Introduction

The migratory process has undergone different transformations from the industrial
revolution to the present day. From the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
to the 21st century, migrations have not only changed their motivations and their purpose but
have also come to modify the societies in which they are established, generating changes at
the economic, social, and cultural field.
The Spanish sociologist, José Félix Tezanos, is effective between the three great
migratory models of our time: the transatlantic model, the north-European model and the
current one. These three models correspond in time with the development of the Industrial
Revolution and the formation and development of new nations, the period after World War II
and the development of the economies of northern Europe and that corresponding to
globalization, respectively. Understanding the evolution of these three models is key when
analysing, not only the current migratory phenomenon in the Mediterranean but also how
many of the arguments used today by European politicians are the product of a discourse that
seeks to confront the citizenship with immigration and the extension of a system that failed
integration. Appendix I offer a table that establishes the main economic and socio-cultural
characteristics of the different migratory models.
The migratory trend that the European Union has been experiencing and is
experiencing on its southern border since 2014, has three characteristics: a high density of
displaced and refugee population, a displacement in a short space of time and finally the
warlike nature of the conflicts that push (push factor) people to flee. This establishes
immigration based on the prevailing need to leave conflict zones and that does not respond to
a merely economic question. All these issues have had their impact on the countries of
destination at an economic, social, cultural, and political level, generating in countries like
Italy or Hungary an atmosphere of racism, xenophobia and hate speech that has ended with
populist politicians in the main positions, presidential of the country. It is key when
understanding and analysing the migratory phenomenon that these displacements are
currently conducted in a rush, without any established plan, without contracts or papers
involved. They are movements that respond to a desperate situation, often turning into
irregular immigration. Most of these migrants have access to low-quality jobs, with
precarious salaries, generating situations of social exclusion in the host countries as soon as
they arrive (Tezanos, 2007). An example and the closest is in Spain, that of Moroccan
seasonal workers, who are subjected to humiliation and abuse for a salary of thirty euros after
a 10-hour day (Carrasco, 2017). These two economic issues generate an impact on the host
society: on the one hand, a social stratification and, on the other hand, a transformation at the
urban level.
The first of them refers to a division in society between people who already resided in
the host country and who are part and essence of this society and immigrants who see
themselves as second-class citizens «socio-economically under-positioned and without full
rights due to their situation » (Tezanos, 2001). This generates social inequality and exclusion
processes that have their repercussion and impact on the second issue mentioned above:
transformation at the urban level. This translates into the creation of neighbourhoods or
ghettos in the cities of the host countries where small diasporas are generated that can serve
as an element of information and orientation for people who are thinking of undertaking the
trip.
The lack of inclusion on the part of these migrants is also generating an important
cultural impact. This inclusion, to a certain extent, is developed by the immigrant himself
who, as established in the descriptive table in Appendix I, has no intention of integrating into
the host culture and society. This new characteristic is part of the new migratory model that
we are currently experiencing, a model that responds to a completely different situation from
those previously experienced in the 19th and 20th centuries. This new immigration comes
from countries with cultures other than European ones where that feeling of total integration
no longer exists under Western guidance or norms (Tezanos, 2007). Many times, this feeling
of total integration is utopian and unfeasible due to the irregular situation of immigrants in
the host country.
The sum of the impact at the economic, social, and cultural levels results in a political
impact that will be developed more widely later, but which, however, we will briefly describe
in the following lines. The political effect that the migration issue is producing in Europe has
once again occupied the front pages of newspapers and newsreels throughout Europe. Even
though European citizenship, as we will also see later, the feeling of welcome continues to be
predominant, and attitudes continue to be favourable to immigration. However, some
countries of the European Union, are beginning to elements of rejection of immigration
appear, especially in countries with high unemployment rates and that are or have been
affected by the migration crisis in the Mediterranean.
This rejection is generating the rise of movements and political parties of the extreme
right, which were marginalized on the political scene. This has resulted in a transformation of
the European political map where the radical right has reached the parliaments of many
Member States. The last to join this list of parliaments has been Spain, where the far-right
party has won twenty-four seats. Portugal, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Malta are the only four
countries in the Union where the extreme right has no representation.
This rejection of immigration and refugees has also had its translation and impact at a
political level in the European institutions. The Europhobic and extreme right-wing parties,
which have in common their rejection of Europe and immigration, have achieved 172 MEPs,
a ridiculously small number if we compare it with the 437 that the centre-right, centre-left,
and liberal parties have brought together.
The new migratory trend is not only affecting migratory movements but is also
generating impacts on host societies that, if not analysed and explained clearly and concisely,
can (as is currently happening in many countries) cause the extreme hold institutional
positions, giving them enough power to decide who does and who does not enter their
territory. European citizenship remains tolerant of immigration and in solidarity with the
refugees arriving on European shores. However, increased parties and politicians are taking
advantage of this situation, not only to wage a battle against those who cross the
Mediterranean risking their lives.
 Chapter I
Public opinion regarding extra-community immigration

The migration crisis began in 2015 when it began to have an echo in the media and on
social networks. Naturally, the States that share a border with the Mediterranean and the
Middle East were those that suffered the most migratory pressure (Del Valle, 2016), namely
Greece and Italy. Along with those, the transit states —Germany, Hungary, Austria— whose
irregular immigration has also increased exponentially since the worsening of the situation in
the Middle East and North Africa (Porras Ramírez, 2017). Logically, this increasing
accumulation of ethnically and culturally different immigrants who settled in these countries
ended up enhancing the perception of the harmful effects of immigration. Maldonado Solís
(2019) affirmed that "in the countries that received the most migrants and in which there was
more unemployment in the central years of the crisis are those in which the anti-immigration
discourse has penetrated more deeply." However, these conclusions are not appreciable in the
list of data that reflect public opinion regarding immigration, where, after the last five years, a
more favourable attitude towards it seems to be evident.
Table 1. Percentage of public opinion that is favourable to immigration from
outside the European Union, before the pandemic started
Country 2012 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Portugal 69.47 51.64 81.63 52.17 55.55 51.64 65.88
Sweden 89.89 74.22 68.04 65.3 67.01 69.79 62.88
Romania 60 55.29 58.53 38.04 37.36 44.44 50.56
Spain 53.93 53.33 52.32 59.09 63.04 59.34 69.56
Croatia 53.93 51.13 44.08 44.68 36.55 51.57
Ireland 58.69 48.93 50.53 60 61.05 62.76 76.59
Luxembourg 79.38 45.83 48.38 51.57 54.34 62.22 69.23
United Kingdom 60.63 40 41.48 53.26 55.78 68.13 64.04
Germany 55.2 32.22 41.3 43.01 43.01 43.01 47.82
The Netherlands 63.54 47.91 41.05 45.36 46.87 45.26 46.39
Finland 65.97 46.31 40 39.17 40,00 41.23 39.13
Poland 53.65 46.98 38.37 30.43 24,08 29.67 42.85
Slovenia 45.26 35.1 38.04 29.16 31.95 22.68 32.65
Denmark 59.79 44.68 36.66 32.97 32.6 32.6 44.08
Austria 49.47 38.46 36.17 39.13 40.42 45.16 50
France 51.61 37.63 33.33 38.04 36.95 41.3 42.39
Bulgaria 32.5 25.84 30.58 16,03 22.82 16.85 23.86
Belgium 39.79 30.92 29.89 39.79 44.89 46.93 46.93
Lithuania 42.69 34.4 24.73 26,08 36.08 30.52 47.36
Hungary 23,04 29.47 24.73 15.62 19.79 21.87 27,08
 Cyprus 21.42 23.46 24.21 22.68 29,00 34.69
Italy 47.82 19.35 21.34 35.16 31.25 39.78
malt 22.34 20.88 25 22.82 37.89
Estonia 18.47 19.78 14.73 18.27
Greece 32.65 23.46 19.58 27.83 21.64 20.61 29.89
Slovakia 22.34 21.27 18.94 13.82 26.37
Latvia 22.34 16.84 15.21 14.43 14.63 16.dec 21.27
Czech Republic 18.55 19.56 14.73 14.58 15.62 14.58
Source: self-made. Data obtained from Standard Eurobarometer. The Values of
Europeans. A survey conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, at the request of the
European Commission (nº 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 91)

That is why it is appropriate to infer the influence of other factors, beyond border pressure and
geographical factor.
Artiles and Meardi (2012) concluded that the causes of the rejection of immigration were the
unemployment rate and the risk of poverty, as well as the competition for welfare resources. This
hypothesis gains strength when we focus on the era in which we find ourselves, and this is what
Steinberg (2016) proposed when explaining the flight of voters from socialist parties to far-right parties.
He suggested that they were the "losers of globalization", those, in general, poorly qualified, who are
harmed by the opening to foreign trade, losing their jobs due to the competition of products from other
countries, and who are attracted by the protection offered by the right by closing the borders abroad.
There is a generalized association that relates immigration to unemployment and the fall in the
number of wages (Ruesga, 2008). González Ferrer (2002) pointed out that a greater foreign workforce
causes a decrease in the amount of income from work and especially those received by less qualified
workers. If, in addition, the standard of living increases (reflected by the consumer price index), and the
population perceives that their wages are insufficient to meet the prices of basic products, it is natural
that this population reacts by adopting an anti-immigration position, together with the price level, the
average salary and the unemployment rate, Blinder and Markaki (2018) found in their surveys that
those who felt that immigration hurt welfare resources agreed to reject immigration
 And the vast majority of those who thought so related the negative effect on the welfare state to
unskilled immigration, partly due to the lower wages they receive and, consequently, the lower tax
contribution, despite enjoying similarly from available resources (Card, Dustmann, & Preston, 2005).
For this same reason, Artiles and Meardi (2012) concluded that the higher the social spending per
inhabitant, the lower the rejection of immigration.
French, Dutch, and Hungarian leaders have warned about the danger of opening the
borders and have pointed to Islam as the cause of the danger (Onghena, 2015), all in a
discourse that is characterized by relating immigration to crime and terrorism. Fear appears to
be one of the most influential factors in opinion about immigration. Bichara Khader (2016)
attributes it to the overestimation by Europeans of the quotas of Muslims that exist in the total
population. And this is reflected in the survey conducted by the Social Research Institute in
which both the French and the Germans were convinced that the Muslim population was five
times greater than what existed in their State (Khader, 2016).
Along with the factors already mentioned, there is a great fear that opening doors to the outside may
lead to a loss of one's identity (Onghena, 2015). And this fear adds to the fear generated by the sudden
opening to global markets, which has generated a feeling of loss of national sovereignty (Steinburg, 2016).
Lindsay Richards (2017), in her study on the subject, discovered that people tended to be more in favour of
immigration if they were of the same race or ethnic group, contrary to what happened when it was different.
ethnic groups or cultures.
Western Europe brings together the States with the highest values of average salary
and public spending on social protection per capita. In our analysis, these two factors have no
bearing on the attitude towards immigration, probably because it is not an issue that worries
the population. Now, if we look at the unemployment rate, we see that while in France, the
Netherlands and Germany it is not correlated with attitude towards immigration, in Austria,
Belgium and Luxembourg, the correlation is extraordinarily strong (- 0.92 in Austria, -0.90 in
Belgium, and -0.84 in Luxembourg), and this despite enjoying low unemployment rates. The
explanation lies in the sharp increase in unemployment suffered in 2014 compared to 2012.
This situation continued until 2017.
In this region, regardless of the unemployment rate, the factors that concern the
population the most are those related to capacity and security. In France, the immigration
acceptance rate is influenced by population density (in a moderate correlation, -0.6), by the
number of undocumented immigrants in French territory (strong correlation, -0.89), and the
number of immigrants sentenced to prison (moderate correlation, -0.6).
 Indeed, France hosts one of the highest values of irregular immigrants present in its
territory, although, about its total population, it has fluctuated between 0.15% and 0.17%,
behind eight other European States. In terms of national security, France is also the European
country that has suffered the most “jihadist” attacks in recent years.
In the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium, variation in the number of asylum seekers
has been a factor influencing attitudes towards immigration. And in Austria, the correlation is
even more intense if we relate public opinion about immigration to the number of immigrants
sentenced to prison, which makes sense if we consider that Austria is the third country in the
Union European Union with the highest number of immigrants serving sentences in
proportion to the total population of the State.
The most surprising thing about the study of Western Europe is the German
behaviour: we have not found any indicator that influences public opinion about immigration.
The German case is one of the most interesting to study: it is the State of the Union
that receives the most asylum applications, 600,000 applications more than the country that
follows it on the list, in this case, Italy. Its government promotes an attitude of open borders
and acceptance of refugees, but the attitude of its population is more reluctant, which is
inferred from its values of acceptance of immigration, which range between 55 and 32 per
cent over the last eight years.
The German case does not deviate from the general trend anticipated by Rob Ford
(2017), according to which anti-immigrant sentiment encourages more extreme right-wing
voters (in general) than the feeling of pro-immigration that, on the contrary, does not have the
same force when it comes to dragging the population to the electoral colleges. In the German
case, we see that even though the opinion regarding immigration is not very favourable
among the population, the centre-left parties (Merkel's CDU and the Social Democrats)
continue to hold the majority, for reasons of different nature not related to the migratory issue
and to which their voters grant greater importance.
The Member States bordering the Mediterranean are logically those that have suffered the most
migratory pressure, since the beginning of the crisis in 2015, Greece, Italy, and Spain. In 2015, Greece
registered more than 900,000 undocumented immigrants, an increase that can hardly be correlated with the
rejection of immigration, since the increase from one year to the next is so rapid. If we add to this, in general,
the Greek population suffers from a negative attitude towards immigration (figure 1).
Now, if what we look at is the percentage of the total population that irregular
immigrants represent, we find that the most affected countries are Greece, Cyprus, and Malta.
Figure 1. The immigration acceptance rate in Southern Europe

Data obtained from Standard Eurobarometer. The Values of Europeans. A survey was
conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, at the request of the European Commission (No.
77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 9
On the contrary, in Italy and Spain, as of 2014, irregular immigration grows drastically and however,
also increased the acceptance of immigration.
Figure 2. Number of irregular immigrants

Data obtained from Third-country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data
(rounded). Eurostat
Table 3. Percentage of irregular immigrants about the total population
  2012   2014   2015   2016   2017   2018  
52.3
Spain 53.93 0.11 53.33 0.102
2
0.10 59.09 0.08 63.04 0.09 59.34 0.16
81.6
Portugal 69.47 0.08 51.64 0.04
3
0.043 52.17 0.06 55.55 0.05 51.64 0.04
51.1
Croatia     53.93 0.05
3
0.05 44.08 0.07 44.68 0.08 36.55 0.13
38.0
Slovenia 45.26 0.07 35.1 0.04
4
0.04 29.16 0.11 31.95 0.20 22.68 0.21
19.5
Greece 32.65 0.65 23.46 0.67
8
0.67 27.83   21.64 0.63 20.61 0.86
21.3
Italy 47.82 0.04 19.35 0.04
4
0.04   0.05 35.16 0.05 31.25 0.04
20.8
Malta   0.54 22.34 0.23
8
0.23 25 0.09 22.82 0.11   0.41
24.2
Cyprus 21.42 0.90 23.46 0.58
1
0.58 22.68 0.40 29 0.47   0.69
Data obtained from Third-country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data
(rounded). Eurostat
In terms of demographic indicators, the only states where there is a correlation are Slovenia and
Croatia. Indeed, public opinion in both States is strongly influenced by variations in the number of irregular
immigrants, population density and the rate of irregular immigration as a percentage of the total population.
From an economic perspective, Italian and Spanish public opinion, about immigration, depends
enormously on the employment situation: the higher the unemployment rate, the less acceptance of
immigration (tables 4 and 5).
Tables 4 and 5. Correlation between the unemployment rate and the immigration
acceptance rate: Italy and Spain
Italy Unemployment Immigration Spain Unemployment Immigration
rate acceptance rate Acceptance
2012 10.7 47.82 2012 24.8 24.8
2014 12.7 19.35 2014 24.5 24.5
2015 11.9 21.34 2015 22.1 22.1
2016 11.7 25.8 2016 19.6 19.6
2017 11.2 35.16 2017 17.2 17.2
2018 10.6 31.25 2018 15.3 15.3
2019 14.1 14.1 0.8735495
Data source: Data obtained from Standard Eurobarometer. The Values of Europeans. A
survey was conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, at the request of the European
Commission (No. 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 91). Unemployment rates. Annual data (rounded).
Eurostat
 In Greece, by contrast, public opinion about immigration depends on per capita public spending
on social protection measures. This would explain the decline in the acceptance of immigration as of
2014, the year from which spending on social protection falls by approximately two hundred euros per
person.
Table 6. Correlation between spending on social protection and acceptance of
immigration
Greece Immigration acceptance Spending on social protection
2012 32.65 4,693.01
2014 23.46 4,315.93
2015 19.58 4,423.88
2016 27.83 4,470.89
2017 21.64 4,385.25 0.82804141
Data source: Standard Eurobarometer. Europeans Views on the priorities of the European
Union. A survey was conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, at the request of the European
Commission. (No. 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 91). Expenditure: main results. Expenditure on
social protection benefits. Euro per inhabitant at constant 2010 prices. Eurostat.

The youngest members of the European Union —mostly post-Soviet states— are the most reticent to
the Union's migration policies, where, for example, we see in Latvia, in 2017, that only 14% of the population
is in favour of immigration. Probably because of the rapid economic growth of the Eastern States since
their entry into the European Union, the economic situation is not a matter of concern that conditions
the opinion about immigration, which is inferred from a lack of correlation between the
variables.
Figure 7. Acceptance of immigration in Eastern Europe
 Data source: Standard Eurobarometer. Europeans Views on the priorities of the European
Union. A survey was conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, at the request of the European
Commission. (No. 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 91).
Now, the question’s demographics influence public opinion about immigration. Along with this
demographic issue, there is concern about foreign crime. This is reflected in the fact that Eastern Europe is the
European region where the crime rate committed by foreigners, influences the public opinion about
immigration (namely, in Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic and Latvia); however, said crime rate is
especially low if we compare it with the other States.
Table 8. Foreigners convicted of committing crimes, per thousand inhabitants
Latvia Acceptance Criminality Poland Acceptance Criminality

2012 22.34 3.72 2012 53.65 1.49

2014 16.84 4.35 2014 46.98 1.43

2015 15.21 5.34 2015 38.37 1.37

2016 14.43 7.21 2016 30.43 1.75

2017 14.63 4.82 - 2017 26.08 2.22 -0.763728

0.7112003

Romania Acceptance Criminality Czech Acceptance Criminality

Republic
2012 60 0.87 2012 18.55 16.32

2014 55.29 1.27 2014 19.56 14.73

2015 58.53 1.35 2015 14.73 15.85

2016 38.04 1.53 2016 14.58 17.12

2017 37.36 1.46 0.7601576 2017 15.62 17.15 -0.6772107

Data obtained from Standard Eurobarometer. Europeans Views on the priorities of the
European Union. A survey was conducted by TNS Opinion & Social, at the request of the
European Commission (No. 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 91).
Prisoners by citizenship. Foreign country. Per hundred thousand inhabitants. Eurostat.
Wager (2018) attributes the rejection of immigration in the East to the direct and abrupt change
from a communist system to a neoliberal system, which resulted in insufficient welfare resources to
protect the entire population. Now, in our analysis, we see that, at present, there is no correlation
between social spending and public opinion; so, in this case, the rejection would already be “inherited,”
maintaining that fear of a reversion to the previous situation in which social protection was insufficient.
Nyzio (2017) refers to a lack of capacities, both economically and in infrastructure, and their
history and culture, according to which it can be said that they are not used to dealing with Muslims, to
which their experiences must be added. negative with minorities. Heath and Richards (2019) also opt
for the cultural and religious line and conclude that the limited contact throughout its history with other
cultures constitutes the reason for its negative attitudes. Both objective and subjective factors coexist that
influence the formation of public opinion about immigration. There is no single factor that prevails over the
others; rather, the indicators that influence public opinion vary according to the state in which we find
ourselves. We have seen how the formation of public opinion is usually given by a combination of factors,
both objective and subjective, which are due both to the transitory circumstances of the State and to
perceptions of a subjective nature that are already rooted in the feeling of individuals. An economic factor is
usually present only in those states in which the population has faced worsening economic conditions
(Ireland, Italy, Spain). In general, when there is a worsening of some of the economic indicators, this factor is
usually sufficient by itself or, at least, prevails over the other factors, when it comes to generating a rejection
of immigration.
The factor of "security" is present both in those states in which immigration has been especially
linked to crime; and in those other States in which criminality at the hands of foreigners does not present
especially high values. In these last cases, the incidence of the security factor has surely been complemented
by the coexistence of subjective factors already present in the mentality of the population. The same happens
in the case of the density and representative values of irregular immigration and asylum seekers when these
are presented as the only objective factors that influence the opinion of citizens. The incidence of these factors
on public opinion is usually accompanied by subjective factors related to cultural identity, ethnicity, and
religion. Whether it is the threat of losing one's own cultural identity, the fear of less social cohesion or simply
the natural psychological reaction to greater multiculturalism; subjective factors can lead to a minimal
increase in the number of foreigners present in the territory causing an enormous rejection of the phenomenon
of immigration.
What is inferred from this analysis is that the incidence of one factor or another on public opinion
depends on the circumstances experienced by each State and the characteristics of each society.
Objective and subjective factors coexist and complement each other when it comes to causing a
rejection of immigration. And, although the objective factors constitute circumstances and situations
that individuals experience and that affect their lives, the subjective factors, such as perceptions that are
rooted in the mentality of the population, can be much more decisive and difficult to alter.
 Chapter II

The European response to the migration crisis

13
objective of the Action Plan was to intensify cooperation with Turkey to support the Syrian
refugees under temporary protection in Turkish host communities, as well as cooperation
with neighbouring countries of Syria, to prevent irregular migration to Turkey and the
European Union, all through the European Union Trust Fund for the Syrian crisis. In
February 2016, a report was made on the implementation of the plan and its results. In it, you
can find data as relevant as the significant decrease in arrivals of migrants and/or refugees to
the Greek coasts from Turkey. Although the number of migrants and refugees was declining
in the Aegean, it was not enough. Refugees continued to arrive on the Greek coast. You can
see how until March 2016 refugees continued to arrive in Greece and if compared to last
year's data, you can see how migrants and refugees arriving in 2016 outnumber refugees
arriving on the same dates in 2015.
European Commission (2016)3. Comparison of irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece.
Period January – April
In light blue arrivals in 2015. In dark blue arrivals in 2016.

Source: UNHRC (2017)4.

Faced with the possibility that the refugee figures for 2015 could be repeated, the
European Union in March 2016 decided to sign a pact with Turkey to stop the migratory
flow. A pact that has been very controversial in Europe and has received criticism from both
the United Nations and International Organizations (such as the IOM) and NGOs that were
3
See ANNEX to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play
of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan -
Implementation Report. p., 4. COM (2016) 85 final. Brussels.
4
See Refugees / Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean. Availableon
http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean
14
working on the ground. Next, the agreement and its consequences will be analyzed, both on
the Greek and Italian coasts.
On March 8, 2016, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in their
Declaration published on the website of the European Council agreed to work on "the return
of all new irregular migrants passing from Turkey to the Greek islands, bearing the costs the
EU as well as resettle, for each Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, another
Syrian from Turkey in the EU Member States, within the framework of existing
commitments». At this moment, the European Union reactivated, after more than eight years
of paralysis, the negotiations with Turkey. In the same press release, the principles of the
agreement are established, among which are "the preparation of the decision regarding the
opening of new chapters in the accession negotiations, as well as speeding up the
liberalization of visas with all Member States with a view to its elimination in June 2016”5.
The European Union, in this agreement, decided to outsource its border control. For
political scientists, this pact gives rise to the creation of a "buffer state", in which
immigration control becomes a currency and the border states become buffer states that
absorb or prevent the passage of immigrants. migrants and refugees, to a specific territory. In
the case at hand, Turkey would be the buffer state that will absorb and prevent the migratory
flow to Europe in exchange for commercial benefits, resumption of the integration process or
the liberalization of the visa policy for all its citizens. This is how the European Union
controls migratory flows from the outside and not from within (Mascareñas, 2016: 1). After
the entry into force of the Agreement on March 20, 2016, many voices were raised against
the pact and many NGOs decided to withdraw from the refugee camps so as not to be
involved in the return or expulsion of refugees to Turkish lands. United Nations organizations
such as UNICEF also joined in the criticism of the pact, criticizing the lack of sensitivity
towards the victims of the war, as well as the absence of mentions of minors who, according
to this Organization, represent 40% of the refugees trapped in Greece (Vallejo, 2016).
Authors such as Sami Naïr, an Arab political scientist, in his book "Refugees" (2016)
denounced that "the agreement turned refugees into immigrants, and the law that prevails for
them is that of European laws [...] that consider them as an irregular immigrant, clandestine.
There has been doubt not only about the legality of the agreement but also its effectiveness.
As the graph shows, the number of refugees and migrants arriving on the Greek shores

5
See Council (2016) Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the EU - Consilium. Available in:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/07-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/
15
through Turkey fell drastically and the First Report on the progress registered in the
application of the EU-Turkey Declaration shows this.

Source: UNHRC (2017)6.

Therefore, the entry into force of the Agreement has slowed down the migratory flow
that now, however, opens other doors. The Aegean crisis moved to the Italian coasts, where
the Island of Lampedusa was a preferential destination for all those people who arrived from
Libya (Arango, 2016:34) and today the European Union has its crisis in this area. where the
arrival of refugees has increased by 20% in 2016 (Riordan, 2017: 90). Proof of this is the
increase in activity on the Italian coast after the entry of the EU-Turkey agreement, as shown
in the following graph. Returning to the EU-Turkey Statement, it must be said that this would
not have been possible if the Turkish government had not seen an opportunity to advance its
interests. The refugees are serving Turkey to achieve its objectives, something
understandable if we consider that the European Union was willing to pay any price for not
receiving more refugees and not having more deaths in the Mediterranean (Naïr, 2016: 102).
From one year to the next, Turkey had become a safe country for the European Union, even
though all the reports from the European Parliament on Turkey said otherwise. Javier de
Lucas, in his speech at a conference at the University of Salamanca, held on May 2, 2017, He
called the agreement illegal and considers that Turkey deceived the European leaders and that
the agreement would cost the European Union more than one dislike. In his book
"Mediterranean: The shipwreck of Europe" (2015) he accuses the European Union of not
complying with its international obligations and of going against community law itself when
they do not want to comply with the laws (De Lucas, 2015: 96).
Despite the criticism, everything seemed to work after the agreement: the Aegean
route had been cut off, refugees hardly arrived and NATO was established in Greek waters to
6
See Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean. Available at:
http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.
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dissuade the mafias that trafficked migrants (Arteaga, Enríquez, 2016: 7). However, on the
night of July 15, 2016, Turkey suffered a coup that ended up failing but had repercussions on
the pact it had signed with the European Union. Weeks later Erdogan accused the
governments of the West, especially the German and Italian ones, of supporting the terrorists
and the coup plotters (Zambrana, 2016) and of not giving a forceful response to the military
uprising, as Qatar or Russia did. Since the coup, Turkey's relations with the European Union
have been a flurry of accusations and threats from both the Turkish and European sides. In
August 2016, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, in an interview with the
German newspaper "BILD", assured that Turkey felt humiliated by the treatment received by
the European Union and threatened to break the pact if the European group did not fulfil its
promises, referring to the liberalization of visas that were not carried out in June 2016 and
that should be carried out before October of that same year (Ronzheimer, 2016).
After the numerous arrests that took place after the coup, Turkey's deterioration and
democratic backsliding were evident, so much so that the European Parliament asked in its
plenary session in November 2016 to temporarily suspend the accession negotiations despite
not being a decision binding, this was another blow to Turkey, which reacted immediately,
threatening to open the borders and let any refugee who was in Turkish territory through
(Mourenza, 2016 b).
After the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, the successive reports of the
European Commission on the progress made show that the Balkan route is weakened and
therefore the arrival of refugees and migrants on the Greek coast has decreased considerably.
According to the 2017 Commission report on this issue, there was insufficient staff in the
asylum offices and in the European Border Guard to continue to correctly implement all the
provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement. Regarding the return of irregular migrants to Turkey,
the Declaration "provides for the return of all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers
whose application has been declared inadmissible or unfounded, who cross from Turkey to
the Greek islands after 20 March 2016”. The number of returns remains below the number of
arrivals on the Greek islands, which continues to pose significant migratory pressure. This
situation is due to the accumulated delays in the asylum procedures that are the product of the
lack of administrative personnel. While non-Syrian refugees are returned to Turkey by sea to
a detention centre, Syrian refugees are returned by air to a refugee camp near the Syrian
border. The agreement has worked in all its aspects were it not for resettlement and
relocation. It should be noted that resettlement is "the transfer of displaced persons who are in
clear need of international protection, at the request of the United Nations High
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Commissioner and in agreement with the resettlement country, from a third country to a
Member State, where they will be admitted and will be granted the right to stay and any other
rights", To date, the European Union has only relocated 14% of the total number of people
appointed by the Council; in this way, the European Union failed in its objective stipulated in
the European Migration Agenda on the relocation of more than 40,000 refugees and migrants
before the end of 2017. Currently and according to the latest report of the European
Commission, only 20,000 refugees have been resettled from Turkey to the Member States.
The Court of Justice of the European Union concluded that the EU-Turkey agreement
was agreed by the Member States and not by one of the European institutions, for which it
declared itself incompetent to study the case. The defenders of the agreement maintain its
effectiveness and it is not surprising that countries such as Germany or Malta are thinking of
applying the same model in agreement with Libya (Mascareñas, Montijano, 2017:2).
Considering the current situation in Libya, the application of this model might not bear the
expected results due to the multitude of actors, both governmental and non-governmental, on
the ground. Critics of the agreement continue to maintain its illegality, focusing their
arguments on the fact that the "outsourcing of international protection to a country like
Turkey is not legal.
And this is where the last factor that put the EU Declaration with Turkey at risk
comes in: the Turkish constitutional referendum held on April 16, 2017, which resulted in the
reinforcement of the figure of Erdogan, who has increased his powers and it has become the
magistracy with the most power in the State, leaving the political system without any system
of checks and balances, which in English is called “check and balance” (Toygür, 2017). This
accumulation of power leads many authors to think that Turkey is already out of the
European Union, since with this constitutional change, it could not comply with the
Copenhagen Criteria (Cebrián, 2017). CEPS researcher Steven Blockmans in his research
paper entitled “Why the EU should terminate accession negotiations with Turkey?” after the
Turkish referendum, argues that Turkey no longer has a place in the European Union and that
after the country's authoritarian drift, the Union must complete the accession process with
Turkey since the separation of powers is a fundamental political element for the integration of
a country within the community (Blockmans, 2017: 2).
On January 19, 2022, the European Union Agency for Asylum replaced the European
Asylum Support Office (EASO). The new agency must optimize the functioning of the
Common European Asylum System: reinforcing the operational and technical assistance it

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provides to member states and increasing consistency concerning the assessment of
applications for international protection.
On December 9, 2021, the Council adopted the Regulation making EASO a full-
fledged agency of the EU. In this way, the first of the proposals to reform the Common
European Asylum System was approved and a great step forward was taken in the
modernization of asylum and reception practices in the EU. Since the height of the migration
crisis in 2015, the EU has been implementing measures to better control external borders and
migratory flows. Thanks to these measures, irregular arrivals in the EU have been reduced by
more than 90%.
The EU and its Member States are stepping up their efforts to establish an effective,
humane and safe European migration policy. The European Council plays an important role
in this work, setting the strategic priorities.
Based on these priorities, the Council of the EU determines the lines of action and the
mandates for negotiations with third countries. It also adopts legislation and defines specific
programs. Over the last few years, the Council and the European Council have forged a
strong response to migratory pressure.
In October 2015, the Luxembourg Presidency activated the Device for Integrated
Political Response to Crises (IPCR), which seeks concrete tools to help coordinate the
political response to the crisis, bringing together the main actors.
The 'Eastern Mediterranean route' refers to irregular arrivals in Greece, Cyprus and
Bulgaria. In 2015, a large number of refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war arrived in the EU
via this route. Since then, the number of irregular arrivals on this route has dropped
considerably, thanks to cooperation between the EU and Turkey.
The "western Mediterranean route" refers to irregular arrivals in Spain, both by sea
to the Iberian Peninsula and by land to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North
Africa. It is mainly used by migrants from Algeria and Morocco, although people from many
sub-Saharan African countries also try to reach Europe through this route.
After reaching a peak in 2018, Spain has been seeing a decline in the number of
arrivals, for various reasons. An important factor has been the EU's investment in a close
partnership with Morocco to help strengthen border control and combat migrant smuggling.
The "West Africa route" refers to arrivals at the Canary Islands, in the Atlantic Ocean.
In 2020, this has become the most used sea route to reach Spain, with ten times more arrivals
than in the same period last year. This route, with departures from Morocco, Western Sahara,
Mauritania, Senegal and Gambia, represents more than half of the arrivals by sea to Spain.
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 The "Central Mediterranean route" refers to irregular arrivals by sea to Italy and
Malta. Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa transit through Tunisia and Libya
on their way to Europe. This route to the EU was the most used between 2015 and 2017. In
2020, after two years with low numbers of irregular migrants on the route, the number of
migrants has increased considerably.
The EU has taken concrete steps to address the migration situation in Libya and tackle
the root causes of migration in Africa. Following the political turmoil in Belarus and the
restrictive measures taken by the EU, in June 2021 Belarus started organizing flights and
internal travel to facilitate the transit of migrants to the EU, first to Lithuania and then to
Latvia and Poland. Most of the migrants were Iraqis, Afghans and Syrians. During the
European Council on June 24-25, 2021, EU leaders condemned any attempt by third
countries to instrumentalize migrants for political ends. On October 22, 2021, they stated that
the EU will continue to address the continued hybrid attacks of the Belarusian regime, in
particular by taking additional restrictive measures against individuals and legal entities.
Thanks to the concerted efforts of the EU, the daily number of irregular arrivals has
fallen dramatically. However, migratory pressure on the borders remains high.
The EU has adopted several sets of rules and frameworks aimed at managing the legal
migration flows of highly skilled workers, students and researchers, seasonal workers and
people aspiring to family reunification.
As far as other migratory flows are concerned, the EU has common rules for the
processing of asylum applications. In addition, the EU also signs readmission agreements for
the return of irregular migrants.

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