OBJECT/REAL EVIDENCE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO

G.R. No. 179029, August 12, 2010
FACTS:
Captain de Vera, SPO1 Balido and PO3 Almarez conducted a buy-bust
operation which resulted to the apprehension of the herein accused.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police
Station for investigation. At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a
request for laboratory examination. The appellant was transferred to the
Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or on December
29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory
examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan.
Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of
the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen
submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The accused was charged with violation of RA 9165 and was convicted.
Accused appealed the decision of the RTC and claimed that: (1) his guilt was
not prove beyond reasonable doubt due to failure of the police did not
conduct a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust
operation; and (2) a period of two days had elapsed from the time the shabu
was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not chain of custody was sufficiently established when the
two-day period which lapsed between the day of apprehension and day of
turn-over to the laboratory was not explained.
HELD:
No. The chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain.
 The strict compliance to the chain of custody rule may not always be
possible under field conditions. For this reason, the implementing rules
provides that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."
Thus, noncompliance thereof is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence
may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however,
must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and
the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to
have been preserved.
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any
explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required
physical inventory, photographing of the seized drugs and the details of the
turn over during the two-day period.
The records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3
Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was
received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the
person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer
to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier discussed, the identity
of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as the person who
had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not been
established.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA
G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
FACTS:
On November 13, 2003, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, while PO1
NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDORAMIREZ were on duty, a certain
EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance
regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while
driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City,
he had a traffic dispute with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said
vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road,
Caloocan City.
Thereat, the passenger of said taxi cab and fied their guns. Surprised,
Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he reached a
police station nearby where he reported the incident. The police officers on
duty immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue
corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While
approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their
guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased
them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black
bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a
magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered
from CalantiaoÕs companion a 0.38 revolver.
Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by
P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug. RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to
the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn
Calantiao’s conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marijuana found in Calantiao’s possession was
inadmissible as evidence against him on the grounds of either it was
discovered via an illegal search, or because its custodial chain was broken?
HELD:
NO. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident
to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by
the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a
reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers
from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully
arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to
ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence
under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in
Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could have
easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence
inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s
possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers
could validly conduct a warrantless search.
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized
drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because
what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the
seized marijuana from the time the police officers confiscated it, to the time
it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was brought
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason
to overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of
custody of the seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render the
marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence. Hence, as
Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly
perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
January 17, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04069.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCURY DELA CRUZ ALIAS “DEDAY"

G.R. No. 212171, September 07, 2016
FACTS:
At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3
Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their civilian asset proceeded to
Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the team went inside
the interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales together with the civilian
asset approached the house of Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1
Bullido were strategically hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. The
civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy shabu worth
P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small plastic containing
white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the former the
P200.00 bills. Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1
Bullido, who saw the consummation of the transaction rushed to the scene.
When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for
help and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased
her, however, her neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega ("Ortega") blocked their
way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but Ortega did not
listen, so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot as the people likewise
started to gather around them. Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade
arrest. The team then arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice. On their
way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1 Reales handed to PO3
Batobalonos the small plastic containing white crystalline substance which he
purchased from Dela Cruz.
Thereafter, upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos marked
the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06." Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory
Examination of the seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. The
Request and the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime
Laboratory OfÞce-7, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by
PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of November 11, 2006.
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report No. D-
1771-2006," with the finding that the specimen gave positive result for the
presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Cebu City, found the accused-
appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabuunder Sections 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 91653 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant’s case should be dismissed due to failure of
the police officers to comply with the procedure in the custody and
disposition of seized drugs (chain of custody).
HELD:
We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any intent or ill
motive on the part of the police officers to falsely impute commission of a
crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is entitled to great respect and deserves to
prevail over the bare, uncorroborated denial and self-serving claim of the
accused of frame-up. Also, we reject the appellant’s contention that the
police officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1
of R.A. No. 9165, which provides for the procedure in the custody and
disposition of seized drugs.
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody
in the handling of evidence, “substantial compliance with the legal
requirements on the handling of the seized item” is sufficient. This Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply
with the requirements under Section21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural
lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be
able to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the
dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the
arresting officers; turned over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the
laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these
are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the
guilt of the accused will not be affected.
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has
been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that
the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and
the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.
Accused-appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to
impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies
of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, accused-
appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
She simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:
THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO
G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent spouses filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages
against the petitioners. Later on, the complaint was amended to an action
for recovery. Respondent alleged: (1) that the disputed property was
originally owned by Buenaseda; (2) had long been partitioned between her
two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila; and (3) that owned 1/3 of the
portion of Perfecto’s share by virtue of a deed of sale executed between
them and one of Perfecto’s heir, Pedro.
While in their original answer, petitioner alleged that the subject
property had already been extra-judicially partitioned between the heirs of
Vitaliano and Perfecto, they subsequently changed their position when the
complaint was amended. They now claimed that the property was not
partitioned with specific metes and bounds. What is cleared among the heirs
is their respective shares thereof.
RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro. CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a
preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, the certified true copy of cadastral map and the
municipal assessor's records. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
where petitioners argued that the cadastral map, which serves as the basis
of the alleged partition, is inadmissible in violation of the best evidence rule
and hearsay rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a certified true copy of cadastral map is inadmissible in
evidence on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule and hearsay
rule.
HELD:
NO. Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents
may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
or the record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were
presented by two public officers.
As to the Hearsay Rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule.
The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of
the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness
to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The
document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the
department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of
cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the
corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are
exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. JESUS M. MUPAS

G.R. No. 181892 September 08, 2015
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Government - through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)and the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA)- for the construction and development of the NAIA-
IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC
and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and comparative
proposals to AEDC's unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law
and its implementing rules.
Paircargo consortium also submitted their competitive proposal to build
the NAIA-IPT III. Both AEDC and Paircargo offered to build, however,
Paircargo submitted a bid superior to AEDCÕs unsolicited proposal, thus
DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO).
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan,
both foreign corporations organized in Japan, for the construction of the
NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the
problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCOÕs payments until
June 2003.
Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant costs of the
construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original documents to the
court, however PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified under
Sec. 3 Rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous
accounts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-submission of original documents is justified.
HELD:
The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-
submission due to numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under
the rule. However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary
of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the
admission of the original documents on which the summary is based. The
proponent must prove that the source documents being summarized are also
admissible if presented in court.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the
original of the document must be produced in court.
Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied
documents he presented in courts are authentic theses photocopied
documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be admissible as evidence,
or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the project.

MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ

G.R. No. 169985, June 15, 2011
FACTS:
Respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their
portions of the subject property, to wit: Petitioner Modesto Leoveras --
3,020 square meters and Respondent Casimero Valdez -- 7,544.27 square
meters.
In 1996, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already
obtained in his name two TCTs: one - covering an area of 3,020 square
meters; and two - covering an area of 1,004 square meters. Thus,
respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-
square meter portion on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the
3,020 square meters identified in the parties' Agreement.
 In his defense, the petitioner claimed: (1) that the parties has agreed
that the extent of their ownership would be based on their actual
possession; (2) that he actually possessed and subsequently acquired has a
total area of4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two portions and
caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question; and (3) that respondent
participated in executing an Affidavit of confirmation of subdivision, which
corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed
the petitioner's ownership over the disputed property.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the RTC. CA noted the
discrepancy between the respondent's signatures as appearing in the
Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on record, on the other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an allegation of ownership that is contrary to those
expressly stated in an agreement may be used as evidence.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The petitioner does not dispute the due
execution and the authenticity the Agreement entered into between him and
the respondent. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not
reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently
executed in order to reflect the parties' true intention. Factual findings of the
CA holding that such affidavit is spurious due to discrepancy of respondent’s
signature therein leads us to rely only on the agreement as the basis for the
claim of ownership of both parties.
The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the parol
evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing,
the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in
the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to
have been waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court
allows a party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this
case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a
meeting of the minds of the parties.
 WILGEN LOON et al. vs. POWER MASTER, INC.et al.
G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Respondents employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and
leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the
petitioners filed a complaint for money claims and illegal dismissal. Labor
Arbiter (LA) partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. Both parties appealed
the LA’s ruling with the NLRC.
6 months after filing their notice of appeal, Respondents filed an
unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and
computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine
(ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts
allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards.
On the other hand, petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental appeal from
the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the
supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six
months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with
memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed
to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002.
Third, the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore
the petitioners’ forged signatures.
NLRC giving weight to the photocopy of computerized payroll records
ruled in favor of respondent. It maintained that the absence of the
petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for
their authenticity. The CA affirmed the NLRCÕs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mere photocopies as documentary evidence filed 6
months from notice of appeal are admissible in evidence where there is an
allegation of forgery by the adverse party.
HELD:
NO. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not
required in labor cases, the liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two
requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the
submission of evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the
allegations sought to be proven.
Respondents, in this case, failed to sufficiently prove the allegations
sought to be proven. Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized
copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest
opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim
that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal.
While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to
photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery
and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present
the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted
their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. Failure to present the
originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.
G.R. No. 201001 November 10, 2014

FACTS:
MCMP Construction and Monark Equipment Construction Corporation
agreed to the lease of heavy equipment by MCMP from Monark thru a Rental
Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five pieces of heavy
equipment to MCMP’s project site in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon,
evidenced by Documents Acknowledgment Receipt No.04667 and 5706,
received by MCMP representatives Jorge and Rose.
During trial, Reynaldo, Monark’s representative, testified that there
were two original copies of the contract, one for MCMP and one for Monark;
however, Monark’s copy was lost and despite diligent efforts, cannot be
located, hence he presented photocopy of the Contract which he had on file.
MCMP objected to the presentation of the secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof, since there were no diligent efforts to locate it, but did not
produce MCMP’s copy of the contract despite a directive from the trial court
to produce it.
 After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of Monark, ordering MCMP to pay
the balance of the rental fees inclusive of interest as well as 25% attorney
fees. MCMP appealed to the Court of Appeals when its motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC, but the appeal was also denied,
hence it elevated its case to the Supreme Court, on the issue of whether or
not secondary evidence may be presented in the absence of the original. It
argues that the custodian of the original document was not presented to
prove its loss; its loss was not even reported to the police; it was only
searched by Monark for purposes of the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation
of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the
Best Evidence Rule.

HELD:
NO.
“Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of
the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is
contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
 (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant
rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a
lost document:
"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of
its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and
after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss."
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set
down the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has
been lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of
the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites
are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been
lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held
by this Court, "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses
are matters best left to the trial court." Hence, the Court will respect the
evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not
the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the
Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy
of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have
asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to
present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the
presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable
presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING

CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) who
was terminated due to his alleged participation in padding of Credit Meter
Readings (CMR) or slot machines at Casino Filipino-Hyatt.
Petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR for illegal
dismissal. CSC held that petitioner's appeal had already prescribed. The CSC
did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission
of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found that a verification
of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter
reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's
Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned
about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed
his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of
prescription in its Comment.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his
dismissal on August 13, 2007, which was within the 15-day period for filing
the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission sent to
the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of
documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is
sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act
of2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter reconsideration was
not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then led his complaint before the CSC.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not a letter reconsideration filed through facsimile is
allowed.
HELD:
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter
reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission,
such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used
by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the
motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or
personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., it was held inadmissible in evidence the filing
of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: “x x x A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all
the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading. x x x”
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.

SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION
G.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015
FACTS:
Lucia was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit and Kimwa is a
construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers.
On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract
where40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier
to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted
area in Toledo City at Php 240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling
aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia
filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. It argued that the controversial
quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper limit or the
maximum quantity that it could haul. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement
articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum
limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol
Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing
evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged
to haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15,
1995.
HELD:
YES. Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity
which it was obliged to acquire from Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on
admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. -- When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, itis considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
c) The validity of the written agreement; or
d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that
the parol evidence sought to be introduced points to the conclusion
proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant,
tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or
subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to
be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions
has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to
by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to
be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by
the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Spouses Paras
pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or
imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to
express the true intent of the parties. Further, Kimwa, through its
Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these
issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.
It is true that petitioners’ Complaint does not specifically state
words and phrases such as "mistake, “imperfection," or "failure to
express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that
the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that
the Agreement "entered into . . . on 6 December1994 or thereabouts"
was founded on the parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity
of aggregates allotted in favor of Kimwa must be hauled by May 15,
1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of
petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area.
The Special Permit’s condition (issued to Paras) that a total of
only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by
petitioner Lucia Paras from the permitted area lends credence to the
position that the aggregates "allotted" to respondent Kimwa was in
consideration of its corresponding commitment to haul all40,000 cubic
meters. This is so, especially in light of the Agreement’s own
statement that "the said Aggregates is for the exclusive use of
[respondent Kimwa. By allotting the entire 40,000 cubic meters,
petitioner Lucia Paras bound her entire business to respondent Kimwa.
Rational human behavior dictates that she must have done so with the
corresponding assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not
ridiculous, of her to oblige herself to make this allotment without
respondent Kimwa’s concomitant undertaking that it would obtain the
entire amount allotted.
Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for
only six (6) months from November 14,1994lends credence to
petitioners Spouses Paras’ assertion that, in entering into the
Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so
because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can be completed
by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner
Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently clear to any party she was
transacting with that she could supply aggregates only up to May 15,
1995 and that the other party's hauling must be completed by May 15,
1995. She was merely acting with due diligence, for otherwise, any
contract she would enter into would be negated; any commitment she
would make beyond May15, 1995 would make her guilty of
misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be
rendered illusory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated July 4, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals Special 20th Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 74682 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of Branch 55 of the Regional
Trial Court, Mandaue City dated May 16, 2001 in Civil Case No. MAN-
2412 is REINSTATED.