Cases of Commodatum

1. Mina vs. Pascual

Facts: Andres Fontanilla, with the consent of his brother Francisco, erected a stone
warehouse on a part of the lot owned by the latter without consideration. Upon the death
of Andres and brothers, Alejandra Mina, et al. for Francisco and Ruperta Pascual, et al. for
Andres become their respective heirs. Mina, et al. file an action to declare the sale of the
lot, where the warehouse stands, between Ruperta to Cu Joco as null and void and of no
force and effect after the trial court annulled the possession for the reason that it affected
Cu Joco who is not a party to the suit despite the ruling of the Supreme Court that the
subject lot and the warehouse belonged to the Mina, et al. in a separate proceeding. Both
parties in the ninth paragraph of the facts submitted to the Court agree that there existed,
and still exists, a commodatum under which Pascual, et al. held the lot.

Issue: WON the agreement entered into by the brothers Fontanilla is one of commodatum.

Held: No. The Court held that although both litigating parties may have agreed in their
idea of the commodatum yet that denomination given by them to the use of the lot granted
by Francisco Fontanilla to his brother, Andres Fontanilla, is not acceptable. Contracts are
not to be interpreted in conformity with the name that the parties thereto agree to give
them, but must be construed, duly considering their constitutive elements, as they are
defined and denominated by law.

It is an essential feature of the commodatum that the use of the thing belonging to
another shall for a certain period. Francisco Fontanilla did not fix any definite period or
time during which Andres Fontanilla could have the use of the lot whereon the latter was
to erect a stone warehouse of considerable value, and so it is that for the past thirty years
of the lot has been used by both Andres and his successors in interest. The present
contention of the plaintiffs that Cu Joco, now in possession of the lot, should pay rent for
it at the rate of P5 a month, would destroy the theory of the commodatum sustained by
them, since, according to the second paragraph of article 1740, "commodatum is
essentially
gratuitous," and, if what the plaintiffs themselves aver on page 7 of their brief is to be
believed, it never entered Francisco's mind to limit the period during which his brother
Andres was to have the use of the lot, because he expected that the warehouse would
eventually fall into the hands of his son, Fructuoso Fontanilla, called the adopted son
of
Andres, which did not come to pass for the reason that Fructuoso died before his uncle
Andres. With that expectation in view, it appears more likely that Francisco intended to
allow his brother Andres a surface right; but this right supposes the payment of an
annual rent, and Andres had the gratuitous use of the lot.
 2. De Los Santos v. Jarra
G.R. No. 4150
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: In a contract of commodatum whereby one of the parties thereto delivers to
the other a thing that is not perishable, to be used for a certain time and afterwards returned, it
is the imperative duty of the bailee, if he should be unable to return the thing itself to the owner,
to pay damages to the latter if, through the fault of the bailee, the thing loaned was lost or
destroyed, inasmuch as the bailor retains the ownership thereof.
FACTS: On the 1st of September, 1906, Felix de los Santos brought suit against Agustina
Jarra, the administratrix of the estate of Magdaleno Jimenea, alleging that in the latter part of
1901 Jimenea borrowed and obtained from the plaintiff ten first-class carabaos, to be used at
the animal-power mill of his hacienda during the season of 1901-2, without recompense or
remuneration whatever for the use thereof, under the sole condition that they should be returned
to the owner as soon as the work at the mill was terminated.
Magdaleno Jimenea, however, did not return the carabaos, notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiff claimed their return after the work at the mill was finished. our died of rinderpest, and it
is for this reason that the judgment appealed from only deals with six surviving carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether defendant is under obligation to indemnify the owner thereof by paying him
their value.
RULING: The court held in the affirmative.
The court held that in a contract of commodatum whereby one of the parties thereto delivers to
the other a thing that is not perishable, to be used for a certain time and afterwards returned, it
is the imperative duty of the bailee, if he should be unable to return the thing itself to the owner,
to pay damages to the latter if, through the fault of the bailee, the thing loaned was lost or
destroyed, inasmuch as the bailor retains the ownership thereof.
Here, the court held that the carabaos delivered to be used not being returned by the defendant
upon demand, there is no doubt that she is under obligation to indemnify the owner thereof by
paying him their value.
 3. Quintos v. Beck
FACTS: The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff. The latter gratuitously granted to the former
the use of the furniture subject to the condition that the defendant would return them to the
plaintiff upon the latter's demand. The plaintiff sold the property. There after the plaintiff required
the defendant to return all the furniture transferred to him for the new owners in the house
where they were found.
On November 5, 1936, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff reiterating that she may call for the
furniture in the ground floor of the house. On the 7th of the same month, the defendant wrote
another letter to the plaintiff informing her that he could not give up the three gas heaters and
the four electric lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the same month when the
lease in due to expire. The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view of the fact that the
defendant had declined to make delivery of all of them. On November 15th, before vacating the
house, the defendant deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the plaintiff and
they are now on deposit in the custody of the sheriff.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant complied with his obligation to return the furniture upon the
plaintiff’s demand.
HELD: NO.
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because under it the
plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving for herself the
ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the furniture to the
plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit A; articles 1740, paragraph 1,
and 1741 of the Civil Code).
The obligation voluntarily assumed by the defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's
demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the latter's residence or
house. The defendant did not comply with this obligation when he merely placed them at the
disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and the four eletric lamps.
As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the
latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the
deposit of the furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not entitled to place
the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the
furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric
lamps.
Keywords: liability in cases of force majeure, borrowing of 3 bulls and failure to return or
purchase, Bureau of Animal Industry, Bagtas, Cagayan
Summary: Bagtas borrowed three bulls from the Bureau of Animal Industry for one year for
breeding purposes subject to payment of breeding fee of 10% of book value of the bull. Upon
expiration, Bagtas asked for renewal. The renewal was granted only to one bull. Bagtas offered
to buy the bulls at its book value less depreciation but the Bureau refused. The Bureau said that
Bagtas should either return or buy it at book value. Bagtas proved that he already returned two
of the bulls, and the other bull died during a Huk raid, hence, obligation already extinguished.
He claims that the contract is a commodatum hence, loss through fortuitous event should be
borne by the owner.
4. Republic vs. Bagtas
Important topic: Obligation of the Bailee to return of the thing loaned
Facts: Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls for a period of one
year for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book
value of the books. Upon the expiration of the contract, Bagtas asked for a renewal for another
one year, however, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved only the
renewal for one bull and other two bulls be returned. Bagtas then wrote a letter to the Director of
Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls with a deduction of yearly
depreciation. The Director advised him that the value cannot be depreciated and asked Bagtas
to either return the bulls or pay their book value. Bagtas neither paid nor returned the bulls. The
Republic then commenced an action against Bagtas ordering him to return the bulls or pay their
book value.
LC: *Trial court: After hearing, the trial Court ruled in favor of the Republic, as such, the
Republic moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted.
INTERVENING FACT: Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and administrator of Bagtas'
estate, returned the two bulls and filed a motion to quash the writ of execution since one bull
cannot be returned for it was killed by gunshot during a Huk raid. The Court denied her motion
hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals because only questions of law are raised.
Issue:
1. WON the contract was commodatum
2. WON Bagtas should be held liable for its loss due to force majeure.

Held:
1. NO, the contract is not commodatum.
2. YES, he is liable for the loss.
Ratio: A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. Supreme Court held that Bagtas
was liable for the loss of the bull even though it was caused by a fortuitous event. If the contract
was one of lease, then the 10% breeding charge is compensation (rent) for the use of the bull
and Bagtas, as lessee, is subject to the responsibilities of a possessor. He is also in bad faith
because he continued to possess the bull even though the term of the contract has already
expired.

If the contract was one of commodatum, he is still liable because: (1) he kept the bull longer
than the period stipulated; and (2) the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value
(10%). No stipulation that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of
the appellant would be exempt from liability.
The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was
renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used
the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid, it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore,
when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an
appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the
Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event
the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.