deng’s evaluation of the
treatment of Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi reveals this stance. Deng is hopeful about Mao’s
lenient treatment of Peng, and thus hopes to remain a member of the Party himself. He is then
shocked about the news of Liu’s exclusion from the party: “I remember the Lushan meeting
where Peng Dehaui had been criticised, yet he had not been stripped of his party membership,
I thought that they would do the same with him [Liu Shaoqi].” (Deng 1968: 34-35).
12
Deng produced the majority of his confession while in the countryside. As subject of
these struggle sessions, Deng was exposed to peasants’ “speaking bitterness”, an important
means of emotion control in Maoist China (Perry 2002). Accordingly, these sessions left a
deep impression, and made Deng aware of his political Self being an “exploiter” (Deng 1968:
36). The new awareness Deng gained from his re-education in the countryside stems from the
change in pedagogic authority that the lower and middle-class peasants represented. As
Bourdieu (1973) notes, any kind of education system essentially reaffirms its own power, by
perpetuating its dominance through education. This is equally true for the re-education during
the Cultural Revolution. Under the prevailing circumstances of the time, “speaking
bitterness” was an important action to substantiate the pedagogic authority of the new
dominant class – the revolutionary peasants. By accepting the accusations made by the
dominant class, and by admitting the wrongdoings of both his intellectual and political Self,
Deng succumbs to this functionalist approach to education.6
In his pursuit of leniency, Deng attempts to separate his political and intellectual Self.
When confronted with his wrongdoings as a writer on political economy, he readily admits
guilt and distances himself from his intellectual Self. Simultaneously, he creates a potential
system of restitution for his political Self, by employing medical terminology in order to
signal a potential ‘cure’ for his previous erroneous behaviour. However, once confronted with
a different re-education system in the rural Zhulin commune, Deng was forced to admit his
comprehensive guilt, in both his political and the intellectual work, thereby subjugating
himself to the pre-existing power relations, which were, in this case, in the hands of the
revolutionary peasants.
Conclusion
This article has considered the question what is the function of the language used in
Deng’s ‘Report Back’ for the description of relationships. The analysis was centred on three
main issues: the trust bestowed upon different political agencies; an evolving Mao cult; and
the distinction between a political and intellectual Self. These three focuses were examined
within the historical setting of the Cultural Revolution, in order to determine the functionality
underlying the language used.
It was observed that, in his expression of trust, Deng moves from a generalized trust in
the local Party, to a specific form of particularized trust in Mao. This form of particularized
trust evolved from the prevailing Mao cult of the time. This cult was characterized by the
intense study of Mao Zedong thought and, in the case of Deng, forged a feeling of personal
familiarity with Mao. The Mao cult was furthermore a manifestation of a bargaining strategy
that Deng attempted, in order to positively influence his verdict. This bargaining strategy
seems to have evolved because of Mao’s assurance for lenient verdicts for those cadres who
fully comply with the system of thought reform, by confessing all wrongdoings.
Deng’s situation was particular, however, as he was not only a political figure, but an
intellectual one as well. Concerning his political work Deng pronounced his purely
administrative role, labelling others’ as decision makers. He thereby denied full responsibility
for his political actions, and, simultaneously signalled his readiness to change. His
intellectual Self was considered more of a threat to the verdict than his political Self. He thus
created a leeway by separating the two Selves. The work of the intellectual Self is described
as erroneous behaviour, likened to an illness that can be cured by Mao Zedong thought.
The expression of trust, the pronunciation of the Mao cult, and the distinction between the

6
The approach is considered functionalist, despite taking place in a Marxist system, because
it does confirm the prevailing dominance of the dominant class.
13
political and the intellectual Self, are means to express conformity, and re-affirm prevailing
power structures. The language used by Deng thus functioned to communicate in a
functionalist way, fulfilling his subordinated role in the process of thought reform.
Accordingly, his behaviour was adapted to the requirements of functionalist society.
However, his mode of communicating was met with a Marxist system in the midst of a class
struggle and revolution. Deng, a subordinate within the social system, was not in a position to
challenge the dominant power relations. The inherent contradiction of the duel formalistic-
Marxist requirements, posed by the society during the Cultural Revolution, rendered Deng’s
reintegration into the ranks of the party impossible.
The analysis of the language under examination has revealed significant findings. The
language of the Cultural Revolution is characterized by its polemics, its dichotomous
character, and its contradictory nature. It is reflective of a society in struggle, where an
individual could no longer trust the social and political arrangements, due to the seemingly
incompatible formalistic and Marxist social structures. Within the void created between the
two, language neither functioned as an instrument of communication nor a mode of pursuing
symbolic profit. In this case, to the individual exposed to thought reform language was
deemed a potential liability, as he was implicated by the very words he was forced to utter.
The findings concerning trust are amongst the most important in this study. Trust is an
important theoretical concept in the research on contemporary China, which is often used by
political scientists and sociologists. This article highlights the utility to apply theories on
generalized and particularized trust to the historical study of China, and particularly to the
time period surrounding the Cultural Revolution. As this case study has revealed, the
question of trust is of considerable importance when gauging the relationship between the
individual and the state during this tumultuous period and warrants continued attention in
future historical-based research.
Finally, previous studies on thought reform have neglected the role of the person
subjected to the process. Deng’s reflections on the small-group sessions (as well as his
attempted bargaining strategy) demonstrate that the individual – consciously or
unconsciously – plays an active role in the re-education process. In order to gain a fuller
insight into the way that thought reform functions, there is a need to pursue the examination
of the agency of the exposed. The ‘Report Back’ was a popular assignment during the
Cultural Revolution; hence, there exists a bulk of historical source-material yet to be
discovered and analyzed. Indeed, as Deng’s failed re-education highlights, key questions still
remain, such as: why would the CPC engage its cadres in long-term re-education only to
exclude them from the ranks of the party in the end?
Suffice to say, there is still much to be discovered concerning the language of thought
reform during the Cultural Revolution. Deng’s Report – as well as many others drafted at the
time – bear the potential for far-reaching implications, and offer a fertile point of study,
where language, society, and history meet.
14
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Thought Reform During the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Case of

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Two Opposing Views of Inner-Party Struggle

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Bourdieu’s (1973) functionalist interpretation of the education system is noteworthy to

The Role of Trust

Maoist Mobilization Tactics and Emotional Control

Background, Structure and Content of the ‘Report Back’

Analysis and Discussion

The Mao Cult

The Intellectual and Political Self

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