The directions issued in the judgment are as follows; Social Action forum for

Manav Adhikar V UOI - 2018 10SCC:

1. The investigating officers are guided by the principles stated in Joginder Kumar v. State of
U.P and others, D.K Basu v. State of W.B, Lalita Kumari and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar
and another.

With regard to the directions given in Rajesh Sharma, the Court gave out the following judgment:

1. The direction contained in 19(i), which contains the provision of establishment of Family
Welfare Committees, as a whole is not in accordance with the statutory framework .

2. Court modified the direction No. 19(iii) stating that if a settlement is arrived, the parties can
approach the High Court under Sec 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

4. Director General of Police of each state should make sure that the investigating officers who
are in charge of investigation of cases of offences under Sec 498-A is imparted rigorous training
with regard to principles stated by this court relating to arrest.

5. When an application for bail is entertained, proper conditions have to be imposed but
recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground while rejecting an application
for grant of bail under Section 498-A IPC.

DK Basu V State of West Bengal

The case thus gave a landmark judgment where guidelines regarding the arrest of a
person were prescribed otherwise more offenses were committed in the name of
doing justice. It prevents any infringement with the rights of an individual during
detention and thus protects all the citizens by certain procedures established by law.
Although now, the proper procedure has been established by law and anyone who
does contempt of court is liable to be punished, still, there are crimes similar to
those in the above case, for instance, police officials refuse to file an FIR, or does
something due to which many innocent people have to suffer injustice and due to
which there is infringement with the fundamental rights of the citizens. Therefore,
more strict laws should be made so that innocent people have not to suffer.

In my opinion, before this case, the administration of the criminal system existing
in a country like India needed an effective mechanism. This case evolved as a
landmark case as the guidelines issued by the bench aimed to protect the people in
custody. It is an obligation of the State to protect the citizens; either they are
accused of an offense or a normal innocent person.

Moreover, the torturous and cruel approach of police in dealing with arrestees
required a strong change. The Apex Court had to meddle in such a situation and
the decisions taken by the bench were absolutely appropriate and just.

Bikramjit Singh v State of Punjab (Cri. App No. 667 of 2020)

on October 12, 2020.
he Court held that there is a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be
released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2), CrPC are
fulfilled.

The Court has held that right to default bail is not merely a statutory right under the
first proviso to Section 167(2) of the CrPC, but that it is part of the procedure
established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, it is a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on

bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2), CrPC are fulfilled.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), through Section 167 (2) provides that the
detention of an accused person cannot be authorised beyond a statutory period
prescribed to complete the investigation.

Ordinarily, the statutory period to complete investigation and file a charge sheet is a
maximum of 90 days in offences punishable with life imprisonment or death.
However, for offences under UAPA, this period can be extended up to 180 days.

While dealing with a UAPA case, where the accused was denied a plea for default bail,
the Supreme Court said.

"We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under
a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been
correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under
the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure
established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore,
a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the
conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled."
The Court further held that the Special Court alone had jurisdiction to extend time up
to 180 days under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act (UAPA).

The Supreme Court observed that all offences under the UAPA, whether investigated
by the National Investigation Agency or by the investigating agencies of the State
Government, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up under the NIA Act.

The accused in this case was remanded to custody by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

After expiry of 90 days in custody, he filed an application for default bail before Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate.

This bail application was dismissed as the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate had
already extended time for custody from 90 days to 180 days under Section 167 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended by the UAPA.

This order was set aside by the Special Court, which held that the Special Court alone
had jurisdiction to extend the time for custody 180 days under the first proviso in
Section 43-D(2)(b), UAPA.

However, the plea for default bail was refused.

The Special Court order was set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which
held that when the probe is being conducted by the State police, the Magistrate has the
power under Section 167 (2), CrPC, read with Section 43 (a) of UAPA to extend the
period of investigation up to 180 days. The High Court held that in such a case, the
Magistrate may then commit the case to the Court of Sessions as per provisions of
Section 209, CrPC.

The High Court added that in case the investigation is conducted by the agency under
the NIA Act, these powers would be exercised by the Special Court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court first took note that the High Court had got the dates all
wrong.

Whereas the bail application was made by February 25, 2019, the High Court had
marked it as March 26, 2019. The charge sheet was filed on March 26, while the High
Court marked it as March 25.

Referring to the default bail plea first preferred by the accuse, the Supreme Court
went on to remark,
"The fact that this application was wrongly dismissed on 25.02.2019 would make no
difference and ought to have been corrected in revision. The sole ground for
dismissing the application was that the time of 90 days had already been extended
by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ajnala by his order dated
13.02.2019. This Order was correctly set aside by the Special Court by its judgment
dated 25.03.2019, holding that under the UAPA read with the NIA Act, the Special
Court alone had jurisdiction to extend time to 180 days under the first proviso in
Section 43-D(2)(b)."

Opining that the accused had a fundamental right to be released on default bail, once
the statutory conditions under Section 167 (2), CrPC were fulfilled, the Supreme
Court proceeded to set aside the High Court ruling under challenge.

The Court added that

"... so long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated
period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default
bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section
167(2), kicks in and must be granted".

N Sasikala V Enforcement Officer 1997 1CTC Pg317 -

The petitioner is seeking for modification of an order D/- 20-8-1996 passed by the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, E.O. 1, Madras ordering the petitioner to furnish a bond for Rs. 3 crores and also
with cash security for the same amount with two sureties of like sum each or cash security for case one of
the sureties for the said amount

2. The case of the petitioner is that the conditions imposed by the learned Magistrate are impossible of
compliance and the petitioner does not have the wherewithal to furnish case deposit or even to find
sureties to the above amount. The petitioner further submitted that the conditions attached to the bail
order amounts to denial of bail and per se unreasonable

3. The respondent submitted that the conditions so imposed are purely the discretion of the Court and
that the learned Magistrate has considered the extent of seriousness and cumulative effect of the case
and has fixed and quantum. It is also contended on behalf of respondent that in a case of economic
offence involving contravention to the extent of several crores of rupees affecting the economy of the
Nation, the conditions should be in commensurate with the extent of contravention and a lenient view
should not be taken. It is further urged that since the petitioner herself had agreed to abide by all the
conditions that may by imposed for her release on bail, she is not entitled to resist the conditions imposed
 4. The point for consideration is whether the Magistrate can insist for cash security as a condition
precedent to release a person on bail

hussainara khatoon vs state of Bihar

The importance of this case can be seen in the fact that almost 40,000 under trial
prisoners were released after this judgment. The case motivated various socially
committed citizens and lawyers to raise their voice for the underprivileged and utilize the
wide scope of Public Interest Litigation to get justice.
According to the court, while providing bails on personal bonds, the roots of the accused
in the community was to be considered which would prevent him from fleeing, which
includes?

1. The length of his residence in the community,

2. His employment status, history and his financial condition,
3. His family and his relationships,
4. His reputation, character and mental condition,
5. His record of convictions and record of appearance at court proceedings,
6. The identity of responsible members of the community who would vouch for his
reliability,
7. The nature of the offence charged and probability of conviction,
8. Any other factor indicating the ties of the accused to the comm.

Rakesh Kumar Paul V. State Of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67

This case basically moves around Section 167(2)[1] of the Criminal

Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’). Section 167(2)

proviso (a) clause (ii)[2] provides that before the expiry of 60 days, police

have to complete the investigation and has to file a charge sheet. Section

167(2) proviso (a) clause (i)[3] provides that the police will have to

complete the investigation and file a charge sheet within the expiry of 90

days if the punishment for the crime committed by the accused is death,

life imprisonment or an “imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years”

Also, this case involves Section 7[4], 13(1)(b)(2)[5] and 13(2)[6] of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. For the issue which was discussed in
this case, I believe that we should interpret the term “not less than”

present in Section 167(2) to the cap of 10 years. We should only interpret

it as following the intention of the legislators. The period of 90 days should

only be given in cases where 10 years is the minimum punishment

prescribed as the gravity of those offences will be much larger than those in

which the punishment prescribed is less than 10 years. Also, the bail should

be given immediately after the expiry of either 60 or 90 days (as the case

depends) and must be understood as an indefeasible right.

Nikesh Tarachand Shah v Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1

The Supreme Court ruling in the Nikesh Tarachand case the legality of pre-bail
conditions is very important and inconsistencies in the scope and applicability of
pre-bail conditions under the prevention of money laundering act made a very
strong case. With the ruling regarding the constitutionality of the conditions
precedent to bail (especially in economic crimes), it may be worth considering
whether the Supreme Court would have eliminated the conditions otherwise
severely challenged, but because of the ambiguity caused by the Amendment Act,
2012.

Given the (incorrect) scheme of crimes scheduled under the PMLA Act, it was
obvious that the Supreme Court could not have reached any other conclusion. It
remains to be answered if an economic crime, such as money laundering,
demanded strict/drastic conditions, such as contested conditions, and if the state
could restrict the rights of a person in the case of such crime.