Poverty Reduction Strategies in

Africa

A fundamental question about contemporary Africa is why does Africa remain

so poor, long after the departure of the European Colonial domination and in the
midst of so many natural resources?
Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa provides new understandings of the
persistent issue of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and makes recommendations
for policy frameworks to help African governments alleviate poverty. Each
chapter uses case studies to review the old strategies for resolving the problem
of poverty in the continent and make the case for new initiatives to address
poverty. The contributors focus on practical and day-to-day issues as the best
approach to formulate and implement poverty reduction strategies in con-
temporary Africa.
This book is invaluable reading for students and scholars of African politics
and development.

Toyin Falola is University Distinguished Teaching Professor and the Jacob and
Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities at the University of Texas at
Austin, USA.

Mike O. Odey is a Professor of Economic History at Benue State University,

Nigeria.
Global Africa
Series Editors: Toyin Falola and Roy Doron

1 Dissent, Protest and Dispute in Africa

Edited by Emmanuel M. Mbah and Toyin Falola

2 Environment and Identity Politics in Colonial Africa

Emmanuel M. Mbah

3 Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa

Edited by Toyin Falola and Mike O. Odey

4 Literature and Culture in Global Africa

Tanure Ojaide

5 Gendering Knowledge in Africa and the African Diaspora

Contesting History and Power
Edited by Toyin Falola and Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso
Poverty Reduction Strategies
in Africa

Edited by Toyin Falola and

Mike O. Odey
First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Toyin Falola and Mike O. Odey;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Toyin Falola and Mike O. Odey to be identified as the authors
of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
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without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Names: Falola, Toyin, editor. | Odey, Mike Odugbo, editor, author.
Title: Poverty reduction strategies in Africa : the ideology of the family-
state / edited by Toyin Falola and Mike Odugbo Odey.
Other titles: Global Africa ; v 3.
Description: New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series: Global Africa ; v 3 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017004333| ISBN 9781138240667 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781315282978 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Poverty–Government policy–Africa, Sub-Saharan. |
Africa, Sub-Saharan–Economic conditions–21st century.
Classification: LCC HV438.A357 .P68 2017 | DDC 362.50967–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017004333

ISBN: 978-1-138-24066-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-28297-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents

List of illustrations viii

Notes on contributors x

Introduction 1
MIkE O. ODEY AND TOYIN FALOLA

PART I
Dimensions and assessments of poverty reduction policies
and programs in sub-Saharan Africa 19

1 Poverty in postcolonial Africa: the legacy of contested

perspectives 21
SATI U. FWATSHAk

2 Scaling up power infrastructure investment in sub-Saharan

Africa for poverty alleviation 53
AORI R. NYAMBATI

3 The impact of anti-corruption conventions in sub-Saharan

Africa 65
DANIEL BARkLEY AND CLAIRE MADUkA

4 Interrogating the issues of corruption and poverty in

contemporary Africa 78
IDRIS S. JIMADA

5 PEPFAR and preventing HIV/AIDS transmission: evidence

from sub-Saharan Africa 92
DANIEL BARkLEY AND OPEYEMI ADENIYI
vi Contents
  6  Reflections on the current challenges of poverty reduction in 
Africa 109
LOvEDAY N. GBARA

7 A critical analysis of poverty reduction strategies in

postcolonial Africa 120
FELIX O. OkOkHERE

PART II
Problems of good governance and institutional failures in
West Africa 137

8 Weaknesses and failures of poverty reduction policies and

programs in Nigeria since 1960 139
MIkE O. ODEY

9 In the web of neoliberalism and deepening contradictions?

Assessing poverty reform strategies in West Africa since the
mid-1980s 155
OkPEH O. OkPEH, JR.

10 An assessment of abuse of the elderly as an aspect of poverty

in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 177
MILDRED O. EkOT

11  Reflections on the interface between poverty and food 
insecurity in Nigeria 193
FUNSO A. ADESOLA

12 An appraisal of the poverty reduction program in Bayelsa

State of Nigeria: “In Care of the People” (COPE) 204
EzI BEEDIE

13 A comparative analysis of incidence of poverty in three

urban centers in Ghana from 1945 to 1990 215
WILHELMINA J. DONkOH
 Contents vii
PART III
Dimensions of poverty in East and Southern Africa 243

14 Land reforms, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya: the

postcolonial experience 245
MARTIN S. SHANGUHYIA

15 Extraversion and development in northwestern Ethiopia:

the case of the Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 268
LUCA PUDDU

16  Affirmative action as a theological-pastoral challenge in the 
South African democratic context 283
ELIJAH M. BALOYI

Index 294
Illustrations

Figure
5.1 PEPFAR funding, 2004–2008 93

Tables
3.1 ratification and entry into forced dates for AU and UN
conventions and SADC Protocol 68
3.2 Preventive and punitive measures in the AU, SADC
Protocol, and UNCAC 70
3.3 The Control of Corruption Index 71
3.4 Descriptive statistics 73
3.5 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimations 74
5.1 PePFAr first-phase budget funding by country 93
5.2 Difference-in-Differences (DID) of mean adult HIV rates
for PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR recipient countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, 2003 to 2008 95
5.3 Difference-in-Differences (DID) of mean total fertility
rates for PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR recipient countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, 2003 to 2008 95
5.4 ABC activities in PEPFAR countries 99
5.5 Descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation 101
5.6 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: ordinary least
squares (OLS) dependent variable is log (HIV) 102
5.7 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: two-stage least
squares (2SLS) 102
5.8 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: ordinary
least squares (OLS) 103
5.9 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: two-stage least
squares (2SLS) 103
5.10 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: ordinary least
squares (OLS) 105
5.11 Variance inflation factor (VIF ) 105
 Illustrations ix
8.1 Poverty in Nigeria by state, 1985 to 1992 144
8.2 Dimensions of poverty in Nigeria in 1995, 1999, and 2001 145
9.1 Changes in human development over time in selected
countries, 1975 to 2003 161
9.2 The 32 poorest countries in the world as measured by the
UNDP’s Human Development Index, 2005 162
9.3 Structural adjustment programs and poverty in sub-Saharan
Africa, 1985 and 1990 168
11.1 Percentages of Nigerians living above or below the poverty
line in select years 195
11.2 Select countries population living below the poverty line,
2011 199
Contributors

Adesola, Funso A. is Chairman, Department of International Relations, Obafemi

Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He is a product of two first-
generation Nigerian Universities: OAU, Ile-Ife and University of Benin,
Benin City where he obtained his MA and PhD respectively. He has authored
two books entitled International Relations: An Introductory Text and National
Security in Nigeria Relations with its Neighbours. He has also published
widely in reputable local and international journals. His research interests are
security studies, geopolitics, and international relations in Africa.
Adeniyi, Opeyemi is a Reader in Economics, American University of Nigeria,
Yola, Adamawa State, Nigeria, and is also undertaking a minor study in Inter-
national and Comparative Politics in the same school. He is currently an editor
with Economics on the Move (EOTM), a scholarly organization that teaches
economics using both theoretical and practical measures. EOTM awarded him
a travel grant to attend the Africa Conference on Poverty and Empowerment in
Texas. He has coordinated economics-related field trips and outings to the
Central Bank of Nigeria and other organizations. He is a very active member
of the Economics Club of the American University of Nigeria. He co-edited
the publication entitled “Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Development
in Cameroon” and is currently working on revisions to the article.
Baloyi, Elijah M. has been a Minister in the Reformed Church for 12 years and
is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Practical Theology at the University
of South Africa. His research focus includes pastoral counseling, gender
studies (particularly women’s rights in the African context), and marriage
issues, as well as the integration of theology and psychology. He has pub-
lished several books and articles.
Barkley, Daniel is Professor and Chairman of the Economics Department at the
American University of Nigeria. He is also Executive Director of Economics
of On The Move, a US-based NGO that supports empirical research projects
in developing countries.
Beedie, Ezi is a doctoral research student in Development Studies, Birkbeck
College, University of London, United kingdom, and a Consultant for the
 Contributors xi
retirement and aging awareness NGO, RetAge Centre Initiative in Abuja. A
trained teacher with over 20 years’ teaching experience in Nigeria and the
Uk, she served as Executive Director of a Uk educational charity whose
vision is raising the aspirations and achievements of African and Caribbean
children and their parents. Her research interest is old age poverty reduction
in Nigeria, and her dissertation explores poverty reduction and the COPE
program. She received her Master’s degree in Social Policy and Develop-
ment, Middlesex University, London in 2010. She holds a B.Ed. degree from
Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), zaria, Nigeria (1986) and an M.Ed. degree
in Special Needs/Inclusive Education from the Open University, Milton
keynes, Uk (2007). She has carried out unpublished practitioner action
research on developing inclusive curricula, addressing difficulties in literacy
development, and managing behavior in schools.
Donkoh, Wilhelmina J. is a Senior Lecturer in History at kwame Nkrumah
University of Science and Technology, Ghana, and is currently a Fulbright
Senior Research Fellow at Lyon G. Tyler Department of History, College of
William & Mary, Williamsburg, virginia, USA. She has been a past recipient
of the Sephis visiting Fellowship to the School of Women’s Studies, Univer-
sity of Jodhpur, kolkata, India (2006); Cadbury Fellowship, Centre for West
African Studies, University of Birmingham, Uk (2002), Outstanding Teacher
Honoree, Honor a Teacher Initiative, Jackson State University School of
Education, Jackson, Mississippi, USA (2002); and African Studies Associ-
ation International visitor’s Award (2000). She has published extensively in
major peer-reviewed journals, and contributed several book chapters, includ-
ing to the Encyclopedia of African History (2005), and Tradition and
Modernity in West African Societies: The Case of Ghana in Comparative
Perspective (2004).
Ekot, Mildred O. is a Lecturer in the Department of Home Economics, Univer-
sity of Uyo, Nigeria. She holds a Master of Science in Home Economics and
is currently pursuing a doctorate in Human and Family Development at
Okpara University of Agriculture, Umudike, Nigeria. She has written several
articles in peer-reviewed journals, including Nigerian Journal of Home
Economics, Journal of Home Economics Research, and Lagos Journal of
Interdisciplinary Studies. She has contributed book chapters to Women and
Power in Africa in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Century (2009) and Early
Childhood Education in Nigeria (2010). Her research interests are home and
family life, particularly family survival and development of family members,
and the welfare of less privileged family members, particularly the elderly
and children.
Falola, Toyin is a Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Texas
at Austin. His more than 100 publications include Key Events in African
History: A Reference Guide, Nationalism and African Intellectuals, The
Power of African Cultures, and numerous edited volumes such as The United
States and Africa, The Atlantic World, and Sango.
xii Contributors
Fwatshak, Sati U. is a Professor of Economic History in the Department of
History and International Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria, where he
received his MA earlier and his PhD in 2003, and has been a Faculty member
since 1990. He also served as head of the department for two terms. He was a
Fulbright Fellow at New York University, New York City, USA during the
2000/2001 academic session. Between 2003 and 2009 he was a member of
various international teams, including one jointly sponsored by volkswagen
Foundation of Germany and CORDAID of The Netherlands which carried
out research on Sharia implementation in Nigeria. He became Nigeria
Country Coordinator of the volkswagen Project between 2007 and 2009. His
research publications and interests span African social and economic history,
including the history of African entrepreneurship, African development, and
African political conflicts.
Gbara, Loveday N. has been an Assistant Professor of International and Com-
parative Politics at the American University of Nigeria since 2009. He
earned both his BSc in Business Administration, MA in Public Administra-
tion from Minnesota State University, Mankato, Minnesota, USA, and his
PhD in Political Science from Washington State University, Pullman, Wash-
ington State.
Jimada, Idris S. teaches Contemporary and Comparative Studies at the Ahmadu
Bello University, zaria. He obtained his BA in History from the University of
Ilorin and his Master’s and PhD from the Ahmadu Bello University, zaria.
He was head of the Department of History of ABU and pioneer head of the
Department of History and Archaeology, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida Uni-
versity, Lapai, Niger State. He has published widely on topical issues in
books, reputable journals, and magazines. He has also been actively engaged
in international conferences and seminar proceedings. His publications
include “British Imperial Interest and Nupe Resistance 1886–1903,” in A.M.
Yakubu, I. Jumare, and A. Saheed (eds), Northern Nigeria; A Century of
Transformations 1903–2003 (2005); and “Slavery and Slave Trade in the
Middle Niger and Confluence Area,” in Ade Ajayi and Okon Uya (eds),
Slavery and Slave Trade in Nigeria: From Earliest Time to the Nineteenth
Century, among others. He is also editor of several reputable journals.
He serves as a member of the Nigerian National Committee on the UNESCO
Slave Route Project and other national committees.
Maduka, Claire is based in the Department of Economics at the American Uni-
versity of Nigeria. Her research focuses on poverty and corruption in Nigeria
as well as in other African countries.
Nyambati, Aori R. is a Master’s student specializing in International Develop-
ment and Global Governance, with a particular emphasis on FDI, Energy,
Climate Change, Anti-poverty Strategies, and Ethics of Foreign Aid. Aori’s
most recent publications include Energy and Socio-economic Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa (March 2011); Climate Change and Sub-Saharan Africa
 Contributors xiii
(April 2011), and Kenya’s FDI Inflows Trends between 2000 and 2010: What
Does the Future Hold? (September 2011). He was one of the participants in
an International Conference on Energy and Climate Change in London
(December 16–20, 2011), where he presented a paper entitled The IMF and
Global Climate Change Policy.

Odey, Mike O. is a Professor of Economic History and the immediate past head
of the Department of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria,
where he served for two terms. His teaching and research focus include Issues
in the Nigerian and African Development Question and Comparative Eco-
nomic Growth, Poverty Policies/Analysis, Food Security Systems, Environ-
mental and Entrepreneurial Studies, as well as Inter-group Relations. He has
written over 80 well-researched publications in these areas in both inter-
national/local journals, as well as book chapters. He is editor of several jour-
nals, including Journal of Research & Contemporary Issues. He has authored
two books, including The Development of Cash Crop Economy in Nigeria’s
Lower Benue Province, 1910–1960 (2009) and his latest published book is
Food Crop Production, Hunger, and Rural Poverty in Nigeria’s Benue Area,
1920–1995 (2010). He has been a Member of Council, Historical Society of
Nigeria since 2005. He was one of the award winners of the Omohundro
Institute of Early American History & Culture in Ghana in August 2007.

Okokhere, Felix O. attended Simon Fraser University in British Columbia,

Canada where he studied Political Science and Sociology. Prior to that, he
obtained a college Diploma in Criminal Justice (Criminology) at Danglas
College, British Columbia, Canada. He also holds an Msc in International
Relations at the University of Benin, in Nigeria. He is currently a Lecturer in
the Department of Political Science and also a PhD candidate in Strategic
Studies at Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria. He teaches Inter-
national Politics. He has published a book entitled Africa in the Global System
and a number of researched articles in learned journals, including “From
Secular Wars to Holy Wars and Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism in
Nigeria.” His research focus is on Security and Development Studies.

Okpeh, Okpeh O. is a Professor of African History at the Benue State Univer-

sity, Makurdi, Nigeria. A widely traveled and active scholar, he has written
extensively on development issues as they relate to Africa and contributed
chapters to edited books and articles in learned journals. He has also authored/
co-authored and edited/co-edited many books, including Gender, Power and
Politics in Nigeria (2007); Population Movements, Conflicts and Displace-
ments in Nigeria (2008); and China in Africa: Threats and Opportunities
(2009). He is Editor of the Journal of Globalization and International Studies.
Currently on research leave at the veritas Catholic University, Abuja, he is
the recipient of many distinguished academic awards, including the Nigeria
University Commission (NUC) Award for supervising the best PhD thesis in
the Humanities (2008) in Nigeria and the Distinguished Africanist Research
xiv Contributors
Excellence Award, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin,
USA (2010).
Puddu, Luca is Desk Africa Coordinator of Equilibri.net, an Italian think-tank
concerned with geo-politics and international relations. He received his PhD
in the History of International Relations from the University of Florence in
2011. His academic interests include rural development, foreign aid, and
security issues in the Horn of Africa. The results of his research activity have
been presented at various national and international conferences.
Shanguhyia, Martin S. is an Associate Professor of African History at Syracuse
University, New York, USA. His research and teaching interests are colonial
and postcolonial Africa, focusing on agriculture, the environment, and land
politics, and the intersection between modern development and African liveli-
hoods. He also has interests in colonial and postcolonial state politics in
Africa.
Introduction
Mike O. Odey and Toyin Falola

Introduction
Poverty in Contemporary Africa is a collection of 16 essays that seeks to provide
fresh explanations on the African crises, using different dimensions of poverty
during the postcolonial period up until about 2010 with broad implications for
future African sustainable development. The authors provide variegated expressions
of local and regional case studies of poverty in contemporary Africa with global
connections as a basis for reviewing the old strategies towards resolving the
problem of poverty in the continent. Rather than commonplace theorization, the
authors focus on more practical and day-to-day issues as the best approach to public
policy formulation and implementation on poverty reduction in contemporary
Africa. The essays clearly underscore the necessity for a deeper understanding of
the real nature of the current problem and further show what postcolonial African
governments should do to rescue the vast majority of the African population from
their current misery. Furthermore, the problem-solving approach of contributors in
the volume underscores the essence of research for purposes of sustainable develop-
ment, unlike certain of the existing literature on Africa’s contemporary problems
without genuine concern or practical suggestions on how to meet the desired pro-
gress. Furthermore, all the essays are analyses of experienced academics and
experts on the issues interrogated, bringing into fruitful harmony previously isolated
and neglected cases of poverty analysis throughout the whole gamut of the African
continent. As we see it, the volume is most timely, and is put together as another
important step towards Africa’s sustainable development.
The scope of the volume is considerably wide, covering local, national, and
regional themes on poverty in contemporary Africa, and connects them to issues
of sustainable development during the postcolonial period, with some instances
stretching up to 2010. Indeed, the arguments of the essays are not localized to
any particular country or region in Africa. Rather, the collection is a fair repres-
entation of a new understanding of dimensions of poverty from different regions
of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, out of the 16 essays in the volume, four are
case studies on different dimensions of poverty in Nigeria, two are on the West
African sub-region, two on East Africa, two on South Africa, and six others on
the rest of Africa.
2 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
The theme of the book falls within a huge body of the existing literature on
contemporary African crises, with particular reference to poverty. However,
there is no edited volume that has precisely addressed those issues in the African
context and in contemporary parlance in the way that contributors to this volume
have done. To wit, they all address the problem of poverty from different per-
spectives. For instance, Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest
Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About it (2007) explains why
some countries are trapped in poverty and goes further to provide strategies of
redeeming them. He underscores the need to change the existing poverty reduc-
tion strategies in Africa and Central Asia as well as to create larger space for
more inclusive and robust public policy engagements towards the poor for pur-
poses of sustainable development. The necessity is predicated on the remarkable
changes such as rapid transition from low-income to middle-income status in
such regions. Furthermore, as Collier has argued, different countries and regions
would need different strategies, which is what the present book has generously
provided.
African countries generally fall within the four poverty traps of Collier’s
Bottom-Billion: as resource-trapped nations leading to corruption, rent-seeking,
and “Dutch-disease,” the conflict-coup trap, land-locking/bad neighbors, and bad
governance/small countries. Furthermore, the book looks at the role of foreign
aid in the African development process which the author maintains is not the
problem of sub-Saharan Africa but the attitude of donors towards the Southern
Hemisphere. Similarly, in Erik S. Reinert’s epic work, How Rich Countries Got
Rich […] and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (2010), the author argues that
important economic lessons for sustainable development may be learned from
setting the historical record straight, such as the relevance of the British indus-
trial history, the USA, the Asian Miracle, etc. He further deals with the ever-
increasing gap between the rich and poor nations despite the massive economic
transfers in the name of “development assistance” to Africa since 1970 as a res-
urrection of ancient but viable historic and economic tradition. The whole truth
lies in the fact that getting rich or remaining poor depends on how different
nations approach and engage theories of development and resources available to
them. Thus, Reinert depends heavily on a large number of classical/modern eco-
nomic thinkers whose ideas have moved the world in the past 500 years or more
to underscore the necessity for all the poor nations of the world to always get
their economic theories and activities right in order to achieve sustainable
growth. This is indeed what is responsible for the lost art of creating the middle-
income earners/countries as an engine of growth in most countries of the world
today. Similarly, Robert Claderisi’s The Trouble with Africa (2007) is also a
very significant volume and is similar to the present book in a number of ways.
In his argument, Claderisi attempts to puncture a number of illusions regarding
the current African crises. The book is one of the most provocative and in-depth
analysis with an inside story of the problems hindering the African development
processes and what seems to be fundamentally wrong with the continent in the
past 30 years. He argues that Africa’s problem is not neoliberalism, crushing
 Introduction 3
debt burdens, the Cold War or whatever, but the African people themselves
whom he considers as thugs in power, battered with the culture of corruption, a
continent riddled with wars/violence, etc. He demonstrates why and how foreign
aid is not working in Africa and what can be done to reverse the trend. It is from
this point of view that Claderisi provides ten new templates for Africa’s future
development, beginning from the present millennium. One clear departure from
this posture is Jeni klugman’s edited volumes I and II, A Source Book for
Poverty Reduction Strategies (2002). Both volumes provide cutting-edge macro-
economic issues as well as sectoral approaches and techniques to effect poverty
reduction in contemporary Africa. The two volumes look far beyond the limits
or problems of low-income earning capacity in Africa and dwells rather on
poverty as a multidimensional problem such as lack of opportunity, low capa-
city, and high levels of financial insecurity and issues of empowerment. The
volumes equally underscore the fact that poverty can only be tamed with the idea
of expanded meanings of poverty in mind. The provided case studies are fair
representations of the understanding of poverty in contemporary Africa and how
to develop and strengthen poverty reduction programs already in existence in the
continent. However, the volumes do not have “all the answers” to the poverty
question in Africa. Furthermore, most of the cases date back to 2002, and to that
extent the present volume seeks to fill the gaps in the existing literature on
poverty crises in contemporary Africa.
One other related volume that falls within the framework of the present book
is George B.N. Ayittey’s Africa Unchained: The Blueprint of Africa’s Future
(2005), which explains why the African continent still remain so poor over time
despite its huge natural and human endowments. The book is about Africa’s
postcolonial worsening economic conditions, ranging from complex internal
dynamics, especially the failure of the postcolonial elite model, faulty policies/
strategies of development, and monumental leadership problems and extraneous
forces such as the failure of foreign aid in different parts of the continent. This
book begins where Ayittey left off, by providing the missing details embedded
in the African traditional philosophy and constitutional system as clearly set
forth in the essays. Related and significant to the present book is Jeffrey D.
Sachs’ The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time (2005) in which
the author emphasizes the need to make the necessary investments as a panacea
to end poverty all over the world as an obligation. He further argues that
although so many millions of people are impoverished and perishing due to
extreme poverty, such stories are barely written and the real circumstances or
conditions of the poor may never be correctly analyzed. This is why extreme
poverty has become one of the most current and destabilizing factors in the
world, perhaps more so than the current global terrorism. It is also against
this background that the global community should shift attention collectively
towards ending poverty and hunger in Africa more than ever before as part
of the central argument and contribution to the debate which the present book
seeks to provide. In a similar work, Gordon McCord and colleagues (2005)
provide an in-depth study. The authors debunk what they regard as extreme
4 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
interpretations/misconceptions by the Washington Consensus regarding Africa’s
poverty and slow economic growth rate by arguing that Africa’s poverty trap is
rather the outcome of a complex web of many interactive factors, structural con-
ditions, and sociopolitical history. Beyond the usual suggestion of macro-
economic policies and good governance, Jeffrey Sachs and colleagues suggest
that African countries can, among other things, come out of the existing wide-
spread poverty trap through the domestication of the Millennium Development
Goals and also repackage the existing North–South dichotomy to achieve long-
term sustained growth in the continent.

Chapter outlines
This book is divided into three parts. The first, entitled “Dimensions and assess-
ments of poverty reduction policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa,” com-
prises seven chapters. The first chapter by Sati Fwatshak provides a graphic
picture of the desperate and growing pace of poverty in contemporary Africa. He
explains that, between 1983 and 1993, nearly 70 percent of Africa’s population
had fallen below the poverty line with a “disproportionate share of global
poverty.” He further shows that in the mid-1990s, Africa had 30 out of 49 of the
low-income countries of the world; only seven out of 41 middle-income coun-
tries; only three out of 17 upper-middle-income countries; and none among the
26 high-income countries in the world. Illiteracy rates in Africa in the mid-1990s
were in double digits: as high as 86 percent in Niger, 81 percent in Burkina Faso,
and 60 percent and above in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Burundi, Mali, Benin, and
Côte d’Ivoire. Many African countries experienced negative growth rates and
none of those with positive rates of growth exceeded 5 percent. By 1998,
Africa’s GNP per capita had dropped from $664 in 1980 to $513, and in the
whole of Africa the drop was from $749 in 1980 to $668 in 1998. The number of
Africans living below the poverty line on less than $1 per day rose from 89.6
million in the late 1960s to 233.5 million in the late 1990s. Thus, in the 1990s,
absolute poverty figures rose five times faster in Africa than in Latin America
and two times faster than in South Asia. Fwatshak’s main concern is a critical
review of divergent emerging opinions of historians and non-historians on
poverty in Africa during the postcolonial period, and he also tries to harmonize
them. He interrogates the issues in depth from four different perspectives. The
first concerns the facts and debates on poverty in contemporary Africa, which he
considers to be the most pervasive of all the African woes which he re-crafted as
the “African Drama.” The second legacy on the contested perspectives on
poverty is articulated as causes of poverty in pre-colonial Africa. The third is the
emphasis on the underdevelopment/exploitation paradigm, which the author con-
siders as externalists’ perspective and articulated within the framework of both
Marxist and non-Marxist views. Fwatshak’s central argument in the fourth
section of his chapter is a debate on how to find the most appropriate solution to
the persistent poverty in postcolonial African societies. The author decries the
lack of consensus on the causes and solutions to poverty in contemporary Africa,
 Introduction 5
and subscribes to the harmonization of the divergent views on poverty in the
continent by taking into account Africa’s historical roots, and being mindful of
the other emerging factors in global perspective. This is because, as the author
argues, externalists’ and internalists’ perspectives work in fruitful harmony and
neither of the two sides can replace the other. His main conclusion includes the
need to return to the ideas which helped Africa

develop local institutions that have endured for centuries such as agricul-
ture, the basis of Africa economy that has empowered the people over time;
reliance on local resources; the prevention of autocratic power, continental
unity as well as external assistance in a number of critical areas such as in
the area of reparations, debt cancelation to mitigate the problems resulting
from the slave trade and colonial rule.

Chapter 2, “Scaling up power infrastructure investment in sub-Saharan Africa

for poverty alleviation” by Aori R. Nyambati, explains the role of power infra-
structure in poverty alleviation within the broad context of economic empower-
ment in the continent. The author demonstrates the correlation between energy
supply and poverty alleviation, and explains that lack of access to modern energy
services is one of the major constraints to economic growth and sustainable
development and, indeed, to poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa. Today,
Africa has a power infrastructure investment backlog of over US$40.6 billion
and holds the world’s lowest electrification rate of about 30.5 percent, and this is
one of the most important factors responsible for the slow pace and erratic pro-
gress in the socioeconomic transformation of the region. Low energy supply in
Africa is due to the inefficient and poor maintenance of infrastructure, and this is
a threat to the overall achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by
2015. To move forward, Nyambati suggests that the governments of SSA should
do more than talk about the rhetoric of African problems by providing the basic
facilities like electricity and other modern sources of energy as a basis for
poverty alleviation and the socioeconomic transformation of the continent.
Nyambati’s main argument correlates energy supply and poverty reduction, and
covers four aspects. The first is an explanation of the poor state and maintenance
of the power infrastructure in Africa. The second is a search for an appropriate
guiding principle in policy formulation and governance mechanism, which must
necessarily be in tandem with the sustainability of energy supply. The third is
the need for a radical shift towards modern energy sources through external col-
laboration from other parts of the world, which he argues must be affordable and
accessible at continental and regional levels. The last is the necessity for long-
term commitment to energy research, development, and distribution in sub-
Saharan Africa. In looking ahead to sustainable poverty reduction in sub-Saharan
Africa, as Nyambati consistently argues, there is no single country in the world
that has experienced fast economic growth and development and reduced abject
poverty without adequate and equitable energy supply. He regrets that currently,
Africa does not have nuclear and bio-energy that could ameliorate the poor
6 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
infrastructure. Despite safety issues, he argues that sub-Saharan Africa has an
untapped comparative advantage with regard to nuclear energy. Although Africa
has about 18 percent of the globe’s uranium which is useful for nuclear energy,
it remains untapped. He highlights some of the uses of nuclear energy when
tapped as clean and renewable and can provide the much-needed energy
resources critical for the region’s growth and development in the twenty-first
century, and useful for de-carbonizing the region’s economies; drastically redu-
cing the region’s GDP expenditures on imported oil; lessening national debts;
helping transform the region’s energy security landscape; and creating the pos-
sibility of a more competitive sub-Saharan Africa. He further argues that all the
industrialized economies (such as the OECD bloc) have an edge in the nuclear
industry and are exporters of nuclear energy, and wonders why sub-Saharan
Africa should be left out. For instance, France depends on nuclear energy and is
a major exporter in the industry, and creates over 200,000 jobs directly and indi-
rectly per year. China and India, two of the fastest-growing non-OECD nations,
have dramatically boosted their nuclear industry investments in preparation for
increased future energy demands, and Africa can do the same to reduce her
poverty level. At the micro level, nuclear energy may be used to finance African
economies. Similarly, Africa’s bio-energy is only exploited in its traditional
form, even though bio-energy constitutes more than 70 percent of total primary
energy consumed in southern African countries. Like nuclear energy, Bio-fuel
energy is a viable and sustainable source of energy derived from crops such as
grain sorghum, sweet sorghum, soy bean oil, sugarcane, palm oil, and red grass.
Among other options, bio-energy is cheap and can relegate the region’s green-
house gas emissions (GHGs), improve the region’s quality of the atmosphere,
boost local economic development, and help job creation. However, sub-Saharan
Africa’s bio-fuel subsector is currently constrained by socioeconomic factors
ranging from food insecurity, sharing of benefits, gender inequality; and market-
related factors such as inaccessibility, poor infrastructure, ecological labeling,
and unfair world trade.
In Chapter 3, “The impact of anti-corruption conventions in sub-Saharan
Africa,” Daniel Barkley and Claire Maduka discuss the problem of corruption in
Africa and argue that because corruption is notoriously hard to measure or even
define, it is impossible to say for certain whether corruption in Africa is increas-
ing or whether it is worse than in other places. In their analysis they use the
“Difference-in-Differences” (DID) estimator to assess the impact of the measures
to curb corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Applying the DID model to a panel of
46 African countries between 1998 and 2010, their analysis shows that these
measures did not reduce kaufmann, kraay, and Mastruzzi’s “Control of Corrup-
tion” Index in the ratifying states. However, despite the difficulties involved in
the measurement and assessment of corruption trends, it is not impossible to
develop indices for measuring or assessing corruption. The authors use the
Control of Corruption Index and Corruption Perspective Index to measure corrup-
tion in Africa, set against three major anti-corruption conventions as approved
by African states: the United Nations’ “Convention against Corruption,” the
 Introduction 7
Southern African Development Community’s “Protocol against Corruption,”
and the African Union’s “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corrup-
tion.” The use of the Difference-in-Differences (DID) model in the assessment
of the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in Africa shows that the provi-
sions of the conventions were vague and did not incorporate robust monitoring
mechanisms to meet the desired goals. The authors further argue that for suc-
cessful anti-corruption measures, legal and financial institutions are imperative
to strengthen and enforce accountability in the public sector as well as change
from “top-down” to “bottom-up” and the need to enhance press freedom as
important anti-corruption strategies in the region.
In Chapter 4, “The besieged continent: interrogating contemporary issues of
corruption and poverty in Africa,” Idris S. Jimada attempts a critique on the
dominant paradigms used in explaining the roots of poverty in Africa with con-
crete evidence and links between corruption, colonialism, and poverty in the
continent. From a plethora of problems that have besieged the African continent,
Jimada singles out the problem of corruption and its various types among
African leaders as the most important factor in the impoverishment of the people
and the reason for the slow progress in Africa today. This has been demonstrated
by those he referred to as “godfathers” in power who are responsible for colossal
wastage of public resources for personal gain, siphoning off state resources to
maintain those in power through the process of political patronage and to secure
the loyalty of the less privileged, and the like. Apart from the problem of corrup-
tion and wide-ranging implications, the author also provides an explanation for
the dominant paradigms of the political economy of Africa’s predicament of
hunger, disease, climate change, wars, and conflicts which are all linked together
as responsible for the growth of poverty in contemporary Africa. Other factors
include colonial domination and imperialism as well as unfavorable operations
of the IMF and World Bank in Africa. According to Jimada, the problems of
corruption of the African political elite and their parasitic behavior and
materialist-driven lifestyles have drained African resources to the disadvantage
of the vast majority of the people. Jimada’s argument revolves around the effects
of colonialism and how it has bequeathed to Africa all forms and levels of cor-
ruption with a class of power-drunk and soulless political elite who took over the
affairs of the continent and became a confused hybrid of privileged entrepren-
eurs only interested in their own welfare by misusing public authority and wealth
for private gain. Thus, as Jimada puts it, “Colonialism left nothing behind but
structures that would ensure the continuation of exploitation and underdevelop-
ment” in the form of modern-day state parasites and materialists who are always
standing in the way of the common good and national development. This is
indeed how corruption is taking its toll on Africa. Until it is effectively tamed,
poverty in contemporary Africa will also continue to ravage the continent.
Issues of health are taken up in Chapter 5, “PEPFAR and preventing HIv
transmission: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa.” Daniel Barkley and Opeyemi
Adeniyi call into question the ineffectiveness of the strategy to “be faithful,
correct and consistent in the use of condoms” in curbing the transmission of
8 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
HIv/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. This is demonstrated in the huge numbers of
those living with the virus in the region compared to other regions of the world.
In particular, Barkley and Adeniyi use the Difference-in-Differences (DID)
estimator econometrics technique to assess the impact of the U.S. President’s
Emergence Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in the spread of HIv/AIDS in sub-
Saharan Africa. According to the authors, PEPFAR is one of the largest health
plans ever initiated by any country to address a disease, and it initially included
15 countries and represented around 50 percent of HIv infections worldwide,
with 12 countries in Africa, as well as vietnam, Haiti, and Guyana. The 12
PEPFAR “focus countries” in Africa are Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia,
kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia. PEPFAR’s first five-year fiscal budget (2003–2008) alloc-
ated $15 billion for HIv prevention, care, and treatment. Amidst complicated
intervening variables between the “treatment” and “control” groups of the coun-
tries, the authors show that the strategies have not brought about any significant
reduction in the rate of adult HIv infection and spread of the disease in the
region to justify its initial popularity. They argue that the reduction in the adult
HIv rate between 2001 and 2009 was most probably due to higher death rates of
adults who were HIv positive rather than the implementation of PEPFAR’s
ABC preventive measures as had been assumed. Against this background, the
authors question the rationale for the continued use of ABC as an HIv preven-
tive policy in Africa and conclude that it is imperative to look for an alternative
panacea for the virus in Africa as another way to mitigate contemporary poverty
in the continent.
Chapters 6 and 7 consider a number of policy options. In Chapter 6, “Reflec-
tions on the current challenges of poverty reduction in Africa,” Loveday N.
Gbara sees Africa’s persistent poverty and underdevelopment problems as con-
stituting some of the most strategic challenges to the international community, as
well as an important aspect of African studies in the twenty-first century. The
main concern of the author is that none of the prescribed solutions from Western
development experts or institutions and social scientists to these problems has
brought about practical alleviation of Africa’s persistent poverty and under-
development. Instead, the scale of poverty and underdevelopment in con-
temporary Africa has escalated. Gbara argues that while other regions of the
world have experienced economic prosperity and reduced levels of poverty, per
capita income in Africa in the 1990s remained about the same as it was for most
countries when they became independent in the 1960s: “During the 1990s nearly
half of all Africans lived on $1 a day or less, and 30 percent of the world’s poor
lived in Africa – a higher share than at independence.” Furthermore, Africa
ranks at the bottom in global comparisons of social development indicators in
areas such as literacy, life expectancy, and healthcare, as one in five children
dies before the age of five.
The chapter also examines some of the key factors that have contributed to
the ugly poverty profile in Africa in the twenty-first century, its impact, and pos-
sible strategies by which to move Africa forward from this deplorable condition.
 Introduction 9
The chapter attempts to harmonize several views on the challenges of poverty
reduction in contemporary Africa over time. From a historical perspective, the
author attempts to provide new explanations on why poverty in contemporary
Africa has not been effectively tamed. According to Gbara, these are traceable to
a number of factors, including the international system of slavery and the slave
trade, the prolonged period of colonial domination of the continent, and the unfa-
vorable European commercial activities with Africa which he argues were
designed to exploit Africa’s natural wealth, infrastructural, and human capital
exacerbated by the impact of the Cold War and post-war politics as well as by
wars/conflicts within Africa. Other factors include the failure of political leader-
ship, institutional failure, and the African way of life. The author particularly
conceptualizes poverty in the context of African history and suggests that, to
take the continent out of its current deplorable conditions, Africans in the
Diaspora and various governments in Africa should work together to bring about
a new regime of sustainable growth through viable policies of poverty reduction
in the continent that are more congenial to their cultural backgrounds.
In Chapter 7, “A critical analysis of poverty reduction strategies in postcolo-
nial Africa,” Felix O. Okokhere maintains the same line of argument as other
contributors on the subject of poverty reduction in postcolonial Africa. The basic
approach in this particular chapter is a panoramic view of the political economy
of poverty in contemporary Africa under five sections. Within the existing theor-
etical framework and contending perspectives on poverty, the first section dwells
on the nature of poverty in contemporary Africa, which is potentially endowed
with human and mineral resources but lacks the ability to harness such abundant
resources to maximum capacity for the benefit of the people. Thus, he argues
that, in the mist of abundant natural resources, Africans remain hungry and
ravaged by preventable and curable diseases, and most people are deprived of
human dignity, liberty, and the basic necessities of life. In a world where bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements and lines of cooperation are being explored in
various ways to great advantage, African countries still continue to exhibit lack
of political will and economic power to be a major player and competitor in
various endeavors within the global community. Long after independence in
most African countries, Africa’s gross domestic product remains only 1 percent
of the world’s total, and average income per head – which was $450 – has stead-
ily fallen relative to the industrial world, and is now less than one-fiftieth of that
in Organization for Economic Cooperative and Development (OECD) countries.
Indeed, the poverty profile within contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, as
shown by the responses of the economies of most countries in the region,
appears to be worse than others, despite the market-oriented development pol-
icies urged on it by the World Bank and other outside agencies since the 1980s.
The flow of aid to Africa is declining, while population growth is still racing
towards the billion mark. Africa’s economies are currently socialized into the
Western concept of economic development but without sustainable manufac-
turing and industrial growth, etc. In the second section of the chapter, Okokhere
continues with an overview of the current economic predicament and causes of
10 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
poverty in Africa which he sees as a global threat and must be dealt with in ways
that have not yet been attempted. In the third section, the author shifts emphasis
to the neoliberal views of the Washington Consensus which he considers as a
viable option for poverty reduction, despite its limits. The fourth section links
poverty in Africa to the growing influence of globalization which he regards as
commercialization of poverty in the continent. The final section is a critical ana-
lysis of the current strategies for poverty reduction in Africa. According to
Okokhere, poverty reduction programs in Africa should be de-linked from global
patterns that are unrelated to Africa. It is also necessary to involve the poor
themselves in issues of poverty reduction and to prioritize the needs of the poor
in fiscal planning as well as to shift ideological positions for sustainable poverty
reduction in Africa. The author concludes the chapter with an emphasis on the
need to empower the poor by providing them with unhindered access to the basic
needs of life as well as a total overhaul of the existing policies and macro-
economic programs of government at both local and international levels for the
benefit of the vast majority of the people who are poor.
Six chapters constitute Part II of the volume, “Problems of good governance
and institutional failures in West Africa.” Drawing data from Nigeria and Ghana,
they bring local experiences into the larger conversation on poverty. In Chapter
8, Mike O. Odey analyzes the failure of policies in Nigeria since its independ-
ence in 1960. The chapter focuses on the inherent poverty of ideology in the pol-
icies of the Nigerian government on poverty reduction programs. The argument
of the author is set against the background of the fact that Nigeria has all it takes
to be one of the greatest nations in the world and to free her citizens from
poverty, being the second-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa and the thir-
teenth largest oil producer in the world; yet it is a nation where the vast majority
of the population still remains under grinding and increasing poverty for so
many complex reasons. In this chapter, the author constituently demonstrates
that the poverty level of most Nigerians has either remained largely the same, or
in most cases even worse since independence in 1960. For the most part, the
central argument revolves around the nature and dimensions as well as a critical
review of poverty policies and programs of the Nigerian successive governments
since 1960. According to Odey, the development policies of the postcolonial
governments in Nigeria, like the rest of Africa, are mere replicas of those of the
colonial government, and are generally incapable of promoting sustainable
growth and necessary development to reduce the existing poverty level in the
country. He further argues that the policies are relatively uncoordinated and too
many have inherent missing links. Other factors for lack of development and
why poverty is growing in Nigeria include the burgeoning level of corruption
within the political class and mismanagement of the nation’s oil wealth as well
as the effects of long military rule in Nigeria. Against the backdrop of the fore-
going, the author argues that the existing poverty programs have failed to yield
the desired results, as shown in the poor performance of the economy which is
predominantly agrarian, the Dutch Disease syndrome; hence the growth of
poverty in the midst of oil wealth which is enjoyed by only a privileged few.
 Introduction 11
In conclusion, Odey advocates for a shift from the rent-seeking policies/behavior
of government to broad-based macro-economic programs driven by fresh initi-
atives, which he argues would be more beneficial to the rural poor who consti-
tute the vast majority of the Nigerian people and move the economy towards the
desired sustainable development.
In a related manner, Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr. undertakes a critique of reforms in
the West African region. Chapter 9 offers a critical examination of the persistence
and pervasiveness of poverty in virtually the whole of the West African sub-
region as part of the major concern in the development process throughout Africa.
Some of the basic issues he raises and attempts to resolve include the following
questions: What is the nature and dimension of poverty in the region? How did it
come about? What were the responses of stakeholders to tame poverty in the mid-
1980s and why are they still inadequate? In what specific ways has poverty
affected the development of the sub-region? For the most part, Okpeh argues that
the failure of poverty alleviation programs at different levels of government in the
West African sub-region are traceable to their neoliberal pedigree and show how,
indeed, they have compounded poverty conditions in the sub-region rather than
mitigating them. For example, he demonstrates that the neoliberal argument for
budget cuts in basic social services such as education, healthcare, and other pro-
grams has not only led to job losses for many government employees, but also
threatens the future health, well-being, and productivity of the population in the
region. The more loans countries in the region got from the BWIs, the more
public institutions were driven into deeper crisis. In addition, drastic cuts in gov-
ernment expenditure decimated the health and educational sectors, eroded social
safety nets, and intensified the suffering of the majority of the people. The author
articulates his argument in four main sections. The first begins with a panoramic
view on the nature of his argument which he situates within the framework of
neoliberalism. The second section is an attempt to explain the historical per-
spective of poverty in the West African sub-region, with particular reference to
the dimensions, nature, character of poverty, and its implications for the socio-
economic development of the region. The third section examines the responses by
the governments and people of the region to the phenomenon of poverty. Here,
Okpeh questions why the different responses have failed to reduce poverty as
expected, despite the many alleviation programs on the account of their neoliberal
pedigree, and shows how, indeed, they have compounded poverty instead of miti-
gating it. In the fourth and final section of the chapter, Okpeh tries to knit together
the various arguments with a conclusion on the roadmap to ending poverty in the
sub-region. According to Okpeh, to achieve this, the region must first disentangle
itself from the web of neoliberal contradictions which underpin these policies,
and at the same time look inward by investing resources capable of creating
wealth, improving the standard of living of the vast majority of the people, and,
finally, building strong institutions that would guarantee good governance and
deliver sustainable development to the people.
Chapter 10 by Ekot O. Mildred provides several manifestations of poverty in
contemporary Africa with particular reference to the concept of “elder abuse”
12 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
which Ekot explains is a new dimension of poverty in Akwa Ibom State of
Nigeria and is equally widespread in contemporary Africa. The thrust of Ekot’s
argument revolves around the extent to which the strategy has achieved its
objectives in the area. The author argues that although the fight against poverty
in Nigeria has been going on over time, the aspect of elder abuse within the
domestic setting remains largely neglected, despite the fact that it is an accurate
indicator of poverty assessment in Nigeria. Ekot sees elder abuse as both a cause
and consequence of poverty in Akwa Ibom State in Nigeria. The author further
identifies the nature and character of elder abuse in Akwa Ibom as lack of care,
absence of old people’s homes (professional institutions) where they could be
cared for, emotional abuse, and lack of social security for the aged. Other
instances of elder abuse include reduction in the real income of retired civil ser-
vants whose retirement benefits are either not paid for months or paid under very
harsh conditions, and the marginalization of aged-retired individuals by the
general public. The most significant consequence of elder abuse, according to
Ekot, is the growth of poverty among the aged who are always suspected of
witchcraft. The author concludes by advocating for improvement in educational
attainment, individual consciousness and the need to create awareness regarding
the challenges of the elderly in government programs on poverty reduction and a
change of attitude towards the aged as an avenue leading to the reduction of
poverty in Nigeria.
In Chapter 11, Funso A. Adesola reflects on the interface between poverty
and food security systems in Nigeria with a population of over a quarter of sub-
Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest number of poor and hungry
in the world and comprises mostly agricultural farmers surrounded by too many
environmental risks. Like the rest of Africa, Adesola clearly demonstrates how
over 75 percent of the Nigerian rural population spend more than half of their
net income on food to stay alive as an index of poverty. Adesola sees poverty as
a major threat to food security in Nigeria, because income and purchasing power
always move in tandem, and food insecurity and hunger is mainly a distribu-
tional problem. To be sure, food shortages and malnutrition in Nigeria are due to
failure of the distribution system by which food is not getting to the poor people
as it should. In some cases, lack of income and poor purchasing power to buy
food remains a problem. The chapter further argues that the country’s hungry,
rural poor are not prone to crime, violence, and other social vices, unlike their
counterparts in the Nigerian cities. Apart from that, the long gestation period of
agricultural produce, unpredictable intervening climatic hazards, and numerous
uncertainties make the prospects of food security a pipe-dream. Adesola con-
cludes with alternative suggestions on how to reduce the vulnerability of the
food security system in Nigeria which would also improve the well-being of the
vast majority of the poor as the most viable interface.
Chapter 12 by Ezi Beedie is a critical assessment of the poverty reduction
program “In-Care of the People” (COPE) in the Bayelsa State of Nigeria from
the perspective of the beneficiaries themselves. The author uses several tech-
niques such as purposive sampling, semi-structured interviews, and thematic
 Introduction 13
documentary analysis to explain the poverty reduction programs of the Bayelsa
State government. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first
section provides background information as well as the rationale for a review of
poverty reduction programs in Nigeria since 1986 when the Structural Adjust-
ment Program was introduced. She argues that poverty is increasing in the area
and needs to be genuinely checked. The second section reviews in broad strokes
the nature of poverty reduction programs in Nigeria, showing that the poverty
alleviation measures in Bayelsa State should be directed towards growth, the
basic needs of the poor, and rural development approaches. The third section
deals more specifically with the impact of COPE on the aged household heads
(AHH) in Bayelsa State. Beedie consistently argues from the perspective of the
beneficiaries that COPE has short-term benefits simply by keeping children in
school, which in itself cannot reduce the incidence of poverty among the aged
population. Furthermore, the chapter shows that the aged were being used as a
means to an end to secure the program objectives of COPE. Beedie concludes
that because COPE has only provided temporary relief to the beneficiaries,
thereby in certain ways preventing a drift into worse incidence of poverty which
is not poverty reduction as originally intended, the AHH in COPE program still
require an interventionist policy for long-term benefits rather than the condi-
tional cash transfer.
In Chapter 13 by Wilhelmina J. Donkoh, “A comparative analysis of inci-
dence of poverty in three urban centers in Ghana from 1945 to 1990,” the focus
of the chapter is a comparative study of three urban phenomena: diet, disease,
and health issues. Here Donkoh analyzes the level of poverty in three selected
urban centers in Ghana characterized by the growth of industrialization. The
chapter is a reflection on the nature and incidence of poverty in the three cites of
Accra, kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi from the colonial to the postcolonial
period up until 1990. The chapter begins with an introduction and continues with
a demographic analysis of the patterns and changes during the period. Donkoh
argues that attempts by the colonial and postcolonial governments to bring social
and economic services for the benefit of the poor to the urban centers in the
selected cities failed. Instead, they caused these areas to further deteriorate into
centers of poverty, social deprivation, and lack of access to essential goods, ser-
vices, credits, and opportunities for growth. Furthermore, the author implies that
the incidence of poverty in the selected cities seemed to represent the rest of
Ghana in broad strokes during the period. Donkoh also re-examines these
“complex,” “heterogeneous,” and “phenomenal” changes that led to the growth
of poverty in the cities side by side with government intervention towards
improvement such as the national management of external debt, Operation Feed
Yourself (OFY), and the policy of self-reliance. However, she observes that, of
the three cities identified, the cost of living was lower in Kumase than in Accra
and Sekondi-Takoradi. In all of these places the incidence of poverty has escal-
ated with the emergence of informal settlements (squatter system) side by side
with a wide variety of informal economic activities sometimes dictated by
gender divisions.
14 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
Part III of the volume, “Dimensions of poverty in East and Southern Africa,”
comprises three interrelated chapters on land and agriculture. Martin S.
Shanguhyia focuses on the future of land reforms in kenya. From East Africa,
Shanguhyia examines three related issues of National politics, land-induced
poverty, and the future of land reforms in kenya. In the argument, land is placed
at the center of kenya’s political and economic development initiatives since
independence. He shows how the elites in kenya have politicized the land factor
to their own advantage, leaving the vast majority of the people in poverty as a
result of “landlessness.” The author organizes the chapter under five sub-
headings. The first begins with the politics of land reforms in Africa and a syn-
opsis of the kenya context. It shows that government has undermined equity in
land distribution, thereby contributing to the emergence of “landlessness” in
kenya and the general impoverishment of the people. The second section ana-
lyzes the historical dimensions of evasive land settlement programs in kenya as
a colonial creation inherited by the postcolonial government which is deteriorat-
ing. The author particularly interrogates the squatter problem, which featured
prominently in kenya’s independence manifestos of the kenya African Nation-
alist Union (kANU) and the kenya African Democratic Union (kADU). The
third section of the chapter captures the issues of politicization of land and land-
lessness, as political obstacles to equitable land distribution in kenya. This is
rendered in the fourth section as missed opportunities, and is indeed the crux of
the failure of land reform programs, which according to Shanguhyia is the most
significant factor in Kenya’s poverty analysis during the postcolonial period. The
fifth section of the chapter seeks lasting solutions to the problem through self-
empowerment: civil society and the quest for land reforms. The author argues
that although landlessness and related socioeconomic issues are political prob-
lems requiring political solutions, because generations of land reforms have
failed to yield the desired results, the best alternative is to resort to civil society
and similar organizations through which vulnerable groups in kenya can con-
front the seemingly hegemonic practices of the state that have for long impeded
reforms in property ownership. To make this succeed more rapidly, political
commitment, good self-governance, and the involvement of external donors as
well as continued expansion in political space will provide the desired support.
In Chapter 15, Luca Puddu examines the dialectics and paradigms of Western
modernization through large-scale land acquisition and mainstream development
theory and control of the political space in Ethiopia. This chapter provides a
historical approach to the explanation of rural development in the Ethiopian bor-
derlands, which the author observes is fundamental to a better understanding of
the contemporary processes of rural modernization in the region. For the purpose
of this analysis, both primary and secondary sources are used. He collected
primary sources from the archives of the World Bank Group, the National
Archives and Record Administration at Maryland, the Food and Agricultural
Organization, and the National Archives of Great Britain at kew Gardens. The
author analyzes the World Bank-financed Humera Agricultural Project under-
taken between 1969 and 1974 in the northwestern lowlands of Ethiopia, East
 Introduction 15
Africa. Puddu attempts to show that the intentions of Western donors in the
project were purely for economic reasons to appropriate foreign capital and tech-
nologies to strengthen their claim over the contested border and transform de
jure sovereignty into de facto territorial control. The author further examines
how the country was opened up to foreign investments as part of the current
spate of “land grabbing” throughout Africa and the unresolved tensions between
state land tenure and primitive accumulation. The chapter is divided into four
sections. The first discusses the possibility of applying the paradigm of extraver-
sion to the trajectory of state formation in modern Ethiopia. It also provides a
short overview of the process of political centralization undertaken by Haile
Selassie after 1941. The second section focuses on the Setit Humera region in
northwestern Ethiopia and the intended outcomes of the World Bank-financed
Humera Agricultural Project. The third section describes how foreign technolo-
gies and financial flows were appropriated by the imperial regime to realize
goals other than those expected by foreign patrons. The final section highlights
the similarities between past and contemporary patterns of government interven-
tions in the western lowlands, providing a short picture of development policies
in the Gambella Regional State. Among other things, Puddu attempts a descrip-
tive analysis of territorial sovereignty and agrarian development from the
Western modernist approach within which he situates the Ethiopian territorial
development of the World Bank-financed Humera Agricultural Project in cotton
production.
The chapter concludes that the modernization process of cotton production
and capital accumulation has not empowered or brought about any meaningful
development to the local people where the project sites were located. Therefore,
as Puddu argues, Western donors should depart from a rational choice of theor-
etical models and take cognizance of the fact that economics is deeply embedded
in politics, as is clearly demonstrated in the context of land acquisition for cotton
production in western Ethiopia. This approach would help build a better under-
standing of local realities and prevent the failure of new rural poverty through
the model of Western modernization strategies.
Affirmative action is one of the most heated debates and current issues in the
political economy of the subcontinent, and is the focus of Elijah M. Baloyi’s dis-
cussion in Chapter 16. The author particularly relates the issue as a theological
problem under the new democratic praxis in South Africa by examining the
concept of “affirmative action” in contemporary South Africa and the practical
efforts to redress the imbalances orchestrated by the previous policies of the
apartheid regime. It is aimed at retaining and giving opportunities to previously
disadvantaged groups who suffered most as a result of segregation and discrimi-
natory laws. Affirmative action should be applied in government departments,
private companies, and by other stakeholders to review and correct the injustices
of the past and as a reconciliatory move in the region. Although this action has
been embraced by the majority of the people in the country, some people still
have mixed feelings about it and even argue against it. Some people call it
reversed apartheid, while others see the process as a political vendetta against
16 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
those who benefitted from the previous imbalances of the apartheid regime.
Baloyi’s analysis is divided into five main sections. The first provides general
background information on what the concept of affirmative action is and how it
is practiced in contemporary South Africa. The second section is situated within
the context of those who argue against the practice of affirmative action in South
Africa. The third section is a critical assessment of the application of affirmative
action in South Africa and what the nation stands to gain if the principle is truly
applied, accepted, and put to work in South Africa; The fourth section looks at
the necessity of equitable redistribution of wealth in South Africa, using biblical
examples. The concluding fifth section provides pastoral theological guidelines
on the restoration of human dignity in post-apartheid South Africa.

Conclusion
It is imperative to reflect briefly on the main achievements of this book. One is
that it is a contribution to the debate on poverty in contemporary Africa from
fresh perspectives in a way that the existing literature has not done, either in
historical depth or by way of multidimensional approaches. By extension, the
book provides major contributions on issues of Africa’s sustainable develop-
ment, which is invariably linked to poverty and food insecurity in the continent.
Thus, it will not only attract general readers who are interested in the con-
temporary African crises, but also how to resolve the challenges confronting the
people of the continent. The book will be equally useful to public institutions
and most libraries. Furthermore, as a focus on different aspects of poverty in
contemporary Africa, the book will likely make it a double attraction to people
of diverse interests, especially African historians, political scientists, military
historians, as well as scholars of international relations.
The book is equally significant for attempting to answer one fundamental
question regarding sustainable development in contemporary Africa: Why does
Africa remain so poor, long after the departure of the European colonial domi-
nation and in the midst of so many natural resources? Each of the chapters in
the volume has successfully brought the reader closer to the required solution by
providing useful insights and variegated data from different regions of the conti-
nent towards the panacea for Africa’s poverty crises, which constitutes the
central argument of the book. This is a threat to the overall achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals (MGDs), now replaced by the UN’s Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), due to the inability of MDGs to reduce the world
poverty level by half according to the UN Millennium Declaration ending in
2015. It has become a matter of double imperative that the world should indeed
be thinking more seriously about the morality of hunger and poverty and how to
achieve the desired sustainable growth and development in contemporary Africa
than ever before. And this indeed, inter alia, is what this book stands for.
Beyond commonplace argument, the volume has provided a clearer view on
poverty in contemporary Africa from which definite public policy frameworks
and implementation could be articulated and, if properly done, under strong
 Introduction 17
political will by the people and governments of Africa, the continent will be in a
better position to move forward from its current quagmire towards reasonable
progress and sustainable development. Furthermore, it is on this note that the
volume has raised a number of important caveats regarding policy formulation in
Africa, namely the need to direct such policies towards the poor in particular who
constitute the vast majority of the African population. This should be done in a
way that is consistent with the implementation of such policies towards reason-
able poverty reduction, as well as the need to carefully reorder the weak and
jagged rhythms of too many poverty reduction policies in the continent in line
with the new concerns raised in this volume. Undoubtedly, most authors have
raised a central question of considerable importance to the debate on Africa’s sus-
tainable development by focusing on the neglected aspects of poverty crises in
contemporary Africa, thereby taking the debate to the next level. These aspects
are reflected in several case studies and incidences of poverty in Africa in this
volume, ranging from the problem of land acquisition/grabbing and “the politics
of emulation” in East Africa, capitalist advancement and the failure of foreign aid
in Africa, to different manifestations of poverty in selected cities in postcolonial
Ghana, to abuse of the elderly in Nigeria, etc. Indeed, this book bequeaths to the
reader a new consciousness about poverty in contemporary Africa and the neces-
sity for fresh initiatives by the people and government of the continent and the
world community on how best to approach poverty in contemporary Africa.
The implication of all this is that if the past approaches were inadequate and
new dimensions of poverty are emerging, as is clearly set forth in this volume,
so much more is required from contemporary governments in Africa to deal with
the persistent problems of the continent. For the governments and people of
Africa to connect to the global community effectively, there is a need for proac-
tive institutional regimes to deal decisively with the enigma of political corrup-
tion which, as the volume has shown, is the biggest hurdle to Africa’s sustainable
development. Another implication of the volume is the call by several contrib-
utors to refurbish the dilapidated infrastructural facilities throughout the conti-
nent as a basis for Africa’s development trajectory. Finally, the chapters in this
debut volume have shown that there is room for optimism regarding the process
of African sustainable development and, indeed, the future of Africa is brighter
now than it was in the past. Should any of those who did not do so before now
believe in Africa’s sustainable development chance to read this book and decide
to change their minds positively with rising faith in a new contemporary Africa
without poverty, may they indeed count that as a contribution of this volume to a
new Africa.

References
Ayittey, G.B.N. Africa Unchained: The Blueprint of Africa’s Future, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005.
Claderisi, R. The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aids Isn’t Working, London: Yale
University Press, 2007.
18 M.O. Odey and T. Falola
Collier, P. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be
Done About it, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
klugman, J. (ed.) A Source Book for Poverty Reduction Strategies, volumes I and II,
Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002.
McCord, G., Sachs, J.D., and Wing Thye Woo. Understanding African Poverty: Beyond
the Washington Consensus to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) Approach.
Paper presented at the conference on Africa in the Global Economy: External Con-
straints, Regional Integration, and the Role of the State in Development and Finance
organized by the Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD), held at the South
African Reserve Bank, Pretoria, June 13–14, 2005 (December 19, 2005).
Reinert, E.S. How Rich Countries Got Rich […] and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor,
London: Constable & Robinson, 2010.
Sachs, J.D. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time, London:
Penguin, 2005.
Part I
Dimensions and
assessments of poverty
reduction policies and
programs in sub-Saharan
Africa
1 Poverty in postcolonial Africa
The legacy of contested perspectives
Sati U. Fwatshak

Introduction: facts and “fragile consensus” on contemporary

Africa’s poverty
William G. Mosely’s Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial African
Issues1 seems to summarize the scholarship on postcolonial Africa, as debates
persist about the continent’s problems. Thus, about or slightly more than 50
years after a majority of African states gained political independence in the
1960s, only the fact that the continent is poverty-stricken enjoys a strong con-
sensus; the causes of the problem enjoy only a “fragile consensus,” while sim-
mering debates – dating back several centuries – bestride the theme. In 2013,
Toyin Falola, Maurice Amutabi, and Sylvester Gundona captured the simmering
debates when they wrote that some people believe that blaming colonialism is
now off the point, but that Africa still “needed to recover and heal from the
effects of colonial violence and trauma.”2 The major lines of division are debates
between those who argue that the principal problem is external and those who
argue that it is internal.3 In this section, I outline the facts of poverty in postcolo-
nial Africa and highlight the emerging consensus on the problem.
The facts of poverty in postcolonial Africa have been widely documented in
comments and statistics provided by organizations and individuals. According to
Noah Attah, poverty has lasted for too long on the continent; it is being domest-
icated in its southward move on the globe.4 Toyin Falola identifies economic
decline and stagnation, mass deprivation, destitution/refugee crises, misery, and
mass poverty as common features on the continent.5 According to the Council
for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)’s 2011
claim, poverty and “food insecurity” were common among Africans at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century.6 George Ayitteh argues that “African countries
[have] compete[d] for the lowest distinctions” in the UN annual Human Devel-
opment Indexes since 1990.7
In the 2014 UN Human Development Report or Development Plan (UNDP),
34 of the 45 poorest and lowest ranked countries were in Africa; Asia, the
Middle East, and Latin America shared the remaining 11 low-ranking slots.
No African country was among the 49 countries with very high human develop-
ment, led by Norway; only five African countries – Libya (55), Mauritius (63),
22 S.U. Fwatshak
Seychelles (71), Tunisia (90), and Algeria (93) – were among the 52 countries
ranked as high. Only 11 African countries – Botswana (109), Egypt (110),
Gabon (112), South Africa (118), Cape Verde (123), Namibia (127), Ghana
(138), Congo Republic (140), Zambia (141), Sao Tome and Principe (142), and
Equatorial Guinea (144) made it in the medium category out of a total of 42
countries.8
The 2014 UN Human Development Report on Africa’s poverty is consistent
with the continent’s poverty trend between 1980 and 2012 on which the reports
have data.9 In the opening remarks to the summary of its year 2000 report, the
World Bank stated:

[D]espite gains in the second half of the 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa (Africa)
enters the 21st century with many of the world’s poorest countries. Average
income per capita is lower than at the end of the 1960s. Incomes, assets, and
access to essential services are unequally distributed. And the region con-
tains a growing share of the world’s absolute poor, who have little power to
influence the allocation of resources. Moreover, many development prob-
lems have become largely confined to Africa.10

The statistical data, which have been fairly consistent since the 1960s, speak for
themselves. Seven African countries failed to grow by 7 percent as predicted at
independence. Instead, since 1960, many African countries have suffered neg-
ative GDP growth. Caloric intake on the continent was lower than those of other
continents, including Latin America and East Asia.11 In the decade from 1960 to
1970, Africa had the lowest GNP per capita in the world and had 21 out of 30
least developed countries. In the 1980s, infrastructure collapse resulted in lower
health and educational attainments. By the mid-1980s, there were 120 million
extremely poor people in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). During the same period, the
number of extremely poor in East Asia was also 120 million but the index and
gap were 9 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively. Between 1983 and 1993, nearly
70 percent of Africa’s population fell below the poverty line. By 1990, sub-
Saharan Africa had a smaller though “disproportionate share of global poverty,”
while half of the world’s poor lived in Southeast Asia.12 In the mid-1990s, Africa
had 30 out of 49 low-income countries of the world; only seven out of 41
middle-income countries; only three out of 17 upper-middle-income countries;
and none among the 26 high-income countries in the world. Illiteracy rates in the
mid-1990s were in double digits: as high as 86 percent in Niger, 81 percent in
Burkina Faso, and 60 percent and above in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Burundi,
Mali, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire. Many African countries experienced negative
growth rates; none of those with positive rates of growth exceeded 5 percent.13
GNP per capita in the sub-region dropped from $664 in 1980 to $513 in 1998,
and in the whole of Africa the drop was from $749 in 1980 to $668 in 1998. The
number of Africans living below the poverty line on less than $1 per day rose
from 89.6 million in the late 1960s to 233.5 million in the late 1990s. Thus, in
the 1990s, when many African countries had been under Structural Adjustment
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 23
Programs (SAPs) for about a decade, absolute poverty figures rose five times
more in Africa than in Latin America and two times more than in South Asia.
Thus, Africa entered the new millennium with many of its citizens in absolute
poverty, manifested in poor primary education enrollment, high death rates
among infants, high incidences of disease, raging wars, declining export shares
for primary products, narrow resource bases, and the brain drain. At the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, 20 of the 24 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs) in the world were in Africa. In 2001, the 28 bottom countries in the UN
ranking were in SSA.14
Life expectancy declined from about 50 years in the mid-1990s to 48 years in
2003, and to 46 years in 2005, in contrast to above 60 years for other regions,
including Europe, Asia, and Latin America.15 The poverty situation was so bad
that in its 2003 report the UNDP postponed the possibility of Africa’s develop-
ment and movement out of poverty to the twenty-second century, believing that
it may achieve full Universal Primary Education (UPE) only in 2029; reduce the
poverty rate by half only in 2147; and lower the death rate among children by
two-thirds only in 2169.16 In 2009, Dambisa Moyo wrote that seven out of ten
failed states were in Africa; more than half of the African population lived below
the poverty line, earning less than $1 per day; and sub-Saharan Africa had half
of its population in abject poverty.17 In 2010, Noah Attah showed that the conti-
nent still led the world in poverty with 32 out of 40 least-developed countries in
the world.18 Ironically, the continent is rich in natural and human resources.
In spite of these facts, consensus on the causes of the problem remains
“fragile,” though unrelenting, as the stark division in the scholarship, between
externalists and internalists, has been diminishing. The “fragile consensus” recog-
nizes that both factors have been building.19 A few examples of perspectives that
represent the “fragile consensus” are worth mentioning. In his 1988 publication,
for instance, Bade Onimode, a Marxist and a major proponent of the externalist
argument, wrote that neither the liberal nor the Marxian interpretation of the
African problem provided complete explanations.20 Rather, according to him,
factors to blame are both internal and external: “the relations of exploitation,
domestic class structures, prostrate external dependence, and distortions of the
dominant neocolonial social formations in Africa” led to underdevelopment.21
Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O’meara made the point more explicitly in
1985, when they stated that some of the problems of postcolonial Africa are
historical and external – the slave trade, colonialism, and unfavorable and global
“economic problems.”22 Others are internal, for example, bad leadership, public
corruption,23 “varied traditions, ethnic loyalties, religious tensions, [and]
environmental characteristics.”24 Achebe and others, who are non-Marxists, add
to the above external problems and on the domestic plane blame aid dependence
and the adoption of non-African theories/concepts by leaders.25 Ayitteh, a major
proponent of the internalist factors, also recognizes the roles of the slave trade
and colonialism.26 According to him, “it would be impossible to calculate the
economic damage of the slave trade to the indigenous economies of West Africa
aside from the human loss,”27 and colonialism established artificial boundaries.28
24 S.U. Fwatshak
The World Bank, a key proponent of the internalist perspective, has also
increasingly recognized the externalist argument. In its 1994 and 2000 publica-
tions, the Bank puts the blame on both internal and external factors, such as poor
access to external markets and low prices for primary products, economic glo-
balization, and the increasing marginalization of Africa, “interventionist” and
strings-tied donor policies, and short-term macro-economic reforms, among
others.29 According to Kado and Panford, internal and external socioeconomic
and political factors include “colonial rule and […] inherited colonial problems”;
for example, inadequate and poor infrastructure, poor skilled human capital, illit-
eracy, dependence on a narrow range of exports, bad economic management,
civil and ethnic conflicts/wars, illnesses, and so on.30
Toyin Falola, also a non-Marxist, in his various works draws attention to the
two-way context of the African crisis: external problems of dependency and
colonialism, a hostile external environment, rapid population increase, and elite
politics and bad leadership, among others.31 In its 2011 summit, CODESRIA lent
its voice to the two-way dimensions of the problem. To this extent, it lists the
internal factors as:

[R]apid urbanisation, the national question, regional integration, gender

inequality, food insecurity, violent conflict, political fragmentation, and the
fact of occupying a subaltern position in the global community, and in
global governance […] the continent’s inability to keep pace with the rapid
advances in science and technology, including […] biotechnology and nan-
otechnology, genetic engineering.

External factors recognized by CODESRIA include “complex neoliberal globali-

zation, changes in intercultural relations at the global level, climate change […]
the ICTs revolution.”32 Being a “fragile consensus,” points of emphasis in the
causes of African poverty have resisted resolution; the internalist and externalist
debates remain on the table of scholarship. The section that follows historicizes
the debates, showing that, indeed, they have been going on for too long.

The internalist perspective

The internalist viewpoint, which has been loudest since the end of the Cold War,
is that external historical factors such as the slave trade and colonialism are too
remote justifications for postcolonial Africa’s malaise. Instead, internalists argue
that domestic issues are the more potent factors. These include bad leadership,
conflicts, natural disasters, ethnic loyalties and ties, family and regional obliga-
tions, “corruption,” “incompetence,” “mismanagement,” “nepotism,” and clien-
tele.33 I use as examples of the internalist argument the works of Joshua Agbo,
Dambisa Moyo, Paul Collier, George Ayitteh, Basil Davidson, and the World
Bank. Because each emphasizes different aspects of the problem, I take them
individually.
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 25
Joshua Agbo’s self-inflicted pain thesis
In his contribution to the internalist causation for Africa’s problems and poverty,
Joshua Agbo argues that Africans are to blame for the current crises and poverty
on the continent34 because “Africa has bewitched” and underdeveloped
“herself ”35 in the following ways: theft and mismanagement of public funds;
voluntary out-migrations (the Mfecane and the Great Trek); African participa-
tion in the slave trade; internal conflicts; and abuse of power by leaders.36 Abuse
of power has wider implications: injustice, inhumanity, favoritism, the pursuit of
sectional, ethnic, and other parochial interests, oppression and suppression of
opponents, rule by a few, and deadly competition for power characterize the con-
tinent. Agbo joins issues with externalists who blame colonialism by arguing
that Latin American and Asian countries were also colonized but are more
developed than African countries, including Ethiopia which escaped formal
colonialism.37 In addition, he argues that the colonialists were more developmen-
talist than postcolonial African leaders because they diversified the African eco-
nomies and enacted and enforced development laws like the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act (CDWA), labor laws to protect workers, and
minimum and higher wage laws. Conversely, African leaders failed to diversify
their economies and instead relied heavily on foreign aid, which led to indebted-
ness.38 Agbo’s proposed solution is socialism as well as the removal of old
regimes and orientating the people.39
Agbo is correct in pointing out that corruption and bad leadership seriously
complicate postcolonial Africa’s poverty profile. However, he errs in some spe-
cific details. Clearly, Agbo does not understand the difference between the
Mfecane (the Zulu expansionist wars) and the Great Trek (Boer inland migration
from the Cape Coast to escape British colonialism). With respect to the slave
trade, though Africans sold Africans in the slave trade, the complicity of Europe-
ans cannot be ignored and the transaction reduced to normal trade. His argument
for socialism is similar to those of Claude Ake and Bade Onimode who wrote
during the Cold War when Marxism-Leninism was popular. Moreover, the adop-
tion of socialism in many African countries following independence did not pull
them through.

Stanley C. Igwe’s bad leadership and corruption thesis

Stanley C. Igwe, also writing in 2010, argues that blaming colonialism for Afri-
ca’s woes is out of place because, according to him, Africa was not developed
prior to the slave trade and colonialism, Africans were not literate, and they
lacked knowledge of how to plow and make the wheel. In this context, colonial-
ism only made it harder for Africans to develop but did not originally cause
Africa’s underdevelopment.40 According to Igwe, “the major culprits of Africa’s
destruction today, are AFRICANS themselves, namely, Africa’s leadership.”41
Leadership in postcolonial Africa lacks a development agenda; it is largely
ignorant and impoverishes the people; it is dictatorial, kleptocratic, corrupt,
26 S.U. Fwatshak
transfers stolen wealth abroad, and spends more on arms transfers, as corruption
is widespread on the continent while followership is in a state of apathy. In addi-
tion, bad leadership on the continent has led to a low “innovative value system,”
a crisis of identity, “poor industrialization policy,” and “poor diplomacy.”42 Bad
leadership has also engaged in competition for control of natural resources, as
was the case with the Paul Kagame–Yoweri Museveni conflict of interest in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Tigrayan brothers’ (Isaias
Afewerki–Meles Zenawi) conflicts symbolized in the border wars between
Eritrea and Ethiopia.43 Corruption, which features high on the list of leadership
failures, has led to negative impacts that are mutually reinforcing and include
economic lag, poverty, wars, ethnic conflicts, armed robberies, kidnapping,
internet crimes, rape, and immorality.44 At the macro level, corruption erodes
public confidence in an organization, destroys efficiency in such an organization,
and eventually discourages investors, among other problems.45
According to Stanley Igwe, Africa can develop by having leaders who integ-
rate African values into their development paradigms, are accountable, industri-
alize the continent, and are not corrupt.46 In terms of strategy, he suggests that all
state governments should establish old people’s homes staffed by professionals;
provide education loans for students of higher institutions; create special funds
for newborn babies; and create an unemployment database, establish refineries,
and reduce corruption.47
Igwe’s argument on bad leadership aligns with existing scholarship, since bad
leadership and corruption (as complicating factors in the continent’s poverty)
have received due scholarly attention. Scholars have documented brutal dictator-
ship (military and civilian), strangulation of multiparty democracy and lengthy
rule by individual leaders, and corruption in postcolonial Africa’s leadership
profiles.48 He is, however, wrong in claiming that Africans were not literate and
did not know about the plow before colonialism. Some were literate and used the
plow; for example, North Africans. His argument that Africans were poor prior
to colonialism is also a wrong generalization; it also ignores the role of the pre-
colonial slave trade. However, his proposals which suggest a wide range of roles
for government, except for the welfare aspects, may not be in tandem with the
current realities of market-led economies.

Dambisa Moyo’s Aid Curse49

Dambisa Moyo argues that the most important cause of poverty on the continent
is dependence on foreign aid. According to her, since the 1940s, Africa has been
given a total of $1 trillion in aid, and that aid accounted for up to 90 percent of
Africa’s net income between 1987 and 1996.50 However, according to her,
instead of generating development, poverty increased from 11 percent to 66
percent between 1970 and 1998, the peak periods of aid receipts.51 Aid has
caused Africa’s poverty by creating corruption (aid theft by African leaders);
by increasing indebtedness (being an interest-based loan); by fueling internal
conflicts among the elite competing for aid control; and by creating loss of
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 27
sovereignty to donors. Moyo argues that Africa can still get out of poverty in
52

several ways, including copying the examples of the Nordic countries that used
market economic principles to achieve a socialist agenda;53 abandoning aid;
issuing short-term, ten-year, interest-guaranteed bonds; establishing and operat-
ing microfinance schemes following the example of Mohammed Yunus in Bang-
ladesh; and by the African Diaspora making home remittances.54
Moyo’s argument accords with that of Asante and the World Bank, among
others. According to Asante, aid is good but its current administration has been
“counterproductive”; has caused rising indebtedness; and “acute balance of
payment problems and severe restrictions upon the conduct of domestic
policy.”55 The World Bank heavily criticized donor countries for forcing aid
recipients to spend aid monies on items to be purchased from the donor countries
and for tying aid to conditions, which allow them to control the administrations
of recipient countries, thus weakening African countries’ capacities.56
I agree with Moyo that Africa needs to eliminate corruption and become less
aid-dependent.57 In respect of her proposed solutions, however, the problem is
whether what worked for Nordic countries can still work for Africa. A related
problem is that since aid is not free money but a loan to be repaid, how can
Africa avoid indebtedness if it does not use aid for economically vibrant
production?

Paul Collier’s four traps58

According to Paul Collier, poverty and other problems in poor countries, led by
Africa, have four causes, called traps: conflicts, natural resource dependence,
being landlocked, and bad governance.59 According to him, up to 70 percent of
poor countries have either experienced or are experiencing one type of conflict
or another which affects economic performance – they reduce growth and devel-
opment by 2.3 percent.60 Natural resource dependence inhibits growth because it
leads to the Dutch Disease, bureaucratic inefficiencies, rentierism, and clientele
politics.61 Many African countries are landlocked (as are many other countries
around the world); however, they suffer from bad neighborliness, which means
they have neighbors that are either poor or engulfed in conflicts, or both.62
African countries are poorly governed, have poor tax regimes, possess few trans-
port facilities, and suffer macro-economic instability.63
Collier suggests various ways out for Africa. These include donor countries
increasing aid support on condition that recipients carry out reforms and that aid
be given in phases; the establishment of a maximum of ten years’ external
military intervention in failed states; the enactment and enforcement of inter-
national laws and codes that are appropriate to the level of development of the
poor countries; and liberalization of trade in which the G8 are to remove trade
barriers against poor countries’ products and grant them temporary protection
against Asian-produced products. The World Trade Organization, he adds,
should reform its roles in international trade, and poor countries should diversify
their economies and export bases.64
28 S.U. Fwatshak
Collier’s four traps are valid in the context of the continent’s postcolonial
experiences. Several works validate his conflict trap; for instance, incidences of
communal conflicts, civil wars, and border conflicts have been widely docu-
mented. Civil wars were fought in Nigeria, Chad, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda,
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Angola, instigated or caused often by external powers.
International conflicts based on border disputes occurred between Ethiopia and
Somalia over Ogaden; between Angola and DRC; between Uganda and Tanza-
nia; in western Sahara; French and Libyan troops were involved in the Chad
conflicts; and there were wars of subversion in Southern Africa.65 However, the
four traps are not exhaustive causes of the problem. His proposal that aid be
increased aligns with that of the World Bank’s 2000 report.
With regard to the first strategy, Collier, like many authors, has shown that
aid money has led to corruption. Therefore, what is the guarantee that condi-
tional aid will not be stolen? With respect to military intervention, from a poor
country’s perspective, the ten years of international military intervention in the
bottom countries is capable of being misread as a reintroduction of the discred-
ited re-colonization debate.66 Many African countries are signatories to several
international codes on human rights but they have not complied. How can new
codes work? Trade liberalization by the rich countries has been going on in
various contexts. Examples include the old Lome Convention, the USA’s
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, extended to 2015, and
Europe’s Everything But Arms (EBA), also of 2000. The new liberalization in
favor of poor countries is over ten years old, but Africa’s poverty rating has not
declined. I, however, share Collier’s opinion that the rich countries need to do
more to help Africa in several ways.

George Ayitteh’s bad leadership and “statism” thesis

There are three principal causes of poverty in contemporary Africa, according to
George Ayitteh. These are bad leadership, the state apparatus (statism), and the
environment.67 The problem of bad leadership, according to Ayitteh, manifests
in the old generation of postcolonial Africa’s leaders who adopted Western
foreign development ideologies and practices but who were non-performing and
corrupt; lacked vision, lacked a proper understanding of capitalism and social-
ism; and did not properly understand democracy (and so became power-drunk,
repressive, dictatorial, perpetuated themselves in power as life presidents, and
claimed that democracy was alien to Africa). They also neglected the rural peas-
ants (the “Atingas”), who lacked a political voice and became victims of ruling
elite oppression and exploitation, and victims of HIV/AIDS, civil wars, and
famines.68 They also abandoned indigenous institutions and practices, including
dress modes, educational institutions, lifestyles, and economies like the free
market for foreign ones such as statism in its various forms. To this extent, they
culturally betrayed their citizens.69
According to Ayitteh, the solution to Africa’s problems should come from
within and not outside Africa because “[o]nly Africans can save Africa.”70
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 29
He proposes economic, social, and political reforms in this direction. Some of
the major economic reforms include recourse to Africa’s indigenous institutions
– free enterprise, village markets, and trade – as well as investment and innova-
tion in cottage industries/indigenous technologies.71 Major social reforms include
provision of basic infrastructures; overhaul of the old system by repairing
broken-down institutions – security, bureaucracy, financial, electoral, and legal;
and by cleaning up and changing the bad leadership. Political reforms include
the incorporation of traditional institutions into governance structures, adoption
of the bottom-up development approach focusing on peasants, and the use of
Village Development Committees/Councils (VDCs).72 These align with his
earlier proposals in 1992 in which he identified the solutions as good leadership;
an enabling political infrastructure and social stability;73 ending corruption; the
adoption of financial discipline; ending dictatorship; intellectual reform by per-
mitting intellectual, expressive, and political freedom; and a return to indigenous
systems.74
Ayitteh’s proposals are good in the sense that Africans need to define and be
involved with their own future by finding an appropriate role for indigenous
systems. Some of the Asian countries (e.g., Japan and China) benefitted from
their Confucian ethics in establishing political stability. They also align with the
ideas of other scholars, such as P. Thandika Mkandawire and Charles Chuk-
wuma Soludo, who earlier on in 1999 argued that Africa should look inward and
adopt a market economy, but differed from Ayitteh by proposing a stronger role
for the state.75 However, Ayitteh’s idea that Africa can only be saved by Afri-
cans is controversial. For example, the role of outsiders was significant in the
development of some Asian countries.76 His statism argument is old.77 Moreover,
the condemnation of all state policies is not justifiable in every case. In the case
of Nigeria and Kenya, for example, the state stepped up local capital by creating
enabling environments for the emergence of local bourgeoisies, although in the
case of Nigeria Biersterker has shown that multinational corporations (MNCs)
fought indigenization laws.78

Basil Davidson’s nation-state curse thesis

Basil Davidson argues that postcolonial Africa’s critical problem is the coloni-
ally established nation-state, which resulted in the following problems. First, it
shackled Africa’s development due to the small size; unproductive economies;
and the exploitative, bad, and corrupt leadership character of the states.79 Second,
indigenous institutions were abandoned in favor of foreign ones, including life-
styles, socialism, and educational institutions, instead of indigenous ones.80
Third, it favored the elite, who fostered ethnicity and “kinship corporations”
leading to recourse to “tribalism or clientelism” by the majority81 with disastrous
consequences for the sustenance of democracy.82
In Davidson’s opinion, the solutions lie in two things Africa needs to do: to
build a “post-imperialist politics of participatory self-commitment” and to estab-
lish an appropriate post-imperialist state similar to the European Union (EU),
30 S.U. Fwatshak
building on the examples of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in
Africa, which aim to gradually take apart the colonially established nation-state,
and to introduce a region-wide framework of participatory structures.83 There is
some merit in Davidson’s mega-state proposal. A mega state can yield political
strength in a large market. However, although Africa has yet to implement this
structure, there is no guarantee that a mega African state would actually be post-
imperialist. A new state structure without a strong productive base cannot make
the state viable. Besides, there are various obstacles along the way. Since the
events leading to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in
1963 through to today, the strong attachment of individual states to their former
colonial masters, especially as in French Africa, as well as the personal ambi-
tions of different African leaders, remain tough challenges in the way of a mega
African state.

The World Bank84

Until its 2000 report, the World Bank was the leading proponent of the internal
causation for postcolonial Africa’s failures and poverty. In its Elliot Berg-
supervised report of 1981, the Bank argued that poor internal economic and
administrative policies were responsible for the continent’s failures. These
included: industrialization based on poorly organized, inefficient, import substitu-
tion industrialization; poor exchange rates; poor tax, wage, and export crop pol-
icies; and excessive and inefficient bureaucracies.85 In its 1994 report, the Bank
claimed that the most significant causes of Africa’s economic troubles were inter-
nally generated wrong or poor macro-economic and sectoral policies. These
included state-led development manifested in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
import substitution industrialization; protectionism; foreign exchange regulations;
and tax regimes unfavorable to peasant production. Additional problems included
a poor human resource profile and deteriorating and poor-quality leadership due
to the emergence of authoritarian, centerist rulers, especially in the 1970s and
1980s. All of these factors, the Bank argued, resulted in macro-economic instab-
ility, budget deficits, and poor economic performance.86
The World Bank’s 1994 report proposed that postcolonial Africa adopt
macro-economic reforms for its growth, development, and movement out of
poverty. Based on the Washington Consensus of the World Bank, IMF, and the
U.S. Treasury Department, the World Bank insisted that only market-led policies
could help Africa. But before then, many African countries, one after the other,
from the late 1970s through to the 1980s, had adopted macro-economic reforms
called Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).87 Several researchers have
shown that the SAPs failed to take Africa out of the woods. For example, in
their book Our Continent, Our Future, Thandika Mkandawire and Charles
Soludo examine Africa’s adoption of World Bank and IMF SAPs and concluded
that the SAPs had failed to put the continent on the path of growth and develop-
ment, and so did not eradicate poverty.88 Joseph Stiglitz has also criticized the
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 31
liberalization policies of the Washington institutions, arguing that there are few
but very slow encouraging results from liberalization. Austerity measures pro-
duced crises, growth was short-lived, and job losses replaced job creation. Those
countries cited as success stories, such as Botswana, Ethiopia, and Uganda, actu-
ally “followed strategies that were markedly different from those of the Wash-
ington Consensus.”89 According to Falola, SAPs became a new form of
colonialism, causing more poverty.90 A country like Nigeria degenerated from a
middle-income country in the pre-SAP period to a poor country after implement-
ing the SAPs.
Although in 2000 the World Bank significantly modified its stand on the
causes of poverty in Africa by also blaming external factors, it remained
unrelenting in blaming internal factors. On the external side, it heavily criticized
globalization and donor aid conditionality for worsening economic conditions in
Africa. Its points on the internal side remained similar to those proposed in
earlier years, as new issues were identified. These included poor macro-
economic policies, a narrow range of exports, rapid population growth, poor
quality and access to social amenities such as education and health, and income
and gender inequality.91 By identifying with the two sides of the African conun-
drum, the Bank aligns itself with the emerging consensus that the problems of
postcolonial Africa reside both outside and inside the continent.
The internalist literature was partly a response to the externalist perspective
on postcolonial Africa’s problems as presented below.

The externalist perspective

The most significant cause of poverty and other problems in postcolonial Africa
according to externalists is imperialism – past and current. One or both ideology
and Afrocentericism first shaped the externalist perspective, as historicism
characterizes it. The ideological perspective tends towards Marxism; Afro-
centericism is a widely shared feature of Africanist writers; and historicism
characterizes all. I start with the Marxists.

Marxist/dependency scholars
Rooted in the nineteenth-century “drain theory” of Indian politician Dadabhai
Naoroji, elaborated later by V.I. Lenin,92 Gunder Frank,93 and Samir Amin,94
among others, Marxists and non-Marxists developed and sustained the theory
that Africa’s problem is one of underdevelopment occasioned by the continent’s
unequal relationship with the more developed powers. The underdevelopment
thesis is domesticated to Africa in the works of Kwame Nkurmah, Samir Amin,
Claude Ake, Bade Onimode, and Walter Rodney, among others.
Kwame Nkurmah and Samir Amin wrote extensively on neo-colonialism,
which they blame for postcolonial Africa’s quagmire. Both authors situate the
origin of neo-colonialism in colonialism. According to Nkurmah, whose work
appeared in 1966, the colonialists imposed their political constitutions (except in
32 S.U. Fwatshak
Ghana) and established forced unions on the colonial subjects.95 In its old and
current forms, neo-colonialism is characterized by the spread of the global
North’s influences: cultural and religious; the developed countries’ educational,
cultural, and social cooperation with less developed countries, which subverts
indigenous institutions, aid supplies, trade, and investments;96 the exploitation of
Africa’s natural/primary resources; and the adoption of former colonial powers’
currencies.97 Nkurmah’s thesis accords with his socialist ideology, which made
him a dictator. His writing also reflects the Cold War context in which he wrote.
Samir Amin’s focus was West Africa. His work with which I am concerned
appeared in 1971. Like Nkrumah, Amin argues that Africa’s “present problems”
have roots in the nineteenth98 and twentieth centuries. According to him, coloni-
alism caused Africa’s problems in the following ways. First, it led to the “West-
ernization” of Africa,99 while various forms of aid “prolonged […] dependence
beyond 1960.”100 Second, it laid the foundation for the postcolonial “outward-
directed” cash crop and mining extraction economies of West Africa;101 the con-
sequence was that it “inevitably leads, after a certain stage of growth, to a
permanent crisis in the budget and balance of payments.”102 Third, the division
of West Africa by the colonial powers produced pressures on the colonies and
postcolonies to “maintain colonial structures and policies and colonial ‘develop-
ment’,” all of which “irresistibly produce foreign domination and underdevelop-
ment.”103 Amin’s conclusions were based on the specific study of French West
Africa, especially Senegal. But the experiences of the former French colonies
are relatively similar to those of other African countries.
Claude Ake and Bade Onimode, among others, make similar arguments to
Nkurmah and Amin, to the extent that colonial and neo-colonial imperialisms
are the major causes of Africa’s poverty. Ake argues, therefore, that colonialism
underdeveloped Africa in a number of ways: integration of the continent’s eco-
nomies into the world capitalist system; unequal trade and destruction of local
crafts; foreign direct investments; export orientation of African economies; and
promotion of primary production, among others.104 The postcolonial African
economy has retained many of the essential features of its colonial predecessor.
It is disarticulated; monopolistic due to the rise and dominance of SOEs or
Public Enterprises (PEs); has a narrow resource base; lags behind in industriali-
zation; is financially (aid) and technologically dependent, in spite of dependency
reduction measures like indigenization in Nigeria and the Arusha Declaration in
Tanzania; and reflects basic contradictions in production relations in the rural–
urban, peasant–petty bourgeois economies.105 According to Ake, Africa should
end existing capitalist relations of production, which promote a syndrome of
dependency, and apply socialism,106 if the continent is to develop and move out
of poverty.
Like other Marxists, Onimode argues that postcolonial Africa is poor because
it is underdeveloped, since its “huge wealth has been plundered for the benefit of
non-Africans.”107 Structurally and historically, the problem has roots in external
exploitation and internal faulty “domestic class structures,” colonialism and
neo-colonialism;108 with respect to neo-colonialism, for example, he identifies
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 33
multinational corporations as major agents of Africa’s exploitation. Multination-
als dominate trade, mining, and manufacturing in Africa, thereby causing
dependency, failed industrialization, decapitalization through repatriated profits
and other economic transfers, weakness of indigenous entrepreneurs, and techno-
logical backwardness. Onimode also associates multinationals with unemploy-
ment, public corruption, political instability, and cultural decadence in Africa.109
In various ways, the multinationals cause capital flight.110 Onimode argues that
scientific socialism was the answer to Africa’s problems. Onimode’s arguments,
in a fundamental sense, are similar to those of Ake. Their views accord with
their Marxist orientations.
In the category of Marxist scholars, Walter Rodney provides a deeper histor-
ical explanation of Africa’s problems. According to him, postcolonial Africa’s
economic poor performance and poverty are caused by the exploitation and
underdevelopment of the continent over past centuries through the slave trade
and colonialism.111 According to Rodney, the transatlantic slave trade, which
started in the fifteenth century, marks the beginning of the great divergence
between Europe and Africa – hitherto at near par.112 Colonialism led to the
exploitation and expropriation of Africa’s natural resources through modern
infrastructures; payment of low wages to Africans; commercial domination by
expatriate firms; unequal trade between Africa and Europe; taxation; seizure of
peasants’ lands for European commercial farmers’ use; and poor attention paid
to the health and educational development of Africa, as the emphasis on educa-
tion produced low-level or semi-skilled manpower to assist colonial exploita-
tion.113 Appearing in 1972, Rodney’s book was one of the earliest attacks on the
colonial historiography of Africa and has since remained a basic text in history,
sociology, and political science disciplines in African universities. In a general
sense, Marxists’ works formed part of the Cold War debates.

Non-Marxists’ and the Rodney legacy of history dependence

Quite a number of non-Marxist Africanists follow Walter Rodney’s line of argu-
ment that the slave trade and colonialism are major complicating historical
factors in postcolonial Africa’s poverty. Many Africanist scholars agree that the
slave trade impacted negatively upon Africa from the point of the continent’s
demographic and economic stagnation and political instability.114 The colonial
damage thesis is exemplified by the works of Crowford Young,115 Toyin
Falola,116 Felix Ekechi,117 Erik Gilbert,118 Femi Kolapo,119 and Adam Hoch-
schild,120 among others. According to these scholars, colonialism also damaged
Africa by appropriating Africans’ land; by exploiting and expropriating the conti-
nent’s natural, fiscal, and labor resources; by using modern mass carrier transport
infrastructures; and by using native rulers as tax collectors and labor mobilizers,
among others. Because the arguments are quite similar and well known to
scholars, it is unnecessary to take them one by one. However, Hochschild’s
documentation of the Congo case under King Leopold’s rule before 1908 is
illustrative. Hochschild shows that brutal exploitation and impoverishment of
34 S.U. Fwatshak
Africans in that country manifested in confiscation by Leopold’s army of food
items from the natives, whose resistance was met with attacks and arson on their
villages; the abduction of local women as concubines by Belgian officials; forced
labor and slavery; the exploitation of elephants for ivory; the exploitation of
rubber, resistance to which cost natives their hands or lives; and the forced
cultivation of groundnuts, plantain, and cassava by peasants.121 Despite these,
heavy taxation and the destruction of local industries also characterized
Leopold’s rule.122 Thus, according to Basil Davidson, the colonialist claim to
developing Africa and “disbursing wealth in favor of the poor benighted blacks”
was not backed by “reliable statistical records of empire.”123 Rather, imperial
records show that Africa was exploited on an unprecedented scale.124

Does history matter now?

The debates between internalists and historical-structural externalists raise the
question of whether or not history matters. Contemporary internalists do not
deny the externalist claims in respect of the negative impacts of the slave trade
and of colonialism upon Africa. Their argument, however, is that these factors
should not count in explaining poverty and failures in postcolonial Africa
because they are too remote; in other words, “Some have called to an end to the
blame game.”125 Ayitteh is very loud on this point. He asserts that the externalist
arguments centering on the slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism/
imperialism, and the World Bank are off point, useless, and “kaput” because the
colonialism causation is too remote, while all the externalist causations only
helped the ruling elite hide their failures.126 In the 1990s he argued similarly,

Everyone recognizes the repugnance of the slave trade, colonization and

racism. But the obsession of many black leaders and intellectuals, as well as
whites in the West, with these past travesties invariably distorts their per-
ceptions of current problems so that they are incapable of making a dispas-
sionate, objective analysis.127

Earlier on in the 1980s, Achebe and others wrote that “Africa cannot be hunted
by its past.”128 Thus, internalists question whether African leaders were not in a
position to resist neo-colonialism using the political power they had gained at
independence.
For some, history still matters today. Accordingly, Crawford Young argues,
“Overall, the colonial legacy cast its shadow over the emergent African state
system to a degree unique among other major world regions.”129 The colonial
legacy manifests in neo-colonialism, which ensures that political, economic, cul-
tural, and military links are maintained with the former colonial power in the
best interest of the former master.130 Toyin Falola argues along similar lines. In
his view, the problems caused by colonialism in the economic and political
spheres were very deep and have persisted into the postcolonial period.131 Thus,
the wars and food shortages in postcolonial Africa have colonial roots in, for
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 35
example, the wars of conquest. The foundations of hunger and aid dependence
132

were laid in the colonial economy following the imposition of a cash crop
economy, exploitation of minerals, neglect of areas lacking natural resources, the
imposition of forced labor, and taxation.133 Many of the features of the colonial
state were inherited; for example, government by a small, imposed group who
pursue their own narrow interests.134 Lending his voice to the colonial legacy,
Ekechi argues, “the explanation for many of Africa’s persistent troubles – polit-
ical, social, and economic – can be found in the legacies of European colonial-
ism.”135 In a similar manner, Carter and O’meara have argued that although
colonialism has long passed, its “imprint” on the psychology of “post colonial
rulers, structures, and actions should not be underestimated.”136
While historians have been very loud in propagating the historical legacy,
non-historians have also tried to historicize the African drama and identify
historical, external causations. A.G. Hopkins refers to their efforts as the
“reversal of fortune” thesis. The scholars in this category blame the slave trade
and colonialism for Africa’s economic woes. They use the sixteenth century,
when the transatlantic slave trade began, as a baseline. The evils of slavery and
colonialism, they argue, created the crises of institutions and of institutional fail-
ures. Although Hopkins has faulted their methodology and empirical data, the
principal parameters they identify as the roots of the African problem – slavery
and colonialism – remain the same as those identified by historians.137 Patrick
Chabal also makes a strong case for using Africa’s past, especially external rela-
tions, unfavorable to Africa, as a framework for understanding postcolonial
Africa’s problems.138 The historical, externalist perspective was a response to
colonialist literature and propaganda that colonialism developed Africa and
therefore reduced poverty on the continent. The colonialist perspective is pre-
sented below.

Colonialists’ perspectives on colonialism as developmentalist

Colonial and Eurocentric writers claimed that European powers did the continent
good by colonizing it, by ending the slave trade, and by bringing civilization and
prosperity. The colonialist argument has roots in Article 6 in both the Berlin
Treaty and the Royal Niger Company (RNC) Charter. According to the Berlin
Treaty, all foreign powers colonizing Africa were obliged to preserve “the native
tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and
material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery and especially the Slave
Trade.”139 The RNC Charter committed the company to discourage and as far as
possible abolish domestic slavery and ownership of slaves by its employees.140
Reiterating the civilization agenda of colonial rule, Fredrick Lugard wrote,
“The British role here is to bring to the country all the gains of civilization by
applied science” to stop local rulers oppressing their people, and to inculcate in
them the importance of justice and a corrupt-free society.141 In his diaries,
Lugard described the King of Bussa on the Niger River as “a specially dirty
and mean looking savage, seated on a filthy and greasy carpet and Musnud,
36 S.U. Fwatshak
surrounded by a group of ordinary savages.” The king’s doors had “naked girls
and semi-nude women” gazing around while sheep, goats, and chickens moved
about freely in the compound.142 In effect, Lugard painted a picture of barbaric
and poor Africa, which Britain came to uplift.
Cecil Rhodes, the diamond magnate in South Africa, who served in South
Africa’s Cape Parliament and also as Prime Minister in the Cape Colony in the
1890s, was a firm believer in the development of Africa through British imperi-
alism.143 In his speeches, Rhodes argued that while the missionaries took it upon
themselves to be the “protectors of the natives,” the Dutch looked down upon
the “natives as animals.”144 Although putting himself out as the defender of
South African natives, Rhodes consistently argued that the natives were children,
“in a state of barbarism,” and “in a lower state of development.”145 He thus
advocated a system of separate living (apartheid) of blacks from whites.146
Rhodes chartered DeBeers, a company that was a significant force in British
imperialism in South Africa.147 European powers granted King Leopold of
Belgium the right to rule the Congo as a personal estate because he promised to
bring better government, development, and “humanitarian assistance” to the area
and to abolish the slave trade and slavery.148 Beyond mere intentions, colonial-
ists also believed and claimed that colonialism actually developed Africa.
According to Lugard, colonial rule benefitted Africans because the coming of
Europeans to Africa led to improved transportation and that education led to
material development. He added that colonial rule put an end to slavery; estab-
lished courts of law; inculcated in the natives a sense of individual responsib-
ility, of liberty, and of justice; taught native rulers how to apply civilized
principles; and saw to it that the system of education should be such as to
produce happiness and progress. Lugard concluded:

I am confident that the verdict of history will award high praise to the efforts
and achievements of Great Britain in the discharge of these responsibilities.
For, in my belief, under no ruler – be it of his own uncontrolled potentates,
or of aliens – does the African enjoy such a measure of freedom and of
impartial justice, or a more sympathetic treatment, and for that reason I am
a profound believer in the British Empire and its mission in Africa.149

Flora Shaw supports Lugard, arguing that colonialism brought civilization, law
and order, security, and an efficient justice system.150 In a typical vent-for-
surplus theory tone, Shaw argues that the tropical products had not been fully
developed to full capacity; some had “not been cultivated at all.”151 Some of the
products were still growing wild in the bush and were not being planted or har-
vested. Increased production of these products would be achieved if markets
were opened to play reciprocal roles: to serve as venues for sales of raw mater-
ials and also as avenues for industrial goods.
Several other works follow the colonialists’ perspective of colonialism as
developmentalist.152 Even before Africanist scholars began to challenge colonial-
ist historiography explorers like Roger Casement and E.D. Morel, who wrote
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 37
negative reports on Leopold’s rule in the Congo, disputed the colonialist devel-
opmentalist claims. Casement, for instance, reported that Leopold’s personal rule
led to the neglect of the natives in the provision of social amenities, forced labor,
requisition of animals for the meat needs of Leopoldville, ruthless killings (espe-
cially in the rubber economy), arson, and more.153 Morel echoed Casement and
reported on the ill-treatment of the natives (including their chiefs, women, and
children) through flogging, mutilation, imprisonment, heavy taxation by govern-
ment soldiers and government officials, depopulation due to incessant killings,
and the destruction of local industries.154 In addition, colonialist documents and
other writings contradicted colonialists’ developmentalist propaganda. For
instance, with respect to British colonization of the continent, Article 12 of the
Royal Niger Company (RNC) Charter empowered the company to acquire and
purchase, take by cession, and other legal means the

rights, interests, authorities, or powers of any kind or nature whatever, in,

over, or affecting other territories, land, or property in the region aforesaid,
and to hold, use, enjoy, and exercise the same for purposes of the company,
and on the terms of this Our Charter.155

However, in the final analysis, force, not the treaties, was the determining factor
in the colonization of Africa. According to Lugard, the defeat of France in the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the need for sources of raw materials and food
supplies by Germany, and the British need for areas of foreign investment,
among others, forced the three nations into colonialism.156 Many of the
colonies had

fertile land which already produces some the most necessary and valuable
raw materials of trade, cotton, silk, rice, rubber, sugar, coffee, tea, oils,
drugs, dyes and spices, gold and gems, and other important elements of civi-
lized industry, and home products of our tropics.157

The foregoing perspectives by colonialists and explorers show that the impact
of foreign rule upon Africa was an unsettled issue during colonialism. But what
was the economic status of Africa before colonialism? Debates also feature in
the scholarship.

Debating the poverty status of pre-colonial Africa

While earlier European explorers, missionaries, and scholars claimed that pre-
colonial Africa was generally poor, Arab writers and contemporary Africanist
scholars argue otherwise, as outlined below.
38 S.U. Fwatshak
European explorers’, missionaries’, and scholars’ “dark” and
“barbaric continent”
Up until the nineteenth century, Europeans did not have full knowledge of
Africa. Their writings tended not to distinguish between the pre- and post-slave
trade eras. While they had a fair knowledge of North Africa, which had for long
been closely attached to Europe,158 sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remained to be
“discovered.” Thus, in the Middle Ages, European knowledge about Africa
beyond the Canary Islands, especially SSA, was that of a dark, dreaded area
characterized by heavenly drops of liquid flame and boiling waters, rocking of a
serpent, and the large hand of Satan reaching up from the deep waiting to seize
its victim.159
Some Europeans depicted the inhabitants of Africa as abnormal beings. For
instance, a Benedictine clergy, Ranulf Higden, who drew a map of the world in
1350, asserted that “one-eyed people” who covered their heads with their legs
inhabited Africa. In the fifteenth century, a geographer claimed that Africans had
the heads of lions, three faces, and one leg. In the same century, an Italian priest
claimed that Africa was the home of a giant bird, “the roc.”160 These defective
and mythical views reflect the lack of knowledge and dominant Christian under-
standing of events characteristic of Europe at that time.
Fifteenth-century European explorers like Vasco da Gama and Diogo Cao of
Portugal, among others, reached SSA, especially the Congo, where Diogo Cao
observed the practices of polygamy and slavery. These observations provided
fertile ground for Christian missionary activities. However, some of the mission-
aries and later Portuguese traders became involved in the transatlantic slave
trade, which dominated SSA history between the fifteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries.161 However, European knowledge of African hinterlands remained that of
the land of “darkness.” Thus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when
Europeans revived their interest in Africa following the industrial revolution, the
European view of Africa was incomplete. The writings of scholars, explorers,
and missionaries of that period reflect European interest.
European scholars, explorers, and missionaries who wrote about SSA in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries depicted the sub-region, especially areas
beyond the coasts, as one that was barbaric, stagnating, undeveloped, and by
implication poor. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for instance, referred to coast-
land North Africa as “European Africa” and SSA as upland Africa or “Africa
proper.” SSA, according to him, was a land largely “shut up” to the other parts of
the globe,162 with some parts largely uninhabited; the interior marshlands, with
“luxuriant vegetation” inhabited by wild animals; and its peoples barbarians.163
Thus, according to him, the African exhibited “the natural man in his completely
wild and untamed state.”164 Hegelian Africans also lacked a sense of morality or
humanity. With the exception of the Muslims, they did not know God, were sor-
cerers, and worshipped fetishes. Africans, he added, were tyrannical, cannibalis-
tic, and engaged in internal slavery apart from the European enslavement of
Africans, as parents sold their children and vice versa. They were also lawless;
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 39
their kings extorted their people, but their subjects could also kill them.165 On this
basis, Hegel concluded, “This condition is capable of no development or culture,
and as we see them at this day, such have they always been.”166
Hegel’s views, which were not radically different from those of Diogo Cao,
were widely shared by Joseph Conrad in his novella The Heart of Darkness,
which described his journey on the River Congo as “like traveling back to the
earliest beginnings of the world, when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big
trees were kings.” He saw “an impenetrable forest,” the waterways were deserted,
while “hippos and alligators sunned themselves side by side.”167 Roger Casement,
in his report on the Congo Free State, was critical of Leopold’s rule in the Congo,
but he claimed that the natives by the late 1880s “lived their own savage lives in
anarchic and disorderly communities, uncontrolled by Europeans.”168
The dominant view of Africa in Europe in the nineteenth century, as exempli-
fied in the positions of Christian missionaries like Reverend W. Hughes, William
Booth, founder of the Salvation Army, and David Livingstone, among others,
followed the Hegel-Conrad model but with some modifications. According to
Hughes, Africa was the land of darkness, awash with barbarism and heathenism.
It needed the three Cs: Christianity, civilization, and commerce; it needed legiti-
mate trade in place of the “sinful” slave trade.169 The view that SSA was uncivil-
ized, backward, and, by implication, poor and in need of civilization was
robustly documented by explorers like David Livingstone and Henry Morton
Stanley who traversed East and Central Africa. Livingstone, the first European
to have widely traveled in Africa “from coast to coast,” was not only a mission-
ary, but also an explorer.170 So was Stanley, the journalist sent by the New York
Herald to find out whether or not Livingstone was alive.171 The work of Living-
stone received the attention of many organizations, including universities in
Britain and Ireland which sent missionaries to Africa.172
Explorers in West Africa also came to the conclusion that Africa was back-
ward, undeveloped, uncivilized, and poor.173 The explorers’ perspectives influ-
enced the opinions of early colonial officials like Lugard. According to Lugard,
“Africa has been justly termed ‘dark continent’ because the secrets of its peoples,
its lakes, and mountains and rivers, have remained undisclosed not merely to
modern civilization, but all through the ages of which history has any record.”174
The rest of the world did not immediately need Africa’s products and believed
that the people were warlike and resentful of visitors.175

Arab writers and Africanists’ progressive pre-slave trade Africa

Earlier Arab writers who had traveled to Africa observed the continent’s endow-
ments. For instance, prior to the fifteenth century, depictions of Africa included
North Africa as seat of the prestigious and enviable Egyptian civilization. The
achievements of West Africa were recorded by Arabic writers, such as Masudi,
Ibn Hawkal, al-Bakri, and ibn Batuta, who depicted the region as a gold-rich
sub-region. West Africa’s gold wealth supplied much of the trans-Saharan
trade.176
40 S.U. Fwatshak
Africanist scholars have also pointed to the functionality of Africa before the
transatlantic slave trade by identifying and discussing its politics and economies.
Their writings show that food production was based on ecological differences,
the practice of crafts, and trade-sustained domestic and export economies of the
period.177 Food production generally consisted of farming, pastoralism, hunting,
and fishing. Mainly agrarian communities occupied the savanna178 and the forest
regions. African cultivators used several farming methods and land management
systems, namely shifting cultivation, intercropping, agro-forestry, terracing, wet
land, and irrigation and mixed farming.179 The two main tools for cultivation
were the plow (especially used in North Africa, Egypt, and Tunisia) and hoes
(common in tropical Africa). Ethiopia used both plows and hoes.180
Crops included indigenous and imported stocks such as maize, millet,
sorghum, fonio, rice, cassava, sweet potatoes, cotton, yams, coco-yams, fruits
(especially bananas), legumes, dates, beans, peas, peppers, onions, tomatoes,
pumpkins, cucumbers, melons, cotton, cocoa, barley, sugarcane, wheat, olives,
limes, grapes, lemons, tobacco, oil palms, coconuts, plantains, coffee, okra,
rubber, cowpeas, watermelon, guava, pawpaw, oranges, and cloves. Some of
these crops were not indigenous to Africa. Animals such as donkeys, camels,
horses, cattle, goats, pigs, and chickens were domesticated, as wild game were
also hunted.181
Pastoral societies included the nomadic Fulbe of Senegal, Gambia, northern
Nigeria, and Niger; the Massai of East Africa, Sotho, and Tswana; the Heroro
people of the central Namibia Plateau; the Khoi (Hotentots); the Galla of Ethio-
pia; the Baggara Arabs of East Sudan; and the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi.182
Fishing communities lived along the rivers Congo and Niger; the lagoons of
Dahomey, Togo, and the Ivory Coast; and the coasts of Mauretania, Angola, and
South Africa.183 Examples of hunting-and-gathering societies included the San
(Bushmen), the Pygmies of the Congo Basin, the Dorobo, Sanye of Kenya,
Kindigs and Sandwe of Tanzania, and the Mejo of Southern Ethiopia.184
The cottage/crafts industry was also vibrant. West Africa’s forest peoples
practiced a number of indigenous crafts, including the creation of brass, bronze,
and clay sculptures and ivory and wood carving, which provided items of reli-
gious, household, furniture, ornamental, and adornment use.185 Iron smelting was
widespread in Africa. In the Congo, cottage industries produced jewels from
copper, weapons from iron, cloths from leaves and raffia palm fibers, baskets
and mats from local grasses, and wooden tools from local plants.186 Glass and
cloth production were also features in many African economies.187
Africans traded internally and externally through trade centers. The famous
trans-Saharan trade, which began in the pre-Christian era,188 thrived, as did local
trade. Markets and market centers existed in a free enterprise economy; women
dominated crop markets and other aspects of the economy.189 According to
Rodney, the pre-slave trade African economies compared favorably with those
in Europe. As Rodney argues, “the difference between the two [Europe and
Africa] was in no way to Africa’s discredit.”190 The slave trade significantly
changed the tide in favor of Europe.191
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 41
Although no statistics exist on the wealth or poverty status of pre-slave trade
and pre-colonial Africa, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the above data, as
argued by Rodney, that the transatlantic slave trade marks a watershed in the
poor performance of African economies.

Conclusion
Much of the recent internalist, ahistorical, dependence perspective on the causes
and solutions to poverty in postcolonial Africa have come from non-historians
who do not appreciate the enormity of the weight of Africa’s beleaguered eco-
nomic history. There are two aspects of this issue. First, as argued by Falola, the
younger, post-independence generation did not experience colonialism, and all
they have seen and experienced is postcolonial states’ failures.192 Second, as
argued by Hopkins, since 1987, when Austen’s book on poverty in Africa
appeared, historians have abandoned Africa’s economic history for issues of
gender and race, while non-historians took up the topic of poverty, especially
social scientists. According to Hopkins, historians “abolished poverty by the
simple device of taking it off the agenda.”193 However, social scientists’ domina-
tion of the poverty theme started much earlier with the rise of development eco-
nomics, which since the 1950s has been concerned with formulating general
theories and strategies for the growth of less developed countries.194 In the 1960s
and 1970s, development economics focused on poverty and inequality. In the
1970s and 1980s, its focus was failing individual countries. Poverty in less
developed countries was claimed to result from those countries’ bad macro-
economic policies.195 Africa’s history did not matter. Another problem is that
early Africanist historiography devoted substantial effort to the heroic refutation
of colonialist historiography, showing that Africans had histories, civilizations,
and organized political systems, for example, empires and kingdoms.196
To its credit, however, the internalist argument scores a point. Leadership
failures, conflicts, and corruption, among others, are implicated in postcolonial
Africa’s malaise. Many more voices document this as some express anger at this
situation.197 For Africa to find its footing and move out of the development and
poverty quagmire, a number of issues have to be taken into consideration. First,
Africa is not one country, and the application of a one-size-fits-all solution may
turn out be unworkable. In this case, each country needs to be studied and solu-
tions appropriate to its situation proffered and implemented. Second, the exter-
nalist and internalist perspectives of the problems and their solutions are not as
contradictory as they may appear; each complements the other. Moreover, a con-
sensus is already building around the understanding of the problem and its solu-
tions. On the side of externalists, the World Bank in its 2000 report, as
referenced earlier, emphasized both the internal and external causes and solu-
tions to Africa’s problems. While reiterating macro-economic reforms (including
diversification and market-led growth) and public sector investments in human
capital and infrastructures, as well as empowerment of the people by the state,
the Bank maintained that since globalization did not favor Africa, developed
42 S.U. Fwatshak
countries should increasingly open up their markets to Africa, as the cost of
implementing the World Trade Organization’s policies is too huge for Africa.
The Bank also maintained that Africa’s path out of poverty would include
increasing aid to the continent and debt relief/cancelation by richer countries and
donor agencies.198
In Falola’s opinion, local and international interventions are required. At the
local level, Africans need to return to the ideas that helped Africa “develop local
institutions that endured for centuries: agriculture as the basis of economy that
empowered the people, irrespective of gender and age; reliance on local
resources; the prevention of autocratic power […] and community and lineage
participation in politics.”199 Other important factors include African unity, an
efficient African Union (AU), and strong regional organizations. Asserting
democracy requires good governance, effective leadership, and mass participa-
tion based on lessened state power and improved local government systems; the
efficient use of resources; preservation of the environment; and empowerment of
women – a new system that is not elitist-oriented.200 External assistance is also
needed in a number of critical areas. The first is in the area of reparations,
including debt cancelation, to mitigate the problems resulting from the slave
trade and colonial rule. Reparations, if given, would allow “skills, knowledge,
money, machines, and ideas” to flow into Africa.201 The second is ending the
receipt of monies stolen from Africans.202 Falola asserts that foreign assistance
will help increase development and alleviate poverty. Falola further argues that
the failure of the global community to help the continent amounts to “ignoring
the damages caused by the slave trade, colonialism, the cold war, and an exploit-
ative international market system.”203 There is a big sense in the emerging con-
sensus, from which policy makers for Africa and their implementers need to
draw to move the continent out of poverty.

Notes
1 William G. Mosely, Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial African Issues
(Guildford: McGraw Hill, 2004), xiv.
2 Toyin Falola, Maurice Amutabi, and Sylvester Gundona, “Introduction,” in Toyin
Falola, Maurice Amutabi, and Sylvester Gundona, eds, Africa After Fifty Years: Ret-
rospections and Reflections (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2013), xix.
3 Smile Dube and Calvin O. Mesilela, “Rethinking the African State: A New Conceptu-
alization of Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang and Kwamina
Panford, eds, Africa’s Development in the Twenty-first Century: Pertinent Socio-
economic and Development Issues (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 28.
4 N.E. Attah, “Towards Understanding the African Predicament,” in A.O. Agwuele,
U.M. Nwankwo, and O. Akinwumi, eds, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Over-
coming the African Predicament (Berlin, Germany: MediateamIT, 2010), 89.
5 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-state
(New York: Three Rivers Press, 1992), 9; Toyin Falola, “ ‘Great Wings Beating
Still’: Africa and the Colonial Legacy,” in Toyin Faloa, ed., The Dark Webs: Per-
spectives on Colonialism in Africa (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 3;
George B. Ayitteh, Africa Unchained: The Blue Print For Africa’s Future (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2, 402.
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 43
6 CODESRIA, “Africa and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century.” Available at
www.codesria.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a1321.pdf (accessed July 9, 2013).
7 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 3.
8 UN, Human Development Report (2014), see 2014 Human Development Index; see
also Table 16; Supplementary Indicators: Perceptions of Well-being at pp. 220–223.
9 UN, Human Development Reports (2011), see Statistical Annex, Table 2, 131–134;
UN, Human Development Report (2014), see Table 16; see also Supplementary
Indicators: Perceptions of Well-being at pp. 220–223.
10 World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Press Briefing Report (March
2000). Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20358914~menuPK:685152~pagePK:146736~piPK:
226340~theSitePK:258644,00.html (accessed July 9, 2013).
11 Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 456. Cf. Fwatshak, “Fixing
What Really Ails Africa: The Global North and the Sick Man of the World Since the
Late Colonial Period,” in A.O. Agwuele, U.M. Nwankwo, and O. Akinwumi, eds,
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Overcoming the African Predicament (Berlin,
Germany: MediateamIT, 2010), 70–72.
12 Meier and Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development, 18–19.
13 Meier and Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development, Exhibit 1. A. 1, 8–11;
Fwatshak, “Fixing What Really Ails Africa,” 70–71.
14 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 3–5.
15 Attah, “Towards Understanding,” 94.
16 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 5.
17 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way
Out for Africa (London: Penguin, 2009), 5–6.
18 Attah, “Towards Understanding,” 90.
19 For details of concessions across the divide, see World Bank, Adjustments in Africa
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), 31–34; Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden,
219, 233–239; Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 351–353; George B.N. Ayitteh, Africa
Betrayed (New York: St. Martins’ Press, 1992), 10, 13, 23, 81–83, 266–267, 277;
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What
Can Be Done About It (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 88–95; Moyo,
Dead Aid, 48–49, 52, 26–27; Stanley C. Igwe, How Africa Underdeveloped Africa
(Port-Harcourt: Professional Printers and Publishers, 2010), 18; Gwendolen M.
Carter and Patrick O’meara, “Introduction,” in Carter and O’meara, eds, African
Independence: The First Twenty Five Years (Bloomington: University of Indiana
Press, 1985), vi; Kenneth W. Grundy, “The Impact of Region on Contemporary
African Politics,” African Independence, 101. For details on the concessions of
externalists, see, among others, Claude Ake, Political Economy of Africa (Ibadan,
London, New York: Longman, 1981), ch. 5, pp. 125–129, 170–184; Bade Onimode,
A Political Economy of the African Crisis (London: Zed Books, 1988), 64–65.
20 Onimode, A Political Economy, 1.
21 Ibid., 2.
22 Carter and O’meara, “Introduction,” xiii.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., vi.
25 Chinua Achebe, Goran Hyden, Achola Pala Okeyo, and Christopher Magadza, eds,
Beyond Hunger in Africa: Conventional Wisdom and a Vision of Africa in 2057
(Nairobi: Heinmann Kenya, 1990), 7.
26 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 351–353.
27 Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed, 5.
28 Ibid., 4–5, 7.
29 World Bank, Adjustments in Africa, 31–34.
44 S.U. Fwatshak
30 Kado and Panford, “Introduction and Overview of the Background,” in Kwadwo
Konadu-Agyemang and Kwamina Panford, eds, Africa’s Development in the
Twenty-first Century, 1.
31 See, among Falola’s numerous works, The Power of African Cultures (Rochester:
University of Rochester Press, 2003), 73–88; “Introduction,” in Toyin Falola, ed.,
Africa, Vol. 5, Contemporary Africa (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2003),
xxiv–xxxi; Economic Reforms and Modernization in Nigeria, 1945–1965 (Ohio:
Kent State University Press, 2004), 55–67, 157–233; “ ‘Great Wings Beating Still’:
Africa and the Colonial Legacy,” in The Dark Webs, 3–4. Sati Fwatshak has elabo-
rated on these views of Falola in his chapter contribution entitled “From the Indi-
genous Economy to Globalization: Falola’s Africa Economic History, 2000–2011,”
in Nana Akua Amponsah, ed., Beyond the Boundaries: Toyin Falola and the Art of
Genre-Bending (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2014), esp. 266–282.
32 CODESRIA, “Africa and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century,” 2.
33 Mosely, Taking Sides, xvii; John Soul, “Ideology in Africa: Decomposition and Rec-
omposition,” African Independence, 301.
34 Joshua Agbo, How Africans Underdeveloped Africa: A Forgotten Truth in History
(Ibadan: Kraft Books, 2010), 10.
35 Ibid., 42–56, 121–128.
36 Ibid., 71–84.
37 Ibid., 11–12.
38 Ibid., 85–96.
39 Ibid., 151–155.
40 Igwe, How Africa Underdeveloped Africa, 18.
41 Ibid., 13.
42 Ibid., 7–8, 23–29, 125–144.
43 Ibid., 21–22.
44 Ibid., 88–92.
45 Ibid., 94–96, 103, 106–119.
46 Ibid., 146–151.
47 Ibid., 14–149.
48 See, e.g., Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independ-
ence (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Sanford J. Ungar, Africa, the People and
Politics of an Emerging Continent (New York: Touchstone Books, 1978, 1989 edn);
Ayitteh, Africa Unchained; Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed; Dube and Mesilela, “Rethink-
ing the African State,” 28–46; Falola, Amutabi, and Gundona, “Introduction,” in
Africa after Fifty Years, xvii–xix.
49 From the original review by Fwatshak in the Journal of the Historical Society of
Nigeria 19 (2010): 157–159.
50 Moyo, Dead Aid, 25, 35, 47.
51 Ibid., 47.
52 Ibid., 22, 26–27, 48–49, 52, 55–66.
53 Ibid., 72, 73.
54 Ibid., 75–143.
55 S.K.B. Asante, “International Assistance and International Capitalism: Supportive or
Counterproductive?,” in African Independence, 250.
56 World Bank, Can Africa Claim?
57 Moyo, Dead Aid, 29–35.
58 This is based on the original review of Collier’s book by Fwatshak, “Dealing with
Being Poor: The Bottom Billion,” Global South 5, no. 1 (2009): 50–52. Available at
www.sephisemagazine.org.
59 Collier, The Bottom Billion, 5.
60 Ibid., 19–27.
61 Ibid., 38–44.
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 45
62 Ibid., see ch. 4.
63 Ibid., see ch. 5.
64 Ibid., 190.
65 See Grundy, “The Impact of Region,” in African Independence, 101; Kwamina
Panford and Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, “21st Century African Development
Crises and Challenges,” in Africa’s Development in the Twenty-first Century, 1–25;
and the essays in Part IV of “Conflicts and Crises of Development,” in Africa After
Fifty Years, 279–378.
66 The calls for the re-colonization of Africa appeared in the 1990s as advocated by
Paul Johnson, William Pfaff, and Ali Mazrui, among others. For details of their posi-
tions and the criticisms that followed, see C.J. Dakas, “The Role of International
Law in the Colonization of Africa: A Review in the Light of Calls for Re-
Colonization,” African Yearbook of International Law 7 (1999): 85–118.
67 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 327.
68 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 10–15, 19, 27, 31, 58–59; Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed,
8–23, 65–70.
69 Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed, 100–101, 113–254, 307, 336–338; Ayitteh, Africa
Unchained, 19, 23, 30, 31, 34–35, 59, 61–92, 94–102, 103–104, 163–171, 178,
324–325, 333–335, 398, 406–410.
70 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 417–418.
71 Ibid., 398–399, 418–419.
72 Ibid., 5, 24, 89–91, 224–225, 327, 330–331, 365, 367–368, 378–398.
73 Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed, 310.
74 Ibid., 309–325.
75 P. Thandika Mkandawire and Charles Chukwuma Soludo, Our Continent, Our
Future: Perspectives on Structural Adjustment (Dakar: CODESRIA, Africa World
Press, IDRC, 1999), based on reviews. See, e.g., www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/
Publications/.
76 S.U. Fwatshak, “The Cold War and the Creation of Economic Divergences: Africa
and Asia Compared,” in Toyin Falola and Emmanual Mbah, eds, Contemporary
Africa: Challenges and Opportunities (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014),
89–125.
77 For instance, it was raised in 1985 by Robert H. Jackson and Carter Rosberg, in their
chapter “The Marginality of African States,” in African Independence, 56; and by
Michael F. Lofchie in “Africa’s Agrarian Malaise,” in African Independence,
163–210. The World Bank and IMF have also been flogging the point.
78 Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State and Control of the Nigerian
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), chs 3 and 5.
79 Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden, 10–13, 250–260, 290.
80 Ibid., 107, 114, 119–202, 209, 224, 296–310.
81 Ibid., 12.
82 Ibid., 207–215, 227–239.
83 Ibid., 321–322.
84 This section is adapted from Fwatshak, “The Cold War and the Emergence of Eco-
nomic Divergences.”
85 World Bank, Accelerated Development.
86 World Bank, Adjustments in Africa, 31–34.
87 For details, see, S.U. Fwatshak, “Fixing What Really Ails Africa: The Global North
and the Sick Man of the World Since the Late Colonial Period,” in Agwuele,
Nwankwo, and Akinwumi, eds, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Overcoming the
African Predicament (Berlin, Germany: MediateamIT, 2010), 79–80.
88 Mkandawire and Soludo, Our Continent, Our Future.
89 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: Penguin, 2002),
186–188.
46 S.U. Fwatshak
90 Falola, “ ‘Great Wings Beating Still,’ ” 15.
91 World, Bank, Can Africa Claim?
92 Igwe, How Africa Underdeveloped Africa, 16–17.
93 Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review
(September 1966).
94 Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Periph-
eral Capitalism (trans. Brian Pearce) (New York and London: Monthly Review
Press, 1976).
95 Kwame Nkurmah, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York:
International Publishers, 1966), 15–20.
96 Ibid., 35, 50.
97 Ibid.: details natural resource exploitation in Africa on 84–219, 220–259.
98 Amin, Neo-colonialism,viii.
99 Ibid., ix.
100 Ibid., xii–xiii.
101 Ibid., xvii. The external orientation of the colonial economies of West Africa is
detailed in chs 1–5.
102 Ibid., 115.
103 Ibid., 274.
104 Claude Ake, Political Economy of Africa (Ibadan, London, New York: Longman,
1981), chs 2 and 3.
105 Ibid., ch. 5.
106 Ibid., 188.
107 Bade Onimode, A Political Economy of the African Crisis (London: Zed Books,
1988), 5.
108 Ibid., 2, 14–22.
109 Ibid., 45–64.
110 Ibid., ch. 4.
111 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard
University Press, 1982), 33v.
112 Ibid., 95–113.
113 Ibid., chs 5 and 6.
114 See, e.g., J.E. Inikori, ed., Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade
on African Societies (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1982); Tiyambe Zeleza, A Modern
Economic History of Africa (Oxford: CODESRIA, 1993), 65–69; Hugh Thomas,
The Slave Trade (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 694–695.
115 Crawford Young, “The Heritage of Colonialism,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald
Rothchild, eds, Africa in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 21.
116 Toyin Falola, “Introduction,” in Toyin Falola, ed., Africa, Vol. 3: Colonial Africa,
1885–1939 (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), xvii; Toyin Falola, “ ‘Great
Wings Beating Still.’ ”
117 Felix K. Ekechi, “The Consolidation of European Rule, 1885–1914,” in Africa,
Vol. 3.
118 Erik Gilber, “The Economic Impact of Colonialism,” in Africa, Vol. 3, 107–122.
119 Femi J. Kolapo, “The Political Impact of Colonial Rule,” in Africa, Vol. 3, 87–105.
120 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Boston, MA; New York: Mariner Books,
1999).
121 Ibid., 110–111, 118–121, 131–135, 164–166.
122 E.D. Morel, “Native Life under Congo State Rule,” in Barbara Harlow and Mia
Carter, eds, Archives of Empire (Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press,
2003), 741–770. More details may be found in Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost.
123 Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden, 218.
124 Ibid.
125 Falola, Amutabi, and Gundona, “Introduction,” in Africa after Fifty Years, xix.
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 47
126 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 6–9, 18, 26–27, 33, 48–49, 56, 84, 105, 327,
370–372, 403.
127 Ayitteh, Africa Betrayed, 6.
128 Achebe et al., Beyond Hunger in Africa, 6.
129 Young, “The Heritage of Colonialism,” 20.
130 Ibid., 27, 29.
131 Falola, “ ‘Great Wings Beating Still,’ ” 3–4.
132 Ibid., 5–7.
133 Ibid., 12–14.
134 Ibid., 8–9.
135 Ekechi, “The Consolidation of European Rule,” in Africa, Vol. 3, 33–41, 50; Gilber,
“The Economic Impact of Colonialism,” in Africa, Vol. 3, 107–122; Sean Stilwell,
“The Imposition of Colonial Rule,” in Africa, Vol. 3, 3–11.
136 Carter and O’meara, “Introduction,” vi.
137 A.G. Hopkins, “The New Economic History of Africa,” Journal of African History,
Vol. 50 (2009): 155–177.
138 Patrick Chabal, Power in Modern Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
139 “General Act of the Conference of Berlin,” excerpts in Archives of Empire, 31.
140 “Royal Charter to the National Africa Company, Later called the Royal Niger
Company,” in Archives of Empire, 376.
141 Frederick Lugard, “Duties of Political Officers and Miscellaneous Subjects,” in
Archives of Empire, 403.
142 Lugard, “The Diaries of Lord Lugard,” in Archives of Empire, 390.
143 Harlow, “Cecil Rhodes: Colossus or Caricature?,” in Archives of Empire, 475–476.
144 Excerpts from “The Speeches of Cecil Rhodes 1881–1900,” in Archives of
Empire, 497.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 500.
147 Ibid., 517.
148 Harlow, “The Congo: Abominations and Denunciations,” in Archives of
Empire, 711.
149 Lugard, “The Dual Mandate,” in Archives of Empire, 421.
150 Flora L. Shaw, “A Tropical Dependence,” in Archives of Empire, 470.
151 Ibid., 461.
152 Examples include Allan McPhee’s The Economic Revolution in British West Africa
(New York: Negro Universities’ Press, 1926); and Hla Myint’s The Economics of
Developing Countries (London, Hutchinson Co., 1973).
153 Roger Casement, “The Congo Report,” in Archives of Empire, 717–727.
154 E.D. Morel, “Native Life under Congo State Rule,” in Archives of Empire, 741–770.
More details may be found in Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost.
155 “Royal Charter to the National Africa Company, Later called the Royal Niger
Company,” in Archives of Empire, 377.
156 Lugard, “The Dual Mandate,” in Archives of Empire, 420, 301, 354.
157 Shaw, “A Tropical Dependence,” in Archives of Empire, 461.
158 G.W.F. Hegel, “The Philosophy of History” (1822), in Archives of Empire, 23.
159 Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost, 6.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid., 6–18.
162 Hegel, “The Philosophy of History,” in Archives of Empire, 21.
163 Ibid., 22.
164 Ibid., 23.
165 Ibid., 23–26.
166 Ibid., 27.
48 S.U. Fwatshak
167 Joseph Conrad, The Heart of Darkness (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 10, 35–36.
168 Roger Casement, “The Congo Report,” in Archives of Empire, 716.
169 See Revd. W. Hughes, “Dark Africa and the Way Out,” 1892, and David Living-
stone’s Cambridge Lectures, cited by Carter and Harlow, “The Mission: Christian-
ity, Civilization, and Commerce,” in Archives of Empire, 243, 253–278.
170 See Livingstone’s Cambridge Lectures, in Archives of Empire, 253.
171 M.B. Synge, “Preparing the Empire: Livingstone and Stanley in Central Africa,” in
Archives of Empire, 301.
172 The Right Hon. Sir Beatle Frere, “Dr. Livingstone,” in Archives of Empire, 308.
173 See Hughes, “Dark Africa and the Way Out,” in Archives of Empire, 243, 253–278.
174 Lugard, “The Dual Mandate,” in Archives of Empire, 417–418.
175 Ibid., 419.
176 J. Ki-Zerbo, ed., General History of Africa, Vol. 1 (abridged) (Ibadan: Heinemann
Educational Books, 1990), 36–42.
177 A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, 76, but see generally ch. 2.
178 R.J. Harrison Church, Africa and the Islands (London: Longman, 3rd edn, 1973),
80–85.
179 Tiyambe Zeleza, Modern Economic History of Africa (Dakar: CODESRIA,
1993), 85.
180 Ibid., 86–95.
181 C.C. Ifemesia, “The Peoples of West Africa Around a.d. 1000,” in J.F. Ade Ajayi
and Ian Espie, eds, A Thousand Years of West African History (Ibadan: Ibadan Uni-
versity Press, 1977), 43–46; Church, Africa and the Islands, 80–85; Zeleza, Modern
Economic History, 95–116, 117–184.
182 Denoon and Nyeko, Southern Africa since 1800, esp. 7–12; Church, Africa and the
Islands, 7–12, 90–92.
183 Church, Africa and the Islands, 96–97.
184 Donald and Nyeko, Southern Africa since 1800, esp. 7–12; Church, Africa and the
Islands, 97.
185 Ifemesia, “The Peoples of West Africa,” 43.
186 Hoschild, King Leopold’s Ghost, 8–10, 73.
187 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 339–341.
188 Ifemesia, “The Peoples of West Africa,” 44–46.
189 Ayitteh, Africa Unchained, 343–350.
190 Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 69.
191 Ibid., 70.
192 Falola, “ ‘Great Wings Beating Still,’ ” 3–4.
193 Hopkins, “The New Economic History of Africa,” 155–177.
194 Meier and Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development, 69.
195 Ibid., 70.
196 Examples include Ajayi and Espie, eds, A Thousand Years of African History, and
Basil Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa (Boston, MA; Toronto: Atlantic Little
Brown, 1959).
197 See, among others, Meredith, The Fate of Africa; G.A. Akinola, Leadership and the
Postcolonial Nigerian Predicament, Department of History, University of Ibadan
Monograph Series, No. 1 (Ibadan: Book Write Publishers, 2009); Olayemi
Akinwumi, Before We Set the House Ablaze: Let Us Consult the Oracle (History),
Third Inaugural Lecture, Nasarawa State University, Keffi (December 11, 2009);
Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Books,
1984); and Chinua Achebe, Anthills of the Savannah (New York: Anchor Books,
1988).
198 World Bank, Can Africa Claim?
199 Falola, “ ‘Great Wings Beating Still,’ ” 17.
200 Ibid., 17–19.
 Poverty in postcolonial Africa 49
201 Ibid., 19; Adejo makes a similar case for reparations to atone for the damages caused
by the slave trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. He uses as examples repara-
tions paid at various times to European slave owners; reparations paid to the U.S.A.
from Fiji for injuries to their consul; China’s payment of reparations to Japan fol-
lowing the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 to 1895; and Germany’s payment of repara-
tions to Europe for damages caused by World War I, among others, to call for a
similar treatment for Africa. See Armstrong Matiu Adejo, Reparations: Africa’s
New Charge in a Changing World (Makurdi: Peach Global Publications, 2004), 1,
and ch. 5.
202 Falola, “ ‘Great Wings Beating Still.’ ” 19.
203 Ibid.

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2 Scaling up power infrastructure
investment in sub-Saharan Africa
for poverty alleviation
Aori R. Nyambati

Introduction
This chapter examines the role of power infrastructure in poverty alleviation in
sub-Saharan Africa within the broad context of economic empowerment in the
continent. Energy and abject poverty are strongly correlated; lack of access to
modern energy services are a major constraint to sub-Saharan Africa’s economic
growth and development and, ultimately, poverty alleviation. Even though sub-
Saharan Africa has the lowest rate of electrification – with the region’s current
rate of electrification being 23 percent – sub-Saharan Africa must not succumb
to oblivion. The mire of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa can be defeated in our
lifetime under one necessary condition: creating a well-funded and maintained,
robust, and sustainable power infrastructure.

The current level of power infrastructure in sub-Saharan

Africa
The current state of power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa is a microcosm
of the challenges and opportunities facing the region in the twenty-first century.
Despite recent impressive investments in physical infrastructure, sub-Saharan
Africa’s share of power infrastructure not only lags far behind that of the rest of
the world, but the problems of poor maintenance, overstaffed utilities, distribu-
tion losses, and under-collection of revenue remain key pointers to the overall
challenges facing the region in the twenty-first century and beyond. Only 4
percent of sub-Saharan Africa farmlands are irrigated. Less than one-third of
sub-Saharan Africa has access to electricity. Barely 56 percent of the region’s
population drink clean water. Less than one-third of rural Africans live near
passable roads. And about 60 percent of Africans have no access to basic sanita-
tion facilities.1
Africa holds more than 9.5 percent of the world’s oil reserves, about 8 percent
of the world’s natural gas resources, 4 percent of global coal, excellent wind
energy potential, and abundant solar radiation through the year with a potential
for solar photovoltaic electricity that could serve over 600 million Africans who
currently have no access to electricity. Although the country has over 1,750 TWh
54 A.R. Nyambati
potential of hydropower and about 14,000 MW of geothermal potential, the
energy crisis in sub-Saharan Africa is veritable and austere.2 Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca’s energy gap is exorbitantly high, currently hovering around US$23 billion a
year. The region’s funding streams and options are obstreperous. Sub-Saharan
Africa has electrification density of 25 percent, making the region’s power gen-
eration inadequate, consumption rates lanky, and electrification limited.
Of the 48 sub-Saharan African nations with a combined population of about
800 million, the region only generates approximately the same amount of power
as Spain, with a population of just 45 million.3 For example, in 2006, Africa’s
total installed capacity was about 106.3 GW; the total annual electricity con-
sumption stood at 488,315 GWh, as consumption per inhabitant per annum for
sub-Saharan Africa remained at 532 Kwh/inhabitant/year.4 Sub-Saharan Africa is
far from installing nuclear power plants, even though a policy for increased
nuclear power production in sub-Saharan Africa is overdue. Despite safety
issues, this chapter argues that sub-Saharan Africa has an untapped comparative
advantage with regard to nuclear energy: sub-Saharan Africa has considerable
deposits of uranium.
Nuclear energy is clean. Nuclear energy is renewable and can provide the
much-needed energy resources critical for the region’s growth and development
in the twenty-first century. Nuclear energy can decarbonize the region’s eco-
nomies; drastically reduce the region’s GDP expenditures on imported oil; lessen
national debts; help transform the region’s energy security landscape; and create
the possibility for a more competitive sub-Saharan Africa. All of the industrial-
ized economies (such as the OECD bloc) have an edge in the nuclear industry.
Some of these nations are exporters of nuclear energy. Why not sub-Saharan
Africa? For instance, France depends on nuclear energy, and the industry creates
over 200,000 jobs directly and indirectly per year. France is a major exporter of
nuclear energy. China and India – the fastest-growing non-OECD nations – have
dramatically boosted their nuclear industry investments in preparation for
increased future energy demands.5
Although complex to finance at the micro level, nuclear energy can be and is
easily financed at the macro level. Nuclear power is a critical infrastructure for
sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, a race for more nuclear power plants in sub-Saharan
Africa is a healthy one and must be encouraged. This is a race to the top. Afri-
ca’s bio-energy is only exploited in its traditional form, even though bio-energy
constitutes more than 70 percent of total primary energy consumed in Southern
African countries. Bio-energy is a viable, sustainable source of energy derived
from crops such as grain sorghum, sweet sorghum, sugarcane, and red grass.
Among other options, bio-energy is cheap and can relegate the region’s green-
house gas emissions (GHGs), improve the region’s quality of the atmosphere,
boost local economic development, and help create jobs.6 However, sub-Saharan
Africa’s bio-fuel subsector is currently constrained by socioeconomic factors
such as food insecurity, sharing of benefits, gender inequality; and market-
related factors such as inaccessibility, poor infrastructure, ecological labeling,
and unfair world trade.
 Power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa 55
In sub-Saharan Africa, hydropower is poorly harnessed and therefore con-
strained. Among other factors, climate change now poses an enormous challenge
for sub-Saharan Africa’s hydropower subsector. Unattended problems of climate
change have the potential to turn off the switch on hydroelectric power genera-
tion, making sub-Saharan African states over-reliant on fossil fuels and foreign
oil. The greatest climate change-related impact upon hydropower will come
from increased evaporation of water from reservoir surfaces due to higher
temperatures.7

Energy consumption profile in sub-Saharan Africa

There is no single country today anywhere in the world – North America, South
America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, or Africa – that has attained long-term economic
growth and development, reduced both absolute and overall poverty, and the like
without an adequate and equitable energy supply. Robust energy supply is one
of the keystones of socioeconomic development, and it is widely acknowledged
that ample energy supply provides the driving force necessary for accelerated
economic growth, increased investment, and a rise in the living standards of a
population.8
Energy resources (coal, natural gas, oil, and the like) are major sources of
income for Africa’s major gas and oil producers and account for about 50 to 80
percent of government revenue from energy resources.9 For example, Algeria
receives about 60 percent of her revenue from natural gas, while Nigeria, Libya,
and Angola net over 80 percent of their revenue from oil exports.10 In tandem
with increased economic growth, poverty alleviation and empowerment are sound
elements of an energy policy for sub-Saharan Africa. Given the current chal-
lenges, there is no doubt that sub-Saharan Africa is in dire need of a policy for
rapid investment in its energy or power sector. Such a policy must encourage
pragmatic financing models; mitigate corruption and indiscipline; encourage
research and innovation; and foster knowledge and skill sharing on a wider scale.
Doors of opportunity for sub-Saharan Africa have been shut for too long. This
must not happen again. Each nation in sub-Saharan Africa is unique and has its
own comparative advantage. African nations have coexisted and thrived together
and must continue to do so in this century. Above all, energy-rich nations must
now strive and be willing to connect with energy-deficient neighbors. Trade
and openness must help everyone. Regulations and laws must be sensible and
properly enforced as consumer energy choices expand throughout sub-Saharan
Africa.
Strict standards will have to be applied with regard to safety, health, and
environmental care in the use and development of all kinds of energy in sub-
Saharan Africa in the twenty-first century. Unless massive efforts are made to
expand the range, quality, and quantity of energy services available to the poor,
sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to achieve the globally set Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), any time soon.11 The region must strive for energy
independence, acting promptly and multilaterally. Synchronous with accelerated
56 A.R. Nyambati
economic growth, the region must develop, support, and enhance tools for meas-
uring and monitoring energy access. Energy access must be treated as any basic
human right, a missing MDG.
Sub-Saharan Africa must quickly transition into a modern, flourishing society
that can effectively compete with the rest of the world, while providing the high
quality of life which her populations deserve. Since financing for modern sources
of energy is a major obstacle, sub-Saharan Africa must tap into various regional
and international financing initiatives such as the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF ) and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These
can provide funding for renewable energy investments.12
However, the epicenter of the region’s energy policy must be poverty allevia-
tion, economic empowerment, jobs and quality employment for women and
men, rapid economic growth and wealth creation as well as enhancement of the
overall welfare of the African people (capabilities). Such goals must support all
legal, ethical, and socioeconomic provisions intended to ease regional member
states’ transition to modern/cleaner or “greener” economies.

Energy transitioning
While the use of modern energy sources such as electricity, kerosene, and LPG
are critical to the well-being of many rural and urban poor people, especially
women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa, energy transition is both desirable and
necessary in sub-Saharan Africa. By definition, energy transition is the change in
one state of energy system to another in terms of quantities, structure of end use,
and the quality of supplies. Energy transition thus involves carriers, converters,
services, and resources.
Transitioning to modern energy sources is critical for sub-Saharan Africa.
Modern energy sources are essential for heating, cooking, and lighting, and chil-
dren in families with modern resources such as electricity can study longer,
which normally translates to a rise in education levels. The industry, businesses,
and households cannot function without energy. A society cannot function
without energy. Without energy, people will die. Energy is life.
According to UNESCAP (2005), energy inputs such as electricity and fuels
are essential in generating jobs, industrial activities, transportation, commerce,
micro-enterprises and agricultural output. Central to poverty alleviation efforts is
the supply of safe, clean, accessible, affordable, and reliable energy, especially
to the poor. The poor in sub-Saharan Africa must now transition from using fire-
wood, dung, candles, kerosene lamps, and ambers for lighting to modern sources
of energy such as electricity. This paradigm shift is not inexorable, utopian, or
empty thinking but an achievable goal within a generation or two. Since ample
power supply is a central component of basic facilities and services required for
communities to function, compete, and thrive, sub-Saharan Africa states must
scale up measures for regional power. The region must improve the effective-
ness and governance of utilities as well as support sector-wide engagements
aimed at expanding access to power by the poor, the needy, and the industry.
 Power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa 57
Sub-Saharan Africa’s energy policy and objectives
Nearly 650 million people rely on traditional biomass for cooking and heating in
sub-Saharan Africa.13 Normally, cooking is done on three stones, and paraffin,
wax candles, smoky ambers, kerosene lamps, or low-efficiency lanterns provide
lighting. Some households even go without any form of lighting. Efforts to attain
significant rates of rural and urban electrification in many sub-Saharan African
countries are miniscule. Much of rural sub-Saharan Africa is not yet fully integ-
rated into the mainstream economy, partly due to poor power infrastructure.14
Efforts to expand the provision of cleaner and renewable energy supplies at the
village level now depend on technology and on sound, pragmatic and straight-
forward energy policies that are in tandem with improved financing models.
To meet sub-Saharan Africa’s energy demands, conditions necessary for
foreign investment in the power sector must be in place. These conditions
include preferential treatment such as tax exemptions and guaranteed returns for
project start-ups. Feed-in tariffs must be encouraged, energy conservation idol-
ized, and corruption, indiscipline, and illegal tapping discouraged. Financial aid,
including bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other countries, and/or assist-
ance from development banks is critical in building synergies needed for
increased power supply in sub-Saharan Africa. Central to energy access will be
service decentralization, encouragement of demand-driven responses, privatiza-
tion of some energy sectors, market deregulation, and strengthening of public–
private partnerships, among others.15
The following discusses some of sub-Saharan Africa’s goals of policy, such
as energy affordability for poverty alleviation, energy accessibility, research and
knowledge sharing, energy security and capacity, energy price volatility, and the
use of environmentally friendly energy sources and technologies.

Policy 1: energy affordability

The capacity of affordability of energy is the ability of a household to maintain
current energy expenditures without needing to devote an additional share of
their budget to energy supply. As such, energy affordability may be assessed in
terms of the share of income required to purchase the average energy bundles
like electricity, natural gas, petrol, and diesel, while taking into account the dif-
ferent patterns of household energy expenditures, and projected changes in
prices and incomes over a given period of time.
Energy affordability can be of access or of consumption, and may encompass a
household’s ability to pay as well as its willingness to pay. Moreover, energy
affordability can be micro – estimates that are disaggregated by income group,
family type, or geographic region – or macro – average national energy expendi-
tures divided by average household income. Energy access may not be possible
without push factors, such as disposable income, and availability of modern and
high-quality energy sources. Energy affordability is also thought to be synonymous
with low energy prices, even though economically speaking this is not true.
58 A.R. Nyambati
Large populations in sub-Saharan Africa cannot afford modern energy
sources such as electricity. Energy price exorbitance in sub-Saharan Africa is
due to the following factors. First, sub-Saharan Africa’s crude oil, like several
other raw materials, is exported to foreign nations for processing before being
imported back again at a colossal price. Furthermore, almost none of the major
oil producers in Africa substantially process their own crude oil for local use and
for export. Sub-Saharan Africa is thus a net importer of its own oil. Nigeria, the
continent’s largest oil producer, refines only 14.6 percent of her crude oil. For
comparisons, Egypt refines 19.2 percent; Algeria 16.7 percent; South Africa 15.6
percent; Libya 11.6 percent; Morocco 5.2 percent; and Kenya only 3.0 percent.16
Second, sub-Saharan Africa is over-reliant on expensive oil-based generation
and small-scale national power grids. Third, sub-Saharan Africa’s energy
resources are often located far away from major demand centers. The region’s
major oil producers are spread out across the continent; political and economic
challenges continue to decelerate energy production and supply in a continent
endowed with enormous cost-effective energy resources like crude oil, hydro-,
solar, and wind power.17

Policy 2: energy accessibility

According to the Asian Development Bank, energy access

is any or a combination of the following: (1) provision of electricity and

motive power to households, (2) improvement in the supply and delivery of
energy services to households, (3) provision of modern fuels and/or efficient
devices for cooking, and/or heating to households and (4) provision of
finance to households to access energy.18

Energy access is about accessing various forms of modern energy services.

Energy accessibility is also about “a household having reliable and affordable
access to clean cooking facilities, a first connection to electricity and then an
increasing level of electricity consumption over time to reach the regional
average.”19 Energy access entails considerations of the types of energy carriers,
the end uses available, the users or consumers themselves, the cost of such
energy, benefits accrued to the end users, and the quantity and quality of energy
provided.20
Sub-Saharan Africa’s current energy access levels are miniscule and unac-
ceptable. About 77.5 percent of the populations in sub-Saharan Africa have no
access to electricity.21 Over 60 percent of Africans will not have access to electri-
city by 2020, and the number of people relying on the traditional use of biomass
is projected to climb from 2.7 billion to 2.8 billion by 2030.22 Africa’s access to
the electricity grid is less than 1 percent, while 80 percent of oil resources in
Africa are located in four countries: Nigeria, Libya, Angola, and Algeria.23
Almost two billion people (including those in sub-Saharan Africa) need
modern energy services to accelerate the attainment of the new UN Sustainable
 Power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa 59
Development Goals which the UN adopted in 2016 in place of the New Millen-
nium Development Goals.24 As has been argued,

The UN Millennium Development Goal of eradicating extreme poverty by

2015 will not be achieved unless substantial progress is made on improving
energy access. To meet the goal by 2015, an additional 395 million people
need to be provided with electricity and additional one billion provided with
access to clean cooking facilities. This will require annual investment in
2010–2015 of $41 billion, or only 0.06% of global GDP (MER). To meet
the more ambitious target of achieving universal access to modern services
by 2030, additional investment of $756 billion or $36 billion per year is
required. This is less than 3% of the global energy investment projected in
New Policies Scenario to 2030.25

To improve energy access in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter proposes the

following:

• Ensuring consistency across legal and regulatory frameworks as a means of

smoothening sub-Saharan Africa’s integration and development of effective
power pools.
• Mainstreaming energy accessibility initiatives into national and regional
development planning and budgeting.
• Targeting trade and aid support to boost sustainable energy production and
supply.
• Eliminating all forms of poverty and want through gender empowerment
and/or through giving economic voice to the poor.
• Ensuring donor alignment to eliminate multiplicity of programs and projects.
• Strengthening regional integration and corporation, particularly in areas of
energy research, production, trade, and conservation.
• Making energy access a basic human right.
• Intensifying and diversifying national and regional energy sources and
baskets.
• Electing visionary, democratic, and development-conscious governments
throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
• Incentivizing sustainable energy production and use through subsidies (legal
and monetary options).
• Engaging the private sector, non-governmental organizations, donors, and
others who can help boost the required synergies.
• Eliminating corruption, lawlessness, and bad governance; that is, elimin-
ating black markets, illegal connections, hoarding of oil, gas, and the like,
and by ensuring the rule of law.
• Encouraging the conservation and use of energy-efficient technologies.
• Intensifying rural electrification initiatives.
• Tapping locally available and indigenous energy-producing materials for
energy production.
60 A.R. Nyambati
• Encouraging feed-in tariffs (FITs).
• Encouraging positive energy reforms and related policies. Reforms are pre-
requisites to achieving secure, sustainable, and cost-effective energy mixes,
including renewable sources and nuclear power.
• Drawing upon clear and specific pro-poor policies and strategies that
embrace the use of clean, accessible, and ample energy supply; and connect-
ing energy-poor states in the region to energy-surplus neighbors. For
instance, Kenya could improve her energy access levels by connecting to
her neighbors such as Southern Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda.

Policy 3: addressing energy price volatility

Energy and other products with unstable conditions of supply do experience
regular price fluctuations from time to time. This fluctuation is what is termed
price volatility. Price volatility is also a measure of security’s stability and is
calculated as the standard deviation from a certain continuously compounded
return over a given period of time. In energy markets (EM), energy price volatil-
ity is often caused by speculation. Occasionally, however, oil price volatility is
caused by unexpected economic developments or events that are non-economic
in nature, such as political instability and natural calamities.26
Nevertheless, energy price volatility has a negative impact on the economic
development and growth of any economy, and therefore on poverty. In the case
of sub-Saharan Africa, oil and natural gas prices are increasingly volatile. In sub-
Saharan Africa, frequent price fluctuations make it difficult for regional govern-
ments and firms to form well-calculated investment decisions.27 Furthermore,
declining revenues from falling oil prices due to volatility inevitably place
enormous burdens on the regional governments to maintain acceptable levels of
services as well as in their debt servicing. According to Mabro,

Volatility disturbs governments of exporting countries as they rely heavily

on oil revenues. Low prices lead to severe curtailment of expenditures, but
such are constraints of domestic politics that the axe does not always fall on
the less worthy projects. High prices lead to demands for expenditure
increases that are not sustainable in the long run. Price instability generates
instability to a wide front: investments, human capital, corporate perform-
ance and the economic development of oil exporting countries.28

As a remedy, some volatility can be removed via long-term contracts, through

market-based tools such as swaps, options, and commodity price-linked loans, or
through domestic stabilization funds, compensatory financing, privatization of
the oil trade, and adapting tax levels to eliminate the risks to governments and
their populations.29
 Power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa 61
Policy 4: maximizing the use of electric power generated by
sustainable, economic, and environmentally acceptable technologies
Sub-Saharan Africa is a net importer of fossil fuels. Moreover, petroleum-based
products such as gasoline and diesel fuels constitute the primary energy sources
for transportation in the region.30 As the world globalizes, it is estimated that in
the next 20 years or so energy consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa and
in other low- and middle-income countries will be about 0.7 percent per annum
through 2030.31 Powerful long-run trends such as modernization, motorization,
and industrialization are thought to continue to put pressure on sub-Saharan
Africa’s limited energy resources, thereby encouraging the use of cheap fossil
fuels, even when a policy of expanded use of fossil fuels will not come without
risk. Due to climate change and other unexpected surprises, for instance, there is
a need to consider exploring, investing, and expanding power generation cheaply
but sustainably. Sub-Saharan Africa must consider the use of clean and renew-
able energy alternatives such as solar power, wind power, and hydropower,
which are often in abundance and largely untapped.

Policy 5: supply reliable energy services to enhance security and

capacity
Conventional oil supplies are widely believed to be approaching peak produc-
tion, even if natural gas liquids and expensive, destructive, risky, deep-water,
and polar oil are included.32 Peak oil supplies will have grave implications for
sub-Saharan Africa. For example, peak oil supplies will expose sub-Saharan
Africa to energy vulnerabilities. High cost and disruptions will constrain sub-
Saharan Africa’s energy access capacity; destabilize economic globalization and
growth, if not entirely curtail sub-Saharan Africa’s ambitions to industrialize, as
well as alleviate the quagmire of poverty in the twenty-first century.
As millions of Africans continue to lack access to modern sources of energy,
especially electricity, sub-Saharan African countries must address energy
security by disrupting wasteful energy consumption habits, encouraging energy
efficiency, and developing indigenous energy resources for rapid economic
growth. A nuclear power option must be on the table as wind and solar power
options are expanded. Electricity expansion programs must be funded; reason-
able government interventions encouraged; institutional capacity built; power
sector reforms engendered, and good governance practices embraced. Regional
governments must resort to, and support, adequate financing models and techno-
logy transfers.
In brief, sub-Saharan Africa’s energy reliability must be conceptualized in
terms of two key components: adequacy and security. Adequacy refers to the
ability of the system to amply supply a customer’s energy requirements under
normal operating conditions. The adequacy dimension often considers the
system statically. Security, on the other hand, refers to the dynamic responses of
the system to unexpected interruptions, and relates to its ability to endure them.
62 A.R. Nyambati
Together, adequacy and security describe the overall reliability of the system,
which may broadly be described as the ability to supply the quantity and quality
of energy desired by a customer when it is needed, at a particular time, and in a
given geographical location.

Policy 6: longer term commitment to energy research, development,

and demonstration
Extensive investment in energy research, development, and demonstration
across sub-Saharan Africa is critical for increased energy production and
supply. For instance, energy research is essential for new knowledge and
product creation. However, research must appeal to the existing needs, regional
diversity, and unique nation-state situations. The overall goal of policy must be
to attract investors and other institutions that are eager to support clean energy
research and development for sub-Saharan Africa. A commitment to
energy research, development, and demonstration will also demand that
sub-Saharan African economies transcend the knowledge base of individual
nations, and to think alongside sub-regional and regional frontiers if they are
to achieve more collective learning goals and the understanding that they
desperately need.
Given the significance of research and demonstration, sub-Saharan African
nations must embark on supporting high-quality, high-potential energy research,
by investing significant resources and efforts to identify and develop the next
generation of energy resources and energy technologies than currently available.
Sub-Saharan Africa must then draw upon research findings to inform policy and
pedagogy.

Conclusion
Energy and abject poverty are strongly correlated. Lack of access to modern
energy services is a major constraint to sub-Saharan Africa’s economic growth
and development, and ultimately to poverty alleviation.33 Sub-Saharan Africa
cannot attain longer term economic growth and development; reduce abject
poverty; phase out slums and squatting; supply adequate water and sanitation;
power businesses and industry; improve children’s education, among others,
without adequate and equitable energy supply.
The quagmire of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be defeated with
sticks, guns, bombs, or charcoal except through one necessary condition: a plen-
tiful power supply. Even though sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest rate of elec-
trification, with the region’s current rate of electrification being 23 percent,
sub-Saharan Africa must not succumb to oblivion.34 Abject poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa can be defeated within our lifetime. Pockets of poverty in urban
centers and in rural Africa can be eliminated rapidly. However, this will only be
possible under one necessary condition: well-funded and maintained, robust, and
sustainable power infrastructure.
 Power infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa 63
To avoid the failures of the past, considerable efforts must be made to expand
sub-Saharan Africa’s range, quality, and quantity of energy services provided to
the poor toward achieving poverty alleviation and the overall set aims of the
UN’s new Sustainable Development Goals.35 Without a robust energy infrastruc-
ture in sub-Saharan Africa for poverty alleviation, the twenty-first century may
once again be a lost century for sub-Saharan Africa.

Notes
1 Africa Partnership Forum Support Unit, Progress Report: Infrastructure. Prepared in
Collaboration with the NEPAD Secretariat for the Seventh Meeting of the APF,
Moscow, October 2006.
2 African Development Bank, Oil and Gas in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009).
3 IMF, “Africa’s Power Supply Crisis: Unraveling the Paradoxes,” IMF Magazines,
Countries and Regions, May 22, 2008.
4 ICA, Power Supply Situation in Africa: Background Paper Prepared for ICA Annual
Meeting, March 13–14, 2008.
5 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2008 (Paris, France, Sep-
tember 2008).
6 Schlamadinger, B. and Waupotitsch M. eds, Greenhouse Gas Balances of Bioenergy
Systems: A Bibliography on Greenhouse Gas Balance of Bioenergy, Forestry, Wood
Products, Land Use and Land-change (Graz: Joanneum Research, 1996).
7 Harrison, G.P. and Whittington, W.H., “Vulnerability of Hydropower Projects to
Climate Change.” IEE Proceedings, Generation, Transmission and Distribution 149,
no. 3 (2002): 249–255.
8 Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD), Reaching the
Millennium Development Goals and Beyond: Access to Modern Forms of Energy as a
Prerequisite 2007 (GNESD, 2007).
9 Zalik, A. and Watts, M., “Imperial Oil: Petroleum Politics in the Nigerian Delta and
the New Scramble for Africa.” International Socialist Review, April 2006.
10 BP. Statistical Review of World Energy (London: BP, 2010).
11 UNDP and WHO, The Energy Access Situation in Developing Countries: A Review
Focusing on the Least Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (New York:
UNDP and WHO, 2009).
12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), Financial
Mechanisms, 2011a.
13 United Nations International Development Organisation (UNIDO), Scaling Up
Renewable Energy in Africa. Twelfth Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Gov-
ernments of the African Union (Addis Ababa: AU, 2009).
14 UNESCAP, Energy Services for Sustainable Development in Rural Areas in Asia and
the Pacific: Policy and Practice (UNESCAP, 2005).
15 International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Poverty: The Missing Millennium Devel-
opment Goal? March 1, 2011.
16 BP, BP Statistical Outlook 2012 (London: BP, 2011).
17 African Development Bank, Africa’s Power is Very Expensive to Produce by Global
Standards, Yet Costs Could Be Reduced through Regional Trade (Tunis: AfDB, 2011)
(see OECD/IEA, IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 (Paris: IEA, 2010).
18 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2010: 1.
19 IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011 (Paris, IEA, 2011).
20 IMF, World Economic Outlook 2006 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2006).
21 Practical Action, Poor People’s Energy Outlook 2010 (UK: Rugby, 2011).
64 A.R. Nyambati
22 World Bank, World Bank Report, G8 Energy Ministers Meeting (Rome, May 24–25,
2009).
23 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (London: BP, 2010).
24 UNDP and WHO, The Energy Access Situation in Developing Countries: A Review
Focusing on the Least Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (New York:
UNDP and WHO, 2009).
25 OECD/IEA, IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 (Paris: IEA, 2010).
26 Guo, Hui and Kliesen, L.K., “Oil Price Volatility and US Macroeconomic Activity.”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 87, no. 6 (2005): 669–683.
27 UNCTAD, The Exposure of African Governments to the Volatility of International
Oil Prices, and What to Do about It. AU Extraordinary Conference of Ministers of
Trade on African Commodities, Arusha, Tanzania, November 21–24, 2005.
28 Mabro, R., Oil Markets and Prices, OIES Monthly Comment, August 2000.
29 Serleti, A., Quantitative and Empirical Analysis of Energy Markets (revised edn)
(London: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007).
30 UNCTAD, The Exposure of African Governments to the Volatility of International
Oil Prices, and What To Do about It.
31 BP, BP Energy Outlook 2030 (London: BP, 2011).
32 UK Energy Research Centre, A Global Peak is Inevitable. The Timing is Uncertain,
but the Window is Rapidly Narrowing (UK: ERC, 2009).
33 UNDP, What Will It Take to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals? Inter-
national Assessment (New York: UNDP, 2010) (see Cline, The Economics of Global
Climate Change).
34 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Outlook 2009 (Paris, 2009) (see World
Bank, Addressing the Electricity Access Gap (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010)).
35 United Nations International Development Organisation (UNIDO), Scaling Up
Renewable Energy in Africa. Twelfth Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Gov-
ernments of the African Union (Addis Ababa: AU, 2009); see also UN-Energy, The
Energy Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (New York,
2005).
3 The impact of anti-corruption
conventions in sub-Saharan
Africa
Daniel Barkley and Claire Maduka

Introduction
Over the past decade, African states were engaged in three major anticorruption
conventions. These included: (1) the United Nations’ “Convention against Cor-
ruption,” (2) the Southern African Development Community’s “Protocol against
Corruption,” and (3) the African Union, “Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Corruption.” This analysis uses the “Difference-in-Differences” (DID)
estimator to assess the impact of these measures on stemming corruption in sub-
Saharan Africa. Applying the DID analysis to a panel of 46 African countries
between 1998 and 2010, we found that these measures did not reduce Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s “Control of Corruption” Index in ratifying states. Cor-
ruption is notoriously hard to measure or even define, and therefore it is imposs-
ible to say for certain whether corruption in Africa is increasing or whether it is
worse than in other places.1 Transparency International defines corruption as
“the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”2 The secretive and sensitive
nature of corruption not only complicates assessing its magnitude and impact but
also the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies.3 “Corruption is illegal every-
where in Africa; yet woven deep into the fabric of everyday life.”4
Corruption in Africa ranges from high-level political graft on the scale of mil-
lions of dollars to low-level bribes to police officers or customs officials. Cor-
ruption occurs behind closed doors, making it hard to estimate its precise size
and effect, but details found in exposed cases of corruption indicate that corrup-
tion is a significant problem for sub-Saharan Africa. It is estimated that Benin,
for instance, loses $75 million a year through corruption.5 Global Integrity estim-
ates that more than half of the Ugandan government’s annual budget is lost to
corruption each year, amounting to $950 million.6 Mobuto Sese Seko, former
President of Zaire, was reported to have looted the national treasury of some $5
billion: an amount equal to the country’s entire external debt at the time he was
ousted in 1997.7 The Anglo Leasing scandal where the Kenyan government
awarded a non-existent leasing company several contracts cost the country as
much as $1 billion.8 In total, the African Union estimates that corruption
costs Africa more than $148 billion a year, more than six times the aid
which developed countries collectively gave to sub-Saharan Africa in 2008.9
66 D. Barkley and C. Maduka
Corruption undermines the efficacy of institutions, discourages investment, and
holds back development. Africans keep an estimated $150 billion in capital off-
shore, which is money that could be used to develop the continent if its owners
had the confidence to invest at home.10

The problem of corruption in contemporary Africa

Corruption has corrosive micro-economic effects as well. “Corruption allows
inefficient producers to remain in business, encourages governments to pursue
perverse economic policies, and provides opportunities for bureaucrats and
politicians to enrich themselves through bribes from those seeking government
favors.”11 When corruption is widespread and institutionalized, firms may
devote resources to obtaining valuable licenses and preferential market access
instead of using its resources to improve productivity.12 “Entrepreneurs facing
corruption may shift part of their savings toward the informal sector or
minimize production in a way that needs or demand for public services is
minimized.”13
African governments have made discernible efforts to combat corruption. In
many cases they have been spurred on by international donors pushing for trans-
parency and good governance as well as by domestic pressure to fulfill campaign
promises of reform.14 “The end of the Cold War removed the national security
argument for tolerating and supporting corrupt regimes. The post Cold War
agenda of democratization, accountability, and transparency has compelled gov-
ernments around the world to directly address the corruption problem.”15
Since 2000, the heads of African states have adopted four major international
anticorruption conventions: (1) the United Nations’ (UNCAC) “Convention
against Corruption,” (2) the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
“Protocol against Corruption,” (3) the Economic Community of West African
States’ (ECOWAS) “Protocol on the Fight against Corruption,” and (4) the
African Union’s (AU) “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.”
Each of these conventions has evolved in response to specific demands and pres-
sures at the global, regional, and sub-regional levels.16 However, before becom-
ing binding laws (e.g. “entry into force”), a predetermined number of member
state’s legislative authorities (e.g. Parliament, National Assembly) must “ratify”
these “adopted” measures.17 Table 3.1 shows the ratification and entry into force
dates for the AU, SADC, and UNCAC anti-corruption measures.
The AU, SADC, and UNCAC anti-corruption conventions each provide a
framework for combating corruption through their preventative and punitive
measures. The preventative measures are intended to preclude the occurrence of
corrupt activities by creating the conditions that “promote good, honest, trans-
parent, and efficient public management as well as high standards in the private
sector.”18 The punitive measures are judicial or administrative actions taken after
corruption has occurred and deter further corruption by increasing the likelihood
that corrupt agents will be caught and punished. While these conventions
differ in the scope and extent of their preventative and punitive measures, they
 Anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 67
nonetheless establish to varying degrees a common standard for the enforcement
of anti-corruption conventions by binding all ratifying states to the same laws.19

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) represents the
first binding global agreement on corruption. The convention is unique not only
in its geography but also in the extensiveness of its provisions.20 The United
Nations General Assembly presented for approval the UN Convention on
October 31, 2003, and entry into force took place on December 14, 2005.21 The
UNCAC takes a comprehensive approach to preventing and combating corrup-
tion. It employs a very broad definition of the term “public official,” which
includes any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial
office of the state.22

The African Union’s Convention on Preventing and Combating

Corruption
The “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption” was adopted by the
heads of state at the African Union Summit held in Maputo on July 11, 2003,
and the 15 ratifications required for entry into force of the AU Convention were
reached in July 2006 and entry into force took place on August 5, 2006.23 Over
half of sub-Saharan Africa has ratified the AU Convention since 2006. Dell notes
that the AU Convention includes “African priorities and standards and a degree
of harmonization across the whole region” and is unique among anti-corruption
instruments in containing mandatory requirements.24 According to Transparency
International, the AU Convention

has extensive provisions on the ways, means and standards for preventive
measures in the public and private sectors [including] requirements in the
public service of declarations of assets and establishment of codes of
conduct. Moreover, it includes offences relating both to public sector cor-
ruption and private sector (private-to-private) corruption.25

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol

against Corruption
The SADC “Protocol against Corruption” heralded as the first anti-corruption
African treaty entered into force on July 6, 2005.26 Nine of SADC’s 14 members
have ratified the treaty, which provides both preventative and enforcement meas-
ures to combat domestic and international corruption in the region. Table 3.2
details the preventative and punitive measures in each of the three conventions.
These measures provide a framework for countering corruption.
Table 3.1 Ratification and entry into forced dates for AU and UN conventions and SADC Protocol

Country AU: Convention on Preventing SADC: Protocol against UN: Convention against
and Combating Corruption Corruption Corruption

(Entry into force: 05/08/2006) (Entry into force: 06/07/2005) (Entry into force: 14/12/2005)

1 Angola 08/29/2006
2 Benin 09/20/2007 14/10/2004
3 Botswana 07/06/2005*
4 Burkino Faso 11/29/2005
5 Burundi 01/18/2005 10/03/2006
6 Cameroon 08/01/2006*
7 Cape Verde
8 C.A.R.
9 Chad 04/23/2008
10 Comoros 02/04/2004 06/10/2006
11 Congo 01/31/2006
12 D.R.C. 07/13/2006
13 Ivory Coast 09/23/2010
14 Djibouti 04/20/2005
15 Eritrea
16 Ethiopia 09/18/2007 11/26/2007
17 Gabon 02/03/2009 01/10/2007
18 Gambia 04/30/2009
19 Ghana 06/13/2007 06/27/2007
21 Guinea-Bissau 10/09/2007
20 Eq. Guinea 10/09/2007
22 Kenya 03/02/2007 09/12/2003
23 Lesotho 10/26/2004 07/29/2003 08/01/2006*
24 Liberia 06/20/2007 09/16/2005
25 Madagascar 06/10/2004 22/09/2004
26 Malawi 11/26/2007 09/27/2002 04/12/2007
27 Mali 12/17/2004
28 Mauritania 10/25/2006
29 Mauritius 04/01/2002 12/15/2004
30 Mozambique 02/08/2006 09/04/2008
31 Namibia 05/08/2004 07/06/2005* 08/01/2006*
32 Niger 02/15/2006 11/08/2008
33 Nigeria 09/26/2006 12/14/2004
34 Rwanda 02/25/2004 04/10/2004
35 Senegal 12/02/2007 12/16/2005
36 Seychelles 01/06/2008 03/16/2006
37 Sierra Leone 03/12/2008 09/30/2004
38 Somalia
39 South Africa 11/11/2005 05/15/2003 11/22/2004
40 Sudan
41 Swaziland
42 Tanzania 02/22/2005 20/08/2003 05/25/2005
43 Togo 09/14/2009 06/07/2005
44 Uganda 08/30/2004 09/09/2004
45 Zambia 03/30/2007 08/07/2003 07/12/2007
46 Zimbabwe 12/17/2006 08/10/2004 08/03/2007

Source: Ratifying states of the African Union’s “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption” are available at www.africa-union.org; “List of Countries
which Signed, Ratified/Accepted to the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.” Ratifying states of the “UN Convention against Corruption”
are available at www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session3/V0987465e.pdf.
Note
SADC: Anticorruption Conventions in Africa. It became operational in July 2005, 30 days after its ratification by two-thirds of the SADC membership. Available at
http://archive.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/conventions_instruments/sadc_protocol.
70 D. Barkley and C. Maduka
Table 3.2 Preventive and punitive measures in the AU, SADC Protocol, and UNCAC

Preventive measures Punitive measures

AU Convention Preventive anti-corruption body or Bribery of national public

bodies sector officials
Public sector finance (Art. 9) Bribery of private sector
Public reporting (Art. 10), access to decision makers
information (Art. 13), Illicit enrichment by a public
whistleblower protection (Art. 32 official
and Art. 33) Embezzlement,
Public education on combating misappropriation, or other
corruption (Art. 13) diversion of entrusted
Comprehensive domestic regulatory property by a public official
and supervisory regimes for Bribery of a public official in
banking (Art. 14) order to capitalize on his or
Declarations of assets for public her influence in a public
officials institution
Establishment of codes of conduct Bribery of a public official to
for public officials (Art. 7) induce an unlawful act
Mandatory requirements of
declaration of assets by
designated public officials and
restrictions on immunity for
public officials (Art. 7)
The need for media to have access to
information (Art. 12)
National control measures to ensure
that the setting up and operations of
foreign
companies in the territory of the
State Party shall be subject to the
respect of the national legislation
in force (Art. 5)
Encourage all countries to take
legislative measures to prevent
corrupt public officials from
enjoying illicitly acquired assets
by freezing their foreign accounts
and facilitating repatriation
SADC Protocol Code of conduct for public officials Bribery of and diversion of
Transparency in public procurement property by public officials
of goods and services Trading in influence with
Easy access to public information respect to such officials
Protection of whistleblowers Fraudulent use or concealment
Establishment of anti-corruption of corruptly obtained
agencies property
Participation of the media and civil
society
Use of public education and
awareness as a way of introducing
zero tolerance for corruption
 Anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 71
Table 3.2 Continued

Preventive measures Punitive measures

UNCAC Preventive anti-corruption body or Bribery of national public

bodies
Public sector ethics and procedures
Preventive anti-corruption body or
bodies
Public sector ethics and procedures
Public procurement
Public sector finance
Public reporting, access to
information, whistleblower
protection
Public education
Private sector standards, including
accounting and auditing standards
Money laundering
sector officials
Bribery of private sector
decision makers
Illicit enrichment by a public
official
Embezzlement,
misappropriation or other
diversion of entrusted
property by a public official
Bribery of a public official in
order to capitalize on his or
her influence in a public
institution
Bribery of a public official to
induce an unlawful act.

Measuring corruption
There is no ideal way of assessing trends in corruption as well as government
performance against corruption.27 This circumstance arises largely from the
hidden nature of most corrupt activities. This unobservable nature of corruption
complicates attaining consistent and comparable measurement statistics across
countries.28 Nonetheless, researchers have used cross-country surveys and polls
to develop a number of useful corruption indexes. The current study uses
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s “Control of Corruption Index” (CCI). We
selected the CCI indices because they are likely to capture changes in corruption
brought about by implementation of the anti-corruption conventions’ preventa-
tive and punitive measures. Table 3.3 highlights the primary focus of the CCI
and CPI in measuring the extent of corruption. The Control of Corruption Index
(CCI) measurements range from –2.5 to 2.5 and are indexed to have a mean of
zero. A higher positive CCI number indicates lower corruption. The important
empirical advantage of the CCI is its coverage; the CCI includes data for 46
African countries between 1998 and 2010.

Table 3.3 The Control of Corruption Index

Control of Corruption Index (CCI)

Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi
The Control of Corruption Index (CCI) captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.

Source: CCI. Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf.

72 D. Barkley and C. Maduka
Transparency International’s Corruption Perspective Index (CPI) is the most
widely disseminated corruption metric among policy makers.29 Like the CCI, the
CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the
abuse of public office for private gain. However, there are several limitations to
using the CPI in the current study. First, it is based on data from the past three
years which means that a change in the perceptions of corruption as a result of
the implementation of anti-corruption policies may only emerge in the index
over long periods of time.30 In addition, the CPI is based on polls, the values of
which are subjective, and less reliable for countries with fewer sources. Polling
is even more challenging when it involves acquiring unbiased data from sub-
Saharan African states.31 The methodology of the CPI changes from year to year,
making even basic better-or-worse comparisons difficult. Finally, the CPI’s
coverage of African countries is not as extensive as the CCI.32 Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index values for only 16 sub-Saharan
African states in 2002 whereas the CCI includes corruption measures for 46 SSA
countries in 1998. Moreover, the CCI is derived from a larger dataset of sources,
and it employs a broader definition of corruption and uses a different strategy to
aggregate its corruption indicators.33

The Difference-in-Differences (DID) model

The ratification of anti-corruption conventions in many ways resembles natural
experiments, with the ratifying countries forming the “treatment groups” and the
non-ratifying countries forming the “control groups.” A natural experiment
occurs when some exogenous event – a change in government policy alters the
environment in which individuals operate. Unlike a true experiment, in which
the control and treatment group are randomly selected, the control and treatment
group arise from the particular policy. This feature complicates isolating the
effect of the anti-corruption initiatives, since differences in corruption may be
due to systematic difference between countries rather than implementation of
anti-corruption initiatives.
Although the AU, SADC, and UNCAC conventions were adopted prior to
2004, they all “entered into force” and thus became enforceable laws for the rati-
fying states between July 6, 2005, and August 5, 2006. The Difference-in-
Differences can be represented as a regression framework, which allows control
for time-invariant state conditions, time-series changes in corruption, and time-
variant observables characteristics.

Yit = β0 + β1dBik + β2d1 + β3δi + β4 Xit + μit (1)

In this equation i indexes 46 sub-Saharan African countries, t indexes years 1998

to 2010, and k indexes the three anti-corruption conventions: AU, SADC, and
UNCAC. For our model, the three anti-corruption policy variables, AU, SADC,
and UNCAC, are simply defined to be unity for countries and time periods that
have ratified one of the three anti-corruption conventions.
 Anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 73
The dummy variable dt is a fixed-year effect and the dummy variable δt is the
fixed-state effect. The anti-corruption policy dummy variables dBik impose the
restriction that the individual anti-corruption convention has the same effect on
corruption, Yit for each year following its ratification. Finally, Xit is a vector of
observables characteristics. The model includes a first-order autoregressive AR
(1) term where μit = ρμit-1 – εit. Here ρ is a first-order serial correlation coefficient
and εit is an error term.

Data and variables

Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics

Corruption Description and definition Mean (standard

deviation)

Control of Corruption The CCI ranges from –2.5 to 2.5 with a higher –0.62 (0.61)
Index (CCI) score indicating less corruption (n = 598).
SADC 1 if country i ratified the SADC “Protocol 0.10 (0.31)
against Corruption” in year t; and zero
otherwise (n = 598).
UNCAC 1 if country i ratified the UN “Convention 0.31 (0.46)
against Corruption” in year t; and zero
otherwise (n = 598).
AU 1 if country i ratified the AU “Convention on 0.25 (0.43)
Preventing and Combating Corruption” in
year t; and zero otherwise (n = 598).
Media Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press 56.33 (19.41)
Index” with a higher score, indicating less
freedom (n = 598).

Source: Ratifying states of the African Union’s “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corrup-
tion” are available at www.africa-union.org; “List of Countries Which Signed, Ratified/Accepted to
the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.”
Notes
Ratifying states of the “UN Convention Against Corruption” are available at www.unodc.org/
documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session3/V0987465e.pdf.
The “Control of Corruption Index” (CCI) is available at http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/
results.php?years=all&variable_ID=1281&theme=10&country_ID=all&country_classification_ID=all.
Media is Freedom House’s Freedom Index and is available at www.freedomhouse.org/template.
cfm?page=16.
74 D. Barkley and C. Maduka
Table 3.5 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimations

Dependent variable: CCI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

AU 0.04 (0.03) – –
SADC – 0.076 (0.05) –
UNCAC – – 0.012 (0.03)
Media –0.0000102 0.0051* (0.002) 0.0051* (0.002)
Y1999 –0.012 (0.02) –0.012 (0.02) –0.011 (0.02)
Y2000 –0.002 (0.04) –0.002 (0.03) –0.003 (0.03)
Y2001 –0.019 (0.03) –0.019 (0.03) –0.017 (0.03)
Y2002 –0.033 (0.04) –0.033 (0.04) –0.031 (0.04)
Y2003 –0.088 (0.05) –0.088 (0.05) –0.085 (0.05)
Y2004 –0.008 –0.008 –0.008
Y2005 –0.0138 –0.0138 –0.0132
Y2006 –0.015 –0.0175 –0.0175
Y2007 –0.0256 –0.0256 –0.0248
Y2008 –0.0351 –0.0351 –0.0351
Y2009 –0.0528 –0.0539 –0.0528
Y2010 –0.0882 –0.0882 –0.0882
Ρ 0.79* (0.03) 0.79* (0.03) 0.79* (0.03)
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95
N 552 552 552
F–stat 172.68* 172.70* 172.02*
Durbin–Watson 2.34 2.34 2.34

Note
* p < 0.01, standard errors are in parenthesis.

Results
Table 3.5 reports the three estimations of equation (1); three use the Control of
Corruption Index (CCI) as the dependent variable. Each model included the
fixed-state effects. The coefficients of the anti-corruption terms AU, SADC, and
UNCAC all indicate that sub-Saharan African countries which ratified the AU,
SADC, and UN anti-corruption measures experienced no significant change in
corruption relative to the countries that did not ratify these conventions. In fact,
the coefficients of the fixed-year dummy variables suggest that corruption
appears to have gotten progressively worse in sub-Sahara Africa since the ratifi-
cation of these conventions. The coefficient of Media is consistent with other
studies that found media freedom to be associated with lower levels of
corruption.34

Testing multiple linear restrictions

While the anti-corruption conventions may be individually insignificant, they
may be jointly significant. This circumstance arises because several SSA coun-
tries have ratified more than one of the three anti-corruption conventions. In
terms of parameters of equation (1), the null hypothesis, Ho: is that coefficients
anti-corruption policy dummy variables dBik are jointly zero:
 Anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 75
Ho: dBik = 0;
(8)
Ha: dBik ≠ 0

The sum of squares residuals (SSR) for the restricted model (e.g., equation (1)
without the three policy dummy variables) is 9.06. The SSR, the unrestricted
model in (e.g. equation (1) with the three policy dummy variables), is 9.00.
Accordingly, the corresponding Fstat is:

(SSRr – SSRur) / q _______________

______________ (9.06–9.00) / 3
Fstat = = = 1.11
SSRur / (n – k – 1) 9.00 / (552 –60 – 1)

Since Fstat is less than the critical Fc = 2.30, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
stated in equation (8). We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
conventions have had no joint effect on corruption.

Conclusion
The success of any anti-corruption convention depends on legal and financial
institutions – judiciary, police, and financial auditors – to enforce and strengthen
accountability in the public sector.35 Although the anti-corruption conventions
contain robust preventative and punitive provisions, they nonetheless suffer from
an “implementation gap”: the difference between the laws on the books and
practical compliance. Webb notes,

The most disappointing aspect of the UNCAC was its failure to incorporate
a robust monitoring. […] The experience of the OAS Convention suggests
that a vague provision for monitoring will result in a long delay before
even the most rudimentary action is taken to hold states parties
accountable.36

At the time of writing, the UNCAC had not implemented a monitoring mech-
anism. Without monitoring, there is no guarantee that countries will comply with
the Convention’s commitments. Monitoring is especially important, since many
UNCAC measures are controversial and costly.37 Article 22 of the AU Conven-
tion establishes a follow-up mechanism through an Advisory Board. In addition,
each state party is required to report to the AU Executive Council on a regular
basis on the progress made in complying with the provisions of the AU Conven-
tion. However, the AU Convention lacks funds to implement fully its monitoring
instruments. Moreover, the Convention establishes no provisions on sanctions
for member states. Similarly, Article 11 of the SADC Protocol establishes a
committee consisting of state parties tasked with not only monitoring the imple-
mentation of the Protocol by member states but also providing advocacy by
building the capacity of anti-corruption agencies through training. However,
according to one anti-corruption policy expert,
76 D. Barkley and C. Maduka
Five year[s] […] since the Protocol entered into force the Committee is
practically still non-existing. The non-establishment of the SADC Anti-
Corruption Committee has as well deprived the anti-corruption agencies the
opportunities to benefit from the training programs the Committee should
have adopted.38

Corruption continues to plague sub-Saharan African societies despite the ratifi-

cation of notable anti-corruption conventions, which contain preventative and
punitive measures that should have yielded noticeable reductions in corruption.
Our analysis suggests that to be effective, anti-corruption conventions need more
than formal ratification by legislative assemblies. Fully enforced anti-corruption
“can make a real difference to the quality of life of millions of people around the
world […] by removing one of the biggest obstacles to development.”39

Notes
1 Ellis, Stephen. 2005. “The Roots of Corruption.” Current History May: 203–208.
2 Dell, Gilliam. 2006. “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa: What Civil Society Can
Do to Make Them Work.” Available at www.transparency.org/ (accessed December
11, 2012).
3 Svensson, Jakob. 2005. “Eight Questions about Corruption.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 19, no. 3: 19–42.
4 “Corruption ‘Cost Africa Billions.’ ” BBC News, September 18, 2002. Available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2265387.stm (accessed February 26, 2012).
5 PANA, November 1, 2001.
6 Global Integrity. Available at www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/uganda/ind
ex.cfm (accessed December 11, 2012).
7 Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” 42.
8 Hanson, Stephanie. 2009. “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Council on Foreign
Relations. Available at www.cfr.org/publication/19984/corruption_in_subsaharan_
africa.html (accessed December 11, 2012).
9 “Corruption ‘Cost Africa Billions’ ”; and “Development Aid at its Highest Level Ever
in 2008.” Available at www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649_34487_4245859
5_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 26, 2012).
10 Ellis, “The Roots of Corruption,” 208.
11 Mbaku, John Mukum. 1996. “Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of
Cleanups.” CATO Journal 16, no. 1: 99.
12 Murphy, Kevin, Shleifer, Andrei, and Visney, Robert. 1991. “The Allocation of
Talent: Implications for Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 503–530.
13 Sevensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” 37.
14 Hanson, “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
15 Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa.”
16 Ibid.
17 The “United Nations Convention against Corruption” was negotiated in seven negoti-
ating sessions over a two-year period at the United Nations Office in Vienna by repre-
sentatives of 129 countries from all regions, including numerous countries in Africa.
18 Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa,” 11.
19 By ratifying or acceding, a state becomes a “State Party” to the treaty. Sometimes
states ratify with “reservations,” stating that they consider certain specified passages
or articles in the instrument to be non-applicable or non-binding as specified in
the convention. If not, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies. This
 Anti-corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 77
establishes that any reservation made should not be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty (Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa,” 40).
20 Martin Polaine, “Guide to the UN Convention against Corruption” (UNCAC), Anti-
Corruption Forum, 006/2015. Available at www.lcilp.org/anti-corruption-forum/
(accessed February 16, 2015). See also Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa.”
21 Transparency International. Available at www.transparency.org/global_priorities/
international_conventions/conventions_instruments/au_convention (accessed Decem-
ber 11, 2012).
22 Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa,” 24.
23 Abel, Cornelia. 2010. “Instruments to Strengthen Anticorruption Ethics.” Trans-
parency International, Program Coordinator, South East Europe, PowerPoint Slide
Presentation.
24 Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa,” 27.
25 Ibid.
26 Dell, “Anticorruption Conventions in Africa”; and Transparency International. Avail-
able at www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/conventions
_instruments/sadc_protocol (accessed December 11, 2012).
27 Chêne, Marie. 2008. “Assessing the impact of anticorruption measures in Burkina
Faso.” Transparency International (U4 Helpdesk). Available at www.u4.no/helpdesk/
helpdesk/query.cfm?id=158 (accessed February 26, 2012).
28 Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption.”
29 Ibid.
30 “ICCR FAQ.” Available at www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2004_faq.html (accessed
December 11, 2012).
31 However, collecting reliable data on corruption through traditional survey techniques
even under the most favorable circumstances is inherently problematic; respondents
may choose to misreport or not report at all for many reasons. The extent to which
these measurement errors are not systematically related to country characteristics
may be less of a concern when studying variations in corruption across countries
(Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” 23).
32 Mozambique, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali could not be included in the official list
of countries ranked by the 2002 CPI because there were fewer than three sources of
data for these countries. The EBRD–World Bank Business Environment and Enter-
prise Performance Survey compiles experiences of more than 10,000 firm managers
in 1999 and 2002, and are only available for 26 transition countries.
33 Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption.”
34 Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption”; Treisman, Daniel. 2001. “The Causes
of Corruption: A Cross-national Study.” Journal of Public Economics 76: 399–457.
35 Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” 34.
36 Webb, Phillipa. 2005. “The United Nations Convention against Corruption: Global
Achievement or Missed Opportunity.” Journal of International Economics Law 8,
no. 1: 191–229.
37 Transparency International. 2008. “Effectively Monitoring the United Nations Con-
vention Against Corruption.” (UNCAC) Policy Position Paper #01/2008.
38 Paulus Kalomho Noa, Director of Anti-Corruption Commission, Namibia. Available
at www.accnamibia.org/index.php?module=News&func=display&sid=42 (accessed
December 11, 2012).
39 Kofi Annan, Secretary of United Nations. 2003. “Statement On The Adoption by the
General Assembly of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, October 31.
Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/secretary-general-
speech.html (accessed December 11, 2012).
4 Interrogating the issues of
corruption and poverty in
contemporary Africa
Idris S. Jimada

Introduction
Several theories have been advanced on the litany of problems in Africa, which
range from conflicts/wars to corruption, governance, and colonialism to prob-
lems of climate change leading to drought and famines to diversity of diseases to
endemic poverty besieging the continent. Over the past 50 years, Africa is the
only continent left out of the global rise in prosperity and economic transforma-
tion. The question is: why? Or, what has gone wrong with Africa? This chapter
offers a critique of the dominant paradigms often used to explain the roots of
poverty in contemporary Africa. It argues with compelling evidence that corrup-
tion pervading the basic fabric of African societies constitutes the common and
fundamental denominator in the impoverishment of Africans.
The progressive erosion of African norms and values due to centuries of
enslavement and colonialism has culminated in the matrix of uncertainty and
instability entrapping the continent. While some Afrocentric writers and scholars
have often laid the blame of Africa’s woes and misfortune on the tragedies of
slavery and colonialism, evidence suggests that the plight of Africa goes deeper
than theories of domination and imperialism. It is often argued that the general
picture of Africa today, which conjures up certain common images of poverty,
hunger, disease, conflict, war, and political and economic instability, is directly
related to these episodes. Without doubt, these images of despair, hopelessness,
and helplessness are a depressing litany of crises confronting Africa, such as
strikes, revolts, wars, and conflicts which are linked directly to poverty.
In the midst of abundant resources, Africa is the poorest continent in the
world. Monies stolen from Africa often end up in foreign banks, and the custodi-
ans of these funds are never inclined to return them. The aura of deprivation per-
vading Africa is indicative of a people besieged. Africans were for centuries
unquestionably victims of injustice, inequality, and oppression, which are
directly linked to corruption. Despite emerging democratic practice, the quality
of governance is dwindling and the mass of the people are helpless onlookers in
the affairs of their nations. Now, corruption, like the proverbial rat, has eaten
deep into the basic fabric of society. Corruption stifles developmental efforts and
impoverishes the mass of the people.
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 79
The greatest challenge confronting Africa today is not ethnic, regional, reli-
gious, or sectional divisions or environmental and climatic changes but pervasive
and outlandish corruption. Corruption is not a new phenomenon in Africa;
however, in recent years its proportion has reached alarming and endemic rates.
Corruption is threatening Africa’s very existence and survival, leading one
modern writer to comment: “Africa is a sinkhole that swallows money with little
or no return.”1 To buttress the point about the pervasiveness of corruption and
intensifying poverty among the masses in resource-rich Nigeria, for instance, the
BBC World News of Monday, February 13, 2012 highlighted the news that
poverty is intensifying in Nigeria and that over 100 million Nigerians survive on
less than $1 per day.
While it is clear that corruption in whatever form has been a pervasive and
persistent phenomenon throughout history, many countries in Africa today enjoy
unenviable reputations as the most corrupt countries in the world. To several
functionalist scholars, a correlation exists between corruption and development.
Corruption is beneficial to political modernization and contributes to national
integration, administrative capacity, and economic development.2 Corruption in
whatever way it is viewed is morally wrong and opportunistic. Most African
countries have the lowest GDP in the world. Most African nations typically fall
towards the bottom of any list measuring income per capital. In 2009, 22 of 24
countries identified as having low human development on the United Nations
Human Development Index are located in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, Africa’s
GDP was 5.6 percent, and in 2016, economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa
dropped to about 1.5 percent in the hope that it be will pick up thereafter. In
most African countries today, GDP per capital is less than $200 per year, signi-
fying a low standard of living which engenders more disease, conflict, inequality,
extremism, and further corruption that created these problems in the first place.
The subject of corruption has long been of interest to philosophers, historians,
and social scientists, but discussion has intensified significantly since the mid-
1960s with the study of modernization and development.3 There are relatively
few efforts, however, to systematically study the correlation between corruption
and poverty in Africa. It is often said that corruption in Africa arose from rever-
sion to a traditional capitalist winner-takes-all attitude in which power and
family relationships prevail over the rule of law.4
The aim of this chapter is to provide a framework for examining how corrup-
tion constitutes the prime factor in the widespread poverty affecting African
states over time. Corruption in Africa is a pervasive phenomenon, hindering eco-
nomic growth and creating widespread poverty among the people. An examina-
tion of the concepts of corruption and its various forms is first offered, followed
by an analysis of arguments often advanced by commentators on the nature of
problems afflicting Africa. We end by drawing conclusions upon how corruption
is largely responsible for the contemporary predicament of African nations.
80 I.S. Jimada
Conceptualizing corruption in contemporary Africa
Several modern scholars and writers have articulated their definitions of corrup-
tion.5 Here, it suffices to re-examine the diverse vices of corruption and to relate
how the numerous forms of economic, judicial, political, and moral corruption
bring about poverty and lead to the decay and collapse of states. Some funda-
mentally corrupt practices threaten security to life, human dignity, and public
and private property. Among the primary forms of this type of corruption are
disenfranchisement, especially through election rigging and fraud; forced instal-
lations of governments through undemocratic means; favoritism; and the misuse
or misappropriation of public funds.
These types of corruption are prevalent in several nations of Africa and often
lead to instability and conflict in these societies. Since contemporary African
societies are also complex and diverse, it is equally plausible to suggest that cor-
ruption also involves things taken for granted, such as ethnicity, sectionalism,
racism, opportunism, bootlicking, hypocrisy, factionalism, regionalism, nepotism,
extortion, exclusion, and exploitation of the weak and minorities; these may be
counted as corruptive practices. As in many parts of Africa, these types of corrup-
tion raise questions about national interests and nationhood because they often
serve as the basis of empowering one group to the disadvantage of others. Rather
than seeking long-term national integration and development, Africa’s elite are
more concerned with securing immediate personal interests and advantages for
particular people, regions, and cultures rather than national interests.
Furthermore, European colonialism in Africa appears to have added a new
dimension to corruption. The definitions of corruption became selective. Euro-
pean theories of corruption separated morality from the law, politics, and eco-
nomics. African perspectives and definitions of corruption were not always in
line with colonial interpretations. The divergence between African and colonial
perceptions of the motive of state and the motive of the end justifying the means
constituted serious problems in tackling corruption in Africa.6 Colonialism came
with a new set of values, and the key ones were profit motive, nationalism, impe-
rialism, chauvinism, racism, regionalism, and fascism, which had direct implica-
tions for African values of communalism, integrity, and level of corruption.
It has been argued that colonialism has watered down the pristine values of
traditional African societies. Colonialism has been blamed for producing a soul-
less political elite who took over the affairs of the continent; they became a con-
fused hybrid of divergent values with hues of ill-digested European and Western
values. These translated into ethnicity, nepotism, favoritism, sectionalism,
bigotry, and corruption. African societies came under direct Western ideological
influence, which compromised the unyielding values of indigenous African
societies.
There is a consensus that corrupt behavior in Africa involves misuse of public
authority and public wealth for private gain. These are also aspects of corrupt
practices that are taken for granted. Access to power means access to wealth,
which is not questionable since nobody is brought to justice. Many scholars
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 81
focus on personal enrichment, embezzlement, misuse of public property, and
falsehood as related to the direct impoverishment of Africans. However, ques-
tions of ethnicity, regionalism, or favoritism could empower and enrich one
group against the other – raising especially the question of minority rights.
The functionalist position that sees a correlation between corruption and
development in emerging economies championed by some scholars has since
been challenged by those observers who emphasize the dysfunctional con-
sequences of corruption. Drawing from the insights of classical philosophers, the
post-functionalist rejects the

god-fatherism […] and condescension of those who had rationalized and

apologized for corruption which wastes revenues and resources which might
be utilized elsewhere, in development which Africa nations desperately need
and erodes the trust and loyalty granted to political leaders by their fol-
lowers, and solidifies inequities in the apportionment of goods in favour of
certain strata of society.7

Several scholars argue that incumbents engage in corrupt behavior to maintain

their control of the political arena because it allows manipulation of access to
state resources, position, and wealth. Strategic groups must acquiesce in incum-
bent demand in order to obtain the goods and services they desire. Corruption in
this case is a mechanism for buying political loyalty. The ability to access fosters
dependency on the regime and thereby contributes to the survival of the ruling
elites. Ruling groups use the benefits of political power in an attempt to redress
the insecure position they find themselves in. Mutual backscratching is inaugu-
rated between the regimes and the privileged entrepreneurs. This peculiar rela-
tionship has been called “a parasitic symbiosis” between the public and private
sector in which the business groups become a “parasitic state class,” or a state-
dependent elite. The point is that the ties between the ruling groups and the
large-scale or foreign entrepreneur fostered by corruption hinder the develop-
ment of a private, indigenous, independent elite and, by extension, the mass of
the African peoples. They also contribute to an increase in the alienation felt by
groups excluded from the advantages of corruption.8
Corruption thrives in Africa because the opportunist exploits ethno-linguistic,
regional, and sectional fragmentation to plunder. Things deteriorate when there
is great inequality and injustice in wealth distribution and weak governmental
institutions of control, to the glorification of wealth and the display of it by
corrupt officials. Much more serious for the scandals of corruption is gross fol-
lowership failure that has allowed corruption to thrive unabated. Corruption
thrives in Africa because the people appear to condone it.

Dominant paradigms
Many African statesmen and commentators on African affairs often lay the blame
of Africa’s plight on enslavement, colonialism, imperialism, and postcolonial
82 I.S. Jimada
intrigues of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other financial
institutions.9 Pervasive corruption exists in Africa today because colonialism
restricted the early influence of an ethical revolution largely due to ignorance
and other complexities. To these classes of elite who are the inheritors of colo-
nial legacies, postcolonialism entails taking full advantage of the trappings of
power. Corruption, bribery, theft, embezzlement, vandalism, plunder, and
looting are not seen as crimes because there is no concern for public property as
a collective national property. This Machiavellian approach and the economic
tyranny of capitalism ensured that corruptive practices prevailed over justice and
the rule of law.10 Evidence shows how colonialism nurtured corruption in Africa
through the presentation of gifts to facilitate trading opportunities.11
Some African writers have argued that cutbacks in health, education, and
other vital social services in Africa prescribed by the IMF and World Bank as
conditions for loans and repayments opened African economies to competition
with more powerful and established industrial nations. To attract investments,
African nations enter a spiralling race to the bottom to see who can provide
lower standards, reduced wages, and cheaper resources; this has increased
poverty and inequality and unequal rules of trade. Rich industrial nations are
active in the largest forms of corruption in Africa and global financial institu-
tions seem to be exacerbating the problem. It is argued that underdevelopment in
Africa goes back to the brutal and primitive forms of colonial pillage which was
satisfied to have Africa produce and then cream off an agricultural surplus
without technological and economic transformation. According to Amin,

Colonialism bequeathed to Africa a weak elite saddled on a weak and

dependent state. […] Peripheral Capitalism eventually led to a sickly eco-
nomic life reduced to being a process of adjustment to the demands of accu-
mulation at the centre […] so then Colonialism left nothing but structures
that would ensure the continuation of exploitation and underdevelopment.12

It is suggested that African nations suffer from key challenges of poverty, a high
concentration of low-income countries, hunger, disease, and famine. UN reports
have systematically revealed the devastating policies toward African states, and
it is suggestive that IMF structural economic policies are flawed in several
crucial respects. For the past 30 years, Africa has been the net exporter of
capital: a creditor transferring more capital abroad than it receives in loans and
foreign direct investment. Between 1970 and 2000, it is believed that $280
billion has been plundered from Africa. Debt became a means of inducing
capital flight and sucking out more resources than were originally provided. It
was also an instrument for making African countries implement policies pre-
scribed by rich countries against the will of African peoples.
Corruption truncates competitiveness and prosperity in Africa. Many of the
elite struggle for power which is an easy avenue for amassing wealth. These
groups of the elite may not need to be competitive like their counterparts in
Brazil, India, China, and Malaysia, since there are abundant resources to plunder
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 83
and offenders are rarely brought to book. The worst form of confusion is that
which considers the structural adjustment program as a development strategy.
All the development plans associated with it from the 1970s have failed. African
nations may not need to follow IMF and World Bank strategies of development.
There are alternative paths to development, as the cases of Malaysia, China, and
Brazil have shown.13
In part, the structural adjustment programs promoted by the World Bank and
the IMF, through their emphasis on privatization, the abolition of state market-
ing monopolies, and the provision of credit and other support for the private
sector are intended to encourage the further growth of an entrepreneurial class.
A range of external financing institutions, including key bilateral donors such as
the U.S. Agency for International Development, now have special facilities to
assist private sector activities in Africa. The aim, at least in theory, is to spur a
shift from “parasitic” to “nurture” capitalism.14
That Africa is poor today appears to be the choice of African leaders. Some
African leaders such as those in Rwanda and Uganda recently claimed that
issues such as lack of capacity building and indiscipline were prime factors in
African poverty, but this superficial view of the contemporary African dilemma
smacks of escapism and defeatism. Mills and Zeleza have argued that African
leaders are culpable of running their countries aground; that Africa is poor
because the leaders made that choice.15 Any examination of the contemporary
problems of Africa that negates the role of corruption is probably artificial. In
studying contemporary Africa, it is necessary to think away any notion of colo-
nialism and postcolonial and neo-imperialist intrigues and domination as prima
facie in the problems of Africa.

Parasitism and materialism

Beyond definitional considerations, there has been a range of analyses of the
causes and consequences of corruption in developing countries. Scholars like
Huntington have viewed it as a virtually inevitable phenomenon of the initial
phases of “modernization,”16 one likely to diminish as African economies and
states move beyond the early stages of capitalist development. This has been the
tendency in Western Europe’s bourgeois transition.17 Others emphasize the
aspirations of Africa’s administrative elites for the status symbols and lifestyles
of the continent’s former colonial rulers, an inclination reinforced at the lower
rungs of bureaucracy by the social disorientation of rapid urbanization. Some
point to the pressures civil servants suffer from the “primordial public,” the net-
works of traditional kinships and ethnic obligations that require redistribution of
acquired wealth and job favors to other members of one’s community of origin –
a form of “solidarity” graft said to draw little moral sanction due to primacy of
kinship ties, and the limited legitimacy of the state structures inherited at
independence.18
A number of writers, noting both the centrality of the state to corrupt activ-
ities in most African societies, have examined corruption as an integral element
84 I.S. Jimada
in relations of political power, in which state property and jobs are allocated to
ethnic groups or supporters in intricate and sometimes far-reaching networks of
patron–client relations. Drawing heavily upon Max Weber, they label states
themselves as “patrimonial” or “clientelist,” which view their occupants of polit-
ical power as a “political aristocracy,” and consider political life as “prebendal,”
in which state power is treated as “a congeries of which can be competed for,
appropriated and then administered for the benefit of individual occupants and
their support groups.”19 Some of those pursuing this approach may also regard
high-level corruption as part of a process of class formation, their emphasis
generally being on its political functionality as a source of patronage resource to
maintain and strengthen the system of political power. In this milieu, the process
of class formation and domination is addressed; this is often presented virtually
synonymously with the holding of public office, an amalgam captured by
Richard Sklar’s assertion that in Africa “class relations, are determined by rela-
tions of power, not production.”20
In Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, where corruption has been
central to the entire system of government and economic activity, the embezzle-
ment of state funds, tax evasion, and other dishonest practices have facilitated
the “consolidation of the economic base of the elite, an elite that has risen out of
primitive accumulation of public resources.”21 Corruption fuels instability and
sectarian strife in the Congo. In September 1996, a revolt in Eastern Congo
spread across the country against Mobutu’s rule. It is suggested that Mobutu and
his cronies siphoned off about 50 percent of the country’s capital budget and bil-
lions in mineral resources.22
In the Sudan there is evidence to suggest that corruption has been a principal
mode of financial accumulation for the formation of a “parasitic comprador capi-
talist class.”23 What is applicable to Sudan in the corruption context is also
applicable to most other African countries. Ekeh, writing specifically on Nigeria
but generalizing for much of Africa, notes that corruption was:

Not an issue of ethics or morality; it should be seen, instead, as one of the

technical terms for “capitalistic accumulation” […]. Corruption takes place
principally through the state apparatuses because it is through the state that
most of the surplus appropriation and redistribution takes place in the
society.24

Segun Osoba has provided compelling evidence on how corruption fuels poverty
and instability in Nigeria. Although focusing primarily on Nigeria, his submis-
sions are assumptions that governance in Africa was increasingly becoming
kleptocratic as an emerging phenomenon.25 Millions of public resources and
wealth find their way abroad into foreign bank accounts or real estate holdings.
To what degree illicitly obtained public resources are “capitalized” or laundered
is impossible to quantify, due to the generally clandestine nature of the process.
However, the frequency with which current or former cabinet ministers, dir-
ectors of public enterprises, and party leaders eventually become wealthy
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 85
entrepreneurs testifies to its extent. Nonetheless, the same attitude has led
modern scholars to conclude that African leaders revel in squander mania, cor-
ruption, and lack of discipline.26 Due to the endemic nature of poverty in Africa,
malnutrition and famine are prevalent in many communities of Africa, which are
worse than AIDS.
The pervasiveness of the phenomenon of corruption has led Earnest Harsch
to argue that in Africa in less than three decades of independence, corruption has
given birth to several multi-billionaires while plunging into misery nearly half a
billion human beings. By diverting public funds, “Many African leaders must be
held responsible, at least in part for the enormous misery and persistent poverty
in which the people are mired.”27 Kalu Agabi, Nigeria’s one-time Minister of
Justice and Attorney General, probably horrified from the shock of the gargan-
tuan corruption in high places, notes sadly that “Big men are the greatest crimi-
nals, and except you go after the big criminals and bring them to book, the rate
of crime may not reduce.”28
The role of corruption in private accumulation has long been obvious in a
wide spectrum of institutions and organizations, but its extent and nature vary
considerably. While in some countries it may be a secondary attribute from the
perspective of the governing elites, in others it is the cement that holds together
the entire system of political and class domination. Corruption seems to have
developed regardless of official ideology and overall economic approach, includ-
ing, to some extent, in states like Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique, which for
many years proclaimed their adherence to some form of socialist program that
frowned upon private enrichment and capitalist accumulation. However, the
most propitious conditions exist in countries that have both large public sectors
and relatively indulgent policies towards the activities of private enterprises,
which means that there exist not only significant opportunities to appropriate
public resources, but also more formal economic outlets into which illicit pro-
ceeds may be channelled.29 Money laundering by many African leaders has
resulted in jail terms in countries abroad.
Many writers on contemporary Africa have noted the decisive role of political
corruption in the emergence of a propertied class; there are hundreds of busi-
nessmen across Africa who owe their rise to the direct support of the ruling
political elite in their countries.30 For these groups of the elite, access to power
became a do-or-die affair, since the acquisition of power assures them and their
cronies abundant wealth beyond their imagination. Nor has it been unusual for
foreign donor governments, based on broader political considerations, to look
the other way when their favored clients divert money given as aid. This has led
Harsch to point to the importance of viewing corruption as an international phe-
nomenon, in which there exist not only corrupt officials in Africa and other
regions of the South, but also “corrupting states” of the North.31
Western governments, previously reticent about criticizing the corrupt prac-
tices of African leaders, now find it expedient to proclaim more forcefully
support for democracy and human rights in Africa. They have also threatened to
withhold aid from some of the more blatant violators. The donor agencies and
86 I.S. Jimada
international financial institutions at last discovered that corruption was, indeed,
a major problem that needed to be curbed in the interests of “better government.”
To an extent, this fitted in very well with the argument that the continent’s eco-
nomic and social ills were primarily the fault of African “indiscipline” and mis-
management rather than of such externally derived problems as the neo-imperial
manipulation of global financial institutions, debt, or low world market prices
for its export commodities. According to Mamdani, the story of capitalism in
Africa is a story of capitalism without production; borrowed development ideo-
logies are not meant for production anyway. He argues, with equal foresight, that
internal elite struggles in Africa are routinely waged with an intensity not known
in many other places; where opposition is normally construed as treason and
criticism as sabotage.32
Across Africa, the people have responded to the economic crises in different
ways. Some have criticized bureaucratic graft and corruption. Others have criti-
cized government measures that placed a greater burden on the masses. In the
streets, popular resentment against misrule and corruption usually merged with
anger and violence about years of injustice and inequality. Sadly, some of the
anger and frustration often degenerated into ethnic and regional violence against
innocent groups. For example, during the post-election crises in Nigeria in April
2011, protests against the ruling party and its rich members degenerated into an
ethnic, regional, and religious crisis in some of the northern states. Similarly, in
recent years, in places like Gabon, Mali, Burkina Faso, Zaire, and other coun-
tries, protesters often targeted the businesses of leading officials or their political
clients. The real issue is corruption among the leading elite and poverty among
the masses.
In virtually all African countries, corruption has emerged as a major public
issue. Various groups propose various mechanisms to prevent corruption. For
example, the Democratic Republic of Congo proposed to Liberia a “code of
political ethics” in 1991. The code barred financial interests that could conflict
with official duties. The recent constitution in Mali stipulated that the prime
minister and cabinet ministers publicly list their holdings before taking office.
As part of a broader crackdown on corruption in Burkina Faso, then-President
Thomas Sankara ordered public inventories of the properties and income sources
of all senior officials, to cut out the “gangrene of corruption” and instill an
“exemplary lifestyle” among officeholders.33 However, a coup in October 1987
undermined Sankara’s efforts, to the relief of significant layers of the state and
military bureaucracy. In other countries such as Ethiopia, governments estab-
lished joint worker–management committees to gather evidence of self-
enrichment and to “expose criminals and looters.”34 In rare instances, more
drastic actions have occurred, such as executions of corrupt leaders, as in Ghana
in the early 1980s. However, the deepening menace of corruption has not abated
but intensified.
Despite the emergence of an independent, vocal press in many countries of
Africa, it is unlikely that any particular measure or institutional reform, even if
buttressed by popular involvement and control, can eliminate corruption. In the
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 87
midst of economic collapse and chaotic political change, new impulses and
opportunities for theft and dishonesty are bound to arise. Over the longer term,
only a profound transformation in social and political relations is likely to
weaken significantly the underlying causes of corruption; corruption’s roots are
deeply embedded in Africa’s dependent economic and state structure. Also
alarming is the methods people use as coping mechanisms: recourse to supersti-
tion and traditionalism in order to escape poverty.
Over time, this has resulted in the continuous and phenomenal enrichment of
African rulers, the emptying of the national treasury, and the indebtedness
almost to the point of bankruptcy of some countries. Hence, there exists a crit-
ical dearth of resources for investment of social, economic, and cultural develop-
ment of the masses. Africa is in a paradoxical situation in which the scandalous,
almost legendary wealth of key ruling class members mocks the unspeakable
poverty, misery, and degradation of the people. This has, in turn, brought about
a situation of potential and actual violent confrontation between the minority
plutocrats and the majority paupers and destitute. It is in this context that the
current phenomenon of “area boys,” ethnic militias, and other fundamentalists
are an alarming manifestation.35
This situation fuels mass cynicism about and distrust of the public elite, and it
constitutes a major factor in the persistence of inter- and intra-communal disu-
nity, antipathy, and strife as well as the progressively worsening problem of
political and social instability in contemporary Africa. Since the public treasury
has been the primary and ultimate source of rapid and sensational private accu-
mulation by the political elite, the struggle among factions of the ruling class to
capture state power (and, therefore, the national treasury) has become progres-
sively acrimonious and bitter. This kind of struggle ends in a winner-take-all res-
olution; factions use the poor masses from their areas of origin (village, town,
local government, state, or ethnic group) as cannon fodder and battering rams
against their rivals and competitors from other areas, thus further dividing the
people and undermining the stability of the state and society of an already pro-
foundly unstable state and society.36
Rampant corruption among the ruling class has taught a dangerously disrup-
tive lesson to the generality of the people: being honest, hardworking, and law-
abiding does not pay. Consequently some of the ordinary people who have
learned this lesson from the top then try to replicate the corrupt practices of their
leaders at their own low levels in the form of petty acts of bribery, speculation,
and embezzlement of public funds. Thus, corruption as a way of life has become
pervasive and popularized in the African polity, especially in the context of
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), where the working people’s real income
has become so devalued that it is impossible for most salaried workers, wage
earners, and marginalized income earners to survive on their legitimate earnings.
The obsession of many elite members with private at the expense of public
accumulation has led them to divert resources earmarked for running and main-
taining public institutions in their charge, institutions like hospitals, schools,
universities, public utilities, the judiciary, the police, and even the armed forces,
88 I.S. Jimada
to corrupt, private purposes. They force these institutions to act below their capa-
city in the efficient performance of their assigned tasks, thereby endangering the
lives of the citizens whom these public institutions are meant to serve. The sys-
tematic pillage of the nation’s wealth by its supposed custodians over several
decades results in large-scale unemployment for many young Africans of modest
origins. After they successfully pass out of schools, universities, and other insti-
tutions of learning, they cannot find gainful employment. Leaders have looted
resources that could have been used for job creation. As a consequence, many of
these educated young people leave the continent in search of better opportun-
ities, resulting in a “brain drain,” or they pursue various criminal activities.
Greedy African leaders have squandered the future of their country and its chil-
dren, and reduced Africa to its current status of a pariah state in the comity of
nations.37 Largely due to corruption, other nations of the world have become
beneficiaries of African energy and brain power.
Despite abundant resources, corruption has made Africans the poorest people
in the world. The data proving African underdevelopment are bleak and forebod-
ing. Africa has one of the highest rates of maternal and infant mortality in the
world. In one of its global monitoring reports, UNESCO revealed that eight
million Nigerian children are out of school. There is evidence of the deteriorat-
ing living conditions of Africans owing to corruption. Iya Abubakar, one-time
Vice-Chancellor and Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, appalled at the
damaging effects of corruption, wrote:

The monster of corruption has robbed Nigeria between 1960 to date of a

conservative estimate of over 400 billion US dollars, stashed away in
foreign banks, money that could have been used in building and equipping
schools, hospitals and the construction of roads and for agricultural equip-
ment. […] [T]he monster that has rendered a country’s development
impossible.38

Like most countries in Africa, Nigeria’s real income per capita has remained
static; today it is $250, virtually the same as it was in 1960. In 1960, for instance,
Nigeria’s per capital income was about 1.5 times that of Malaysia; but today
Malaysia’s per capita income is 15 times that of Nigeria.39 Africa is the only
continent that has grown poorer in the past 30 years, with conditions often worse
than they were at independence. Throughout Africa, life expectancy is between
45 and 46 years for men and women, respectively. Over 60 percent of Africans
live below the poverty line and the illiteracy level is the highest in the world. It
is precisely due to the near total collapse of infrastructures, health, and educa-
tional facilities that a ridiculous number of Africans seek solace in foreign coun-
tries. Many affluent Nigerians, for example, seek medical attention in Western
countries or India and send their children to schools in the West or in Malaysia.
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 89
Conclusion
Corruption is taking its toll on Africa. Corruption discourages hard work,
honesty, patriotism, discipline, and integrity. It is no wonder that Africa is bereft
of the sterling qualities of leadership and innovation. Corruption tarnishes the
image of Africa by our inability or unwillingness to deal with it. Poverty has led
to a sharpening of ethnic identities and differences, and it breeds insecurity, con-
flict, and violence.40 Poverty knows no religion, region, or ethnicity, but, sadly,
in Africa, corruption is now the norm, not just an occasional or problematic
exception as in other parts of the world. Ihonvbere demonstrates that the ruling
elite in postcolonial Africa have managed to:

Snatch failure and confusion from the palm of success. African policy
makers have managed to put the cart before the sick horse, ignore glaring
realities while manipulating the people and squandering scarce resources
[…] when the so-called leaders are not squandering incredible opportunities
for growth and development, they busy themselves with intra and interstate
wars […] all in the diabolical struggle to corner power for primitive and
mindless accumulation that has so far precipitated pains, poverty, alienation,
violence and instability.41

Africans are mourning decades and centuries of injustice, inequality, and oppres-
sion. Corruption is undermining our capacity to promote and defend our sover-
eignty and dignity.

Notes
1 Thomas Callaghy, “Africa Falling Off the Map.” Current History 1994: 31–36.
2 Joseph Nye, “Corruption and Political Development; A Case–Benefit Analysis.” The
American Oolitical Science Review 1967: 417–427; see also Lucian Pye, “The
Concept of Political Development,” The Annals 358, March 1965: 1–19.
3 Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruhlik, “The Political Dimensions of Corruption, Clean
Ups: A Framework for Analysis in Comparative Politics.” Corruption: A Selected and
Annotated Biography 24, no. 1, 1991: 77–78.
4 Victor T. Le Vine, Political Corruption: The Ghana Experience (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975), p. 110.
5 See, among others, William N. Brownsberger, “Development and Governmental
Corruption-materialism and Political Fragmentation in Nigeria.” Journal of Modern
African Studies 21, no. 2, 1983: 215–233.
6 There is evidence to suggest that the British used corrupt tactics to influence kings
and chiefs in the Middle Niger area of Nigeria in order to maintain a foothold in
Nigeria. See Michael M. Mason, The Foundation of the Bida Kingdom (Zaria:
Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1976).
7 Stanislav Andreski, “Kleptocracy as a System of Government in Africa,” in The
African Predicament (New York: Twenty Century Fund.1968), p. 206. See also
Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Nations (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1963).
8 Patrick Dobel, “The Corruption of a State.” The American Political Science Review
72, no. 5, 1978: 958.
90 I.S. Jimada
9 John Waterbury, Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evid-
ence from Egypt and Morocco. Government and Opposition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976), pp. 426–445.
10 See Iya Abubakar, “Science and Technology and National Development.” Eighth
Memorial Lecture in Honor of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Arewa House, Kaduna, January 15,
2008, pp. 7–20.
11 Mason, The Foundation of the Bida Kingdom, pp. 86–122.
12 Samir Amin, “The State and the Question of Development,” in Anyang Nyongo (ed.),
Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 1–3.
13 John Ralston Saul, The Collapse of Globalism and the Re-invention of the World
(New York: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp. 154–210. Saul has explicitly shown how
countries such as Malaysia have managed to chart alternative paths to development
outside IMF and World Bank dictated strategies.
14 Ernest Harsch, “Accumulators and Democrats; Challenging State Corruption in
Africa.” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 1, 1993: 31.
15 Greg Mills, Why Africa is Poor and What Africans Can Do about It (New York:
Penguin, 2010), pp. 8–12; Jomo Kwame Sundaram, “Economic Liberalizations in
Africa” and Ronald Kasmir, “If You Are Part of the Solution You Are Likely Part of
the Problem,” in Tiyambe Zeleza, The Study of Africa; Global and Transnational
Engagements (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2007), pp. 62–79.
16 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1968), pp. 59–71.
17 James C. Scott, “The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations.” Comparative
Studies in Society and History 11, no. 3, 1969: 315–340.
18 Dobel, “The Corruption of a State,” 958.
19 Harsch, “Accumulators and Democrats,” 38.
20 Richard L. Sklar, “The Nature of Class Domination in Africa.” Journal of Modern
African Studies 17, no. 4, 1979: 537.
21 David Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World;
The Case of Zaire (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 32–33.
22 See United Nations Development Programme Report for Africa.org.1996.
23 El Wathig Kameir and Ibrahim Kursany, “Corruption as the Fifth Factor of Produc-
tion in the Sudan,” Uppsala, 1985, The Scandinavian Institute of Research Studies,
Report No. 72, p. 8.
24 Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 8, no. 2, 1966: 99.
25 Segun O. Osoba, “Corruption in Nigeria; Historical Perspectives.” Review of African
Political Economy 23, no. 69, September 1996: 371–386.
26 Bayart Jean François, The Criminalization of State in Africa (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999).
27 Harsch, “Accumulators and Democrats,” 31–48.
28 Kalu Agabi, in The Vanguard Newspaper, March 30, 2002.
29 Morris Szeftel, “Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia; The State as a
Resource in Itself.” Review of Africa Political Economy 24, May–August 1982: 20.
30 Seymonr Lipset and Salman Lenz, “Corruption Culture and Markets in Culture
Matters,” in Samuel Huntington et al. (eds) (New York: Basic Books, 2000),
p. 113, etc.
31 Harsch, “Accumulators and Democrats,” 31–48.
32 Mahmoud Mamdani, “Contradictory Class Perspective on the Question of Demo-
cracy; The Case of Uganda,” in Anyang Nyongo (ed.), Popular Struggles for Demo-
cracy in Africa (London: Zed Books), pp. 10–22.
33 Prarie Michael (ed.), “Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution:
1983–1987.” Pathfinder, 2007.
34 Harsch, “Accumulators and Democrats,” 31–48.
 Issues of corruption and poverty in Africa 91
35 Osoba, “Corruption in Nigeria,” 371–386.
36 Ibid., 382.
37 Ibid., 384.
38 Iya Abubakar, “Science and Technology and National Development.” Eighth
Memorial Lecture in Honor of Ahmadu Bello, Arewa House, Kaduna, January 15,
2008. pp. 7–10.
39 Ibid., p. 19.
40 Yusufu B. Usman, For the Liberation of Nigeria (London: New Beacon Books,
1979), pp. 78–92.
41 Julius Ihonvbere, “Reinventing Africa for the Challenges of the Twenty-first
Century.” Text of the 2010 Annual Public Lecture of the Centre for Black and African
Arts and Civilization (CBAAC), Lagos, July 22, 2010, p. 1.
5 PEPFAR and preventing
HIV/AIDS transmission
Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa
Daniel Barkley and Opeyemi Adeniyi

Introduction
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is the United States
government’s global strategy to fight the human immunodeficiency virus and
acquired immune deficiency (HIV/AIDS) pandemic. The U.S. government estab-
lished PEPFAR through the U.S. Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria Act of 2003. PEPFAR’s main prevention program featured the con-
troversial ABC strategy: Abstain, Be faithful, and the correct and consistent use
of Condoms. This study uses the “Difference-in-Differences” (DID) estimator to
assess the impact of ABC on slowing the spread of HIV in PEPFAR’s sub-
Saharan African (SSA) recipient countries. Applying DID analysis to a panel of
African countries in 2003 and 2008, we found no statistically significant differ-
ence in the adult HIV rates for PEPFAR recipient countries and non-PEPFAR
recipients in SSA. Our results call into question the effectiveness of ABC as an
HIV preventative strategy in SSA.
President George W. Bush initiated PEPFAR, and it is widely recognized as
one of the most notable accomplishments of his presidency. HIV/AIDS infects
an estimated 33.3 million people worldwide. SSA remains the most seriously
affected region; the number of persons living with HIV accounts for approxi-
mately 67 percent of all people living with HIV worldwide.1 Table 5.1 shows the
adult (ages 15–49) HIV rates in SSA in 1990, 1996, 2002, and 2009.
PEPFAR initially included 15 countries, which collectively represented
around 50 percent of the HIV infections worldwide: 12 countries in Africa as
well as Vietnam, Haiti, and Guyana. The 12 PEPFAR “focus countries” in
Africa are Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. PEPFAR is one
of the largest health plans ever initiated by a country to address a disease. PEP-
FAR’s first five-year fiscal budget (2003–2008) allocated $15 billion for HIV
prevention, care, and treatment. Figure 5.1 breaks down PEPFAR’s first-phase
funding in Africa by country.
Development (USAID) channeled the majority of PEPFAR funds through
competitively awarded grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts with U.S.-
based non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and host country governmental
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 93
Table 5.1 PEPFAR first-phase budget funding by country

Countries 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Botswana 24.3 51.8 54.9 76.2 93.2

Ivory Coast 24.3 44.4 46.6 84.4 120.5
Ethiopia 48 87.7 123 240 354.5
Kenya 92.5 142.9 208.3 368.1 534.8
Malawi 14.5 15.2 16.4 18.9 23.9
Mozambique 37.5 60.2 94.4 162 228.6
Namibia 24.5 42.5 57.3 91.2 108.9
Nigeria 70.9 110.2 163.6 304.9 447.6
Rwanda 38.2 56.9 72.1 103 123.4
South Africa 89.3 148.2 221.5 397.8 590.9
Tanzania 70.7 108.8 130 205.5 313.4
Uganda 90.8 130.1 149 236.6 283.3
Zambia 81.6 148.4 169.9 216 269.9
Zimbabwe 16.8 20.6 22 23.5 26.4
Total 723.9 1,167.90 1,529.00 2,528.10 3,519.30

Source: PEPFAR Country Profiles. Available at www.pepfar.gov/press/countries/profiles/index.htm.

Notes
Figures are in millions of current US$. Malawi and Zimbabwe are not PEPFAR focus countries.
SSA countries collectively received more than $9.4 billion funding or approximately 60 percent of
PEPFAR’s $15 billion first-phase budget.

4,000

3,500

3,000
Millions of US$

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Figure 5.1 PEPFAR funding, 2004–2008.

organizations. The first phase of PEPFAR’s strategy established policies for

HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care. Approximately 20 percent of PEP-
FAR’s total budget was allocated to prevention, with the remaining 80 percent
going to care and treatment, laboratory support, anti-retroviral treatment (ART),
TB/HIV services, support for orphans and vulnerable children, infrastructure,
training, and other related services. Figure 5.1 shows PEPFAR’s preventative
94 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
allocation budget for 2007. PEPFAR’s preventative programs included the pre-
vention of mother-to-child HIV/AIDS transmission during birth as well as pro-
grams for blood and injection safety. These prevention programs have been
widely recognized as being effective in preventing HIV/AIDS transmission. By
September 2007, PEPFAR programs had prevented mother-to-child transmission
for ten million pregnancies and provided ART to 1.45 million individuals.2
The cornerstone of PEPFAR’s adult HIV prevention strategy is the ABC
approach (Abstain, Be faithful, and correct and consistent use of Condoms) with
a strong emphasis on A and B over C. ABC is an abstinence-based sex education
program that stresses abstinence until marriage but includes information on safe-
sex practices. ABC represents a compromise between abstinence-only sex educa-
tion and comprehensive sex education. ABC programs encourage participants to
eliminate casual sex partners and to practice fidelity within their marriages and
other sexual relationships. ABC clients are instructed how to use a condom but
are also taught that condoms do not protect against all forms of sexually trans-
mitted diseases.
A substantial proportion of PEPFAR’s budget supports ABC activities. First-
phase legislation stipulated that 33 percent of funds for prevention be spent on
abstinence-until-marriage programs. Country teams could apply for an exemp-
tion to the 33 percent rule, but overall funding across PEPFAR countries must
meet the target; thus a waiver in one country requires compensatory increases in
another.3 In 2008, the United States Congress reauthorized PEPFAR for $48
billion over 2008 to 2013. The 33 percent earmark was removed from the
reauthorized legislation and replaced with a requirement that the Global AIDS
Coordinator report to Congress if less than 50 percent of funding to prevent
sexual transmission of HIV is spent on abstinence and fidelity programs in coun-
tries with generalized epidemics.4
There is considerable debate on the effectiveness of the ABC policy. Some
critics charge that PEPFAR’s ABC policies are the result of lobbying by Ameri-
can political and social groups with moral rather than public health agendas.5
Studies have called into question the effectiveness of abstinence as a long-term
strategy for reducing HIV transmission.5 The general consensus among public
health officials is that all three ABC elements are essential to reducing HIV inci-
dence, but promoting “A” and “B” over “C” has been sharply contested.6 Fur-
thermore, PEPFAR’s “C” activities are directed at “high-risk” groups, such as
commercial sex workers, and not at the general population.7
Supporters of ABC contend that their approach is evidence-based and point
to declines in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in PEPFAR-aided countries as proof
of their method’s effectiveness.8 Indeed, as implemented in Uganda and other
places, the ABC approach has been effective in reducing the rate of new infec-
tion.9 Zambia, for instance, has successfully increased both the age of sexual
debut and abstinence among young people.10
However, the decline in the prevalence of adult HIV in SSA started before
PEPFAR. Since 2001, four PEPFAR countries – Botswana, South Africa,
Namibia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia – have experienced
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 95
significant declines in HIV prevalence among young women or men in national
surveys. Between 2001 and 2009, overall HIV incidence in Namibia decreased
by more than 25 percent. In Zambia, HIV incidence declined by more than 25
percent between 2001 and 2009. Moreover, reductions in adult HIV prevalence
in SSA have not been limited to PEPFAR-aided countries. UNAIDS (2010, 28)
estimates that the incidence of HIV has significantly fallen in 22 countries in
SSA between 2001 and 2009. Table 5.2, which depicts the global change in adult
HIV rates between 2001 and 2009, shows HIV rates as falling or stable in SSA
countries.
Table 5.2 estimates the Difference-in-Differences (DID) between the mean
adult HIV rates for PEFPAR of 11 of the 12 recipients and 34 non-PEPFAR
countries.11 Table 5.2 shows that the incidence of HIV fell faster in PEPFAR
recipient countries over the PEPFAR’s first phase (2003–2008). In 2003, the
average incidence of HIV between PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR countries dif-
fered by 0.603 (= 1.111 – 0.508). By the end of PEPFAR’s first phase (2008) the
difference fell to 0.317 (= 0.761 – 0.445), yielding an HIV adult DID of 0.286.
However, before concluding that PEPFAR’s first-phase intervention reduced the
incidence of HIV by nearly half in recipient countries, we must control for
factors other than PEPFAR’s ABC that might explain the DID in adult HIV
rates.
Similarly, Table 5.3 shows estimates of the DID between the mean total fer-
tility rates for all 12 PEPFAR recipient and 34 non-PEPFAR countries. In this
case, the difference between PEPFAR recipient countries and non-PEPFAR
countries in 2003 and in 2008 was 0.07, resulting in a DID of 0.00, suggesting

Table 5.2 Difference-in-Differences (DID) of mean adult HIV rates for PEPFAR and
non-PEPFAR recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 2003 to 2008

PEPFAR Non-PEPFAR PEPFAR/

Non-PEPFAR

2003 1.111 0.508 0.603

2008 0.761 0.445 0.317
Difference-in-Differences (DID) – – 0.286

Sources: UNAIDS data and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS.

Table 5.3 Difference-in-Differences (DID) of mean total fertility rates for PEPFAR and
non-PEPFAR recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 2003 to 2008

PEPFAR Non-PEPFAR PEPFAR/

Non-PEPFAR

2003 5.036 5.106 0.07

2008 4.74 4.747 0.07
Difference-in-Differences (DID) – – 0

Source: World Bank.

96 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
that PEPFAR had no impact on total fertility rates. Again, this result does not
control for factors other than PEPFAR that might explain the DID in total fertil-
ity rates.
One 2007 study, which looked at the five years (1997–2002) leading up to the
start of PEPFAR as well as the three years (2004–2007) following its launch,
found that PEPFAR had reduced the death rate due to AIDS in Africa by 10
percent but had no appreciable effect on the prevalence of HIV/AIDs.12 This
study, however, did not include an assessment of the entire first phase
(2003–2008) of PEPFAR funding. The 2006 to 2008 years are especially
important, since PEPFAR funding more than doubled during this time. PEP-
FAR’s 2009 budget continued the emphasis on ABC prevention, essentially
requiring that at least half of all prevention spending be on abstinence-based
activities.13

Method: Difference-in-Differences (DID)

This study used two models of the DID estimator econometrics technique to
assess the impact of PEPFAR in slowing the spread of HIV in the 12 focus coun-
tries in Africa. The first DID model assesses PEPFAR’s ABC by using the inci-
dence of adult HIV (ages 15–49) as the dependent variable. In this model, the
DID estimator is the difference between the average adult HIV rates in PEPFAR
and non-PEPFAR countries before PEPFAR intervention minus the difference
between the average adult HIV rates in PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR countries
after PEPFAR’s intervention. A statistically significant negative DID estimator
implies that adult HIV rates are lower in PEPFAR countries owing to the
application of PEPFAR’s ABC policies in the focus countries. Our second DID
model assesses PEPFAR using the total fertility rate (average births per woman)
as the dependent variable. This model employs neoclassical consumer behavior
analysis to explain the variation in fertility with per capita income, adult literacy
rates, and infant mortality along with the DID estimator. In this second model,
the DID estimator is the difference between the average total fertility rates in
PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR countries before PEPFAR intervention minus the
difference between the average fertility rates in PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR
countries after PEPFAR’s intervention. A statistically significant negative DID
estimator in this case implies that average fertility rates are lower in PEPFAR
countries owing to the application of PEPFAR’s ABC policies in the focus
countries.
The PEPFAR project in many ways resembles a natural experiment, with the
PEPFAR focus countries forming the “treatment group” and the remaining sub-
Saharan African countries forming the “control group.”A natural experiment
occurs when some exogenous event – a change in government policy such as
PEPFAR – alters the environment in which individuals operate. Unlike a true
experiment, in which the control and treatment groups are randomly selected,
the control and treatment groups in this case arise from the implementation of
PEPFAR policy. This complicates isolating the effect of the PEPFAR, since the
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 97
decline in HIV prevalence may be due to systematic differences between coun-
tries rather than PEPFAR policies.

HIVit = β0 + β1Yt + β2PEPFARi + β3Y1 * PEPFAR + βjControlsit + μit (1)

Two years of data are needed for controlling the systematic differences between
the control and treatment groups: one year before the policy change and one year
after the policy change.14 The years 2003, 2008, and 2009 were selected for this
study; with 2003 corresponding to the “before PEPFAR” period, and 2008 and
2009 corresponding to the “after PEPFAR” intervention period.15 This particular
arrangement permits us to arrive at more robust results by estimating two DID
coefficients; one for each time period of 2003 to 2008 and 2003 to 2009. The
effectiveness of the PEPFAR’s ABC policy is assessed using the following
model: (1) for t = 2003, 2008, and 2009 where HIVit is the incidence of adults
(15–49 years old) living with HIV in country i in year t; Y2008 and Y2009 are
dummy variables equaling 1 for the year 2008 and 2009 respectively and are 0
otherwise; PEPFARi is a dummy variable equaling 1 if country i was a PEPFAR
“focus country” and is 0 otherwise.
The parameter β1 captures changes in adult HIV rates for all SSA countries
before and after PEPFAR. The coefficient on PEPFAR, β2 measures the change
in the adult HIV rates in PEPFAR countries not due to PEPFAR’s ABC activ-
ities. The parameter of interest is coefficient of the interaction term Y* PEPFAR:
β3 measures the change in adult HIV rates due to PEPFAR’s ABC policy. The
parameter β3 is the Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimator and when the
control variables are not included in equation (1) it may be expressed as:
____ ____ ____ ____
β̂ 3 = (HIV2009,P – HIV2009,NP) – (HIV2003,P – HIV2003,NP) (2)

where the subscript “P” stands for PEPFAR focus countries and the subscript
“NP” stands for non-PEPFAR countries. In this case, β̂ 3 is the difference over
2003 to 2009 in the average incidence of adult HIV between PEPFAR and non-
PEPFAR countries. Similarly, the difference over 2003 to 2008 in the average
incidence of adult HIV between PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR countries is:
____ ____ ____ ____
β̂ 3 = (HIV2008,P – HIV2008,NP) – (HIV2003,P – HIV2003,NP) (3)

Four independent variables are included to control for the intervening character-
istics across SSA countries: DEATH, the crude death rate per 100 in country i in
year t; LIFE, life expectancy in country i in year t; HEALTH, public health
expenditures as a percentage of GDP in country i in year t; and CHRISTIAN, the
percentage of the population that is Christian in country i in year t.
The reduction in HIV rates may be as a result of the deaths of HIV-positive
adults rather than from implementing PEPFAR’s ABC measures. The variable
DEATH is added to the specification to control for this possible effect. The ele-
vated HIV rates in PEPFAR countries may be due to PEPFAR treatment and
98 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
care programs that have extended the lives of HIV-positive adults. The variable
LIFE controls for differences in life expectancy between PEPFAR and non-
PEPFAR recipients. Similarly, the variable HEALTH (health expenditures are a
percentage of GDP) controls for the effect of government expenditures on public
healthcare in helping to extend the lives of HIV-positive adults, thereby increas-
ing the incidents of HIV. The abstinence-based approach to slowing the spread
of HIV did not begin with PEPFAR and is not exclusively practiced in PEP-
FAR’s focus countries.16 Findings from pre-PEPFAR Kenya and Zimbabwe
show an association between declines in HIV prevalence and behavior changes
consistent with abstinence and being faithful.17 Many Christian denominations
have strong objections against the use of condoms to prevent the spread of HIV/
AIDS.18 Accordingly, members of these faiths are more inclined to practice “A”
and “B” (Abstinence and Being faithful), PEPFAR policy notwithstanding. The
variable CHRISTIAN controls for the extent to which “Abstinence and Being
faithful” and not using condoms affects adult HIV rates.
When the control variables are included in equation (1) the OLS estimate of
β̂ 3 no longer has the simple form of equation (2) and equation (3) but its interpre-
tation is similar.

PEPFAR and fertility

In this section, changes in the total fertility rate are used as an additional way of
evaluating the effectiveness of PEPFAR’s ABC programs. Although PEPFAR is
by no means a “family planning” scheme, it seems plausible that its massive
intervention could have affected fertility rates in focus countries. Table 5.4
shows PEPFAR’s outreach programs promoting the “correct and consistent
usages of condoms” and abstinence-based programs served tens of millions of
people in fiscal year 2008 alone. Moreover, PEPFAR distributed 698,205,000
condoms during its first phase.
Contemporary high fertility rates in SSA countries are characterized by
unplanned and unwanted pregnancies, early age at first sexual union, and early
age at giving birth.19 Indeed, Timaeus and Moultrie’s (2008) analysis of survey
data from South Africa found that postponement of births contributed substan-
tially to that country’s fertility decline. Accordingly, a plausible argument for
PEPFAR’s impact on fertility is that PEPFAR’s ABC increased the capacity to
exercise control over reproduction and thus lowered fertility rates in recipient
countries. That is, PEPFAR’s Abstinence, Being faithful, and the correct and
consistent usage of Condoms ultimately translated into delayed sexual debut and
reduced unplanned and unwanted pregnancies, all of which lowered fertility
rates in recipient countries.

The micro-economic theory of fertility

The micro-economic models of fertility draw from the neoclassical theory under-
lying consumer behavior. These models assume that household preferences for a
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 99
Table 5.4 ABC activities in PEPFAR countries

“AB” Abstinence and/or “C” Outreach promoting Condoms shipped

Being faithful (FY2008) Condoms (FY2008) (FY2004–2008)

Number of people served Number of people served

Botswana 212,900 38,100 17,367,000

Ivory Coast 633,100 671,600 8,136,000
Ethiopia 6,970,900 5,416,500 165,978,000
Kenya 4,574,300 5,941,000 40,002,000
Mozambique 2,389,700 2,019,800 125,922,000
Namibia 321,200 400,400 0
Nigeria 4,670,700 1,506,600 9,705,000
Rwanda 717,200 776,900 50,724,000
South Africa 1,178,700 3,030,500 3,330,000
Tanzania 2,814,600 2,692,200 72,559,000
Uganda 4,519,800 1,737,000 133,911,000
Zambia 1,487,400 1,182,100 69,707,000
Total 30,490,500 25,412,700 689,205,000

Source: PEPFAR Country Profiles. Available at www.pepfar.gov/press/countries/profiles/index.htm.

certain number of surviving children determine the “demand for children.” Equa-
tion (4) displays a rendition of the micro-economic theoretical model that expresses
the demand for children (proxy here as the total fertility rate TFR) as a function of
capita income (Income), infant mortality (Mortality), and adult literacy (Literacy):

TFR = f (Income,Mortality,Literacy) (4)

In countries with high infant mortality, parents may have more children than they
desire in the expectation that some will not survive.20 A country-level econo-
metric analysis for the period 1960 to 2000 found that mortality changes account
for a major part of observed fertility decline in the period since 1960.21 World
Bank data for Africa corroborate the impact of infant mortality on fertility. SSA
countries with substantial fertility declines in the 1980s and 1990s were also
countries that enjoyed some success in reducing infant and child mortality.22 The
demand for children depends on household income. All other factors being equal,
higher income allows households to support larger family sizes. However, under
the “quantity–quality trade-off ” hypothesis, parents may choose to have fewer
children in order to invest in more schooling per child.23 Finally, greater literacy
is associated with lower fertility rates; as women become better educated they
tend to earn a larger share of the household income and produce fewer children.24
The micro-economic theoretical model of fertility can readily be modified to
test the effects of PEPFAR on fertility. Equation (5) adds the three Difference-
in-Differences terms – PEPFAR, YEAR, and (PEPFAR*YEAR) – to equation (4).

F = f (Income,Mortality,Literacy,PEPFAR,YEAR, PEPFAR*YEAR) (5)

100 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
Equation (6) expresses equation (5) in log-linear format:

log Fertilityit = φ0 + φ1YEARt + φ2PEPFAR + φ3(YEARt * PEPFAR) +

1 (6)
φ2 ____________ + φ log Incomeit + φ6 log Literacyit + ηit
log Mortalityit 0

The inverse format assumes that infant mortality has a diminishing returns effect
on fertility. This circumstance arises from the physical conditions that limit the
number of possible pregnancies in a woman’s lifetime.

Data sources
The HIV incidence (15–49) is compiled by the UNAIDS Data and the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, and is retrieved from http://data.un.
org/Data.aspx?q=hiv&d=UNAIDS&f=inID%3a32. The CIA World Fact Book
provided data for the variables BORDERS, the number of international land
borders, and CHRISTIAN, the percentage of the population that is Christian. The
World Bank Catalog Data (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog) was the
source for the remaining variables: FERTILITY, total fertility rate, births per
woman in country i in year t; DEATH, crude death rate per 100 in country i in
year t; LIFE, life expectancy at birth in years in country i in year t; INCOME,
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) country i in year t; LIT-
ERACY, the adult literacy rate (percentage of population aged 15 years and
above) in country i in year t; and HEALTH, health expenditures per capita, PPP
(in constant 2005 international dollars) country i in year t.
Table 5.5 presents the summary statistics for the dependent and independent
variables.

Discussion
Table 5.6 presents the ordinary least-squares estimates of equation (1). Model
1’s Difference-in-the-Differences estimator (the coefficient of the interaction
term) implies that the average HIV difference between PEPFAR and non-
PEPFAR countries in 2008 and 2009 was not significantly different from the
average HIV differences between PEPFAR and non-PEPFAR countries in 2003.
Model 1’s and Model 3’s results are particularly striking, since they do not
include the control variables. Serial correlation does not undermine our conclusion
that the DID estimator is statistically insignificant. In fact, serial correlation provides
further evidence that our estimated DID coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Durban–Watson (D–W) statistics indicate positive serial correlation of the residuals
for all four models. Serial correlation does not affect the unbiased nature or consist-
ency of OLS estimators, but it does affect their efficiency. With positive serial corre-
lation in the error term (e.g., D–W less than 2), the OLS estimates of the standard
errors will be smaller than the true standard errors, making the true DID t-statistics
smaller. Table 5.7 presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations of Model
2 and Model 4 assuming DEATH, LIFE, and HEALTH are endogenous variables.25
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation

Variable Definition Mean (standard Mean (standard Mean (standard

deviation) 2003 deviation) 2008 deviation) 2009

HIV Incidence of HIV (ages 15–49) in country i in year t. 0.66 (0.84) 0.53 (0.63) 0.52 (0.61)
DEATH Crude death rate per 100 in country i in year t. 13.82 (3.58) 12.43 (3.22) 12.17 (3.13)
LIFE Life expectancy at birth in years in country i in year t. 52.44 (7.09) 54.74 (6.93) 55.22 (6.84)
HEALTH Health expenditures per capita, PPP (in constant 2005 117.67 (176.99) 169.61 (240.59) 183.32 (267.46)
international dollars) country i in year t.
CHRISTIAN Percent Christian in country i in year t. 42.71 (30.05) 42.71 (30.05) 42.71 (30.05)
FERTILITY Total fertility rate, births per woman in country i in year t. 5.09 (1.22) 4.75 (1.22) 4.68 (1.22)
MORTALITY Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) in country i in 79.49 (25.63) 70.73 (25.07) 69.15 (24.95)
year t.
INCOME GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 2,440.05 (3566.80) 2,847.15 (4090.41) 2,828.71 (4028.70)
country i in year t.
LITERACY Adult literacy rate (percentage of population aged 15 61.74 (19.88) 62.98 (19.00) 62.98 (19.00)
years and above) in country i in year t.
102 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
Table 5.6 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: ordinary least squares (OLS)
dependent variable is log (HIV)

OLS Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4:

2003–2008 2003–2008 2003–2009 2003–2009

YEAR2008 –0.03 (0.24) –0.18 (0.16) – –

YEAR2009 – – –0.03 (0.24) –0.19 (0.17)
PEPFAR 1.14* (0.33) 0.35 (0.23) 1.14* (0.33) 0.36 (0.24)
YEAR *PEPFAR –0.37 (0.46) –0.15 (0.31) –0.37 (0.46) –0.12 (0.31)
DEATH (log) – –5.046 – –5.0924
LIFE (log) – –38.9436 – –38.7504
HEALTH (log) – 0.57* (0.08) – 0.55* (0.08)
CHRISTIAN – 0.01* (0.002) – 0.01* (0.002)
CONSTANT –0.2192 63.08* (13.80) –1.37 (0.17) 62.97* (13.84)
Adjusted-R2 0.15 0.63 0.15 0.62
Observations 86 84 86 84
Durbin–Watson 0.92 1.18 0.91 1.2
F-Statistic 5.98* 20.97* 6.03* 20.13*

Notes
* p < 0.01; standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table 5.7 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: two-stage least squares (2SLS)

2SLS Dependent variable is log (adult HIV rates)

Model 5: 2003–2008 Model 6: 2003–2009

YEAR2008 –0.30(0.18) –
YEAR2009 – –0.34*** (0.18)
PEPFAR 0.20 (0.29) 0.11 (0.29)
YEAR*PEPFAR –0.03 (0.34) 0.06 (0.35)
DEATH (log) –6.08** (1.75) –5.07** (1.86)
LIFE (log) –74.727 –69.273
HEALTH (log) 0.71* (0.15) 0.78* (0.16)
CHRISTIAN 0.01* (0.003) 0.01* (0.003)
CONSTANT 80.83* (21.40) 72.10* (21.33)
Adjusted-R2 0.6 0.6
Observations 84 83
Durbin–Watson 1.17 1.19
F-Statistic 9.30* 9.40*

Notes
* p < 0.01;
** p < 0.01;
*** p < 0.10; standard errors are in parenthesis.

The signs and significance of all of the coefficients in Model 5 and Model 6
are consistent with least-squares estimations of Model 2 and Model 4 respec-
tively. Most importantly, the coefficients of the interaction terms in the 2SLS
models are consistent with the OLS results: PEPFAR’s intervention had no sta-
tistically significant impact upon adult HIV rates in recipient countries.
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 103
Table 5.8 presents four OLS estimates of equation (6), the neoclassical model
of fertility. The coefficients of the interaction term in Model 7 through Model 10
indicate that PEPFAR’s ABC intervention had no statistically significant impact
on total fertility rates in recipient countries; the two-stage least-squares estimates
represented in Table 5.9 (Model 11 and Model 12) convey a similar conclu-
sion.26 The 2SLS results are consistent with OLS DID estimates in Table 5.6.

Table 5.8 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: ordinary least squares (OLS)

OLS Dependent variable is log (total fertility rate)

Model 7: Model 8: Model 9: Model 10:

2003–2008 2003–20098 2003–2009 2003–2009

Y2008 –0.07 (0.07) –0.03 (0.03) – –

Y2009 – – –0.09 (0.07) –0.04 (0.03)
PEPFAR 0.008 (0.10) –0.002 (0.05) 0.008 (0.10) 0.003 (0.05)
YEAR*PEPFAR 0.01 (0.14) 0.04 (0.07) 0.01 (0.14) 0.04 (0.07)
GDP (log) – –0.0014 – –0.0014
1/MORTALITY (log) – –3.759 – –3.8624
LITERACY (log) – –0.009 – –0.0085
CONSTANT 1.60* (0.05) 4.19* (0.19) 1.60* (0.05) 4.15* (0.19)
Adjusted-R2 –0.01 0.719 –0.01 0.717
Observations 92 88 92 88
Durban–Watson 1.03 1.14 1.04 1.17
F-Statistic 0.47 38.15* 0.66 37.84*

Notes
* p < 0.01; standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table 5.9 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: two-stage least squares (2SLS)

2SLS Dependent Variable is log (total fertility rate)

Model 11: 2003–2008 Model 12: 2003–2009

YEAR2008 –0.03 (0.03) –

YEAR2009 – –0.04 (0.04)
PEPFAR –0.01 (0.06) –0.01 (0.06)
YEAR*PEPFAR 0.06 (0.08) 0.07 (0.08)
GDP (log) –0.0021 –0.08** (0.03)
1/MORTALITY (log) –6.305 –6.35
LITERACY (log) –0.009 –0.009
CONSTANT 4.25* (0.21) 4.24* (0.21)
Adjusted-R2 0.71 0.71
Observations 83 83
Durbin–Watson 1.15 1.12
F-Statistic 27.15* 24.71*

Notes
* p < 0.01;
** p < 0.01; standard errors are in parenthesis.
104 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is said to exist when two or more independent variables are
“highly” correlated. We put “highly” in quotation marks because there is no
absolute number we can cite to conclude that multicollinearity is a problem.27
Since multicollinarity violates none of the Gauss-Markov assumptions, the
“problem” of multicollinearity is not really well defined. However, a strong
linear relationship among the independent variables may undermine hypothesis
tests. Under the Gauss-Markov assumptions the variance of the OLS estimates,
VAR(β̂ j), is dependent on the variation in the total sample and the correlation
among the independent variables:

σ 2
__________
Var(β̂ j) = (7)
SSTj (1 – R 2j)
_
For j = 1, 2 […] k independent variables where SSTj = Σni=1(xij – x j)2 is the total
sample (n) variation in xj, σ 2 is the variance of the error term, µ and R 2j is the
R-squared from regressing xj, on all other independent variables including an
intercept. Accordingly, equation (7) shows that the smaller total sample variation
and the higher correlation among the independent variables, the larger variances
of the OLS estimates. The OLS variances are of practical importance: a larger
variance means a less precise estimator, and this translates into larger confidence
intervals and less accurate hypothesis tests.28
Muliticollinearity is a concern for the current analysis owing to the strong linear
correlation between the variables LOG(DEATH) and LOG(LIFE). Moreover, our
relatively small sample size (n = 84) Pearson’s r for the pair is –0.95 in the 2003
and 2008 panel and –0.94 in the 2003 and 2009 panel. Moreover, the Pearson’s r
between Year*PEPFAR and PEPFAR is 0.65 for both panel periods. This latter
finding could undermine the hypothesis tests regarding the DID estimators.
The variance inflation factor (VIF ) is a common statistic used in multicolline-
arity analysis. The VIF for coefficient j is simply VIFj = 1 / (1 – R 2j ), where R 2j is
the R-squared from regressing xj on all other independent variables including an
intercept. Sometimes a VIF of 10 or higher is used as an indication of multi-
collinearity.29 Table 5.10 shows only that the VIF for LOG(DEATH) and
LOG(LIFE) is above 10 in both panels. Fortunately, high correlation among
these two control variables does not make it more difficult to determine the
effects of PEPFAR. Table 5.11’s least-squares estimates show that dropping
LOG(LIFE) or LOG(DEATH) does not substantially change the standard errors
or the coefficients of YEAR*PEPFAR or PEPFAR. Indeed, the results in Table
5.11 are consistent with our earlier OLS models in Table 5.6. Our main interest
is the causal effect of interaction term, Year*PEPFAR on the dependent variable,
adult HIV. Table 5.10 shows that the VIF of the interaction term is only 2.32,
which suggests that multicollinearity does not appear to undermine our hypo-
thesis tests regarding the DID estimator.
Table 5.11 shows that none of the VIF estimates for independent variables
used in the micro-economic fertility model is above 2.
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 105
Table 5.10 Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation: ordinary least squares (OLS)

OLS Dependent variable is log (HIV)

Model 13: Model 14: Model 15: Model 16:

2003–2008 2003–20098 2003–2009 2003–2009

YEAR2008 –0.113634 (0.17) –0.12 (0.19) – –

YEAR2009 – – –0.11 (0.19) –0.10 (0.18)
PEPFAR 0.32 (0.26) 0.34 (0.27) 0.36 (0.28) 0.34 (0.26)
YEAR*PEPFAR –0.29 (0.35) –0.33 (0.37) –0.34 (0.37) –0.29 (0.35)
DEATH (log) – 1.45* (0.32) 1.35* (0.32) –
LIFE(log) –3.0024 – – –2.8584
HEALTH (log) 0.53* (0.09) 0.49* (0.09) 0.46* (0.09) 0.50* (0.09)
CHRISTIAN 0.01* (0.002) 0.01* (0.003) 0.01* (0.003) 0.01* (0.002)
CONSTANT 12.63* (2.78) –7.52488 –7.0191 11.93* (2.83)
Adjusted-R2 0.56 0.49 0.49 0.55
Observations 84 84 84 84
Durbin–Watson 1.14 1.09 1.15 1.05
F-Statistic 18.64* 14.82* 14.18* 17.66*

Notes
* p < 0.01; standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table 5.11 Variance inflation factor (VIF)

2003–2008 2003–2009

LOG (GDP) 1.54 1.54

1/MORTALITY 1.59 1.59
LOG (LITERACY) 1.35 1.35

Conclusion
The fall in adult HIV rates in sub-Saharan Africa is a welcome development.
This reduction in HIV incidence likely reflects the natural trends in the epidemic
as well as the result of prevention programs resulting in behavioral change in
different contexts (UNAIDS 2007). This analysis shows that these improve-
ments, however, cannot be attributed to PEPFAR’s abstinence-based prevention
programs. These results call into question the continued use of ABC as a HIV
preventative policy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Notes
1 United Nations (2010).
2 Office of US Global AIDS Coordinator (2012).
3 Dietrich (2007).
4 PEPFAR Watch (2012).
5 Di Censo et al. (2002); Caldwell (2002); Dailard (2003).
6 Dietrich (2007). See also “HIV Prevention Policy Needs Urgent Care,” Lancet 367,
no. 9518 (April 2006): 1213–1215. Available at www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/
article/PIIS0140-6736%2806%2968513-9/fulltext (accessed March 27, 2012).
106 D. Barkley and O. Adeniyi
7 The distribution of condoms targeted only specific high-risk populations, such as
commercial sex workers and their clients: sero-discordant couples, men who have sex
with men, substance abusers and mobile male populations (Dietrich 2007: 289).
8 Kamwi et al. (2006). Congress Donald M. Payne, Chairman of the Africa and Global
Health Subcommittee Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of
Representative One Hundred and Tenth Congress, First Session April 24, 2007.
9 Sinding (2005).
10 UNAIDS (2010). Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Health, Tropical Diseases
Research Centre, University of Zambia, and Macro International Inc., Zambia Demo-
graphic and Health Survey 2007 (Calverton, MD: CSO and Macro International Inc.,
2009).
11 Incidence of HIV (ages 15–49) data for Ethiopia were unavailable for the years 2003,
2008, and 2009. Accordingly, Ethiopia is not included in the analysis involving the
incidence of HIV even though it is a PEPFAR focus country.
12 Sepulveda (2007).
13 PEPFAR Watch, “Finding Restrictions.” Available at www.pepfarwatch.org/the_
issues/abstinence_and_fidelity/ (accessed March 27, 2012).
14 Woolridge (2009).
15 Although the Leadership Act, which created PEPFAR, passed in May 2003, funds
were not appropriated until January 2004, and the majority of the first year’s funding
was not fully obligated until September 2004 (Sepulveda 2007). HIV prevalence
peaked in sub-Saharan Africa in 2000 (UNAIDS 2007: 5). UNAIDS (2010) has pub-
lished comparable (updated) estimates of adult HIV for 2001 and 2009.
16 Dailard (2003).
17 Cheluget et.al. (2006); Mahomva et al. (2006).
18 See Caldwell and Caldwell (1990). Vatican, “Condoms Don’t Stop AIDS,” Guardian,
October 9, 2003. Available at www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1058966,00.
html (accessed March 27, 2012). Archbishop Gabriel Charles Palmer-Buckle of Accra
has stated:
[T]he Catholic Church [offers] three methods to help solve this problem of AIDS
in Africa: “A,” abstain; “B,” be faithful; “C,” chastity, which is in consonance
with traditional African values. Those Planned Parenthood people are only talking
about condoms. By the way, they know full well that the condoms devoted to
Africa are Sub-standard.
(“Ghanaian Archbishop Says Church Has Failed Africa.” National Catholic
Reporter. Available at http://ncronline.org/news/vatican/ghanaian-
archbishop-says-church-has-failed-africa (accessed March 27, 2012)
19 World Bank (2010).
20 Todaro and Smith (2011).
21 Angeles (2010).
22 World Bank (2010).
23 World Bank (2010).
24 Todaro and Smith (2010).
25 The 2SLS model assumes that the variables LIFE (life expectancy), DEATH (deaths
per 1,000), and HEALTH (health expenditures as a percentage of GDP) are endo-
genous variables. Instruments for LIFE and DEATH include ELDER (the percentage
of population older than 65) and ELDER2, SANITATION (the proportion of the popu-
lation using improved sanitation), and WATER (the proportion of the population using
improved water sources). The instrument for HEALTH is MILITARY (military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP assumes that governments face a “guns-vs.-
butter” tradeoff between expenditures on health versus expenditures on the military)
(World Bank catalog data available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog
(accessed July 28, 2012)).
 PEPFAR and prevention of HIV transmission 107
26 The 2SLS model assumes that INCOME (per capita income) and MORTALITY (infant
mortality) are endogenous variables. Instruments for INCOME include EXPORTS
(exports as a percentage of GDP), IMPORTS (imports as a percentage of GDP),
DEFLATOR (GDP deflator), GOVT (government expenditures as a percentage of
GDP), INDUSTRY (industry percentage of GDP), MILITARY (military expenditures
as a percentage of GDP), and INTERNET (internet user per 100 people). The instru-
ments for MORTALITY include WATER (the proportion of the population using
improved water sources) (World Bank catalog data available at http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog (accessed 28 July 2012)).
27 Woolridge (2009).
28 Ibid., 95.
29 Ibid.

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6 Reflections on the current
challenges of poverty reduction
in Africa
Loveday N. Gbara

Introduction
Africa’s persistent poverty and underdevelopment problems have together
emerged not only as a challenge to the international community but also as an
important aspect in African Studies in the twenty-first century. Nearly all of the
models and approaches prescribed by development experts, development institu-
tions, and social scientists over the years have failed to bring about any practical
economic growth or poverty reduction in Africa. Instead, the scale of poverty
and underdevelopment has been exacerbated. This chapter examines some of the
key factors that have contributed to the growth of poverty in Africa in the
twenty-first century and goes further to explore the historical contexts of poverty
in the continent as well as its impact and possible strategies to move Africa
forward from this deplorable condition.
Poverty may be defined in many different ways. For the purpose of this
chapter, poverty is defined as the lack of ability to meet and maintain an accept-
able standard of living. A citizen of a given African state could be regarded as
poor should his or her standard of living fall below an acceptable norm accord-
ing to the prevailing sociocultural values. Poverty is generally characterized by
the inability of people, households, and communities to command sufficient
resources to satisfy their basic needs, such as food, shelter, and health.1 A rider
from this from the African perspective is that poverty may be taken to include
alienation from communities, insecurity, crowded homes, low wages, and unsafe
and inefficient forms of energy, lack of jobs, and fragmentation of family.
In contrast, wealth is characterized by good housing, the use of gas or electri-
city, ownership of major durable goods, and large sums of money: “Using
minimum costs of food and other criteria, the World Bank estimated in 1988 that
29.7% of the total population in developing countries, were poor.”2 According to
the same estimate, 49 percent of people in South Asia and 49.8 percent in sub-
Saharan Africa were poor.3
While other regions of the world have experienced economic prosperity and
reduced levels of poverty, per capita income in Africa in the 1990s remained
roughly the same as it was for most countries when they became independent in
the 1960s: “During the 1990s nearly half of all Africans lived on $1 a day or
110 L.N. Gbara
less, and 30 percent of the world’s poor lived in Africa – a higher share than at
independence.”4 Furthermore, Africa ranks at the bottom in global comparisons
of social development indicators in areas such as literacy, life expectancy, and
healthcare, as one in five children dies before the age of five.5 A Guardian news
article dated February 14, 2012 reported:

[F]rom the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has become worrisome

announcement that poverty is on the rise in Nigeria with more than 100
million citizens earning less than $1 per day as the gap between the rich and
poor continues to widen.

Causes of poverty in Africa in historical perspective

Indeed, no region of the world, no matter how developed or underdeveloped, is
totally free from poverty and the problems associated with it. Even advanced
countries, including the United States, Canada, or France, have some level of
poverty among their populations. The fact that much of the population in Africa
still lives in poverty, hopelessness, and underdevelopment in the twenty-first
century despite all of the models and approaches prescribed by the international
community has posed a significant challenge to all those who are concerned with
the plight of Africans and the African continent. Perhaps a brief examination of
its past could shed light on why a continent endowed with abundant natural
resources still finds herself in a perpetual cycle of poverty and underdevelopment.
Although numerous factors may be linked to the current state of African
affairs, this chapter argues that, from a historical perspective, various factors are
basically responsible for the nature of poverty in independent African states.
These factors include the international system of slavery and slave trade, coloni-
alism (prolonged periods of colonial occupation), and European-backed com-
mercial activities designed “to exploit Africa’s considerable natural wealth
provided little institutional, infrastructural, and human capital.”6 Misguided pol-
icies accepted by African political and business leaders of African Union
member states in collaboration with development experts are another cause of
poverty.7

Cold War and post- Cold War politics

The outbreak and intensity of the Cold War (1947–1989) transformed newly
independent African states into proxy battlefields between the United States and
the former Soviet Union and contributed to African poverty.8 Political instability
and poverty resulted from persistent African conflicts, and decades of military
governments and military coups. For example, 71 military coups occurred in
Africa between 1952 and 1990. Military coups resulted in the toppling of 60
percent of the entire African continent. While countries such as Guinea experi-
enced one or two incidences of military coups, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and
Ghana underwent numerous coups and counter-coups. Africa had a total of 88
 Challenges of poverty reduction in Africa 111
military coups from independence up until the twenty-first century. In 2000,
Africa had only three coups.9

Ethnic conflicts in Africa

Since the end of World War II, which devastated Europe, no other continent on
earth has been so consumed or devastated by ethnic conflicts than Africa. In
Nigeria, for example, persistent ethnic problems, many years of military rule,
and rampant corruption have created a large population of the poor. Ethnic prob-
lems and economic issues in Nigeria triggered the 1966 civil war that claimed
the lives of over a million people. Between 2000 and 2007, over 54,000 people
were killed in ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa. In Liberia, in late 1990,
more than 150,000 out of a population of three million were killed. Ethnic con-
flicts in Liberia also resulted in over 800,000 refugees. In Rwanda, in 1994,
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in 100 days of fighting between
the main ethnic group Hutu and the minority Tutsi ethnic group. About a million
people also ended up as refugees.10

The disaster of African leadership

Leadership here refers to individuals who perform the act of leading others. It
constitutes the ability to affect human behavior to accomplish a mission desig-
nated by the leader. For leadership to be effective, it is necessary to influence
others to support and implement decisions that the leaders and group may deem
necessary. Without influence, leadership does not occur. In other words, leader-
ship implies the act of influencing others, but the type of influence leaders should
exert must be positive rather than negative. Myles Munroe observes, “Whenever
a nation has a lack of quality, legitimate, and just leaders, national deterioration
occurs. Quality leadership is a key to prosperous and peaceful life and nation.”11
According to Munroe, “quality” includes being competent, knowledgeable, and
skilled in the job of national leadership. “Legitimacy” is not just winning elec-
tions but the acceptance by the governed who command their mandate and trust;
people to whom they can entrust the authority of governance. “Just” leadership
refers to fairness and equity and inclusiveness in all its ramifications. A combi-
nation of these key characteristics, or legacy-building leadership, is what the
African sub-continent lacks.
Unfortunately, the type of influence the African leadership has had on sub-
Saharan Africa has been a disastrous one. The leadership engages in corrupt
practices, lack of transparency and accountability, continuing militarism, and a
host of other negative measures. Leadership in Africa is typified more by disfig-
uring examples – such as Idi Amin of Uganda, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, or
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe – than by positive role models such as Nelson
Mandela of South Africa and Secretse Khama of Botswana. Other groups of
developing nations, such as Southeast Asia or Latin America, exhibit wide vari-
ations in leadership quality, but none is so extreme in its range as Africa.12
112 L.N. Gbara
During the past three decades, about 90 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s leaders
have behaved despotically and governed poorly. They have infringed their peo-
ple’s human and civil rights, initiated or exacerbated existing civil conflicts,
decelerated per capita economic growth, and proved corrupt.13
Rotberg goes on to contend that good leaders around the world guide the gov-
ernment of nation-states to perform effectively for their citizens. They deliver
high security for the state and its people, a functioning rule of law, education,
health, and a framework conducive to economic growth. They empower civil
society and protect the environmental commons. Crucially, good leaders also
provide their citizens with a sense of belonging to a national enterprise of which
everyone can be proud. They knit rather than unravel their nations. They seek to
be remembered for how they have improved the real lives of the governed than
the fortunes of the few. Despicable rulers oppress their own fellow nationals,
depriving them of liberty, prosperity, and happiness.
Mugabe of Zimbabwe exemplifies despicable leadership; Zimbabwe, a rich
nation, is now reduced to the edge of starvation and fear. Poverty within the context
of resource abundance, as in oil-rich Nigeria from 1975 to 1999, also reflects inad-
equate leadership. The civil war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970 claimed thousands
of lives. The continuing ethnic, tribal, and religious conflicts and other catastrophic
events that have taken place in Nigeria have all been fueled and precipitated by
both bad civilian and military leadership. Decades of stagnant economic develop-
ment and persistent widespread poverty in Africa are glaring evidence of poor
leadership. Poor leadership is the culprit here because it has created a negative
environment for bad macro- and micro-politico-socioeconomic factors to thrive.
Regardless of various fundamental causes of slow progress, the role of poor leader-
ship in Africa has been singled out by various development experts and scholars as
the chief cause of underdevelopment.14 Thus, African leadership has failed to
achieve stable and acceptable political order, order in terms of improving the lives
of its citizens; and achieving peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Commenting on the African leadership crisis, Kofi Annan, former Secretary
of the United Nations, observed, “It is time for Africans to hold their political
leader and not colonialism responsible for the civil wars and economic failures
that ravage their lives.”15 Similarly, the former Secretary General OAU, Dr.
Salem Ahmed Salim, noted:

Admittedly, the continent (SSA) is littered with failed institutions, mostly

due to bad leadership. Devastating conflicts have been provoked and sus-
tained by leadership factors. Indeed, the narrow interests of a given leader-
ship have determined the whole security of nations and societies. As we
move in the new century and Africa faces up to its challenges, it is important
that the leadership factor is given due attention.16

Africa does indeed lack leaders with vision to serve Africans, and it is possible
to see why the absence of effective leadership could lead to a vicious cycle of
poverty.
 Challenges of poverty reduction in Africa 113
Weak institutional capacity
The development of productive capacities within a country is strongly influenced
by the institutions that enable or constrain processes of capital accumulation,
technological progress, and structural change. These institutions include both the
institutional environment, or the set of fundamental political, social, and legal
rules that establish the basis for production, exchange and distribution, and insti-
tutional arrangements, or the regular relationships among economic agents and
related informal rules which govern the ways in which they cooperate and
compete.17
In East Asian countries, weak institutions contributed to the 1997/1998 finan-
cial crisis. In many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the weakness
of institutions contributed to aggravate the impact of the global crisis upon their
economies. In nearly all of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, weak institutions
were not only an important obstacle to the implementation of reforms but also
the main reason for the continuous political and social unrest. In all developing
countries, reforms were often too narrowly focused on macro-economic policy.
The new agenda must stress effective public and corporate governance, anti-
corruption efforts, banking transparency, independence, strong capital markets,
and adequate social safety nets.18
Great political institutions should be autonomous and effective, and they
should have a mechanism in place or a capacity to adapt to citizens’ demands.
However, many public institutions in African states seemed impressive on paper
and in some ways reflect those of the colonial masters, but generally deliver poor
results in the end. However, it is also important to point out that many of these
institutions were designed by the colonial administrations to extract wealth for
the metropole and not to promote indigenous development. Their inability to
generate policy reforms or contribute to growth has led to the examination of
possible causes. The results of such findings point to the notion that African
states’ poor performance and counterproductive policies were no accidents but
the results of underlying bad governance or institutions.19 In 2000, the executive
directors of the World Bank discussed its strategy for governance and public
sector reforms. Its report, Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Gov-
ernance, built on numerous studies that emphasized the critical importance of
well-functioning and accountable public institutions for economic growth and
poverty reduction.
The strategy called for the bank to move governance, institutional develop-
ment, and capacity building to center stage and to help clients build institutions
to make and implement good policy and deliver public services themselves.20
Weak, fragile, and corrupt African institutions lack the capacity to serve,
promote rule of law, produce meaningful public policies, and, in some respects,
affect the outcomes of development projects in a negative manner. The World
Bank demanded reformation and improvement. Persistent African poverty is
often the end result of failed and dysfunctional African institutions.
114 L.N. Gbara
Culture
Africa must look to its past to determine why, after decades of independence and
development assistance, persistent, widespread poverty and economic decline
still prevail. Perhaps development agencies and development experts have neg-
lected the role of culture among other factors in the development equation dis-
course in Africa. The African Commission contends, “We believe that the
inattention to culture in the policy-making of many poor countries goes some
way to explain the failure of so many development initiatives in Africa over the
years.”21
Anthropologists usually define culture in a manner that covers all facets of
human society: knowledge, beliefs, behavior, arts, morals, law, customs, and the
like. Joseph G. Jabbra and O.P. Dwivedi define culture as:

[A] way of life of a group of people or a society through which it views the
world around it, attributes meanings, attaches significance to it, and organ-
izes itself to accomplish, preserve, and eventually pass on this legacy to
future generations.22

They argue that culture should also be seen not only as a material possession but
also as consisting of institutions, people, behaviors or emotions, a style of
accomplishing things, and, specifically, how people perceive, relate, and inter-
pret events both from within and without. Thus, culture in this sense, and also in
our context, refers to the shared values and representations of the members of
organizations, such as governmental bureaucracy or a nation-state.
Various levels of culture exist – national, regional, and corporate – and
researchers choose a level depending on the focus of analysis. Researchers
studying a country at the national level often use Hofstede’s four-dimensional
model of national culture as a framework to organize and analyze data, informa-
tion, and reflections and to compare national cultures. Hofstede, who is widely
regarded as the most influential scholar in the development of national culture
theory, posits the following four dimensions of culture: power distance,
individualism-collectivism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. These
dimensions create the framework to research national cultures.23
Some social scientists and development scholars contend that dependent
development or development programs in Africa have failed to make a meaning-
ful impact. For example, Claude Ake, a prominent Nigerian political scientist,
argues that building on the indigenous culture is a necessary condition for self-
reliant development to which there is no alternative.24 Ali A. Mazrui, in his book
Cultural Forces in World Politics, “seeks to demonstrate that differences in
skills and techniques are, on the whole, more basic than differences in income.
And these skills differences are profoundly affected by culture.”25
Building on the above theme, Lawrence Harrison and Jerome Kagan, in their
book Developing Cultures, argue that attitudes and beliefs explain much of the
difference in the relative success of peoples and nations. In the long run, the
 Challenges of poverty reduction in Africa 115
habits, values, and behavior of ordinary people determine national strength. Why
have former colonies in East Asia succeeded while colonies in Africa remain
stuck in poverty? Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington argue in their book
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress that Ghana and South
Korea were essentially at the same level of development in the early 1960s. Yet,
in the twenty-first century, Ghana’s gross national income per capita calculated
on the basis of purchasing power is about $2,000, while South Korea’s is about
$15,000.26
Although colonialism may be blamed for some of Africa’s poverty and devel-
opment failures, as some Africans are quick to claim, it is naïve to believe that
the legacy of colonialism explains its disappointing performance since independ-
ence. Rather, some observers of African development contend that African
culture, including fatalism, sorcery, authoritarianism, and excessive communi-
tarianism contribute significantly to African reality today. During the course of
its 2005 study, the Commission for Africa found diverse views on the question
of development in Africa. For example, there were those for whom all the talk of
culture confirmed their worst fears. They accepted the notion that people’s cul-
tural background influences their attitudes and the choices they make. However,
they see African cultures as regressive and tribal. Furthermore, they argue that
African cultures are inimical to development, an irrational force that generates
inertia and culminates in economic backwardness.27 In Race and Culture,
Thomas Sowell’s great contribution to this discourse, he argues:

Racial, ethnic, and cultural differences among peoples play a major role in
the events of our times, in countries around the world, and have played a
major role in the long history of human race. The history of cultural differ-
ences among peoples enables us to understand not only how particular
peoples differ but also how cultural patterns in general affect the economic
and social advancement of the human race.28

Sowell argues that culture is central to understanding the different success rates
among different nations. Why did uneducated and unskilled Chinese rubber
plantation laborers in colonial Malaya produce more than double the outputs of
the Malay workers? Why do the fewer than 5 percent of Indonesians of Chinese
descent account for 80 percent of the country’s capital? A culture that stresses
hard work, saving, and advancement clearly plays a role. Culture, including the
customs and the institutions of their society, molds the behavior of human
beings.29
Colonialism was an unfortunate era in many countries in Africa and other
regions of the world. European colonialism in Africa disrupted traditional
African societies and divided tribes, and its consequences should not be minim-
ized. While the former colonies in East Asia have exploited the advantages of
colonialism and minimized the disadvantages, Africa today is more dependent
on rich nations than ever. The African cultures reflect strong family values,
respect for elders, powerful bonding, close ties, and diversity on the one hand,
116 L.N. Gbara
but on the other, corruption and ineffectiveness discourage creativity and innov-
ative activities. The latter traits negatively affect development projects and eco-
nomic development and create a culture of poverty and despair.

The impact of poverty in contemporary Africa

It is no exaggeration to acknowledge that poverty does have negative effects on
populations, nations, and regions around the world. Poverty engulfs large por-
tions of the African population decades after independence, leading to instab-
ility, ethnic conflicts and wars, population displacements, disempowerment,
social exclusion, and other social problems. For example, 44 million African
children are out of school and millions will die as a result of hunger. Africa is
way behind in achieving the UN Development Goals by 2015. By some estim-
ates, Africa is expected to achieve the UN goals by 2165 instead of 2015.30
Ethnic wars are often associated with poverty and cost millions of lives
throughout Africa. The economic costs of ethnic conflicts are also enormous and
wars often destroy Africa’s best-trained, best-educated, and most valuable
human resources. Scarce and valuable resources needed to promote economic
growth are often used to fight wars and rebuild destroyed infrastructure. Poverty
in Africa has regional and international dimensions and implications as well.
Neighboring states often suffer from ethnic conflicts; the overflow of refugees
results in economic and social problems.31
Brainerd and Chollet argue that:

Poor, fragile states can explode into violence or implode into collapse,
imperiling their citizens, regional neighbors, and the wider world as their
livelihoods are crushed. Poor and ungoverned states and territories can
become spawning grounds for global threats like terrorists, drug trafficking,
environmental devastation, and disease.32

In an era where national boundaries are blurred and where global instability and
terrorism prevail, poverty in Africa has added a new challenge to the inter-
national community. Increasingly large numbers of highly skilled and unskilled
Africans migrate to neighboring regions and the industrialized states to seek jobs
and better standards of living, an unfortunate development that further creates a
brain drain and exacerbates poverty and instability in Africa.33

New strategies for reducing poverty in Africa

To break from the culture of poverty, despair, and hopelessness, African states
must rely less on international aid because international aid is often tied to eco-
nomic and political reforms and conditions, many of which are detrimental to
the African states. Furthermore, aid has not led to any meaningful economic
growth or poverty reduction in Africa. Percy argues, “despite a substantial
amount of aid (much larger in per capita terms than provided to any other
 Challenges of poverty reduction in Africa 117
region), sub-Saharan African countries, with very few exceptions, have regressed
since independence.”34 Since achieving independence, the general history of
Africa has been one of development failure.35 Other measures needed to reduce
Africa’s poverty include investing Africa’s revenues generated from its natural
resources and minerals in productive economic purposes to boost economic
growth, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI contributes to eco-
nomic growth and jobs for Africans. The entire African continent receives less
than 1 percent of FDI.36 Furthermore, diversification is necessary for economic
growth and poverty reduction in Africa. In addition to utilizing Africa’s natural
resources effectively, e-manufacturing, large-scale (mechanized) production,
agricultural development, and exports will substantially boost economic growth
and free Africa from a culture of poverty and dependency. In the area of leader-
ship, a leadership vacuum certainly exists. The right leadership committed to
development, economic growth, and poverty reduction is needed.

Conclusion
The intention of this chapter was to examine the extent of poverty in Africa and
to consider new strategies how to reduce it. The chapter looked at the concept of
poverty as well as its current dimensions in the continent. It observed that
poverty is exacerbated in the continent because African resources are still being
extracted and squandered consistently from both within and outside, leading to a
range of problems. These problems include poverty, underdevelopment, and
social problems, such as conflicts, economic deprivation, and political instab-
ility. Admittedly, poverty is not a natural condition of the continent. Rather,
poverty is a condition triggered by actors within and outside the continent.
African leaders and elites who should have prevented the exploitation of Afri-
ca’s resources have instead collaborated with external actors.37
Advanced nations of the world and other external actors could not have been
able to exploit Africa without teaming up with African leaders. Their collabora-
tion exacerbated the greatest theft and economic exploitation in the history of
humanity since slavery. The outcome of these efforts is that Africa remains a
continent that is still plagued by conflicts, poverty, and underdevelopment prob-
lems in the twenty-first century, and Africa’s endemic conditions may continue
to pose a challenge to the international community if drastic steps are not taken
to effectively address Africa’s growing poverty problems. However, poverty and
underdevelopment problems in Africa are fundamental issues that only the
African leaders and people must address if Africa is expected to move forward
and become an effective partner in the fast-moving global system. To achieve
this, we strongly urge African governments and leaders to actively seek and
recruit qualified Africans in the Diaspora to join forces with Africans at home to
fight poverty and build a prosperous Africa. Furthermore, various African gov-
ernments need to work collectively so that the continent can move forward in
development strides like the rest of the world.
118 L.N. Gbara
Notes
1 May (1999).
2 World Bank (1992: 30).
3 Yapa (1996).
4 Fox and Liebenthal (2006: 3).
5 Ibid.
6 Barrett, Carter, and Little (2006: 1).
7 Murithi (2005).
8 Thompson (2004).
9 Schraeder (2004).
10 Thompson (2004) and Schraeder (2004).
11 Munroe (1993: 14).
12 Rotberg (2004).
13 Ibid.
14 Dada (2007).
15 Annan (2001).
16 Salim (2002: 38).
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2006).
18 Bigman (2002: 34–35).
19 Moss (2007).
20 World Bank (2003).
21 Africa Commission Report (2005: 122).
22 Jabbra and Dwivedi (2005: 23–24).
23 Vinken, Soeters, and Ester (2004).
24 Ake (1985).
25 Mazrui (2000: 8).
26 Harrison and Huntington (2000).
27 Africa Commission Report (2005).
28 Sowell (1994: 1).
29 Harrison and Kagan (2006).
30 Murithi (2005).
31 Thompson (2004).
32 Brainerd and Chollet (2007: 1).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Percy (2005: 665).
36 Murithi (2005).
37 Ibid.

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AIDS, Africa Recovery in United Nations.” African Development Forum 14, no. 4: 1.
Barrett, C., Carter, M., and Little, P. 2006. Understanding and Reducing Persistent
Poverty in Africa. London: Routledge.
Bigman, D. 2002. Globalization and the Developing Countries: Emerging Strategies for
Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation. New York: Cabi.
Brainard, L. and Chollet, D. 2007. Too Poor for Peace: Global Poverty, Conflict, and
Security in the Twenty-first Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
 Challenges of poverty reduction in Africa 119
Dada, O.J. 2007. “Strengthening African Political Leadership: Capacity for Development
– Key Challenges.” Paper delivered at the African Association for Public Administra-
tion and Management, Mbabane, Swaziland, September 3–7.
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gress. New York: Basic Books.
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7 A critical analysis of poverty
reduction strategies in
postcolonial Africa
Felix O. Okokhere

Introduction
Poverty has become a refrain and its lyric is well known throughout Africa. The
drumbeat of poverty is loud and its effect on the African peoples is devastating
to say the least. The majority of African states are confused about how to get out
of the endemic poverty. Governance has collapsed, and state institutions are
ineffective and crippled. Development has stalled owing to lack of good govern-
ance and credible political leadership. This chapter identifies the absence of
political will and integrity in governance as the main causes of the endemic
poverty that plagues Africa in the twenty-first century. Using neoliberal eco-
nomic theory, the objective of this chapter is to identify the causes of Africa’s
poverty, look at globalization and the persistence of poverty in Africa, and
analyze the contending perspectives in the poverty debate. The chapter recom-
mends a totally home-grown (African-centered) solution to the poverty problem.

Economic realities in contemporary Africa

Undoubtedly, Africa is rich in both human and mineral resources but lacks the
ability to harness the abundant resources at its disposal for the benefit of the
people. In the midst of abundant natural resources Africans remain hungry and
thirsty, and they are ravaged by preventable and curable disease, deprived of
human dignity and liberty, and more. In a world where bilateral and multilateral
agreements and cooperation are being explored and exploited in various areas,
including economics, politics, defense, society, culture, and information techno-
logy, African states continue to exhibit lack of political will and economic
muscle to be one of the major players and competitors in various endeavors
within the global community.
Poverty is the resultant effect and consequence of not being able to wriggle
out of the aforementioned paradox. According to S. Oshewolo, the rising profile
of poverty in Africa is assuming a worrisome dimension, as empirical studies
have shown.1 Following some years of colonial rule and almost five decades of
independence, much of Africa remains poor. This is particularly true for sub-
Saharan Africa where, in 1994, gross domestic product was only 1 percent of the
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 121
world’s, and income per capita averaged $450. It has steadily fallen relative to
the industrial world and is now less than one-fiftieth of income in Organization
for Economic Cooperative and Development (OECD) countries.
The responses of the economies of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa
appear to be worse than others to the market-oriented development policies
urged on it by the World Bank and other outside agencies since the 1980s. Now
the flow of aid is declining while population growth is still racing towards a
barely imaginable one to 1.2 billion in the year 2020.2 Africa’s economies are
currently socialized into the Western concept of economic development.
However, the likelihood that the region is going to be developed by capitalism
and neoliberal economic paradigms seems unlikely and smaller than ever.3
Africa’s poverty is linked with and connected to its household-based agrarian
economies with very limited long-distance trade and export-oriented cash crop
production and mineral extraction imposed by colonialism. Manufacturing is of
little significance. Today, in the twenty-first century, farmers produce coffee,
cocoa, tea, cotton, sugar, and tobacco. Competition from much more productive
capitalist agriculture in Asia and Latin America is intensifying while industrial
countries’ dependence on Africa’s minerals and metals is also declining by about
2 percent a year.4
In the area of manufacturing, production for international consumption is
blocked by an inability to compete with imports and by tiny domestic markets.
Meanwhile, collapsing infrastructures, political risk, and poorly trained work-
forces tend to make manufacturing for export uncompetitive, even at very low
wages.5 According to the Economic Commission for Africa, in most of Africa
industrial expansion faces “impossible difficulties.”6 South Africa is the major
exception with its diversified and relatively sophisticated economy and a popula-
tion growth rate below that of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa alone
accounts for about two-fifths of GDP.7
Looking at Africa’s poverty from the market economy and industrial-output
perspectives, two general features emerge. First, besides South Africa, the one
large industrialized country in the subcontinent, there are six other countries with
over 20 million inhabitants each: Congo/DR, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan (including
the new breakaway country of South Sudan), Tanzania, and one large country,
Nigeria. Between them, these eight countries account for 61 percent of all Afri-
cans south of the Sahara. Nigeria, with an estimated population of 167 million in
2011, contains almost one in five Africans living south of the Sahara. The other
40 countries are small, including 12 mini-states with populations of under two
million.
Second, in terms of income per capita, size and wealth do not go together. For
example, Nigeria is one of the poorest African countries despite her formidable
oil production and wealth; it had a per capita income of only $240 in 1996. The
so-called “middle-income” African countries are Senegal, Zimbabwe, Swazi-
land, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo/DR, Cameroun, Botswana, Gabon, and South Africa.
With the exception of South Africa and its near neighbor, and the partial excep-
tion of Côte d’Ivorie, most of the citizens of these countries are often no better
122 F.O. Okokhere
off than their apparently poorer neighbors. Most of the middle-income countries
are mineral exporters; their per capita income figures are boosted by the value of
oil and other minerals which the major transnational corporations extract and
export from them.8

Theoretical framework
Liberalism is a social, political, and economic philosophy based on a positive
view of human nature, the inevitability of social progress, and the harmony of
interests.9 In other words, liberalism portrays people as essentially rational,
ethical, and moral creatures capable of controlling their basic impulses. Neo-
liberalism is the reinforcement and promotion of liberal philosophy and prin-
ciples, particularly in the area of international economic relations. Critics of the
neoliberal theory argue that neoliberals often behave in irrational and immoral
ways in the process of economic engagement with others, which they do not see
as the inevitable result and manifestation of a flawed human nature. Rather, neo-
liberals usually see such behavior as being the result of ignorance and misunder-
standing, which can be overcome through education and forming social and
political institutions.
The influence of neoliberal thought is unarguably the most potent economic
weapon used in justifying poverty and inequality in developing countries of the
globe. Neoliberal policies advocated by the world-governing elites during the
1980s, and even more so in the later decades, showcase such influence. Neolib-
eral theorists rely on the development perspective to convince skeptics of the
possibility of eradicating poverty through free- and open-market policy initi-
atives. This postulation is captured in the words of former World Bank President
Barber Conable:

If I were to characterize the past decade, the most remarkable thing was the
generation of global consensus that market forces and economic efficiently
were the best way to achieve the kind of growth which is the best antidote to
poverty.10

Neoliberal thinking, which is also referred to as the “Washington Consensus,”

has pervaded the global economic landscape. United States-led capitalist states
dominate global economic thought and philosophy. The name reflects the fact
that such thinking is accepted and promoted by the opinion leaders in Washing-
ton, the IMF, World Bank, independent think-tanks (mostly from the West), the
U.S. government policy community, investment bankers, and so forth.11
Neoliberalism does not operate solely within the tenets of free market enter-
prise. In addition, it inculcates the principle of “democratic liberalism” and
imbibes the culture of commercial liberalism. Proponents of democratic liberal-
ism argue that democracies are more ideal and peaceful than are non-
democracies, particularly in dealing with the principles and practice of doing
business.12 As a result, liberals anticipate that as the world becomes a more
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 123
democratic place, it will also become a more peaceful and commercially friendly
place.
The spread of democracy has also been accompanied by another trend: the
growth of economic interdependence. This interdependence takes many forms,
from the more obvious and recognizable growth in trade among states to the
somewhat less obvious increase in investment that people and corporations make
in other countries. For commercial liberalism, trade, and interdependence are
forces for peaceful coexistence and poverty eradication.
The logic is that the greater the level of interdependence, the more one
nation’s well-being depends on another nation’s well-being. This interdepend-
ence creates common interests. As Richard Rosecrans observed in one of the
most forceful and persuasive liberal statements of recent years, “it is nonetheless
true that interpenetration of investment in industrial economies provides a
mutual state in each other’s success that did not exist in the nineteenth century as
before World War I.”13 As a result, the incentive to wage war is absent in such a
system, since war disrupts trade and the interdependence on which trade is
based.
Neoliberal theory and its proponents address political, social, economic, and
all other global issues within commercial and neoliberal trade principles and
actions. They fail to admit that the problem of Africa’s endemic poverty is a
direct consequence of the irregularities created by uneven economic competition.
War certainly disrupts trade. However, is it only in war between states, which in
itself is occasioned by global economic greed and exploration, that disrupts
trade? What about Africa’s civil wars, perhaps the most direct cause of chronic
and abject poverty within the continent of Africa? Elite greed and social, polit-
ical, and economic oppression of the majority of the African people have pitched
different ethnic groups against one another. The religious, cultural, and class
conflicts in Africa are a result of the elite quest to acquire new needs and own
new and exclusive properties to the detriment of their people.
Neoliberalism creates new wealth and new consumer habits. It also perpetu-
ates old poverty, creates new desperate citizens, encourages economic and finan-
cial crimes, promotes fraudulent and sharp business practice, and degrades the
environment. Africa’s poverty exists in spite of its enormous wealth in natural
resources and is as a result of official, private, and commercial corruption in high
and low places. African states such as Cameroun, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya,
Uganda, and Egypt remain among the top 20 most corrupt states in the world.
Cameroun, Nigeria, and Tanzania rank among the top five, according to the 1998
Transparency International World Corruption Perception Index. The principle of
an open and free market enterprise is a fine idea. However, the reality of Africa’s
harsh and biting poverty may not make neoliberal economic theory, principles,
and practice a successful experience in Africa.
124 F.O. Okokhere
An overview of the global poverty profile
As interdependence transforms the global security agenda, poverty emerges as
one of the most pressing security issues in world politics today. Approximately
3.2 billion people live in low-income economies (economies with per capita
income of $725 or less; in many cases they live on the edge of survival).
Although every society has its rich and poor, the gap between the world’s indus-
trialized North (the richest first-world nations of North America, Western
Europe, Australia, and Japan and the former communist second-world nations of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and the economically less
developed nations of the world’s South (Latin American, Asia, and Africa) is
enormous. The developing countries, home to four-fifths of the world’s popula-
tion, earn only about one-fifth of the world’s GNP. Although India and China
account for large numbers of the world’s poor, 29 of the 50 poorest countries in
the world are located in sub-Saharan Africa, including the ten poorest. These
regions are burdened by high population growth, widespread disease, poor
education systems, and subsistence agricultural economies. In many of the
poorest societies, wealth and land are concentrated in the hands of a small elite,
creating huge disparities within these societies. Rural poverty and underemploy-
ment encourage immense migrations to urban centers, where people live in
wretched conditions in “shanty towns” and “favelas” without adequate sanitation
or pure water.14
Since 1980, these problems have been worsening rather than disappearing.
The gap between the rich and poor has widened rather than narrowed. During
this period, the income of approximately a quarter of the world’s population has
declined, and in 43 countries average incomes are actually lower than they were
in 1970. During the 1980s, sometimes called the “lost decade,” per capita
income in Latin America fell by 7 percent. In sub-Saharan Africa, per capita
GNP dropped by 10 percent and real prices for major export commodities,
notably tea, coffee, cocoa, and cotton, fell by more than 50 percent in real terms.
Many African countries confronted a mountain of debt and were forced to use
up all or most of their earnings from exports merely to pay interest on that debt.
Overall, during the past three decades, the share of global income enjoyed by the
richest 20 percent of the world’s population rose from 70 to 85 percent while the
share of the poorest 20 percent declined from 2.3 to 1.4 percent.15
Poverty is associated with a variety of problems. Approximately 17 million
people die each year in the developing world from curable diseases like malaria,
and 90 percent of all those infected with HIV (the virus that causes AIDS) live
in these countries. Approximately 500 million people in the developing world
are chronically malnourished, including more than one-third of the children. The
world’s poor are, in large measure, either left out of economic globalization cur-
rently or are shortchanged during the process. Globalized markets that operate
through transnational corporations may provide opportunities, stimulate eco-
nomic development, and create new or higher paying jobs. In some parts of the
world, however, this economic development has proceeded only slowly, if at all,
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 125
and gaps between the world’s rich and the world’s poor continue to widen. In
addition, where economic development has proceeded, it has come at a price,
threatening social stability and traditional values and straining the environment.
Integrating the world’s poor into the global economy, and doing so in a way that
does not perpetuate poverty, thus represents a major challenge in today’s world.
Integrative institutions and actors such as intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and transnational corporations and international law
comprise a web of complex interdependence that is resulting in increased inter-
state cooperation. All play an important role in this development process.
The way in which the world deals with poverty is likely to determine whether
the coming decades are peaceful and stable or violent and dangerous. Poverty
produces frustration and anger, directed both at the governments of developing
countries and at citizens of wealthy countries. It is from the densely packed slums
of the developing world’s “megacities” (urban centers with a population of more
than ten million) that angry young terrorists emerge determined to take revenge
on their own rulers or on wealthy foreigners, and to make the world take notice of
their plight. Civil war, lawlessness, and refugees are some of the consequences of
urban overcrowding, unemployment, and poverty. The problems of global
poverty and underdevelopment thus draw together a number of strands which
need urgent and sincere attention: how the integration of some political institu-
tions and the rise of others, like a global economy, are transforming life, and how
a whole new set of issues is making its way onto the global security agenda.

Contending perspectives in the poverty debate

Poverty is a multidimensional concept. The Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) reports that poverty encompasses different dimensions of deprivation that
relate to human capabilities, including consumption and food security, health,
education, rights, security, dignity, and decent work.16 Rocha avers that the
ample varieties of poverty worldwide have led to an equally large number of
essays in terms of definition, measurement, and policies.17 In addition, Maxwell
observes that the complexity of measurement mirrors the complexity of defini-
tion.18 This complexity increases where participatory methods are used and
people define their own indicators of poverty. Hulme and Mosley, therefore,
explain the definition of what is meant by “poverty.” How it might be explained
and who constitutes “the poor” are fiercely contested.19
In Africa, poverty is both structural (chronic) and transient. The former is
defined as persistent or permanent socioeconomic deprivations and is linked to a
host of factors such as limited productive resources, lack of skills for gainful
employment, endemic sociopolitical and cultural factors, and gender. The latter,
on the other hand, is defined as transitory/temporary and is linked to natural and
human-made disasters. An example of this is the persistence in the mismanage-
ment of government affairs, corruption, and undemocratic habits of the majority
of African rulers. Consequentially, transient poverty has thus far become irre-
versible and structural because it persists in Africa.
126 F.O. Okokhere
However, at the heart of the debate about defining poverty stands the ques-
tion of whether poverty is largely about material needs or whether it is about a
much broader set of needs that permit well-being.20 This is very true because
many forms of deprivation that vary such broader sets of needs which permit
well-being can be found in Africa.21 Looking at the former position, it concen-
trates on the measurement of consumption, usually by using incomes as a sur-
rogate. The use of the income poverty approach, or the poverty line, is
strengthened by the fact that the majority of national governments and devel-
opment agencies use the concept for their analyses of poverty and anti-poverty
policies.22 It is noteworthy to acknowledge that income is an inadequate meas-
urement of welfare. This is very true because forms of deprivation that very
poor people experience (particularly in Africa) are not captured by income
poverty measures.
Africa’s poverty analysis cannot be wholly dependent on income or other
neoliberal economic scales or measurements. For example, wages earned com-
pared with the cost of living and the rising inflation constantly experienced by
Africans are immensurable. African economies are as unpredictable as they are
irredeemable, at least for now. The poverty indices used by neoliberal scholars
do not fully address or capture the true picture of the nature of poverty in Africa.
Research studies have shown that new layers of complexity were added in the
1980s. These include the incorporation of non-monetary aspects, such as power-
lessness and isolation, vulnerability to a sudden dramatic decrease in consump-
tion levels, ill-health and physical weakness, social inferiority, and humiliation.
Such dimensions of poverty are significant in their own right and are also essen-
tial analytical components for the understanding of income poverty.23
Drawing inspiration from the work of Rocha, the general definition requires
qualification regarding the concepts of absolute and relative poverty.24 While
absolute poverty is theoretically associated with the vital minimum, the concept
of relative poverty incorporates the concern with inequality or relative depriva-
tion, where the abuse minimum is socially guaranteed. Absolute poverty implies
the inability to attain a minimum standard of living or poverty line.
African Development Bank defines absolute poverty as “a condition of life
degraded by diseases, deprivation, and squalor.”25 On the other hand, the essence
of poverty, in relative terms, is “inequality,” which implies that poverty may also
be described as relative deprivation.26 Rocha, however, notes that the persistence
of chronic deprivation of basic needs makes absolute poverty the obvious pri-
ority in terms of definition measurement and political action from the inter-
national point of view.27
C. Gore explains the concept of all-pervasive poverty. According to him,
poverty is also pervasive where the majority of the population lives at or below
income levels sufficient to meet their basic needs, and the available resources,
even when equally distributed, are insufficient to meet the basic needs of the
population. He reiterates further that pervasive poverty leads to environmental
degradation. This is because people consume into the environmental capital
stock to survive. This, in turn, undermines the productivity of key assets on
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 127
which their livelihood depends. It should also be noted that where extreme
28

poverty is pervasive state capacities are necessarily weak.

The Human Poverty Approach has been advanced by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in its Human Development Reports. The UNDP
uses this conceptual framework to specify some basic human capabilities, which
if absent could result in poverty. It includes the capability to “lead a long,
healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity,
self respect, and the respect of others.”29
The measurement index method of conceptualizing poverty has also been
recognized in some existing literature.30 As observed by J.S. Omotola, measur-
ing poverty, though a herculean task, has become the rule rather than the excep-
tion.31 In terms of measurement, Rocha purports that defining the relevant and
operational poverty concepts and choosing the adequate measurement proced-
ures is the result of a sensible and informed analysis of social reality. Measuring
poverty is a matter of identifying the essential causes of poverty in a given
society.32 Is it widespread and affects the majority of the population, or is it
locally concentrated? What are its roots? Is it a traditional syndrome or does it
result from economic and technological change? What are its main features?
Who are the poor in terms of some essential characteristics? This overall
information on the poverty syndrome is the key element in adopting concepts
and measurement instruments that seem the most appropriate to a specific
context in terms of social reality and data-gathering possibilities.

Causes of poverty in contemporary Africa

Several factors are responsible for poverty in Africa. These include absence of
political will and integrity in governance, conflict, debt burden, crime and viol-
ence, governance, and unequal economic exchange. The absence of political will
and integrity in governance involves African states that pay mere lip-service to
the problem of poverty. As a result, policies which could otherwise take Africa
out of poverty fall short, either due to lack of the political will to make changes
or to the pervasive presence of graft occasioned by the absence of integrity in
governance. African governments do not see much need to genuinely fight cor-
ruption in their various states, for the obvious reason that corrupt officials are
agents of the rich, influential, and powerful in government. The majority of
African states have anti-graft agencies operating under the tutelage of very
corrupt leadership at the helms. Africa’s stolen wealth is in the trillions of dollars
(mostly in foreign banks). Yet not much has been achieved in terms of bringing
perpetrators to justice. Theft of the commonwealth of the African people has in
no small way contributed to the poverty in Africa. Monies that should have been
used for poverty eradication or, at least, poverty reduction generally find their
way into the private bank accounts of those to whom the monies were entrusted
for onward distribution for the people’s benefit.
Regarding conflict, Africa is home to most of the world’s conflicts. For
example, civil wars account for most of the refugee problems in Africa. Many
128 F.O. Okokhere
people are displaced from their natural and familiar habitats. Sudan to Libya,
Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia to Sierra Leone, and Congo/DR to Rwanda
– all have contributed to the generation and persistence of poverty in those
African states. Resources that could have been utilized for national development
is channeled towards the persecution of unnecessary wars, thus creating more
poverty for the people.
According to D.O. Ajakaiye, debt burden is assuming increasing importance
as a cause of poverty in developing countries of the world.33 In such countries,
servicing of the debt has encroached upon the volume of resources needed for
socioeconomic development. The productive sectors such as agriculture, manu-
facturing, and the like are equally constrained, leading to low productivity, low
capacity utilization, underemployment, and low purchasing power, thereby sub-
jecting the masses or the majority of the people to abject poverty. Nigeria, which
has the highest number of Africa’s poor based on population, had US$28.5
external debt by the end of 2000. This amounted to about 80 percent of the coun-
try’s GDP. The amount required to service this debt annually is enough to
hamper government expenditure for the provision of badly needed social and
physical infrastructure for the poor.
Regarding crime and violence, a steady increase in crime and violence has
degraded the quality of life to a varying extent in many countries of the world.
Although individuals of all socioeconomic groups are affected, the urban poor
are particularly vulnerable to these social problems. Crime and violence have
serious economic costs. For instance, an increasing proportion of public
resources, which is already limited, are required to strengthen law enforcement,
support the growing prison population, finance the demand placed on the judicial
system, and provide healthcare for persons injured by violence. Other costs
include the expensive security systems and guards now required by businesses
and homes, and the loss in potential revenues from foreign investors and tourists
who have sought other destinations as a result of the threat of crime and the
migration of the urban middle class. Kidnappings and abductions for ransom are
examples of how crime can contribute to unemployment and poverty in Africa.
Because of the heterogeneous nature of the poor, it is difficult to link poverty,
crime, and violence directly. However, the adverse social consequences of crime
have been closely associated with poverty; for example, loss of lives at produc-
tive age and quantum loss of properties.
Regarding governance, the persistence and pervasiveness of poverty in
several countries have been linked to the lack of popular participation in govern-
ance and decision making as well as a weak institutional base. This has led,
among other things, to poor accountability, transparency in resources allocation,
weak program and policy implementation and monitoring, waste of natural and
national resources, and ineffective poverty alleviation initiatives.
Regarding unequal economic exchange, African states suffer unequal rela-
tions and economic exchange from the more advanced and developed economies
of the world. Balance of trade and payment is often unfavorable towards Africa
due largely to the technological superiority and economic greed of the developed
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 129
states. For example, world economic policies, largely dictated to Africa by
institutions controlled by economic superpowers, such as the World Bank and
the IMF, encourage and enforce unequal relations either through lending,
pricing, trade tariffs, policies, embargoes, or outright exploitation.

Neoliberal commercialization of poverty in Africa

The 1980s and 1990s offered neoliberals the opportunity to argue and
emphasize that the production, distribution, and consumption of almost all
goods and services should be determined by market forces and that the free
functioning of the market should not be distorted by government interference.
Consequently, advocates of neoliberalism favored minimum government and
laissez-faire economics. This harked back to the views of the nineteenth-century
Manchester school liberals but owed much of its more recent popularity to the
writing of neoclassical economic thinkers such as F.A. Hayek and Milton Fried-
man. The ideas of these thinkers gained many adherents among professional
economists in the late 1970s and subsequently came to have an important effect
on the policies of the New Right, and they influenced the governments of the
United States and the United Kingdom. The World Bank and the IMF were also
profoundly affected by neoliberalism via their U.S.-trained economic advisors
and the strong role exerted by the U.S. government in their management.34 At
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the dominant approach to develop-
ment is more rooted in these neoliberal values and policies than ever before.
The key to the reduction of global poverty and hunger is identified as global
economic integration via free trade; this is expected to achieve the greatest pos-
sible global economic growth that, in turn, is expected to result in the greatest
possible contribution to global economic welfare. The key problem with this, of
course, is that it does not secure an equitable distribution of the benefits of
increased global economic welfare.
The inequitable distribution of global wealth (benefit) is a sore point in the
neoliberal theoretical framework and analysis. Critics of neoliberalism argue that
its policy perceptions have helped create the highest levels of global inequality
seen during the post-war period.35 Such changes provide a potent illustration of
the historian Eric Hobsbawn’s observation that the belief, following new classi-
cal economics, that unrestricted international trade would allow the poorer coun-
tries to come closer to the rich runs counter to historical experience as well as
common sense.36 Hobsbawn’s observation is not far off from the pan-Africanist
economic postulation of notable African scholars such as Samir Amin, who
believe that Africa can and must be liberated from the liberal illusion of eco-
nomic development. Rather, it should embark upon renewed forms of self-
centered development.37 Amin further posits that “there is no doubt that, for the
time being, governments of the southern countries still seem to be fighting for a
‘true neo-liberalism’ whose Northern partners, like those of the South, would
agree ‘to play the games’.”38 The southern countries can only realize that this
hope is completely illusory.
130 F.O. Okokhere
Even the supporters of the free-market model have had to admit its failure to
assist the world’s poor. For example, the Financial Times reported that, despite
lauding the “system of wealth creation […] now everywhere regarded as the
most effective that humanity has yet devised,” it had to concede that

it remains […] an imperfect force […] [since] two-thirds of the world’s

population have gained little or no substantial advantage from rapid eco-
nomic growth and even in the developed world, the lowest quartile have
witnessed trickle-up rather than trickle-down.39

One of the strongest justifications for laissez-faire economics has come from the
philosophy of Social Darwinism, which was popularized in the writings of the
nineteenth-century social thinker Herbert Spencer. It was Spencer, rather than
Charles Darwin the biologist, who coined the phrase “the survival of the fittest.”
Spencer believed that making welfare provisions for the poorer members of
society (whom he regarded as the least fit) would retard the development of
human society as a whole and should, therefore, be abandoned. The cruel
implications of such a philosophy appear shocking and yet many advocates of
neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s came close to adopting such a position in
the developed capitalist economies but coerced poorer economies into adopting
it during that same period. The IMF loans and its harsh conditions explain this
point. The neoliberal position is that the welfare state should be “rolled back” in
order to eradicate the “culture of dependency” that it breeds, and all areas of life
should be opened up to economic competition.

Globalization and the persistence of poverty in contemporary

Africa
About 80 percent of the world’s population live in developing countries, marked
by low incomes and high poverty, very high unemployment, and low education.
For those countries (mostly in Africa), globalization presents both unprecedented
risk and fewer opportunities. Therefore, making globalization work in ways that
enrich the whole world requires making it work for the people in these countries.
African states that opened themselves up to the outside world have not neces-
sarily reaped the fruits of globalization. Even the few whose GDP increased did
not experience sustainable growth. The people in these various African countries
found themselves worse off than before. The debate about economic globaliza-
tion is mixed with debates about economic theory and values. Each country
differs in its history and circumstances. Therefore, what works in terms of eco-
nomic strategy for some may not work for others. In this regard, the global eco-
nomic universalism as prescribed by neoliberalism has not taken Africa to the
promised land.
The IMF ’s market fundamentalism and economic liberalism, aided by the
Washington Consensus, opened up African markets to goods from foreign lands,
but the African countries had little to sell abroad. Opening up capital markets did
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 131
not bring an inrush of capital; investors were more interested in taking out
Africa’s bountiful natural resources. Often, the IMF ’s requirements brought
fiscal austerity, and more poverty. The role of multinational corporations has
come to symbolize what is wrong with globalization, what I may refer to as the
“new global evil.” Many instances of corporate evil have become infamous; for
example, cigarette companies’ conspiracy in denying that the product kills,
environmental degradation caused by oil spills, slave and child labor worldwide,
and corporate conspiracy in promoting and protecting dictatorships around the
world.
These irresponsible actions on the part of corporations have maintained the
status quo of abject poverty in Africa. Multinationals rely heavily on the eco-
nomic principles of eminent eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith. He
argued that individuals in pursuing their self-interest would advance the broader
interest of society. Incentives to out-compete rivals would lead to lower costs
and to the production of goods which consumers wanted, and that consumers,
and society more generally, would benefit from both. In Smithian economics,
morality played no role (though Smith himself was intensely concerned about
moral issues, as evidenced in Theory of Moral Sentiments, a work that preceded
Wealth of Nations). Individuals did not have to think about what was right or
wrong, only about what was in their own self-interest; the miracle of the market
economic was that, in doing so, it promoted the generated welfare, which means
making money.40
Building on this logic, many corporate economists argue that the first or the
only responsibility of corporations is to their shareholders. They should do what-
ever it takes to maximize stock market values or profits. In this extension of
Smithian economics, if morality enters the picture at all, it does so only to enjoin
firms to think about the interests of shareholders above all else; in fact, to think
only of shareholders.
Multinational companies are richer than most countries in the developing
world. In 2004, the revenue of U.S. car company General Motors was $191.4
billion, greater than the GDP of more than 148 countries. In its fiscal year ending
2005, U.S. retailer Wal-Mart’s revenues were $285.2 billion, larger than the
combined GDP of sub-Saharan Africa. These corporations are not only rich but
politically powerful. If governments decide to tax or regulate them in ways they
do not like, they threaten to move elsewhere. There is always another country
that will welcome their tax revenues, jobs, and foreign investments.41 Businesses
pursue profits, and this means that making money is their first priority. Com-
panies survive by keeping costs down in any way they can within the law. They
avoid paying taxes when possible; some skimp on health insurance for their
workers; many try to limit spending on cleaning up the pollution they create, and
often the bill is picked up by the government in the countries where they operate.
The many evils these multinational companies indulge in are too numerous to
mention. They get away with these evils because they hide under the umbrella of
being corporate citizens shielded by the all-embracing arms of globalization.
132 F.O. Okokhere
Strategies for poverty reduction in contemporary Africa
The first strategy is to end the link between national poverty reduction strategies
and global forecasts and challenges. It is obvious that variables external to a con-
tinent’s domestic environment (e.g., falls in commodity prices, recession in
industrial countries) can affect national poverty reduction efforts. Therefore,
Africa’s poverty reduction efforts and strategies must not rely solely on global
economic trends. The current wave in economic downturns in the European
Union and the United States is a wakeup call for Africa’s economic strategies,
both in government and business. Europeans are battling with budget deficits,
debts repayment defaults, unemployment, austerity measures, and the like. It will
be foolhardy for African states to continue to expect more foreign aid and eco-
nomic handouts from those looking for help for themselves.
Second, involve the poor in strategic planning. Many governments in Africa
do not consult with those for whom it claims to create a program of action. For
instance, the majority of Africa’s poor live in rural areas. Countries such as
Nigeria embark upon poverty alleviation programs without much input from the
main stakeholders (the poor) in society. Programs such as the Green Revolution,
PAP, NEEDS, and the like did not achieve the desired results due to the wrong
strategies employed. There are justifiable fears that the current Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) may go the same way as other programs if not
properly handled. Various African governments must sincerely pursue a partici-
patory government process to have an all-inclusive poverty reduction strategy.
For example, poverty reduction policies and strategies must have a top-to-bottom
approach. Consumers of policies need to be active participants in the planning,
implementation, and evaluative stages to guarantee success.
Third, the national budget must prioritize the needs of the poor. Most African
states skew their budgets towards areas where the poor are excluded. For
example, rural infrastructural development, and small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) are often neglected in favor of less important areas like elephant pro-
jects. The 2012 national budget of Nigeria proposes at least 75 percent of its
total budget of over four trillion naira for recurrent expenditure. This means that
only 25 percent is left for capital expenditure, an area that is badly in need of
funding for national growth and development. Recurrent expenditures are used
for the running costs of government. In this process, official corruption and
embezzlement take place unchecked to the detriment of the poor and needy in
society. Should governments target poverty reduction through budgeting, the
poor will have a lot of their needs met.
Fourth, an ideological or paradigm shift is needed. Ideologies play an
important role in the choice of instruments used to address problems, including
those of poverty, inequality and security. Each of the core concerns of social
policy needs and matters regarding citizenship are social constructs that derive
full meaning from the cultural and ideological definition of “deserving poor,”
“entitlement,” and “citizens’ rights.” Although in the current parlance the choice
between targeting and universalism is couched in the language of the efficient
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 133
allocation of resources subject to budget constraints and the exigencies of glo-
balization. What is actually at stake, however, is the fundamental question about
a polity’s values and its responsibilities to all its members. The technical nature
of the argument cannot conceal the fact that ultimately, value judgments matter
only with respect to determining the needy and how they are perceived. In addi-
tion, in attaching weights to the types of costs and benefits of approaches chosen,
such weighting often reflects one’s ideological predisposition. In addition, soci-
eties choose either targeting or universalism in conjunction with other policies
that are ideologically compatible with the choice and that are deemed constitu-
tive of the desired social and economic policy regimes.42 African governments
need to have a paradigm shift from bias to empathy towards its poor with the
aim of finding a lasting solution to the endemic poverty problems in Africa.

Conclusion
There is no doubt that Africa is home to the world’s poorest people. However,
what is in doubt is whether Africa can turn itself around. The definition of who
is poor varies from country to country and from continent to continent, largely
on the basis of perception. In Africa’s largely rural and agrarian society, for
example, some people regard a household as poor based on the number of cows
they have. Others define poverty by non-asset variables such as the number of
wives a man has. Indeed, income, non-income basic needs, empowerment, and
participatory perception are important in establishing the bottom-line definition
of the poverty line in African countries.
Africa’s absolute poverty refers to households below the poverty line. In
general, the poverty line is the minimum level of income needed to access basic
necessities, such as food, shelter, education, and health. For Africa’s poor,
empowerment is needed to access basic necessities, such as food, shelter, educa-
tion, and health. Despite the numerous poverty alleviation programs embarked
upon by various African states, poverty has not only continued but has deepened
over time in the post-independence period. The main reasons for the persistence
and deepening poverty in Africa may be classified into four major groups: cul-
tural, historical, international, and policy-related reasons.
First, cultural rigidities have had negative effects upon poverty alleviation
across Africa. The rigidities are manifested in defiance to change in consumption
patterns and unequal distribution of wealth. For instance, the government can
provide free education or health services, but these cannot be utilized by the
people who need such services because of their cultural beliefs. Lack of aware-
ness to accumulate or save for the rainy day is also anchored in cultural rigid-
ities, as households attach more importance to generosity and festivities than to
saving. A working culture is also deficient.
Second, historical factors have negatively influenced the development process
and anti-poverty evolution. Besides plundering the resources of Africa, colonial-
ists infused wrong magic through elite rulers of Africa in the post-independence
period. Third, international trading and power relations are unequal, greatly
134 F.O. Okokhere
disfavoring African countries in terms of trade. The prices of their export com-
modities are largely dictated by the advanced countries. Over the years, these
prices have fluctuated. Likewise, the international community has not adequately
and genuinely supported the development endeavors of African countries, mani-
fested by debt burden and declining FDI flows.
Fourth, in the post-independence period, Africa has dealt with poorly
designed and implemented development policies and strategies. It has not con-
scientiously directed its development agenda and priorities. Consequently, there
is a pronounced and persistent lack of adequate facilities and infrastructure (e.g.,
roads, education, and healthcare), an unaltered production structure, lack of
technological change or improvement, a brain drain, and persistent internal con-
flicts, which divert expenditures from development activities to military
operations.
In addition, the persistence and deepening of poverty in Africa is attributed to
deficient management capacity, a poor working environment, deficient will and
vision to develop the country’s resources, lack of accountability, and a growing
institutionalization of corruption. In general, the responsibility for the apparently
dismal political, social, and economic performance of many African countries
falls to all actors: politicians, civil servants, the international community, and the
poor (to a lesser extent).
It is disheartening to observe that despite the various global and continental
initiatives to address poverty reduction, little has been achieved in post-
independence Africa. It is imperative for Africa to tackle poverty eradication
more proactively and innovatively in the medium and long term. It is important
to build up a development policy and strategy from the present status of the poor.
The starting point is to understand the poor through research, surveys, and par-
ticipatory methodology to facilitate designing and implementing appropriate and
effective policies and strategies. This approach would involve adopting holistic
approaches anchored in indigenous knowledge and a country-focused develop-
ment agenda. Indeed, poverty eradication is a desirable and doable long-term
goal, which African countries should be committed to undertake through their
indigenous development vision and action.

Notes
1 S. Oshewolo, “Galloping Poverty in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Government’s Inter-
ventionist Policies.” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 12, no. 6 (2010).
2 African states have not done well in the manufacturing and export sectors of their
economies. Therefore, GDP is not expected to rise above current manufacturing and
export levels.
3 J.S. Saul and L. Collin, “Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism.” Monthly Review
51, no. 3 (1999).
4 African Development Bank Report, 1998, 33 and 47–48.
5 Many years of poor governance, political instability, and endemic corruption made
industrialization impossible in the majority of sub-Saharan African states. Consequen-
tially, the poverty rate hit 70.1 percent in Nigeria in 2012, despite continued rises in
world crude oil prices.
 Poverty reduction strategies in Africa 135
6 Foreign direct investment is desperately needed in the industrial sector.
7 Saul and Collin, “Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism.”
8 Ibid.
9 K.L. Shimko, International Relations. Perspectives and Controversies (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, 2008).
10 Barber Canable, Former World Bank President, in J. Cavanagh, Daphne Wysham,
and Marcos Arruda, Beyond Bretton Woods: Alternatives to the Global Economic
Order (London: Pluto Press, 1994).
11 C. Thomas and M. Reader, “Development and Inequality,” in B. White et al. (eds),
Issues in World Politics (2nd edn) (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
12 Shimko, International Relations.
13 Economic success can only be guaranteed in the presence of peace and in the absence
of war. In this regard, Africa has not been so fortunate. See Shimko, International
Relations, for more details.
14 W.R. Mansbach and E. Rhodes, Global Politics in a Changing World (3rd edn)
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
15 The 1980s was particularly bad for African economies. Despite very strict IMF condi-
tionality, little or no progress was made.
16 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), “Rising to the Global Challenge: Part-
nership for Reducing World Poverty.” Policy Statement by the DAC High-level
Meeting upon Endorsement of the DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (Paris,
April 25–26, 2001).
17 S. Rocha, “Varieties of Poverty Situations World Wide,” in I.O. Oyewale (2013),
Impact of Globalisation on Poverty Reduction in Nigeria. Interdisciplinary Journal of
Contemporary Research in Business 4, no. 11 (1998).
18 S. Maxwell, “The Meaning and Management of Poverty.” Retrieved from www.odi.
org.uk/resources/download/222.pdf (1999).
19 D. Hulme and P. Mosley, Finance Against Poverty, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge,
1996).
20 Judging by the disparity between the standards of living of citizens of industrialized
states and those of the less industrialized states, it may safely be acknowledged that
income is an inadequate measurement of welfare.
21 Inadequate income promotes deprivation. Austerity measures in various African states
in the 1980s and 1990s and the devaluation of national currencies increased poverty
in the continent.
22 S. Maxwell, “The Meaning and Measurement of Poverty.” Available at www.odi.org.
uk/resources/download/2227; A. Garba, “Alleviating Poverty in Northern Nigeria.”
Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the Zumunta Association, Minneapolis,
MN, July 28–29, 2006.
23 Neoliberal economic thought, which gave birth to the concept of globalization, misses
the point in its often habitual generalizations of global economic analysis.
24 Rocha, “Varieties of Poverty Situations World Wide”
25 African Development Bank, “Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the
Poverty Situation in Nigeria,” in S. Oshewolo, Galloping Poverty in Nigeria: An
Appraisal of the Government’s Interventionist Policies(2002). Journal of Sustainable
Development in Africa 12, no. 6, 2010: 18–34.
26 T.K. Bradshaw, Theories of Poverty and Anti-Poverty Programs in Community Devel-
opment. RPRC Working Paper No. 05206, 2006.
27 S. Rocha, “Varieties of Poverty Situations World Wide.”
28 C. Gore, Globalization, the International Poverty Trap and Chronic Poverty in the
Least Developed Countries. CPRC Working Paper No. 30, 2002.
29 Africa has one of the lowest life expectancy rates in the world, which is a result of
chronic poverty and preventable disease.
136 F.O. Okokhere
30 See J.S. Omotola, “Combating Poverty for Sustainable Human Development in
Nigeria: The Continuing Struggle.” Journal of Poverty 12, no. 4, 2008: 496–517;
Rocha (1998).
31 Omotola, “Combating Poverty for Sustainable Human Development in Nigeria.”
32 S. Rocha, “Varieties of Poverty Situations World Wide.”
33 O. Ajakaiye, “Overview of the Current Poverty Eradication Program in Nigeria,” in
A. Jega and H. Wakili (eds), The Poverty Eradication Program in Nigeria: Problems
and Prospects ((Kano: CDRT, 2002), pp. 8–33.
34 Breton Woods’s institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank are both channels
of neoliberal economic indoctrination.
35 N. Adams, Worlds Apart: The North–South Divide and the International System
(London: Zed Books, 1993).
36 E. Hobsbawn, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London:
Abacus, 1995).
37 A. Samir, The Conditions for an Alternative Global System Based on Social and
International Justice. Document for WSF Mumbai (2004).
38 Ibid.
39 Financial Times, December 24, 1993.
40 See Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations (Edin-
burgh: Florian Hall) for more details.
41 China’s revived economic interests and activities in Africa are a testament to this
assertion.
42 Ideologies play very important and vital roles in the concept, design, and implementa-
tion of economic policies. This is evidenced in Western neoliberal capitalism, defunct
Soviet socialism, and Chinese communism. These ideologies have gone through
various metamorphoses, yet each has recorded some degree of success. Africa can
learn from these experiences.
Part II
Problems of good
governance and
institutional failures in
West Africa
8 Weaknesses and failures of
poverty reduction policies and
programs in Nigeria since 1960
Mike O. Odey

Introduction
Nigeria is undoubtedly the second-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa and
the thirteenth largest oil producer in the world, albeit with mounting and grind-
ing poverty since she attained independence in 1960. Between 1960 and today,
what may be regarded as poverty programs and policies in Nigeria have been
more or less the same in content and manner of formulation without fundamental
changes or improvement. There has never been any such thing as a comprehens-
ible and all-embracing poverty policy document in Nigeria. Thus, three institu-
tions or agencies of government always claim to be responsible for poverty
reduction programs in Nigeria. The first is the National Planning Commission;
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria mandated the Commission to
be responsible for poverty reduction. The second includes several ministries
(Education, Health, Agriculture, and Environment), each of which tries to situate
poverty reduction programs within its general framework of operations. The
third includes ad hoc agencies like Better Life for Rural Women (BLRW);
Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI); Family Economic
Advancement Program (FEAP); National Poverty Eradication Program
(NAPEP); National Agricultural Land Development Program (NALDA);
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), and so
on. Furthermore, for 22 of the nation’s 57 years of independence, the govern-
ment has been democratically elected with a complex federal structure incapable
of correcting the ills of the past, including poverty reduction. For more than 30
years, the nation has been under a military dictatorship with far-reaching
implications for national economic growth and widespread poverty.
Up until 2006, Nigeria was a notorious debtor nation, which partially explains
the increasing poverty at that time. Indeed, repayment of debt to the Paris Club
of creditor nations, amounting to US$18 billion, and twice as much to other
foreign creditors, exacerbated poverty. Nigeria sought and eventually received
relief. Despite such relief and Nigeria’s enormous assets of arable land for agri-
cultural production, oil wealth, huge natural resources, and human capital, more
than half of Nigerians still live in relative and absolute poverty. In both urban
and rural areas, Nigerians are struggling on a daily basis to eke out a living after
140 M.O. Odey
more than 50 years of independence. So much poverty exists in the midst of
huge wealth, which, for the most part, is mismanaged from one regime to
another, leading to the growth of abject poverty and the so-called Dutch Disease
Syndrome. These factors invariably add to the very slow pace of economic
growth and abject poverty. Nigeria is one of the richest countries in Black
Africa, but it has the highest number of poor people on the continent; the
majority live without the barest necessities of life, demonstrated by very wide
gaps between the very rich and the very poor.
Since independence, Nigeria has been beset with many problems, ranging
from ethnic sentiments which culminated in the 1967 civil war; to Islamic funda-
mentalism in the northern part; to social insecurity and youthful restiveness in
the Niger-Delta; to constant post-election crises and countless ethnic/religious
violence; to crises resulting from the removal of fuel subsidies. Of all of these
issues, poverty and hunger constitute the most serious challenges to the Nigerian
government at all levels as well as to individuals. It has defied all government
maneuvering, and its effects have reverberated throughout the country. Gener-
ally, Nigerians are very resilient people and seem used to the turbulence and
hardship emerging from these numerous crises. Successive Nigerian govern-
ments have attempted to reduce the high level of poverty penury, without tan-
gible results.
This chapter asks two fundamental questions. First, what is the nature and
dimension of poverty in Nigeria since independence? Second, why has there
been so much poverty in the midst of so much wealth over the past 57 years?
The analysis goes further to suggest possible ways by which poverty can be gen-
uinely palliated in the country. In addressing these questions, it is necessary to
critically examine the poverty reduction policies and programs in Nigeria since
1960 from a historical perspective. The method used here includes, among other
things, a review of the economic policies of government related to poverty issues
and the general performance of the economy to determine the extent to which
poverty has been alleviated through such policies and over time. The analysis
revealed the apparent failure of government to surmount the problem of wide-
spread poverty in Nigeria over the past 50 years. To deal with the implications
of widespread poverty in the midst of wealth in Nigeria, the conclusion attempts
to repackage the too many ill-conceived policies on poverty in Nigeria and the
bottlenecks in the implementation process that have not brought about apprecia-
ble poverty reduction. The emphasis is on the necessity for a more aggressive
and effective management of the natural resources, human, and social capital in
Nigeria.

The nature and dimensions of poverty in contemporary

Nigeria since 1960
Experts on the subject of poverty conceptualize it in many ways, ranging from
the traditional to more technical meanings. The range of meanings is wide
enough for every divergent interest to find its slot. The most common definitions
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 141
include: lack of the basic necessities of life, such as food, housing, proper educa-
tion, access to potable drinking water; absence of health facilities; lack of money
due to unemployment or other reasons; high rates of infant mortality; low life
expectancies; and lack of participation in the political decision-making process.
Simply put, poverty is deficiency in the provision of basic things that make life
worth living. Poverty is a relative term because what constitutes poverty and a
sense of lack, desperation, or helplessness to some may not be so to others.
Perhaps only the poor can more accurately define the concept rather than
someone who does not know what suffering and desperation implies and how it
feels to be poor. From the foregoing, poverty implies, among other things, a dire
need or deprivation of the things that are necessary to make life meaningful.
Poverty in Nigeria is generally characterized by poor physical and infrastruc-
tural facilities, low levels of technological development, and a predominantly
agrarian economy driven by traditional methods of production, poor living stand-
ards, and the over-dependence of the vast majority of the people on the few who
are better off in the rural and urban centers. According to several sources,
poverty in Nigeria has not been markedly reduced from levels 50 years ago.
More than half of the population live in both absolute and relative poverty. For
instance, according to the UN, the nation’s key indicators of poverty have shown
that the average life expectancy of Nigerians at birth was 37 years between 1960
and 2000, and, by 2008, it was 43 years. In 1960, the GDP per capita was about
US$99, by 1995 US$260, and by 2008 US$1,121. Exports of goods and services
at independence stood at 9 percent and rose to 43 percent by 2008. Imported
goods and services are currently about 30 percent, compared to 17 percent in the
1960s.1 Furthermore, the UN reports that “the African average of US$20 of
health in aid per person, Nigerians get US$2 in aid per year, and at the moment,
Nigeria’s health system is rated as one of the bottom five in the World.”2 Out of
about 140 million people, nearly 100 million Nigerians live in absolute poverty
despite the fact that the nation has the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa,
with an annual GDP of not less than US$71 billion. By 1993, the dependency
ratio in Nigeria was about 106 percent, and those with access to safe water were
about 40 percent. By international ranking of development among postcolonial
states in sub-Saharan Africa over the past 50 years, Nigeria is far from being one
of the top five. The incidence of poverty grew from 27.2 percent in 1980 to 65
percent in 1996, and it has been on the increase by the average rate of 10 percent
every three years since then.3 According to one UNDP report, the trend in the
growth of poverty in Nigeria placed the country at 151 out of 174 poor countries
of the world by 2000.4
By 1960, the Nigerian economy was largely unmechanized and bound by tra-
ditional methods of agricultural production activities, such as the hoe and
cutlass, and characterized by the household mode of production with low-
capacity utilization. Since independence, the country has remained as poor as
ever due to the inability of the political class to properly manage and transform
the available resources, especially oil and agricultural wealth, into much-needed
goods and services. As such, the economy is still characterized by agrarian and
142 M.O. Odey
subsistence behavior with minimal market operations. For the most part, the
economy is driven by small-scale peasant farmers engaged in traditional agricul-
ture.5 In simple terms, over 75 percent of Nigerians depend solely on traditional
agricultural production.
By the independence period, the nation’s GDP was 60 percent. However, as
the role of petroleum and oil continued to assume an overriding importance in
all aspects of national life, agriculture’s percentage of GDP dropped from 60
percent in 1957, 53 percent in 1960, and 34 percent in 1974. The civil war of
1967 and the droughts of the 1970s dramatically affected agriculture. Beginning
in the early 1980s, Nigeria imported more than 50 percent of her food require-
ments, which is a serious contradiction in a nation that made self-sufficiency in
food production a cardinal objective. In fact, the poor have not benefited from
the oil wealth of the country due to mismanagement. Experts have summed up
the experience as a symptom of the “Dutch Disease from Oil,” raising a funda-
mental question:

Why did Nigeria’s booming oil export wealth have so little lasting benefit?
The short answer is mismanagement of those oil resources. As some other
oil exporters have found a dramatic increase in oil revenues, when not
managed carefully, produces “Dutch disease.” Nigeria also had its own
disease that compounded the effect of “Dutch Disease”: Droves of farm
workers moved from the rural sector into non-tradable production in search
of higher (but temporarily) nominal wages in the urban sector. On top of
that, excessive mechanization by better off farmers further displaced in rural
areas. Misallocation of resources in agriculture showed few tangible bene-
fits. Subsidies tended to benefit large, better off – farmers, not small farmers
– who became poorer.6

Oil production constitutes about 34 percent of GDP, over 97 percent of total

exports, and no less than 80 percent of every annual budget. Massive increases
in public investments related to oil production are made for the purpose of
raising productive capacity and human capital. However, these efforts have not
led to a rise in the level of exchange rates in the past.7 Thus, over time, poverty
rules throughout the nation, as the so-called peasants have remained the van-
guard of the nation’s economic base for the past 50 years. Small-scale farmers
have proven to be very resilient, and they are dynamic agents in the development
of commodity production for both internal and export trade. For example, up
until the Nigerian civil war in 1967, it was the small-scale agricultural farmers
who were responsible for the production of palm produce in the East, cocoa in
the Southwest, rubber in the South-South, groundnuts and hides and skin in the
North, and benniseed in Central Nigeria. Even now, most Nigerians still depend
on these subsistence farmers for their very survival, either directly as full-time
farmers or indirectly as part-time farmers.
Even after the discovery of the oil wells in the Niger-Delta region by Shell-
BP in 1957 and the exportation of about 1.8 million barrels by 1962 through to
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 143
the present day, the culture of poverty in Nigeria remains more or less the same.
For the most part, the Nigerian economic base is neither socialist nor capitalist
but tends towards a mixed economy, which provides an important explanation
for the nature and dimension of poverty the nation is experiencing. In fact,
several analysts see the general performance of the economy as wasted years and
a lost battle against poverty.8
Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones under three broad geographical
regions also known as agro-climatic zones of the North, Middle, and South.
About 46 percent, or nearly half, of the poor in Nigeria live in the North zone in
a very poor agro-climatic environment. The South accounts for 32 percent of the
poor and the Middle Belt about 21 percent of the poor. Between 1985 and 1992,
it is believed that the number of the poor in Nigeria slightly reduced from 26.3 to
22.8 million in the rural areas, but rose from 9.7 million to 11.9 million in the
cities.9 In the 1980s and 1990s, variations and changes in the patterns of poverty
worsened throughout the country.
Although poverty in Nigeria is both a rural and an urban phenomenon, the
poor are concentrated in the rural areas. Subsistence farmers make up most of
the poor; they include those without land and those with land but without access
to inputs to engage in productive activities that could change their living con-
ditions. Lack of employment opportunities, population pressure, and disputes
over land have thrown several rural dwellers further into poverty compared to
other parts of Nigeria since 1960. Most of the rural farmers have very small-
sized farmlands because they are poor, and they stay poor because of lack of
good infrastructure, especially good roads, which is accentuated by seasonal
farming and lack of money to buy even subsidized fertilizers and other farm
inputs. The most vulnerable groups of the poor in Nigeria are children and
women, especially widows and single parents. Furthermore, one significant
explanation of the nature and growth of poverty from household surveys in
Nigeria is that most people use almost all their cash earnings to purchase food as
a survival strategy (see Table 8.1).
On the other hand, the young and agile job seekers who left the rural villages
after graduation from the universities and colleges for urban centers in the hope
of getting jobs are the largest number of the urban poor in Nigeria. They are
deprived groups living in slums and have constituted different types of social
risks such as armed robbers, kidnappers, and prostitutes throughout the country.
Unless something positive is done, the worst is yet to happen in terms of social
insecurity, going by the current growth rate of urbanization in Nigeria which is
about 5.3 percent annually, perhaps the fastest in the world.10 This suggests that
urban poverty in Nigeria is likely to increase in the years to come, just as it has
been reported that the general level of poverty in Nigeria is on the increase, from
55 million people in 1998 to 70 million people (66 percent of the population
in 2000).
The common experiences of the poor remain the same throughout the country
with marginal differences between regions. These include, among other things,
lack of purchasing power due to unemployment, lack of skills due to illiteracy,
144 M.O. Odey
Table 8.1 Poverty in Nigeria by state, 1985 to 1992 (poverty line = N395.41)

State 1985/1986 1992/1993

Incidence Depth Severity Incidence Depth Severity

Lagos (Urban) 24.0 7.0 3.2 27.9 0.9 0.3

FCT 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.5 24.5 15.7
Anambra 30.9 10.4 4.5 16.3 5.9 3.1
Bauchi 58.7 24.7 13.2 55.6 23.6 13.3
Bendel 41.7 14.6 6.7 16.2 6.1 3.3
Benue 46.0 18.3 9.3 36.8 17.6 11.4
Borno 42.1 16.8 8.7 41.8 18.5 10.8
Cross River 42.1 13.9 6.1 33 15.6 9.4
Gongola 48.8 19.1 9.8 31.7 12.9 6.8
Imo 32.2 10.1 4.5 14.4 6.6 4.0
Kaduna 49.8 18 8.7 24.7 9.7 5.3
Kano 48.3 16.4 7.6 50.8 19.9 10.4
Kwara 41.3 13.0 5.4 31.4 13.6 8.2
Lagos Rural 36.1 11.6 5.2 36.1 14.5 7.6
Niger 56.6 28.5 18.2 44.4 20.0 12.2
Ogun 45.4 14.5 6.2 26.3 9.7 4.8
Ondo 44.5 17.9 9.3 26.6 11.2 6.6
Oyo 31.5 7.2 2.4 22.9 8.8 4.7
Plateau 47.5 17.2 8.7 42.6 18.8 11.3
Rivers 35.8 9.7 3.6 37.9 15.8 8.8
Sokoto 46.9 18.5 9.4 52.6 25.6 15.8
All Nigeria 43 15.7 7.9 34.1 14.7 8.5

Source: NCS, FOS, 1985/1986 and 1992/1993, cited in The World Bank Poverty Assessment, Nigeria:
Poverty in the Midst of Plenty, The Challenge of Growth with Inclusion, May 31, 1996, p. 42.

lack of basic necessities, and inability to do the simplest things without the help
of others with goodwill. In their daily struggles for survival, the Nigerian urban
poor appear to be worse off than their rural counterparts in several dimensions.
A number of studies have shown that the urban poor have developed several
coping strategies to contend with the high cost of living.11 These include, among
other things, avoiding whatever will make them spend money, and, because the
poor have to work harder to make ends meet, most have less time for leisure,
trek long distances to places and to work, and buy food on credit with an agree-
ment to pay foodstuff traders after receiving salaries or when able. Furthermore,
to avoid living on credit, many go to the extreme of taking away left-overs from
social parties and funerals, eating unconventional foods, etc. Of course, this
Nigeria is the same country where the opulent live with fleets of cars and a ring
of bodyguards to fend off armed robbers from stealing their ill-gotten wealth.
Table 8.2 further explains the dimensions and indicators of poverty in Nigeria
from 1995 to 2001.
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 145
Table 8.2 Dimensions of poverty in Nigeria in 1995, 1999, and 2001

Poverty dimension and indicators 1995 1999 2001

Income
Population below US$1 per day (%) 70.2
Population below minimum level of dietary energy 13 7
consumption (%)
Services
Schooling
Primary school enrollment (female %) 47.8 45.9
Primary school enrollment (male %) 52.2 54.1
Youth literacy (% ages 15–24) 81.1 87.8
Health
Access to essential drugs (% of total population) 10
Access to physicians (per 100,000 people) <30
Nigerians living with HIV/AIDS (millions) >5
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15–24) 5.8
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) 305
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000) 187 183
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 112 110
Immunization, measles (% of children under 12 months) 44 40
Immunization, full (5 of total children) 17
Maternal mortality (modeled estimate per 100,000 live 1,100 704
births)
Clean water
Access to safe drinking water (% of population) 50
Access to safe drinking water (% of urban population) 80
Access to safe drinking water (% of rural population) 40
Access to improved water source (% of population) 62
Access to improved sanitation (% of population) 54
Empowerment
Proportion of seats held by woman in national 3
parliament (%)
General
Population (millions) 111.3 125
Average annual growth in GDP 2.9 2.9

Source: World Bank: Baseline data on which reform projections are based (cited in NEEDS
NIGERIA, National Planning Commission, Abuja, 2004).

The nature of poverty alleviation policies and programs in

Nigeria since 1960
It is necessary to first understand the nature of poverty programs in Nigeria to
facilitate a robust analysis on the extent to which they have been effective in
poverty reduction during the period under review. However, such an attempt
prior to the 1990s should begin with an apology, because there was no definite
policy on poverty in place before then. Some reports have shown that elaborate
146 M.O. Odey
poverty eradication programs were initiated in Nigeria between 1986 and 1993,
but failed to achieve the desired goals due to lack of priority and proper coordin-
ation.12 Indeed, what may be taken for poverty policies here were essentially pro-
grams that were linked to poverty, but which were not necessarily poverty
policies and not directed to the poor. Both colonial and postcolonial govern-
ments in Nigeria recognized the role of such policies in poverty reduction, but
there was no clear and specific economic policy towards poverty reduction in
Nigeria until 1994 and later in 2001 when the real process of drafting an interim
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was put in place. According to Bade
Onimode,13 some of the economic policies in Nigeria following independence
were essentially policies of underdevelopment rather than those of development
because they continued to entrench neo-colonial dependence policies. These
include an oil policy in 1967, an indigenization policy in 1977, an income policy,
austerity measures, and a National Economic and Empowerment and Develop-
ment Strategy (NEEDS) which was launched in May 2004. In between these
major policies of government, different strategies have also been articulated to
achieve national development, such as Operation Feed the Nation, the Green
Revolution, the River Basin Authorities, and the Poverty Alleviation and Reduc-
tion Policy. It was hoped that the formulation and successful implementation of
these macro-economic policies would stimulate economic growth and provide
social services, and reduce poverty in the long run. However, these were neces-
sary but not sufficient conditions for poverty eradication in Nigeria because they
always emphasized macro-economic theories of growth, stabilization, balance of
payments, full employment, and income distribution rather than practical issues
of poverty reduction. In fact, rather than reducing poverty, some of the policies
even aggravated poverty or “triggered off a precipitous fall in incomes and led to
a sharp deterioration in living standards” like the Structural Adjustment Program
in 1986.14
Lack of focus and the right attitude towards poverty reduction in the existing
fiscal/budget policies in Nigeria may find justification in the fact that it was only
in the 1990s that the global community was beginning to pay specific attention
or give a clarion call for sustainable development within which to locate the
drive towards poverty reduction in Nigeria as in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.
Since then, and more than ever before, concepts, strategies, programs, types, and
criteria for measuring poverty began to be developed by the UNDP in the 1990s
which necessitated corresponding responses from the Nigerian government
regarding poverty alleviation.15 Over time, the traditional way of dealing with
poverty in Nigeria has rested on each state of the Federation and the Federal
government at the center to manage each of these programs.
A poverty alleviation program was also reflected in the (1996–1998) Govern-
ment Rolling Plan, elaborated in several documents by which the National Plan-
ning Commission, Abuja, under several nomenclatures involving a wide range
of multi-sectoral programs was designed to reach the poor16 with the National
Directorate of Employment handling other units, including the Directorate of
Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) and Better Life for Rural Women
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 147
which was responsible for training traditional birth attendants to work as rural
midwives, establishing cottage industries for rural women, etc.
Other programs in the Rolling Plan include the agricultural sector, the health
sector, the education sector, transport, and housing and finance. Again, different
states in Nigeria were charged with specific responsibilities for dealing with
whatever constituted a problem to the welfare needs of the poor in their respec-
tive areas and were expected to act accordingly, such as the provision of agricul-
tural and extension services, primary healthcare delivery, provision of boreholes,
the periodic immunization of children, and the National Poverty Eradication
Program (NAPEP). In addition, non-governmental organizations, parent–
teachers’ associations (PTAs), community and self-help associations, local
chiefs, and powerful elites have also lent support to alleviate the suffering of the
poor throughout the country.
Other related programs in the Rolling Plan include approaches to maximize
the use of land resources effectively at subsidized rates, provision of credit and
loan schemes, health centers in different local government areas, sensitization on
the control of communicable diseases such as promotion of knowledge and atti-
tude regarding personal hygiene, disposal of excreta, etc. The development of
infrastructure and girls’ education, adult, and female literacy were also encour-
aged in the education sector. Furthermore, new buses were provided in 1988 to
rescue the transport sector from total collapse, but they are never enough. It was
for similar reasons that buses were provided by the Federal government to all the
states of the Federation to ease the mass movement of the people in January
2012 following the removal of fuel subsidies. Furthermore, there were several
moves towards the construction of urban houses for all income groups as a
poverty alleviation program.
It was against this background that NEEDS (National Economic Empower-
ment and Development Strategy) was launched in May 2004 following a gesta-
tion period of about three years. NEEDS is a product of widespread
consultations among a cross-section of Nigerians and interest groups set against
the background of the previous initiatives and the dream about what Nigeria
should be. The idea was first muted in what is called the Kuru Declaration in
2001 which envisioned what Nigeria should be by 2010. Those who were privi-
leged to prepare the final draft conceded that most Nigerians were unaware of
the extent of the rot and decay in the social and economic system which
NEEDS was articulated to address. Although NEEDS was largely home
grown and essentially inspired by the current challenges from the global per-
spective of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it was however not
limited to poverty reduction as many people assumed. It focused on four stra-
tegic areas of national development – namely value orientation, poverty reduc-
tion, wealth creation, and generation of employment – all of which could be
achieved, and it was hoped that by creating an enabling environment the dream
could be realized. As before, it has been mainstreamed at the state and local
government levels as SEEDS and LEEDS to make development a collective
responsibility and make poverty a thing of the past in Nigeria in line with the
148 M.O. Odey
declaration of the UN MDGs.17 The most important question here is: To what
extent have all these programs brought about poverty reduction in Nigeria
over time?

Weaknesses and failures of poverty programs in Nigeria

since 1960
NEEDS, like Vision 2010 and similar documents, passed through a long gesta-
tion period before it was published, with four cardinal objectives which were not
exclusively poverty alleviation policies or programs. Apart from this, NEEDS,
like other documents before it, is a duplication of the existing programs and is
highly complex. It is difficult to coordinate and implement the programs at the
national, state, and local government council levels. According to the UNDP,

[T]he greatest flaws in these poverty alleviation strategies are their “top-
down approach” which resulted in the creation of a multiplicity of institu-
tions with overlapping roles and responsibilities. State and Local
Government Councils were reduced to mere agents by which to implement
various poverty programs which were not necessarily the immediate needs
of most rural community in contemporary Nigeria.18

Essentially, the Federal government was just a facilitator of poverty reduction

programs while the states and local governments were to implement the policies.
Things do not seem to work that well in Nigeria. Most of the programs are too
generalized with a very wide scope, to the extent that available resources are
thinly spread in pursuit of too many activities. This is compounded in the imple-
mentation process with inconsistencies due to constant regime changes in
Nigeria. Indeed, the programs of NEEDS seem to be the best regarding poverty
reduction in the country, but, like similar programs in the past, they have not
been fully implemented as planned. Those who benefited were not the poor, but
the rich and the influential. Furthermore, Vision 2010 did not take care of certain
interest groups and many Nigerians viewed it as a “trickle-down thing”:

The most serious weakness is no doubt its insufficient attention to the

poverty problem of Nigeria and the great danger it (poverty) poses in all
spheres of human endeavors. With regard to its usefulness in contemporary
Nigeria, it has been described as out of date and unrealistic.19

The problem of poverty reduction in Nigeria is linked to the leadership question.

In this regard, the famous Socratic dictum, Knowledge is virtue, has argued that:

What is required for a good society is knowledge of the good or of the most
fundamental ethical values. In the realm of contemporary socio-political
action, it is generally said that what is required are leaders who know what
the society needs and in whose hands the welfare of the society is to be
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 149
entrusted. Such leaders are to formulate and equip themselves with the body
of ideas or a system of ideology that ideally expresses the goals which the
society ought to pursue.20

The idea here is not to suggest that all Nigerian leaders must be philosophers or
experts in ideological formulation before the nation can banish hunger and
poverty. However, it is imperative for the leadership to have a reasonable level
of consciousness about the suffering of the poor masses and also have the capa-
city to attack poverty effectively and get rid of it. This has been the main
problem with poverty alleviation programs and strategies in Nigeria over time.
To several analysts, the weaknesses and failures of poverty programs in Nigeria,
more than 50 years after independence in 1960, have several manifestations such
as plunder, frustration, widespread poverty, and inequality in almost every sector
of the nation’s economy. The implication of this is general stagnation, low pur-
chasing power of the vast majority of people, and very slow economic growth.
This may be traced to a number of factors, the most fundamental being the
absence of clear and radical national macro-economic policies in Nigeria. To the
liberal-minded, the policies are ill-conceived, faulty, and replete with a confused
set of objectives from the point of formulation to implementation stage. To other
critical analysts, the slow pace of economic growth and lack of focus on targeted
projects in the formulation of poverty policies may be linked to the nature of
colonial legacies from which postcolonial governments in Nigeria have not been
able to completely break free. Furthermore, there is the problem of the reckless-
ness and inexcusable failure of the political class to clearly figure out national
priorities in the craft of governance to make poverty history, but who are rather
for the most part bedeviled with a high level of corruption that is virtually incur-
able. Added to these issues is the absence of genuine democratic practice in
Nigeria which could solve these problems. Thus, up until the independence
period and long after, it would appear that the nation was taking the path of a
mixed economy driven largely by the public and private sectors, import substitu-
tion industrialization, and dependence on external influences, as demonstrated
by the National Development Plans of 1962 to 1968, 1970 to 1974, 1975 to
1980, and 1980 to 1985.
In matters of detail and style, it does not take much to know that government
programs and policies were mere replicas of the ten-year colonial economic
policy/plan (1945–1955) which had no clear direction and policy on poverty
reduction in Nigeria during the postcolonial era. Even now, Nigeria still lacks a
systematic and theoretical approach to the formulation of public policy on eco-
nomic development. Indeed, much of what are taken for national economic pol-
icies and development programs are not only inherited from the policies of
colonial government but are for the most part sham imitations of what other
countries were able to achieve or tried to achieve in developing their own eco-
nomies. Although each of the National Development Plans was geared towards
modernization and self-sufficiency in agricultural production, they “showed no
clear-cut objectives and targets to be achieved in agriculture which is the life line
150 M.O. Odey
of the vast majority of Nigerians apart from the watery mention of its moderni-
zation,” not to talk of poverty alleviation.21 Even when the national agricultural
policies of “Operation Feed the Nation” and the “Green Revolution programs”
are judged to have succeeded from 1975 to 1985 because they emphasized the
importance of agriculture and brought to the public limelight the importance of
agriculture, many regarded them as a process of modernizing hunger and poverty
in Nigeria through the “institutionalization of an inequitable socio-economic
system.”22 Furthermore, although when the economy appeared to have recovered
between 1985 and 1992, with the reduction of poverty from 43 percent to 34
percent, the gains for the poor were erratic and mixed because most of them
living in the different geo-political zones did not share in the gains of the
recovery. In fact, the severity and depth of poverty went ahead of the gains
achieved during the period.
This underscores the fact that poverty cannot be reduced more than a nation
can develop without a clear-cut macro-economic principle and practice on devel-
opment, as demonstrated by most emerging nations in their attempts to develop
their economies during the post-World War II period. Economic theory and
public policy analysis appear to be the most dynamic instruments for national
development, unlike during the era of colonial domination which was driven by
laissez-faire attitudes in the British territories. An absence of clear-cut economic
policies and narrow-mindedness regarding issues of importance such as poverty
reduction, sluggish economic growth, and weaknesses in the existing policy
framework has retarded national development as well as entrenchment of
poverty in Nigeria over time. In simple terms, the failure of poverty reduction in
Nigeria is proportional to the poverty of ideology in the past and existing pro-
grams. Too many times, political parties try to articulate manifestos, declaring
what they intend to do if elected to power, but they lack prudence and are hardly
guided by any clear principle towards sustainable development or get to the
bottom of of what will bring about a lasting legacy of making poverty history in
Nigeria.
The application of this for material purposes is that targeted economic growth
requires systematization in policy formulation; it must be empirical, logical, and
evaluative in approach and tailored specifically towards the nation’s problems of
development such as poverty reduction. To a large extent, it is a matter of using
scientific knowledge to make the desired progress towards poverty reduction.
Theory means a law or principle and a methodological way of handling a phe-
nomenon. It is a formula used in resolving a problem without compromise. Over
the past 50 years; this is what appears to be the missing link in the policies of
poverty reduction in Nigeria. Most of the Nigerian leaders have not demon-
strated the charisma with which to move the nation forward to a reasonable level
of poverty reduction and sustainable development. Unfortunately, the selection
processes of those destined to lead the nation to such a level have also been
faulty all along. By giving way to mediocrity and cynicism, everyone appears to
be satisfied with traditional ways of doing almost everything rather than engage
in intellectual capacity to strive towards excellence and prudence as if the nation
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 151
is still in the backwoods of history. This is why indeed, without the engagement
of theory, it has been almost impossible to postulate relationships between the
existing poverty conditions in Nigeria and the phenomenon of our backwardness
to prescribe the desired changes. Diametrically opposed to this are the examples
of European nations during the Age of European Revolutions and Discoveries,
especially Mercantilism, the Bolshevik Revolution, Marxist-Leninist ideals, and
Liberalism which have gone a long way to change the world. Be that as it may,
Nigeria as a nation after more than 50 years of independence does not have to
copy any of these ideologies to move out of poverty towards sustainable devel-
opment because most of these systems have failed to effectively sustain the
development processes in those nations. Nigeria should rather come to terms
with her own initiatives and develop home-made theories and praxis regarding
poverty reduction and then follow through into her dreamland.
On the other hand, in many of the poverty alleviation programs in Nigeria,
the poor do not even know what is happening around them because they are not
involved in the implementation of policies affecting them. If the poor do not
know what government is trying to do to palliate their suffering, how then can
they monitor or assess the progress made in the public domain to make them
confront those accountable for their failure when necessary? Not just that alone;
many times a certain privileged few or communities have always had more than
enough of the benefits of what government has planned for the poor because of
their political connections, while the vast majority of even the most vulnerable
groups receive little or nothing of the social amenities provided.
Indeed, most poverty programs in Nigeria have failed basically because of the
corruption of the political leadership and mismanagement of available resources
by both military dictators and their civilian counterparts over time. By extension,
the inefficient management of available human and natural resources leads to
frustrations and social upheaval. The recent political crisis arising from the
removal of fuel subsidies in Nigeria testifies to this fact. It goes without saying
that wherever corruption thrives, the rich will always be richer and the poor
poorer. This is the crux of the quagmire. Most of those in power are reluctant to
formulate laws and the right policies to alleviate poverty because of corruption
and because they fear that the poor may rise eventually to become like them or
even overtake them. Thus, nothing is changing for the better for poor Nigerians
in the real sense. Furthermore, because of the fragile nature of the Nigerian polit-
ical economy, which is largely bedeviled by chaos and uncertainty, the poor are
generally left to chance and every man for himself, rather than being under good
governance. It is generally characterized by what may be termed a diarchy of
military dictatorship and civilian democracy which appears to be forthcoming at
times if only for a short while, but at other times is threatened by too many
forces and without the prospect of ever being fully developed. This is the
dilemma. In between the two extremes is the outright inability of those in power
to engage in one form of political experimentation or the other where poverty
prevails. It is in the light of these issues that Abdullahi and others have argued
that the failures and weaknesses of poverty programs and policies in Nigeria are
152 M.O. Odey
not traceable to one single individual but to a “cumulative effect of apparent rel-
ative neglect of the vital sectors of the economy in the context of national devel-
opment for several years.”23

Conclusion
From the foregoing, several important issues have emerged in this chapter.
Nigeria is one of the richest in oil wealth and other natural resources, but remains
the habitation of the poorest people in sub-Saharan Africa more than 50 years
after independence. Indeed, the incidence and magnitude of poverty in Nigeria
since 1960 is unpardonable and unimaginable, and it must be dealt with.
Undoubtedly, Nigeria has the wherewithal to bring poverty to the barest
minimum, but the contradiction is that the opposite is the case.
As is clearly observed, the failures of the attempts to reduce poverty in
Nigeria are traceable to the lack of a clear policy framework and direct poverty
programs to ease the malady. For the nation to move from its present chaotic
position much is still required, especially from government, to engage in a policy
“shift away from rent-seeking towards policies, programs and institutions that
promote efficient, sustainable and broad based growth and job creation.”24 Fur-
thermore, government should take full responsibility and develop new initiatives
and show more commitments to implement all planned projects or bring them to
a logical conclusion. These policies must be geared towards growth and social
services so that the vast majority of the people can benefit and begin to enjoy a
better standard of life, thereby bringing poverty to a gradual end.
The essence of articulating new approaches with specific policy targets
towards the poor in particular and the much-needed macro-economic growth and
poverty reduction in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. For Nigeria, a nation
that is so blessed to make poverty history and achieve sustainable development,
economic growth remains the most dependable way by which to provide social
services and reduce poverty. Furthermore, the nature of the growth required must
be rapid and broad based to reach all the vulnerable groups before any reason-
able impact can be made simultaneously.
Apart from this, government has to use available oil wealth to maintain oil
facilities and even expand them to avoid the inevitable effects when oil revenue
in the world market goes down. Furthermore, it is necessary to divert to the non-
oil sectors of the economy to generate employment and income opportunities
from off-farm and agro-processing and to remove price distortions as well as
reform the current trade regime. Diversion from over-dependence on oil wealth
is also imperative due to recurring downturns and uncertainties in the global
market in oil prices. There is also a need for investment in technology, massive
rural infrastructure, and improved access to credit facilities as well as express
access to quality goods and services, especially health, water supply, education,
rural/urban roads, and legislation on human capacity building to improve the
living standards of the vast majority of the population in rural areas. Further-
more, the entire political economy, including the recurring insurgencies in the
 Poverty reduction policies: Nigeria since 1960 153
Niger-Delta region as well as corruption in Nigeria due to oil wealth, must all be
dealt with simultaneously and once and for all in the hope that the resources
from oil will be translated into real socioeconomic benefits for the people. This
is the surest way to alleviate the suffering of poor Nigerians within a short time.
Whatever is necessary to be done for the poor should not be politicized, but
must be liberally provided according to the needs of the poor. Above all, local
communities should be allowed to participate more directly and be involved in
the issues that concern them, while government should endeavor to put the pri-
ority of the nation in perspective, and provide the necessary infrastructure, tech-
nical assistance, and supervision. The essence of involving the poor people more
in the matters that concern them is to underscore the relevance of good govern-
ance and popular participation, and to promote sustainable democracy without
which poverty reduction will not be achieved. Finally, it is unnecessary to
include programs of poverty reduction under too many agencies with too many
names. The Federal government can create one ministry of poverty reduction
with branches in each of the 36 states and smaller branches in each of the 774
local government councils to simplify things for faster progress and to avoid
duplication and conflict.

Notes
1 Databank, World bank.org, cited in “Nigeria’s Journey.” BBC Focus on Africa Maga-
zine, October to December 2010.
2 “Nigeria Now: By Numbers.” .Development Magazine 32, No. 4, 2005.
3 C.A. Sofo, Ali-Akpajiak, and Joni Pyke, Measuring Poverty in Nigeria (Oxfam,
2003).
4 UNDP, Global Human Development Report, quoted in Sofo et al., Measuring Poverty
in Nigeria, p. 29.
5 Z.A. Konczacki and J.M. Konczacki (eds), An Economic History of Tropical Africa,
Vol. 2, The Colonial Period (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
6 National Planning Commission, Poverty & Welfare in Nigeria, FOS. The Federal
Republic of Nigeria, Abuja, World Bank Report.
7 The World Bank Poverty Assessment, Nigeria: Poverty in the Midst of Plenty, The
Challenge of Growth with Inclusion, May 31 1996 (Population and Human Resources
Division, West African Department, African Region), p. 10.
8 D. Agbese (ed.), “The Failed Battle.” Newswatch, August 17, 2009.
9 The World Bank Poverty Assessment, Nigeria: Poverty, pp. 35 and 62.
10 The International Development Magazine 32, no. 4, 2005.
11 The World Bank Poverty Assessment, Nigeria, p. 61.
12 Sofo et al., Measuring Poverty in Nigeria.
13 B. Onimode, “The Performance of the Economy,” in M.O. Kayode et al. (eds),
Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years, Vol. II, The Economy (London:
Heinemann, 1989).
14 Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria, Nigeria Economic Society. Selected Papers for the
1997 Annual Conference, Pat Mag Press, Ltd., Ibadan, p. 212.
15 J.C. Anyanwu, “Poverty in Nigeria: Concepts, Measurment and Determinants,” in
Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria, Nigeria Economic Society.
16 National Planning Commission, “Government Policies and Programs to Reach the
Poor.” Background Paper, January 1994, in The World Bank Poverty Assessment, p. 90.
154 M.O. Odey
17 National Economic and Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (abridged
version, Abuja, 2004), p. 11.
18 Sofo et al., Measuring Poverty in Nigeria.
19 UNDP Human Development Report 1998, p. 63, quoted in Sofo et al., Measuring
Poverty in Nigeria, p. 32.
20 U. Nwala, “The Poverty of Ideology in Nigerian Development,” in O. Nnoli, Path to
Nigerian Development (Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series, 1981), p. 152.
21 A. Abdullahi, in George O.I. Abalu et al. (eds), The Green in Nigeria? (Zaria: Insti-
tute for Agricultural Research, A.B.U., 1984), p. 2.
22 T. Ferdnance, “The Process of Modernizing Hunger in Nigeria,” in J. Collins and F.
Lappe, Food First: Beyond the Myth of Food Scarcity (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin, 1977).
23 A. Abdullahi, quoted in George O.I. Abalu et al. (eds), The Green in Nigeria?
24 The World Bank Poverty Assessment, Nigeria, p. xxi.
9 In the web of neoliberalism and
deepening contradictions?
Assessing poverty reform strategies in
West Africa since the mid-1980s
Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr.

Introduction
The persistence and perversity of poverty throughout the West African sub-
region has continued to be a major concern in development dialogs in the conti-
nent and beyond. What is the nature of this poverty? How did it come about?
Who are its major victims? What are the responses of stakeholders, and why are
they still inadequate? In what specific ways does poverty affect the development
of the sub-region? In addressing these questions, this chapter attempts to situate
the persistence of poverty in West Africa in the context of the inadequacies of
the neoliberal policy frameworks directed at mitigating it since the mid-1980s.
Against this background, the chapter consistently argues and concludes that for
the West African sub-region and indeed the entire continent to extricate itself
from the incubus of poverty, it must first disentangle itself from the web of neo-
liberal contradictions underpinning these policies while at the same time looking
inward. It must invest resources in creating wealth, improving the standard of
living of the people, and building strong institutions that guarantee good govern-
ance and deliver development to the people. To address the task outlined herein,
the chapter is structurally framed in four interrelated sections. Following the
introduction, I attempt a historical profile of poverty in West Africa and explain
its many dimensions, nature, and character and its implications for socio-
economic development. The third section deals with responses to the phenom-
enon of poverty. Here, I argue that the nuanced failures of poverty alleviation
programs result from their neoliberal pedigree and show how, indeed, they have
compounded poverty in the sub-region instead of mitigating it. The final
segment, the conclusion, knits together the various strands of the arguments
articulated throughout the chapter and provides a roadmap out of the poverty
conundrum in the region.

Understanding poverty: a conceptual and theoretical note

Poverty is very hard to define objectively owing to its multidimensional nature
and character. Because of its complex and intriguing dimensions, it should
be subjected to many theoretical and methodological perspectives. Equally
156 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
challenging are the difficulties that arise from any attempt to conceptualize it as
a phenomenon. As a result, scholars have subjected poverty to many conceptual
interpretations and theoretical approaches, and scrutinized it from different dis-
ciplinary backgrounds. Realizing these challenges, many leading scholars only
attempt to describe the phenomenon in terms of its nature and more obvious
characteristics.1 With specific regard to the West African sub-region, we are
admonished particularly as follows:

What exactly then is to be understood by poverty? How can it be defined?

Are the definitional yardsticks quantitative or qualitative or both? Do these
vary from country to country or is there an international determining
standard? These questions would need to be answered realistically. All over
West Africa, the economy is far from being monetized. Talking of a
“poverty line” in terms of a certain income level may therefore not be very
appropriate. Is the nutritional status of a population a better indicator of
poverty? What level of calorie intake separates the poor from the relatively
well off? And if no single index would do, how do we produce a composite
index of poverty in our region?2

Nevertheless, poverty is a situation under which one is unable to meet a per-

son’s material and non-material needs. As a condition of existence character-
ized by dispossessions and deprivations, it refers to a lack of command over
basic consumption needs, which translates into an inadequate level of con-
sumption that leads to insufficient food, clothing, and/or shelter. Scholars like
Todaro and Sen associate it with certain capabilities, including being able to
participate actively and with dignity in society.3 In this sense, poverty is con-
ceived of as a socioeconomic problem with far-reaching implications not only
for the quality of life of a people but also for other aspects of life and behavior.
These other aspects include life chances, health, educational attainment, and
political and voting behavior; it also relates to deviant behavior such as crime,
destitution, immorality, divorce, alcoholism, and delinquency, to mention just
a few.
In another context, poverty is viewed as the inability to attain a minimum
standard of living. The UNDP 1990 Report articulates this view based on two
indices that demonstrate the practical essence of poverty.4 The first focuses on
country-specific poverty lines and the second dwells on the global, which allows
comparisons between countries.5 The UNDP also popularized the use of such
indices as life expectancy, infant mortality rate, primary school enrollment
ratios, the number of persons per physician, and so on.
A variant of the above conventional conceptualization is the subsistence
or poverty line model. This categorizes the poor as those who live below
the subsistence or poverty line. Here, a minimum survival norm is postulated
and specified in monetary terms. It has been noted that, in a superficial
way, the poverty line approach shifts with changes in societal values and eco-
nomic conditions.6 Using the specific case of Nigeria as an illustration, the
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 157
Morgan Commission developed and quantified the standard minimum wage
concept which was mutated over the years and in the context of changing
economic realities. This notion of poverty has weaknesses that should be
highlighted. Apart from the problem that many individuals and groups who,
though statistically located above the poverty line, may be regarded as poor
from an operational point of view, there is the question of quantification
challenges.
There is yet another concept of poverty that encapsulates all kinds of social
group relations. This agrees with the concept of a poverty line, but argues that it
is subject to dynamic changes that define the nature and character of the relations
within a given society. Seen in this context, poverty becomes not a physical or
physiological situation as such, but a single statistical ordering or ranking. The
universe of such comparison may be nations, regions, locations, socioeconomic
classes, sectors, and households of individuals. Thus, it is possible to identify
two types of poverty, namely: primary poverty under which condition poverty
results when the income of an individual or family is insufficient to provide for
basic needs for physical efficiency; and secondary poverty which arises from the
mismanagement of an income that would otherwise have been sufficient for the
satisfaction of basic needs. Captured under this category are those who are poor
due to laziness, recklessness, and profligacy.
The preceding definitional concepts of poverty only go to justify our earlier
claim that the discourse on poverty can hardly be devoid of norms. In a sense
this is expected, and it will always present the conceptual and methodological
challenge associated with establishing “objectivity” precisely because of the sen-
timents the discourse arouses. The conceptual divergences notwithstanding,
there appears to be a form of consensus among scholars on what constitute the
obvious attributes or characteristics of poverty, some of which include the
following:

1 Low income and limited or no visible means of livelihood.

2 Constant struggle for survival economically, socially, and even
physiologically.
3 Poor state of health.
4 Poor living conditions.
5 Low level of literacy or endemic illiteracy.
6 General apathy or outright disdain towards governance and governmental
affairs, arising from broken promises, unsatisfied expectations, sense of
injustice, exploitation, and so on.
7 Limited access to infrastructures: good or negotiable roads, electricity, water
supply, and, perhaps most importantly, healthcare facilities.
8 Low capacity for saving and investment, including acquisition of landed
property.7

Thus, the poor, wherever they are found, combine one or more of certain general
definitional attributes. Approximately, they are:
158 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
(i) Those whose ability to contribute to the productive process is insuffi-
cient; that is, those who are unable to contribute adequately to the pro-
ductive process to warrant an income that would raise them above the
poverty line.
(ii) Those for whom the economy has failed to provide jobs; that is, those
who are willing and capable of earning an adequate income if only jobs
were available.
(iii) Those whose opportunities to participate in the productive process are
restricted by discrimination of various kinds: sex, age, race, gender,
religion, etc.

Therefore, and on this basis, we submit that the poor in any society can easily be
identified based on their economic, cultural, social, and other conditions (see
above). This is notwithstanding the fact that poverty is multidimensional and
that the poor are heterogeneous across and within countries as well as geograph-
ical divides.
Some analysts have suggested a theorization of the poor based on their status
in the prevailing political economy. Accordingly, the theory of poverty must
necessarily isolate and analyze the centripetal and centrifugal forces that govern
and determine the ownership of the factors of production. Those forces ulti-
mately determine the nature and character of interpersonal and intergroup rela-
tions as well as differences in wealth and income in society.8 On this basis,
Akeredolu-Ale advances four theories that we found quite relevant in this dis-
course. These are: (1) the Necessity Theory; (2) the Individual Attributes
Theory; (3) the Natural Circumstantial Theory; and (4) the Power Theory. Since
all these theories are important to our understanding of poverty in West Africa,
it would be worthwhile taking a closer look at their postulations.
The Necessity Theory incorporates three variants. The first is functionalist, and
it argues that specialization leads to efficiency. Since roles are evaluated in dif-
ferent ways, certain roles attract more rewards than others. Second, it is assumed
that those who play such roles occupy high status on the economic and social
ladder of society. Third, it attempts an analysis of the roots of inequalities and
class differentiations in society. This theory is however inadequate owing to
certain contradictions inherent in its postulations. For example, it does not
specify who evaluates these roles and what determines the values placed on each
of these values. As pointed out by Unioamikogbo, the emergence of inequalities
is not and cannot be spontaneous.9 The functionalist theory of poverty is also
ahistorical: it fails to understand poverty as a social process. It concludes that it
is a natural condition for which nothing can be done. However, the history of
human experience suggests the opposite.
A second variant of the Necessity Theory of poverty has close affinity with
the evolutionist theory propounded by Charles Darwin.10 Like the functionalist
framework, this theory of poverty agrees that the poor in society emerge spon-
taneously with inequality and that poverty is a factor in determining who sur-
vives and who is eliminated. This so-called natural selection thesis for explaining
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 159
poverty gives the impression that nothing can be done about poverty and
inequalities in society. However, the question is: How true is this notion? The
third and last strand of the functionalist theory identifies crass exploitation as a
root cause of poverty and inequality in society. Anchoring the basis of its valid-
ity in the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe and North America, the
theory finds relevance in the historical processes that provoked economic growth
and development on the one hand, and inequality and poverty on the other.11
Some economists, however, point out that economic growth sometimes depends
on growing income inequality, for high-income/consumption, inequality lowers
the marginal efficiency of capital in mass production, and retards investment
in the final analysis.12
The Individual Attributes Theory of poverty blames the poor for their misfor-
tune. Analysts who subscribe to this theory contend that one’s placement in socie-
ty’s ranking of income and wealth is entirely determined by one’s motivations,
aptitudes, and ability.13 Operating on the logic that one’s destiny is in an individu-
al’s hands, the theory would appear to hold the poor culpable for their uncompli-
mentary status in society. The theory is however oblivious of the fact that beyond
the individual there are extraneous variables that influence and in fact determine
the possibilities and limits of the individual’s capabilities in the larger society.
The Natural Circumstantial Theory appears to be more directly concerned
with the question of poverty because ideas here focus on identifying factors that
are responsible for and/or create poverty in society. Some of these include geo-
graphical location, variations in biodiversities and endowments, unemployment,
age, physical abilities, etc. Although the theory has some immediate nexus with
policy implications, it is weakened by its assumption that poverty reduction can
be attained without necessarily altering the prevailing socioeconomic and polit-
ical order. Similarly, the theory does not work towards the total eradication of
poverty in society, since it sees in this a utopian ideal. Consequently, it advoc-
ates alleviation, palliative, and remedial measures.
The Power Theory frames its understanding of poverty essentially as a
product of the contestation for power among groups in a social formation. Sub-
scribers to this theory uphold the view that the structure of political power in any
society determines the degree and distribution of poverty among its members.
Since every social order is marked by power struggles, it has its beneficiaries
and victims.14 Those who have political power would always establish an eco-
nomic and sociopolitical system that would benefit them at the expense of those
who do not. Inherent in the Power Relations Theory of poverty is the notion of
exploitation whose overbearing nature produces unpleasant consequences,
including poverty conditions. In addition, as Akeredolu-Ale aptly observes, the
degree of success achieved by the exploiting social class would ultimately
depend on the revolutionary consciousness of the oppressed class or classes in
the prevailing order – that is, on their organizational capacity to resist exploita-
tion by overthrowing the oppressive order.15 This theory eloquently explains
what obtains in developing countries where the low level of political conscious-
ness of the mass of the people on the one hand, and the centralization of natural
160 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
resources which the ruling elites could exploit, on the other, coexist. The theory
also explains the power dynamics among mutually relating groups and the con-
struction of identities such as minority/majority, men/women (gender), rural/
urban, and so on; all of which have implications for exploitation, oppression and
subordination and therefore disempowerment and poverty conditions in society.
A major dimension and policy implication of this theory is its contention that it
is indeed possible to have a poverty-free society. Thus, it advocates poverty
eradication instead of alleviation.

Poverty profile in West Africa

The reality of poverty in the sub-region

Based on the actual condition of human existence, it is possible to argue that very
little has been achieved in Africa (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) during the past
50 years. Compared with the situation in other parts of the world, the continent has
continued to lag behind in virtually all aspects of human development. The situ-
ation is even more depressing as very little efforts are being made by the political
leaders to extricate the continent and the mass of its marginalized and disempow-
ered peoples from the jaws of poverty and underdevelopment either now or in the
near future. As available statistics clearly indicate, precisely because of this the
hope for a bright future is gradually becoming elusive. Year after year and decade
after decade, the continent has not demonstrated encouraging results on the devel-
opment path as it continues to slide deeper and deeper into the crises of under-
development (or is it un-development?). As graphically indicated in Table 9.1,
during the 1970s, barely a decade after the grant of political independence to most
African countries by the erstwhile colonialists, human development levels across
the continent were among the lowest in the world. The type of strong macro-
economic growth that enabled many countries in Asia and the Pacific region and
in Latin America and the Caribbean to deliver impressively improved living stand-
ards to their citizens in the 1990s and early 2000s failed to occur in Africa.
While some observers may argue that Africa is not only the poorest and most
deprived region of the world, it is true that only very few African countries (if
any) have made significant improvements in human development in the post-
independence period. In fact, the statistics on this are as shocking as they are
depressing. For example, since 1990, the UNDP ranked 162 countries in terms
of their human development, using the Human Development Index (HDI). This
calculates developmental achievements using variables such as life expectancy,
educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary, and ter-
tiary enrollment), and adjusted income per capital in purchasing power parity
(PPP) dimensioned in US dollars. Year in year out, African countries compete
for the lowest distinctions. If the 1990s records were not encouraging, 17 years
into the twenty-first century, nothing much has really changed as the continent’s
performance continues to degenerate more and more. As demonstrated in Table
9.2, the UNDP 2004 HDI records reveals that 30 (that is, 93.75 in percentage
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 161
Table 9.1 Changes in human development over time in selected countries, 1975 to 2003

Country Human Development Index (HDI)

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003

Asia & Pacific

Malaysia 0.614 0.657 0.693 0.72 0.759 0.789 0.793 0.796
China, PRC 0.523 0.557 0.593 0.627 0.683 0.721 0.745 0.755
Sri Lanka 0.613 0.648 0.674 0.698 0.719 … 0.74 0.751
Indonesia 0.467 0.529 0.582 0.623 0.662 0.68 0.692 0.697
Thailand 0.613 0.651 0.676 0.707 0.742 … 0.768 0.778
Singapore 0.724 0.761 0.784 0.821 0.859 … 0.902 0.907
Korea, Republic of 0.705 0.741 0.779 0.817 0.852 0.878 0.888 0.901
Latin America
Argentina 0.784 0.799 0.808 0.81 0.832 0.854 0.853 0.863
Venezuela 0.716 0.73 0.739 0.759 0.768 0.776 0.778 0.772
Colombia 0.661 0.689 0.706 0.727 0.751 0.771 0.773 0.785
Jamaica 0.687 0.695 0.699 0.726 0.737 0.752 0.764 0.738
Ecuador 0.63 0.674 0.696 0.71 0.719 … 0.735 0.759
Bolivia 0.512 0.548 0.58 0.603 0.635 0.67 0.681 0.687
Brazil 0.644 0.68 0.695 0.714 0.739 0.771 0.775 0.792
Africa
Togo 0.396 0.445 0.445 0.474 0.486 0.491 0.495 0.512
Congo 0.451 0.497 0.541 0.532 0.53 0.487 0.494 0.512
Lesotho 0.457 0.499 0.517 0.544 0.549 0.513 0.493 0.497
Uganda … … 0.395 0.395 0.403 … 0.493 0.508
Zimbabwe 0.547 0.572 0.629 0.617 0.571 0.511 0.491 0.505
Kenya 0.445 0.49 0.515 0.54 0.524 0.496 0.488 0.474
Madagascar 0.4 0.433 0.429 0.436 0.443 0.469 0.469 0.499
Nigeria 0.324 0.385 0.401 0.43 0.455 … 0.466 0.453
Mauritania 0.339 0.362 0.382 0.387 0.423 0.449 0.465 0.477
Senegal 0.315 0.332 0.39 0.382 0.398 0.425 0.437 0.458
Rwanda 0.341 0.386 0.397 0.351 0.341 0.413 0.431 0.45
Benin 0.288 0.324 0.351 0.356 0.381 0.406 0.421 0.431
Tanzania … … … 0.413 0.406 0.403 0.407 0.418
Côte d’Ivoire 0.382 0.416 0.428 0.429 0.41 0.402 0.399 0.42
Mauritius … 0.658 0.689 0.723 0.747 0.775 0.785 0.791
Botswana 0.503 0.574 0.633 0.675 0.666 0.62 0.589 0.565
Burundi 0.282 0.306 0.332 0.338 0.311 0.325 0.339 0.378
Egypt 0.438 0.487 0.539 0.577 0.608 … 0.653 0.659
Morocco 0.429 0.474 0.51 0.542 0.571 0.603 0.62 0.631

Source: Adopted and modified from UNDP, Human Development Report, 2004 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 142–146; and UNDP, Human Development Report, 2005 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 220–222.

terms) out of the 32 most deprived countries in the world are found in Africa.
Nothing has significantly changed in this ranking since then, posing the question
as to whether the continent will ever get out of the doldrums.
Indeed, as more and more countries recorded development strides at the dawn
of the new millennium, Africa’s future appeared to be bleak in many respects.
162 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
Table 9.2 The 32 poorest countries in the world as measured by the UNDP’s Human
Development Index, 2005

Country Life expectancy Adult literacy rate GDP per capita HDI
at birth (years) (% aged 15 and above) (PPP US$)

Madagascar 55.2 70.6 809 0.499

Swaziland 32.5 79.2 4,726 0.498
Cameroon 45.8 79.2 4,726 0.497
Lesotho 36.3 81.4 2,118 0.497
Djbouti 52.8 65.5 2,086 0.495
Yemen* 60.6 49.0 889 0.489
Mauritania 52.7 51.2 1766 0.477
Haiti* 51.6 51.9 1,742 0.477
Kenya 47.2 73.6 1,037 0.474
Gambia, The 55.7 37.8 1,037 0.474
Guinea 53.7 41.0 1,859 0.470
Senegal 55.7 39.3 2,097 0.466
Nigeria 43.4 66.8 1,648 0.458
Rwanda 43.9 64.0 1,050 0.453
Angola 40.8 66.8 2,344 0.45
Eritrea 53.8 56.7 849 0.445
Benin 54.0 33.6 1,115 0.444
Côte d’Ivoire 45.9 48.1 1,476 0.431
Tanzania 46.0 69.4 621 0.420
Malawi 39.7 64.1 605 0.404
Zambia 37.5 67.9 877 0.394
Congo, DR of 43.1 65.3 697 0.385
Mozambique 41.9 46.5 1,117 0.379
Burundi 43.6 58.9 648 0.378
Ethiopia 47.6 41.5 711 0.367
CAR 39.3 48.6 1,089 0.355
Guinea-Bissau 44.7 39.6 711 0.348
Chad 43.6 25.5 1,210 0.341
Mali 47.9 19.0 994 0.333
Burkina Faso 47.5 12.8 1,174 0.317
Sierra Leone 40.8 29.6 548 0.298
Niger 44.4 14.4 835 0.281

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2005 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005,
220–222).
Notes
* Non-African countries.
CAR: Central Africa Republic.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s report for 2002
gave details of the magnitude of the problem and demonstrates why little or
nothing significant should be expected for a long time. According to the report:

The proportion of the people in 29 African countries living below $2 per

day increased from 82 percent in the late 1960s to 87.5 percent in the late
1990s. For those in extreme poverty – under $1 per day – the increase was
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 163
from 55.8 percent to 64.9 percent. The number of African(s) living in
extreme poverty rose dramatically from 89.6 million to 233.5 million over
the same period.16

The report further observed that poverty, in addition to deepening in Africa, has
become very severe. This is the case because whereas most of the world’s eco-
nomies experienced marked expansion in the 1990s, people in 54 developing
countries had become poorer. It is important and worrisome to note that the
majority of these countries were in Africa. The World Bank puts the picture in
perspective in its 2001 report on the state of development in the continent. Esti-
mating the continent’s population at 580 million people from the 1995 annual
growth rates of 2.5, we are told that of these:

• 291 million people had average incomes of below $1 a day in 1998;

• 124 million of those up to age 39 were at risk of dying before age 40;
• 43 million children were stunted as a result of malnutrition in 1995;
• 205 million were estimated to be without access to health services in 1990
to 1995;
• 246 million were without safe drinking water in 1990 to 1995;
• more than two million infants die annually before their first birthday.17

By 2010, not much had significantly altered in the preceding statistics regarding
Africa and the state of human existence.
The above report has serious implications for West Africa, our focus. Made
up of 16 countries strewn over a land area of about 2.37 million square miles
(6.14 million square kilometers),18 the sub-region of West Africa has had its fair
share of the persistent poverty plaguing the continent of Africa. This is irrespec-
tive of the fact that it is one of the most endowed sub-regions in the continent of
Africa and the world. As a result, available evidence on the condition of human
existence in West Africa is disturbing, to say the least. For example, recent HDI
ranks 12 out of the 16 countries in West Africa in Low Human Development.19
As it is with the continent at the broader level, the phenomenon of poverty in
West Africa has many dimensions. At one level, it affects a vast segment of the
sub-region’s population, be they in the thriving urban centers or in the decaying
rural areas.20 Poverty in the sub-region also incorporates and reflects a gender
dimension in which there is the phenomenon of the feminization of poverty con-
ditions.21 In the context of this, more and more women and children are the worst
affected by poverty and the problems it continues to create. There is also the
question of the nexus between rising poverty conditions, environmental degrada-
tion, and sociopolitical instability in West Africa. Indeed, it has been shown that
there is a sense in which protracted poverty impinges upon environmental mis-
management and the interplay between both implicates sociopolitical stability in
the sub-region.22
Yet the sub-region, like the entire continent, is richly endowed with both
human and natural resources. During the colonial period, it was a major supplier
164 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
of valued raw materials such as cocoa, rubber, palm oil, tin, ground nuts, cotton,
Bauxite, coal, and ivory, to mention just a few, to the global market. Then, from
the late 1950s, some of the countries in the sub-region became major supplies of
valued hydrocarbon resources. Nigeria, for example, is the eighth-largest oil-
producing country in the world. Only recently, it has been joined by Ghana as
another producer of oil in the international market. With these resources, it has
been aptly argued that the sub-region of Africa has no business being poor.
However, like the entire continent, poverty and underdevelopment in West
Africa is associated with a number of factors. Broadly, two perspectives would
appear to contend on this. There are those who anchor their understanding in
what appear to be the consequences or manifestations of poverty.23 For these
analysts, poverty in the sub-region arises from:

(i) inadequate access to employment opportunities;

(ii) inadequate physical assets, such as land and capital, and minimal
access by the poor to credit even on a small scale;
(iii) inadequate access to the means of supporting rural development in
poor regions;
(iv) inadequate access to markets where the poor can sell goods and
services;
(v) low endowment of human capital and destruction of natural resources,
leading to environmental degradation and reduced productivity;
(vi) inadequate access to assistance for those living at the margins and
those victimized by transitory poverty;
(vii) lack of participation, and failure to draw the poor into the design of
the development program.

The second perspective relates the causes of poverty to the structure of unequal
power relations between the sub-region (Africa) and other parts of the world. In
this context, the phenomenon is problematized as a historical process that
explains the disempowerment of the region. According to Walter Rodney, an
exponent of this perspective:

The question as to whom and what is responsible for African underdevelop-

ment can be answered in at least two levels. First, the answer is that the
operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for African
economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it imposs-
ible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Second, one has
to deal with those who manipulate the system and those who are either
agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system.24

This thesis sees in the unequal power relationship between the developed and
developing nations the very elements of marginalization, oppression, exploita-
tion, poverty, and underdevelopment. It also contends that all the features of
poverty (i.e., those assumed to be the causes of poverty by the first school) exist
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 165
to the extent that there is a basic structural inequality in a prevailing power rela-
tionship. Poverty has never been a natural state of existence but instead is the
product of the inequities in social relations existing between classes.
However, beyond these two broad strands of thought on the subject, records
have shown that poverty is protracted in West Africa due to several factors,
which include:

(i) pervasive political violence, including destructive mobilization by

various ethnic and nationality groups for more enhanced participa-
tion in political and economic governance;
(ii) military coups, which destroyed constitutional governance and
stunted the political development process;
(iii) economic dependence, particularly dependence of African eco-
nomies on the markets of Western industrial countries for trade, food
and military aid, development aid, and loans;
(iv) corruption and other forms of political opportunism;
(v) natural disasters;
(vi) ecosystem degradation;
(vii) excessive growth in population.25

In addition, poverty in the sub-region is a product of policy blunders committed

by poorly trained, inefficient, unskilled, ill-informed, and incompetent leaders.26
These leaders have continued to hold West Africa hostage because they are ben-
efitting from the crisis of underdevelopment confronting Africa and the mass of
the people to which poverty is both a cause and a consequence. Thus, any mean-
ingful attempt to tackle poverty in the West African sub-region (and indeed the
entire continent of Africa) must necessarily address the role of the ruling elites
and their agenda in the overall scheme of things.

Implications of poverty for the socioeconomic development in the

West African sub-region
Any serious analysis of why West Africa remains a largely undeveloped region
in the African continent must necessarily interrogate the place of poverty and its
negative consequences. Poverty has affected every facet of life in West Africa. It
is a major issue in the incapacity of the sub-region to transform its resource
endowments into tangible development. This segment of the chapter will
examine the consequences of poverty for the socioeconomic well-being of the
sub-region and explain the specific ways in which this has implicated the devel-
opment process. It has been suggested that the large number of people affected
by poverty in sub-Saharan Africa implies inefficient use of resources and
increases the risk of social upheaval.27 Up to half of sub-Saharan Africa’s
endowment of human capital is underused due to poor or lack of necessary
resources such as land and credit to contribute meaningfully to production and
economic development. In the context of West Africa, although the poor have so
166 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
much energy to contribute to development, they are disempowered and margin-
alized. There is growing bitterness on the part of the poor arising from frustra-
tion associated with widening gaps among social classes. As it is today, it is
becoming difficult for the postcolonial state in the sub-region to mediate effect-
ively in class antagonism. Studies have shown that there is a critical link between
the rising poverty levels and increase in urban violence in West Africa.28 The
threat this poses to law and order across the sub-region is obvious for whoever
cares to see.
Related to the above, poverty is largely responsible for the ceaseless popula-
tion movements, conflicts, and displacements which the sub-region continues to
experience. Generally, the population in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa,
appears to be perpetually on the run. Where this is occasioned by disasters like
famine, earthquakes, draught, and civil wars or ruling elite power squabbles, the
dislocations usually result in incalculable damage. Analysts have linked certain
population movements and displacement in the continent to a complex web of
interrelating variables driven by survival-related issues.29 Thus, as people
struggle to improve their material conditions of living, the competition for scarce
resources (such as land and water) in society becomes fierce. While some
compete for these limited resources by forcing their less powerful neighbors to
move, others migrate to places that offer alternative options. Taking the rural-to-
urban migrations into context, the search for such alternative options has led to
the overpopulation of some cities in West Africa with all the related negative
consequences. Generally underpinned by severe poverty, such population move-
ments are largely responsible for the structural changes which West African
cities and towns have continued to experience.30 It should be mentioned that the
postcolonial state and its ruling elites are yet to figure out a meaningful and
effective way of handling the challenges these population explosions in the cities
pose to the development process.
Therefore, the inability of the ruling elites and policy makers in West Africa
to check the growth of poverty or in fact eradicate it altogether has compounded
the many problems of underdevelopment militating against sustained economic
growth and improved quality of living of the people. Although the region, like
the rest of the continent, suffers structural poverty, the roots of which we have
shown to be historical, the persistence of the phenomenon has also demonstrated
that much needs to be urgently done to arrest this ugly state of affairs. While it
may be argued that considerable efforts have been made in the past and a lot is
still currently being done, it should be clearly stated that the solutions applied
thus far have not been deep enough. Indeed, for over five decades, development
planning and policy making in West Africa has been persistently anchored in
matters that have little or nothing to do with the sub-region’s socioeconomic
realities. As a result, these policies have consistently proved insufficient in
arresting the trend, much more in tackling it.
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 167
The myth of combating poverty from the neoliberal
perspective
Explaining the relationship between protracted poverty and underdevelopment
on the one hand and the failures of policy making and implementation in Africa
on the other is as contentious as the debate on the root causes of the continent’s
economic predicament. Indeed, over the years, the character of the debate keeps
mutating and its contents keep shifting according to the current realities of the
problem and the efforts to address it. As we already pointed about in the preced-
ing analysis, policy making for the most part of postcolonial African history has
been greatly influenced by extraneous factors. In this regard, the role of the
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and the management of the contemporary
context of the global capitalist crisis come into sharp focus. Thus, in spite of the
much-talked-about end of the neoliberal Washington Consensus in the 1990s
following the much-publicized East Asian crises, the fundamental principles and
processes and policies are still intact and continue to hold sway.31 While in the
1960s the fad was “development planning,” in the 1970s this gave way to “basic
needs.” In the 1980s, “basic needs” was overtaken by “structural adjustment”
which focused on markets but neglected to order priorities in the reform. Since
the 1990s however, the attention has been on “good governance.”32
In the particular context of West Africa and the entire continent of Africa,
these neoliberal-driven measures have emphasized the following as the solution
to poverty and underdevelopment:

(i) fiscal discipline;

(ii) reordering of public expenditure priorities;
(iii) tax reform;
(iv) liberalizing interest rates;
(v) a competitive exchange rate;
(vi) trade liberalization;
(vii) liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
(viii) privatization;
(ix) deregulation;
(x) property rights;
(xi) liberal democracy.33

A basic assumption here is that absolute poverty can be reduced and economic
growth and development achieved through macro-economic stability, increased
fiscal transparency essentially to tackle corruption, boost private sector develop-
ment, and attract investment; a credible legal framework; and the elimination of
impediments to both domestic and foreign private investment. Neoliberalism
also recommends privatization and the dismantling of the social contract. It pos-
tures the market as the space for freedom, which is compared favorably with
formal political processes and argues strongly that a free market would best
support a production-driven social contract and procure maximum goods for
168 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
consumption. In this connection, and as Starr aptly observes, under this arrange-
ment, “consumption choice” replaces citizenship as the pre-eminent right.34
Nothing much has actually changed in the policies of the BWIs towards
Africa and other developing countries of the world. This does not mean that the
African situation is beyond redemption per se. On the contrary, it implies that
these policies are inherently unworkable because of the philosophy that drives
them and because they are incompatible with the realities of the problems they
set out to fix in the first place. For example, notwithstanding the praises it was
showered with before its actual application, SAP in its original formulation had
no definite agenda for the poor. Thus, as African economies came increasingly
under the aegis of SAP, poverty and inequality intensified across the continent.
This was regardless of whatever successes the IMF and the WB reportedly
claimed some of them recorded over time. Table 9.3 gives an idea of the stand-
ing of the ten countries sampled during the heydays of the implementation of
this economic package. It is clear from the table how and why the failures of
SAP to reduce or extirpate poverty in West Africa was not so much because
countries in the sub-region failed to comply fully with the implementation tem-
plate and instructions of the BWIs. Indeed, the more they complied with these,
the more poverty intensified with grave consequences for the standard of living
of the common people. Take the often-cited case of Ghana as an example;
poverty (in absolute terms) increased in Ghana by 4.49 percentage points
between 1986 and 1990, representing an increase of 15.5 percent, the fourth-
largest increase in the ten countries sampled.35
Furthermore, the neoliberal argument for budget cuts in basic social services
such as education, healthcare, and other programs not only led to job losses
but also implications for the future health, well-being, and productivity of the

Table 9.3 Structural adjustment programs and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, 1985 and
1990

Head-count ratio (%) Change in poverty Change in micro

(% points) (score)
1985 1990

Côte d’Ivoire 40.31 43.93 5.62 –1.3

Ghana 29.00 33.49 4.49 2.2
Kenya 53.17 58.83 5.66 0.5
Mauritania 32.17 35.52 3.35 0.5
Rwanda 31.59 37.94 6.35 –0.2
Senegal 49.65 54.75 5.1 0.5
Tanzania 53.53 59.79 6.26 1.5
Uganda 37.10 44.69 7.59 0.2
Zambia 48.53 52.54 4.01 –0.3
Zimbabwe 56.71 67.26 10.55 1

Source: A.A.G. Ali, “Structural Adjustment and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1985–1995,” in T.
Mkandawire and Charles C. Soludo (eds), African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, Vol. 2
(Ottawa, Canada: International Development Centre, 1999), 35.
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 169
population of West Africa. The more loans countries in the sub-region got from
the BWIs, the more public institutions were driven into deeper crisis. In addition,
drastic cuts in government expenditure decimated the health and educational
sectors, eroded social safety nets, and intensified the suffering of the mass of the
people. In Nigeria, for example, the dispensation of sustained meager budgetary
allocation to the educational sector over the past three decades has undermined
teaching, learning, and research in institutions of higher learning in the country.36
As a result, the best brains in the sector left for greener pastures in other parts of
Africa (especially South Africa), the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S.A. Sim-
ilarly, in Ghana, studies have shown that underfunding of the educational sector
forced down overall enrollment rates in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.37
The flawed logic of “rolling back the state” embedded in the neoliberal notion
of economic reforms and development exposes the people to intensified inter-
national capitalist exploitation. There is a sense in which unbridled liberalization
of the economy implicates the very essence of the state and its capacity to
mediate in the development process.38 In the first place, by restricting govern-
ment expenditure in favor of debt repayment, neoliberalism disempowers the
postcolonial state in Africa and limits its capacity to intervene in the welfare of
the mass of the people. In West Africa, for example, the more the state is rolled
back by the reform packages of the BWIs, the more the people are delivered to
the rapacious activities of international capital. In the final analysis, more poor
people are created because they are jobless or underemployed, or lack the
resources to take care of themselves. Research has shown that the removal of
fuel subsidies in Nigeria in 2011 and from time to time deepened the pains and
pangs of poverty in the urban centers and particularly the rural areas, because it
triggered increases in pump prices of fuel, which had a serious negative impact
upon the prices of foodstuffs and other social services.39 Unfortunately, many
Nigerians are still grappling with this consequence despite government rhetoric
over palliatives, which are still very far-fetched.
The notion of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) through the deregula-
tion of the economy is also not a particularly strong argument; neither is the
well-bandied commercialization and privatization of public institutions as a basis
for effectively allocating scarce resources in the economy. In the first place, no
investment policy between countries is completely altruistic. Embedded in all
investment policies between modern nations is the idea of power and control,
which is usually less visible. It is indeed the case that FDIs are part of the instru-
ments of control at the disposal of finance capital. Khor has sufficiently demon-
strated that an unregulated investment policy undermines development in the
developing countries of the world, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa.
Explaining this thesis, he advances at least four reasons why this is the case,
namely:

1 Given the colonial legacy of most of these states, indigenous firms are too
weak in many sectors to compete with giant multinationals. Therefore,
giving unlimited access to foreign investors would drive many indigenous
170 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
firms out of business (inhibiting the development of truly indigenous entre-
preneurs positioned to encourage foreign firms in the contest for dominance
of the domestic market).
2 In order to retain a meaningful measure of sovereignty over national
resources and economic activities, developing countries should exercise the
right to limit the degree of foreign ownership overall, especially in crucial
resources (e.g., land) and sectors (e.g., finance).
3 In order to avoid a structural problem in the balance of payments, develop-
ing countries should have the ability to regulate foreign investments in such
areas as equity shares (ensuring that some of the profits will be locally
owned and retained), profit repatriation (ensuring that there is sizable
reinvestment of profit for national development), and import limitation (pre-
venting excessive imports of capital and intermediate goods, which drains
the national foreign reserve).
4 In order to develop indigenous enterprises, poorer countries must promote
their growth subsidies and preferential policies, at least until such a time
when they can compete effectively with larger foreign firms. Removing the
right to treat indigenous firms more favorably could foreclose the possibility
of developing domestic economic capacities, thus perpetuating dependence
on foreign firms.40

The point therefore is that by acquiescing in the neoliberal-driven stabilization

policy recommendations of the BWIs, West African countries increasingly lost
key instruments of macro-economic management, and, as the crisis in their eco-
nomies worsened as a consequence, so poverty and the suffering of the people
intensified. In the final analysis and precisely because of this fact, all poverty
alleviation programs/strategies directed at the poverty question in the sub-region
are either too peripheral or not deep enough, or they are ill-conceived by their
neoliberal intellectual foundations.
Some examples should suffice at this point. In Nigeria since the late 1970s,
especially following the plummeting of the petrodollar, the government has tried
to address the poverty question with economic reforms. Usually these poverty
programs are either embedded in its economic programs or simply framed as a
package addressing aspects of development challenges. Thus, since the early
independence era to the current democratic dispensation, a number of programs
have been formulated by the postcolonial state to deal with the phenomenon of
poverty. Some of these include the Oil Policy of 1967, the Indigenization Policy
of 1976/1977, the Income Policy of 1976, the Austerity Measures of 1980, the
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of 1986, the Poverty Eradication Programs
of 2000, and the National Economic, Empowerment and Development Program
(SEEDS) launched in May 2004. Other rural poverty reduction strategies include
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) in mid-1970, the Green Revolution (GR) and
River Basin Authorities (RBA) of the 1980s, the Directorate of Food and Rural
Infrastructures (DIFRRI) of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the Poverty Alle-
viation and Reduction and Alleviation programs implemented from 2003/2004.
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 171
Inevitably, it turned out that these programs and strategies made very little
impact on reducing poverty or even eradicating it altogether. First, they were
attenuated by their neoliberal intellectual foundations; and second, by the way
and manner in which they were implemented by the operators of the programs.
This was in addition to the top-down approach they adopted in their conceptuali-
zation of the root causes of poverty in Nigeria. By not feeling the needs of the
poor, such programs failed to tap into the prime expectations of the people who
in turn distanced themselves from what they termed “Government Projects.”
Then, too, corruption was also rife in the implementation process, as those
saddled with such responsibilities abused them with impunity. In the final ana-
lysis, not even regime changes or the constant introduction of new policies could
address the critical issues of the poverty question in the country.
The example of Nigeria above is not significantly different from what obtains
in other parts of West Africa. Studies have shown that such policy summersaults
have abounded in Ghana since the Nkrumah era.41 Indeed, right up until the end
of the Jerry Rawlings military junta, poverty alleviation policies in the country
have not been deep enough. In Senegal, Y. Fall presents an interesting analysis
of how the implementation of the BWI reform packages over the years has left
the country vulnerable and intensified poverty among women.42 Her major argu-
ment, namely that the IMF stabilization and adjustment programs intensified the
traditional sociocultural barriers militating against the development of Senega-
lese women in addition to complicating their marginalization and disempower-
ment in the general scheme of things, is as valid for the rest of West Africa as it
is true for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. The point therefore is that the neo-
liberal path to developing the poor countries of the world is inherently flawed.
Since their poverty is structural and historical, there is the need to look for other,
more creative solutions beyond the reform packages of the BWIs. Our central
argument is that there are several alternatives to these stabilization packages
which would be more amenable to the realities of African countries. As the West
African example has shown thus far, moving away from the neoliberal path
would be the beginning of wisdom. How this can be achieved is what we discuss
in the conclusion to this chapter.

Conclusion: the possible way forward

It is practically difficult in all honesty to say that poverty and inequality were
never common in sub-Saharan Africa prior to the 1980s. It is also true that since
the mid-1980s, particularly following the introduction of the BWI economic
reform packages, both conditions worsened and have continued to intensify.
Rapid decline in per capta income of most countries in the continent has con-
tinued, just as the standard of living of the people is increasingly falling. As at
today, about 200 million Africans are categorized as very poor. International
development agencies are perturbed that despite Africa’s enormous resource
endowments, more than half of her population are living below the breadline.
It is now abundantly clear that poverty in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa is
172 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
historical, structural, and self-inflicted. Its first dimension is the refraction of her
economies into the evolving capitalist economic system. The phenomenon has
been sustained over the centuries by the peripheral status of the continent in the
global system and worsened by the failures of the continent’s leaders. These fail-
ures are largely due to their inability to frame genuine development policies that
would transform the continent’s abundant resources into meaningful develop-
ment. It is the combination of these variables that has made Africa’s condition
particularly worrisome.
As clearly shown in the West African example, the solution to poverty in the
continent does not lie in the further subjection of Africa economies to the stabili-
zation packages of the BWIs. On the contrary, these packages have been largely
responsible for the economic woes of contemporary African economies. The
fundamental plank of the neoliberal packages that market forces are better placed
to allocate resources than the state is at variance with the realities of twenty-first-
century development planning where the state is required to guide the develop-
ment process. Development is not solely an economic issue as suggested by
neoliberal scholars; it also has serious social and political objectives. Thus, miti-
gating poverty in Africa would require far-reaching and drastic measures,
anchored in the following recommendations:

1 Vigorously pursuing a people-based and self-sustaining development.

2 Prioritizing production activities to transform Africa from an “exchange
economy” into a production economy.
3 Democratizing the development process through popular participation and
accountability in public affairs.
4 Intensifying the mobilization of domestic resources and revamping of public
institutions
5 Vigorously pursuing regional cooperation and economic integration.43

Policies targeted at the mass of the poor people should follow the articulation
and implementation of deliberate state empowerment. The majority of the poor
people live in rural areas. Consequently, it is also imperative to recapitalize the
rural areas in West Africa by reintegrating them in national and regional eco-
nomies. Such recapitalization policies should be gender-sensitive, since women
play a leading role in the informal sector of the economies. West African coun-
tries should also drive their economic policies on self-reliance, since that is the
only way they can hope to insulate themselves from the vagaries of the neolib-
eral globalization process, aptly described as “contemporary imperialism.”44 In
the final analysis, it is also necessary to make the poor people the center pillars
and concern of every development policy because development is ultimately
about people and their capacity to reproduce their material existence.
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 173
Notes
1 See, e.g., P. Townsend, “The Meaning of Poverty.” The Journal of Sociology 13
(1979): 210–227; P. Townsend (ed.), The Concept of Poverty (London: Heinemann,
1970); M. Rein, “Problems in the Definition and Measurement of Poverty,” in P.
Townsend (ed.), The Concept of Poverty, 215–230; J. Drewnowski, “Poverty: Its
Meaning and Measurement.” Development and Change 8 (1977); M. Lipton, Why the
Poor Stay Poor (London: Temple Smith, 1977); and M.P. Todaro, Economic Devel-
opment in the Third World (New York: Longman, 1989).
2 Akin L. Mabogunje, “The Challenge of Poverty for Effective Urban Governance,” in
Adepoju Onibokun and Adetoye Faniran (eds), Governance and Urban Poverty in
Anglophone West Africa (Ibadan: Center for African Settlement Studies and Develop-
ment, 1995), xv–xvi.
3 Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World; and A.K. Sen, The Standard of
Living (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Similarly, see Commission
for Africa (CFA), Our Common Future (London, 2005); S. Reddy, “Counting the
Poor: The Truth about World Poverty Statistics,” in L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds),
Telling the Truth: Socialist Register 2006 (London: Merlin Press; New York: Monthly
Press, 2006).
4 See UNDP, Human Development Report (1990).
5 For more details, consult M. Walton, “Combating Poverty: Experience and Pro-
spects.” Finance and Development 27, no. 3 (September 1997).
6 See A.G. Onibokun, “Introduction,” in Onibokun and Faniran (eds), Governance and
Urban Poverty in Anglophone West Africa, 7–8.
7 These attributes were extrapolated from the following studies on poverty: P. Kofo and
O.A. Ozo (eds), The Urban Poor in Nigeria (Ibadan: Evans Brothers Nigeria Pub-
lishers, 1987); Nigerian Economic Society, Poverty in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan Univer-
sity Press, 1975); Nigeria Economic Society, Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria (Ibadan:
Nigeria Economic Society Secretariat, 1997); World Bank, Poverty Reduction and the
World Bank – Progress and Challenges in the 1990s (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1996); World Bank, Taking Action to Reduce Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Over-
view (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); and World Bank, World Development
Report, 2006: Equity and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).
8 For details consult Akeredolu, “Poverty as a Social Issue”; Aluko, “Poverty: Its
Remedy”; and M. Ravallion and B. Bidani, “How Robust is a Poverty Profile?”
Finance and Development 31, no. 3 (September 1990).
9 See Sam O. Uniamikogbo, “Poverty Alleviation under Nigeria’s Structural Adjust-
ment Program: A Policy Framework,” in Nigerian Economic Society, Poverty in
Nigeria, 22–24.
10 For details consult Akeredolu, “Poverty as a Social Issue”; and Uniamikogbo,
“Poverty Alleviation under Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Program.”
11 Walter Rodney argued that the development of Europe was a dialectical process in
which Africa was underdeveloped. For details see Walter Rodney, How Europe
Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972). Similarly,
consult Patrick Bond, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (London and
New York: Zed Books, 2006).
12 See Uniamikolo, “Poverty Alleviation under Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment
Program,” 22–23. Also consult K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political
and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957); and John
Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), World Politics: An Introduction to International Rela-
tions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 559–580.
13 Akeredolu, “Poverty as a Social Issue,” 43.
14 For a deeper analysis of this theory and its applications, see Michael Focault, Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press);
174 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
E. Groze, “Contemporary Theories of Power and Subjectivity,” in S. Gnew (ed.),
Feminist Knowledge, Critique and Construct (New York: Routledge, 1990), 20–89;
and Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr., “Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women: A Critique
of Existing Perspectives and their Implications for Sustainable Development,” in C.
Anya (ed.), Perspectives on Violence Against Women in Nigeria (Makurdi: Aboki
Publishers, 2005), 7–18.
15 See Akeredolu, “Poverty as a Social Issue,” 43–45; and Uniamikolo, “Poverty Allevi-
ation under Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Program,” 23.
16 See UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries (Geneva: United Nations, 2002).
17 For details, see World Bank, African Poverty and the Millennium (Washington, DC:
World Bank Publications, 2001). Similarly, see World Bank, Can Africa Claim the
21st Century? (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2000); World Bank,
African Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2000);
George B.N. Ayitteh, Africa Unchained: Blue Print for Africa’s Future (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr., NEPAD and the African Question:
The Myths, the Realities (Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2005); and Martin Meredith,
The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: The Free
Press, 2006).
18 See W.A. Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1975), 173.
19 These countries include: Nigeria, Togo, Gambia, Beni n Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali,
Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Niger, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. For details consult
“Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update, 2008-HDI Rankings,” retrieved
on November 30, 2009 from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
20 See Onibokun and Faniran (eds), Governance and Urban Poverty in Anglophone West
Africa; and Mike O. Odey, Food Crop Production, Hunger and Rural Poverty in
Nigeria’s Benue Area (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010).
21 See Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr., “Mainstreaming Gender in the African Development
Process: A Critique of NEPAD and the Women Question,” in Denis Ityavyar and
Zacharis Anger Gundu (eds), NEPAD and the Challenge of Development in Nigeria
(Jos: Inter-Gender, 2006), 56–74; and I. Dankelman and J. Davidson, Women and the
Environment in the Third World (London: Earthscan, 1994).
22 For an elaboration analysis of these intersections consult Abiodun Alao, Natural
Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment (New York: University
of Rochester Press, 2007).
23 The World Bank and its consultants have consistently popularized this view in their
many development reports. For details see World Bank, African Poverty and the Mil-
lennium, 2001; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, 2000; World Bank,
African Development Indicators, 2000.
24 See Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 5–6.
25 See Organization of African Unity (OAU), The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic
Development of Africa (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1981).
26 John Ilife, The African Poor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Oni-
bokun and Faniran (eds), Governance and Urban Poverty in Anglophone West Africa;
Ayitteh, Africa Unchained; and Meredith, The Fate of Africa.
27 See the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Taking
Action to Reduce Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.
28 See, e.g., Isaac O. Albert and J. Adisa (eds), Urban Management and Urban Violence
in Africa (Ibadan: French Institute for Research in Africa (FIRA), 1994); G. Herault
and P. Adesanmi (eds), Report on Youth, Street and Urban Violence (Ibadan: FIRA,
1997); O. Akinwumi, “Ethnic Militias and Violence,” in T. Falola and S. Salms (eds),
Nigerian Cities (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), 347–352; and Collette
Daaiute and Zeynep Beykont (eds), International Perspectives on Youth Conflict and
Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
 Poverty reform: West Africa since mid-1980s 175
29 For details of this, see Toyin Falola and Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr., Population Movements,
Conflicts and Displacements in Nigeria (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2010). Also
consult Akin L. Mbogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria (London: University of London
Press, 1968); David Anderson and Richard Rathbone (eds), Africa’s Urban Past
(Oxford: James Currey, 2000); and Falola and Salms (eds), Nigerian Cities.
30 See Samir Amin (ed.), Modern Migrations in West Africa (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1968); C. Stahl (ed.), Internal Migrations Today: Emerging Issues, Vol. 2
(Paris: UNESCO, 1988); Toyin Falola and S.A. Olarewaju (eds), Rural Development
Problems in Nigeria (London: Avebury Press, 1992); and A. Adepoju (ed.), Family,
Population and Development in Africa (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997).
31 For a comprehensive analysis of the history of neoliberalism see D. Harvey, A Brief
History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); D. Harvey, Spaces
of Neoliberalization: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development (Stutt-
gart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005); and Bond, Looting Africa, 11–30.
32 Thandika Mkandawire and Charles C. Solution, Our Continent Our Future: Perspec-
tives on Structural Adjustment (Dakar: CODESRIA, Africa World Press, IDRC,
1999), 35–38; P. Mosley, Globalization, Economic Policy and Poverty in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 1970–95 (Reading: Department of Economics, University of Reading, 1996);
and P. Bond and M. Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neo-
liberalism and the Search for Social Justice (London: Merlin Press; Pietermaritzburg:
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; Harare: Weaver Press, 2003).
33 For details of this reform package and its havocs, see Walden Bello and Shea Cun-
ningham et al., Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global
Poverty (London: Pluto Press with Food First, 1994); P. Gibbons and Y. Bangura et
al. (eds), Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment. The Politics of Economic
Reform in Africa (Uppsala: Nordic Institute, 1992); K.J. Havnenik (ed.), The IMF and
the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives (Uppsala: Scandi-
navian Institute of African Studies, 1987); and Amorry Starr, Naming the Enemy:
Anti-corporate Movements Confront Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2000).
34 See Starr, Naming the Enemy, 17.
35 Mkandawire and Solution, Our Continent Our Future, 71. See also Gibbons and
Bangura et al., Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment; Havnenik, The IMF
and the World Bank in Africa; and Ayitteh, Africa Unchained.
36 For more on this, see Okpeh O. Okpeh, State Universities and ASUU National Strug-
gles: The Experience of ASUU BSU, 1994–2005 (forthcoming). Similarly. consult I.
Onyeonoru, “Industrial Conflict in Nigerian Universities: The Presence of the Past
and the Thrust of the Future,” The National Scholar 4, no. 5 (2004): 2–15; and Okpeh
O. Okpeh and Yakubu A. Ochefu, “Democratic Transition, the State and the Develop-
ment of Higher Education in Nigeria, 1999–2004: Emergence Issues and Lessons.”
Lapai Journal of Education 2, no. 1 (2010): 1–13.
37 See Ifeanyi C. Ezeonu, “Structural Adjustment and Stabilization in Sub-Saharan
Africa,” in Malinda S. Smith (ed.), Globalizing Africa (Trenton, NJ: Africa World
Press, 2003), 305–324.
38 For more, see Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order
(New York: Seven Story Press, 1998); and Martin Khor, “WTO and the South:
Implications and Recent Development.” Third World Network (1999).
39 As part of the measures to deregulate the petroleum sector, the Federal Government
of Nigeria under the leadership of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan unilaterally
announced the removal of subsidies from petroleum products on the ground that gov-
ernment was spending so much money importing fuel into the country. As expected,
Nigerians resisted the policy in a coordinated nationwide strike action organized by
labor and civil society organizations that lasted five days. The government announced
some palliative measures which by and large have not yet seen the light of the day.
40 Khor, “WTO and the South,” 9–10.
176 O.O. Okpeh, Jr.
41 See, e.g., D. Dzorgbo, Ghana in Search of Development (Uppsala: Uppsala Univer-
sity, 1998); R. Grant, “Liberalization and Foreign Companies in Accra, Ghana,”
Environment and Planning, A 33 (2001): 997–1014; and L. Van Burren, “Ghana
Economy,” in J. Middleton (ed.), Africa South of the Sahara (Gale: Europa Publica-
tions, 2001).
42 See details of this argument in Y. Fall, “Gender and the Social Dimension of IMF
Policies in Senegal,” in Smith, Globalizing Africa, 365–384.
43 See Bade Onimode, A Future for Africa: Beyond the Politics of Adjustment (London:
Earthscan Publications, 1992), 49.
44 See Okpeh O. Okpeh, “Globalization and the African Question in the 21st Century,”
African Journal of Economy and Society 2, no. 2 (January–December, 2000): 43–60.
10 An assessment of abuse of the
elderly as an aspect of poverty
in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria
Mildred O. Ekot

Introduction
Poverty is a global problem and the elderly are the most vulnerable. In Akwa
Ibom State, abuse of the elderly is widespread and severe as an emerging form
of poverty in Nigeria. Although poverty continues to be at the center stage of
national discourses, the problem of elder abuse is yet to receive the attention of
both the state and federal governments in Nigeria. It is generally believed that
since the elderly live with members of their families, they are well cared for.
Indeed, sometimes caregivers do not realize that some of their actions could be
regarded as abusive.
This chapter examines the nature and patterns of elder abuse in domestic set-
tings in Akwa Ibom State. Using qualitative and quantitative data, the chapter
argues that poverty is both the cause and consequence of abuse of the elderly in
the area of study. It argues further that the better the educational and income
levels of the elderly and their families; the less likely they are to suffer abuse.
The main contribution of the chapter is that it brings to the limelight the perva-
sion of elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State as an aspect of poverty, thereby also
contributing to the growing literature on elder abuse globally. The chapter
recommends increased public awareness of the ills inherent in elder abuse and
the inclusion of the welfare of the elderly in poverty alleviation programs of
government at various levels as well as the institution of social security program
for the elderly to check abuse of the elderly and substantially reduce poverty in
the area.

Elderly abuse as an aspect of poverty in contemporary

Nigeria: an overview
Poverty and abuse of the elderly are widespread and a serious social problem in
Nigeria, as in most parts of the African continent. While poverty continues to be
at the center stage of the national discourses, elder abuse remains largely hidden
from the public without recognition from the public and government in par-
ticular. From preliminary investigations, most Nigerians say that there is no such
thing as abuse of the elderly, since most respondents claim they love their
178 M.O. Ekot
parents very much. Yet research has revealed varying rates of abuse of elderly
people in different parts of the country.1 Abuse of the elderly is also increasingly
acknowledged globally as a social problem that is linked to poverty.2
Poverty may simply be taken as the state of not having enough income to
meet basic subsistence needs.3 On the other hand, elder abuse is an all-inclusive
term representing all types of mistreatment or abusive behavior towards an older
adult.4 The American Psychological Association defines elder abuse as the inflic-
tion of physical, emotional, or psychological harm on an older adult. This sounds
like an all-inclusive definition, and it would appear difficult for Akwa Ibom
people to admit that some of their actions towards the elderly could be catego-
rized as abuse. For instance, to most people in the area, the inability to provide
financial support to the elderly is not generally seen as abuse.
In Nigeria, many elderly people age into poverty as a result of the precarious
economic conditions and the general poverty profile of the populace, and poverty
of the elderly and among the aging population is likely to increase with the
current increase in the number of elderly people globally. Bauer observes that
there is a vital need to understand that aging into poverty is a growing reality
and a crippling challenge for many older adults.5 This is particularly true of
countries with high poverty profiles such as Nigeria where over 70 percent of the
population is classified as poor, 35 percent live in absolute poverty, and vulner-
able groups include young couples with children, the disabled, and old people
with no relatives to support them.6
Using poverty indicators, such as literacy level, access to safe water, nutri-
tion, infant and maternal mortality, and the number of people living on less than
$1 a day, Nigeria is found to rank among the 25 poorest nations in the world
below Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia.7 A recent survey of the poverty situation in
Akwa Ibom State has revealed that poverty is widespread, since 57 percent of
the people are classified as poor, of which about 28 percent are identified as core
poor.8 Elder abuse is most often embedded in the context of care, and poverty
often impacts negatively upon the quality of care offered to elderly people. This
implies that a lack of care of the elderly or any decline in the quality of care may
constitute neglect, while certain reactions and behaviors in the process of care-
giving may constitute abuse. Sijuwade posits that to abuse, neglect, and abandon
the elderly are all typologies of poor-quality care for the elderly.9 He explains
that in the case of abuse, the caregiver actively harms the elderly; in the case of
neglect, the caregiver is passive, insensitive, lacks empathy, and ignores the care
of the elderly, while totally abdicating the responsibilities of taking care of the
elderly constitute abandonment. Bonnie and Wallace maintain that failure by a
caregiver to satisfy elders’ basic needs or to protect the elder from harm consti-
tute mistreatment.
Many studies on elder abuse have revealed various determinants or risk
factors in elder abuse, but poverty has always been identified as a major risk
factor among other socio-demographic, familial, environmental, and societal
factors.10 A study by Tareque, Islam, and Rahman observed that the causes
behind abuse as revealed by the abused elderly were mainly poverty, inability to
 Abuse of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 179
do anything, and dependency.11 It has been observed that poverty among older
adults, as among other age groups, exacerbates social marginalization, con-
tributes to poor physical and mental health, and erodes the ability to live and
function both independently and interdependently – all factors related to quality
of life.12
Currently, there is no social security scheme for the elderly in Nigeria as a
whole, as there is in other nations like the United States, thereby increasing the
poverty profile of many elderly people, and thus leaving the financial burdens of
elderly care to family members who may themselves be facing financial chal-
lenges, and exposing the elderly to neglect and abuse. Bauer observes that often
in countries where the services are available, the payments from Social Security
are the only incomes keeping these elderly out of poverty.13
Many elderly people in Nigeria who retired as public civil servants receive a
pension and are facing a decline in income. At times, the meager pension allow-
ances are paid late or accumulated for months, allowing the elderly to suffer for
months before payment and exposing them to psychological abuse and neglect.
It is also a common practice for government to invite pensioners for documenta-
tion and screening exercises in such a disorganized manner that they are left to
suffer inhuman treatment under harsh weather conditions for days. These expose
severely and partially impaired elders to abuse by caregivers who usually assist
them in these exercises, while the pensions of those unable to attend these exer-
cises are discontinued, irrespective of their physical conditions. These actions
constitute abuse by the government. The poor elderly people in rural areas
without pensions continue to subsist on menial jobs or farming, thereby increas-
ing their poverty profile. The study by Sijuwade, whose respondents were drawn
from low socioeconomic levels, found that 32 percent of them were still working
due to economic necessity despite being aged 70 and older.14
With the increased need for medical care occasioned by old age, the majority
of the elderly lack adequate finances to maintain or meet their special health
needs. In advanced countries such as the United States, services such as Medi-
care provide for the health needs of the elderly, but this is not so in Nigeria.
Although the Akwa Ibom State government recently announced free medical
treatment for the elderly, the policy appears to be mere media propaganda, since
few hospitals in the state capital appear to implement the policy, while health
centers in the rural areas where the majority of elders reside are yet to implement
the policy. Thus, many elderly people suffer medical neglect and abuse at the
hands of family members who cannot afford good medical treatment themselves
as a result of poverty. Sherman, Rosenblatt, and Antonucci observe that abuse
can exacerbate chronic and disabling conditions of the older person and make
the person more dependent, vulnerable, and marginalized.15
Certain socio-demographic characteristics predict poverty in the elderly, thus
increasing their risk of suffering abuse at the hands of family members. Notable
among these factors are incomes or socioeconomic and educational levels. Many
research studies have found relationships between income levels, poverty, and
abuse.16 However, Acierno and others found that lower income was predictive of
180 M.O. Ekot
physical and sexual mistreatment and neglect, but that income was not predictive
of emotional abuse.17
Education serves as a measure of human development as well as a measure of
human capital. Aigbokhan hypothesizes that education is positively related to
income and welfare.18 Omonona also reported that welfare levels increase as
educational attainment increases; as such, households whose heads attained terti-
ary education were the least poor, while those without any formal education
were the poorest.19 Khalid and colleagues confirm that lack of formal education
is also one of the factors strongly associated with poverty. The relationship
between poverty and elder abuse is of interest to this study.20
This study tries to establish a nexus between poverty and abuse of the elderly.
It examines the socio-demographic characteristics of the elderly in Akwa Ibom
State. It identifies poverty as a cause and consequence of abuse of the elderly. It
investigates the common forms of elder abuse and the contribution of poverty to
elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State. The study tested the hypotheses that there is no
significant relationship between socio-demographic status and elder abuse, and
that there is no significant relationship between educational level and elder abuse
in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria.

Methodology
Information for this chapter was extracted from a field survey carried out
between March and June 2011 in Akwa Ibom State which is one of the states in
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, located geographically in the southeastern
corner of the country as part of a larger project on the condition of the elderly.
The survey research design was adopted for the collection of quantitative data
for this chapter. Elderly persons aged 70 years and above were administered the
questionnaire instrument with the help of 12 primary health officers who served
as research assistants. A focused discussion group (FDG) consisting of 36 adult
primary, secondary, or supposed caregivers of the elderly was also organized,
during which semi-structured questions were asked followed by general discus-
sion. Qualitative evidence was also collected from the elderly, the caregivers,
and personal observations. Library and internet resources were also used for
literature and references.
Data collected from the questionnaire were analyzed using frequency counts,
percentages, weighted mean scores, and Pearson Product Moment Correlation
Coefficient (PPMCC). The PPMCC calculated with the Statistical Package for
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0 was used in testing hypotheses. A weighted
mean score of 2.5 and above was regarded as an acceptable response for the
Likert Scale questions, while any mean score below 2.5 was unacceptable or
rejected, and all the hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of significance.
Information gathered both quantitatively and qualitatively was collated, inter-
preted, analyzed, together with secondary sources used for writing this chapter.
 Abuse of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 181
The concept of elder abuse
The concept of elder abuse is not well known in Akwa Ibom State, but the
experience is commonplace. To begin with, the term “elder abuse” sounds
anachronistic to many people of Akwa Ibom State. For 90 percent of the
respondents, abuse was generally associated with cursing and physical mistreat-
ment such as beating. It was a consensus of members of the FDG that it is an
abomination to abuse one’s parents. This is because of the traditional relation-
ship between children and parents, which ideally should be that of respect not
abuse. In addition, the elderly are traditionally generally revered and it is
believed that any curse from them could be very potent and would lead to failure
in life. Members of the FDG contested the word “abuse” vehemently as they
could not associate themselves with the idea of abuse of their elderly parents.
Thereafter, the term “elder abuse” was explained to them using the definition
from the American Psychological Association as the infliction of physical, emo-
tional, or psychological harm on an older adult. Furthermore, the definition of
elder abuse as posited by Bonnie and Wallace as failure by a caregiver to satisfy
elders’ basic needs or to protect the elder from harm constitute abuse was
discussed with members of the FDG.21 Finally, the various forms of abuse
recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) were explained to them –
emotional/psychological abuse, financial/material abuse, neglect/abandonment,
physical abuse, and sexual abuse. On this point, they finally agreed that such
forms of abuse existed to different degrees, and many could be found guilty of it.
Discussants in the FDG were of the view that, apart from sexual abuse which the
majority could not imagine, most times children do not willingly and willfully
commit elder abuse, but general lack due to their own poverty sometimes
resulted in such conditions which could be termed abusive.

Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents show that out of the 5,600
respondents used for the study, 2,558 (47.7%) were males and 3,042 (53.3%)
were females; 2,223 (39.7%) were aged between 70 and 74, 2,086 (37.3%) were
aged between 75 and 79, and 1,291 (23.1%) were aged 80 and above. Out of
these, 1,460 (26.1%) were married, 3,263 (58.3%) were widows/widowers, 662
(11.8%) were divorced, while 215 (3.8%) had never married. With regard to
number of children of the elderly, 333 (6.0%) of the elderly had no children at
all, 882 (15.8%) had one child, 956 (17.1%) had two, 1,456 (26.0%) had three,
1,046 (18.7%) had four, and 924 (16.5%) had five children or more. On educa-
tional qualifications, it was revealed that 981 (17.5%) of the respondents could
not read or write, 1,130 (20.2%) had FSLC, 1,096 (19.6%) had WASC/SSCE,
1,138 (20.3%) had Grade 2/NCE/Diploma, 728 (13.0%) had First Degree/HND,
while 527 (9.4%) had Higher Degrees. On religion, 5,530 (98.8%) of the
respondents were Christians, none was Muslim, and 70 (1.2%) professed tradi-
tional religion.
182 M.O. Ekot
On means of livelihood, 360 (6.4%) of the respondents were still working in
spite of their advanced ages, 2,220 (39.6%) were retired with a pension, 561
(10.0%) were retired without a pension, 896 (16.0%) were still engaged in
income-generating activities, while 1,563 (28.0%) were not at all engaged in any
income-generating venture. On income level, 569 (10.2%) of the respondents
were on a high-income level, 1,148 (20.5%), were on a medium-income level,
1,516 (27.0%) were on a low-income level, 1,079 (19.3%) were below poverty
level, and 1,288 (23.0%) were completely financially dependent. Of these, 2,757
(40.2%) resided in urban areas, while 2,843 (50.8%) were in rural areas. With
respect to living arrangements, 3,527 (63.0%) of the respondents were living in
their own homes, 546 (9.8%) were living with their daughters, 701 (12.5%) were
living with their sons, 560 (10.0%) were living in their extended family com-
pounds, and 266 (4.7%) were living with other relatives, respectively. The distri-
bution also shows that 364 (6.5%) of the elderly lived alone, 1,018 (18.2%) had
two people in their household, 924 (16.5%) had three people in their household,
830 (14.8%) had four people in their household, while 2,464 (44.0%) lived with
five or more people. On the level of physical dependency, the distribution shows
that 2,412 (43.1%) of the respondents were heavily dependent or not physically
able to care for self, 2,012 (35.9%) were moderately dependent or somewhat
able to care for self, and 1,176 (21.0%) were not physically dependent and
were able to care for self.22

The nature of elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria

Data on the common forms of abuse suffered by the elderly in Akwa Ibom State
revealed that emotional/psychological abuse is the most reported form of abuse
(51.8%) frequently experienced by the elderly in Akwa Ibom State with the
major subforms in order of importance being verbal attacks, scolding or yelling
at the elderly, humiliation or name-calling, witchcraft accusation or suspicion,
ignoring the elderly for days, exclusion, harassment, and coercion. The results
also revealed financial/material abuse as the second most common form of abuse
(47.3%) experienced by the elderly in Akwa Ibom State. The subforms of
financial/material abuse identified include: not making good decisions on the
finances of the elderly, taking their monies or possessions without permission,
forcing or tricking them to bring out money, removal of cooked or raw food, and
dispossessing them of land or other properties in decreasing order.
Data also identified neglect and abandonment of the elderly (39%), making it
the third most frequently experienced form of abuse in the state. The major areas
of neglect involved non-provision of money for basic needs, denial of access to
grandchildren, irregular visits, neglecting their medical needs, and lack of help
in activities of daily living. In addition, data revealed that 6.5 percent of elderly
persons suffered complete neglect or abandonment by all their children.
Results revealed that physical abuse is not very common in Akwa Ibom State
with a rate of 13.5 percent of the sample reporting it. The common physical
abuse subforms identified in order of importance were physical assault (hitting,
 Abuse of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 183
slapping, shaking, kicking, and shoving), restraining or locking up the elderly in
the house, and injury (cuts, bruises, etc.). Sexual abuse was the least common
form of abuse (5.3%) among the elderly in Akwa Ibom State. The few identified
cases involved touching the older person in a sexual way against their will, and
sexual molestation (kissing, fondling, and the like). The findings revealed that
many of the elderly suffered multiple abuses. Finally, results from data analysis
also show that the respondents in the study agreed that poverty is a contributing
factor to elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State by scoring a mean score of above 2.5
in the Likert-type question.23
Results on hypothesis one revealed that apart from financial/material abuse
the elderly socioeconomic level had a significant relationship with emotional/
psychological abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, financial/material abuse, and
neglect and abandonment of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State. Tests on hypothesis
two revealed a significant relationship between educational level and all forms
of elder abuse: emotional/psychological abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, fin-
ancial/material, neglect, and complete abandonment in Akwa Ibom State.24

Poverty and elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State

The elderly in this study identified poverty as one of the contributing factors to
elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State. This is not surprising considering the poverty
profile of the state where 57 percent of the people are classified as poor, of which
about 28 percent are identified as core poor.25 This finding agrees with Jamuna
and Malley-Morisson and others who argued that poverty and economic con-
ditions caused the elderly to become more susceptible to abuse.26 Sijuwade also
observed that physical neglect reported by 48 percent of the respondents in his
study may be due to the extreme poverty faced by the families of the elderly.27
Mupila supports the finding that elderly abuse is closely linked to poverty and
that tackling the cause of poverty could greatly improve the security of older
people.28 The FDG confirmed this finding, explaining that the absence of social
services for the elderly coupled with the already strained finances of family
members often result in financial stress leading to abuse.
Poverty is the major reason why 6.4 percent of the elderly in Akwa Ibom
State are still working and 16 percent are involved in various economic activities
in spite of their advanced ages. Although a few of the elderly were happy that
they had jobs despite their advanced age, the majority lamented that they were
still working to earn a paltry living. This means that they would have loved to
retire, but poverty kept them working. These revelations are in agreement with
the findings in a Lagos study by Sijuwade, which revealed that 32 percent of the
respondents were still working despite being 70 years or older.29 However, the
high percentage of elderly who were found to be still working in Sijuwade’s
study may be because the study sample was drawn from an illiterate population
where many were not receiving pension, while this study cuts across all educa-
tional levels. It has been found that many elderly people are mostly employed in
poorly paid jobs and livelihood activities such as day and night watchmen,
184 M.O. Ekot
gatemen, craftsmen, compound cleaners, laborers, nannies, and the like, thereby
adding very little to improving their economic profile.
In addition, 19.3 percent were found to be below poverty level with 23
percent completely financially dependent, 43.1 percent were heavily physically
dependent and needed assistance with activities of daily living, and 6.5 percent
were living alone without any form of assistance. All these conditions exacer-
bate the sufferings of elderly people, increasing their poverty levels and the risk
of abuse. Heavy physical dependency (as with 43.1 percent in this study) and
those without children (6.0%) exacerbate the plight of the elderly poor. The
poverty-stricken elderly do not receive good-quality care.
In contemporary times, when people are thinking more about material gain,
children, friends, nieces, nephews, grandchildren, and other relations may not
want to take on the burden of elderly care when there is nothing to gain. They
are also incapable of paying a stranger to do the work. Hence, poverty of the
elderly is a major cause of abuse in the form of neglect and abandonment. In a
study in India, Tareque and others found the causes behind abuse as revealed by
the abused elderly were mainly poverty, inability to do anything, and depend-
ency. Other studies of the conditions of the elderly also observed that poverty
and precarious economic conditions contributed to the susceptibility of the
elderly to abuse.30
Poverty of the caregiver can also constitute a source of abuse. Sometimes,
children who are caregivers are themselves poor. They belong to the lower
income levels. Akwa Ibom State is made up of civil servants, petty traders,
small-scale service providers, and tradesmen; women and a majority of the
people are engaged in subsistence farming. Incomes are generally low with
about 45 percent unemployment. With widespread poverty and 57 percent clas-
sified as poor and 28 percent as core poor, this translates to poor levels of care-
giving and provision for many elderly people, since the sustenance of the
majority of the elderly depends largely on the incomes of their children.31 In
addition, a poverty-stricken caregiver is likely to dispossess the elderly of his or
her property. Sometimes, they take away vital documents concerning land and
investments, and even clothing items. They sometimes also force the elderly to
sign powers of attorney and force the elderly to will their estates to them as their
paid caregivers. Hence, the results of data analysis revealed that financial/
material abuse is the second most common form of abuse (47.3%).
A poverty-stricken caregiver sometimes develops coping mechanisms such as
ignoring which may be abusive in nature. A member of the FDG observed:

I would like to give my mother adequate care, but it is not possible. I have
four children who are all in school. Even though they say it is free educa-
tion, I still have to feed them and provide uniforms and books. Before I can
finish with my children, the ability is finished. This has become worse since
I lost my job. My husband’s job has never been steady. So the little trade I
am carrying on now just barely keeps us alive. How can I pay hospital bills,
buy medicine, provide adequate food? It pains me that I cannot do it but that
 Abuse of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 185
is the true condition. If I had a good job or say my trading activities were
more profitable, there is nothing more I would like to do than take care of
my dear mother.

Poverty is the major cause of neglect and abandonment of the elderly (39%)
which as this study revealed is the third type of abuse. Children living away
from their parents experience poverty as a result of the neglect of elderly parents.
Hence, many elderly parents are living in the villages, some (6.5%) living alone
without any form of assistance, while their children are scattered all over the
world. An elderly woman complained bitterly,

I bore and brought up nine children both males and females but none is here
to take care of me in my old age. They are all living in America. They come
now and then. I don’t even know my grandchildren – only from pictures.
Nobody cares about me. Ayin ake do akot adu bok (it is expected of a child
to grow and take care of the parent). But my own is different. They are
waiting to give me a befitting burial.

Migration of children is one of the causes of abandonment of the elderly. Many

Akwa Ibom people are found in both urban and rural areas in other parts of
Nigeria. Many are in neighboring African countries – Cameroon, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon – and others are to be found everywhere in the world, including
the United States. Some, due to such migrations and their own problems in the
lands to which they have migrated, have neglected or totally or partially aban-
doned their parents. Others send inadequate funds intermittently. Others send
adequate funds but there is no committed person to give quality care to the
elderly parents. Sometimes caregivers in the form of houseboys and girls are
paid to take care of the elderly. Many such paid caregivers do not give quality
care. Most times caregivers are frustrated by the behaviors of the elderly, espe-
cially if the elderly are not their parents. Those hired caregivers complain of
inadequate pay and do not show enough sympathy. The majority neglect and
exploit the elderly, especially if they are physically dependent. Hence, it may be
said that poverty, not just of finances and resources but of people who are willing
to give quality care, is a cause of elder abuse.
The general lack of knowledge on the care of the elderly is also a cause of
abuse. Many caregivers have no knowledge of the particular needs of the elderly.
Sometimes the elderly behave in a particular way, which could be frustrating and
irritating to the caregiver. Some wet their beds, need assistance to eat, take a
bath, dress, etc.; some have lost their memories and some have short memories
and therefore continue to ask the same question over and over again. All these
things frustrate and irritate the caregiver who may verbally attack the elderly,
causing emotional and psychological distress. Some studies further revealed that
verbal attacks are a very common form of abuse against the elderly.32
Poverty is a major contributory factor to the high level of emotional/
psychological abuse (51.8%) reported in this study. It is the cause of verbal
186 M.O. Ekot
attacks, scolding or yelling at the elderly, humiliation or name-calling, witchcraft
accusation or suspicion, ignoring the elderly for days, exclusion, harassment,
and coercion. This is in collaboration with the results of similar studies on elder
abuse that found higher rates of emotional/psychological abuse.33
Witchcraft accusation and suspicion have also been identified as sub-types of
psychological or emotional abuse suffered by the elderly in Akwa Ibom State
and are often caused by poverty. Poverty is generally attributed to the activities
of witches. Concerns with the activities of witches have gradually taken center
stage in many spheres of discussions in Akwa Ibom State. There is no doubt that
in the state people attribute to witchcraft almost every personal failure, sickness,
death, academic, and even political failures. Most often, family members blame
elderly family members and small children.
The elderly are a target of accusation due to low life expectancy; anyone who
has attained the ripe old age of 70 and above is a suspect. They are suspected of
renewing their lives by drinking the blood of younger people. If a young person
in the family dies, they are accused of killing the person. Witchcraft accusation
is devastating because it results in immediate public shaming, harassment, coer-
cion to confess, isolation, and abandonment not just by the children but by the
whole community. Many children have abandoned their responsibilities towards
their parents due to witchcraft scares, allowing the elderly to languish in poverty
leading eventually to death. Some such accused elderly people have met their
deaths at the hands of their children. An elderly widow, now declared a witch
and abandoned, had this to say:

I have four children which I brought up alone as a widow. I did not kill
them then and they are all still alive. I struggled to give them education.
Now when I should be enjoying the fruits of my labors, I have been accused
and abandoned. Only God will judge between me and my accusers espe-
cially my children.

While the state government enacted a law prohibiting the labeling of children as
witches, the elderly still suffer from such labeling without intervention from any
quarter. This finding is in tandem with the submission by the World Health
Organization that in some traditional societies isolated older women are accused
of witchcraft. The finding corroborates other findings, which found allegations
of witchcraft against frail and vulnerable older women as a factor for abuse in
South Africa.34 A study conducted in Ghana by Adinkrah found that many poor,
often elderly women were accused of witchcraft, and some were murdered by
their male relatives while those who survived were subjected to a range of phys-
ical, sexual, and economic abuse.35 Mupila also observed that in Zambia, elder
abuse was directed at women as victims of witchcraft allegations in both urban
and rural areas.36 This finding was confirmed by the FDG who disclosed that
these allegations in some cases are correct but lamented that the majority of the
accused are not guilty. The group affirmed that because of their frail, poverty-
stricken looks, poor elderly people, especially from rural areas, are often
 Abuse of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 187
suspected of witchcraft, especially if their children are unable to succeed in life
or in the event of the death of a younger family member. They observed that it is
very rare for educated or financially buoyant elderly to be accused. It is also rare
for the elderly whose children are successful in life to be accused of witchcraft.
Even if they are accused, this is done behind their backs, and they do not suffer
the same level of isolation and abandonment, since family members continue to
enjoy the economic power of these wealthy family members. The FDG explained
that the problem is so rampant in the state that some of these accused elderly,
especially women, are driven from their families and allowed to roam as desti-
tute, sleeping in market squares and church compounds, while some have even
been killed, and the lucky ones flee to take refuge in other villages or towns.
Even though poverty could cause high levels of physical aggression, this
study revealed a low rate (13.5%) of physical abuse, which supports the findings
of other studies.37 By contrast, in a Lagos study, Sijuwade found a high rate of
physical abuse as reported by 48 percent of the respondents.38 This is difficult to
explain, since respect for parents and an elder is generally very high among the
Yoruba who constituted the population of Sijuwade’s study. Nevertheless, the
Lagos area is known for its hustle and bustle with diverse non-indigenous people
who may not observe the traditional rules of respect of the elderly as done in a
typical Yoruba society. Sometimes, bus passengers physically push the elderly
around as they attempt to board or alight from buses.
The FDG in this study opined that the relatively low rate of physical abuse of
the elderly in Akwa Ibom State may be related to the fear of the elderly invoking a
curse on them. Many believe that the elderly, especially women, would beat their
breasts for such a young person who would dare to physically assault them, which
as commonly believed would result in lethal curses and calamity. Ajomale also
argues that due to the level of respect accorded to the elderly in Nigeria, it is
uncommon to have cases of beatings and deliberate infliction of injury upon the
elderly.39 The FDG was of the consensus that beating and physically manhandling
elderly parents is regarded as an abomination among Akwa Ibom people. Those
who are known to beat their parents are always subject to public scorn and ridicule.
The findings of this study on the very low rate of sexual abuse (5.3%) is in
tandem with other studies of elder abuse that also revealed low rates.40 Ajomale
observed that sexual abuse of the elderly is not common in Nigeria and that
when it occurs it is seldom reported, and in most cases is ritual related.41 As
observed by Ajomale, it is possible that such cases in Akwa Ibom State have not
come to light, since the elderly would be ashamed to report them. In addition,
since sexual abuse of the elderly is culturally unthinkable, it may be that no
thought has been given to its possible existence; hence, there is no conscious
effort to observe its occurrence. It would also appear that this low rate of sexual
abuse is related to the fact that the elderly are rarely seen as desired sexual
partners.
Test of hypothesis one revealed that apart from financial/material abuse the
elderly socioeconomic level had a significant relationship with emotional/
psychological abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, financial/material abuse, and
188 M.O. Ekot
neglect and abandonment in Akwa Ibom State. This means that in the study,
lower income was found to predict other forms of elder abuse – emotional/
psychological abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect and abandonment
– but was not predictive of financial/material abuse. This finding agrees with the
findings by Biggs, who found that socioeconomic position was related to mis-
treatment.42 In a study in China, Dong supported the finding that lower income
was associated with elder abuse.43 In addition, Sherman identified socioeconomic
status as one of the key factors that led to abuse in a study in India.44 However,
Acierno found that lower income was predictive of physical and sexual mistreat-
ment and neglect, but that income was not predictive of emotional abuse.45
Results of hypothesis two revealed a significant relationship between educa-
tional level and all forms of elder abuse in the Akwa Ibom State. This finding is
in support of Dong, who in the logistical regression analysis of data in India
found lower education as one of the demographic risk factors associated with
elder abuse.46 Lack of formal education is also one of the factors strongly associ-
ated with poverty. Aigbokhan observes that education, being a measure of
human capital, is hypothesized to be positively related with income, and there-
fore welfare.47 Omonona also reported that welfare levels increase as educational
attainment increases; as such, households whose heads attained tertiary educa-
tion were the least poor while those without any formal education were the
poorest.48

Conclusion
Poverty is widespread and is a major contributory factor to abuse of the elderly
in Akwa Ibom State in particular and in Nigeria in general. While poverty con-
tinues to occupy the center stage of national discourse, elder abuse remains
largely hidden and without recognition from the public and government in par-
ticular. This study considered the problem of poverty as the cause and con-
sequence of abuse of the elderly. The study revealed that a significant
relationship exists between income level and elder abuse in Akwa Ibom State. A
significant relationship also exists between educational level and elder abuse in
Akwa Ibom State. Both income and educational levels are predictors of poverty.
The study concludes that the high incidence of elder abuse would only be
reduced if poverty in the state is reduced to the bare minimum.
Based on the findings of this study, the first recommendation is that public
awareness programs and public education campaigns which define elder abuse
should be organized to raise the public’s awareness of the growing problem, to
point out the ills of elder abuse in order to reduce the prevalence of abuse in
Akwa Ibom State. Second, primary caregivers for the elderly should form
support programs, such as respite care, financial support, group shift care, and
the like to provide emotional support and alleviate the stress of caregiving,
thus reducing the accompanying risk of lashing out at the elderly and helping
to prevent abuse. Third, educational awareness programs should also be organ-
ized for the elderly to increase their awareness of their fundamental human
 Abuse of the elderly in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 189
rights, and the need to expose abuse. These awareness programs should include
topics on active and successful aging to help in reducing the cost of healthcare
and medical treatment. Fourth, there should be a law to prohibit the spurious
accusations of the elderly as witches which always results in neglect and
abandonment.
Again, the government should include the elderly in poverty alleviation pro-
grams and institute social security schemes for the elderly in Akwa Ibom State
and Nigeria as a whole, to provide support for them to fall back on if neglected
by their children. In addition, government should ensure prompt payment of gra-
tuities and regular pensions to retired workers, to help reduce the risk of mis-
treatment associated with regular documentations and screening exercises to
which pensioners are frequently exposed.
The Akwa Ibom State government should ensure proper implementation of
its policy of free medical care for the elderly, since the current arrangement does
not really benefit the majority of elderly people in Akwa Ibom State, as free
treatment is not obtainable in all hospitals as broadcast, and when available it
covers only consultation and not medication. Churches, NGOs, health institu-
tions, and government should establish daycare centers for the elderly to look
after elderly people during work or business hours in the absence of primary
caregivers.
Finally, there is a need for government to use the high revenue accrued to the
state to improve the standard of its citizenry by addressing practical matters such
as unemployment, poverty, poor housing, lack of potable water, and insecurity.
These would help change people’s attitudes and beliefs surrounding witchcraft,
which in most cases are merely excuses given by young people who are unable
to achieve comfortable living standards for themselves.

Notes
1 Sijuwade (2008: 542–547); Igbokwe and Asogwa (2010: 239–248); Ekot (2011).
2 Bonnie and Wallace (2003); Lach and Pillemer (2004: 1263–1272); WHO (2010).
3 Bankston (2000: 182–219).
4 Wolf (2001: 6–12).
5 Bauer (2010: 1–33).
6 Global Action on Aging (2008).
7 World Bank (2002).
8 Akwa Ibom State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (AKSEED)
(2004: 117).
9 Sijuwade (2008: 542–547).
10 Jamuna (2003: 125–142); Malley-Morrison, Nolido, and Chawla (2006: 1–11);
Mupila (2008); Sijuwade (2008: 542–547); Ekot (2011).
11 Tareque, Islam, and Rahman (2008: 411–421).
12 International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) (2009).
13 Bauer (2010: 1–33).
14 Sijuwade (2008: 542–547).
15 Sherman, Rosenblatt, Dorrie, and Antonucci (2008: 319–339).
16 Biggs, Manthorpe, Tinker, Doyle, and Erens (2009: 1–14); Dong, Simon, and Gorbien
(2007: 79–96); Sherman et al. (2008: 319–339).
190 M.O. Ekot
17 Acierno, Hernandez, Amstadter, Resnick, Steve, Muzzy, and Kilpatrick (2010:
292–297).
18 Aigbokhan (2000: 4–7).
19 Omonona (2010).
20 Khalid et al. (2011).
21 Bonnie and Wallace (2003).
22 Ekot (2011).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 AK SEEDS (2004: 117).
26 Jamuna (2003: 125–142); Malley-Morisson et al. (2006: 1–11).
27 Sijuwade (2008: 542–547).
28 Mupila (2008).
29 Sijuwade (2008: 542–547).
30 Tareque et al. (2008); Jamuna (2003: 125–142); Malley-Morisson et al. (2006:
1–11).
31 Akwa Ibom State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (AKSEED)
(2004: 117).
32 Yan and Tang (2004: 269–277); Mowlam et al. (2007).
33 Yamaguchi (2001: 116–137); Arai (2006: 13–23); Oh, Kim, Martins, and Kim (2006:
203–214); Wang (2006: 307–315); O’Keeffe, Hills, Doyle, McCreadie, Scholes,
Tinker, Manthrope, Biggs, and Erens (2009).
34 Ferreira (2004: 17–32); Joubert, Lindgren, and Bradshaw (2005: 53–76); Ferreira and
Lindgren (2008: 91–107).
35 Adinkrah (2004: 325–356).
36 Mupila (2007).
37 O’Keeffe et al. (2009); Lauman et al. (2008: 248–254); Igbokwe and Asogwa (2010).
38 Sijuwade (2008: 542–547).
39 Ajomale (2007).
40 O’Keeffe et al. (2009); Laumann, Leitsch, and Waite (2008: 248–254); Acierno et al.
(2010: 292–297); Biggs et al. (2009: 1–14).
41 Ajomale (2007).
42 Biggs et al. (2009: 1–14).
43 Dong et al. (2007: 79–96).
44 Sherman et al. (2008: 319–339).
45 Acierno et al. (2010: 292–297).
46 Dong et al. (2007).
47 Aigbokhan (2000: 4–7); see also Khalid et al. (2011).
48 Omonona (2010).

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11 Reflections on the interface
between poverty and food
insecurity in Nigeria
Funso A. Adesola

Introduction
Nigeria is highly resourceful and very important African country. However, her
level of poverty and food security system have reduced her status in the conti-
nent, similar to most third world countries without sufficient food to meet basic
nutritional needs. Hunger accounts for many of the deaths on the continent every
year, and many African countries are still grappling with the problem of food
crises. In spite of its oil wealth, Nigeria constantly shuttles between poverty and
food insecurity. The mass of Nigerians’ glowing living standards during
the early years of independence gave way to steady decline and stark poverty as
the nation advanced into the post-independence period. This chapter explores the
connection between poverty and hunger, and argues that poverty is a threat to
food security and that hunger is mainly a distributional problem. To be sure,
chronic malnutrition in the country today results not from a lack of food but
from food not getting to the poor people who need it most. In some cases, lack
of income to buy food is a problem. The chapter further argues that the country’s
hungry, rural poor are not prone to crime, violence, and other social vices, unlike
their cities’ counterparts. It concludes by drawing inferences on Nigeria for its
neighbors with which she has a mutual relationship.
In 2011, the World Bank reported that the world population today ranges
between six and seven billion people, with a global rural population estimated to
be 49 percent of that total; about 70 percent of that population is poor. Conway
corroborates this data by noting that today, approximately 850 million people
worldwide are chronically undernourished.1 According to the report, about 200
million of these people live in Africa, 180 million children are severely under-
weight for their age, 400 million women of childbearing age have sickle cell
anemia, and over 200 million children are vitamin A deficient. It is increasingly
worrisome but not surprising that West Africa is again making world headlines on
food insecurity, malnutrition, rising food prices, and drought.2 This explains why a
study of this nature is focused on showcasing Nigeria, an important and resource-
endowed country plagued by a poverty-ridden and food-insecure population.
Following this introduction, the chapter begins with a background section
meant to provide cursory information on Nigeria related to this study. It then
194 F.A. Adesola
raises some propositions and presents the findings of a study. It then analyzes the
poverty and food security interface using the Nigerian case study. Finally, it
shifts focus to drawing some conclusions about an alternative future for Niger-
ia’s poverty and food security situation.

Poverty indices in Nigeria

Nigeria accounts for a quarter of sub-Saharan Africa’s people. Urban dwellers
comprise less than 25 percent of its population. Nigeria is also one of the world’s
most diverse countries, surrounded mainly by the Francophone countries of
Benin, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. An instructive part of the diversity, particu-
larly for the present analysis, is the vagaries of its climatic conditions. There is
moist and unstable air to the south of the country, while to the north is the dry
and stable air of the Sahara. In the southern part of the country, humidity and
temperatures are high all through the year. Annual rainfall ranges from about 60
to 100 inches (150 to 250 centimeters), and it is distributed over a minimum of
eight months.3 The Middle Belt of Nigeria has an even greater contrast between
seasons. Annual rainfall varies from about 35 to 55 inches (90 to 140 centime-
ters), and temperatures range from a dry-season average of 86°F (30°C) to 77°F
(25°C) in the wet season. There, the dry season lasts from May to November.
Droughts and unpredictable rainfall characterize the extreme north of Nigeria,
i.e., 20 to 35 inches (50 to 90 centimeters) of rainfall between June and October.
The dry season in northern Nigeria is very hot between February and May. The
Harmattan hot/dry northeast trade wind blows for more than three months in the
north.
This translates to a wide rainfall distribution in the country and reflects the
geographical patterns of tropical vegetation and animal life in the country. The
tropical rainforests in southern Nigeria experience year-round rainfall, high
humidity, solar radiation, and general equatorial conditions. There is a mix of
woodlands and open grasslands in central Nigeria due to less rainfall and greater
seasonal contrasts. The northern part of the country produces savanna grass-
lands, which is attributable to a combination of hot, dry conditions as well as a
short period of rainfall. Much of this traditional climatic condition has been
ruined by population explosion, inappropriate land-use practices, and warped
government policies.
The other background information necessary for this chapter is a cursory view
on the number of Nigerians living either above or below the poverty line, begin-
ning from the independence period up until about 2011.
As Table 11.1 shows, in 1964 over 84 percent of Nigerians were living above
the poverty line. However, 28.1 percent lived below the poverty line in 1980.
This jumped to 46.3 percent in 1995 and 65.5 percent in 1996. In 1999, during
the return to democratic rule after many years of military rule, 87 percent of
Nigerians lived below the poverty line. In 2003, Nigeria ranked 154 out of 172
countries in the world marginal index.4 By 2007, the then Nigerian President
Umar Yar’Adua in a newspaper report acknowledged that after decades of
 Reflections on poverty in Nigeria 195
Table 11.1 Percentages of Nigerians living above or below the poverty line in select
years

Years Percentage Index of poverty line

1964 84.0 Above poverty line

1980 28.1 Below poverty line
1995 46.3 Below poverty line
1996 65.5 Below poverty line
1999 87.0 Below poverty line
2007 54.0 Below poverty line
2011 70.0 Below poverty line

Sources: www.dawodu.com/nnamani10.htm and CIA World Factbook.

governance, 54 percent of Nigerians still lived on less than $1 per day.5 The
indices grew worse after the global crisis had further decimated household
incomes, rising to 70 percent living below the poverty line in 2011. Table 11.1
graphically illustrates the astronomical rise in the number of Nigerians living
below the poverty level, apart from in 2007.
This meteoric rise in the number of Nigerians living below the poverty line
does not correlate with increasing oil returns. The global appreciation of oil
prices on the international market, especially after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in
the late 1990s, along with the attendant “siege” of the former by the Western
countries accounts for the rise in the numbers of poor Nigerians. To be sure, oil
still accounts for the lion’s share of Nigeria’s official earnings, the debilitating
Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria’s oil-producing communities notwithstanding. For
instance, Mathias Okwe noted that oil accounted for N1.574 trillion out of N1.89
trillion revenue generated by the federal government of Nigeria in the first
quarter of 2008.6
Evidently, Nigeria is an oil-rich West African country but has been plagued
by political upheavals, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macro-
economic management. The country is overly dependent on its oil sector, which
provides 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and about 80 percent of its
budgetary revenues.7 This unhealthy over-dependence on oil has led to utter
neglect of the nation’s hitherto vibrant agricultural sector. Out of 98 million hec-
tares of Nigerian land area 74 million is good for farming, although much of it is
yet to be fully utilized. Paradoxically, the ample oil wealth has done little to
reverse widespread poverty in the nation, as will be seen later in this chapter.
The windfall from increased oil exports and high global crude prices in 2010
greatly increased the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) between 2007 and
2010. In addition, the former Nigerian President, Mr. Goodluck Jonathan has
committed himself to continuing with the economic reforms of his predecessors,
with emphasis on improved infrastructure. Despite the windfall and reforms, the
country’s business environment remains highly challenging – a condition that
appears to help deepen poverty. It is instructive to note that an article on devel-
opment indicators in the developing world records that it takes nine procedures
196 F.A. Adesola
and 34 days to start a business in Nigeria; 14 procedures and 82 days to register
a property; and 457 days to enforce contracts.8 Thus, the Nigerian business
environment is a complex and cumbersome one that allows the poor no room to
thrive.

Underlying propositions
The research herein leads to the following three propositions:

1 Poverty does not exist because there are rich and poor people; rather, a few
are rich because so many others are poor. In fact, Herbert J. Gans posited
that poverty survives in part because it is a baseline failure which tends to
reassure the non-poor of their worth.9
2 A hungry man is an angry man and, under such circumstances, there is
social anomie.
3 It is the rich that impoverish some segments of the population either by
omission or commission.

Poverty is, therefore, not an incident but a process in social relations. Its effect
devastates the dignity and sense of self-worth of its victims.

Data analysis
Expenditure on food, according to the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO), represents about 10 to 20 percent of consumer income in industrialized
nations but as much as 60 to 80 percent in developing countries, many of which
are net-food importers.10 It is further deplorable that sub-Sahara Africa is home
to the largest number of poor and hungry people in world. Many of them are
farmers living on less than $1 per day. This is worsened by population growth,
increasing pressure on limited land and water supply, and the reality of climate
change.11 Hunger is a distributional problem, and the obstacles to improving dis-
tribution are primarily political. Therefore, regulation of conflict, prevention of
violence, reduction of international arms trades, and protection of civil and polit-
ical rights should be central to policies that address hunger.12 In fact, the basic
cause of chronic malnutrition in the world today is not so much a lack of food
but that food often does not get to the people who need it the most. Also note-
worthy is that a meat-based diet, which is largely a Western phenomenon, places
more strain on agricultural resources than a vegetarian-based diet.13
Poverty is another threat to food security. Without good income there is little
possibility of purchasing enough food. With more than 41 percent of people in
sub-Saharan Africa living on less than $1 per day, it is easy to discern why the
World Bank posits that about 32 percent of its population is undernourished.14
Indeed, food security could be defined as access by all to sufficient food for
an active, healthy life. In effect, adequate food availability is a function of an
effective agricultural production infrastructure. Food security is attained only
 Reflections on poverty in Nigeria 197
when food is available at all times and when all people can access it. Food
should also be nutritionally adequate in terms of quality, quantity, variety, and
acceptability within a given culture.15
Food security thus speaks to access to food by all and sundry in a population,
and “security” connotes the risk of losing access to adequate food over a given
period. Therefore, the people are food secure to the extent that the entire popula-
tion has adequate quantity and quality of food stocks.16 Food security exists at
the intersection of empowerment and disempowerment in so many ways. Con-
sequently, high-income earners in food-insecure societies hardly suffer from
food shortages. Rather, this is often the sad plight of marginalized social cat-
egories like the rural and urban poor, women, children, and the physically chal-
lenged who live from hand to mouth and often lack the purchasing power for the
available food in the market. According to Jenkins and Craig, high- and mid-
income families hardly go hungry even when there is food shortage, but the low-
income and poor families are often hungry even when there is food in excess.17
Therefore, barring conflict, bad governance, and inadequate investment in
agriculture, poverty is the main reason many are hungry in Africa. To be sure,
bad governance includes the following: inadequate or ineffective state action;
inadequate preparedness by the government for provision of resources; lack of
priority for the poor; personal aggrandizement of state functionaries; corrupt
public officeholders who discourage private investment and distort resource allo-
cations in ways that hurt the poor; poor infrastructures; and lack of account-
ability and irresponsiveness of rulers to the needs of the ruled.
While poverty is a static concept, its corollary, vulnerability, is a dynamic
one. As a consequence, fluctuations in income have a greater impact on the poor
and their ability to eke out a living within the context of a harsh economic
environment; unlike the high-income earners who only have to cut back on luxu-
ries should they experience income loss. Again, poverty is an intriguing, world-
wide phenomenon. It keeps the poor in an embarrassing state of disrepute. It is
the main cause of hunger and malnutrition and is exacerbated by population
explosion, especially with unchecked rural–urban migration that has led to city
congestion, crime, and other vices. Policy inadequacies and inconsistencies
further contribute to the stark nature of poverty, hunger, and malnutrition in
Nigeria and many parts of Africa.18
The structural dimension of poverty manifests in limited productive resources
and inadequate income to meet the basic existential needs of life. The social
dimension of poverty manifests as a gendered issue: female heads of households
and children from poor homes bear the greatest weight of poverty. The poor
experience limited growth and brain development.19
Interestingly, food accounts for 50 to 60 percent of the budget of poor house-
holds in the developing countries. When food prices rise, the amount of money
left for other household expenditures becomes insignificant.20 The Nigerian poor
and many of their African counterparts starve or resort to carbohydrate-intensive
substitutes when there is an unexpected or unaffordable rise in food prices. The
so-called substitutes are relatively cheap but are also of lower nutritional value.
198 F.A. Adesola
It is instructive to note that a significant percentage of Nigerians are employed
in the agricultural sector. While agriculture provides a means of livelihood for
well over 70 percent of the Nigerian population, it is also Nigeria’s major source
of raw materials for the agro-allied industries. From the early years of Nigeria’s
independence up until 2011, the number of Nigerians actively involved in agri-
culture has remained at around 70 percent.21 This situates Nigeria in the four-
teenth position in the global ranking of those engaged in agriculture.22
Small-scale farmers who produce about 85 percent of the country’s total agri-
cultural production comprise the agricultural sector. They also confront setbacks
as numerous and resilient as the Hydra’s heads. These setbacks range from bar-
riers related to the market, storage, credit, technology, state inertia, and the like.
Consequently, Nigerian farmers have been asphyxiated and consigned to
poverty. Whereas, under normal circumstances, the sector should be generating
jobs for the armies of unemployed, accruing attractive profits for farmers, and
providing requisite food to the mass of the nation’s hungry populace, it has
resulted instead in a nation dependent on food importation because domestic
food production cannot meet national food demand.
Many Nigerians are subsistent farmers. Due to the constraints of technology,
credit, land tenure, storage, yields, climate, market, and other factors, these
farmers do not have the advantage of scale. Apart from lack of advantage of
large-scale production, another dimension to this subsistence is nutritional. The
farmers sell most of their best produce in the market, most often at ridiculous
prices, thereby leaving them with only the rotten or near-rotten produce for their
own consumption. The farmers’ inclination to sell their “best” produce is not
only to attract buyers but also to pay their quotidian expenses: basic bills and
children’s school fees. Little or nothing is, therefore, left to take care of other
expenses beyond the basics.
The relationship between food insecurity and poverty may be seen among
food and cash crop farmers. To be sure, cash crops need a gestation period, and
this is often harrowing and tough for farmers. Farmers also have to contend with
pests, drought, and other climatic conditions. However, once they get on top of
the gestation period, pests, and other inclement environmental conditions, they
are as good as being prosperous. On the reverse side, the food crop farmers are
the worse off owing to the following factors:

• The perennial nature of their produce/output.

• Due to the aforementioned, there is a tendency to start all over again the fol-
lowing year when stability/clemency of the weather is not guaranteed given
the weather vagaries in parts of Nigeria/Africa. It has been mentioned else-
where in this study that northern Nigeria faces the embarrassing threat of
desertification, while the southern part has to contend with weather vagaries,
especially those of insufficient rainfall, drought, and flood.
• Lack of incentive.
• Lack of market facilities.
• Poor infrastructure – road, storage facilities, and implements.
 Reflections on poverty in Nigeria 199
Table 11.2, which shows the percentage of the population living below the
poverty line, further reveals the appalling lacunae that exist in the Nigerian, nay
African food security and poverty template.
Regarding the calculation of figures, select countries were chosen out of the
151 countries ranked. Certain countries share rankings with other countries
because the value of their percentages of the population below the poverty line
was the same. Scores of countries were not ranked owing to lack of data.
The observable pattern is Nigeria in the appalling fourth position in the global
ranking of countries whose population lives below the poverty line. With the
exception of Chad, many of Nigeria’s contiguous neighbors such as Niger
Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Cameroon, and Benin Republic, though
smaller and presumably weaker, ranked below Nigeria. Nigeria is also one of the
countries taking an ignoble lead over many of its West African counterparts in
the poverty ranking. Furthermore, while the percentage value of the Nigerian
population living below the poverty line is as high as 70, compare results with
the United States, France, and China, whose percentages are a mere 12, 6, and 3,
respectively.

Table 11.2 Select countries 2011 population living below the poverty line, 2011

Serial number Global ranking Country Percentage

1 1 Zambia 86
2 2 Liberia 80
3 2 Chad 80
4 3 Sierra Leone 70
5 4 Nigeria 70
6 8 Niger 63
7 9 Comoros 60
8 12 Senegal 54
9 12 Sao Tome and Principe 54
10 14 South Africa 50
11 14 Madagascar 50
12 16 Cameroon 48
13 17 Guinea 47
14 19 Burkina Faso 46
15 23 Côte d’Ivoire 42
16 25 Mauritania 40
17 28 Benin Republic 37.4
18 31 Mali 36.1
19 39 Togo 32
20 48 Ghana 28.50
21 74 Morocco 15
22 82 United States 12
23 84 Azerbaijan 11
24 90 Mauritius 8
25 94 France 6.2
26 100 China 2.8

Source: CIA World Factbook.

200 F.A. Adesola
Aside from the foregoing, the degree of interdependence and agro-allied com-
merce which Nigeria has with its neighbors will further help us appreciate Niger-
ia’s food security profile. On this, the record of parallel or unofficial trade
circuits in West Africa revealed that, during the colonial era, Nigeria had a
liberal import policy and a currency that was directly convertible to the British
pound sterling. This attracted into Nigeria cocoa, grains, cattle, and other
primary commodities smuggled from the surrounding Francophone countries in
return for imported goods. Shortly after independence the situation reversed due
to Nigeria’s increased protectionism and delinking Nigeria’s naira from the
pound sterling. Instead, Nigerian grains increasingly flowed into the Niger
Republic and cocoa into Benin Republic. The same could be said not only of
subsidized fertilizer and locally manufactured goods but also of oil flow across
all of Nigeria’s borders.23
Benin Republic’s proximity to and the porosity of its borders with Lagos,
Nigeria’s commercial nerve center, as well as numerous border towns and vil-
lages has further stoked the volume of parallel imports across the Nigeria/Benin
borders. The same may said be of Niger and Chad borders with Nigeria. Grain
smuggling across the Nigerian/Nigerien borders is a case in point, especially fol-
lowing the Structural Adjustment Program-induced reforms in Nigeria.24 In fact,
after the liberalization of the Nigerian cocoa trade in the late 1980s, Niger – a
non-cocoa-producing Sahelian country – has accumulated a great deal of cocoa
and exported it through NIITRA, its cocoa board.25 In the same vein, Benin and
Togo Republics export more cocoa than Nigeria.
Rice, textiles, wheat flour, sugar, and agro-allied inputs comprise a parallel
trade that liberally traverses Nigeria and its neighbors’ borders through to today.
For instance, about 19 million people engage in the parallel trade within the
densely populated Maradi–Katsina and Kano corridors of the Nigerian border
with Niger Republic.26 Nigeria, which is the largest grain producer in West
Africa, exports significant quantities of coarse grains, such as millet, sorghum,
and maize, to Niger Republic in exchange for cowpeas.27
Global warming and climate change have combined to worsen the situation.
Benin, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger obtain a chunk of their food imports from
Kwara, Oyo, Ogun, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Borno, and Katsina states of
Nigeria, but the states themselves are either drought, pest, or flood plagued.
Nigeria agriculture is rain fed. Little is done to expand its irrigation potential. At
another level, excessive rainfall is a liability for the farmers because it leads to
flood disaster, as Ruma Sayyadi, former Nigerian minister of water resources,
was quoted as saying in a news report.28

Conclusion: alternative interface for poverty reduction and

the food security system
As argued in this chapter, the state of nutrition and well-being of the Nigerian
rural population is appalling. Poverty has vitiated the sense of self-worth of
many rural dwellers and caused them to settle for the most menial jobs, to resign
 Reflections on poverty in Nigeria 201
themselves to a vicious fate, and to drift to the urban centers in search of relief.
One fundamental way to break this vicious circle and move beyond mere rural
development rhetoric is to identify how to meet the basic needs of the rural
population to pave the way for sustainable development.29 This requires spirited
efforts at cornering all difficulties confronting the rural populace in the areas of
felt need: food, water and sanitation, shelter, healthcare, and basic education.30
Knowledge of a people’s basic needs is central to developing realistic policies
for sustainable development.
Some ways to redeem the poor from their debasement and ignoble standard
of living that they face include strengthening the market and public institutions,
and reducing improving healthcare and education. Poor households are com-
pelled to accept dangerous, low-quality, and menial jobs, especially in the
informal sector. Many of these poor and downtrodden people eke out a living.
Some can only afford to eat once a day. Sometimes, such foods are deficient in
calories or fail to meet basic dietary standards. Armies of youth are unemployed
and have left school. Many retirees who have served the nation meritoriously
have been starved by irregularity and violation of their retirement benefits.
In this, micro financing, public provision of free and universal basic primary
and secondary education, basic healthcare, and old age assistance become
instrumental.
Furthermore, inadequate investment in research has inhibited world cereal
production to increase rapidly in tandem with demand, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa. Private corporations, which were presumed to fund agricultural
researches since the 1980s, prefer to invest in crops that provide high yield and/
or returns, such as cotton, soya beans, palm oil, and maize, rather than in basic
staple crops that the poor people need the most.
One hectare of farmland in Africa has the potential to produce two tons of
grain per hectare given the varieties of cereal that are available today. However,
low soil fertility, weeds, pests, and drought reduce the yield below the one ton
needed to feed the farmer’s family and leave him or her with little or nothing to
sell. Families not only have less to eat but are also unable to pay health bills and
school fees, thereby exacerbating a vicious circle of chronic malnourishment,
disease, and illiteracy.31
Indeed, the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s that rescued many
countries in Latin America and Asia should be vigorously pursued with dogged
commitment in Nigeria. To accomplish these ends, there is a need to adopt new
hybrid rice varieties for Nigeria/Africa. Such varieties are resistant to pests, dis-
eases, and drought. They produce high yields with little application of fertilizer.
This position is premised on the fact that rice is an important staple food in
Africa and a major source of calories for the urban poor. Its availability and
prices are welfare matters for the poor masses which, essentially, are the food-
insecure segments of society. In addition, there is a need to cultivate reliable and
accessible markets, minor agro-dealers who can sell small amounts of grain and
fertilizer, and output markets that will enable the farmers to get the best price for
their produce. This can exorcise even the poorest farmer from the fetters of
202 F.A. Adesola
poverty.32 In addition, acute water shortages and the deteriorating quality of
existing water resources due to climate change through salinization have adverse
effects on agricultural production (Conway 2008). This also needs sorting out.
Finally, it is easy to see that poverty and hunger are twin torturers of the
average Nigerian. The two have a way of stoking each other. They are offensive
and undesirable, especially for a nation like Nigeria with high potential and pedi-
gree. If the rural poor do not take to crime and dehumanizing behavior to survive,
the same cannot be said of the urban poor. To be sure, the latter category has the
high potential to resort to crime, prostitution, gambling, alcoholism, touting, and
other social vices. They resort to these actions either to survive hunger or to create
a psychological, though false, sense of indifference. Part of the reason for this
antisocial behavior is a function of lack of good food and the inability to pay for
basic needs as well as an outright lack of a decent personal income. This is a rein-
forcement of the simple truth: a hungry man is an angry man.

Notes
1 The World Bank. 2011. Global Indicators. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL (accessed March 6, 2012); and G. Conway 2008. “Presiden-
tial Address: The Food Crisis.” Geographical Journal 174.
2 See, e.g., Aljazeera World News, January 22 and March 9, 2012.
3 Encyclopedia Britannica. 2009. “Nigeria.” Compton’s by Britannica, v 6.0. 2009.
Available at www.britannica.com/topic/Comptons-by-Britannica (accessed July 11,
2011).
4 C. Nnamani. 2003. “Poverty in Nigeria […] Eroding the Dignity of Man.” Text of the
Fifth Edition of Pre-Convocation Dignity of Man Lecture Series of the University of
Nigeria Alumni Association (UNAA), Princess Alexandria Hall, University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, October 6, 4. Available atg www.dawodu.com/nnamani10.htm (accessed
November 30, 2011).
5 This Day, Lagos, October 18, 2007.
6 Guardian, Lagos, June 23, 2008.
7 O. Owolabi and I. Okwechime. 2007. “Oil and Security in Nigeria: The Niger Delta
Crisis.” Africa Development 32, no. 1: 1–40.
8 Guardian, Lagos, May 7, 2008.
9 Cited in Nnamani, “Poverty in Nigeria,” 4.
10 Cited in R. Bush. 1996. “The Politics of Food and Starvation.” Review of African
Political Economy 23, no. 68: 171.
11 C. Bertini and D. Glickman. 2009. Renewing America Leadership in the Fight against
Global Hunger and Poverty, Report issued by an Independent Leaders’ Group on
Global Agricultural Development (Chicago), Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 16.
12 J.C. Jenkins and S.J. Scanlan. 2001. “Food Security in Less Developed Countries:
1970 to 1990.” American Sociological Review 66, no. 5: 740.
13 P. Smith. 1998. Food Security and Political Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 4–12.
14 World Bank. 2010. Poverty Statistics in Africa. Available at www.thp.org/where_we_
work/africa?gclid=COSNjZaHyqQCFYyGzAodVkGhCw (accessed October 11, 2010).
15 Bush, “The Politics of Food and Starvation.”
16 E. Egbuma. 2001. “Food Security in Nigeria: The Challenges and Way Forward,” in
Abdul-Ganiyu Garba (ed.), Natural Resource Use, the Environment and Sustainable
Development: Selected Papers for Year 2001 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Eco-
nomic Society. Ibadan: The Nigerian Economic Society.
 Reflections on poverty in Nigeria 203
17 Jenkins and Scanlan, , “Food Security in Less Developed Countries,” 719.
18 L. Sanni. 2000. “Agricultural Development without Post Harvest System; Any Hope
for Success?” Abeokuta Alumni Association Lecture Series no. 2, University of Agri-
culture, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria.
19 S. Aluko. 1975. “Poverty; Its Remedies,” in Poverty in Nigeria – Proceedings of the
1975 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society. Ibadan: NES.
20 V. Braun. 2008. Rising Food Prices; What Should Be Done? International Food
Policy Research Institute (Policy Brief ), Washington, DC. Available at www.ifpri.
org/pubs/bp/bp001.pdf (accessed July 11, 2011).
21 P. Okunoye. 2002. “Rising Cost Prices and Food Insecurity in Nigerian and its Impli-
cation for Poverty Reduction.” CBN Economic and Financial Review 39, no. 4.
22 CIA World Factbook. 2011. Available at www.photius.com/rankings/economy/
labourforce_by_occupation_agriculture_2011_o.html (accessed February 3, 2012).
23 J. Egg and J. Igue. 1993. “Market Driven Integration in the Eastern Sub-region:
Nigeria’s Impacts on its Neighbors.” Institut National de Recherché Agronomique/
Institut de Recherché et d’Applications des Methodes de Developpment/Universite
Nationale du Benin, Paris, France. Synthesis Report cited in K. Meagher. 2004.
Informal Integration or Economic Subversion? Parallel Trade in West Africa.
Montreal: IDRC Books.
24 K. Meagher and M.B. Yunusa. 1993. “Informalization and its Discontents: Coping
with Structural Adjustment in the |Nigerian Urban Informal Sector.” United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, Switzerland; and A. Olukosh and
C. Obi. 1993. The State of Nigeria’s Trade with its Neighbors: Issues and Problems.
Text of a paper presented at the Conference on West African Economic Integration:
Nigerian Policy Perspectives for the 1990s, October 26—27. Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria.
25 J. Amselle and E. Gregoire. 1988. “Politiques Nationales et Reseaux Marchands Tran-
snationaux – les cas du Mali et du Niger-Nord Nigeria. Echanges Regionaux, Com-
merce Frontalier et Securite Alimentaire en Afrique de l’Quest.” Institut National de
Recherché Agronomique/Institut de Recherché et d’Applications des Methodes de
Developpment/Universite Nationale du Benin, Paris, France. Synthesis Report cited in
Meagher, Informal Integration or Economic Subversion?
26 A. Mohamadou and M. Tremolieres. 2005. “Cross-border Cooperation between Niger
and Nigeria: The Case of the Maradi Micro-Region.” West Africa Review 7, no. 3.
27 J. Staatz, N. Dembelle, V. Kelly, and R. Adjao. 2008. “Agricultural Globalization in
Reverse: The Impact of the Food Crisis in West Africa.” Background paper for the
Geneva Trade Development Forum, Crans-Montana, Switzerland, September 17–20.
28 Tell, Lagos, May 5, 2008.
29 G. Mydal. 1968. Asian Drama. New York: Pantheon.
30 J. Anyanwu. 2005. Rural Poverty in Profile: Determinants and Exit Paths: Africa
Development Bank. Malden, MA: Blackwell; African Development Bank. 2002.
African Development Report 2002: Rural Development for Poverty Reduction in
Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press; M. Khan. 2001. “Rural Poverty in Develop-
ing Countries: Implications for Public Policy.” Economic Issues no. 26. Washington,
DC: IMF; World Bank. 1996. Nigeria; Poverty in the Midst of Plenty, The Challenge
of Growth with Inclusion: A World Bank Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank;
F. Okafor. 1985. “Basic Needs in Rural Nigeria.” Social Indicators Research 17, no. 2.
31 Conway G. 2008. “Presidential Address: The Food Crisis.” Geographical
Journal 174.
32 C. Conway. 1997. The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for all in the 21st Century.
London: Penguin.
12 An appraisal of the poverty
reduction program in
Bayelsa State of Nigeria
“In Care of the People” (COPE)
Ezi Beedie

Introduction
Since the Nigerian government’s implementation of the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) in the 1980s, the incidence of poverty has continued to increase
in spite of various poverty reduction programs targeted in the main at children,
young adults, and women. In addition, there has been total neglect of the aged in
these programs based on the assumption that they are looked after by their
extended family. Against this backdrop, the chapter appraises the impact of the
Nigerian government’s conditional cash transfer program tagged “In Care of the
People” (COPE) on the poverty of aged-headed household (AHH) beneficiaries.
The analysis made use of purposive sampling to target AHH beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries, community leaders, and officials in Bayelsa, Nigeria. The
basic techniques of data collection were semi-structured interviews and docu-
mentary analyses of policy documents relevant to the study. The analysis of data
collected was done through a thematically grounded approach covering the four
groups of participants identified.
It is apparent that the failure of past poverty reduction programs to also focus
on the target group has exacerbated their deprivation and poverty. The study
reveals that participants do not perceive a reduction in beneficiaries’ poverty but
that COPE has helped them maintain a minimum standard of living by relieving
immediate hardship and suffering. The analysis clearly shows that the AHH ben-
eficiaries seem to be at the service of COPE rather than being served by COPE.
The most important conclusion is that the aged-headed households need an inter-
ventionist policy tool that can address the needs of the elderly as a dependent
group as a poverty reduction measure in the area.
Poverty is one of the severe problems facing the world in recent times. It has
also been established that, even with more resources and educational benefits,
not all countries have been able to eradicate poverty. For instance, during the
1970s, Nigeria evolved from a poor agricultural economy into a relatively rich,
oil-dominated one. It was expected that the number of the poor would have less-
ened by now. However, poverty has been on the increase. The implementation
of the SAP in 1986 introduced a new dimension to poverty in Nigeria.
UNESCO’s 2010 Global Monitoring Report (GMR) revealed that about 92
 Poverty reduction in Bayelsa State of Nigeria 205
percent of the Nigerian population survives on less than $2 daily, while about 71
percent survive on less than $1 a day.1
In spite of poverty reduction programs targeted at women, children, and
young adults, the incidence of poverty has continued to increase. In addition,
there has been a total sidelining of older people in these programs, based on the
perception that they are looked after by their extended family. In some cases,
studies have shown this not to be the case. Therefore, the importance of target-
ing older people in poverty reduction programs cannot be overstated given Afri-
ca’s rapidly aging population. Understandably, poverty reduction has been a
global concern and a daunting challenge for both the developed and developing
countries. These increasing concerns about poverty are well reflected in the
UN’s Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) primary aim of eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015.
Accordingly, successive Nigerian governments and donor agencies put in
place several direct poverty intervention programs with various targets. No doubt
many of these programs were well intended but had limitations that hindered
their impact upon the people’s poverty level. Such intervention programs and
agencies include: the Department of Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure
(DFFRI) to open up the rural areas and improve the conditions of the vulnerable
poor; the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) to tackle the problem of
mass unemployment; the People’s Bank of Nigeria (PBN)/Community Banks
(CB) program to cater for the credit needs of less privileged Nigerians; the Better
Life Program (BLP), which was gender specific, to improve the quality of life of
rural women; the Family Support Program (FSP) and Family Economic
Advancement Program (FEAP) to improve the quality of life of families in rural
areas; the National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA), the
Strategic Grains Reserve Authority (SGRA), and the Accelerated Crop Produc-
tion (ACP) to improve the productive capacities of peasant farmers as well as
improving their incomes and well-being; and the Nomadic and Adult Education
programs to assist in the eradication of illiteracy.
Yet the scourge of poverty seems “unbolting”2 because all the above-
mentioned intervention efforts failed to produce the desired outcomes. The
reasons include program inconsistency, poor implementation, corruption of gov-
ernment officials and public servants, poor targeting mechanisms, and failure to
focus directly on the poor.3 A lack of continuity of the past supply-side poverty
reduction programs by successive administrations has exacerbated the conditions
of the core poor. Past poverty reduction interventions have also failed to consider
poverty among older people because of the traditional family support system,
which has traditionally provided protection for the old, reflecting persisting
assumptions about a lesser magnitude and relevance of the poverty threat among
the old compared to the young.4 In addition, “In Nigeria […] almost all main-
stream poverty reduction policies or targets wholly fail to consider older people.”5
The elderly (defined as those above 60 years of age) constitute 5.2 percent of
the Nigerian population.6 This is projected to increase to 7.4 percent in 2025.7
Therefore, the lack of focus of past poverty reduction programs on older people:
206 E. Beedie
point[s] to a substantial and possibly greater poverty risk among them and
thus the need for mainstream policy to focus on ensuring a measure of eco-
nomic security for present and future older cohorts as a part of overall
efforts to attain the Millennium Development Goals.8

Given that the incidence of old age poverty is high throughout developing coun-
tries Nigeria is no exception, with an old age poverty rate of 15.7 percent.9 The
time for intervention programs to specifically focus on the aged is now, as Desai
and Tye aptly put it:

With the onset of ageing in developing countries, the time has come for
proactive planning of appropriate institutional frameworks and policies. The
main focus of many developing countries lies with children and young
adults, who form the core of their present populations.10

To this end, with the return of democracy in 1999, the Federal Government of
Nigeria embarked on poverty reduction programs by launching the Poverty Alle-
viation Program (PAP) in 2000, aimed at job creation. In 2001, the PAP was
phased out and replaced by the National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP)
aimed at eradicating abject poverty in Nigeria by 2010 and responsible for
coordinating and monitoring all poverty eradication activities. In 2006, Nigeria’s
newly elected president, Yar’Adua, set forth a seven-point agenda to achieve the
MDGs and turn Nigeria into a top-20 industrialized nation by 2020.
To achieve this aim, a targeted and purposeful intervention was needed.11
While there is acknowledgement that the supply-side approach interventions of
other NAPEP programs, such as the Youth Empowerment Schemes (YES),
Rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS), and the Social Welfare Ser-
vices Scheme (SOWESS), may have contributed to reducing poverty, more
needs to be done but differently.12 In response to this challenge, in 2007 the
NAPEP launched an ambitious conditional cash transfer (CCT) program labeled
“In Care of the People” (COPE). This employs a demand-side focus, following
on the progress made in Mexico’s Progresa/Opportunidades as a CCT model for
social safety net. COPE provides cash transfers to extremely poor and vulnerable
households conditional on certain behaviors of target households. COPE is geared
towards breaking intergenerational transfer of poverty and reducing the vulner-
ability of the core poor in society against existing socioeconomic risks. COPE
targets various poverty proxies, which include female-headed “poor” households;
households headed by aged persons (AHH); households headed by physically
challenged persons; and households headed by special groups such as people
living with AIDS; and other vulnerable groups with school-aged children.
COPE’s target groups are uniquely different from other CCT programs due to
its addition of AHH. It pays a fixed amount per school-aged child to all selected
households on the condition of enrolment and retention of children in basic
education (primary one to junior secondary education). Further conditions
include at least 80 percent school attendance, attendance in life skills and
 Poverty reduction in Bayelsa State of Nigeria 207
vocational training, availability of basic health and sanitation in the community,
participation of children under five in the government’s free immunization
program, and acceptance of the compulsory $47 monthly savings arrangements
for the program via Poverty Reduction Accelerator Investment (PRAI). Against
this backdrop, the study explores people’s perception of a CCT program
in Yenagoa Local Government Area (LGA) of Bayelsa State on the extent to
which the COPE program reduces poverty among aged-headed household
beneficiaries.
Bayelsa State is a prominent state in the oil- and gas-producing Niger-Delta
region. It is a major oil- and gas-producing area contributing to over 30 percent
of Nigeria’s oil production. It has an estimated population of two million people.
Bayelsa is of study interest in relation to poverty reduction because, as Elumi-
lade et al. so aptly put it:

The bulk of the resources Nigeria depend upon come from Niger-Delta
region […] where the country’s foreign exchange is earned […] and yet, the
area has the highest form of marginalisation. The Niger-Delta region is the
breadwinner for Nigeria.13

The study is motivated by an interest in ways to alleviate extreme poverty among

a people, particularly the marginalized and disadvantaged elderly who have been
continually excluded from the Nigerian government’s past poverty reduction
programs. A people “privileged” to have come from a region with abundant
resources are so very deprived. The desire for an end to this embarrassing
paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty motivates this study.14 The rural com-
munities in Bayelsa State provide a test case to assess the extent to which the
Nigerian government poverty reduction strategy via COPE has reduced the high
level of poverty and deprivation among the target group of AHH.

A review of the nature of poverty eradication programs in

Nigeria
Most authors have examined the conceptual and institutional frameworks for
poverty alleviation programs in Nigeria and successive governments’ previous
and current initiatives at poverty alleviation/reduction, their targets, and nature
of intervention.15 Elumilade, Asaolu, and Adereti look at the introduction, organ-
izational structure, and funding of NAPEP in 2002. Shawulu, Adebayo, and
Binbol appraise the impact of the NAPEP’s Capacity Acquisition Program
(CAP) and the Mandatory Attachment Program (MAP) in Jalingo Local Govern-
ment Area of Taraba State, Nigeria, with a view to measuring its success or
failure since 1999 to date.16 The study evaluates the extent to which participants
of a NAPEP’s CAP program say their qualities of life have been improved by
the program. It finds that the program is still far from reaching its objectives.
Poverty-related programs and schemes were ineffective and ineffectual con-
sidering the various resources and efforts invested in them.17 Consequently, the
208 E. Beedie
literature reviewed examines the reasons why past programs failed. The reasons
why targeted poverty alleviation policies and programs have failed include
trickle-down, top-down approaches to the design and implementation of the
program;18 institutional duplicity and rivalry, poor implementation and weak
coordination and monitoring;19 corruption and mismanagement of resources;20
lack of participatory research and development activities;21 and lack of reliable
population figures as a benchmark for planning.22
There were no shortages of recommendations in the literature. Elumilade and
colleagues highlight the need to remove all the impediments that are agents of
poverty in the country, such as corruption, ethnic clashes secession ambition,
and electoral malpractices, that would create a cog in the wheel of the success of
the programs. Ogunleye recommends conducting a reliable and acceptable
census, a back-to-the-land policy, transparency and elimination of corruption,
and making communities the centerpiece of poverty eradication among others
for sustainable poverty alleviation in Nigeria.23
The poverty alleviation measures implemented thus far have focused more on
growth, basic needs, and rural development approaches. There is, therefore, the
need for an institutional framework for poverty alleviation in the country to be
revisited so that a sustainable reduction in poverty incidence will be achieved via
adaptation of a holistic poverty reduction approach.24 Thus, there should be an
agreed-upon poverty reduction agenda that may be used by all stakeholders; a
strong political commitment to the poverty reduction goal; and a “depoliticiza-
tion” of poverty alleviation programs and projects, which should be implemented
within the framework of rapid broad-based economic growth with equity, con-
trolled population growth, sound economic management, and good governance,
among others. In addition, poverty alleviation objectives, strategies, and meas-
ures should be integrated into the country’s overall development/policy manage-
ment framework “in order to make a meaningful dent on poverty.”25

Methodology
The instrument of analysis made use of purposive and random sampling to target
AHH beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries between the ages of 65 and 92, com-
munity leaders, and government officials in Bayelsa State of Nigeria. The total
number of people ideally targeted was 32. However, the total number success-
fully interviewed was 14. Due to the inability of access to all the participants
required within this period, not all the targeted respondents were interviewed.
These limitations occurred due to the ill-health of some of these elderly people,
and several unfulfilled promises to keep appointments by leaders and officials.
Data-collection techniques used are semi-structured interviews and documen-
tary analyses of policy documents relevant to the study which highlighted the
issues that informed the interview questions. The analysis of data collected was
done through a thematically grounded approach covering the four groups of
the sample. Three major themes derived from the questions, and also directly
from the data, emerged that summarized the central issues with a degree of
 Poverty reduction in Bayelsa State of Nigeria 209
consistency among the beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and community leaders.
These themes are: personal definition of and experience of poverty; knowledge
and awareness of COPE; and the impact of COPE. The latter theme is the focus
of this chapter.

The impact of COPE upon AHH beneficiaries

It is apparent from the study that the failure of past poverty reduction programs
to also focus on the target group has exacerbated their deprivation and poverty.
This appears to be worsened by the fact that the traditional “safety net” of the
extended family is ineffective, unreliable, and almost extinct due to economic
migration and the replacement of the concept of the extended family system with
the nuclear family. Participants do not perceive beneficiaries’ poverty to have
been reduced but that COPE has helped them maintain a minimum standard of
living by relieving immediate hardship and suffering, thereby preventing them
from falling any deeper into destitution.
As summed up by NK, a non-beneficiary informant: “They [beneficiaries]
remain the same thing. I don’t see any change at all.” Nevertheless, beneficiaries
are indeed grateful for the program because it gave them a sense of freedom
from the stress of hardship, albeit temporarily. Most non-beneficiaries and bene-
ficiaries of COPE agree that life is good when transfers are received by benefici-
ary households. They are able to buy food, school supplies, and the like. It met
the immediate needs of the household in that moment only, it has no longevity,
neither does it generate any income to sustain the household over time. It is for
their upkeep only and so is not helping them in the long term, let alone reducing
their poverty. The transfer makes them happy but only for a short time.

“The amount received is not enough but I am able to manage my grandchil-

dren and myself.”26

“When immediately they bring the money, I am very happy [but] what can
the money do? It is not much.”27

This notion of temporary relief of hardship is attributable to the size and fre-
quency of the transfer. The heads of participating households are given money
monthly depending on the number of children in the household (Child N1, 500
($10), 2–3 children N3,000 ($20), and four children and above N5,000 ($33),
and N84,000 ($525) investment funds under PRAI’s compulsory savings scheme
representing monthly savings of N7,000 ($47)).28 There is a consensus by all
participants including officials that the transfer amount is too small to have the
desired effect of reducing beneficiaries’ poverty, especially since inflation is not
taken into consideration.
These findings echo the views of many scholars that the transfer amount is
too low to cover households’ minimal needs and bring them above the poverty
line. Fiszbein, Schady, and Ferreira believe that larger transfers lead to greater
210 E. Beedie
impacts upon consumption poverty.29 Devereux argues that “tiny transfers equal
tiny impacts, but moderate transfers can have major impacts […] transfers will
impact on productive investment only if they are large enough also to cover
immediate consumption needs.”30 In addition, Kakwani and Subbarao note that
“to be successful in significantly reducing poverty, any cash transfer program
will need to be sizeable.”31 In fact, older people are still living on way below $2
per day because transfers are not linked to inflation and currency exchange rate
fluctuations.
The elderly are the principal breadwinners and caregivers for their grandchil-
dren, and the conditions for the CCT being factors ensuring immunization and
compulsory schooling for school-aged dependants is a task that could be quite
difficult for these aged guardians. Yet the one elementary need which stands out
for this target group is that of a caretaker. They want to be care receivers, not
givers of care as the program demands. They want to be the focus and an end of
a program not a means to an end. Thus, the aged-headed household beneficiaries
seem to be at the service of COPE rather than being served by COPE. A NAPEP
official states,

“So, in reducing poverty if your child, school child stays in school then it
has assisted us, all of us. Those are the great leaders of tomorrow, and
they’re not in school but on the streets just because of no exercise books or
uniforms, that’s the angle of COPE.”32

Therefore, COPE, just like other poverty reduction programs before it, has not
focused on older people. Instead they are treated as instruments by which a goal
is reached and as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. The
implications of this are the seeming neglect of the majority of older people’s
poverty experiences, not only in Nigeria but throughout the African continent.
For instance, the Social Policy Framework for Africa asserts that older people
are generally recognized to be among the poorest of the poor and are under-
served by public provision of health, education, water, and sanitation.33 However,
given that COPE’s main focus is on human capital development for children,
though it takes years and sometimes a generation to develop, it may be argued
that it is meeting that aim by retaining children in school. Nonetheless, it has not
reduced the poverty of the aged-headed households; it has only positioned the
aged as “a means to secure program objectives.”34 This is a similar disadvantage
as seen with Progresa/Oportunidades, which is the model being used as the basis
for that of Nigeria’s COPE. Just like the women in the Progresa/Oportunidades,
the aged in COPE are treated as instruments by which the goal of child welfare
will be reached, and not for their convenience; they are a means to an end rather
than an end in themselves.
In sum, from the perception of the beneficiaries and most of the participants,
while COPE has succeeded in providing the semblance of a “safety net” by
making little positive impact in the aged-headed household beneficiaries in pro-
viding temporary relief of their hardship, there is no noticeable long-term
 Poverty reduction in Bayelsa State of Nigeria 211
change. In any case, the impact of COPE being short or long term is an area of
disagreement. It is noteworthy that the perception of the impact of COPE as
being short term or long term depends on the understanding of the reason(s) for
targeting and the conditionalities. While the NAPEP believes it is reducing
poverty for the simple reason that children are in “school and not on the street,”
the beneficiaries and other interviewees see it as a relief of immediate hardship.
Bearing in mind the beneficiaries are a dependent group because of their inability
to generate an independent livelihood due to their inability to work, this depend-
ency requires tangible welfarist transfers and social assistance.

Conclusion
From the perception of most of the participants, COPE has not reduced the AHH
beneficiaries’ poverty but has done what Béné, Hersoug, and Allison term
“poverty prevention” which is helping them maintain a minimum standard of
living albeit below a given poverty line and to prevent them from falling any
deeper into destitution.35 It provided them with a temporary relief from hardship.
The AHH beneficiaries seem to be at the service of COPE rather than being
served by COPE. The AHH beneficiaries appear to bear the cost of ensuring
household investment in human capital and allowing long-term economic growth
gains without any apparent benefit to themselves or even necessarily to the
household in the short or longer term. The exclusive focus on human capital
accumulation by the younger generation misses the broader context of poverty
alleviation programs for the target group within rural development. This lack of
focus of past poverty reduction programs on older people tends to exacerbate
their vulnerability and deprivation which morphs into old age poverty
On the whole, the data discussed are specific to the Yenagoa Local Govern-
ment Area of Bayelsa State. Hence the findings are not meant to be representa-
tive of the perception of all COPE AHH beneficiaries on the extent to which
their poverty has been reduced. However, the findings could potentially be
instrumental in the assessment of other areas and also in proposing a better
implementation strategy for COPE in achieving its stated objectives.
One of the most significant recommendations in this analysis is that as an
effective poverty reduction program for the aged, CCT may not be the right
policy tool for those poor older people with or without dependants. Moreover, an
explicit interventionist policy tool should be designed to meet the needs of spe-
cific target groups. COPE or other interventionist programs of government or
international agencies targeted at older people should be geared towards provid-
ing some form of regular social welfare package or safety net with no conditions
such as a social pension in order to minimize poverty in old age.
Furthermore, due to dramatic changes in aging in the developing countries,
there is the need for an urgent redirection and refocus on issues of aging and old
age poverty reduction in Nigeria. There is also the need for the Nigerian govern-
ment to recognize aging as a critical policy challenge that should be addressed
via creating “safety nets” that will protect the present generation over the coming
212 E. Beedie
decades. In addition, government should provide programs for guidance, support,
and care for aging populations which should be reflected in its economic and
social development strategy documents.

Notes
1 The Daily Champion Newspaper editorial, January 20, 2010. Available at http://allaf-
rica.com/stories/201001280540.html (accessed August 2010).
2 Olusesan Sola Ogunleye, “Challenges of Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria.” The Social
Sciences 1, no. 3 (2006): 194–197. Available at www.medwellonline.net/fulltext/
TSS/2006/194-197.pdf (accessed February 25, 2010).
3 See Mike I. Obadan, “Poverty Reduction in Nigeria: The Way Forward.” CBN Eco-
nomic & Financial Review 39, no. 4 (2002); Eric Bboh, “The Poverty Reduction
Strategy in Nigeria.” Third Meeting of the African Learning Group on the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers, UN Economic Commission for Africa 3–5 (2003); UNDP,
Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Results – Nigeria. United Nations
Development Program Evaluation Office (2003); Olugboyega Oyeranti and Kolawole
Olayiwola, “Policies and Programs for Poverty Reduction in Rural Nigeria.” Interim
Research Report submitted to the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC),
Nairobi for the Second Phase Collaborative Poverty Research Project (2005); D.O.
Elumilade, T.O. Asaolu, and S.A. Adereti, “Appraising the Institutional Framework
for Poverty Alleviation Programs in Nigeria.” International Research Journal of
Finance and Economics, 3: 66–77. Available at www.eurojournals.com/finance.htm
(accessed April 21, 2010); and Olusesan Sola Ogunleye, “Challenges of Poverty Alle-
viation in Nigeria.” The Social Sciences 1, no. 3 (2006): 194–197.
4 Fidelis O. Ogwumike and Isabella Aboderin, “Exploring the Links between Old Age
and Poverty in Anglophone West Africa: Evidence from Nigeria and Ghana.” British
Society of Gerontology Generations Review 15, no. 2 (2005): 7–15. Available at
www.ageing.ox.ac.uk/system/files/afran_ogwumike_%2526_aboderin_genrev_apr05
_v15_no_2.pdf (accessed September 10, 2010).
5 Fidelis O. Ogwumike, “An Appraisal of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Nigeria.”
CBN Economic & Financial Review 39, no. 4 (2002): 1–17.
6 Nanak Kakwani and Kalanidhi Subbarao, “Aging and Poverty in Africa and the Role
of Social Pensions.” Social Protection Discussion Paper 0521 (2005), The World
Bank, Washington, DC.
7 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Help Age International (2012).
“Ageing in the Twenty-first Century: A Celebration and a Challenge.” Available at
http://unfpa. Org/ageing report.
8 Ogwumike and Aboderin, “Exploring the Links between Old Age and Poverty in
Anglophone West Africa.”
9 Help Age International (2013). Global Age Watch Index Report. Available at www.
helpage.org/global-agewatch/reports/global-agewatch-index-2013-insight-report-
summary-and-methodology (accessed January, 15, 2014).
10 Vandana Desai and Mathew Tye, “Critically Understanding Asian Perspectives on
Ageing.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 5 (2009): 1007–1025.
11 National Poverty Eradication Program, COPE: In Care of the People. The Presidency,
Abuja, Nigeria (2007).
12 Ibid.
13 Elumilade et al., “Appraising the Institutional Framework for Poverty Alleviation
Programs in Nigeria.”
14 World Bank, Nigeria: Poverty in the Midst of Plenty the Challenge of Growth with
Inclusion. A World Bank Poverty Assessment, May 31, 1996. Population and Human
 Poverty reduction in Bayelsa State of Nigeria 213
Resources Division, Western Africa Department, Africa Region. Available at www.
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/05/31/000009265_39
61029235646/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (accessed November 12, 2011).
15 Obadan, “Poverty Reduction in Nigeria: The Way Forward”; Ogwumike, “An
Appraisal of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Nigeria”; Bboh, “The Poverty Reduction
Strategy in Nigeria”; Oyeranti and Olayiwola, “Policies and Programs for Poverty
Reduction in Rural Nigeria”; Elumilade et al., “Appraising the Institutional Frame-
work for Poverty Alleviation Programs in Nigeria”; Ogunleye, “Challenges of Poverty
Alleviation in Nigeria.”
16 H.M. Shawulu, A.A. Adebayo, and N.L. Binbol, “Appraisal of the National Poverty
Eradication Program (NAPEP) in Jalingo LGA, Taraba State, Nigeria.” The Social
Sciences 3, no. 4 (2008): 291–296. Available at www.medwelljournals.com/fulltext/
TSS/2008/291-296.pdf (accessed February, 25, 2010).
17 Obadan, “Poverty Reduction in Nigeria: The Way Forward.”
18 Bboh, “The Poverty Reduction Strategy in Nigeria”; Oyeranti and Olayiwola,
“Policies and Programs for Poverty Reduction in Rural Nigeria”; Elumilade et al.,
“Appraising the Institutional Framework for Poverty Alleviation Programs in
Nigeria”; and Shawulu et al., “Appraisal of the National Poverty Eradication Program
(NAPEP) in Jalingo LGA.”
19 World Bank, “Nigeria: Poverty in the Midst of Plenty”; National Poverty Eradication
Program; COPE: In Care of the People; Bboh, “The Poverty Reduction Strategy in
Nigeria”; and Elumilade et al., “Appraising the Institutional Framework for Poverty
Alleviation Programmes in Nigeria.”
20 Ogunleye, “Challenges of Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria”; and Elumilade et al.,
“Appraising the Institutional Framework for Poverty Alleviation Programs in
Nigeria.”
21 O. Oyesanmi, F. Eboiyehi, and A. Adereti, “Evaluation of the Concepts, Implementa-
tion and Impact of Poverty Alleviation Programs in Nigeria” (2005). Available at
http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=50613 (accessed May
12, 2010).
22 Ogunleye, “Challenges of Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria.”
23 Ogunleye, “Challenges of Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria”; and Elumilade et al.,
“Appraising the Institutional Framework for Poverty Alleviation Programs in
Nigeria.”
24 Ogwumike, “An Appraisal of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Nigeria.”
25 Obadan, “Poverty Reduction in Nigeria: The Way Forward.”
26 DN, COPE beneficiary.
27 WU, COPE beneficiary.
28 National Poverty Eradication Program, COPE: In Care of the People.
29 Ariel Fiszbein, Norbert Rüdiger Schady, and Francisco H.G. Ferreira, Conditional
Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. The World Bank Policy
Research Report (2006), Washington, DC. Available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR CCT_web_noembargo.
pdf (accessed May 20, 2010).
30 Stephen Devereux, “Can Social Safety Nets Reduce Chronic Poverty?” Development
Policy Review 20, no. 5 (2002): 657–675.
31 Kakwani and Subbarao, “Aging and Poverty in Africa and the Role of Social Pensions
Social.”
32 A NAPEP official.
33 African Union, “Social Policy Framework for Africa.” First Session of African Union
Ministers in Charge of Social Development (2008). Available at www.africa-union.
org/root/ua/conferences/2008/oct/sa/2731oct/final%20spfa_%20final%20version_20%
20june2008.doc.
214 E. Beedie
34 Maxine Molyneux, “Mothers at the Service of the New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/
Oportunidades, Mexico’s Conditional Transfer Programme.” Social Policy & Admin-
istration 40, no. 4 (2006): 425–449, at 439.
35 Christophe Béné, Bjørn Hersoug, and Edward H. Allison; “Not by Rent Alone:
Analysing the Pro-poor Functions of Small-scale Fisheries in Developing Countries.”
Development Policy Review 28, no. 3 (2010): 325–358.
13 A comparative analysis of
incidence of poverty in three
urban centers in Ghana from
1945 to 1990
Wilhelmina J. Donkoh

Introduction
The social surveys focused principally on sociological data collection for the
present analysis are geared towards the better regulation and structure of the
colonial and postcolonial town.1 The late colonial period has been characterized
as the era of the “great social surveys” in Africa.2 Colonial authorities employed
surveys or social inquiries to collect facts about specific societies. By the 1940s,
colonial authorities had become firmly entrenched in their areas of jurisdiction
and, therefore, were compelled to grapple with the developmental problems of
their colonized peoples, who had also become challenges for them.3 The period,
among other things, was characterized by dramatic but unstable population
growth that resulted principally from migration into the urban centers where it
was anticipated that one could have a better quality of life. It was further antici-
pated that living in urban areas would expose one to the sophisticated culture
there, which would eventually facilitate the attainment of higher social status.
Barbara Ward, writing on Ghana’s economic assets in the 1950s, aptly captured
this trend when she commented:

The second argument for [economic] expansion is that the aspirations of the
people of the Gold Coast have been aroused to share abundantly in the good
things of modern civilization – in better health, better schools, [and] better
opportunities of all sorts. But none of this expanded welfare can come from
a static economy. Wealth must be increased so that welfare becomes
possible.4

The colonial authorities needed facts and figures for the formulation of informed
policies for effective governance and development of their various areas of juris-
diction. This was also the period when new social and economic forces became
firmly entrenched as critical factors around which change circulated. These
included formal education and “modern” economic opportunities, for instance,
paid work that would enable them to earn money as individuals, and access
to social amenities such as potable water and electricity that would enhance
their quality of life. In colonial Ghana (then the Gold Coast), three major surveys
216 W.J. Donkoh
conducted there focused on Asante (including Kumase), Sekondi-Takoradi, and
Accra.5 The surveys highlighted the systemic weaknesses and problems that pre-
vailed in the urban centers at the time.6
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of poverty in three urban centers
in southern Ghana – Kumase, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Accra – from 1945 when
Meyer Fortes and his team commenced the Ashanti Social Survey, to1990 during
which the first phase of the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was initiated.7 Among other things, the chapter exam-
ines urban poverty and change and the forces that mediated it and how urban
cultures emerged. The chapter clarifies what poverty means and addresses the
following questions: What were the principal causes of urbanization and poverty
in Ghana during the period under study? How did people access what the cities
offered, and who mediated the process? It also explores the relationship between
such dominant phenomena as underemployment/unemployment, housing, health,
and diet in the period under study against a background of poverty.
The nature of poverty is complex and its causes are diverse, but it may be
roughly described as a lack of access to essential goods, services, assets, credits,
and opportunities to which every human being should be entitled. According to
Ben Ofosu-Appiah, “Poverty is an unacceptable human condition that needs
to be addressed at all cost,” and freedom from hunger should be a universal right
to enable all human beings to live in peace while having “access to basic educa-
tion and primary health care.”8 Arguably, individuals and societies that are poor
tend to remain so if they are not empowered to participate in the decisions that
shape their lives. Today, the World Bank defines extreme poverty as subsisting
on an income of less than $1.25 a day and explains that such households cannot
meet the basic needs for survival.9 They are chronically hungry and are unable to
get healthcare, safe drinking water or sanitation, and affordable education for
their children. They sometimes lack rudimentary shelter and basic articles of
clothing like shoes.
However, this definition, particularly the monetary value, is not entirely
tenable for the entire period covered in this chapter. For example, although the
formal banking sector was underdeveloped and generally inaccessible to the
indigenous people, there were alternate credit facilities for the poor. These
included indigenous money lending and traditional cooperative saving schemes
like the “susu” that were sourced for funding expensive projects.10 What was
true was that many urbanites lacked access to good drinking water and primary
healthcare while many school-aged children were not in school.11 The latter was
because either parents could not afford to send them to school or they did not
appreciate the social and cultural implications of such training.
Who constitutes the poor in Ghana is determined by both economic and social
indicators. According to Nii K. Sowa, they could be identified by using such
approaches as income expenditures, the quantity of calories taken in, level of
dignity, freedom from harassment, and level of security.12 He observed that poor
people tended to live in a state of physical and material deprivation expressed in
lack of income, resources, and assets. They also tended to be physically weak
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 217
and lacked strength due to such factors as malnutrition, sickness, and disability.
In addition, they often lacked access to education and resources so that illiteracy
tended to be high among them while they inhabited peripheral locations, were
marginalized, and discriminated against. Often they lacked the ability and capa-
city to change their situation and seemed to be caught in a perpetual cycle of
powerlessness and vulnerability. They also suffered most from such calamities
as climatic changes, conflict, disability, seasonal fluctuations, and war. Sowa
noted the escalating incidence of poverty in Ghana and commented that “the
number of people living below the poverty line increased from an average of
between 30 and 35% in the late 1970s to a range of 45–50% in the mid 1980s.”13

Demographic and urban change in Ghana, 1945 to 1990

A major feature of colonial Ghana was urbanization or the process of becoming
urban. The definition of urban varies between nations. The Demographia World
Urban Areas defines an urban area as a “continuously built up land mass of
urban development that is within a labor market.”14 In Ghana, urban areas refer
to settlements that have a minimum of 5,000 people and such characteristics as
heterogeneity with a minority agrarian/fishing population.15 By 1948, about 13.9
percent of Ghana’s population lived in urban areas, including Accra, Kumase,
and Sekondi-Takoradi.16 The three settlements examined in this chapter were
selected because they were among the most urbanized, modernized, largest, and
the most important among the 41 urban centers in Ghana by 1948. The develop-
ment of new suburbs to absorb the rapidly expanding population resulting from
migration and urbanization characterized the period under study. Among the
new suburbs were Nima, Accra New Town, Asylum Down, Tesano, and Madina
in Accra; New Tafo, Atonsu, Aboabo, Sabo-Zongo, and Sawaba in Kumase; and
Kwesimintsim, Kweikuma, and Efia Nkwanta and Asikafoambantem in Sekondi-
Takoradi. Rapid population growth – both by natural increase and resulting from
migration – was a general concern, particularly in the three urban areas under
study. Barbara Ward Jackson identified this concern when she observed,
“Another dynamic factor in the [Ghanaian] economy is the birthrate. Not far
short of half a million people have been added to the population of the Gold
Coast in the last six years, and the pressure is steadily mounting.”17
All three urban centers covered in this chapter developed as heterogeneous
spaces that drew in both local and international populations. The migrant popu-
lations in these urban centers were drawn from three principal sources: rural
areas in southern Ghana, the Northern Territories, and neighboring West African
countries.18 Ward further identified absolute poverty as one of the major prob-
lems confronting Ghana.19 Deplorable conditions of living were marked by
poverty, disease, and poor housing conditions among many urbanites. It was also
observed that a pattern of uneven development evolved due to unequal training
and exposure, which resulted in unequal earning capacity. Those with higher
levels of formal education and artisanal skills tended to secure jobs that were
more permanent and to earn better incomes.20 These problems unduly impacted
218 W.J. Donkoh
government policy space and perpetuated a proliferation of conflicting internal
cultural practices and norms. The physical growth of these urban centers was
due partly to their “capacity to provide such perceived urban resources as potable
water, education, health facilities, housing, transport, sanitation, and water.”21
Collectively, the three cities have played unique roles in Ghana’s evolution as
a modern state. Accra, for example, has a long history of being a commercial
hub in maritime trade with Europeans.22 From 1877, it became the capital of
Ghana and evolved into an administrative and commercial nerve center. It
became the most urbanized, cosmopolitan, and modernized Ghanaian city during
the period under study. The harbor enhanced Accra’s importance, as it served as
a major transit point for exports and imports. Most of the European commercial
firms sited their headquarters in Accra because it was the hub of government
agencies and departments. Similarly, Kumase, the Asante capital, was strategi-
cally located and was a magnetic pull for immigrants because of its proximity to
most of the natural resources that laid the foundation of the modern Ghanaian
economy.23 Kumase developed into a major inland commercial center endowed
with significant cultural importance where all major trade routes from the north,
the forest zone, and the coast converged.24 By the late colonial period, Kumase
was second to Accra in terms of land area, population size, social life, and eco-
nomic activity. It also played a pivotal role in the vast and profitable distribution
of goods in the country and beyond.25 Sekondi-Takoradi, in 1946, is also of his-
toric importance.
The commercial importance of Sekondi, the older of the two settlements,
dates back to the eighteenth century when several European maritime powers
competed to establish trading bases there, and by the nineteenth century concur-
rently hosted the Dutch and the English.26 Sekondi gained renewed importance
when the first railroad into the hinterland was constructed in 1903 for transport-
ing export commodities including minerals, timber, and cocoa to the harbor.
Takoradi started as a small fishing village but when the first deep-water seaport
in Ghana was built there in 1928 its status became more enhanced and it
developed into one of the most important gateways for international commerce
and travel. The twin towns further developed as industrial and commercial
centers specializing in such industries as timber, plywood, shipbuilding, and
railway repair. During World War II, the Takoradi Base became an important
staging point for British aircrafts flying on missions to such destinations as
Egypt.27 These functions attracted large migrant populations and gained
considerable international cultural influence. By 1945, it was the third-largest
city in Ghana.28
The three cities’ spaces were planned. Planning commenced in Kumase in
1924, Accra in the 1940s, and Sekondi-Takoradi in 1963. Kumase provides an
interesting example that may be compared to development in Accra and
Sekondi-Takoradi. The team that carried out the Ashanti Survey, for example,
reported that by 1946, one could view Kumase from three perspectives: as the
capital of a traditional state, a commercial center, or a colonial administrative
center with several modern amenities accommodating the very small presence of
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 219
Europeans as well as African public servants.29 It also included Christian mission
workers and employees of mercantile firms.
Most Africans lived in densely populated areas with fewer social amenities.
In Accra too, despite the façade of urbanity, there were pockets found within
such areas as La, Osu, and Ga Mashie that were predominantly indigenous and
lacked modern amenities, while areas like Ridge, Cantonments, and Labone
were developed and well served with social amenities and infrastructure. A
similar image could be found in Sekondi-Takoradi where junior public sector
employees, including railway and port workers, lived in suburbs like Kojokrom,
Kwesimintsim, and Anargi, while the business community dominated such areas
as the Market Circle, and senior public servants and management of the mercan-
tile firms lived in the Ridge area. This image of multi-layered and heterogeneous
urban spaces draws attention to the character of these centers as areas where
there evolved a unique culture that was not fully replicated elsewhere in Ghana.
In 1945, for example, the population of Kumase was estimated at 70,000 of
which over 50 percent were non-Asante.30 The large immigrant population was
marked out by specialized economic activities. While the few Europeans living
in Kumase were engaged as public servants, Christian mission workers, and
businessmen, there was also the Levantine community of Syrians, Lebanese, and
Jews who were predominantly traders. The approximately 2,000 to 4,000 indi-
genous people from the Northern Territories and neighboring Francophone coun-
tries generally operated as temporary laborers, while the Yoruba engaged in such
ventures as barbering and petty trading that required very little capital outlay.31
Coastal settlers, including the Ewe, Fante, and Ga, worked either as artisans/
craftsmen or clerks. Acquah also observed that there were considerable demo-
graphic changes in Accra in the 1950s. The population rose from 135,926 in
1948 to 192,047 in 1954. In 1948, 51.6 percent of the 133,192 Africans living in
Accra were indigenous Ga.32 The female Ga population in urban Accra out-
numbered their male counterparts. The population also included nationals from
other parts of Africa, including Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and French West
Africa.
The urban population shifted to 23 percent in 1960, increased to 28.9 percent
in 1970, and to 31.3 percent by 1984.33 Accra’s population, for example, grew at
an annual rate of 5.1 9 percent between 1960 (364,719) and 1970 (617,415), and
3.1 percent between 1970 and 1984 (956,157). An important offshoot of this
state of affairs was the development of such socioeconomic challenges as life-
style and health-related issues, including underemployment/unemployment, diet,
stress, crime, and violence. These developments occurred against a background
of heterogeneity that was sharply marked by the dual heritage of indigenous and
Westernized cultures. The main consequence of rapid population growth in the
selected areas was poverty, which manifested in the form of unemployment,
environmental degradation, low standard of living, large family size, and low
income.
In addition, other social problems including homelessness and high rental
charges gradually crept in and, by the 1980s, had become major concerns in
220 W.J. Donkoh
these centers.34 The rapid urbanization and the associated growth in poverty par-
ticularly since the late 1970s resulted in the publication of several detailed
studies of changes in social conditions that covered population growth, health,
and disease.35 In Accra, for example, between the periods 1948 to 1960 and 1960
to 1970, it was recorded that the contribution of net migration into Accra was
97.7 percent and 66.1 percent, respectively. After 1970 the trend changed and
natural increase became higher than net migration. Between 1970 and 1984
natural increase accounted for 82.6 percent, while net migration was only 17.4
percent for natural increase.36
Similar trends, although at different intensities, occurred in Kumase and
Sekondi-Takoradi. The decline was partly because by 1984 the areas recognized
as Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi excluded segments of the actual urban-
ized areas that fell outside the statutory boundaries as defined politically and for
planning purposes. This wider urban expansion and integration was particularly
noticeable along the principal transportation arteries radiating from the centers
of Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi. Despite the seeming homogeneity that
characterized the composition of the population of these urban centers, there
were clear differentiations along ethnic, social, and occupational lines. Social
dealings across the racial, economic, and political divide were kept to a
minimum. Thus it was documented that:

The different parts of Kumasi mostly meet only in terms of their com-
plementary economic interests and politico-legal roles, though there is a
good deal of friendly personal intercourse between official Kumasi and
commercial Kumasi, and some between these and Ashanti Kumasi. But
there is practically none between Ashanti Kumasi and the foreign African
and other than Coast people.37

As late as 2006, the geographical pattern of development in these urban centers

had not changed since the colonial period.38 The 2006 State of the Ghanaian
Economy Report by the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
(ISSER) stated:

For Accra and Kumasi, the large influx of migrants has become a major
burden. The negative effects include over-crowding, shantytowns, pollution
and large numbers of hawkers. When housing and public services do not meet
the needs of many urban residents, their health and wellbeing are at risk.39

The report added: “A look at the share in urban growth of the 15 largest urban
centers in 1970–2000 shows most of such growth occurred in Accra and
Kumasi.”40 This is an indication that there had been very little change in the
urban situation over the past 50 years. The spatial pattern largely reflects post-
independence economic policies that created industrial clusters in the three core
urban centers of Accra-Tema, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi which have legiti-
mized colonial trade and development patterns.41
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 221
Forces of change in the urban setting and construction of
urban cultures
Several forces mediated change in the three identified urban centers. These
included the structure and regulation by government under different regimes and
ecological, economic, and socio-psychological factors. Three regulation regimes
operated within the three cities covered in this chapter. There was the central
government which formulated national policies that had implications for the
cities. On the local scene, town/municipal/city councils operated alongside the
traditional authorities, popularly referred to as chiefs. Urban regulation was
important because many residents were not indigenous and required permission
to access land and authorization to determine the type of houses that could be
built. In addition, as the population increased, regulations were required to
administer such matters as refuse disposal and construction of drainage to avoid
environmental degradation problems like erosion. The implication at the indi-
vidual level was that in relative terms, ordinary people enjoyed an enhanced
quality of life because they could access such imported commodities as galva-
nized iron roofing sheets and kerosene, while provision of healthcare and educa-
tion became more readily available.42 Socially, the dual heritage comprising the
indigenous and Western worldviews that had characterized the lifestyle of a
select coastal group became a more widespread phenomenon. The infrastructural
development, including roads, railways, and other communication networks, was
required to facilitate exploitation of the natural resources of Ghana. Employment
openings in these sectors became the means of drawing large numbers of eco-
nomic and social opportunity seekers into these urban centers.43 Generally, the
road and railway networks were constructed to link the production areas of raw
materials to the urban centers of Kumase, the entrepôt, as well as Accra and
Sekondi-Takoradi where the maritime ports were located. Construction of rail-
roads through the thick forest stimulated cash crop production that was evacu-
ated to the coastal ports of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi and widened access to
the cash economy in the three urban centers. This development impacted the cul-
tural outlook in the urban centers, especially Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-
Takoradi.44 The new economic opportunities that opened up in these urban
centers became a pull factor for large numbers of people in search of jobs and
the fascination of the urban experience. Geo-political factors also contributed to
the status of Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi as increasingly cosmopol-
itan cities.45
Urban culture in the three colonial centers was a hybridization of indigenous
practices and Western norms that were sometimes flavored by the cultural prac-
tices of dominant African immigrant groups. The three urban centers were linked
directly or indirectly with all parts of the country and the rest of the world by
modern means of communication. Consequently, they were much affected by
world events, ideas, and policies. The urban culture in Kumase, for example,
evolved around its status as the Asante cultural capital combined with its
position as a commercial and colonial administrative center. These qualities
222 W.J. Donkoh
functioned collectively as a magnet that drew in a large number of non-
indigenous populations. Similarly, the urban cultures in Accra and Sekondi-
Takoradi evolved around such factors as influences from the influx of
non-indigenous peoples intermixed with the local population.
A striking difference, though, particularly in Sekondi-Takoradi, was the influ-
ence of the harbor and the railways. One cannot overlook factors underpinning
the emergence of urban culture and modernity in the three centers.46 The
majority of the urban Accra population was employed either by government or
by the commercial firms, while traditional occupations like fishing and agricul-
ture declined in importance.47 They wore Western-style clothing to work and for
other formal occasions such as church attendance. The same could be said for
their counterparts in both Kumase and Sekondi-Takoradi. Urban residence
implied a radical departure from the “traditional” values to which most of the
urban migrants were accustomed. They often adopted a completely new way of
thinking. In the three centers, kinship ties transcended the traditional boundaries
and incorporated social relations emanating from such common interests as
shared residence, occupation, and religious affiliation. Migrants in the urban
setting were compelled to reconsider their social networks and above all their
general worldview. Roche’s comparison between teaching Western economics
to Africans and bush clearing could be extended to how migrant urban dwellers
in the late colonial period envisioned their new lives. In both instances, it was
necessary to shift radically from the “traditional” values to which they were
accustomed as Africans and to adopt a new way of evaluating and appreciating
situations.48
The general assumption was that, socially, an unwritten code of discrimination
operated in such spheres as housing, healthcare, and employment opportunities in
the urban centers.49 One such review from the nationalist perspective stated:

Ghanaians were considered inferior and thus lived in slums, shanty areas
and were poorly paid while their European counterparts lived in well-
furnished buildings in highly-developed residential areas. The provision of
health-care for Ghanaians was no better as Europeans had their own hos-
pitals and most Ghanaians relied on self-medication and the use of herbs.50

In reality, it was not as simple as was observed in Kumase. The social mix and
spatial aggregation of the Kumase population was quite complex. It was
observed that:

Geography and social structure go together and it is not only a matter of

race. African civil servants live on the ridge, some European business men
live in the crowded, polyglot commercial town, with its Syrian traders,
Yoruba barbers and petty traders, Ewe artisans and craftsmen, Fanti and Ga
clerks, Mossi laborers and Hausa market traders – not to speak of the
women street traders of all tribes and the rich Ashanti middlemen and
money lenders, the street lawyers and the lorry-drivers.51
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 223
Contrary to rigid segregation along racial lines, such important considerations as
the type of work and for whom a person worked mediated where they lived. The
ridge areas usually situated on higher ground were designated originally as
special residential zones for British colonial officers in the urban centers. The
mercantile firms also built houses on the ridges for their expatriate personnel.
The objective was to segregate the expatriates from the general African popula-
tion as a response to the erroneous idea that such diseases as malaria and yellow
fever were endemic in Africans, who as vectors transmitted the diseases to non-
carriers.52
In reality, the resident population of these areas was always multiracial, since
domestic workers for the officers as well as a select group of senior African offi-
cials lived there. Besides, by the 1940s this view had long changed. Segregated
living was no longer the norm. The houses on the ridges became duty posts for
housing whoever held the office. With the introduction of the Africanization
policy, more indigenous people moved up to occupy the top positions previously
reserved for Europeans. They also occupied automatically the residences that
went with their new positions. Over time, the ridge areas became associated with
high social status and sophistication.
From the 1950s, more private Ghanaians who had the means but were associ-
ated with neither government nor the European trading firms acquired property
in those areas and moved there. Regarding healthcare, from the time the first
civil colonial hospital was built in Accra, the objective was to attend to the
medical needs of expatriates and public sector employees and their dependants.
Health facilities for Africans were few but there was also the critical factor that
the indigenous people were often suspicious of Western medicine and preferred
to use such traditional medication as herbs and faith healing. How did people
access what the cities offered and who mediated the process?

A focus on selected urban phenomena: poverty, health,

housing, and diet
The colonial authorities sought to create an economic system that would pre-
serve Ghana as a source of raw materials for British industries and as a market
for their manufactured products. Thus, they formulated policies that made
farmers concentrate on the cultivation of such cash crops as cocoa. There was
little diversification in the economy, and secondary industries for manufacturing
such basic commodities as soap, candles, and textiles were discouraged. The
expatriate firms saw such ventures as competition that was likely to reduce their
profits. The retail sector, too, as confirmed in Sir Cecil Trevor’s 1951 report, was
dominated by Indian and Levantine traders, including Syrians, Lebanese, and
Jews, while the banking sector was virtually controlled by European companies
that distrusted the African.53
The implication was that in the urban centers there were few employment
opportunities in the manufacturing sector and little room for Africans to operate
as large-scale retailers. Many people in the three urban centers worked in the
224 W.J. Donkoh
informal sector and often had more than one source of livelihood. In Kumase,
for example, cocoa farming was a major source of secondary income for most of
the wealthier Asante.54 They often engaged in trading and money lending as
well. This category of people included both males and females. One of the
richest money lenders in Kumase in the late colonial period was one Maame
Kunkuma, a native of Dida in the Atwima District who owned several houses in
the central business area of the town.55
The large number of job-seeking migrants often had to resort to innovative
ways to earn a living. One such situation was the peculiar relationship that
developed between male domestic hands of the expatriates and unemployed
African females who developed sexual relations with the expatriates.56 Prostitu-
tion, one of the social conditions related to earning a living in the three urban
centers, resulted, due partly to the fact that there were fewer formal employment
openings for women than for men. Apart from the few who worked in the formal
sector as secretaries, clerks, and telephonists, most women were either engaged
as homemakers or in such areas as petty trading in the informal sector. Often the
wives and dependants of clerks, the teachers, and mission workers, who could be
classified as culture vectors, in all three centers tended to be non-earners, devot-
ing much of their time to homemaking. Where they earned an income, they
tended to engage in such home-based occupations as baking, dressmaking, and
trading. Traditional practice and customary laws allowed women, both married
and unmarried, to earn and use their own incomes freely, just like their male
counterparts.57
However, some women found it more profitable to earn their living by engag-
ing in prostitution or maintaining regular patrons principally from the migrant
male populations who were either single or living in Ghana alone away from
their wives.58 These included Africans, Europeans, Indians, Lebanese, and
Syrians. The majority of these women were migrants to the cities in which they
operated and often had low or no education. They manifested a deterioration of
sexual morality because they openly plied their trade without fear of criticism.59
Generally, these women did well economically and some even acquired landed
property through their trade and supported other relatives financially. In these
urban areas, as Emmerij generalized, “one can observe […] problems […] char-
acterized by growing inequalities, dualism and in formalization.”60 Barbara Ward
Jackson confirmed this observation with the assertion that:

There can be no doubt that the chief need of the Gold Coast economy is
expansion. There is in the first place, the problem of absolute poverty. With
a per capita national income of about £35, the Gold Coast […] is infinitely
remote from other small agricultural communities […] not falling far short
of £1,000 per year per head.61

This may be explained by the fact that poverty and marginality became struc-
tural and was compounded by other emerging problems. Generally within the
informal sector there was considerable occupational mobility, as both males and
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 225
females turned to occupations which required either little capital outlay or spe-
cialist skills.
Several attempts were made to address the problem of urban poverty by
embarking on projects aimed at sustaining basic services to the poor.62 These
included the provision of good drinking water, electricity, primary healthcare
programs, and the development of human capital by encouraging children to go
to school and stay in school. Successive post-independence governments intro-
duced such targeted interventions as micro-credit financing to help people set up
or expand and improve their own businesses to boost employment in the urban
areas. At the time of independence in 1957 Ghana had a positive external
balance, and the socialist-inclined Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government
introduced the “Work and Happiness Program” to create more job openings in
the various state-owned corporations that were set up and also embarked on an
extensive industrialization program, including the establishment of the Industrial
Development Corporation (IDC) and the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation
(GIHOC). These were aimed at reducing dependence on foreign imports. A
major effect of these policies was massive migration from the rural areas into the
urban centers, particularly Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi where most of
the industries and corporations were set up. For instance, the headquarters of
most of the state-owned companies were based in Accra. In addition, several
companies, including the Steel Works, Fan Milk, and Ghana National Trading
Corporation (GNTC) Bottling Company were sited at the specifically created
Accra Industrial Area while others like GIHOC Pharmaceuticals were sited in
more auspicious locations such as Achimota. The Nsawam Cannery Company
sited a few miles outside Accra also drew upon labor from the capital city.
Prominent among the state-owned companies in Kumase were the Jute Factory,
Shoe Factory, and a branch of the GNTC Bottling Company, all located at the
Ahensan Light Industrial Area. Among the state-owned companies in Sekondi-
Takoradi were the Sekondi Boatyard, the Chapter Convention Company, the
Chocolate Factory, and the Railway Corporation with its “Loco” Department
that engaged in engineering manufacturing.63
Barely a decade after independence, the Ghanaian economy went into a reces-
sion that lasted for over two decades with brief periods of relief. By the mid-
1960s the national coffers were depleted, due mainly to intense development
programs of the CPP government. Projects undertaken included the establish-
ment of academic institutions at all levels, infrastructural development, and
industrialization against a background of declining cocoa prices on the inter-
national market. Exports, particularly cocoa, dropped both in volume and value
below levels achieved in the 1950s, while the population increased at a very
rapid rate. Foreign exchange became constricted and imports severely con-
tracted. The Ghanaian economy was experiencing severe shortages of consumer
goods and exhaustion of foreign reserves. The government was compelled to
access foreign loans and investments to continue its projects. Nkrumah’s dreams
of modernization and social engineering ended abruptly in February 1966 when
he was overthrown in a coup d’état organized by the National Liberation Council
226 W.J. Donkoh
(NLC). The NLC government and the Progress Party (PP) administration that
succeeded it were critical of the earlier pro-state-owned policy. Although neither
administration phased out the state-owned corporations, they encouraged and
promoted the private sector to create more jobs to supplement government’s
efforts while they initiated the divestiture process. However, they continued the
process of foreign borrowing to the extent that by 1972 there was a huge exter-
nal debt. By the 1970s, Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi like other cities
in Africa “were increasingly being perceived to be centers of poverty and social
deprivation compared to their earlier position as places of accumulated wealth
and prosperity.”64
The PP government introduced small-scale business loans to empower local
entrepreneurs. It further introduced the Aliens Compliance Order (ACO) in 1970
to ensure indigenous control over the small business sector of the economy. The
ACO sought to prohibit non-Ghanaian participation in identified sectors of the
economy, including petty trading and other non-skilled services. The ultimate
objective was that the ACO would enhance economic opportunities and thus
fight poverty while increasing spending power. It opened up new employment
opportunities for Ghanaians, particularly in the three largest urban centers. This
period marked the genesis of the urban phenomenon known in Ghana today as
“paa o paa” (laborers oh laborers) and “kayayoo” (female porter) or “kayayee”
(female porters), which are all terms for porters. Hitherto, this field was domi-
nated by immigrants from Francophone countries but for the first time large
numbers of Ghanaians moved into these cities to offer their services as porters
because this sector required minimal capital investment, and no skills or refer-
ences. The nature of the job was also such that they did not have to dress smartly
and they could afford to sleep rough. Initially, the service was male dominated
but, over time, more females, the “kayayee,” entered the field. Many of the
service providers in this sector suffered from characteristics attributed to the
impoverished. Admittedly, some, through prudent management, entrepreneurial
acumen, and even luck, managed to do well.65
In 1972, the National Redemption Council (NRC) military government
replaced the PP administration. It introduced policies based on self-reliance that
had poverty and economic empowerment implications. The first dealt with
national external debt management. The NRC government’s position was a unilat-
eral repudiation of the nation’s international debts. The second, code-named
Operation Feed Yourself (OFY), was a national call for people to engage in agri-
culture to supplement their incomes. The implication of the external debt manage-
ment was that the government was denied further credit, so it was compelled to
finance imports up front. Liquidity became a serious problem, resulting in acute
shortfalls in imported goods, which were labeled “essential commodities.”66 Those
most affected by the regime of a harsh economic environment included the urban
poor who lived on low wages and salaries, did not engage much in subsistent agri-
culture, but who had acquired a taste for imported and manufactured foods.
From the mid-1970s, workers in the formal sector, particularly wage earners,
saw the real value of their incomes eroding. Many took on second and third jobs,
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 227
especially in trading. Huge profits were made by those who knew people in influ-
ential positions who could give them chits to collect “essential commodities.” The
chits could be exchanged for cash at a much higher price than originally paid for.
Some acted as front men for influential people. Through such activities people
with little or no training who branded themselves as “businessmen” were able to
amass wealth. The economics of scarcity continued through to 1979 in the tenures
of the Supreme Military Government (SMC I and II), which were the reconsti-
tuted successors to the NRC. The situation worsened during the three-month rule
of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Under the regime of the
Peoples National Party (PNP) (September 1979 to December 1981) there was a
slight reprieve. The Peoples National Defense Council (PNDC) military govern-
ment that took over the administration of the country from January 1982 was ini-
tially ideologically opposed to the Breton Wood Institutions and therefore
continued to promote the policy of self-reliance.
Scarcity of almost every conceivable item – food, raw materials, and medi-
cines – persisted in the first two years of PNDC rule. Although all indicators
pointed to severe prevalence of poverty in Ghana, there were no data on poverty
in the pre-Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) period in Ghana. Inflation
soared and imbalances in both the domestic and external accounts became a
characteristic feature. By 1983, the country was at once combating inflation,
which was running at 123 percent, and a declining output at an average of about
1 percent per annum. There were shortages of almost every conceivable item:
food, raw materials, and even water. The country’s economic plight was
worsened further when, in the midst of severe drought, widespread bush fires,
and acute famine, nearly a million Ghanaians were repatriated from Nigeria.67
Once in Ghana, most of the returnees who had lived and worked in Nigerian
urban settings chose to remain in urban areas rather than return to their home
towns. In fact, most of them elected to stay in Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-
Takoradi for various reasons, including ease of finding the types of jobs they had
engaged in while residing in Nigeria and to enhance their chances of processing
their travel documents for traveling outside again. Many working groups, includ-
ing highly skilled personnel such as doctors, university lecturers, and organized
labor under the Trade Union Congress (TUC), went on strike demanding pay
increases and enhanced conditions of service.
The international community’s attention was drawn to the country. Increased
spending on anti-poverty measures such as strengthening the educational system,
investing in infrastructure, housing, nutrition, and healthcare were resorted to as
solutions to urban poverty and unemployment. However, efforts in this direction
were unsuccessful owing to corruption and mismanagement. The Ghanaian bur-
eaucracy at the time was described as corrupt. The Government of Ghana
adopted an Economic Recovery Program supported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF ) and the World Bank in April 1983, to stem the decline in
the country’s economy. The program dealt with macro-economic stabilization
measures, including fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. It also dealt
with liberalization of prices and restructuring of the public and financial sectors.
228 W.J. Donkoh
By the 1990s, the problem of dualism and inequalities had become so pro-
nounced that it was observed that a dominant characteristic of the twenty-first
century would be affluence and poverty competing for space in the urban
environment.68 Writers like Rimmer argued that one of the major problems
affecting urban centers, including Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi, was
inequalities characterized by poverty and marginality on the one hand and afflu-
ence on the other.69 In this environment, such social vices as the drug/criminal
economy, destitution, prostitution, and urban violence, in addition to poverty,
adverse environmental conditions, and associated disease burdens, became more
widespread. However, the cost of living remained lower in Kumase than in both
Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi.70 This was due in part to the satellite rural settle-
ments that surrounded Kumase and supplied the city with regular food at
low cost.
Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra, on the other hand, as harbor cities, drew in
more outsiders who had little contact with agriculture and food production and
therefore were compelled to rely almost exclusively on the markets for their food
needs. Transportation costs also contributed to the higher food prices. More
recent evidence suggests that the urban poverty situation in the three cities has
worsened, while informal and squatter settlements like Agbobloshie and Sodom
and Gomorrah have sprung up in Accra and Kumase, and almost every undesira-
ble available space had been utilized.71 These informal settlements served as
both residential and production sites. In Accra, Agbobloshie and Sodom and
Gomorrah were located near the industrial area and the central commercial area.
In Kumase, the racecourse near the Kagyatia Central Lorry Park was in the
central commercial area and Sodom and Gomorrah was sited within the Kaase
Light Industrial Area. They represent the built environments for informal eco-
nomic activities that have taken over the economic landscape of African cities.
As urbanized societies modernized in Ghana, there was the tendency for
inhabitants to experience significant changes in patterns of health and disease. It
is pertinent to identify the common diseases that affected the urban populations
and what measures were initiated to prevent or eradicate them. The government
health officials seemed to be generally ignorant about tropical diseases. There
were instances when new epidemics broke out in the urban centers and tended to
circulate among populations in different settlements. In such instances, the gov-
ernment took measures to curb the spread and even to prevent future outbreaks.72
Vaccinations were carried out periodically when there were reports of out-
breaks of contagious diseases. Public education, including lectures and issuing
of notices, was employed. Government also adopted disease prevention strat-
egies as an effective way of dealing with healthcare. Swampy sites were filled up
and drains constructed. In addition, bushy areas with heavy vegetation that pre-
cluded access of the sun and were ideal breeding grounds for mosquito larvae
were cleared. A mixture of kerosene and Izal was periodically used in oiling
swamps, ponds, and pools to prevent mosquitoes from breeding. New town
layouts were carried out to provide better spacing for houses that would enhance
ventilation and sanitary conditions.73
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 229
Over time, there was a slight but observable change in public health in the
urban centers attributable to attitudinal change. For example, the colonial
Medical Officer of Health in Kumase observed:

The most gratifying feature during the year has been the continuing confi-
dence and trust which the African places in the European Medical officers
as shown by the treatment of out-patients at the hospitals. […] At the Ante-
Natal Clinic the attendance during the year was 1,787 as compared with 328
for 9 months during the previous year. The success of this most praise-
worthy work is of course solely due to the great confidence and trust which
the Ashanti mother reposes in the Women Medical Officers.74

Among the major health issues that the urban poor contended with during the
period under study were such diet-related diseases as kwashiorkor, a Ga word
that literally means “one who is physically displaced.” People in the urban
centers, particularly the poor, often ate heavy, starchy diets without the protein
sources, fresh fruits, and vegetables that they required. Even where they used
vegetables, much of their nutrients were lost due to the traditionally long cooking
process, while eating fresh fruits was not a habitual practice among them. Con-
sequently, malnutrition developed as a health issue among both adults and chil-
dren. In the 1940s, more concerted efforts were made to improve the health
situation of the African population despite the prevalence of diseases.
In all three centers, common diseases found included malaria, diarrhea, dys-
entery, yellow fever, and such communicable diseases as smallpox, trypano-
somiasis, whooping cough, tuberculosis, and leprosy as well as diseases like
rabies that were directly transmitted by animals. These diseases were predomi-
nant in the low-income areas where sanitation tended to be poor and room occu-
pancy high. For example, the Senior Medical Officer reported that in dark,
poorly ventilated rooms, the drying process of germ-infected sputum was slow
and expectoration of such sputum could give off germ-carrying fragments over a
more prolonged period.75 Also in Kumase, the incidence of malaria, which was a
major cause of death among children, increased in the 1940s partly as a result of
clearing the dense forest cover due to logging, expanded food production to feed
the growing urban population, extension of cocoa farms, and railway construc-
tion.76 The reason was that it became easier for the particular type of mosquitoes
that were the major vectors of the disease to breed more easily. In the 1950s,
there were several reported cases of Cerebro-Spinal Meningitis (CSM) in
Kumase.77 Acquah observed that the chief causes of death in Accra in the 1950s
were infectious, parasitic, and circulatory diseases.78 The incidence of the disease
that affected both infants and adults was most dominant in the Zongo community
where there was a higher proportion of migrants particularly from the north.79
Stephen Addae has observed that Ghana’s health infrastructure at independ-
ence was mainly a curative one with a public health system that was limited to
the control of major outbreaks of epidemic diseases, including smallpox and
yellow fever.80 The CPP government under Kwame Nkrumah had the objective
230 W.J. Donkoh
of accelerating the pace of socioeconomic development and improving the
general welfare of Ghanaians. Health provision was one area considered pivotal
to the changes initiated by the post-independence government. The move
required radical administrative policies in health accompanied by huge financial
and resource investments. An important example was the decision to train more
Ghanaian doctors locally and the establishment of the University of Ghana
Medical School in 1962. Moreover, several government polyclinics, such as the
Labadi Polyclinic in Accra and the Suntreso Polyclinic in Kumase, were estab-
lished. Healthcare in the public sector became virtually free for Ghanaians from
all sectors of life, and this had considerable implications for the urban poor, par-
ticularly from the informal sector who hitherto had not been covered by either
social health insurance or employer health provision. The government health
policies in tandem with the establishment of the Ghana Medical School resulted
in widespread growth in the private medical industry, thus making healthcare
provision more accessible than ever before. Accra, Kumase, and Takoradi bene-
fited considerably from these state initiatives owing to their growing positions as
industrial, administrative, and industrial centers. Furthermore, the developments
enhanced access of low-income earners to better healthcare in the early post-
independence era.
However, there was a deterioration in living conditions in the 1970s due to
such factors as the economic decline in Ghana discussed above that resulted in
general impoverishment of the nation as a whole and a drop in the standard of
living in the country. For example, per capita GDP, at constant 1975 prices,
dropped from a level of 634 cedis in 1971 to 394.8 cedis in 1983.81 Sowa further
adds that people could not afford the basic necessities of life such as food and
shelter. Index of food production per capita with 1971 as base of 100 dropped to
about 72 in 1982.82 Although available data on life expectancy showed an
increase from 46 years in 1970 to about 55 years in 1979 before dropping to 53
years at the beginning of the 1980s, other indicators point to a severe deteriora-
tion in health standards. Daily calorie supply as a percentage of minimum
requirements dropped from 88 percent in 1979 to 68 percent in 1983. This may
have been due to the 1981/1982 famine caused by the draught that hit the Sahel
region. The poor economic situation also led to shortages of drugs and other sup-
plies, which affected provision of health services. The IMF–World Bank-
sponsored ERP entailed considerable reduction of government expenditure on
such social services as healthcare. This fact coupled with the associated retrench-
ment of over 300,000 public sector workers, most of whom either lived in or
subsequently migrated to the three centers, compounded poverty and health-
related problems there.
Other acute problems associated with a rapidly growing urban population
were accommodation and infrastructural provision. The broad areas that most
impacted the lower income urban population included housing, water, and san-
itation facilities. In Ghana, government had the responsibility of ensuring the
provision of safe water and social housing, and sanitation facilities. Migrants
who settled in the urban centers, particularly those without kinsmen already
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 231
living there, tended to settle in inner-city slums like Ussher Town and squatter
settlements like Fadama and Nima in Accra; Anloga and Sawaba in Kumase,
and Kwesimintsim in Sekondi-Takoradi.83 These settlements were often built in
unauthorized areas. Houses in such areas were often of poor quality and over-
crowded while the conditions there were unsanitary. The large population tended
to generate large quantities of refuse without commensurate disposal mecha-
nisms. Since such areas were often unplanned, they lacked proper drainage
systems and safe, potable drinking water. Different types of housing were identi-
fied in the urban centers. K.A. Busia drew attention to the fact that houses in
Sekondi-Takoradi in the 1950s varied considerably in size, design, and type, thus
making it difficult to classify all of them.84 The same was true of the other two
urban centers discussed in this chapter.85 The predominant types were traditional
compound houses which, according to Acquaah-Harrison,86 constituted about 72
percent of the total housing stock in Ghana.87 This type of house was usually a
large, multiple-occupancy, U-shaped structure with an average of seven rooms
and a shared central courtyard, and facilities including kitchen, toilet, and bath,
and was often patronized by low-income earners. Other types of urban housing
were flats which, though multiple occupancy, had their own facilities. In poorer
areas there were wood, mud, or cement huts with sheet iron or mud roofs. Over-
crowding was a common feature in all types of housing, since room occupancy
generally exceeded three persons. Acquaah-Harrison observed that the situation
affected about 44.5 percent of all households. The reason may be traced princip-
ally to the traditional family structure that typically required people to accom-
modate extended family members within their households. Thus, it was common
practice to find enterprising people who relocated to the urban centers and made
successful careers there to host many of their own kinfolk and others from their
villages who were drawn to the cities because of the better facilities there.88
These dependants included schoolchildren, especially those seeking post-primary
education and young folks in search of employment in the urban centers. In
urban areas, less than 20 percent of all housing units were owner occupied. It
was observed, for example, that Accra’s increasing population created severe
housing shortages.89 According to the 1960 census of Ghana, 60 percent of the
urban population lived with three or more persons per room while 40 percent
lived with four or five persons per room. In the case of Accra, about 60 percent
of the population lived with four persons per room. By the 1980s, there were
about 2,458,000 housing units with occupancy of 5.2 people per dwelling. The
housing needs in the three centers under study increased in tandem with popula-
tion growth. Recognizing that it was too expensive for most middle- to low-
income urbanites to build private homes, first the colonial government and then
its successors worked on programs to address land and material costs and long-
term financing for construction.
The colonial and early postcolonial governments resorted to building housing
estates in the peri-urban and urban districts such as Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-
Takoradi, while public companies and organizations constructed workers’
estates. Collectively, these provided a good stock of housing in the three
232 W.J. Donkoh
centers.90 This practice slowed down considerably after the 1972 coup, thus
leaving provision of housing in the hands of individuals, without proper plan-
ning. This led to haphazard development and hiking of housing rents, particu-
larly in the urban centers under discussion. Although most houses were built by
individuals without any public assistance, government and other corporate
bodies such as the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), the Social Security, and
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) invested in social housing projects. In 1982,
the government established the State Housing Construction Company to help
supply new low-cost dwelling units. The Bank for Housing and Construction
financed private housing schemes on a mortgage basis. Under another housing
ownership scheme, civil servants could acquire accommodation on lease-
purchase terms. The Cocoa Marketing Board, the Social Security, and National
Insurance Trust, and other organizations have also invested in housing projects
but most houses continue to be built without government assistance.
Another major problem that the three urban centers encountered related to san-
itation and access to a safe and adequate water supply to meet basic human needs
with an emphasis on access by the poor and the vulnerable. Successive govern-
ments lacked the political will to levy economic water charges for fear that they
would dissipate their political capital. In these three cities, attempts to solve the
perennial water supply problem by providing potable water for the urbanites led
to the construction of Weija Water Works in 1914, Inchaban Waterworks in 1918,
and Owabi Waterworks in 1928. As the population grew, these water sources
were not enough to provide for the needs of the residents in these centers. Thus,
the dam of the Inchaban Waterworks was raised in 1955 while that of Owabi was
raised in 1960, and the Kpong Water head was constructed in the 1960s to
improve water supply for the rapidly expanding urban population. Between 1970
and 1979, the Barekese Dam was constructed on the Offin River to enhance water
supply to Kumase. In fact, the water sector continued to encounter severe prob-
lems until the 1990s, partly due to poor and inefficient management as well as
government policy implications that led to very low tariffs being charged. Water
as a commodity impacted the lives of all citizenry and was so fundamental that
raising water rates would affect all, in particular the poor for whom it would make
a real difference to their incomes. Consequently, there was insufficient funding of
resources to maintain and extend the infrastructure.91
Food was another major concern of the urban poor. Detached from their agri-
cultural roots and faced with the exigencies of urban life, they had to make
adaptations regarding their diets. Thus urbanized Ghanaians played a key role in
reinterpreting European and other non-indigenous cookery by applying
indigenous-inspired cooking techniques and ingredients to Western and other
foreign recipes and constructions.92
Traditionally, southern Ghanaians preferred simple food with strong flavors.
Typically meals comprised thick, well-seasoned stews, accompanied by such
starchy staple foods as rice, boiled plantains, boiled yams/cocoyams, fufu, and a
variety of steamed maize/millet dough, referred to either as banku or kenkey
when prepared slightly differently. Stews came in a variety of flavors, including
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 233
garden eggs, fish, beans, Fante-Fante (a fishy tomato stew), palava sauce (green
leaf stew), and groundnut (peanut). Commonly eaten vegetables included
spinach, garden eggs, onions, tomatoes, sweet potatoes, beans, corn, and
cocoyams. Meat was considered a sign of wealth and luxury in Ghana and was
seldom eaten. Fish, especially near the coast, was found more often in everyday
dishes and stews. The situation was relatively better in Kumase, which relied on
the satellite villages that supplied local staples, including plantain, cocoyam, and
cassava. Typically, they ate two one-course meals a day.
As migrants settled in the three urban centers, they introduced their preferred
cuisine and ingredients into their new setting and also modified their mealtimes
to adapt to their new situation. The few women among them found an economic
niche in preparing these foods on a commercial basis for their male compatriots
who were mostly single or unaccompanied by their wives. For example, northern
migrants introduced foods prepared with millet and sorghum for themselves such
as porridge, known in the south as Hausa koko, accompanied by either fried bean
cakes called kose (or akara) or maasa, fried maize pancake. Such foods gained
popularity in the southern centers as breakfast. Similarly, Anlo and other
migrants from the southeast introduced their staple diets including gari and
yakeyake, both prepared from fermented coarse cassava flour.
Eating out was rare for families but as single men migrated from their home
communities into the urban areas they patronized foods cooked by commercial
sellers.93 This resulted in the development of the “chop bars” or traditional res-
taurants where local dishes were served. Manual workers, including railway and
dock workers in Sekondi-Takoradi and construction workers in Accra and
Kumase, were compelled to leave home very early to start work. They resorted
to feeding on koko, and either kose or maasa before commencement of work and
their mid-morning break when they could have a heavier meal. Gari as a con-
venient food that could be stored and carried about gained popularity as poor
people’s food eaten in the urban centers. Jollof rice, a spicy rice dish that
includes tomato sauce and meat or fish, was introduced by Kru (from Liberia)
and Creole (from Sierra Leone) immigrants into the urban centers from the late
nineteenth century and was adopted as a festive meal.
Traditionally, palm wine was the preferred beverage of the south and was
served on all important occasions. In addition, fermented grain beverages such
as ahay, gmadagn, and tuei were also served. As a result of the twin phenomena
of migration and urbanization, pito, a fermented beverage made from sorghum,
which was a popular drink in the north, was introduced into the southern centers
discussed in this chapter. One of the ways in which urban dwellers earned extra
income was through the preparation and sale of traditional snacks and desserts
such as kelewele prepared from ripe plantains seasoned with ginger and ground
red pepper, then fried in very hot oil. Another such dessert was tatale, a pancake
made of mashed plantains, seasoned with ginger and ground red pepper, and
deep-fried in palm oil.
Despite such interventions as the establishment of the Farmer’s Council, the
agricultural wing of the workers’ brigade, and state farms by the postcolonial
234 W.J. Donkoh
government, local food crop production was hampered. By the 1970s, productiv-
ity of food crops was low compared to the high population growth. By the 1970s,
the prices of food crops, especially in the urban centers of Accra and Sekondi-
Takoradi, had increased considerably in relation to incomes, particularly for
those in the middle- to low-income groups. Prices for similar items were much
lower in Kumase because of the satellite villages that provided regular supplies
without paying high transport charges.94 However, since these settlements were
built up as part of the urban sprawl, particularly from the late 1990s, the situ-
ation has changed. Between 1990 and 1995, 11 percent of the population of
Ghana was classified as undernourished by the World Bank.95 This meant they
did not receive adequate nutrition in their diet. About 27 percent of children
under the age of five were found to be underweight and more than one-quarter
were stunted (short for their age). Goiter (a swelling of the thyroid gland and a
sign of iodine deficiency) was present in one-third of all schoolchildren.
However, Ghanaians consume a fairly large amount of yams which contain
Vitamin C, and which helped keep body tissues strong, and used iron as well as
Vitamin B1 (thiamin), which helped the body use energy foods. Yams also pro-
vided some fiber, which helped keep the digestive system working properly.

Conclusion
The social surveys conducted in the post-war period made available critical facts
about the social and economic conditions of the time.96 These surveys were
necessitated by the fact that by the 1940s the colonial authorities were firmly
entrenched and therefore needed data to solve problems associated with their
colonized peoples. The challenges to overcome to ensure effective governance
included poverty, housing, and environmental issues against the backdrop of the
new social and economic forces including urbanization, social amenities, and
employment opportunities. Related factors such as diet became an important
index for a better standard of living. Accra, Kumase, and Takoradi, the most
industrialized centers in Ghana, were among the centers of flux and change
where large groups of migrants moved and settled. As they searched for employ-
ment and grappled with such problems as accommodation and how to feed them-
selves in their new homes, it became necessary to improvise and adapt to new
diets by either modifying foods that they had been used to or adapting to food
supplies found in their new homes as a matter of convenience. Poverty became a
real problem for many, as the jobs they expected to find were non-existent and
they lacked the means or access to land on which to farm. Many of them were
pushed into shanty towns and slums.
The colonial government was compelled to fashion policies aimed at solving
these problems. However, inadequate resources hampered these efforts. The first
postcolonial government attempted to deal with the persistent problems by
resorting to state-sponsored industrialization and more intensive social inter-
ventions using financial reserves. When this source dried up, government had
to resort to extensive borrowing, which resulted in further worsening of living
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 235
conditions, particularly for the urban poor. The NLC military government that
toppled the CPP government tried to steer away from state-sponsored industriali-
zation but continued with external borrowing. The PP government towed almost
the same line as the NLC. It initiated the divestiture process of state-owned com-
panies, which resulted in retrenchment of many employees of affected com-
panies and also gained renown for extensive borrowing.
The PP government passed the Aliens Compliance Order, which aimed at
reserving certain sectors of the economy for Ghanaians. This resulted in mass
migration of Ghanaians into the urban areas to take up the places vacated by the
departing aliens. The NRC/SMC military governments succeeded the PP gov-
ernment following a coup and attempted to steer away from the policies of its
predecessor. The cornerstone of its policy was self-reliance, and its refusal to
pay foreign debts led to an acute shortage of imported goods. The government’s
solution was Operation Feed Yourself and Operation Feed Your Industry.
However, people resorted to profiteering known as “kalabuleism.” The AFRC
government that succeeded it tried to champion the cause of the poor by embark-
ing on what it termed a “house-cleaning exercise” to end corruption and all
related vices while calling on Ghanaians to insist on their rights.
The expressed philosophy of the PNP that succeeded the AFRC government
was pro masses and state-sponsored industrialization. It resorted to foreign bor-
rowing and importation while corruption also became apparent. It did not stay in
power for long enough but was toppled by the PNDC military government which
was initially strongly opposed to the Breton Woods Institution and its prescribed
solutions for poverty. Repatriation of Ghanaians from Nigeria coupled with
drought and famine worsened economic conditions particularly of the urban poor
and compelled the PNDC to adopt the IMF-prescribed SAP. Midway through its
implementation it was realized that the policy did not sufficiently help the poor.
Therefore, PAMSCAD was introduced.
Food and housing prices were lower in Kumase than in Accra and Sekondi-
Takoradi while it was much easier to secure government subvention in Accra.
One may conclude that the poor in Sekondi-Takoradi were the worst off during
the period under consideration. The policies adopted by the various governments
to deal with the problems of urbanization, poverty, and related social problems
derived from the prevailing global ideas of the time.
Although absolute poverty in Africa has slightly decreased, income levels have
actually been dropping relative to the rest of the world.97 Harmful economic
systems, conflict, environmental factors such as drought and climate change,
population growth, and hunger are still major causes of poverty in Ghana and
other parts of Africa. Persistent relative poverty is still found in such sectors as
education, housing, transport, energy, drinking water, and health with diseases
like AIDS, malaria, and cholera still widespread in poor African countries like
Ghana. Since 1990 the Government of Ghana has continued its attempts at
solving the problem of poverty by signing up to and ratifying international agree-
ments like the Catagena Protocol on bio-safety to deal with future population
increases and their impact upon land tenure and management in the country.98
236 W.J. Donkoh
Notes
1 Richard Rathbone, “Urban Africa; Histories in the Making,” in David M. Anderson
and Richard Rathbone (eds), Africa’s Urban Past (Oxford: James Currey, 1999;
reprinted 2006), 1–19.
2 Ibid.
3 Allen Hendershott Eaton and Shelby Millard Harrison, A Bibliography of Social
Surveys (Manchester, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 1976), xxxviii. See also Mark
Abrams, Social Surveys and Social Action (London: Heinemann, 1951), 1.
4 Barbara Ward Jackson, “Economic Assets of the Gold Coast,” 1953, PRAAD,
Kumase, ARG 1/1/26A Economic Assets of the Gold Coast, 1950.
5 K.A. Busia, Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi (London: Crown for the Colonies,
1950); Ioné Acquah, Accra Survey (London: University of London Press, 1958).
6 Meyer Fortes, Robert Walter Steel, and Peter H. Addy, Ashanti Survey, 1945–46: An
Experiment in Social Research (London: William Clowes, 1947); Busia, Social
Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi; Acquah, Accra Survey.
7 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey.
8 Ben Ofosu-Appiah, “Why is Poverty Worse in Ghana after 55 Years of Independ-
ence?” Available at www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePageArtikle/ (accessed August
30, 2011).
9 World Bank, “Ending Extreme Poverty and Promoting Shared Prosperity.” Available
at www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty (accessed December 12, 2013).
10 Busia, Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi; and Acquah, Accra Survey.
11 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey; Busia, Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi; and Acquah,
Accra Survey.
12 Nii K. Sowa, Overview of the Poverty Situation in Ghana. Available at www.cepa.
org.gh/researchchapters/AnOverviewofthePovertySituationinGhana11.pdf (accessed
November 24, 2015).
13 Nii K. Sowa, “An Assessment of Poverty Reducing Policies and Programs in
Ghana.” Chapter prepared for presentation at a MIMAP Workshop on Assessing
Poverty Policies to be held at Rabat, Morocco, January 25–31, 2002; sponsored by the
IDRC, 5.
14 Demographia World Urban Areas, Eighth Annual Edition 4 (2012): 2. Available at
www.demographia2.com./db-worldua.pdf (accessed November 24, 2015).
15 PRAAD, Kumase, ARG 1/1/26A Economic Assets of the Gold Coast, 1950.
16 J.S. Nabila, Urbanization in Ghana (Accra: Population Impact Project, (PIP) Ghana,
1988), 1.
17 PRAAD, Kumase, ARG 1/1/26A Economic Assets of the Gold Coast, 1950.
18 Acquah observed in 1954 that the Ewe, who came predominantly from Togoland
which was relatively less developed than Ghana, constituted the majority of the
migrant African population in Ghana. Acquah, Accra Survey, 35.
19 Ibid. She argued that the country’s per capita national income of about £35 compared
to that of small agricultural countries like Denmark that have a high standard of
living, Ghana’s situation was much worse.
20 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey; Busia, Social of Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi; and
Acquah, Accra Survey.
21 Rathbone, “Urban Africa,” 8.
22 J. Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea (London: Churchill
Collections of Voyages and Travels, 1732), 8.
23 J.K. Fynn, Asante and its Neighbors 1700–1807 (London: Longman, 1971).
24 K.B. Dickson, A Historical Geography of Ghana (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1969).
25 W.J. Donkoh, “Kumase: Ambience of Tradition and Modernity.” Transactions of the
Historical Society of Ghana 8 (2004): 780–781; W.J. Donkoh, “Kumase: A Modern
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 237
City of Historic Importance,” in Kevin Shillington (ed.), Encyclopedia of African
History (London: Dearborn Publishing, 2006); Rathbone, “Urban Africa,” 1–19.
26 A reference to Sekondi’s historic importance is found in the fact that the British and
Dutch governors met there with local traditional leaders in 1751 to resolve hostilities
revolving around local disputes emanating from Anglo-Dutch rivalry. See Margaret
Priestley, West Africa Trade and Society: A Family Study (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969), 36.
27 Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London and New
York: Hambeldon Continuum, 2006), 60.
28 From 1960, the second position was taken over by Tamale but Takoradi has regained
this position since 2000. Probably with the oil find in the Western Region, and the
associated population increase and economic development, it is unlikely that the trend
will be reversed in the foreseeable future.
29 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey, 101.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Acquah, Accra Survey, 30.
33 Ibid.
34 UN-HABITAT, “Ghana: Overview of the Current Housing Rights” (UN-HABITAT,
2006), 11.
35 Examples of such publications are K. Ewusi, The Political Economy of Ghana in the
Post-independence Period: Description and Analysis of the Decadence of the Polit-
ical Economy of Ghana and the Survival Techniques of her Citizens, Discussion
Chapter No. 14 (Accra: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 1984);
E. Hansen, “The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana: 1982–1986,” in P. Anyang’
Nyong’o (ed.), Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa (London: Zed Books,
1987), 170–208; I.E.A. Yeboah and N.M. Waters, “Urban Economic Participation and
Survival Studies in Ghana 1960–1984.” Tijdschrift Voor Economische.en Sociale
Geografie 88; and R. Tangri, “The Politics of Government–Business Relations in
Ghana.” Journal of Modern African Studies 30 (1992): 97–111.
36 G. Benneh et al., Demographic Studies and Projections for Accra Metropolitan Area
(AMA). Final Report (Accra: Habitat/Accra Planning and Development Programme,
1990), 35.
37 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey, 101.
38 Editorial, “Geographical Pattern of Ghana’s Development Unchanged since Colonial
Rule.” The Statesman, Accra, March 2008.
39 Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), The State of the Gha-
naian Economy in 2006 (Accra: ISSER, 2007).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey, 150.
43 The three centers that constitute the focus of discussion in this chapter are the nodal
points of the area that constitute what is referred to as the golden triangle in Ghana.
Many of the traditional commercial export products of the country were derived from
the catchment area of this triangle.
44 The Kumase–Sekondi line was constructed between 1898 and 1903 while work on the
Accra–Kumase line, commenced in 1909, was interrupted by World War I. Beginning
in 1929, the British government set aside $1 million annually to supplement the rev-
enues of the colonies.
45 While Accra on the coast was the national capital and the location of headquarters of
most government agencies, private and public companies, and organizations as well
as embassies, the centrality of Kumase and coastal location of Sekondi-Takoradi for
the naturally endowed hinterland, and all being located along the major transportation
corridor of the nation, naturally drew in large populations.
238 W.J. Donkoh
46 John Parker, “Mankraloi, Merchants and Mulattos – Carl Reindorf and the Politics of
‘Race’ in Early Colonial Accra,” in C.C. Reindorf and Samuel Johnson, The Recovery
of the West African Past: African Pastors and African History in the Nineteenth
Century (Basel: Basler African Bibliographien, 1998), 31–48, 35. He also observed
that a person on whom the deferential title owula was conferred was expected to
exhibit gentlemanliness, learning, and urbanity.
47 Acquah, Accra Survey, 28.
48 J.C. Roche, “African Attitudes to Economic Study.” African Affairs 59 (1960): 235,
124–135, 125.
49 Public–Private Partnership Program between the Ministry of Local Government and
Rural Development and Marks Publications & Media. Available at http://ghanadis-
tricts.com (accessed November 20, 2015).
50 Ibid.
51 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey, 161.
52 Stephen Addae, The Evolution of Modern Medicine in a Developing Country: Ghana
1880–1960 (Bishop Auckland: Durham Academic Press, 1997).
53 Sir Charles Cecil Trevor, Report by Sir Cecil Trevor on the Banking Conditions in the
Gold Coast and on the Question of Setting up a National Bank (Accra: Government
Printing Department, 1951).
54 Fortes et al., Ashanti Survey, 159.
55 Interview with Edith Andoh at her residence in Kumase, August 2, 1992, and corrob-
orated by Nana Hene, a close relative of Nana Kunkuma, in a discussion at his house
at Adum, Kumase on January 14, 2000.
56 Acquah, The Accra Survey; and Busia, The Sekondi-Takoradi Social Survey. Also
interview with Edith Andoh, Kumase, 2000. In Kumase, this category of males,
referred to as Aboyfoo (a corruption of boys), and females developed their own pecu-
liar culture which was a hybrid of Western and indigenous practices, and covered
such social spaces as clothing and recreational activities.
57 Fortes, Steel, and Addy, 103.
58 Acquah, Accra Survey, 72.
59 Busia, Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, 108–109; Acquah, Accra Survey, 74.
60 L. Emmerij, “In the Midst of Paradoxes: An Urban Renaissance?,” in Uner Kirdar
(ed.), Cities Fit for People (New York: United Nations, 1997), 105.
61 PRAAD, Kumase, ARG 1/1/26A Economic Assets of the Gold Coast, 1950.
62 Such programs were usually designed for both rural and urban poor, but for the pur-
poses of this discussion the focus is on the urbanites.
63 Significantly, the major strike among transport, dock, and railway workers which
occurred in September 1961 as a reaction against the harsh budget that expanded and
increased taxes took place in Accra, Kumase, and Sekondi-Takoradi where most
skilled and semi-skilled workers were found.
64 Rathbone, “Urban Africa,” 8.
65 J. Songsore, The Urban Transition in Ghana: Urbanization, National Development
and Poverty Development (London: International Institute of Environment and Devel-
opment, 2010), 34.
66 D.S. Massey, “The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the
Twenty-First Century.” Demography 33, no. 4 (1996): 395–412.
67 This exercise in Nigeria is generally seen as retaliation for Ghana’s earlier ACO and
was popularly dubbed “Ghana must go.”
68 Massey, “The Age of Extremes.”
69 D. Rimmer, Staying Poor: Ghana’s Political Economy 1950–1990I (Oxford: Perga-
mon Press, 1992), 143.
70 In fact, this remained true into the twenty-first century. In 2005, for example, the U.S.
Department of State estimated that the daily cost of living in Accra was $171 com-
pared to $132 in Kumase. Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations (publishing details,
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 239
2007), for sub verbo [under the word]. “Ghana.” Available at www.encyclopedia.
com/topic/Ghana.aspx (accessed November 20, 2015).
71 Ghana Statistical Service, 2007, 8.
72 PRAAD, Kumase, ARGP 8/1/10. Annual Sanitary Report on Kumase for 1924–25
(Gold Coast: Government Printer, Accra, 1926).
73 PRAAD, Kumase, ARGP 8/1/26. Report on Ashanti for the Year 1928–1929 (Gold
Coast: Government Printer, Accra, 1929).
74 PRAAD, Kumase, ARGP.8/1/26. Report on Ashanti for the Year 1928–1929 (Gold
Coast: Government Printer, Accra, 1929).
75 Manhyia Archives of Ghana, Kumase, MAG 1/17/6. A presentation of the spitting
habit, presented by W.M. Howells, Senior Health Officer, 1941.
76 Manhyia Archives of Ghana, Kumase, MAG 1/1/35. Report of the Medical Officer of
Health, Kumase, September 1942.
77 PRAAD, Kumase, 3/2/5. Report of the Medical Officer of Health, General Hospital,
Kumase, 1950.
78 Acquah, Accra Survey, 195.
79 PRAAD, Kumase, 3/2/5. Report of the Medical Officer of Health, South Wing Hos-
pital, Kumase, January 28, 1952.
80 Stephen Addae, History of Western Medicine in Ghana, 1880–1960 (Durham, NC:
Durham Academic Press, 1996), 2.
81 Sowa, “An Assessment of Poverty Reducing Policies and Programs in Ghana,” 30.
82 Ibid.
83 Ministry of Housing, “Final Report by the Slum Clearance Party, 23 June 1952,”
attached to Town Planning Advisor, “Slum Clearance in the Gold Coast with Par-
ticular Reference to Ussher Town, Accra: Ministry of Housing, 1954 and Ministry of
Housing,” “Accra: A Plan for the Town – The Report for the Ministry of Housing”
(Accra: Government Printer, 1958).
84 Busia, Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, 5.
85 See, e.g., Acquah, Accra Survey, 46.
86 Richard Acquaah-Harrison, Housing and Urban Development in Ghana: With Special
Reference to Low-income Housing (Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlement
Program (UNHABITAT), 2004).
87 Overcrowding was defined as situations where there were 2.5 persons or more
per room.
88 My own father worked primarily as a storekeeper with SCOA, one of the multi-
national companies, and also owned cocoa and coconut farms as a second source of
income. He accommodated his sister, maternal cousins, nieces, nephews, grandnieces,
and grandnephews in his house at Ashanti Newtown in Kumase and was the primary
provider for them all, even though most of the adults engaged in trading activities.
89 Samuel Agyei-Mensah and Ama de-Graft Aikins, “Epidemiological Transition and
the Double Burden of Disease in Accra.” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the
New York Academy of Medicine Springer 87, no. 5 (2010): 879–897, 7.
90 Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), The State of the Gha-
naian Economy in 2006 (Accra: ISSER, 2007).
91 Water as a commodity impacted the lives of all citizenry and was so fundamental that
raising water rates would affect all, in particular the poor for whom it would make a
real difference to their incomes. Successive governments lacked the political will to
levy economic water charges for fear that they would dissipate their political capital.
92 Wilhelmina J. Donkoh, We Are What We Eat: A Historical Study of Foodways,
Health and Social Status in Ghana since 1900 (KNUST, Kumase: unpublished
chapter, March 2012), 6.
93 Donkoh, “We Are What We Eat,” 10.
94 Ibid., 13.
240 W.J. Donkoh
95 World Bank, Ghana Poverty Past, Present and Future, 1995. Report No. 14504-GH,
Washington, DC.
96 Rathbone, “Urban Africa,” 1–19.
97 World Poverty, “A Look at Causes and Solutions: Poverty in Africa, Famine and
Disease.” Available at http://world-poverty.org/povertyinafrica.htm (accessed Novem-
ber 13, 2014).
98 Albert Osei Wireko, “Biotechnology: A Solution for Ending Hunger and Poverty in
Ghana.” November, 4, 2003. Available at www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/
NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=46034 (accessed November 13, 2014).

References
Abrams, M. Social Surveys and Social Action. London: Heinemann, 1951.
Acquaah-Harrison, R. Housing and Urban Development in Ghana: With Special Refer-
ence to Low-Income Housing. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlement Program
(UNHABITAT), 2004.
Acquah, I. Accra Survey. London: University of London Press, 1958.
Addae, S. History of Western Medicine in Ghana, 1880–1960. Durham, NC: Durham
Academic Press, 1996.
Agyei-Mensah, S. and A. de-Graft Aikins. “Epidemiological Transition and the Double
Burden of Disease in Accra.” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York
Academy of Medicine Springer 87, no. 5 (2010): 879–897.
Anderson, D.M. and R. Rathbone (eds). Africa’s Urban Past. Oxford: James Currey,
1999; reprinted 2006.
Anquandah, J. Rediscovering Ghana’s Past. Accra: Sedco; London: Longman, 1982.
Barbot, J. A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea. London: Churchill
Collections of Voyages and Travels, 1732.
Benneh, G., J. Songsore, J.S. Nabila, J. Yankson, and T. Teklu. Demographic Studies and
Projections for Accra Metropolitan Area (AMA), Final Report. Accra: Habitat/Accra
Planning and Development Program, 1990.
Birmingham, W., I Neustadt, and E.N. Omaboe (eds). A Study of Contemporary Ghana,
Vol. 2. London: Allen & Unwin, 1967.
Busia, K.A. Social Survey of Sekondi-Takordi. London: Crown for the Colonies, 1950.
Dickson, K.B. A Historical Geography of Ghana. London: Cambridge University
Press, 1969.
Donkoh, W.J. “Kumase: Ambience of Tradition and Modernity.” Transactions of the
Historical Society of Ghana 8 (2004).
Donkoh, W.J. “Kumase: A Modern City of Historic Importance,” in K. Shillington, ed.,
Encyclopedia of African History. London: Dearborn Publishing, 2006.
Donkoh, W.J. “We Are What We Eat: A Historical Study of Foodways, Health and Social
Status in Ghana since 1900.” Unpublished chapter, March 2012.
Eaton, A.H. and S.M. Harrison. A Bibliography of Social Surveys: Social Problems and
Social Policy – the American Experience. London: Ayer Company, 1976.
Emmerij, L. “In the Midst of Paradoxes: An Urban Renaissance?” In Uner Kirdar, ed.,
Cities Fit for People. New York: United Nations, 1997.
Ewusi, K. The Political Economy of Ghana in the Post-independence Period: Description
and Analysis of the Decadence of the Political Economy of Ghana and the Survival
Techniques of her Citizens, Discussion Chapter No. 14. Accra: Institute of Statistical,
Social and Economic Research, 1984.
 Poverty in three urban centers in Ghana 241
Fynn, J.K. Asante and its Neighbors 1700–1807. London: Longman, 1971.
Ghana Statistical Service. Ghana Living Standards Survey Report on the Third Round
(GLSS3). Accra: Ghana, 1995.
Ghana Statistical Service. 2000 Population and Housing Census. Government Press,
Accra, 2001. Available at www.wsp.org/UserFiles/file/319200725615_312007101903_
MDGs_All_final3_high.pdf.
Hansen, E. “The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana: 1982–1986.” In P. Anyang’
Nyong’o (ed.), Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. 170–208. London: Zed
Books, 1987.
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER). The State of the Ghana-
ian Economy in 2006. Accra: ISSER, 2007.
Jackson, A. The British Empire and the Second World War. London and New York:
Hambeldon Continuum, 2006.
Mabogunje, A.L. “Backwash Urbanization: The Peasantization of Cities in Sub-Saharan
Africa.” In Michael P. Conzen (ed.), World Patterns of Modern Urban Change: Essays
in Honor of Chauncy D. Harris. Department of Geography, Research Chapter
No. 217–218. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago, 1986.
Massey, D.S. “The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty-
First Century.” Demography 33, no. 4 (1996): 395–412.
Ministry of Housing. “Final Report by the Slum Clearance Party, 23 June 1952,” attached
to Town Planning Advisor, Slum Clearance in the Gold Coast with Particular Refer-
ence to Ussher Town. Accra: Ministry of Housing, 1954.
Ministry of Housing. Accra: A Plan for the Town – The Report for the Ministry of
Housing. Accra: Government Printer, 1958.
Nabila, J.S. Urbanization in Ghana. Accra: Population Impact Project (PIP), 1988.
Osei, Akwasi P. Ghana: Recurrence and Change in a Post-independence African State.
New York: P. Lang, 1999.
Priestley, M. West Africa Trade and Society: A Family Study. London: Oxford University
Press, 1969.
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ca’s Urban Past. Oxford: James Currey, 1999; reprinted 2006.
Richards, H.M. “Report on an Inspection of a Few Compounds in Ussher Town,” attached
to Town Planning Advisor, Slum Clearance in Ussher Town: Plot Scheme for a Block
of Flats for Fishermen. Accra: Town Planning Department, 1954.
Rimmer, D. Staying Poor: Ghana’s Political Economy 1950–1990. Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1992.
Songsore, J. Urbanization and Health in Africa: Exploring the Interconnections
between Poverty, Inequality and the Burden of Disease. Accra: Ghana Universities
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Songsore, J. and G. Goldstein. “Health and Environment Analysis for Decision-Making
(HEADLAMP): Field Study in Accra, Ghana.” World Health Statistics Quarterly 48,
no. 2 (1995): 108–117.
Sowa, N.K. “An Assessment of Poverty Reducing Policies and Programs in Ghana.”
Chapter prepared for presentation at a MIMAP Workshop on Assessing Poverty Pol-
icies held in Rabat, Morocco on January 25–31, 2002; sponsored by the IDRC.
Statesman, The. “Geographical Pattern of Ghana’s Development Unchanged since Colo-
nial Rule.” 2008.
Tangri, R. “The Politics of Government–Business Relations in Ghana.” Journal of
Modern African Studies 30 (1992): 97–111.
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World Bank. Ghana Poverty Past, Present and Future. Report No. 14504-GH. Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank, 1995.
Yeboah, I.E.A. and N.M. Waters. “Urban Economic Participation and Survival Studies in
Ghana 1960–1984.” Tijdschrift Voor Economiche en Sociale Geografie 88 (1997).
Zeilig, L. and D. Seddon. A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa I. Philadelphia,
PA: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2005.
Part III
Dimensions of poverty in
East and Southern Africa
14 Land reforms, landlessness, and
poverty in Kenya
The postcolonial experience
Martin S. Shanguhyia

Introduction
This chapter critically examines a link between national politics, access to land,
and the perpetuation of rural poverty in Africa, with specific focus on Kenya’s
postcolonial experience regarding the country’s land reform program. By remi-
niscing on the history of Kenya’s land reform since 1963, the chapter contends
that access to land in Kenya since independence has been inextricably tied to
national and local politics; so much so that while the distributive effects of the
land reform program following independence have enabled thousands of rural
families to access land through land settlement programs in the 1960s and 1970s,
state politics has also retarded the reform agenda, thereby preventing thousands
of others from accessing the resource. Perhaps the most apt evidence of the latter
is the persistence of numerous land-squatting families, whose status has pro-
vided talking points for national politics in Kenya, and whose predicament has
led them to be defined by the government as “poor” because they cannot afford
to own their land.1
Since independence, agriculture has remained a key preoccupation for the
majority of Africa’s (and Kenya’s) rural population, thereby ensuring that land
retains invaluable importance in the economic and social lives of rural people.
Indeed, analyses familiar with agricultural trends in Africa over the two decades
following independence asserted the importance of owning and controlling land
as an important productive asset given the inherent value of land in social, eco-
nomic, and political terms. Thus, in many African countries, land remains a
major source of wealth, status, and power for those who are able to access it.2
Yet such access and ownership of this resource has proved elusive for larger sec-
tions of the rural populations across the continent. The reasons for this are many,
ranging from the negative legacies of colonial land policies, geophysical con-
ditions that render land inhabitable, population pressure on existing arable land,
social dynamics related to such processes as land fragmentation and inheritance,
unequal income levels and social stratification within rural farming communities,
to the role of political forces.3
Consequently, due to the aforementioned reasons, there has been a rise in lan-
dlessness and near-landlessness in some African countries, which has in turn led
246 M.S. Shanguhyia
to or aided poverty among rural communities.4 Access to arable land by many
individuals in Africa remains unresolved, so much so that poorer rural house-
holds are exposed to perpetual poverty. While this has implications for the
general quest for economic development of rural areas by governments in Africa
(as well as in Asia and Latin America), the resulting inequality has also exposed
the political implications of differential access to land.5 In fact, as this chapter
seeks to demonstrate with respect to Kenya, politics at state level has aided these
conditions to the extent that those not guaranteed such access have been ren-
dered landless, and have therefore been exposed to poverty. The chapter does
not, by any means, assert that access to land or landownership guarantees an
avenue out of poverty; it has been observed by some analysts that those who
own land still require the necessary credits, markets, and external support (from
the government) so as to reap any benefits that accrue from owning land.6 But
such rationalizing notwithstanding, there seems to be an entrenched argument
for a moral and economic validation for the need to ensure equitable access to
land. Such an argument foresees such equity as helpful in reducing hardship by
rural communities in their daily quest to meet their basic needs – food, shelter,
and cash. Such access also allows for economic utilization of land that would not
be realized if land was concentrated in the hands of a few individuals.7
In Kenya where land has been “politicized” since colonial times, the role of
the postcolonial state has been critical in addressing the land question so as to
fulfill public demand for a land reform package that assures access to land. The
need for such reforms has expanded the role of the national government in
broaching land programs aimed at distributing land so as to confront landless-
ness and at the same time boost the smallholder agricultural sector in rural
areas.8 The chapter revisits these programs in retrospect and contends that while
national land settlement programs since independence have aided in making land
available to a considerable number of formerly landless and near-landless house-
holds, many more have missed out on this opportunity, thereby rendering them
prone to landlessness and poverty.9 This is largely the result of “fits and starts”
in the land reform agenda under the aegis of the government since the 1960s, of
which the political elite have taken advantage over the years to entrench their
interests in land, with the potential of perpetuating landlessness and poverty for
the majority without the wherewithal to access the resource. Addressing land-
lessness and its poverty implications therefore demands the political will to
initiate a genuine land reform package. This, in Kenya, has the potential to
succeed only with the integration of civil society institutions that have been at
the forefront of promoting transparency in national governance on the one hand,
and crusading for poverty reduction policies and programs, on the other.
The chapter’s overall argument is that while progress has been realized in
Kenya’s political sector following the introduction of multi-party politics in the
early 1990s and the adoption of a new constitution in 2009, there has been a
marked, slow pace, or “hesitance,” by the government to ensure a comprehensive
land reform agenda. The slow pace results from political liberalization presided
over by a landed political elite which realizes that liberalization threatens its
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 247
interests. This class is also charged with finding the political will to institutionalize
reforms in the land sector.10 The promulgation of the National Land Policy (NLP)
in 2009 was a major development towards addressing Kenya’s troubled land rela-
tions. However, this milestone cannot yet be celebrated given the entrenched
nature of political interests in land. Caution is therefore urged against any expecta-
tion that the NLP will be effectively embraced and implemented by the elite.
Land reform is further complicated by the comprehensive nature of the
national constitution regarding sectors of land relations that require reform, so
much so that John Harbeson describes the constitution as laden with “conflicting
promises.” According to Harbeson, deferring the land reform agenda to Parlia-
ment amplifies complications in the national constitution in ways that seem to
privilege “national-level procedural and deliberative democracy.”11 This arrange-
ment elicits contradictions in national development, particularly when the new
constitution has devolved power to local governments in the bid to involve the
local community in deliberating on the implementations of the national land
reform agenda. Given that a small but powerful class of landowners with polit-
ical clout have dominated Kenya’s agrarian sector, York Bradshaw has rightly
emphasized the impediment to land reforms by this class, which depends on land
for capital and power.12
Consequently, the chapter reaches two important conclusions. First, a pre-
condition for a successful land reform program in Kenya requires a feasible
political environment or commitment from government, particularly from the
ruling elite. This does not necessarily imply “democratic” institutions, since
some of the most successful land reform programs have been accomplished by
less democratic governments, such as Ethiopia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, and Nicara-
gua.13 The Government of Kenya, through and outside the democratically elected
Parliament, has the moral responsibility to implement programs that present eco-
nomic and social challenges to the vast majority of the population. Second,
where commitment to land reform is likely to be absent or falter, Kenya’s civil
society can pressure the government to sustain reform efforts.14
The second alternative is essential for Kenya given that the civil society has
been instrumental in pushing for both political liberation and land reform in
Kenya to a degree less compatible with political interests. Therefore, this discus-
sion also suggests that mobilization through this segment of Kenyan society
remains a viable and effective medium to challenge the government to imple-
ment reforms that bridge poverty gaps created by unequal access to land.15 Civil
society organizations play an important role in the quest for good governance in
Africa by monitoring government performance, facilitating popular participation
in governance. These activities can help the public access essential public
resources.16 Thus, development aimed at bridging inequalities is already in the
purview of the state as part of the traditionally ascribed powers of national gov-
ernments, but it is also one that seeks to involve non-state actors, which tend to
incorporate the poor into the decision-making process. In fact, a closer link has
been drawn between the civil society and poverty eradication not only at state
level but also within the “global balance of social power.”17
248 M.S. Shanguhyia
This chapter also contributes to our understanding of the role of politics and
land management in the development of the modern Kenyan state. Other studies
have revealed those roles as impinging upon the economic and social welfare of
the millions of households who depend on land for their livelihood. The chapter
also contributes to questions of land reform that continue to underline national
politics across many African states and their impact upon the welfare of the
population. Kenya aside, politics with regard to land has been the hallmark of
recent conflicts over land and related resources in several African countries,
especially Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Sudan, and Ethiopia.18 Generally, poverty situations created by differential
access to essential natural resources produce suffering for the “have nots” on a
global scale, and poverty has also become a source of regional and international
security, making it difficult to achieve meaningful “human development.”19
This argument proceeds with an analysis of the historical origins and devel-
opment of skewed land programs that have proved inadequate in solving land-
lessness. An effort is also made to show how national politics have been
deliberately linked to the land question in ways that have aided in dispossession
and inequality in the ownership of and access to land. These actions have
poverty implications for a large section of the population. The extent to which
different government regimes have missed opportunities to address land distri-
bution problems are also examined. The final part of the study examines the role
played by the civil society in the quest for fair land reform in Kenya and argues
that this section of the nation holds the key to accomplishing that agenda.

Kenya’s historical experiences

Colonialism created landlessness in Kenya. It is a colonial creation which the post-
colonial state has not only inherited from the colonial era but has also accelerated
its development. Settler colonial state landownership problems dominated the
colonial period in Kenya and is a major issue inherited by the country’s nationalist
leadership following independence in 1963. Squatters were the most obvious
product of colonial land dispossession policies. These policies led to unequal land-
ownership among communities whose economic livelihoods were based in land.20
Decolonization in the early 1960s offered opportunities to overcome these chal-
lenges. However, following independence, the new government failed to adopt a
more rational and sustainable land reform program that would redress the inequal-
ities in access to land associated with the British colonial state. The top-down land
settlement programs that commenced in 1960 and that were facilitated by British
and international capital achieved modest success in making land available to the
landless majority in rural areas of Kenya, especially the White Highlands.
The realities of decolonization and eventual self-government offered
optimism to a vast majority of dispossessed Kenyan communities. As independ-
ence talks progressed in London during the three years preceding independence
in 1963, excitement and occasional violence in Kenya raised a specter of
squatters invading settler land, and attested to the problem of “land hunger” that
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 249
an independent Kenya would grapple with.21 In the agricultural heartlands of the
Rift Valley, home to a majority of the squatters, the hope was that access to land
and with it an avenue to guarantee economic and social security would replace
years of landlessness and impoverishment.22
Between 1960 and 1970, the government initiated a variety of land settlement
schemes aimed at helping the landless class access land.23 Modern problems
of unequal land distribution in Kenya stem from the inadequacies in these
land reform programs during the early years of independence. The colonial gov-
ernment oversaw a few of these programs, particularly during the critical period
of transition of political power from 1961 to 1963. Several other programs have
been the prerogative of the postcolonial state. An expansion in cultivated acreage
aided by intensive capital and technological investments in the White Highlands,
increased adoption of cash crops in African reserves, as well as accelerated land
consolidation programs from the early 1950s expanded incidences of landless-
ness. In the problematic Rift Valley Province in 1960, the government estimated
the number of landless groups at a conservative figure of 130,000 families.24
This class was largely disregarded in the initial land transfer program of 1960
that sought to limit purchases of European land to the “yeoman,” the experi-
enced and financially able African farmers. In the process, no more than 5,000
such yeomen were resettled.25 More critical were the implications of the eco-
nomic requirement to purchase European land, coming at a time of increased
unemployment in rural and urban areas that prevented many Africans from
raising enough capital for that purpose. Undercapitalization of a majority of the
African population stalled the transfer of land on this basis.
The more comprehensive “Million Acre Settlement Scheme” targeted a larger
section of the landless, unemployed populations that were to be allotted medium
to fairly large plots.26 While this ensured that a relatively large number of poor
households would own small acreages of land, the financial mechanism that
made the allotments possible tied them to a credit system that led to defaulting
on loans, thereby exacerbating their land and economic insecurity. Another
downside of the scheme was its infiltration by the politically connected and
financially able individuals and cooperative organizations that used their status
to access both state credit and large farm acreages. In the process, the most legit-
imate cases of landlessness were squeezed out.27 Instead it created a larger
middle-class, rural peasantry than was intended. A state-backed petite bour-
geoisie appropriated land settlement schemes in postcolonial Kenya, which
accentuated the number of landless families.28 Some large farms owned by this
elite class remained unutilized, and, given their financial dilemmas, it inevitably
led to “sharecropping” on the part of landless families who needed to raise
revenue to repay their loans. This underutilization served to perpetuate a landless
squatter population, which earned a deplorable annual wage of £25 a year by
1969 – barely enough income to educate its children.29
The carry-over effect of the squatter problem from the colonial period
remained a sore point in the postcolonial government’s effort to tackle landless-
ness in Kenya. The large number of squatters increased tensions over land,
250 M.S. Shanguhyia
especially in Central and Rift Valley provinces, and made land reform a priority.
The Squatter Settlement Scheme of 1965 made available small-acre plots to
approximately 18,000 squatter families by 1970. This was a paltry achievement
given that, by 1966, about 46,000 families were still registered as squatters
seeking landownership.30 Thousands others were scattered in the western parts
of the Rift Valley Province: Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Districts, which
includes the Western, Nyanza, and Coast provinces. By the beginning of the
1980s, the landless, the majority of whom were squatters, were estimated at
about 410,000 and seen to increase at a rate of about 5 percent annually.31 In
fact, as is demonstrated later in this chapter, the squatter problem has persisted
in Kenya, and has generated more political challenges to the government’s land
reform program. Yet this segment of the population has been officially desig-
nated by the government as a “poverty group” to be targeted within the wider
scheme of anti-poverty campaigns.32
One should not lose sight of the broader agrarian gains of these land settle-
ment programs. By 1970, approximately five million Africans were settled in
approximately 40 percent of the former White Highlands, albeit at the cost of a
huge debt accrued by the government and the African settlers. This tied Kenya
and these populations to international capital, which made it possible for Afri-
cans to purchase these farms from European settlers. In spite of this economic
dependency on external capital, the newly constituted small-scale holdings soon
attested to the entrepreneurship of a farming community, which, by 1967,
brought in cash revenues of $34.04 million, up from $21.7 million registered
in 1958.33
Over the years, however, these gains have been overshadowed by irregular
prices in regional and global market prices, weakened credit support from the
government, and population growth that has undermined the productive potential
of most small-scale rural farms. Yet the most enduring aspect of these past land
reforms has been the institutionalization of private land tenure over indigenous
communal tenure, so much so that the land security many families were guaran-
teed under communal tenure has dissolved into economic and social inequalities
created by individual landownership. These shortcomings have lingered for
decades and have continued to define the political, social, and economic rela-
tions between the state and its citizens, and between different ethnic com-
munities at the local and national levels in Kenya.
Later programs such as the Shirika Scheme of the 1970s, while not as elabo-
rate as the Million Acre scheme, did not completely utilize surplus land in the
decolonized Highlands. Furthermore, economic constraints still prevented many
households from joining Shirika, or cooperative companies, further constraining
access to land.34 On the other hand, the Haraka Schemes – formerly Squatter Set-
tlement Schemes – expanded the program of settling squatters on state land,
especially in the Coast Province in the early 1970s. The Haraka Schemes only
partially solved the problem of squatters. For example, of the estimated 15,033
squatter families in the Coast Province by 1970, only 1,569 had been settled.
More often than not, such squatters were granted smallholdings on a temporary
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 251
basis in the hope that their economic investment in those plots would earn them
a sufficient income to purchase them as private holdings with title deeds.
However, without initial financial help, particularly in terms of financial credit,
this strategy was undermined by these poor farmers’ investment in subsistence
production rather than cash crop production.35 This attests to the dismal outcome
of government-mediated land redistribution programs following independence,
and also attests to an earlier assertion in this chapter that ownership and access
to land in not a guarantee to emancipation from poverty, particularly where such
ownership and access are not matched with incentives such as credits to invest
in land.
Furthermore, population growth and subdivision of the original farms –
usually five to ten acres – without an intensive innovation to maximize their
potential as income-generating ventures made it unviable for these households to
raise revenue to purchase these plots and secure freehold title deeds. This was
true even for the few small farmers who were lucky enough to access loans from
the government. Their farms were too small in scale to generate substantial sur-
pluses to help repay their loans, leading to default and loss of their land.36 Those
who failed to purchase these plots were either evicted or continued to live in
constant fear of land insecurity. Thus, despite efforts to give landless households
access to land, by the middle of the 1970s poverty was visible among many
households who lived on the margin of any gains that the agrarian sector offered
to the well-to-do sections of the population.37
Thus, since the 1960s, the capitalization of land settlement programs has been
a major factor that has undermined poor households’ access to land. Intensive,
large-scale distribution of land to eliminate landlessness ceased being a national
priority as settlement programs were abandoned or selectively implemented for
political reasons after the mid-1970s. Against this backdrop, the undistributed
millions of acres in the White Highlands that could have been used to accom-
modate thousands of poor landless households were turned into state farms
managed by state corporations as “public land.” Private or corporate holdings
linked to the political elite took over most of this land. These farms, where
underutilized, have become sites of “contested ownership” between these politi-
cally connected classes and landless families who have settled on the land.

Land and consolidation of political power in Kenya

Political obstacles to a successful land distribution program in Kenya have their
origins in the land reform programs that dominated the first decade of independ-
ence. Subsequent government regimes have built on shortcomings in those
earlier programs to consolidate their hold on key state institutions and to create
several others, thereby ensuring that they have access to land while excluding
thousands of landless communities. The mechanism of transfer in the early
1960s was such that land became a political tool for consolidating power by
those in the service of the state. In the process, the state became not only a tool
of accumulation and class struggle but also a tool of dispossession, thereby
252 M.S. Shanguhyia
contributing to incidences of landlessness and poverty.38 Institutions created to
effect land transactions, particularly the Agricultural Finance Corporation and
the Agricultural Development Corporation, were used to protect the interests of
the political and economic elite in ways that resisted pressure for radical change
in the emergent agrarian structure in Kenya.39 The land redistribution process
required access to capital by both the landless and those with inadequate land
who needed to expand their land holdings. Such capital was disbursed through
state machinery that benefited those connected with the government. This led to
corruption that served political expediency at the expense of the poor landless
families. During the first decade of independence, for example, loans provided
by the British government for resettling landless families were used to buy land
from departing European farmers, which was in turn sold to leading political
figures as part of the new independent regime’s efforts to build political patron-
age. Nepotism also became the means by which large tracts of public land were
acquired by family members related to the ruling class.40 Corruption in govern-
ment became the fulcrum of illegal land distribution practices in Kenya follow-
ing independence and has become the largest impediment to land reform in the
country.
Between 1964 and 1978, irregular land allocation by those in government
became a domain for political confrontation between those holding the reins of
power and those calling for accountability and reforms in the land sector to
benefit the landless. Bildad Kagia and Oginga Odinga led the revolutionary wing
within the government that sought egalitarianism in land distribution so as to
eliminate landlessness and prevent the privileged power elite from dispossessing
the poor landless masses in the wake of independence. At the heart of the dis-
senters’ opposition to the political establishment were allegations about indi-
viduals who benefited from land by virtue of their political positions while
closing channels that should have provided land to the poor “freedom fighters.”
Critics of the land reform process advocated for free distribution of land and
cancellation of debts owed by small farm holders. The government was averse to
such reforms that threatened the avowed capitalist path to development by
Kenya’s first regime.41
Furthermore, a commitment to successful land reform would have under-
mined Kenyatta’s political power, which derived in part from using land distri-
bution to build apolitical clientele. Kenyatta constituted his loyalist base by
offering farms in the former White Highlands to the wealthy Kikuyu elite. He
also offered farms to selective sections of the Kikuyu squatters in Nyeri,
Murang’a, and Nyandarua to prevent complete fracture of his Kikuyu base.
Those rewarded with land in return for their political support represented politi-
cians from the poorer regions of Kenya.42 This strategy passed for a publicity
gesture, since the government resettlement schemes largely ignored a majority
of Mau Mau squatters who had fought for freedom and land. They constituted
the landless mass in post-independence Kenya.43 Whatever land that could have
provided them with a means of livelihood was instead appropriated as a resource
for private accumulation and for consolidating political power by the elite. The
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 253
bureaucratic structure crafted to facilitate individual ownership of large tracts of
land rendered many Kenyans landless and created a forum for radical, reformist
leaders, such as Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, who railed against government malaise
in the land reform program in the 1970s, to criticize the government. According
to Kariuki, stalled land reforms during the Kenyatta era manifested through the
failure in development planning and social justice and represented, therefore, a
moral lapse in political leadership.44 Kariuki’s engagement with the skewed land
policies of the Kenyan state in the 1970s has provided a platform for viewing
Kenya’s land problem as a development issue, undermined by unequal horizon-
tal distribution of resources. Clientele networks created in the 1960s by competi-
tion over land and consolidated in later years survive. They remain as a key
structure by which Kenyan political patrons have sought support through this
system of rewards from certain state constituencies. Such patrons have accomp-
lished this by using appointments to government positions as well as material
forms – of which land has been important.
Part of the strategy to contain criticism against government land policies has
been the political censuring of the “reformers” and attempts to marginalize
them from national politics. The decamping of the pro-populist land reform pol-
iticians from the ruling Kenya National African Union (KANU) led to the
establishment of the Kenya African Peoples Union (KPU) in 1966, which
became the forum for criticizing the land-based accumulation practices of
Kenya’s political elite. KPU’s populist agenda, in which land reforms were a
priority, arrayed itself against an entrenched political class unwilling to relin-
quish control over economic and political institutions that had shored up
material gains. This faction of reformists was confronted with and then elimin-
ated by the muffling of parliamentary debates on land and related corruption,
rigging of parliamentary elections, and proscribing opposition parties and by
political assassinations.45
The institutionalization of a single-party system devoid of opposition seemed
to “normalize” the evolution of institutions through which accountability in land
distribution policies was taken for granted without public counter-checks. Hence,
drawing from this experience, some scholars familiar with Kenya’s development
challenges during this era have perceived a close link between the legitimization
of single-party states and the weakening of civil society, especially where the
latter seems to offer competing claims to state resources. The state achieves this
by ensuring political “de-participation” and disenfranchisement.46
Ethnicity has also been a salient feature in the politics of land access in
Kenya, particularly after 1990, and has been used to dispossess communities
thought to be in the “wrong” geographical enclaves with respect to Kenya’s
administrative boundaries. The origins of “ethnicizing” land in national politics
lay in the land resettlement programs in the first decade of independence. Given
the seriousness of landlessness among the Kikuyu, and especially the Kikuyu
squatter problem which the government inherited from the colonial state, the pri-
ority of the resettlement policy naturally targeted this group. This was particu-
larly the case in distribution programs in Rift Valley Province.
254 M.S. Shanguhyia
The Rift Valley has since remained the most politically volatile province in
national land politics. Communities such as the Nandi, Kipsigis, and Maasai that
regard the province as their native region have often been hostile towards
Kikuyu and other “non-native” settlers such as the Luyia and Luo. The political
elite have tapped into the emergent interethnic animosity for political and
material gain. Politicization of land and landlessness and the attendant conflict
has increased following political liberalization in the early 1990s. While the
KANU government had, since independence, advocated for a unitary govern-
ment as a model system for precluding national divisiveness based on ethnicity,
the KANU political elite abandoned its pursuit of unitary government in the Rift
Valley as the party came under threat following the introduction of multi-party
politics in 1991. Before the multi-party elections in 1992, and in a bid to stave
off immense political opposition, KANU unofficially invoked Majimbo, a
regional system of government that was first advocated by KADU, KANU’s
main rival, in the early years of independence as a way to secure land and other
economic interests of Kenya’s small ethnic groups.47 However, KANU adopted
Majimbo in the early 1990s as an ideology of ethnic cleansing by targeting set-
tlers considered as “aliens” in the Rift Valley, particularly those perceived to
support the opposition movement against the KANU regime. Such communities,
mostly Kikuyu, were either killed or expelled from areas they had settled since
independence. The ultimate objective was to disenfranchise these pro-opposition
communities to give KANU an edge in the 1992 General Election.48
Politicizing regions also revived a national debate about whether regionalism
was the means to protecting the political and economic rights of every ethnic
community in Kenya.49 Calls for majimbo had never been so pervasive in
Kenya’s national politics since the early 1960s, albeit for material gain.
However, scholars such as Jacqueline Klopp have argued that the explosive
nature of politics about land under the guise of majimbo in the 1990s offered
opportunities for some political elite of certain ethnic communities to promote
more tolerant, cosmopolitan politics in the quest for political power.50 However,
the violence that marred both the 1997 and 2007 elections exposed the extent to
which ethnicity and “regionalization” of national politics in Kenya remain inex-
tricably tied to unresolved land reform in Kenya.
In the few months before the 1997 general elections, there was further dis-
placement of communities that had been resettled or that had bought land in
parts of the Rift Valley and coastal provinces. For the sake of political expedi-
ency they were perceived as “alien,” and were often linked with the main opposi-
tion political parties.51 Such displacement has been a major cause of landlessness
and poverty among the affected communities. At times, environmental narratives
characterized the discourses on the national politics of dispossession. In the bid
to defend their respective communities’ claim to land in the Rift Valley, some
local political elite alleged that environmental degradation by “alien” com-
munities settled in the Province was decimating the land-based economic
viability of the “native” communities. The solution, they argued, was to expel
them from the settled areas.52
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 255
While these conflicts assumed a political dimension, commissions of inquiry
appointed to examine their causes have identified land issues, aided by state
institutional malpractices, at their core.53 This is particularly the case with the
2007 post-election violence that marked the worst conflict to underline failure by
the government to address land grievances in Kenya since the Mau Mau uprising
in the 1950s.54 The destabilization of Rift Valley Province and other parts of
Kenya where land, settlement programs, and landlessness are sensitive attests to
the unresolved land distribution problems. Politicization and ethnicization of
landownership in those areas has in fact taken on an economic dimension, as the
mass displacement of thousands from their farms since the early 1990s has left
those affected without resource ownership.55

Missed opportunities
A historical analysis of poverty trends across Kenya’s rural farming com-
munities in agricultural potential areas thus reveals that land shortages have
been a major contributing factor. These shortages, while not far from being
“artificial” in some instances, have been created mainly by government pol-
icies.56 Landlessness and related economic and social problems have largely
been a political problem requiring a political solution. Successive governments
since 1963 have missed out on opportunities provided by moments of political
transition to assuage the land problem in Kenya. Kenyatta’s government failed
to capitalize on the nationalist momentum and the inflow of international capital
– even with its dependency implications – to completely eliminate the problem.
By 1975, all institutional guarantees for ownership rights and equal distribution
of national natural resources had been eliminated. For its part, between 1978
and 1990, the Nyayo government recognized agriculture as a key means to
national progress and particularly expanded both large- and small-scale tea
sectors. However, it achieved consolidation at the expense of the existing tradi-
tionally lucrative cash crops such as coffee.57 Any likely economic hits on the
agricultural sector due to an unstable international economic crisis were likely
to be exacerbated by a stalled industrial manufacturing sector for most of the
1980s.58 More importantly, these cash crop sectors were promoted in the fringes
of Central and Rift Valley areas where landlessness was still an endemic
problem for thousands of unsettled families. Therefore, while the well-to-do
small- and large-scale cash crop farmers in these regions may have benefited
from any forms of agricultural development, such benefits were out of reach for
the poor and landless farmers. The possibility of extreme economic gaps
between these rural groups is because, by 1988, the heyday of the Nyayo gov-
ernment, about 70 percent of households located in rural areas depended on
non-wage, farm-related income.59
While targeting the agricultural sector as the driver for economic growth, the
Moi government remained uncommitted to addressing the systemic inequalities
in land distribution. This only exposed the contradictions in state policy in agri-
cultural development that attempted to expand production through a resource to
256 M.S. Shanguhyia
which differential access reproduced social and economic difficulties in the quest
for overall development.
The District Focus in Rural Development, a hallmark in the Nyayo govern-
ment’s approach to national development, aimed more at reducing resource dis-
parities between regions and ethnic groups than eliminating inequalities in the
distribution of personal income that was responsible for accentuating class divi-
sions. It was as much a strategy to redirect resources from the dominantly
Kikuyu Central Province to the less developed regions associated with KANU’s
power base, as it was a means of promoting populist development policies.60
Furthermore, the disappearance of efficiency in national institutions in land
management and distribution may have matured during this period, with no
forms of accountability and transparency in land programs. The consequence has
been massive “land grabbing” whose magnitude, while not unexpected, was
revealed in 2004 by a Commission of Inquiry into illegal allocation and irregular
allocation of public land in Kenya.61
Following the onset of multi-party politics, KANU politicians exploited the
weak institutions governing property rights in land to dominate certain political
constituencies in both rural and urban areas. They did so by grabbing and ille-
gally allocating land to their supporters as “political reward.”62 Allocation of
land to landless communities as part of a grand political scheme to gain popular
support on a national level was another of the KANU leadership’s strategies. In
the run-up to the General Elections in 1997, about 700 Kikuyu families displaced
from their farms in the Rift Valley by political clashes in 1992 were resettled
and awarded security titles by the KANU government in a move that critics
interpreted as politicizing land more for political gain than a genuine solution to
landlessness.63 By 2001, the government had gazetted and allocated about
3,301.01 hectares of the vast Mau Forest Reserve for the settlement of the land-
less. Most of the space was allocated to members of one ethnic community,
denoting nepotism in national resource allocation.64 Elsewhere in the fertile
Mount Elgon region of the northwest Rift Valley, years of claims and counter-
claims to land between the local ethnic communities seemed to have been settled
by a government-mediated reallocation scheme initiated in the late 1980s but
dissipated under poor administration and political interference.65
Increased political liberalization since the 1990s has been unaccompanied by
a commitment to land redistribution reforms. While succumbing to internal and
external pressure to legitimize political pluralism, the KANU political elite,
undercut by the drying up of foreign aid from the Nordic and other major
Western donors, turned to national resources such as land as what Jacqueline
Klopp describes “an attractive patronage asset.”66 This is because land is a highly
accessible resource, and unlikely to be subjected to international scrutiny. Polit-
ical and administration officials seized on the opportunities of the changing for-
tunes in Kenya’s political landscape to accelerate their accumulation of land,
anticipating a loss of their privileged access to such resources in the event of a
successful transition to an era of transparency and accountability.67 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that most of the illegal/irregular land allocations occurred
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 257
between 1990 and 2001, and involved key political elite in an alliance with an
entrenched indigenous economic section of the Kenyan community.68
The end of KANU’s grip on power and the ascent to leadership by the
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 raised hopes that Kenya would
move away from a stunted path of past political failures towards politics of
genuine socioeconomic change and development. Generally, the constitutional
reform process has been gradual and fairly successful, culminating in the adop-
tion of a new national constitution that was endorsed through a landslide refer-
endum in 2005. Meanwhile, the overall question of the land reform process has
persisted and seems to be the sore spot in Kenya’s new-era regime.
Since 2002, land has remained central to the debates about the future of the
“new” Kenya. Tensions and conflicts between landless families and those who
own large shares of land have persisted. Traditionally land-sensitive geograph-
ical parts of the country, notably the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces, have con-
tinued to witness tensions over differential access to land. Most important, class
interests, themselves supported by political connections, have become reminis-
cent of the nature of struggles over land and unequal distribution of this resource
under previous regimes.
Sustained demand by the Maasai for restitution of their rights to land dispos-
sessed from them by Britain in the colonial period has continuously placed
Kenya’s land reform program in the international limelight, while demonstrating
the postcolonial government’s insensitivity to poverty and disenchantment gen-
erated by landlessness. Lack of state commitment to resolving the longest griev-
ance over land in Kenya’s history has also exposed a continued alliance between
Kenya’s political elite and international investors in land even during this period
of political liberalization. Maasai claims to land in Laikipia, traditionally deemed
their original land that was alienated by the British, has been stalled most
recently due to a perceived connection between interests of the political elite
keen on buying ranches in Laikipia and the European private owners of those
enterprises whose 99-year leases were due to expire.69 Thus, in spite of the
“triumph” of democracy enabled by mass participation and propelled by an
enthusiasm for change in the existing terms of property ownership rights, class
and political rights of a seemingly old political elite continue to be an impedi-
ment in Kenya.
NARC was also left to grapple with families that were internally displaced by
KANU’s “Majimbo politics” of the early 1990s. By September 2004, approxi-
mately 400,000 such families were yet to be settled, a number that seemed to
complicate the land question for the government. The Minister for Lands con-
firmed the lack of an established mechanism for confronting landlessness in
general, and of settling the internally displaced families in particular.70 However,
there was a contradiction to the government response to internal displacement as
well. As members of the opposition, NARC politicians had confronted the
KANU regime in the 1990s and called for the resettlement of the uprooted com-
munities. Once they found themselves in positions of power in the post-KANU
era, they seemed unwilling to compromise interests in land by their ilk.71
258 M.S. Shanguhyia
Suspicions about NARC’s entrenched interests in a land redistribution
program seemed to be confirmed by emerging concerns within the public that
the government planned to sabotage important findings on illegal land allocation
in Kenya. The NARC government’s decision to appoint a Commission of
Inquiry in July 2003 to investigate these allocations was part of a new commit-
ment to fight endemic graft in government, and a way of charting a reformist
path by the new government. Nevertheless, once the Commission’s findings
implicated the existing political elite as major players in past illegal land alloca-
tions that had derailed the land reform program, concerns were raised about the
unwillingness of the government to make the findings public. A collusion of
political interests sustained over the years from the Kenyatta through Moi to
Kibaki’s administrations was widely seen as the major reason for the hesitation
to make public the findings of the Ndung’u Commission.72 Indeed, when the
Commission’s report was made public, the findings were a confirmation of the
breakdown in government institutions in the land sector and of the role of access
to political power in misallocation of public land since independence. Public
land in preserved forest areas and riparian ecologies and land set aside for agri-
cultural and recreational purposes had all been “grabbed” as private property
largey for the purposes of economic speculation.73
These revelations emerged in the wake of increasing demands for access to
land by landless and poor communities and for reforms in the land sector that
would narrow economic gaps between the few landed individuals and the poor
sections of the state. By 2004, about 20 percent of the wealthiest individuals in
Kenya owned 51.2 percent of all arable land. Given that Kenya’s total land area
is about 582,650 square miles, and only 17 percent of this is arable land, there is
an acute distribution of productive land in favor of a few individuals within the
population. Such statistical evidence tended to increase national concerns that
existing political interests in land would preclude successful reform in land
redistribution to benefit the poorer sections of the country.74 Generally, however,
the entanglement of politics and land has continued to define Kenya’s land
reform dilemma. If the recent trends at the turn of the twenty-first century con-
tinue to show a perpetuation of political and economic “aristocrats” who have
sacrosanct interests in land, overall land reform to address landlessness may con-
tinue to be the grindstone of Kenya’s national politics and inclusive national
development efforts. In spite of a change of government through democratically
fashioned institutions, the “old” personnel with a strong interest in national
resource accumulation for private gain still dominates Kenya’s productive land-
scapes. Consequently, as Daniel Branch has noted, the transition to power by
NARC in the historic elections of 2002 enabled the former KANU elite with a
propensity to dominate Kenya to morph into leadership in the post-Moi era. It is
this cadre of politicians, keen to reserve land as a political instrument, that have
“helped keep Kenya stuck in its past.”75 The possible influence of this clique of
the political elite was the key to the outcome of the conflict that marked the
bungled 2007 General Election. The 2007 post-election violence, fought around
a contested election, was amplified in provinces such as the Rift Valley, where
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 259
successive governments have failed to successfully address land reforms. Histor-
ical injustices as regards land grievances enabled by inefficient land resettlement
schemes, and the NARC government’s bidding on the land question, were
important issues in the violence that mired those elections.76

The civil society and the quest for land reform in Kenya
Over the years, but particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, representative institu-
tions such as the parliamentary system and political parties that served as
domains for advocating a rational land reform program were subverted by the
political elite as well.77 Thus, for a long time since independence, the use of
national politics to advocate radical changes in land redistribution programs in
Kenya has been challenged by the political elite with interests embedded in land.
Even where any of Kenya’s past regimes may have wanted to confront illegal
allocation of public land, they have lacked the political will to do so.78 Con-
sequently, the quest for reform to address inequality in land distribution and the
poverty that this produces has been left to the civil society. This development
has coincided with the rise of political liberalization in the early 1990s. Grass-
roots movements, professional organizations, faith-based institutions, human-
itarian groups, and the media in particular have provided the means by which
vulnerable sections of Kenyan society have confronted the seemingly hegemonic
state practices, institutions, and agents that impede reforms in property
ownership.
Having lost faith in government to deliver, non-state actors have organized
movements that have been effective vehicles for either enforcing change in gov-
ernment practice, or enabled communities and individuals to act on their own
initiative. Following threats posed to public land reserves in urban and rural
areas, Wangari Maathai and the Green Belt Movement mobilized social protests
against-land grabbing tendencies in the charged political environment of the
1990s. The emergence of such civil society movements was enabled by the
shrinking power of the state due to external pressure from international donors
who now channeled aid to such movements to challenge state hegemony and its
contributions to it.79 As individual institutions, or under the aegis of the National
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), churches in Kenya have often allied
with other civil organizations to effect state policies with regard to governance
as it affects distribution of national public resources. The NCCK played a key
role in pressuring the KANU regime to liberalize politics in the early 1990s.80
Churches in areas riven by land-related strife have been critical in administering
to the needs of the internally displaced, while putting pressure on the state to
address land distribution issues.81
Humanitarian groups have taken up or mediated land petitions by landless
communities against the state. More often than not, demands for access to land
and unjust dispossession, especially in the wake of sustained revival of the
Maasai land claims that have never been resolved, have led to the representation
of land grievances in Kenya as a human rights issue. The Kenya National Human
260 M.S. Shanguhyia
Rights chapter has defined the problem as an economic one in the sense that it
broadens the gap between the rich and the poor, which the government needs to
address on moral principles.82
The liberalization of the media probably holds the edge in “policing” state pol-
icies in resource management in view of public demand for equitable access. The
media in Kenya have been instrumental not only in orchestrating the introduction
of multi-party politics in Kenya but have also exerted constant pressure on
Kenyan regimes since 1992 for transparency and accountability. More than ever
before, the media have been responsible for ensuring that the post-KANU regimes
be accountable and act on stunted land reforms. Members of the legal profession
have interpreted and simplified the constitutional rights to property ownership for
the ordinary citizen, taking advantage of the vibrant media to run informative
commentaries in land rights and state engagement with land reforms.
As a result, the gender dimension to property rights has been outlined in ways
that empower women and to challenge the state to use the opportunities afforded
by the constitutional reform process in Kenya’s new political dispensation to
resolve landlessness and inequality in landownership among women. Up until
the new National Land Policy adopted in 2009, women were barred by historical
and cultural impediments from owning land in Kenya, thereby marginalizing
them to the landless or poor classes of Kenya.83 Women comprise about half of
Kenya’s adult population. About 70 percent of heads of households in Kenya’s
informal settlements have been relegated to the fringes of ownership of land,
Kenya’s most important national resource.84
In its new land policy the government pledged to eliminate cultural barriers
such as matrimonial property ownership biases to facilitate women’s access to
land. However, the policy does not recognize women as among the most vulner-
able groups affected by poverty and deprivation, thereby needing guaranteed
protection of land rights. Not considering women’s vulnerability to exploitation
when addressing women’s poverty and lack of landownership, even within any
forms of amended legal structures, could still open them to exclusion in the
equitable distribution of land resources.
Non-state actors, particularly civil and professional organizations, have moni-
tored and contributed input towards the development of Kenya’s National Land
Policy adopted in 2009. The Kenya Land Alliance (KLA), a non-profit and non-
partisan organization founded in 1999 to coordinate civil society organizations
and individuals who advocate for land reform in Kenya, has played a pivotal role
in monitoring the reform agenda that culminated in the establishment of the
National Land Policy. Since land issues pervade every sphere of Kenya’s public
life, the KLA has also actively advocated the need for efficient, all-inclusive land
reforms through regular contributions to negotiations that have resulted in
Kenya’s new constitution. Together with other non-state actors that have
empowered civic participation in efforts to redress impediments to equal land
distribution, the KLA led the launching of the new land policy in Nakuru on
June 26, 2009. The launch was deliberately organized to coincide with Inter-
national Torture Day, symbolic of the increased recognition that politically
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 261
motivated land grievances produce not only a physical and economic dislocation
but also psychological effects for those who are marginalized by such politics.85
The promulgation of the Kenya Land Policy has been hailed as a major land-
mark by stakeholders within and outside of Kenya. Some external donors whose
financial and technical support remains key to successful land reforms have
hailed this development as impressive and informative in confronting Kenya’s
long-standing problem.86 While stakeholders view the new land policy favor-
ably, their consensus that Kenya’s land problem is a historical problem rooted in
the past has tended to create skepticism when mooted solutions imply ensuring
restitution of rights to those marginalized by historical processes of disposition.
This is because “layers of injustice” cemented by ethnic proclivities to land in
certain sensitive regions, as well as entrenched class interests, are likely to
“become fodder for unscrupulous politicians who are more interested in using
[land] issues to drive political wedges to their own advantages than in resolving
those issues.”87
Therefore, political commitment remains an essential condition to successful
reform aimed at making land available to the poor and landless in both rural and
urban areas. Since this is a dilemma deeply embedded in Kenya’s resource
sector, change will benefit from piecemeal, gradual reforms. Meanwhile the
strengthening of local civil institutions and professional groups, as well as the
meaningful involvement of external donors, remains a viable option to guarding
the gains made in the land reform sector in Kenya. Continued expansion in polit-
ical space will allow for increased public participation in the reform agenda that
promises to improve the economic lot of the poor and the marginalized popula-
tions on account of skewed land distribution and overall state support in the agri-
cultural and urban sectors that rely on land.

Conclusion
Access to and ownership of land remains the key means to navigating successful
livelihoods for a majority of rural communities in Kenya that depend on land-
based production. Yet the way land relations in Kenya have been constituted
since colonial times undermines the possibility of access to this resource by
thousands of families given that a small but influential political section of the
state owns land. In addition, this section is charged with the responsibility of
reforming the land sector, but it has consistently failed to deliver on this agenda,
thereby exacerbating landlessness and attendant economic and social insecurity.
Positive gains in the political arena since the 1990s are a major milestone in
undermining the political structures that have hindered land reforms since inde-
pendence. However, more than the political leaders that have presided over this
political transformation, the civil service sector has helped propel Kenya on the
path to political change which still holds the potential to influence a successful
land reform program that will help narrow gaps in landownership in Kenya. This
in turn is likely to provide solutions to economic poverty for a majority of the
rural populations in the country.
262 M.S. Shanguhyia
Notes
1 Kenya: Development Plan, 1979–1983, Vols 1 and 2 (Nairobi: Government Press,
1979), 21.
2 Milton J. Esman, Landlessness and Near-landlessness in Developing Countries
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, 1978), 2.
3 Ibid., 3–4; Radha Sinha, Landlessness: A Growing Problem (Rome: FAO, 1984), 18,
22–28.
4 Joel Greer and Erik Thorbecke, “Food Poverty Profile Applied to Kenyan Smallhold-
ers.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (1996): 130.
5 Alain de Janvry et al. (eds), Access to Land, Rural Poverty, and Public Action
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1.
6 Ibid., 4–6; Sinha, Landlessness, 1.
7 Sinha, Landlessness, 2.
8 There are many studies, both classic and recent, that analyze Kenya’s post-
independence land reform programs. For a brief description, see William J. House
and Tony Killick, “Social Justice and Development Policy in Kenya’s Rural
Economy,” in Dharam Ghai and Samir Radwan (eds), Agrarian Policies and Rural
Poverty in Africa (Geneva: ILO, 1983), 46–53.
9 Ibid., 53.
10 Consequently, recent scholarship that analyzed the implications of recent political
changes in Kenya on land relations seems to agree that in spite of provisions for a
land policy in Kenya’s new constitution, land is likely to remain a trigger for political
conflict in the country because it plays a key role in Kenya’s “redistributive game” in
national politics. Jacqueline M. Klopp, “Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land
Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya.” Africa Today 47, no. 1 (2000): 8; see also Cather-
ine Boone, “Land Conflict and Distributive Politics in Kenya.” African Studies Review
55, no. 1 (2012): 75–103.
11 For Harbeson, the future of Kenya’s democracy and political stability hinges on the
outcome of this seemingly contradictory arrangement. John Harbeson, “Land and the
Quest for a Democratic State in Kenya.” African Studies Review 55, no. 1 (2012): 29.
12 York W. Bradshaw, “Perpetuating Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Link between
Agriculture, Class, and State.” African Studies Review 33, no. 1 (1990): 15.
13 Sobhan Rehman, Agrarian Reform and Social Transformation: Preconditions for
Development (London: Zed Books, 1993), 127.
14 While “civil society” means different things to different people, as used here it refers
to the “traditional liberal definition that regards it as a sphere of intermediate associ-
ations that are not tied to either the household or the state, but performs a democratic
function in the public realm.” Padraig Carmody, Neoliberalism, Civil Society and
Security in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 28–29. Yet, ideally, there
are civil society organizations, such as NGOs that work directly and identify them-
selves with impoverished populations so as to address their plight.
15 The argument for the importance of “pressure from below” with regard to the recent
and ongoing political and socioeconomic reforms has been explicit in recent studies
focusing on these changes. See a special issue on “The Political Economy of Demo-
cratic Reform in Kenya.” African Studies Review 55, no. 1 (2012): 13–103.
16 The World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2000), 72–73. On further analysis on the link between civil society and governance
see Carmody, Neoliberalism, 31–56.
17 Carmody, Neoliberalism, 57–190.
18 Ward Anseeuw and Chris Alden, The Struggle over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics
and Change (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2010); Jocylen Alexander, The Unsettled
Land: State-making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003 (Athens:
Ohio University Press, 2003); Sam Moyo and Ousman Suliman, The Darfur Conflict:
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 263
Geography or Institutions? (New York: Routledge, 2011); Guma Kunda Komey,
Land, Governance, Conflict and the Nuba of Sudan (London: James Currey,
2010); An Ansoms and Stefan Marysse (eds), Natural Resources and Local Liveli-
hoods in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Political Economy Perspective (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Gunther Schlee and Abdulahi A. Shongolo, Pasto-
ralism and Politics in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia (London: James Currey,
2012).
19 Lael Brainard and Derrick Chollet (eds), Too Poor for Peace: Global Poverty, Con-
flict, and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2007), 1–30.
20 The most vivid analysis of the growth and consequences of the squatter communities
in colonial Kenya is Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and Roots of Mau Mau (London:
James Currey, 1987); also Philip M. Mbithi and Carolyn Barnes, Spontaneous Settle-
ment Problem in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975).
21 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya (London: James Currey,
1990), 408.
22 Kanogo, Squatters and Roots, 163.
23 A number of studies have focused on the mechanisms used to decolonize the White
Highlands in Kenya. See esp. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political
Economy of Neo-colonialism (London: Heinemann, 1975); Gary Wasserman, Politics
of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue, 1960–1965 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976); Christopher Leo, Land and Class in Kenya
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).
24 Leo, Land and Class in Kenya, 124.
25 John Harbeson, “Land Reforms and Politics in Kenya, 1954–70.” Journal of Modern
African Studies 9, no. 2 (1971): 240.
26 Ibid.: 242; Leo, Land and Class in Kenya, 124–125; Leys, Underdevelopment in
Kenya, 73–75.
27 Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, 92–93.
28 Leo, Land and Class in Kenya, 120, 125.
29 Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, 182–183; also Miller and Yeager, Kenya, 49–50.
According to Miller and Yeager, such landless families were also employed on large-
scale government farms created from former European farms.
30 Republic of Kenya Economic Survey (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971), 77; Leys,
Underdevelopment in Kenya, 75.
31 House and Killick, “Social Justice and Development,” 47.
32 Kenya: Development Plan, 1979–1983, 21.
33 Miller and Yeager, Kenya, 50; for an analysis of these developments into the 1980s,
see Kate Currie and Larry Ray, “The Kenya State, Agribusiness, and the Peasantry.”
Review of African Political Economy no. 38 (1987), 93–94; also Angelique Haugerud,
“Land Tenure and Agrarian Change in Kenya.” Africa: Journal of the International
African Institute 59, no. 1 (1989): 65.
34 Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party State in Kenya: From “Harambee” to
“Nyayo” (Berkeley: University of California Press (1991), 81.
35 Mbithi and Barnes, The Spontaneous Settlement, 74, 77.
36 Daniel Branch, Kenya, Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2011), 95–96.
37 Henry Bienen, Kenya, The Politics of Participation and Control (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1974), 21.
38 Berman, Control and Crisis, 408.
39 Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, 65–66.
40 Branch, Kenya, 103; Miller and Yeager, Kenya, 51.
41 Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, 192, 198–200; Harbeson, Land Reforms, 245–246.
42 Widner, The Rise of a Party State in Kenya, 43–47, 61.
264 M.S. Shanguhyia
43 With regard to the marginalization of Mau Mau squatters in the post-independence
programs, see Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, 179–207.
44 Branch, Kenya, 105–109.
45 With regard to the government crackdown on KPU and its supporters, as well as the
assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki over his scathing criticism of the govern-
ment’s handling of the land reform program and unmetered corruption that bred
poverty among thousands in Kenya, see Widner, The Rise of a Party State, 58–69,
84–109; Branch, Kenya, 110–120.
46 Widner, The Rise of a Party State, 28.
47 For a detailed analysis of KADU versus KANU’s constitutional approach to ruling
Kenya during nationalist politics between 1960 and 1964, see Robert Maxon, Kenya’s
Independence Constitution: Constitution-making and End of Empire (Plymouth: Fair-
leigh Dickinson University Press, 2011), ch. 3.
48 Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya, A Kenya
Human Rights Commission Report (Nairobi, Kenya, 1998), 10–13; Human Rights
Watch/Africa, Divide and Rule, 12–13; see also Report of the Parliamentary Select
Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya
(September 1992), 9–10.
49 “Can Majimboism Work.” Kenya Times, May 20, 1993; “Majimboism: Pros and
Cons.” Kenya Times, May 21, 1993.
50 Jacqueline Klopp, “Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for
Land and Nation in Kenya.” African Studies 61, no. 2 (2002): 270.
51 Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya,
July 31, 1999.
52 Killing the Vote, 28; Report of the Judicial Commission, 167; see also Klopp, “Ethic
Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism.” Cana-
dian Journal of African Studies 35, no. 3 (2001): 473–517.
53 “Kenya Human Rights Commission, Special Edition on Post-election Violence.
Human Rights Report 10, no. 1 (January–June 2008): 30–34.
54 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A
Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence (August 15, 2008).
55 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Special Edition on Post-election Violence, 18.
56 In September 2004, the Minister for Lands still regarded claims of landlessness as
“artificial.” East African Standard, September 12, 2004.
57 Widner, The Rise of a Party State in Kenya, 183–187.
58 Frank Holmquist, Frederick S. Weaver, and Michael T. Ford, “The Structural Devel-
opment of Kenya’s Political Economy.” African Studies Review 37, no. 1 (1994): 91.
59 Mwangi WaGithinji, Ten Millionaires and Ten Million Beggars: A Study of Income
Distribution and Development in Kenya (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000), 34.
60 Joel D. Barkan and Michael Chege, “Decentralizing the State: District Focus and the
Politics of Reallocation in Kenya.” Journal of Modern African Studies 27, no. 3
(1989): 436.
61 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public
Land (June 2004).
62 Ibid., 8; Onoma, The Politics of Property Rights, 160–161.
63 Killing the Vote, 32; Daily Nation, December 3, 1997.
64 Steve Mukawale, “Land Deal Gone Sour.” East African Standard, October 23, 2004.
65 Clare Medard, “Indegenous Land Claims in Kenya: A Case Study of Chebyuk, Mount
Elgon District,” in Anseeuw and Alden, The Struggle Over Land in Africa, 1935.
66 Klopp, “Pilfering the Public,” 8.
67 Ibid.
68 Report of the Commission, 8.
69 East African Standard, August 25, 2004; East African Standard, August 27, 2004;
East African Standard, September 12, 2004.
 Reform, landlessness, and poverty in Kenya 265
70 East African Standard, September 12, 2004.
71 Mumbi Ngugi, “Land Woes: Redressing Historical Wrongs.” East African Standard,
September 11, 2004.
72 Kwendo Opanga, “Will Kibaki Address the Land Problem.” East African Standard,
September 12, 2004; “Cover up Feared Over Land Report.” East African Standard,
September 12, 2004.
73 See the executive summary of the findings in Report of the Commission of Inquiry.
74 Commentary by Oduor Ongwen, “Kibaki Should Release the Ndung’u Report.” East
African Standard, July 28, 2004.
75 Branch, Kenya, 245, 246–299.
76 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice, 17.
77 Widner, The Rise of a Party State, 39–74, 100–106.
78 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 18.
79 Branch, Kenya, 186; Wangari Maathai, The Green Belt Movement: Sharing the
Approach and the Experience (New York: Lantern Books, 2003); Wangari Maathai,
Unbowed: A Memoir (New York: Knopf, 2006).
80 Widner, The Rise of a Party State, 190–192.
81 Killing the Vote, 30–31.
82 East African Standard, August 27, 2004.
83 This shortcoming was recognized in the new land policy. Republic of Kenya, Ses-
sional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy (August 2009), 52.
84 Ngugi, “Land Woes.”
85 Kenya Land Alliance, “Launching of the Kenya National Alliance,” Executive
Summary, June 26, 2009. Available at http://pdffree.info/launching-the-kenyan-
national-land-policy.html (accessed March 28, 2012).
86 USAID Kenya, Kenya Land Policy: Analysis and Recommendations (April 2008;
updated version, 2009).
87 Ibid., ix. Historical complexities of land reform are also made clear by the Kenya
Land Alliance in The National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing the Historical Injus-
tices, Issue Paper No. 2/2004.

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15 Extraversion and development in
northwestern Ethiopia
The case of the Humera Agricultural
Project, 1967 to 1975
Luca Puddu

Introduction
This chapter takes into account a case study of rural development in the Ethio-
pian borderlands and the points of contact with contemporary patterns of agri-
cultural modernization. For this purpose, both primary as well as secondary
sources are used. Primary sources have been collected in the archives of the
World Bank Group, the National Archives and Record Administration at Mary-
land, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the National Archives of
Great Britain at Kew Garden to analyze the World Bank-financed Humera Agri-
cultural Project, which was undertaken between 1969 and 1975 in the northwest-
ern lowland of Ethiopia. While Western donors intended agricultural
development in purely economic terms, the imperial regime appropriated foreign
capital and technologies to strengthen its claims over the contested border and
transform de jure sovereignty into de facto territorial control. Findings from the
Humera project shed light on the interconnection between contemporary patterns
of rural development and longue durée trajectories of state formation in the
lowland peripheries of Ethiopia.
The media and academia have recently devoted much attention to the issue of
“land-grabbing” and Western-financed rural development programs in the Global
South. Large land leases are justified on the grounds of their capacity to promote
economic growth, connect dispersed and technologically backward small land
holders into global value chains, or facilitate small land holders’ way out of agri-
culture. Western-backed land reforms support this process by creating more
clearly defined land rights and promoting new land markets, which in turn allows
the transfer of landownership to the most productive farmers.1
Ethiopia is one of the main recipients of Western development aid and large-
scale land investments.2 Often portrayed as a successful example of the develop-
mental state, its rural development policy has nonetheless been a major bone of
contention with international donors. The official rural modernization strategy
tries to keep together two contradictory elements: Western-backed ideas that
rural development should promote private sector enterprise, and market forma-
tion by formalizing and securing farmers’ land rights. The Ethiopian government
believes that state ownership of land and strong intervention in the national
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 269
economy are necessary to avoid rent-seeking activities and adverse effects on
the rural poor.3 Authors have highlighted that behind formal representations of
rural development programs as vehicles of modernization lie a deep restructur-
ing of state–society and center–periphery relations in favor of the former. Works
have focused on the consequences in terms of changing access to resources for
local communities.4 When concerned with the reasons behind government inter-
vention, they highlight their connection with new global food regimes5 or
analyze rural policies within the framework of contemporary ethnic federalism
and the ideological commitment of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front.6
In this chapter, a historical approach to the issue of foreign aid and rural
development in Ethiopia is used to locate the argument within the framework of
a longue durée trajectory of state building and to address the root causes of con-
temporary development policies in the lowlands of the country, where joint pri-
vate–public intervention is more prominent. Archival research has, in this
perspective, shed light on the real concerns behind government intervention in
its fringe peripheries and helped reveal the nature of the relationship between
foreign donors and recipient countries. I focus on the Humera Agricultural
Project, undertaken in northwestern Ethiopia between 1969 and 1975 with
Western technical and financial assistance. Findings from Setit Humera highlight
how the Ethiopian state appropriated Western rhetoric of rural development to
increase de facto sovereignty over its fringe periphery. Territorialization of state
power, not economic development in its Western fashion, was the final goal of
the Ethiopian Empire.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the
possibilities of applying the paradigm of extraversion to the trajectory of state
formation in modern Ethiopia. It also provides a short overview on the process
of political centralization undertaken by Haile Selassie after 1941. The second
section focuses on the Setit Humera region in northwestern Ethiopia and the
intended outcomes of the World Bank-financed Humera Agricultural Project.
The third section describes how the imperial regime appropriated foreign tech-
nologies and financial flows to realize goals other than those anticipated by
foreign patrons. Archival documents reveal why Western donors were not able
to put significant pressure on the Ethiopian government. The final section high-
lights the similarities between past and contemporary patterns of government
intervention in the western lowlands, providing a short picture of development
policies in the Gambella Regional State.

State building and extraversion in modern Ethiopia

In analyzing the longue durée process of state building in sub-Saharan Africa,
Jean Francois Bayart developed the concept of extraversion to argue that local
societies, constrained by the difficulty of making their power autonomous, delib-
erately turned the external environment into a major resource in the process of
political centralization.7 The Ethiopian state-building trajectory may well fall
270 L. Puddu
within the same paradigm.8 Continuing attempts to adopt cultural models
imported from abroad mark the country’s recent history, following what
Clapham defines as “the politics of emulation.”9 The access to external material
resources allowed Ethiopian emperors to undertake the twofold process of terri-
torial expansion and political centralization between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. At the same time, from the Treaty of Uccialli to the contemporary
insertion of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front within the
framework of the global war on terror, attempts to mislead foreign patrons and
reshape narratives of local people in conformity with national interests charac-
terize this relationship. In many ways, such strategies recall Bayart’s concept of
trickery, defined as “the quality which allows a person to manipulate hostile
forces, too powerful to be confronted directly, but which can be turned into good
account in such a way as to be useful for one’s own purpose.”10
The trajectory of state formation in Ethiopia has nevertheless some distinctive
features that make it a unique case study in sub-Saharan Africa, having commo-
nalities both with the European experience and postcolonial processes elsewhere
in the continent.11 On the one hand, the technologies of rule adopted by Ethio-
pian rulers in the highlands shared many points of contact with European feudal
arrangements. The categories of gult and gebbar, namely the former giving the
overlord power to collect tributes from the latter, mediated the territorialization
of imperial power. In conquered territories, the gebbar–gultegna relationship
implied the spatial reorganization of the political and economic realm through
land expropriation and distribution to highland military settlers (neftennya) and
local nobles (balabbat) incorporated within the administrative structure.12 On the
other hand, state presence in the lowland peripheries not suited to sedentary agri-
culture was often nominal owing to the difficulty of imposing the techniques of
controlling the highlands that were dominated by a highly mobile nomadic
people.13 Moreover, the demarcation of international borders did not result from
violent geo-political competition with neighboring states but were a consequence
of international agreements with colonial powers. Following World War II,
internal as well as external factors shaped the dichotomy between the highlands
and lowlands. On the one hand, Haile Selassie exploited his diplomatic leverage
by allowing large inflows of foreign assistance from the United States and their
Western allies, transforming a loosely feudal monarchy into a modern, central-
ized state.14 Agricultural development programs were undertaken in the eastern
and western lowlands to create new sources of revenue and reduce the political
leverage of the rural aristocracy in the Christian highlands. Political centraliza-
tion paralleled the creation of a government-controlled salary structure for civil
servants and the military in place of the old tributary system. The Emporer
directly appointed the governors of the recently established administrative units
at the provincial (awraja) level, which traditionally belonged to the local aristo-
cracy. District (woreda) and sub-district (miktel-woreda) governors were subju-
gated to the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Overlords outside of the
Abyssinian core were deprived of their political role and were gradually trans-
formed into landlords, while gebbar peasants often became tenants of their
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 271
former patrons. On the other hand, poor colonial boundary demarcations left
15

new, independent states in the Horn of Africa with a heritage of contested

administrative frontiers, increasing attempts to impose a more effective presence
upon resource-rich border areas.16 Water wells, settlement projects, and village
programs became the tools to win the hearts and minds of border peoples, as
well as to sanction the effective appropriation of frontier spaces by the central
state.
The epistemology of development legitimized government intervention. Even
if formally embedded in concepts of free market and private initiative, moderni-
zation theory supported the state taking an active role in promoting Walt W.
Rostow’s “take-off ” stage of the economy.17 In this perspective, as much as
colonial administrators used European technology to shape the economy of
African colonies, FAO- and World Bank-sponsored rural development programs
provided the Ethiopian regime with the practical and managerial technologies to
shape the economy of the periphery and to facilitate the process of nation build-
ing along the trajectory codified in Western experience. Managerial technologies
were the general principles about what the economy should be like: the introduc-
tion of commercial agriculture and the transition to individual property rights
were intended to improve farmers’ productivity and rural governance. The distri-
bution of modern agricultural inputs and credit facilities, as well as the construc-
tion of transportation infrastructures, were the procedures to change the economy
of the lowlands for the needs of the center.18 Western donors looked at the issue
of rural development in economic terms. Land was a valuable commodity. State
intervention was aimed at increasing cash crop production for the needs of
import substitution. To this aim, since 1954 the FAO attached an economic
advisor to the Ethiopian government to prepare a multi-year plan for textile
industrialization.19 On the contrary, for Ethiopian rulers, cotton development
programs also assumed a strategic significance. The diffusion of cash crop pro-
duction and the involvement of foreign capital allowed the imperial center to re-
elaborate the patterns of surplus extraction and authority.20 Moreover, cotton
being a non-consumable good, the insertion of selected areas of the country into
the value chain of textiles would reduce the margin of agricultural surplus
diverted by government agents at the periphery. The rhetoric of development
transformed vast no-man’s lands grazed by hostile peoples and claimed by
neighboring powers into valuable economic assets and legitimized the appropria-
tion of the frontier space by the Ethiopian state.

Agricultural modernization in Setit Humera

The Setit Humera district

The Setit Humera district lay in the corner of the borders of Sudan, Ethiopia, and
Eritrea, about 100 kilometers south of Tessenei and 380 kilometers north of the
capital of Begemder, Gondar. Barely inhabited by settled agriculturalists until
the 1950s owing to the harsh climate and the fear of malaria, agropastoral tribes
272 L. Puddu
linked by economic and social ties crossed the area by the Setit River and occu-
pied it, which challenged international borders.21 Since the nineteenth century,
the area had been a major source of disagreement between regional powers, and
several changes have occurred in the region. Ethiopian emperors competed with
their Sudanese counterparts to assert territorial claims through military expedi-
tions for cattle and slaves. During the colonial period, it was one of the strategic
outlets exploited by Italy to assert its economic influence over northern Abys-
sinia.22 The expansion of Ethiopian authority over the northwestern periphery
was mainly connected to tribute and slavery, without evolving in the gebbar–
gultegna relationship of the highlands. Original pastoral and agropastoral
inhabitants were referred to by the highlanders as Shanquilla, or dark-skinned
slaves, with local Ethiopian warlords at times competing with Sudanese mer-
chants for control of this profitable trade. Setit Humera was a classic example of
what Anthony Asiwaju terms a “frontier of separation,” where neither of the bor-
dering states claimed or exercised an effective authority and local peoples
remained independent as long as they did not obstruct the two larger powers.23 It
had economic links both with the Sudanese lowlands via the Sahelan caravan
trade and with the Ethiopian and Eritrean highlands. These links were forged
through the seasonal emigration of farmers into the fertile but environmentally
harsh escarpment. Because of its isolation from the outside world, exiled bandits
and political leaders often found refuge here.24 Even after World War II, the
exact demarcation of borders remained an unresolved issue. The boundary traced
by the United Kingdom in 1903 was a matter of controversy between Addis
Ababa and Khartoum: friction resulted around the allocation of land and water
rights to migrant farmers as well as the control over trade and tax revenues.25
Disputes were aggravated by the introduction of commercial agriculture.
Since the late 1950s, large-scale mechanized farming had proliferated in the Setit
Humera district, leading the joint FAO–World Bank appraisal mission in Ethio-
pia to describe it as “the most significant success story of Ethiopian agriculture
in recent years.”26 Farmers grew cotton along with sesame seeds and sorghum as
the main crops. Increased demand for cotton stemmed from Roberto Barattolo’s
cotton ginnery and textile factory located in Tesseney and Asmara, respectively.
Moreover, import tariffs and quotas kept cotton prices artificially high, and the
government encouraged foreign investments in mechanized agriculture through
financial incentives geared towards increased profits on exports and subsidies for
the purchase of tractors and fertilizers.27 Local communities devoted to pastoral-
ism did not engage in commercial agriculture. Consequently, large farms met
their seasonal labor needs through the influx of immigrants from the Christian
highlands of Begemder and Eritrea while local small land holders provided a
reserve of manpower during the peak harvesting season. In 1969, Setit Humera
produced 240,000 tons of sorghum, half of all domestic raw cotton, and 95
percent of the overall national production of sesame seeds. Out of a total agricul-
tural production of 450,000 metric tons, 399,000 tons were moved out of the
region through the Tessenei route.28
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 273
Financing rural development in Setit Humera
The World Bank Group and the Ethiopian government started negotiations for
the Humera Agricultural Project in 1967. The main goals of the project were: to
improve the balance of payments through increased cotton production to offset
the importation of raw material for the textile industry; to raise the volume of
direct taxes from the agricultural sector to counteract the downward tendency of
foreign trade revenues; and to promote the development of a rural entrepreneur-
ial class ready to exploit new market opportunities through the infusion of Green
Revolution technologies and the allocation of long-term property rights. To this
aim, the project was supposed to improve transportation networks, map the area
for better agricultural planning, provide agricultural credit to “progressive
farmers,” and create a land registration program.29
In the view of foreign consultants, road construction would have provided
farmers with new marketing outlets and greater economic incentives. The Setit
sub-district – the project area where large mechanized farming was more
developed – was relatively isolated from the rest of the country, especially in the
rainy season. Thus, the 1968 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)–
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) mission
strongly recommended the construction of a bridge crossing the Setit River and
an all-weather road linking the area to the underutilized cotton ginnery of Tess-
eney. Planners estimated that 1,500 hectares of additional land could be put into
production with a new road, in addition to the 8,500 hectares developed annually
without any transportation improvement.30
Cadastral surveys were the tools to put the national territory under the juris-
diction of legally separated entities and impose a new hierarchy where the state
was the only legitimate source of power. The transition from a constellation of
“consuetudinary” codes to a system of freehold rights sanctioned by law was, for
S.D. Clark, the FAO legal advisor in Ethiopia, a natural outcome of moderniza-
tion as the Weberian state developed the administrative capabilities to impose its
direct authority over specific areas.31 In this perspective, Setit Humera “idle”
lands were empty spaces where the multiple prerogatives of peasantry and nobil-
ity – so hard to overcome in the Christian highlands – were, in theory, non-
existent. Thus, they could be the perfect laboratory to spread concepts of
modernity and economic rationality.
Promoting technological innovation was the third pillar of the Humera
project. Setit Humera rain-fed agriculture was mainly based on extensive
farming methods: in 1967, estimated yields amounted to 300 kilograms of raw
cotton per hectare, making the venture profitable only because of artificially high
internal prices.32 An agricultural research station, partly financed by British
Overseas Development Assistance, would promote more efficient agricultural
practices. An effective agricultural credit policy would have facilitated the
purchase of modern inputs and fertilizers. Technological improvements were
expected to provide an estimated increase in yields of 400 percent within
the next six years, allowing production to meet international market standards.33
274 L. Puddu
The financial arm of the Green Revolution in Setit Humera was the Agricultural
and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB); a World Bank-financed and
government-controlled bank created in 1970, it was expected to facilitate access
to credit for commercial farmers engaged with agro-industrial crops, which
would have been able to purchase improved seeds, tractors, and fertilizers. Setit
Humera was explicitly cited as one of the main sites where the AIDB lending
activity was concentrated.
The provision of agricultural credit was strictly linked to granting secure
rights to land. The 1969 Appraisal Report inferred that the precarious nature of
land titles represented the main reason why the existing Development Bank of
Ethiopia failed to operate properly; statutory law required collateral in the form
of real estate.34 In response to this problem, the state should have been an inter-
mediary in allowing individuals to obtain long-term rights to idle, unexploited
land and transform it into a profitable venture. Other political motivations lay
behind the widespread perception within the World Bank mission of the fact that
“the ruling Amhara tribe had limited respect for other tribesmen property and
rights.”35 Up until then, the main beneficiaries of land grantees had usually been
state officers or former aristocratic overlords. The FAO–IBRD appraisal mis-
sion’s proposal to modify the procedures of allocation of government land com-
prised moving it from the Ministry of Interior to an inter-ministerial committee
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Land Reform, Planning and Agri-
culture. The mission was motivated by the concern to avoid the dissipation of
government lands for merely political purposes: Setit Humera concessionaires
should have been selected from among commercially experienced persons, with
moderate capital resources and entrepreneurship attitudes.36 A program of land
titling under the Ministry of Land Reform and the provision of 33-year or longer
leases would have freed these “model farmers” from any political conditionality,
fostering their propensity towards long-term investments in land.37

Development and territorialization in the northwestern

frontier
Officially, Western donors shared the same economic development agenda, fixed
by the decision, in 1969, to coordinate all bilateral aid programs under the
umbrella of the World Bank-led Consultative Group for Ethiopia. Nevertheless,
behind the surface, conflicting interests shaped this monolithic image. In the case
of the World Bank, the 1970s were a decade of transformation in the approach to
the issue of project lending. McNamara’s commitment to expand the range and
volume of financial loans translated into a general deterioration of Bank opera-
tions as bank officials were pressed to move to borrowing from countries as
much money as possible in order to meet the quantitative lending targets
imposed by the presidency.38 Moreover, imperial Ethiopia enjoyed a special rela-
tionship with the Bretton Woods Organization. It had been the first country in
sub-Saharan Africa to receive a loan in 1950; since 1968, the World Bank
had also taken the place of the United States as the main donor of Addis Ababa.
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 275
For Great Britain, early diplomatic and technical support for the Humera Project
was based on commercial reasons: the introduction of large mechanized farms in
the western lowlands opened up new opportunities for the export of British trac-
tors and spare parts as well as the involvement of British firms as technical con-
tractors.39 Instead, U.S. officials in Eritrea were more concerned with
strengthening Ethiopian control over the Northern Province. Kagnew Station,
located near Asmara, was one of the main American overseas military facilities
and a crucial asset in the worldwide communication network. Security concerns
underpinned official development façades. For instance, the American Consul at
Asmara saw Western assistance towards road construction in Eritrea as a tool to
increase the patrolling capacity of the Ethiopian armed forces engaged in
counter-insurgency operations.40
The Ethiopian government was able to play on these differences in pursuing
its own agenda. While the FAO–World Bank mission considered “idle” lands in
the western lowlands in terms of unexploited economic resources, for Addis
Ababa, the Setit Humera district assumed a military significance as a strategic
battlefield vis-à-vis Khartoum. Despite the constitution of a Joint Boundary
Commission in 1966, the unresolved frontier dispute between Sudan and Ethio-
pia nearly erupted into open conflict, fueled by skirmishes between farmers on
the two sides of the border. Moreover, in retaliation for the support of Khartoum
to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF ), Addis Ababa provided the Anya Anya
movement operating in Southern Sudan with a safe retreat in its territory. Alle-
gations of Ethiopian and Sudanese soldiers crossing the frontier to fight rebels
invaded the local press, igniting tensions on both sides.41 In 1967, following
claims that Sudanese troops had set fire to farmers’ crops within the Ethiopian
territory, 400 Ethiopian emergency police units armed with heavy artillery were
deployed along the boundary on the Setit River, with plans to increase this
number to 1,200 units.42 In such a situation, infrastructural development helped
promote the settlement of ethnic fellows from the Christian highlands. However,
beneficiaries were not selected for their entrepreneurial attitudes; instead, settle-
ment patterns followed the path historically embedded in the Abyssinian tradi-
tion of territorial expansion in the gebbar areas. As American officials reported
to Washington in February 1968, following a discussion between the Police
Commissioner General of the Begemder Province and the United States Public
Safety Program’s official, the higher authorities in Gondar and Addis Ababa
planned to encourage retired policemen and soldiers to settle the western low-
lands with the purpose of asserting the effective occupation of the territories bor-
dering Sudan. Veterans were allowed to purchase unsettled land at a cheap price;
in return, the government requested they be available for call-up in case of a
foreign invasion, operating as a shadow division of the Ethiopian Army.43
In addition, Addis Ababa exploited the new economic opportunities provided
by the Humera Agricultural Project to foster its political base. The 1955 Ethio-
pian Constitution declared all lands not held or possessed by any person be
placed in the public domain. On this basis, by 1963 the most valuable lands
in the Setit sub-district had been brought under the jurisdiction of the state.44
276 L. Puddu
The incorporation of fertile areas into the government’s portfolio provided the
imperial regime with new assets for political patronage, centralizing its authority
to grant government lands, a power previously vested in the hands of both the
Setit miktel-woreda and Setit Humera woreda governors, but now placed with
the office of the woreda and provincial governors. Lands in the Setit miktel-
woreda were granted to absentee government officials from the Christian high-
lands, who then hired migrant laborers to carry out field operations for them.45
The land tenure regime was very different from that envisaged by Western
partners. While embracing the idea of agricultural planning, the Ethiopian gov-
ernment resisted the full commoditization of land and the creation of a land
titling program, which would have freed farmers from the pervasive intrusion of
the state. Moreover, land grantees were larger than needed for the profitability of
the venture and, most of all, only temporary. Addis Ababa rejected farmers’
attempts to pay the land tax, which would have allowed the legal recognition of
their titles of ownership. Instead they were left with mere usufructuary rights
subjected to one-year renewal.46 The same patterns applied to the subsidies for
agricultural credit and inputs. Looking at the AIDB, the financial arm of the
“Green Revolution,” its commitments to Setit Humera mechanized farmers
amounted between 1970 and 1974 to 6.4 million Ethiopian dollars. Beneficiaries
of government land could thus borrow at lower interest rates than those available
to smallholders in the rest of the country.47 Along with credit policies, the expan-
sion of mechanized farming was further supported by very favorable fees for the
import of tractors and gasoline. The Ministry of Agriculture controlled how
permits for duty-free fuel were issued; as such it could address the development
of large commercial farming in selected areas.48 Setit Humera’s major farmers
obtained rapid returns on the order of more than 30 percent of starting capital.49
Western donors were partially conscious of these contradictions, but, at the same
time, they were constrained by political issues in their approach with the Ethiopian
counterpart. John Williams, Director of the Department for Program Evaluation,
believed the financing for the Humera project would be a tool to strengthen the
position of the “reformers” promoted to the rank of ministers by the Emperor in the
1969 cabinet reshuffle. Thus, the first tranche of the loan was released even before
the 1970 World Bank economic mission was able to submit its conclusions.50
Addis Ababa was able to play on the deficit of communications between dif-
ferent agencies to accelerate the release of funds. For instance, the World Bank
considered cadastral surveys a crucial prerequisite for loan financing.51 In theory,
Great Britain would have provided these surveys under the technical assistance
program as part of the application to be submitted to the Bank, pending the author-
ization of the Sudanese government. On May 8, 1969, nonetheless, British officials
discovered that the Ethiopian government had already submitted a project proposal
to the World Bank, claiming that aerial surveys would have been provided by the
British government anyway.52 When, after Khartoum’s refusal, the British retreated
from their original intent, the World Bank’s Agricultural Development Service
was faced with a fait accompli and was forced to provide financial assistance for
an aerial photography mission to the Ethiopian Air Force.53
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 277
In the realm of land tenure, Western advisors strongly contested the practice
of granting government lands on a political basis. An official report commis-
sioned by the Ministry of Land Reform to the Agricultural Development Service
in 1968 first raised the problem.54 Nonetheless, in March 1973, the Eastern
African Division of the World Bank suggested legal action against Addis Ababa
on the matter as a precondition for the release of new funds for the Agricultural
Minimum Package project.55 The Eastern African Division also voiced opposi-
tion to input and credit policies. The exemption from duties on tractor gasoline
alone was evaluated at a loss of five million Ethiopian dollars per year, which
resulted in a major drain on financial resources. These worries clearly emerged
during the negotiations for the release of a 10.8 million Ethiopian dollar lease for
the financing needs of the AIDB in 1971. The Eastern African Department pro-
posed that the Loan Committee in Washington subordinate lending to subscrib-
ing a letter of intent on the part of the Ethiopian government in which Addis
Ababa promised to abolish all gasoline tax exemptions as well as undertake a
study aimed at eliminating the duty-free importation of tractors and spare parts.56
Nevertheless, the fear of being involved in politically sensitive matters and of
alienating the Ethiopian government prevented donors from taking any signi-
ficant action. Of all the requests advanced, the only concession was the elimina-
tion of the duty-free legislation on gasoline in 1973.57
The final 1979 World Bank report marked the Humera Agricultural Project as
an almost complete failure. Political and military turmoil interrupted work on
constructing the road to Tesseney in 1973. Technological improvements were
expected to increase cotton production by about 400 percent; nevertheless, crop
yields remained too low to guarantee the profitability of the venture without state
incentives. As a testament to that fact, in 1975 farmers abandoned cotton farming
in favor of sorghum and sesame.58 Moreover, the main goal of raising govern-
ment revenues did not materialize. The value of duty-free fuel and other sub-
sidies – fiscal incentives for the import of tractors, lower interest rates for
agricultural credit, tariff barriers on the imports of raw cotton – exceeded tax
payments made by Setit Humera commercial farmers, resulting in a net inflow of
economic resources to this relatively rich agricultural region.59
From a political–military perspective, however, the project did not fall short
of expectations. The settlement of heavily armed “farmers” along the border
increased the bargaining power of Addis Ababa in the face of Khartoum. In
1972, a bilateral border agreement was signed. With respect to the 1902 treaty,
the Ethiopian Empire formally obtained a concession of some 24 square miles
south of the Setit River while Sudan formally agreed to cease its support to the
ELF.60 Nonetheless, the overthrown of the imperial regime in 1974 and the adop-
tion of the 1975 Land Reform Act forced government-sponsored settlers to
abandon their holdings under the threat of Wolqait communities raised up in
arms. Many of them did not become the World Bank’s envisaged vanguard of a
national rural bourgeoisie, but the backbone of the Ethiopian Democratic Union
(EDU), a military movement fighting for the restoration of the Empire.61
278 L. Puddu
Contemporary patterns of rural development in the western
lowlands
Current foreign-sponsored rural development policies in the Ethiopian periphery
share many points of contact with the case study analyzed in the previous
section. At a more general level, contemporary receipts elaborated by develop-
ment officials suggest that, by promoting land markets and formalizing long-
term rights to land, African farmers will be freed from the social and political
constraints of the accumulation of profits.62 The emphasis on good/bad institu-
tions as drivers of change underlie a deterministic faith in development as a
reproduction of Western historical patterns, recuperating some of the assump-
tions of modernization theory. At a local level, similarities involve the tools
employed to promote the opening of the agrarian frontier as well as the specific
features of the loci of rural modernization. The Ethiopian regime encourages
industrial cash crop production through means of state subsidies, fiscal exemp-
tions, and foreign-financed infrastructural construction. The Gambella Regional
State, located in the southwestern periphery of the country bordering South
Sudan, is one of the main sites of Western-sponsored rural development pro-
grams and large-scale investments in land. At the same time, it is also one of the
main sites of conflict and power contestation. The three main actors involved are
the central government, the regional state, and grassroots ethnic insurgencies, the
most prominent among them being the Anywaa-led Gambella People Liberation
Front.63 In addition, the region has historically been an arena of confrontation
between Addis Ababa and its Sudanese counterpart, both concerned with taking
control over trade flows of ivory and gold.64
The final goal of contemporary rural strategies is to create rural employment,
improve the balance of payments, and promote a broader process of rural moderni-
zation. In order to classify available lands to be put into production, and in com-
pliance with the 2005 and 2010 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, a program of
land mapping has been carried out, leading to the creation of a Federal Land Bank
with an estimated capital of 3.7 million hectares of “idle lands,” concentrated
mainly in the lowlands.65 The regional government allocates land leases for deals
over 5,000 hectares. Domestic investors account for 95 percent of total land leases.
In Gambella, three-quarters of them are Tigrayan connected to the ruling EPRDF.66
According to the Oakland Institute, state concessionaires are absentee landlords
who do not reside on their farms; moreover, contrary to the developmental rhetoric
of valorizzazione, they are often former soldiers with little farming experience. In
addition, Human Rights Watch underlines how Western donors’ financed resettle-
ment programs in the regional state are exploited by the central government to
“clear” the most valuable lands from former users in order to lease them to politi-
cally connected “commercial investors.”67 Even if contemporary rulers are faced
with different internal and external conditions than their imperial predecessors,
they continue to rely on image management strategies and manipulation of exter-
nal resources to extend state power over de facto semi-independent enclaves where
internal sovereignty is contested by local and external competitors.
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 279
Conclusion
The Setit Humera case study highlights how the imperial regime appropriated
foreign capital, technologies, and categories of “development” to undertake the
twofold goal of asserting de facto sovereignty over the northwestern frontier and
creating new economic assets to be granted to its political constituencies. The
Western concept of territory related to property as well as to the physical frag-
mentation of territory through mapping and surveying techniques. The Humera
Agricultural Project was conceived to change gradually the significance of land,
as a valuable commodity that could be bought or sold on the market to the most
productive farmers. However, contrary to scientific criteria of economic effi-
ciency sponsored by foreign donors, rural development programs served prim-
arily to strengthen geo-political claims against regional competitors and provide
resource assets to consolidate the political base of the Empire. The distance
between intended and concrete outcomes was due to the fact that local stake-
holders – the different levels of government within the Ethiopian polity – were
not pursuing a profit-maximization strategy. Subsidies and state-led infrastruc-
tural schemes were not conceived to promote economic growth; instead, follow-
ing the patterns of cotton colonialism in other parts of the continent, they were
conceived as administrative compensations, elaborated to insert the state and its
different sub-units into the social relations of production connected to land and
trade.68
Contemporary enclosures in the western lowlands should be framed through
the same lens. The contradiction between official pro-market rhetoric and
increasing government control over land allocation as well as the manipulation
of financial aid and conceptual models imported from abroad should not be
ascribed to the rise of new global food regimes or the ideological commitment
towards economic growth of the contemporary Ethiopian developmental state.
Here, the most important issue is to consider contemporary events within the
framework of a longue durée trajectory of state formation historically entrenched
in Abyssinian frontier society. In evaluating justifications for the outcomes of
development projects, donors should partially depart from rational choice theor-
etical models and take into account that, in the Ethiopian context, economics is
deeply embedded in the realm of politics. This approach will help build a better
understanding of local realities and prevent the failure of new rural moderniza-
tion strategies.

Notes
1 Amanor Kojo, “Global Food Chains, African Smallholders and World Bank Govern-
ance.” Journal of Agrarian Change 9, no. 2 (2009): 258.
2 Jon Abbink, “Land to the Foreigners: Economic, Legal, and Socio-cultural Aspects of
New Land Acquisition Schemes in Ethiopia.” Journal of Contemporary African
Studies 29, no. 4 (2011); Luca Puddu, “La Corsa alloro del XXI secolo: Acquisizione
di suolo etiopico da parte di Multinazionali Indiane,” in Gian Paolo Calchi Novati
(ed.), L’alternativa Sud-Sud: chi vince e chi perde (Rome: Carocci, 2011).
280 L. Puddu
3 Davide Chinigò, “The Land Still Belongs to Meles. Land Registration and Tenure
Insecurity in Siraro, Southern Ethiopia.” Afriche e Orienti 1 (2011).
4 Simone Rettberg, “Contested Narratives of Pastoral Vulnerability and Risk in Ethio-
pia’s Afar Region.” Pastoralism 1, no. 2 (2010); Tom Lavers, “Patterns of Agrarian
Transformation: State-mediated Commercialisation and the Land Grab.” Journal of
Peasant Studies 39, nos 3–4 (2012).
5 Fouad Makki, “Power and Property: Commercialization, Enclosures, and the Trans-
formation of Agrarian Relations in Ethiopia.” Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 1
(2012).
6 Tom Lavers, “Land Grab as a Development Strategy? The Political Economy of Agri-
cultural Investment in Ethiopia.” Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 1 (2012).
7 Jean Francois Bayart, “Africa in the World: An History of Extraversion.” African
Affairs 99, no. 395 (2000).
8 Cristopher Clapham, “Controlling Space in Ethiopia,” in W. James, D. Donham, A.
Triulzi, and E. Kurimoto (eds), Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After (Oxford:
James Currey, 2002); Emanuele Fantini, Good governance e restaurazione autori-
taria in Etiopia (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Torino, 2008).
9 C. Clapham, “Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation.” Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics 44, no. 1 (2006).
10 Bayart, “Africa in the World,” 259.
11 Sara Vaughan, “Federalismo e Sviluppo nelle Periferie del Bassopiano Etiopico.”
Afriche e Orienti 1 (2011).
12 Siegfried Pausewang, Peasants, Land and Society: A Social History of Land Reform
in Ethiopia (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1983); Donald Crummey, “State and
Society: Nineteenth Century Ethiopia,” in D. Crummey and Carl C. Stewart (eds),
Modes of Production in Africa (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981).
13 Donald Donham, “Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire,” in D. Donham and
W. James (eds), The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
14 Harold G. Marcus, The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United
States (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1995); G.P. Calchi Novati, Il Corno d’Africa
nella Storia e nella Politica (Rome: SEI, 1994).
15 John Markakis, Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974);
Dessalegn Rahmato, Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of
African Studies, 1984).
16 Wafula Okumu, “Resources and Border Disputes in Eastern Africa.” Journal of
Eastern African Studies 4, no. 2 (2010).
17 Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (London: James Currey,
1996).
18 Richard Roberts, “French Colonialism, Imported Technology, and the Handicraft
Textile Industry in the Western Sudan, 1898–1918.” Journal of Economic History 47,
no. 2 (1987), 461; see also Pauline E. Peters, “Inequality and Social Conflict Over
Land in Africa.” Journal of Agrarian Change 4, no. 3 (2004); Mario Zamponi,
“Tradizione, sistemi d’autorità e gestione della terra in Africa sub-sahariana.” Africa
63, no. 4 (2008).
19 Edward Nicholson, Report 728 to the Government of Ethiopia (Rome: Food and Agri-
culture Organization, 1957).
20 L. Puddu, “Terra e autorità nell’Etiopia Imperiale.” Afriche e Orienti (forthcoming).
21 James McCann, “A Dura Revolution and Frontier Agriculture in Northwest Ethiopia.”
Journal of African History 31, no. 1 (1990).
22 Giovanni Dore, “Micropolitica regionale e funzionari genealogisti. La politica
indigena degli Italiani nel Walqait,” in G. Dore, I. Taddia, and J. Mantel Necko, I
quaderni del Wolkait, Documenti per la Storia sociale d’Etiopia (Harmattan: Torino,
2005).
 The Humera Agricultural Project, 1967 to 1975 281
23 A.I. Asiwaju, “The Concept of Frontier in Setting of States in Pre-colonial Africa.”
Presence Africaine 127 (1983): 46.
24 Peter Garretson, “Frontier Feudalism in Northwest Ethiopia: Shaikh Al’Imam Abd
Allah of Nuqara, 1901–1923.” International Journal of African Historical Studies 15,
no. 2 (1982).
25 M. Abir, “The Origins of the Ethiopian–Egyptian Border Problem in the Nineteenth
Century.” Journal of African History 8, no. 3 (1967); Richard P. Stevens, “The 1972
Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro-Arab Policy.” Journal of Modern
African Studies 14, no. 2 (1976).
26 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development
Association (IBRD/IDA), Economic Growth and Prospects in Ethiopia: Volume II,
AE9. Eastern African Department (September 22, 1970), 23.
27 Mohamed Duri, “Private Foreign Investment in Ethiopia 1950–1968.” Journal of
Ethiopian Studies 7, no. 2 (1969).
28 IBRD/IDA, Economic Growth, Volume II, Annex II, Table II.
29 IBRD/IDA, Humera Agricultural Development Project, Report PA-30a. Agricultural
Project Department (April 7, 1970).
30 World Bank Group Archives (WBA), Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59,
Setit Humera Agricultural Development Project, C (1–3), Project Performance Audit
Report: M. Weiner, Ethiopia Setit Humera Agricultural Development Project (June
1979).
31 S.D. Clark, Legal Matters Affecting the Awash Valley Authority and Proposed
National Water Legislation, Development of the Awash Valley Phase II, on behalf of
The State Rivers and Water Supply Commission (Addis Ababa: FAO, 1972), 5.
32 IBRD/IDA, Humera Agricultural Development Project, 3.
33 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59, Setit Humera Agricultural
Development Project, C (1–3), Project Performance Audit Report: M. Weiner, Ethio-
pia Setit Humera Agricultural Development Project (June 1979): 3.
34 WBA, Record of the Africa Regional Office, Box 58, Ethiopia-Setit Humera Agricul-
tural Development Negotiations 01. Ethiopia: Setit Humera Agricultural Development
Project, 3.
35 WBA, Record of the Africa Regional Office, Box 11, Ethiopia, Land Reform,
Correspondance 01. Ethiopia: Land Reform, from Andersen to Evans (January 9,
1964).
36 FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program, Project Identification Mission to the Northwestern
Lowlands Region of Ethiopia, 20/68/Eth 2 (Rome: FAO, November 14, 1968), 5.
37 National Archives of Great Britain (NA), AY 4/2647, FAO/IBRD Cooperative
Program, Project Identification Mission to the Northwestern Lowlands Region of
Ethiopia, 20/68/Eth 2 (Rome: FAO, November 14, 1968), 13.
38 Patrick A. Sharma, “Bureaucratic Imperative and Policy Outcomes: The Origins of
World Bank Structural Adjustment Lendings.” Available at SSRN, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1920479 (accessed August 15, 2011).
39 FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program, Project Identification Mission to the Northwestern
Lowlands Region of Ethiopia, 20/68/Eth 2 (Rome: FAO, November 14, 1968), 12.
40 National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), RG 59, Box 468, AGR ETH,
Airgram from AmConGen Asmara to Addis Ababa (April 13, 1972).
41 NA, FCO 39/60, Confidential Telegram from British Embassy, Khartoum (March 18,
1967).
42 NARA, RG 59, CFP, Box 2077, POL 32–1 ETH, Secret Intelligence Note, Ethiopia–
Sudan: Jitters at the Border (April 17, 1969).
43 NARA, RG 286, Public Safety, Box 7, Confidential, Monthly Report for Public
Safety, USAID/E (February 1968).
44 Haftom Tesfay, Rural Land Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Tigray: The Case of
Humera (Master’s thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2011), 76.
282 L. Puddu
45 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59, Setit Humera Agricultural
Development Project, C (1–3), Project Performance Audit Report: M. Weiner, Ethio-
pia Setit Humera Agricultural Development Project (June 1979): 19.
46 IBRD/IDA, Humera Agricultural Development Project, 4.
47 IBRD/IDA, Appraisal Report, Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, 13.
48 Economic Growth and Prospects in Ethiopia: Volume II, AE9, Eastern African
Department (September 22, 1970), 13.
49 IBRD/IDA, Appraisal Report, Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank,
Annex 11.
50 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59, Ethiopia, Humera Agricultural
Development, Negotiations 01, Office Memorandum from J.H. Williams to A.G.
Elmary (June 13, 1969).
51 NA, AY 4/2647, TPI Pesticides. Record of a meeting held at Eland House on Decem-
ber 2, 1969.
52 NA, OD 6/1485, Agricultural Development Projects Wollamo-Soddo and Setit Humera,
Ethiopia. Notes on a meeting in the East African Department on May 8, 1969.
53 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59, Setit Humera Agricultural
Development Project, C (1–3), Project Performance Audit Report: M. Weiner, Ethio-
pia Setit Humera Agricultural Development Project (June 1979).
54 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 11, Ethiopia, Land Reform,
Correspondence 01, Outline of a Report on the Development of Government Land,
Ethiopia (under preparation) (September 9, 1969).
55 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59, Setit Humera Agricultural
Development Project, C (1–3), Letter No. 217 from Brakel to Tolley (March 1, 1973).
56 WBA, Record of the Africa Regional Office, Box A 87028, Minimum Package
Project C (1–7), Memorandum from the Eastern African Department to the Loan
Committee: Ethiopia-Agricultural and Investment Bank (February 1972).
57 John Cohen, “Foreign Involvement in Land Tenure Reform in Ethiopia,” in John
Montgomery (ed.), International Dimensions of Land Reform (London: Westview
Press, 1984).
58 WBA, Records of the Africa Regional Office, Box 59, Setit Humera Agricultural
Development Project, C (1–3), Project Performance Audit Report: M. Weiner, Setit
Humera Agricultural Development project (June 1979), 3.
59 IBRD/IDA, Recent Economic Performance and Future Prospects in Ethiopia, Volume
III: Fiscal Policy and the Agricultural Sector, 9a-ET. Country Programs Department,
Eastern Africa (June 15, 1973), 38.
60 NA, FCO 39/1159, Political Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, Telegram from
Goulty to Kay, August 5, 1972.
61 NA, FCO 31/2103, Secret, Political Relations between Ethiopia and Suda, Teleletter
from Palmer, May 2, 1977.
62 Pauline Peters, “Inequality and Social Conflict over Land in Africa.” Journal of
Agrarian Change 4, no. 3 (2004).
63 Dereje Ferissa, “A National Perspective on the Conflict in Gambella,” in Svein Ege,
Harald Aspen, Birhanu Teferra, and Shiferaw Bekele (eds), Proceedings of the Six-
teenth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Trondheim, 2009).
64 Abdussamad Ahmad, “Trading in Slaves in Bela-Shangul and Gumuz, Ethiopia:
Border Enclaves in History, 1897–1938.” Journal of African History 40, no. 3 (1999).
65 Lavers, “Patterns of Agrarian Transformation,” 802.
66 F. Horne, Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa. Country Report: Ethiopia
(Oakland: Oakland Institute, 2011), 22–24.
67 Human Rights Watch, Waiting Here for Death: Forced Displacement and Villagiza-
tion in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region, 2012.
68 Ulrich Sturzinger, “The Introduction of Cotton Cultivation in Chad: The Role of the
Administration, 1920–1936.” African Economic History 12 (1983).
16 Affirmative action as a
theological- pastoral challenge in
the South African democratic
context
Elijah M. Baloyi

Introduction
The current South African landscape is, among other things, typified by affirma-
tive action, which is used to redress the imbalances that were orchestrated by the
previous apartheid regime’s policies. It aims to retain and offer opportunities to
previously disadvantaged groups who suffered as a result of segregation and dis-
criminatory laws. It is through government departments, private companies, and
other stakeholders that this action is used to review and correct the injustices of
the past as a way towards reconciliation. Although this action has been embraced
by many people (perhaps the majority of the people in the country), some still
have mixed feelings about it and even argue against it. Different arguments have
been used. For example, while some people call it reverse apartheid, others view
it as a way to avenge and punish those who benefitted from the previous imbal-
ances. It is not the aim of this chapter to argue for or against affirmative action.
Rather, the chapter examines how affirmative action is being practiced in South
Africa during the post-apartheid period, and it examines some of its advantages.
Using theological-pastoral intervention, an attempt is also made to evaluate the
arguments against the practice. Some pastoral guidelines are suggested for ways
in which pastoral caregivers can assist people who devalue affirmative action by
thinking that it threatens their livelihood.
Having achieved political emancipation, the major challenge in South
Africa is economic liberation; that is, to bring about a greater and more equit-
able distribution of wealth and an improvement in the quality of life of all
South Africans. Although South Africa is blessed with an abundance of natural
resources, the country still has wide disparities in the distribution of wealth.
Mlody reports:

Black people were, effectively, denied the education and training opportun-
ities that would provide the qualifications required for higher paying
employment and professional careers. The new South Africa is committed
to removing these causes of labour market inequality through the empower-
ment of the black majority.1 To emphasize this, the reporter goes on to
indicate that among the challenges South Africa face, poverty and
284 E.J. Baloyi
unemployment top the list of needs which the government and the private
sector have to address by pursuing policies that will help to remove the
imbalances of the past.2

The hypothesis of the study is that the arguments that are often used to invalidate
the practice of affirmative action do not help take the country to a higher level of
democracy, since they do not offer a good alternative for enhancing the equal
participation of South Africa’s citizens in the economy of the country. In this
chapter, therefore, the mixed feelings South Africans have about affirmative
action, in particular arguments that discredit the practice, are discussed with the
aim of providing some pastoral guidelines for dealing with these feelings. The
researcher studied the arguments of those who oppose affirmative action by
looking at the relevant literature (including books, articles, the internet, and other
documents) on affirmative action in South Africa. Counter-arguments are offered
and are followed up with some biblical-pastoral guidelines on how affirmative
action may be viewed and understood positively.

Background to the practice of affirmative action in

Southern Africa
Colonization and racial inequalities in Africa have, among other things, directly
and indirectly orchestrated poverty, particularly towards the oppressed people,
blacks being the majority. In South Africa apartheid rules went further, keeping
black people poor by offering bantu education and making sure that blacks are
always underprivileged. The forced removals of black people in South Africa
between 1960 and 1982, which saw blacks being dumped in barren and uninhab-
itable areas, exposed the people to poverty.3 Blacks were also exposed to harsh
conditions where many even died,4 and the policies of inequality in South Africa
implied that black people had limited needs, expectations, and aspirations for a
comfortable life. If a person is made an alien to his or her country of birth it
easily paves the way to making that person poor, and this is what colonialism
has done to more than half of Africa. In addition, apartheid damaged South
Africa even further; hence affirmative action is one of the ways in which to
respond to the challenges caused by apartheid. This is why the author is of the
opinion that had colonization and apartheid or any form of racial inequality not
taken place on African soil, there would be no need to talk about affirmative
action today. It is the inequalities that hurt the continent and which bring about
the need for affirmative action in trying to reverse the injustices inflicted upon
the black majority of Africa.
Section 3 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1988 deals with affirmative
action and states: “Every design must, in order to achieve employment equity,
implement affirmative action measures for people from designated groups in
terms of the Act.” What is affirmative action and what is its goal(s)? The Urban
Dictionary defines affirmative action as referring to the practice of hiring
minority races instead of white races, even if the white applicant is more
 Affirmative action in South African democracy 285
qualified – the idea being that minorities have been oppressed and this is one
way for the government to make amends.5
Affirmative action in South Africa is sometimes referred to using euphemisms
such as corrective action, reverse discrimination, and a remedial strategy aimed
at addressing the legal historical exclusion of a majority.6 Htun argues that by
means of affirmative action, power is exercised more subtly by structuring pat-
terns of politics, texturing social relationships, and molding social identities (not
least racial identities).7 From this perspective it is argued that the action is aimed
at correcting the policies whereby social and economic inequalities were for-
mally enforced through laws of discrimination and segregation in countries like
South Africa and the United States. Vorster defines affirmative action as a legal
process whereby inequalities with regard to economic opportunity, access to
educational institutions, job opportunities, and landownership are rectified
through legal action in order to redress historical inequalities.8 To clarify the
meaning of the term, De Waal, Currie, and Erasmus state:

Affirmative action means preferential treatment for disadvantaged groups of

people. Typically, an affirmative action program will require a member of a
disadvantaged group to be preferred for distribution of some benefit over
someone who is not a member of that group. The grounds of preference are
usually race and gender.9

This definition may be understood well in the context of South Africa’s history,
where the apartheid regime used laws and regulations to discriminate against
certain races in preference to white people. Since the advent of democracy in
1994, numerous policies and programs have been put in place to redress the
imbalances of race and gender in the South African labor force. Rankhumise and
Netswera10 conducted a study which helps explain the importance of training
interventions that are useful for the success of affirmative action appointees and
identifies possible barriers for implementing affirmative action in Mpumalanga
hospitals, which may also be helpful for other stakeholders. Because of the
limited space of this chapter, the author intends not to go into the details of their
research but will refer to it when necessary.
After years of racial discrimination under the apartheid regime, it took some
time and effort for the newly elected government to decide on how to rectify the
imbalances of the past; affirmative action became its tool. Since the enactment
of the Broad-based Black Empowerment Act of 2003 (BBE Act), much has been
written and assumed about affirmative action. In February 2007 the government
formally codified the BBE Act Codes of Practice, which includes the following:

• Code 100: Ownership

• Code 200: Management
• Code 300: Employment equity
• Code 400: Skills development
• Code 500: Preferential procurement
286 E.J. Baloyi
• Code 600: Enterprise development
• Code 700: Socioeconomic development
• Codes 800–807: Qualifying small enterprises

The Employment Equity Act defines “black people” as a generic term that
includes Africans, coloreds, and Indians in its provisions. It states: “Measures
should be designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated cat-
egories have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in
all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated
employer.”11 Affirmative action, then, is intended to ensure that people from pre-
viously disadvantaged groups who qualify for a particular position receive pri-
ority. But the question is: Will all these codes be implemented? In order to
prioritize previously disadvantaged people in the job market, the following para-
graph gives a short summary as to the way in which such an action is to be
taken.
The answer is that employers should consult the Department of Labor
regarding the details of how to implement the Act in terms of employment. Fur-
thermore, trade unions have become part of the job interviewing and job selec-
tion processes in order to ensure that the previous discrimination in the labor
force was eliminated as far as possible. Government departments, companies,
and other stakeholders have been requested to implement the system when they
employ people. Thus, empowerment in the workplace continues, though at a
slow pace.12 In 2002, black equity in public companies was estimated at 9.4
percent. This refers to the percentage of black people who were employed on the
basis of the Employment Equity Act.

Some arguments against affirmative action in

Southern Africa
Although the policy of affirmative action has been discussed, approved, and
adopted as a way to redress past imbalances, Mlody points out that considerable
disagreement still exists regarding the impact of affirmative action policies upon
the economy and job creation.13 The primary reasons include the following
claims of discrimination, emigration, apartheid, and incompetence. Each will be
discussed in detail.

Affirmative action discriminates against foreign investors

On January 8, 2007, Finstone, an Italian-owned, Luxemburg-based company,
controlled three granite production operations in South Africa. The company
instituted legal action against the South African government at the International
Centre of Settlement of Investment Disputes (IDSID). Finstone alleged that
South Africa’s BEE Act policies, aimed at advancing the rights and opportun-
ities of historically disadvantaged groups, discriminated against foreign inves-
tors.14 With this in mind, Finstone would argue that since investors from different
 Affirmative action in South African democracy 287
countries come from different contexts where, for some, affirmative action which
will prioritize black people would be against them, they will not feel free to
invest in a country which will continue to have more blacks than whites in the
job market. In other words, this would discourage white investors from investing
in the country.

Emigration of young white males is a concern

Vorster addresses the emigration issue raised against affirmative action:

During the past two decades emigration from South Africa has escalated to
such a degree that it has caused reason for concern. This is especially true
because many of the emigrants are highly qualified people and losing them
has worsened the unemployment situation.15

Edigheji also refers to the emigration issue: “The result is that some whites have
emigrated, as part of the global trend to take better job opportunities in other
countries.”16 The emigration of white people from South Africa immediately
after the dawn of democracy in the country is also mentioned by Makgoba, who
notes that when one group of “dethroned white” males languished in a Zimba-
bwean jail for masterminding a coup in Equatorial Guinea, another group of
white males emigrated to Nigeria.17 Although Makgoba does not specifically
mention that they were emigrating because of affirmative action, the connotation
of “dethroned” may be taken to mean that affirmative action was the reason. In
other words, the fact that affirmative action would see many blacks taking up
management positions is another way of dethroning the white supremacy which
has ruled for many decades; hence the dethroned whites feel threatened to the
extent of escaping the country. It should be remembered that during apartheid
times, whites were always in the management positions which allowed them to
control the economy of the country, and now the BBE is aimed at changing just
that. It should be noted that this is the change that the previous beneficiaries of
apartheid would hate to see.

Affirmative action is reversed discrimination or apartheid

Vorster notes that discrimination against white males will put them in a poorer
position than their fellow black citizens, which does not rectify the past but only
reverses the roles played in oppression.18 Affirmative action should not just
reverse the situation so that the previously disadvantaged become the advant-
aged (and the other way around). If this happens, there has been no progress in
justice and fairness, and the action merely creates new imbalances, gaps, and
subsequent hostility.19 It is unfortunate that he does not provide any alternative
to how the current government should execute its mandate of bringing equality
to all of its citizens in the economic sphere without applying affirmative action.
In “[u]nfair affirmative action in South African historiography,” Pretorius
288 E.J. Baloyi
indicates clearly that Afrikaner people are not only ignored in the historiography
of this country, they are also judged and condemned in negative terms as if they
had done nothing good in the history of South Africa.20

Affirmative action promotes incompetence in the workforce

According to Edigheji, a number of radio callers, commentators, market analysts,
and scholars tend to equate affirmative action with the appointment of people
who lack the necessary skills and knowledge for the positions they occupy.21
Among the scholars, Cameron22 and Luiz23 argue that appointments in the public
services on the basis of affirmative action constrain the capacity of the state to
provide services to the populace and effectively manage the economy. Heilman
raises another point of concern in articulating that the process becomes part of
the problem instead of part of the solution due to the fact that a degrading quality
is attached to the expression “affirmative action appointment.”24
The above serves as evidence that affirmative action is under attack as a
method to redress the imbalances with regard to the wealth of this country. In
the same manner that some Christian churches orchestrated and supported the
apartheid regime, some people feel that affirmative action, which is aimed at
improving the lives of the former marginalized communities of South Africa,
strips and deprives them of their own wealth and rights. It is true that some
people who benefitted from the past not only feel threatened but also believe that
they should remain in a privileged position even when that time is past and
things are changing. Some people are of the opinion that affirmative action is
reversed apartheid, while others view it as a way to enrich previously disadvan-
taged people as soon as possible.

Critical assessment of affirmative action in the South African

context
It is not enough to criticize without trying to solving the problem. Perhaps the
critics should come up with new methods that can help redress the situation in
the place of affirmative action. However, such alternatives are lacking in their
points of criticism. The Freedom Charter states clearly that South Africa belongs
to all South Africans; both black and white people have a share in shaping the
country. Those who believe that affirmative action is not doing enough to redress
the situation should come up with alternatives as to how the corrections can be
made to reach similar goals as the ones intended by affirmative action.
Pastoral caregivers should not run away when things do not suit them. This
has to do with the issue of emigration which Vorster pointed out. It is irrespon-
sible for people to run away from their country of birth instead of facing prob-
lems responsibly. Many oppressed South Africans died in the struggle in their
country during apartheid times. It would be unreasonable to say that they had
options to choose to emigrate because only people who have wealth to survive
normally opt for immigration. Emigration is the opposite of exile, which many
 Affirmative action in South African democracy 289
South Africans opted for under the siege of the apartheid regime. The differ-
ence is that if one is in exile, one does not have rights in a country; whereas
someone who decides to emigrate has rights to find employment, conduct busi-
ness, and buy property in the foreign country – which is better than exile. In
other words, white people who are running away from the country are still
advantaged in that they have the option to run away, which the previously dis-
advantaged people did not have. This argument is not to say that they have no
choice but to fight for a solution, but that they should stay in the country and
help to change the lives of all of its people because this is better than running
away from a problem.
Majavu reported that the Employment Equity Commission said on August 3,
2011 that “[i]t will take black people another 127 years to get into management
positions relative to their number in the economically active population.”25 This
statement appeared after the Chair of the Employment Equity Commission
released its eleventh report at the Union Buildings. It articulated that racism con-
tinues to be one of the greatest stumbling blocks for transformation. According
to the report, very little change has taken place in the top four levels of manage-
ment in the private sector, with white people still occupying 73 percent of top
management positions in 2010. An SABC news bulletin confirmed the findings
earlier that morning.26 Although the number of white people in top management
positions has decreased by 8.1 percent in the past four years, 59 percent of the
new recruits in top management were white.27 Affirmative action still has a long
way to go in redressing the situation, and those who argue against it are not
talking on behalf of the majority of South Africans. The fact that it is being
implemented, whether slowly or quickly, brings hope to the nation rather than
despair when things remain as they were before. If it were not for affirmative
action, the 73 percent mentioned above would still be 100 percent, which would
mean that the disadvantaged would have remained where they were before the
democratic government was elected.
Possible incompetence in the workforce cannot be used to judge affirmative
action because those who are not following the BBE Act when employing people
are not the same as those who drafted the policy. Educational and training
methods which ensure that those people tapped through employment equity are
capable of performing their jobs should be put in place. Therefore, fear of this
kind can only exist if employers are not taking the necessary precautions. If
employers are empowering their new recruits, incompetence will not be a
problem.

An example of redistribution of wealth in biblical times

There are only two biblical stories that are relevant to further explain the ana-
lysis in this chapter. There is evidence of redistribution of land and wealth in
ancient biblical times, particularly when one had lost his or her possessions
unjustly. The first story is that of the Shunamite woman in 2 Kings 8:1–6. Verse
6 says:
290 E.J. Baloyi
The king asked the woman about it, and she told him. Then he assigned an
official to her case and said to him, give back everything that belonged to
her, including all the income from her land from the day she left the country
until now.

The woman had left the land owing to famine (as recorded in verse 1). While she
was gone, some people took over her land and other resources she had left
behind. When she returned, the king told them to give back whatever they had
taken from the woman. In this way, restoration was accomplished by taking from
those who had enriched themselves unjustly from the fields that belonged to the
woman. The system of injustice was challenged by the king’s decree because the
owner had managed to grab what had initially belonged to the woman. Revers-
ing past unjust practices which destroy the dignity of people cannot be done
without some people losing something. This is why people feel worthless when
black economic empowerment measures are implemented to reverse things
because they also have to undergo some loss.
The second story is that of Zacchaeus, as we read in Luke 19:1–9. In verse 8
Zacchaeus says: “Look Lord, here and now I give half of my possessions to the
poor, and if I have cheated anybody out of anything, I will pay back four times
the amount.” The first thing we note is his acknowledgement of a past mistake,
which makes it possible for him to realize the afflictions he inflicted upon other
people. Second, his readiness to redress the situation is very clear. Third, the fact
that redressing the situation will also cause pain when one loses some of one’s
belongings is very obvious. This part of the New Testament teaches us that
instead of arguing or trying to protect himself, Zacchaeus was ready to return the
wealth that he unjustly took from people. Thus, the Bible teaches us to embrace
the changes that take us to the future. The South African community, particu-
larly those who enjoyed the benefits of the past apartheid regime, can be encour-
aged to adopt this way of redressing the wrongs of the past instead of trying to
avoid it by running away from the country or evading responsibility. The fact
that injustice was committed in biblical times makes it possible to use examples
like these two as ways of correcting past mistakes.

The way forward: pastoral theological guidelines

Affirmative action is a way to restore human dignity

Although restoring human dignity to people who have been oppressed seems to
be the responsibility of the government alone, to others pastoral caregivers need
to understand that it becomes difficult – if not impossible – to do pastoral work
or help people whose dignity was taken away by apartheid policies and prac-
tices. Many people no longer believe in themselves or have the self-confidence
to be able to realize their dreams because they lack dignity. Economic power
plays a major role in giving people dignity because, for example, if one lacks
money to have a roof over one’s head, one’s dignity is affected. Therefore, the
 Affirmative action in South African democracy 291
caregiver will find it difficult to discuss issues of life and morals with a person
who has nowhere to sleep the next night. By helping the person get employment
so that he or she can be economically empowered and have shelter, everything
else pertaining to his or her life will start to fall into place.

A commandment of love
As a pastoral caregiver, it would be unfair not to include the biblical message of
love when dealing with the issue of wealth distribution. It should be out of the
love people have for fellow human beings that they acknowledge that things
should change for those who have been disadvantaged. The concern about the
people who are emigrating from the country demonstrates selfishness and a lack
of love towards those people who are now being uplifted. Vorster echoes this
sentiment, stating that love must be closely related to the justice that the
Kingdom of God brings.28 It is the Christ-like love that leads one to consider the
interest of one’s fellow man which should be expressed in a concrete way in life.
In fact, if both black people and white people in South Africa loved one another
before, there would now be no need for affirmative action because everyone
would have cried and tried to fight for the upliftment of the marginalized even
before the democratic government came into power. Had this love been fostered
during apartheid, things would now be better. It is too bad that we start to talk
about this love when the real damage has already been done.

Reconciliation
Vorster is correct in asserting that affirmative action should promote reconcili-
ation.29 Reconciliation should be accompanied by restitution, admission of guilt,
humiliation, and regret – as happened in the Old Testament (see Deuteronomy
22:19 and Exodus 22:4). Even though some people might use affirmative action
to punish their former oppressors, the author does not think that this is the inten-
tion with affirmative action. This was never part of the draft of the Act and is the
reason why even the opposition parties accepted the draft legislation, since it
was prepared and submitted to Parliament before it became binding. Those who
choose to use it for such purposes are perhaps driven by a lack of true under-
standing of its intent because, as was said earlier, its main purpose is to redress
the wrongs of the past. Although it had been many years since the two brothers
Jacob and Esau parted ways because of Jacob’s deceitfulness towards his father
(Genesis 27), the need for reconciliation was evident (as we read in Genesis 32).
Therefore, Jacob went back to be reconciled with his brother. Jacob had to give
some of his domestic animals to Esau during the process of reconciliation
because that was part of the blessings he had deceitfully taken from his brother
when he asked for blessings from his father Isaac. Reconciliation also implies
that the wrongs of the past must be corrected, even by paying back.
292 E.J. Baloyi
Convince yourself that the wealth of South Africa belongs to all who
live there
It is the duty of both pastoral caregivers and the government to convince people
to accept redistribution or to share things that they wrongly obtained. Giving back
what one owns is never an easy task, but the government and the church should
not give up teaching and educating people to do it for the sake of equality. The
wrongs of the past cannot only be addressed by denouncing them to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, but they should be revisited and corrected. It is not
enough to criticize apartheid and its effects, but its impact and legacies should be
addressed. If the Bible teaches that we need to pay back those whom we owe
before going to the altar of God, then we have to take heed of this message even
in this context and accept it with thankful hearts. When African people articulate
“I am because we are,” it is in the same vein as biblical teachings about being
each other’s keepers. Wiersbe correctly states that people who care serve one
another.30 According to both the African culture and the biblical message, we are
on this planet to take care of one another. Hence there is no reason to enjoy life
while our brothers next to us are lacking something which we have.

Conclusion
It has not been easy for our government to decide on implementing affirmative
action as a way to reunite this broken and divided country. However, it is the
best alternative for avoiding the civil strife and genocide that have crippled most
parts of the African continent. The practice of land grabbing, like in neighboring
Zimbabwe, is a good example to learn from: peaceful reconciliation and redis-
tribution of wealth have to be carefully studied and implemented. Therefore,
affirmative action has, up until now, proven to be the better tool to move from
apartheid to democracy. Although the statistics indicated in the research show
that the majority of the South African people, particularly blacks, are still living
in poverty, since the inception of black economic empowerment even our very
poor people have started to live with hope. People who feel that they are nega-
tively affected by this should start to embrace it positively, since it is a way to
unite them with their previously disadvantaged brothers and sisters.

Notes
1 Mlody, C.D. “Skills Training and Productivity in the Second Economy.” The Thinker
27 (2011): 26.
2 Ibid.: 27.
3 Kgatla, S.T. “Forced Removals and Migration: A Theology of Resistance and Libera-
tion in South Africa.” Southern Africa Journal of Missionology 41, no. 2 (2013):
120–132.
4 Pilger, J. Freedom Next Time: Resisting the Empire (New York: Nations Books,
2007), 197.
5 Affirmative reaction. Blog. Available at www.urbandictionary.com/define.php
(accessed December 15, 2013).
 Affirmative action in South African democracy 293
6 Kanya, A. The Politics of Redress: South African-style Affirmative Action (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.
7 Htun, M. Racial Democracy to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in
Brazil (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2004), 1.
8 Vorster, J.M. Christian Attitude in the South African Liberal Democracy (Potchef-
stroom: Potchefstroom Theological Publications, 2007), 77.
9 De Waal, J., Currie, I., and Erasmus, G.E. The Bill of Rights Handbook (Landsdowne:
Juta, 2001), 223.
10 Rankhumise, E. and Netswera, F.G. “Identifying the Barriers to Affirmative Action
Training: Perceptions of Affirmative Action Appointees in Mpumalanga Public Hos-
pitals.” South African Journal of Human Resource Management 8, no.1 (2010): 3.
11 Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1988, 1. Available at www.labour.gov.za (accessed 26
July 26, 2011).
12 Alexander, N. “Affirmative Action and the Perpetuation of Racial Identities in Post-
apartheid South Africa.” Lecture delivered at the East London Campus of the Univer-
sity of Fort Hare on March 25, 2006, 8.
13 Mlody. “Skills Training and Productivity in the Second Economy,” 27.
14 Chow, M.W. “Discriminatory Equality v. Non-discriminatory Inequality: The Legiti-
macy of South Africa’s Affirmative Action Policies under International Law.” Con-
necticut Journal of International (2009): 1.
15 Vorster, J.M. Christian Attitude in the South African Liberal Democracy, 108.
16 Edigheji, O. Affirmative Action and State Capacity in a Democratic South Africa
(Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 2007), 4.
17 Makgoba, M. “Comment and Analysis.” Mail and Guardian, March 31, 2005, 2.
18 Vorster, N. Restoring Human Dignity in South Africa (Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom
Theological Publications, 2007), 92.
19 Ibid., 180.
20 Pretorius, F. “Unfair Affirmative Action in South African Historiography.” Paper
delivered in the Department of Historical and Heritage Studies in the University of
Pretoria, 2001, 4.
21 Edigheji, “Affirmative Action and State Capacity in a Democratic South Africa,” 2.
22 Cameron, R. “The Reconstruction and Development Programme in South Africa:
Designing New Political Institutions.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 8, no. 2 (April
1996): 283–294.
23 Luiz, J.M. “South African State Capacity and Post-apartheid Economic Reconstruc-
tion.” International Journal of Social Economics 29, no. 8 (2002): 594.
24 Heilman, M.E. “Affirmative Action’s Contradictory Consequences.” Journal of Social
Issues 108 (1996): 108.
25 Majavu, A. “Top Management Jobs Still Go to Whites.” Sowetan, August 4, 2011: 4.
26 Munghana Lonene, F.M. “ ‘Tiko axi etleri’ Morning Programme.” August 4, 2011.
27 Majavu. “Top Management Jobs Still Go to Whites,” 4.
28 Vorster. Restoring Human Dignity in South Africa, 81 and 117.
29 Ibid., 82.
30 Wiersbe, W.W. Caring People: Learning to Live With and Help One Another (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker, 2002), 59.
Index

Abacha, Sani 111 anti-corruption measures 66

ABC strategy (Abstain, Be faithful and APA (American Psychology Association)
correct and consistent use of Condoms) 178, 181
92–4 apartheid 36, 283–8
Accra 215–17; New Town 217 Arab 37, 39
ACO (Aliens Compliance Order) 226 archives: Record Administration at
Acquaah-Harrison, Richard 231 Maryland, FAO, and Great Britain at
Addae, Stephen 229 Kew Gardens 14, 268
Addis Ababa 274 “area boys” 87
affirmative action 218, 283, 291; aristocracy, political 84
arguments against 286–8; assessment in ART (anti-retroviral treatment) 93
South Africa 288; definition of 284–5 Asante 215
AFRC (Armed Forces Ruling Council) “Atingas” (African rural peasants) 28
227, 235 AU (African Union) 42, 66
Africa: conflicts/wars within 9; poverty Australia 123
reduction in 9; social policy framework
for 210 backwardness 33
African: the African Commission 114–15; Bauer, Fran 178
“African drama” 4; the African Union Bayelsa, State of, Nigeria 204–5
65; electricity holding 53; leadership Benin Republic 200
111 besiege 78
Africanization 223 Bible 292
Africans in Diaspora 9, 26 biblical 289; message 291–2; teaching 292
Afrikaner 287 bio-energy 54–5
Afrocentric 78 black 283–4; BBE Act (Broad-based Black
AGOA (African Growth Opportunity Act) Empowerment Act 2003) 285, 287, 289;
28 economic empowerment 283, 284, 289,
agriculture, mechanized 272 292; equity 286; majority people 286
AHH (Aged Household Heads) 13, 204, blame game 34
206 BLRW (Better Life for Rural Women)
AIDS 85 139, 146, 205
Ajakiaye, D.O. 128 Bolshevik Revolution 151
Ake, Claude 114 Bonnie, R.J. 178, 181
Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria 177–80, 200 Botswana 121
Amin, Idi 111 bourgeois 83
Amin, Samir 129 “brain-drain” 88
Annan, Kofi 112 Bretton Woods Organization 274
Ante-Natal Clinic 229 bureaucratic 86
anti-corruption conventions 65–7 Burkina Faso 110

Cameron 288
Cameroun 121, 185
capitalism 83
Caribbean, the 113, 161
CCI (Control of Corruption Index) 71
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) 56
Cecil, Rhodes 36
Chad 194, 199–200
China 188
Christ-like 291
Christian 98, 181; churches 189, 288;
highlands 275, 270; mission workers in
Kumase 219
Civil War 28, 112; Nigerian 112; society
259
clientele 253
clientelism 29, 84
CMB (Cocoa Marketing Board) 232
Codes of Practice, BBE Act 284
CODESRIA (Council for the Development
of Social Science Research in Africa) 21
Cold War politics 9, 66, 110
colonial authorities 215
colonial violence and trauma 21
colonialism 80–2, 115, 121, 279
colonization 284
commandment 291
Commission, the: African 114–15, 289;
Morgan 157, 258; Ndung’u 258
Conable, Barber (World Bank President)
122
condoms 98
conflicts 7, 9, 24, 28, 78–9, 86, 89, 112,
127, 166, 196, 217, 248, 255, 257, 275;
African 110; ethnic 24, 26, 110, 111,
116; internal 24–5, 26, 134
Confucian 29
corruption 65; conceptualization 80; in
contemporary Africa 66; control of 65;
definition of 65, 80; “gangrene of” 86;
leadership and corruption 29; measuring
of 71; poverty and corruption 78–9;
problem of 66; Protocol against 7
Cote d’Ivoire 128
cotton ginnery 272
countries, Nordic 27
CPI (Transparency International’s
Corruption Perspective Index) 72, 123
crime and violence 128
crops: cash 221–3, 249; coffee 121, 255;
food 40
CSM (Cerebro-Spinal Meningitis) 229
culture 114–16; Cultural Forces in World
Politics 114
Index 295
Currie, I. 285
DAC (Development Assistance
Committee) 125
Darwin, Charles 130, 157; Social
Darwinism 130
De Waal, J. 285
DeBeers 36
decolonization: of Kenya 248
defeatism 83
democracy 205; triumph of 25
democratic 283, 287; “democratic
liberalism” 122
Department of Labor 286
Deuteronomy 22:19 291
development 113, 268: African 115, 120;
allies 270; cultures 114; developing 113;
donors 278; economic policy/plan 149;
epistemology of 271; indigenous
economies 113
DFRRI (Directorate of Food, Roads and
Rural Infrastructure) 139, 146, 170, 205
dialectics 14
Diaspora, African 9, 27
DID (Difference-in-Differences) 6, 65, 72,
92, 95; method 96
Diogo Cao 38, 39
discrimination 285–7; laws of 285
disenfranchisement 253
Dong, X. 187
DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo)
121, 128, 248
drought 78, 142, 193, 194, 198, 201, 235
Dutch 36
Dutch Disease Syndrome 10, 27, 139, 142
Dwwedi, O.P. 114
East Asia 113–15
EBA (Everyting But Arms) 28
ECA (Economic Commission for Africa)
121; economic 120; macro 152
economies: African 126; market-led 26
economy: capitalist 143; mixed 143, 149;
socialist 143
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West
African States) 30, 66
EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union) 277
education 23, 26, 28, 36, 70, 82, 112, 122,
124, 133, 147, 180: Nomadic and Adult
programs 205; sex 94
elder abuse 11, 210; characteristics 181;
concept 181; definition 177, 205; nature
182; sexual 183
electricity holding 53
296 Index
elite 29, 84; political 256 “fragile consensus” 21–3
emigration 286–8 France 199
Emperor 276 Francophone 226
empirical 120 free market 129
employment 278, 291; definition 286, 289; Freedom Charter, the 288
EEC (Employment Equity Commission) Friedman, Milton 129
284; equity 284; rural 278
energy infrastructure 53; affordability 57; Gabon 121, 185
consumption 55; nuclear 6, 54; policy GDP: growth 22, 142; per capita 22
and objectives 57; poverty of 62; power GEF (Global Environmental Facility) 56;
53; research development 62; resources integrity 65; warming 200; wealth
55; state-led 279 (benefit) 129
entrepreneurs 66, 81 gender 160, 205
environment 125, 228; environmental General Motors 131
degradation 221, 254 Genesis 291
Equatorial Guinea 185, 287 geography 67, 222
Erasmus 285 Ghana 178, 186; evolution 218; GIHOC
Eritrea 275; ELF (Eritrean Liberation (Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation)
Front) 275 225; National Liberation Council (NLC)
Esau 291 225–6; University Medical School 230
escapism 83 GHGs (greenhouse gas emissions) 54
Ethiopia 121, 247, 268 Global South 268
ethnic wars 116; Tutsis and Hutus 111 global war on terror 270
Eurocentric 35 globalization, economic 124, 130
Europe, Western 124 GMR (Global Monitoring Report) 204
European 151; European Africa 38; God 186, 291–2; kingdom of 291
European companies 223; Europeans “godfathers” 7; god-fatherism 81
living in Kumasi 219; exploitation 33–4; Gold Coast 215–17
explorers 37; missionaries 37; Union 29 Gore, C. 126
Ewe, Fante and Ga 219 Green Revolution, the 132, 150, 170, 201,
Exodus 22:4 291 273
expatriates 224
extraversion 268; concept of 269 Harrison, Lawrence 114–15
Hausa traders 222
family, extended 181; heads of 197 Hayek, F.A. 129
famine 78, 290 HDI (Human Development Index) 79, 127,
FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) 161, 179
186, 271–2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm 38
FDG (focused discussion group) 179, 184, HIPCs (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries)
187 23
FDI (foreign direct investment) 117, 131, HIV/AIDS 28, 92–5, 125
134, 169 Horn of Africa 271
FEAP (Family Economic Advancement household 182
Program) 139 human capital 110, 139, 179
fertility 98–100 human rights: fundamental 188;
Finstone 286 international codes 28; watch 278
food: import 200; insecurity 193; Humera Agricultural Project, Ethopia 14,
insecurity and poverty 193–4; 268–9
production 40; security defined 196–7 hunger 192, 196–7
forced cultivation/labor 34, 37 Huntington, Samuel 115
foreign aids/loans 11, 17, 26, 57; hypothesis 284
corruption 28; counterproductive 27;
dependence 34 IDC (Industrial Development Corporation)
fossil fuel 61 225
 Index 297
ideological 132 Latin America 113, 124, 161, 201, 246
IDSID (International Centre of Settlement leadership 111; Africa 25, 111; bad 25;
of Investment Disputes) 286 legitimacy 111
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 82, Lebanese 219
122, 129–30, 230 legislation 291
imperialism 78, 81 Levantine 219; traders 223
“In-Care of the People” (COPE) 12, 204; liberalism, definition and philosophy of
beneficiaries 210–11; impact 206 122, 151
Indian 223 liberalization 259
indigenization 29 Liberia 128
indigenous 113 life expectancy 8, 161, 186
industrialization 271 living standards 192
internationalization 253 Livingstone, David 38
Isaac 291 London 248
Islam 178 “lost decade” (1980) 124
ISSER (Institute of Statistical, Social and Lugard, Fredrick 35, 37
Economic Research) 220 Luiz, J.M. 288
Luxemburg 286
Jabbra, Joseph 114
Jacob 291 Machiavellian 82
Japan 124 McNamara 274
Jewish traders 219 Majaru 289
job opportunity 287 malaria 229
Jonathan, Goodluck 195 Malaya 115
Manchester 129
KADU (Kenya African Democratic manufacture 121
Union) 14 MAP (Mandatory Attachment Program)
Kagan, Jerome 114 207
KANU (Kenya African Nationalist Union) Maputo 67
14, 253–4 marginalization 12, 206
Kenya 121, 178, 245; KLA (Kenya Land marginalized 291
Alliance) 259, 260; National Land Market Circle, the 219
Policy 260 Marxist 4
Kenyatta, J. 258 Marxist-Leninist 151
kerosene 221, 228 Massai 257–9
Khartoum 275–6 materialism 83
Kibaki 258 Mau Mau 255
Kingdom of God 291 Mazrui, Ali 114
kleptocratic 84 MDGs (Millennium Development Goals)
knowledge 148 55–6, 59, 116, 132, 142–8, 204, 206
Kumase 215–17; capital of Asante 218 megacities 125
Kuru Declaration, the 147 mercantilism 151
kwashiorkor 229 Mexico 206, 247
Kyoto Protocol, the 56 migrants 230, 233–4
migration 185
laborers, Mossi 222 military dictatorship 139
Lagos 187 Mlody, C.D. 283
laissez-faire 129–30 MNCs (multinational corporations) 29,
land: acquisition and grabbing 14, 17, 245, 131
256, 268; hunger 248; ownership 260; modernization 79, 83; agricultural 271;
policy 247, 274; reforms 14, 247; tenure rural 278; strategy 268
regime 276 Moi, Arap 258
“landlessness” 14, 245, 249; and poverty mortality 98–100
252 Mugabe, Robert 113
298 Index
multiracial 223
Munroe, Myles 111
NALDP (National Agricultural Land
Development Program) 139, 205
NAPEP (National Poverty Eradication
Program) 139, 147
National Development Plan, Nigeria 149
National Planning Commission 139
NDE (National Directorate of
Employment) 205
NEEDS program 132, 139, 147–6, 148
neoliberal 122; commercialization of
poverty 128
neoliberalism 123, 129, 155; criticism of
129
news 79, 110, 200, 289: BBC 78, 79
NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
189
Niger-Delta 139, 142, 153, 206
Nigeria: 121, 139–53; poverty level 194;
poverty profile 178, 194; poverty
ranking 194
North America 124
OAU (Organization of African Unity) 30,
122
OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperative and Development) 6, 9, 54,
121
OFN (Operation Feed the Nation) 150, 170
Ofosu-Appiah, Ben 216
OFY (Operation Feed Yourself) 13, 226,
235
Old Testament 291
Oshewolo, S. 120
paradigm 14, 18; shift 132–3
paradox 120
“parasitic symbiosis” 81; state–class 81, 83
parasitism 83
Paris Club, the 139
pastoral 283, 290, 284; caregivers 288;
guidelines 290
patrimonial 84
PBN (Peoples’ Bank of Nigeria) 205
PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief) 92
perspectives: externalist and internalist
4–5, 24; of Corruption Index 6; World
Bank 24
Peru 247
PEs (Public Enterprises) 32; corruption 33
policy: macroeconomic 113; neoliberal 122
poor: African 26; Africa’s 128; diplomacy
26; industrialization policy 26; world’s
125
population growth 217; pressure on land
245; squatter in Kenya 249; urban
Ghana 219
poverty: commercialization of 128;
conceptualization 127; contending
perspectives 125, 155; characteristics of
141, 157; debates 125; definition 109,
125–6, 155, 216; in East and Southern
Africa 243; elder abuse as an aspect
177; feminization of 161; global 22,
123; impact on Africa 116; implications
for African development 165, 183;
incidence of 194; indices of 194; level
of 182; HIV/AIDS and diseases 124;
nature and dimensions of 140, 145, 155;
persistence 129–30; poverty line, 22;
profile 160; responses to 155; reduction
strategies 109, 120, 127, 139–40, 204,
206, 278, 133; relative and absolute
139–40, 178; wars, strikes and conflicts
as causes of 78, 110, 127, 164–5;
weakness and failures of policies of 139,
148
PPMCC (Pearson Product Movement
Correlation Coefficient) 180
PPP (purchasing power parity) 160
“prebendal” 84
pressure on land 245
Pretorius 287–8
primordial 83
production: of food 40; social relations of
279
prostitution 224
Pygmies 40
qualitative and quantitative 177, 179–80
questionnaire 180
race 115
racial 285
railways construction in Ghana 221
Rawlings, Jerry 171
reconciliation 291
redistribution 289
refugees 111
religion: Christian 181; Islam 181
residuals 75
restoration 290
restrictions 74
Rift Valley 249
Rocha, S. 126–7
 Index 299
Rosecrans, Richard 122 theological 283
Rostow, W.W. 271 theory: evolutionist 157; individual
Royal Niger Company (RNC) Charter 35, attributes of poverty 159; micro-
37 economic 98; of moral sentiments 131;
rural poverty 245; development 255, 269, natural circumstantial 159; of necessity
273 157; neoclassical 98; neoliberal
economic 120
SABC (South African Broadcasting tobacco 120
Corporation) 289 “top-down” to “bottom-up” 7
SADC (South African Development trade: balance of 128; barriers 27
Community) 30, 66 traders 222
Salim, Ahmed 113 traditional: medication 223; values 221
Sandawe 40 trajectories 268
Sao Tome and Principe 199 Transparency International 65
SAP (Structural Adjustment Programs) 13, Treaty of Uccialli 270
23, 87, 170, 200, 204, 227 Trevor, Sir Cecil: 1951 report 223
Seko, Mobuto Sese 65 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
Sekondi-Takoradi 215–17; commercial 292
importance of 218 Trypanosomiasis 229
Selassie, Haile 270 Tutsis and Hutus 111
Shaw, Flora 36
Shell-BP 142 UN Development Goals 116
Shunamite 289 UN Millennium Declaration 16
Sierra Leone 128 UNCAC (United Nations’ Convention
Sijuwade, P.O. 178, 183, 187 against Corruption) 65–7
smallpox 229; epidemic 229 underdevelopment 23; Africa’s 25, 125
SMEs (small and medium enterprises) 132 UNDP (UN Human Development Plan)
Social Darwinism 130 21–2, 141, 146, 148, 156, 161
Social Policy Framework for Africa 210 unemployment 125, 283
socialism 29 UNESCO 88, 204
SOEs (state-owned enterprises) 31 United States 178–9, 199, 285
sorghum 272 UN’s Sustainable Development Goals
South Africa 121, 186, 283–8; (SDGs) 16
historiography 287; wealth of 292 UPE (Universal Primary Education) 23
Soviet Union 124 uranium deposits 54
Sowa, Nii K. 216 urban 219; change 217; cultures,
SOWESS (Social Welfare Services construction of 220; dwellers 192
Scheme) 206 urbanization 83; culture 221; migrants in
Spencer, Herbert 130 Ghana urban 222; rapid growth 219;
SPSS (Statistical Package for Social regulation 221; urbanization and poverty
Sciences) 180 215
SSA (sub-Saharan Africa) 6, 22, 37, 92, USAID 92
112–13, 117, 160
SSNIT (Social Security, and National vaccinations 228
Insurance Trust) 232 Vasco da Gama 38
state building 269 VDCs (Village Development Council/
Sudan 121, 248 Committees) 29
“susu” 216 vitamin A 193
Syrians 219; traders 222 volatility, price 60
Vorster, J.M. 288
Tanzania 121
tax: evasion 84; exemptions 57 Wal-Mart 131
territorialization 274 Wallace, R.B. 178, 181
terrorists 116, 125 Ward, Barbara 215, 224
300 Index
wars: civil 125; ethnic 116 World Bank Report 22, 28, 43n10, 121,
WASC (West African School Certificate) 192
181 World War I 122
Washington Consensus 10, 31, 122, 130 World War II 111, 150, 218, 272
Wealth of Nations 131 WTO (World Trade Organization) 27
web of neoliberalism 155
Western: allies 270; development 268; YES (Youth Empowerment Scheme) 206
donor 278; economics 222 youth, unemployed 201
WHO (World Health Organization) 181, 186
Williams, John 276 Zacchaeus 290
witches 186 Zambia 178, 186
world: low income countries 22: poorest Zimbabwe 248, 292
countries 124