Ethnic and Racial Studies

ISSN: 0141-9870 (Print) 1466-4356 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20

The politics of ethnic representation in Philippine

bureaucracy

Weena Gera

To cite this article: Weena Gera (2015): The politics of ethnic representation in Philippine
bureaucracy, Ethnic and Racial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2015.1080374

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1080374

Published online: 17 Sep 2015.

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 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1080374

The politics of ethnic representation in Philippine

bureaucracy
Weena Gera
Social Sciences Cluster, University of the Philippines Cebu, Cebu City, Philippines

ABSTRACT
The good governance argument for diversity in civil service is based on the
notion that creating a bureaucracy that represents the diverse communities it
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serves strengthens government accountability and legitimacy. This paper

argues that ethnic representation in national bureaucratic governance in the
Philippines primarily constitutes a means for political reallocation of space, as
it is embedded in the government’s framework of asymmetric political
autonomy. Mired in intersecting political and ethnic tensions (i.e. blurred
ethnic distinctions/ethnic identity disputes and politico-ethnic conflicts),
patrimonial forces could easily exploit the country’s bureaucratic
representation policies as spaces for patronage and as superficial tokens to
mollify interethnic factions of their share of the national polity. Thus, instead
of facilitating equitable voice in bureaucratic governance, such policy
framework could only hold ordinary indigenous and minority ethnic
communities captive in the elite-dominated interethnic struggle for
representation.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 10 November 2014; Accepted 11 June 2015

KEYWORDS Politics of ethnic representation; ethnic representation in bureaucratic governance; political

reallocation of space; asymmetric autonomy; representative bureaucracy

Introduction
Fundamental in the paradigm of ethnic representation in bureaucracy is the
assertion that this strategy lends legitimacy to the government by creating
a more responsive civil service that represents the diverse communities it
serves. Particularly amid increasing diversity of ethnic and racial lines in multi-
cultural societies, many governments including the USA, Canada, Great
Britain, Australia, Malaysia, South Africa and India, among others, have
pursued in varying scopes, ethnic representation in public organization (see
Kennedy-Dubourdieu 2006; Elias 2013; von Maravic, Peters and Schroter
2013; Smith 2013).

CONTACT Weena Gera wsgera@up.edu.ph

© 2015 Taylor & Francis
 2 W. GERA

With the growing assertion on the imperatives of diversity in bureaucratic

governance, analyses on how ethnic representation strategies transform gov-
ernment performance and effectiveness in public service delivery have
expanded. There is, however, a prevailing gap in examinations over the motiv-
ations that drive policy formulation, as well as the implications of institutional
arrangements vis-à-vis the country’s political context on implementation. This
paper contributes to this analytical discourse by examining the interplay of
institutional and political factors that influence ethnic representation in Philip-
pine bureaucracy at the national level.
The Philippines is a nation inhabited by a number of different ethno-lin-
guistic groups. The dominant ethnic groups who have largely converted to
Christianity and adopted many foreign cultural elements include the
Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Pangasinense, Kapampangan, Bicolano
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and Waray. Outside these groups are ethnic minorities and indigenous
peoples (IPs)1 scattered across the archipelago with diverse cultural character-
istics. They are known to live generally in poor, geographically remote areas or
rural communities with limited access to basic social services and mainstream
economic activities and employment (Gonzalez 2005; Stavenhagen 2005;
Carino 2012).
In accordance with the constitutional mandate to address cultural exclu-
sion and historical marginalization of ethnic minorities and IPs, the Philippine
government enacted policy provisions to promote broader minority ethnic
and indigenous representation in the national bureaucracy. This study
would, however, argue that such policy provisions primarily constitute a
means for political reallocation of space as they are embedded in the govern-
ment’s framework of asymmetric political autonomy. It then illustrates the
implications of such institutional arrangement vis-à-vis the country’s political
landscape.
First, there is a deeply embedded patrimonial and patronage politics in the
Philippines – ‘predominated by oligarchic forces whose access to the state is
the major avenue to private accumulation’ (Hutchcroft 1998, 234). This defines
the country’s intergovernmental political system characterized as ‘dichoto-
mized sections of patrimonial powers: marked by contradictions between
the oligarchies from central and local political structures, often bound in stra-
tegic compromise and shifting loyalties’ (Gera 2008/2009, 31). This extends to
the country’s bureaucracy and civil service, which is notably highly appointive.
There are also intersecting politico-ethnic tensions prevailing in the
country. Amid its ethnic diversity, there are fundamental disputes over
ethnic distinctions where identities of IPs and ethnic minorities remain
mired in anthropological, historical and conceptual contentions. There is no
real consensus as to who exactly are the IPs in the country, with ethnic iden-
tities continually reconstructed along demographic and sociocultural factors.
These ambiguities have not only deprived opportunities for recognition of
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 3

indigeneity and ethnicity claims, but also fuelled tensions among the ethnic
minority and indigenous communities themselves.
The country also remains in the midst of ongoing volatile peace agree-
ments to overcome decades of politico-ethnic conflicts. Certain groups
among ethnic minorities and indigenous communities – in particular, the
Bangsamoro2 in the south and the Cordillera ethnic groups3 in the north –
have mobilized armed rebellions against historical marginalization and viola-
tions of rights to ancestral lands, towards self-determination. Institutional
arrangements within the framework of asymmetric autonomy have been
pursued as a means for the settlement of ethnic conflicts and secessionist
struggles. However, while the long processes of complex negotiations have
resulted in peace deals, fragments of inter- and intra-ethnic factions, their
forces and their underlying agenda, continue to compete for leadership in
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waging the struggle for political autonomy, which has aggravated conflicts
and ran initial inroads into the ground.
This paper presents the argument that amid these intersecting political and
ethnic tensions, patrimonial forces could easily exploit the country’s bureau-
cratic representation policies as spaces for patronage and as superficial
tokens to mollify interethnic factions of their share of the national polity. Con-
sequently, these policies could not deliver equitable ethnic representation
and voice in national bureaucratic governance. Instead, they contribute to
prevailing politico-ethnic tensions, which hold ordinary indigenous and min-
ority ethnic communities captive in the elite-dominated, interethnic struggle
for representation.

Ethnic representation in bureaucracy

Donald Kingsley (1944) first articulated the concept of representative bureauc-
racy and was pursued by David Levitan (1946) to argue that a compelling way
to ensure bureaucratic accountability was to place bureaucrats who represent
the people they served, since they would pursue the people’s aspirations by
proxy. Krislov (1974) and Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) similarly pro-
posed that bureaucrats were more likely to fight for the rights and pursue
decisions reflective of the needs of those from similar backgrounds and
values. The notion is that representative bureaucracy promotes a pluralist
system that includes within it stakeholders from different cultures and
sectors bringing in their potential contributions (Gonzalez 2005; Pitts 2007).
Essentially, the government forms a microcosm of the broad constituency
based on the premise that bureaucracy can serve better when it reflects the
demographic characteristics of its citizens (Rourke 1978).
This is aligned with the framework of cultural diversity in the bureaucratic
workforce, which according to the UN (2001) lends legitimacy to the govern-
ment by broadening the involvement of multiple stakeholders that reflect
 4 W. GERA

understanding of the diverse cultures of the communities served. The

bureaucracy could gain from the unique capacities and experiences that
various ethnic groups bring, in the process adding a wider array of insights,
sensitivity and responsiveness into policymaking and public service (Jemiai
2001).
Within this paradigm, governments organize affirmative policy strategies
towards diverse recruitment in the bureaucracy so that under-represented
ethnic and indigenous groups can gain their share of the opportunities
related to a civil service career. It has been argued that amid cultural exclusion
and historical marginalization, affirmative action or preferential accommo-
dation of minority and indigenous groups becomes necessary (Curry and
West 1996; Bruce 2002; Gonzalez 2005; Wise 2005). Affirmative actions
involve a quota and proportionality-driven method with statistical goals for
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recruitment, training and promotion on the basis of membership in disadvan-

taged and under-represented groups. These changes, if adopted broadly in
the bureaucracy, can theoretically lead to improving the status of indigenous
and ethnic minorities, as well as the performance in governance and public
administration.
An affirmative policy such as ethnic bureaucratic representation is parallel
to, and often integrated with, the framework of asymmetric autonomy, which
is anchored in the argument that an asymmetry of institutional design is a
reasonable response to asymmetric aspirations that exist across the state’s
territory (McGarry 2012). Ghai (2000, 12) noted that inherent to regional
autonomy, ‘asymmetry acknowledges the unevenness of diversities and
opens up additional possibilities of awarding recognition to specific groups
with special needs or capacities, such as indigenous peoples whose traditional
culture is central to their way of life’. Thus, spaces for bureaucratic represen-
tation are characteristic of asymmetries in autonomy frameworks. Corre-
spondingly, these asymmetries in political autonomy and affirmative
bureaucratic representation policies are noted to pose varying implications
according to the specific political context, structures and conditions upon
which these are enforced.

Implications and caveats

Amid the ideals of affirmative and asymmetric frameworks, there are,
however, counter-assertions that these are inconsistent with the principles
of equality and non-discrimination (Mosher 1968; Larson 1973; Lim 2006).
Inherent asymmetries in autonomy are asserted to cause resentments and
hostilities against privileged positions afforded to distinct identities with
special needs that create new exclusions (Ghai 2000). In the same way,
caveats have been posed against ethnicity-based bureaucratic representation.
Thomas (1990), Jemiai (2001) and Dimitrijeviç and Kovács (2004) asserted that
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 5

such frameworks legitimize ethnicity-based majority rule in multiethnic con-

texts, potentially dividing people along ethnic lines and creating opportu-
nities for exclusion. These scholars noted that marking out ethnic identities
might unintendedly highlight differences between ethnic groups in the work-
place, polarize them, produce conflict, and generate a worse situation than
the one it sets out to do away with.
There are also implications in terms of resistance from the mainstream
society who would see that preferential accommodation and recruitment
based on proportionality unjustly deprives the majority of opportunities. The
UN (2001) noted that it becomes contentious when procedures and practices
that guarantee representation to some, will deny it to many. Lim (2006, 202)
also argued that ‘partiality by minority bureaucrats legitimizes partiality by
other bureaucrats and makes them less restrained in discriminating against
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the minority group’. Moreover, ‘ethnicization’ could occur – a situation where

all initiatives and decisions are read mainly in ethnic terms (Gonzalez 2005;
Schöpflin 2001). In such situations, the good governance character of diversity
strategy is considered lost since policy decisions do not transcend ethnicities.
Another critical caveat is that institutional arrangements for bureaucratic
representation, if not carefully calibrated according to the country’s political
context, could arguably heighten the marginalization of certain communities.
Stavenhagen (2005) underscored that indigenous organizations may claim
the right to represent IPs at the national level, but this may not be compatible
with existing political structures. This is much like what Ghai (2000) has noted
of the problems that can be posed by asymmetric autonomy in less efficient
bureaucracies, or with politicians not given to compromise. Asymmetric fra-
meworks could be problematic particularly if only one or two groups enjoy
autonomy, or when the region benefiting from it wants equal or even superior
representation in central institutions. The UNDP (2004) would note that if
managed unconstructively, diversity strategy could quickly lead to instability
within states and trigger civil conflict that could derail development.

Institutional framework for ethnic representation in national

bureaucracy
The Philippines enacted legislation to promote broader minority ethnic and
indigenous representation in the national bureaucratic structure. These laws
are pursued in accordance with the constitutional mandate to address cultural
exclusion and historical marginalization of ethnic minorities and IPs.

Administrative Code of 1987

In principle and in legislation, the country’s civil service recruitment standards
are based on the constitutional mandate, which provides that all recruitments
 6 W. GERA

and appointments in the career service shall be made according to merit and
fitness. These are determined by competitive examinations and based on
minimum qualification standards of education, training, eligibility and experi-
ence set by the Civil Service Commission. The Commission promotes a policy
of non-discrimination in the selection of employees on account of gender,
civil status, disability, religion, political affiliation, or ethnicity.
Nonetheless, as a strategy to promote broader representation among
ethnic minorities and IPs in the bureaucracy, the Philippine government pro-
vides for an affirmative policy via Executive Order 292, otherwise called the
Administrative Code of 1987. It provides that ‘to facilitate the integration of
the members of cultural communities and accelerate the development of
the areas occupied by them, the Commission shall give special civil service
examinations to qualify them for appointment in the civil service’.4 Specifically
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for the indigenous of the Cordilleras, the Civil Service Commission has also
issued Memorandum Circular 20 (1988) noting that, ‘preference in appoint-
ment shall be given to a native of Cordillera in cases where all the applicants
equally meet the minimum requirements for the position’.5

Bureaucratic representation embedded in regional autonomy

As previously noted, the Philippines adopted asymmetric autonomy as an insti-
tutional arrangement to settle ethnic conflicts and secessionist struggles. It
involves the grant of greater autonomy to certain ethnic groups who are claim-
ing a distinct identity, to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern
(Ghai 2000; Weller and Nobbs 2010). Within this framework of power distri-
bution and political reorganization of space, the Philippines conceded regional
autonomy to certain ethnic minority groups aimed to address marginalization
and accordingly facilitate ethnic representation in governance.
Two sub-national units among ethnic minorities – the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),6 covering five Muslim-dominated provinces in
the south, and the Cordillera Administrative Region for the Cordilleras in
northern Luzon – were given special status as regional governments, as a
result of decades-long struggle and lengthy peace negotiations. Embedded
in the provisions for regional autonomy are expanded mandates for ethnic
representation in national government agencies in the region.
In ARMM, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement7 mandates the Philippine gov-
ernment to appoint Muslim representation in national line agencies. The
Muslims in the Philippines were also provided bureaucratic representation
through the Office on Muslim Affairs under the Office of the President,
which was later reconstituted to become the National Commission on
Muslim Filipinos. In the same way, the Republic Act 9054, also known as the
2001 Organic Act for the ARMM, grants autonomy and powers for the regional
government to enact its own regional administrative code and regional local
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 7

government code. Section 5 of such legislation mandates for representation

in central government or national government departments and offices: ‘As
far as practicable, the autonomous region shall be represented in the depart-
ments, offices, commissions, agencies, and bureaus of the national govern-
ment … in the region.’
The ethnic groups in the Cordilleras, on the other hand, have settled for
administrative autonomy as a result of two failed plebiscites to legalize a
regional government. Nonetheless, Executive Order 220 (1987),8 which
created the Cordillera Administrative Region, defined the region’s autonomy
over the regional administrative system, which includes the promotion of indi-
genous institutions and processes for conflict resolution and dispute settle-
ment, among others. Section 10 of this provision identifies the Cordillera
Executive Board as the development body and implementing arm of the
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Cordillera Administrative Region constituting twenty-nine regular members,

including six representatives from the Cordillera Bodong Administration and
twelve representatives from the different ethno-linguistic groups in the
Cordillera. Section 16 provides that for the purposes of the Cordillera Admin-
istrative Region, exemptions from civil service rules and regulations may be
provided by the Civil Service Commission.

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

As a direct strategy for ethnic representation in the national bureaucracy, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) was created via the
Republic Act 8371, known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of
1997.9 The NCIP is the primary government agency that formulates and
implements policies, plans and programmes for the promotion of the rights
and well-being of IPs, and for the recognition of their ancestral domains
(IPRA, Chapter 7, Sections 38 and 44a).
The NCIP serves under the Office of the President, composed of seven com-
missioners representing the seven ethnographic regions in the country as
defined by the IPRA. Section 50 provides for the constitution by the NCIP of
a consultative body consisting of traditional leaders, elders and representa-
tives from women and youth of the different cultural communities and indi-
genous groups, to advise it on matters relating to these communities’
concerns and aspirations.

The politics of ethnic representation in national bureaucracy

This paper argues that these policy provisions and institutional arrangements
for ethnic representation in Philippine national bureaucracy are mired in inter-
secting political and ethnic tensions: (1) blurred ethnic distinctions and ethnic
identity disputes; and (2) politico-ethnic conflicts aggravated by asymmetries
 8 W. GERA

in political autonomy provisions. These have allowed for the politicization of

the country’s ethnic representation strategies – utilized by competing patri-
monial forces as spaces for building patronage and as superficial tokens to
assuage elite-dominated interethnic factions in the political reallocation of
space in governance.

Blurred ethnic distinctions and ethnic identity disputes

The invisibility of IPs and ethnic minorities in Philippine national bureaucracy
and the lack of enforcement of the Administrative Code of 1987 in civil service
are for a huge part due to the lack of accurate demographic data. Data collec-
tion and disaggregation on IPs and ethnic minorities in government records
are inadequate. It has been noted that there has been no accurate compre-
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hensive count of Philippine IPs since 1916 (Guia-Padilla 2012).

Approximations of the number of indigenous ethno-linguistic groups in
the country vary widely – between about seventy and 140. An unofficial
survey conducted by the NCIP (2009) estimates the population of IPs in the
Philippines to be 12–15 million. According to this survey, the majority of IPs
(61%) are found in Mindanao, 33% are found in Luzon, and 6% in Visayas
(in Carino 2012). Former NCIP chair Brigida Zenaida Hamada-Pawid noted:
‘The indigenous Filipino population has been an elusive sector, and is often
profiled as a mere estimate by government agencies today … [Most] do not
appear in the planning statistics.’10
International organizations including the United Nations Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues (UN 2009) criticized the general lack of systematic collec-
tion and documentation of disaggregated data on IPs along various concerns.
As a response, the Philippine National Statistics Office (NSO) worked closely
with the NCIP in operationalizing an ethnicity variable in the government’s
2010 Census on Population and Housing. On May 14, 2004, the Office of
the Civil Registrar General (OCRG) also issued Administrative Order No. 3,
Series of 2004, which directs the offices under the NSO and the OCRG to reg-
ister the birth, marriage, death, dissolution of marriage, and revocation of the
dissolution of marriage among IPs in the Philippines.
However, Carino (2012) argued that disaggregation of data for IPs could
not be done beyond the use of the ‘mother tongue’ variable because of the
absence of specific questions on indigenous ethnic identity in the national
census survey questionnaires. Carino further noted that the five-page forms
needed to record IP births or deaths were cumbersome and were often
ignored by local registrars or nurses tasked to document births in local
hospitals. IPs themselves also tend to postpone registration until legal
documentation becomes necessary. Clearly, such constraints in systematic
data collection and disaggregation have significant bearing on why ethnic
representation could not be properly addressed.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 9

As Reichenberg (2001) argued, affirmative action can only be successful if

agencies utilize more measurable criteria to rate their progress in managing
diversity. Proportional representation in civil service thus becomes moot in
the Philippines where there is no real disaggregation of population data
based on appropriate identification of ethnic minorities and indigenous
groups who are most under-represented in the national bureaucracy. This
constitutes an expedient excuse to justify the lack of action in promoting
ethnic representation in the civil service, evident in the Inventory of Govern-
ment Personnel by the Civil Service Commission where ethnicity is not a data
indicator.
The lack of data also stems from prevailing disputes over definitions of
ethnic identities, particularly of indigeneity as previously mentioned. Describ-
ing the situation of IPs in the Philippines, Stavenhagen (2003, 8), Special Rap-
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porteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, reported that ‘there is no

consensus as to exactly who are indigenous peoples in the country. Indigen-
ous identities probably continue to be constructed and reconstructed amid
demographic changes, political exigencies, and religious dimensions’.
Amid its ethnic diversity, there are prevailing disputes over ethnic distinc-
tions in the country where identities of IPs and ethnic minorities remain mired
in anthropological, historical and conceptual contentions. In its legislation of
the IPRA of 1997, the indigenous cultural communities and IPs are identified
based on ‘self-ascription and ascription by others’ or ‘on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of con-
quest or colonization’.11
This definition proves ambiguous and suggests a much less defined
boundary between these groups and other Filipinos. Some IPs identify them-
selves differently from what others call them. For example, in the study on
data disaggregation in Nueva Vizcaya, an indigenous ethnic group call them-
selves the Bugkalot while others historically know them as the Ilongot (Tauli-
Corpuz, de Chavez, and Carino 2006). Resulting from intermarriages, some
individuals declare two ethnicities, following either their maternal or their
paternal origin.
Such ambiguities lead to disputes over authenticity of identities, even
among the indigenous cultural communities and IPs themselves, which com-
plicate and morph into inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts and rivalries, especially
when representation in decisions over scarce resources is involved. Fernandez
(2003) noted that in the 1960s and 1970s, the Civil Service Commission con-
ferred eligibilities to members of the cultural communities through a testimo-
nial procedure. However, some individuals who made false claims of their
membership in certain cultural groups to secure civil service eligibilities
abused this process.
The NCIP, tasked to identify criteria to decide who is indigenous and
who is not for the purpose of the IPRA, has thus defined ethnicity as a
 10 W. GERA

household member’s identity by blood relations and not by choice, adop-

tion, or confirmation. This definition is aimed to prevent the inclusion of
‘fake’ members of indigenous communities, or those who claim to be
indigenous for selfish gains. Many nonetheless found a problem with this
definition, believing it to be disrespectful of the right to cultural integrity,
as many indigenous groups do not consider consanguineal relations as
the only or even primary determinant of their ethnicity (Jefremovas and
Perez 2011).
It can be noted that there is a refusal to define indigeneity in the 2007
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – because
‘historically indigenous peoples have suffered from definitions imposed by
others’ (Daes 1995, 3). However, the prevailing ambiguities embedded in
the discourse of IP identities have not only deprived opportunities for
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recognition of indigenous claims, but also fuelled tensions even among

the ethnic minority and indigenous communities themselves. In particular,
matters that involved decisions over who represents the indigenous
communities and whether each ethnic community has the right to be
represented have created antagonisms among the ethnic minority elites.
These complicate into inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts and rivalries,
especially when resources and sensitive matters of ancestral domain are
involved.
The diaspora of ethnic and indigenous groups who may have been dis-
placed or who may have voluntarily resettled outside of their traditional
domains also contributes to the fragmentation of collective ethnic identity,
and thus constitutes another constraint to proportional ethnic representation.
IPs often suffer disproportionately from armed conflict as their lands were
often the sites of armed encounters, with many of them recruited by
various parties to the fighting (Watanabe 2007; United States Department
of State 2011). Development aggression and intimidation along with increas-
ing environmental threats such as disastrous flooding due to continued
logging and mining activities led to the displacement of many IPs from
their traditional lands (Orticio 2006; AHRC 2012; AIPP 2012; Guia-Padilla
2012; Longid 2012).
Outside influences and changing economic systems of the IPs have also
facilitated their movements. While most of them remain engaged in subsis-
tence agriculture, they are increasingly being integrated into the wider
market economy in the whole country (Carino 2012). For these ethnic
groups who are territorially dispersed and fragmented, their participation
and representation in governance at different levels are much more circum-
scribed. It is thus clear that a concrete conceptualization of indigeneity and
appropriate identification of ethnic minorities are central to the process of
diversity management and bureaucratic representation, without which IPs
and ethnic minorities could be trapped in the web of identity politics.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 11

Breeding ground for patronage in civil service

In a culture of appointive civil service, the availability of an affirmative pro-
gramme of actions for ethnic representation may be contested as a breed-
ing ground for patronage (UNDP 2004). Particularly amid blurred ethnic
distinctions and prevailing contestations in ethnic identities, the govern-
ment could not institutionalize concrete parameters to implement bureau-
cratic representation. This proves to be politically expedient particularly in
building patronage in the bureaucracy. It is ripe for bribery and co-optation,
especially among leaders of ethnic groups. This has reportedly fuelled
tensions and disintegration among ethnic factions who had to battle for
benefaction.
The civil service structure of the Philippine government is highly appoin-
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tive. The country’s president holds a strong clout in the recruitment of civil
service personnel from top-ranked bureaucratic officials down to clerical pos-
itions. Approximately 10,000 positions (Monsod 2008/2009) (including those
at the highest third-level career posts as well as highly technical posts) are
subject to presidential prerogative. This is based on the ‘residual powers of
the President’, which means that when there is no legal stipulation as to
who the appointing authority is for a certain position, the power redounds
to the president (Monsod 2008/2009, 15). The Civil Service Commission can
only administer and make referrals from among the eligible candidates, but
the appointing authorities (i.e. the president and other delegated executive
heads) still exercise wide latitude of discretion in the final selections based
on trust and confidence that are not covered in the rules of nepotism. The
Commission has no power, whether to veto or to protect, when the subject
is a ‘presidential appointee’, which undermines the constitutional imperative
of ‘merit and fitness’ (Monsod 2008/2009, 14).
However, affirmative strategies such as ethnic representation in the civil
service become legally sanctioned avenues and spaces to build patronage.
The few officials coming from ethnic minorities and indigenous communities,
who have made it to top bureaucratic positions in government, were
appointed mainly on the basis of political alliance and not by affirmation of
their ethnicity. These include the top bureaucratic positions of indigenous
bodies all appointed by the president. For example, the president appoints
all seven NCIP commissioners representing the seven ethnographic regions
in the country, as well as the executive director who manages the secretariat.
Moreover, based on Executive Order 220, the president appoints the twenty-
nine regular members of the Cordillera Executive Board and its executive
director.
Being recruited in the bureaucracy under a customized civil service exam-
ination also remains a highly competitive proposition for ethnic minorities
and IPs. Pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service
 12 W. GERA

Commission conducted the Cultural Community Examination in 1989 – a

customized examination for cultural and ethnic groups designed to be
responsive to their level of education and their limited development oppor-
tunities. However, the examination was stopped in view of the low pass rate
(1,755 out of 18,031). Commission statistics show that Muslims in the ARMM
region performed poorly in the career examinations. In 2000 and 2001, the
pass rate ranged between just 0.35% and 1.86% (Fernandez 2003). Such
limitation of an affirmative policy amid high illiteracy among IPs and
ethnic minorities could only open up opportunities for patronage-based
recruitment.

Politico-ethnic conflicts aggravated by asymmetries in political

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autonomy
As noted, the Philippines remain in the midst of ongoing volatile peace agree-
ments to overcome decades of politico-ethnic conflicts and secessionist
struggles. The government has conceded regional autonomy to certain
ethnic minority groups, specifically the ARMM and the Cordillera Administra-
tive Region, to address demands against marginalization and accordingly
facilitate self-governance. However, characteristic to what Ghai (2000) has
cautioned, asymmetric autonomy could pose problems in less efficient politi-
cal and bureaucratic systems. Indeed, fragments of inter- and intra-ethnic pol-
itical factions have competed over leadership and legitimacy in waging the
struggle for political autonomy in the country.
Particularly in the context of the Bangsamoro struggle in the southern Phi-
lippines, predominant politico-ethnic factions have exploited the inherent
asymmetries in political autonomy in asserting their position (i.e. Moro
National Liberation Front versus the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and their
splinter groups), which aggravated tensions in the region. These fuelled
deep resentments and distrust against the national government and regional
leadership, particularly amid a complex web of factors including worsening
poverty conditions, inequality, cultural discrimination, exploitation of indigen-
ous natural resources, displacement, and overall economic and political
marginalization.
The Bangsamoro struggle is rooted in desires to reacquire the status of a
separate, independent state, wherein Muslim Filipinos would have greater
access to and control over the benefits of socio-economic development in
Mindanao and establish an Islamic way of life (Alim 1995; Santos 2001; San
Juan 2007; Lingga 2010). The government peace negotiations12 led to the cre-
ation of the ARMM in 1989 via the Republic Act 6734.13 However, this could
not achieve sustained peace in the region. What happened was that
despite provisions of political autonomy and regional self-governance,
ARMM was not granted fiscal powers to generate its own resources and run
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 13

its own affairs. As of 2011, it continues to receive approximately 98% of its

operating revenue from the national government and remains highly depen-
dent on central allocations.14
Moreover, the inherent asymmetries in the claim and exercise of autonomy
among different ethno-linguistic and political factions have been exploited by
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leadership, which created divisions
within the organization and heightened tensions with rival factions.15 This has
derailed the peace initiatives, particularly when secessionist groups including
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) staunchly opposed the MNLF’s
bargain and sought a separate framework of political autonomy within a
shared political arrangement (i.e. a sub-state)16 with the Philippine govern-
ment (Wadi 2012).
The government ultimately shifted its peace negotiations with the MILF on
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January 1997. After seventeen years of negotiations for a political settlement,

the MILF dropped its bid for full independence in favour of autonomous
control over large areas in Mindanao. On March 2014, the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed. This agreement is a comprehen-
sive peace pact that prescribes the design for a new political entity that will
replace the ARMM and establish a new set of institutional arrangements
and modalities between the central government and the autonomous gov-
ernment with respect to power-sharing, wealth and revenue sharing,
among other provisions. This has resulted in the drafting of House Bill 4994,
otherwise called the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which remains to be deliberated
in Congress.
The peace deal and the Bangsamoro Basic Law continue to face severe
challenges, particularly the animosity of rival MNLF and two of its factions –
the Misuari Breakaway Group and the Islamic Command Council, which felt
left out in the peace agreements, especially over the issue of wealth
sharing. Instead of joining the Transition Commission to draft the Bangsamoro
Basic Law and take part in tripartite agreements proposed by the government,
MNLF forces instead engaged in military siege and continued defiance against
the negotiations. The pretext of their defiance was the lack of transparency in
the agreements and the MILF’s lack of credibility and its purported ties with
Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah.
MILF’s rogue faction, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom fighters, which
broke away from MILF due to serious disagreements over the terms of the
peace deal, further complicates the dynamics, along with the other armed
groups in the region. All these signify the growing complications and ten-
sions aggravated as a result of the asymmetrical nature of autonomy.
Taking into consideration the complex reality of Mindanao with its current
tri-people17 demography, asymmetries in regional autonomy have impli-
cations for the coexistence of the region’s diverse peoples pitted in poli-
tico-ethnic conflicts.
 14 W. GERA

Political reallocation of space

The stakes in politico-ethnic conflicts in the Philippines very much reflect
Wolff’s (2006, 5) description of ethnic conflicts as a global phenomenon:
‘extremely diverse and complex, ranging from legitimate political, social, cul-
tural, and economic grievances of disadvantaged ethnic groups to agendas of
the state and small cartels of elites, to so-called national security interests.’ By
conceding regional autonomy, the Philippine government granted political
space to territorially concentrated ethnic minority groups and IPs, specifically
the ARMM and the Cordillera Administrative Region, for self-governance.
However, as far as the Philippine government is concerned, it could not
afford the formation of a unified Moro front that could seriously pose as a
threat to national security. Wolff (2006) noted that a policy of stratified
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pluralism is needed to disintegrate formerly cohesive groups, nourish antag-

onisms between and among their members, and prevent any sense of unified
resistance.
It can thus be argued that the government negotiates mainly within such
paradigm of stratified pluralism in which ethnic representation in national
bureaucracy becomes an expedient. Particularly for ARMM, this is provided
for in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement negotiated by the MNLF. This has
been followed through via the aforementioned 1997 IPRA and the creation
of the NCIP. This also remains evident in the pending Bangsamoro Basic
Law, which provides in Article VI Section 9 for the Bangsamoro Participation
in Central Government. It stipulates that the central government shall:
appoint competent and qualified inhabitants of the Bangsamoro in the follow-
ing offices in the Central Government: at least one (1) Cabinet Secretary; at least
one (1) in each of the other departments, offices and bureaus, holding executive,
primarily confidential, highly technical, policy-determining positions; and one (1)
Commissioner in each of the constitutional bodies.18

Embedded within the government’s framework of regional autonomy, ethnic

representation in national bureaucracy thus becomes a convenient backhan-
der to assuage rival political forces and elite factions among minority ethnic
and indigenous communities and secessionist forces of their share of the
national polity, while peace negotiations proceed indefinitely. However,
typical of asymmetric frameworks, there are clear implications in the enforce-
ment of bureaucratic representation for ethnic minorities and IPs as a means
for political reallocation of space. The unevenness in the redistribution of
spaces for representation in governance among fragmented ethnic minority
groups and IPs could only create new exclusions and the privileging of predo-
minant groups among ethnic minorities, some of which could trigger new
hostilities. Given the Philippines’ patrimonial structures and ongoing poli-
tico-ethnic tensions, inherent asymmetries in ethnicity-based bureaucratic
representation could only be exploited by competing forces in advancing
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 15

predominant interests among ethnic minorities. This would consequently

defeat the principle of representative bureaucracy of inclusive governance
for marginalized ethnic communities and indigenous groups.

Conclusion
What the Philippines’ case demonstrates is that amid prevailing disputes over
ethnic and indigenous identities and the consequent difficulties in enforcing
proportional representation, ethnicity-based bureaucratic representation
becomes primarily anchored in the government’s political autonomy frame-
work in peace agreements. With this institutional arrangement, ethnic rep-
resentation in national bureaucracy essentially constitutes a means for
political reallocation of space that extends opportunities for participation in
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governance for indigenous and ethnic minority groups, without having to

give up effective hold over resource-based decisions.
This framework can well be expected especially when viewed alongside
what Stavenhagen (2005) argued, that there is a need to find constructive
arrangements between the legitimate concerns of the state regarding territor-
ial integrity and national unity, and the equally legitimate concerns of IPs and
ethnic minorities regarding their collective rights for representation in
decisions particularly over their ancestral domain. However, within the pre-
vailing political context of the Philippines, an affirmative policy strategy
such as bureaucratic representation could only produce the same exclusions
and heightened tensions among predominant interethnic factions, as the
country’s asymmetric political autonomy does.
The unevenness in the allocation of representation that tends to privilege
majority-based rule in a multi-ethnic context excludes smaller ethnic group-
ings and indigenous communities. Particularly in the ongoing Bangsamoro
peace agreements, embedded provisions for ethnic representation in national
bureaucratic governance pose the very implications of inherent asymmetries
in regional autonomy that could favour predominant Muslim ethnic groups in
the allocation of representation, notwithstanding that Mindanao has a tri-
people demography. Ordinary indigenous and minority ethnic communities
are often caught in the crossfire of ethnic conflicts and held captive in the
margins amid elite-dominated, interethnic struggle for representation. This
ends up compromising the very goals of facilitating equitable ethnic represen-
tation and voice in national bureaucratic governance. Meanwhile, the NCIP
remains generally regarded as mainly a mouthpiece of the central govern-
ment rather than a voice for the marginalized ethnic and indigenous
communities.
Ethnic representation in national bureaucracy thus represents a quandary
to ethnic minorities and IPs in the Philippines. However, it has to be under-
scored that this paper focuses its examination solely on the political
 16 W. GERA

reallocation of space via ethnic representation at the national bureaucratic

level. At this juncture, it becomes important to note that bureaucratic rep-
resentation for ethnic minorities and IPs at the local government level
could provide a more nuanced picture of the variegated and specific experi-
ences of ethnic and indigenous participation in governance. A summation of
these local experiences vis-à-vis the national dynamics would be a critical
area that could be explored for further research towards a broader analysis
of the country’s enforcement of ethnic representation in bureaucratic
governance.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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Notes
1. Broadly, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities refer to those with social, cul-
tural (and historical) identity (in a collective sense) distinct from the dominant
or mainstream society (ADB 1998). They are also usally kinship-based, with a
close attachment to their ancestral land, who have attempted to maintain local
self-sufficiency and resist assimilation (Barsh 1999; Gonzalez 2005; Carino 2012).
2. Bangsamoro (‘the Moro People’) is the generic name for the 13 ethno-linguistic
Muslim tribes in southern Philippines.
3. The peoples of the Cordillera include 10 ethno-linguistic groups in the mountai-
nous regions of northern Luzon.
4. Personnel Policies and Standards, Section 25, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V,
Executive Order 292
5. This was amended via Memorandum Circular 28 (1989) to qualify the term ‘Native
Cordillera.’
6. Republic Act No. 6734 (1989), entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao’
7. The 1996 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Phi-
lippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is the third of a series of
peace agreements, which officially ended the struggle for independence, and later
for autonomy, waged by the MNLF since the late 1960s.
8. http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo1987/eo_220_1987.html
9. It marked the first time that a state in Asia explicitly recognized and legislated the
rights of IPs to their ancestral domain (UNDP 2004).
10. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/535431/giving-indigenous-peoples-a-face
11. Chapter 2, Section 3(h), The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (Republic Act
8371)
12. The Philippine state has been negotiating with secessionist groups in southern
Philippines starting in 1977 under the Tripoli Agreement followed by two other
peace pacts in 1986 called the Jeddah Accord and the 1996 Final Peace Agree-
ment with MNLF.
13. The ARMM was officially inaugurated on November 6, 1990 and expanded in 2001
via RA 9054 and a plebiscite. The ARMM bureaucracy at present employs around
30,000 workers mostly paid out by the national government.
 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 17

14. As noted by Appropriations Committee Vice Chair, Representative Pangalian Balin-

dong of the House of Representatives at http://congress.gov.ph/download/
commdaily/CDB%20Vol.%202%20No.%2026%20(09.13.11).pdf
15. In 1977, Hashim Salamat, with a group of primarily Maguindanao-Iranun followers,
established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from a desire for a complete
secession from Philippine sovereignty and accusations against the sell-out of the
political autonomy by MNLF. Nur Misuari, who was Tausug-Samal by ethnicity, and
founding chairman of MNLF remained its leader. A second, mostly Maranao
faction, the MNLF-Reformist Group, similarly revolted against the leadership of
Nur Misuari (Russell and Ty 2010).
16. http://www.interaksyon.com/article/109029/bbl-will-create-sub-state-with-equal-
powers-to-natl-govt—former-up-law-dean
17. The three peoples in Mindanao consist of the Moros with 13 mostly Islamicized
ethno-linguistic groups; the Lumad, with 18 ethno-linguistic groups of highlan-
ders; and the mainstream Christians composed mainly of migrant settlers in the
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twentieth century (Santos 2001, 44–45). However, some Lumads have been
partly Islamicized or Christianized further adding to the complexity of Mindanao’s
ethnic make-up.
18. http://www.opapp.gov.ph/sites/default/files/House%20Bill%20No.%204994.pdf

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