Susanna Wing (Auth.) - Constructing Democracy in Transitioning Societies of Africa)

Const ruc t i ng D e mo c r ac y i n
Tr a nsi t ion i ng S o c i e t i e s of A f r ic a
Const ruc t i ng D emoc r ac y i n
Tr a nsi t ion i ng S oc i e t i e s
of A f r ic a
Const i t u t iona l i sm a n d
D e l i be r at ion i n M a l i
Susa n na D. Wi ng
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITIONING SOCIETIES OF AFRICA
Copyright © Susanna D. Wing, 2008.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published in 2008 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS
Companies and representatives throughout the world.
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave
Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom
and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European
Union and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-37239-3 ISBN 978-0-230-61207-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230612075
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Wing, Susanna D.
Constructing democracy in transitioning societies of Africa :
constitutionalism and deliberation in Mali / Susanna D. Wing.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN9780–230– 60463– 3
1. Political participation—Mali. 2. Democracy—Mali.
3. Constitutional history—Mali. I. Title.
JQ3389.A91W56 2008
320.96623—dc22 2007040028
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: May 2008
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Wesley
Con t e n t s
List of Tables ix
Acknowledgments xi
List of Acronyms xiii
Introduction 1
One Principles of Constitutionalism 13
Two Democratic Transitions and their Legacies
in Comparative Perspective 35
Three Originating Participation: The Sovereign
National Conference 61
Four Integrating Citizens and the State:
Decentralization and Elections 81
Five Challenges to Inclusion: Constitutionalism and
the Rights of Women 101
Six Experiments in Dialogue 125
Seven Dialogue in Times of Crisis 155
Conclusions: Dialogue and Legitimacy 173
Appendix One: Data from the Question and Answer Assembly
(Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique) 179
Appendix Two: Messages Received by the Malian
National Conference 183
Notes 189
Bibliography 213
Index 233
Ta bl e s
2.1 Participation rates by election in Benin 42

3.1 Members of the Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple 64
3.2 Participants in the National Conference
Preparatory Commission 66
3.3 Participants in the National Conference 67
3.4 Participants registered in the National Conference,
July 29, 1991 67
3.5 Participants registered in the National Conference,
July 29, 1991, categorized by age group and sex 68
4.1 Presidential elections, 1992 87
4.5 Legislative elections, 1992–2002 90
4.6 Municipal elections, 1992–2004 92
4.7 Municipal elections, percentage of seats won
by party, 1992–2004 93
4.8 Women and municipal elections, 1998–1999 93
4.9 Electoral participation rates in 1992 95
4.10 Participation rates for elections, 1997–2007 97
6.1 Question and Answer Assembly (Éspace d’Interpellation
Démocratique)—participants in forum, 1995 137
Démocratique)—interpellations received by mail
from those absent, 1995 139
Démocratique)—partial listing of participants, 1997 140
Démocratique)—interpellations, 1998 141
6.5 Overview of interpellations, 1994–2005 142
6.6 Interpellations by region, 1998–2001 146
7.1 Community meetings organized by civil society 162
x / tables
7.2 Numbers of ex-combatants from the North integrated

into the public services 164
A1.1 Participants in the Question and Answer Assembly
(Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique), 1994 179
A1.2 Question and Answer Assembly (Éspace d’Interpellation
Démocratique), 1994 180
Démocratique), 1994—interpellations from individuals 180
Démocratique), 1994—members of the Honorary Jury 180
Démocratique), 1995—contributors 182
Ac k now l ed gm e n t s
This book began as my doctoral dissertation at the University of California,

Los Angeles, in the Department of Political Science. It would not have
come to fruition without the support of numerous people. First and fore-
most is Richard Sklar who has been a mentor since my first days at UCLA
and has provided me with irreplaceable intellectual guidance and friend-
ship. I am especially grateful to him for the many hours he spent with me,
always willing to share his knowledge and experiences. Edmond Keller
has been a ready supporter and amiable critic. I am truly grateful for his
continued help navigating academic waters. I thank Carole Pateman for
her seminars that helped bring this project to life and for her friendship
and enduring enthusiasm for my work. She continues to be an inspiration
to me. Revision and editing of the manuscript took place at Haverford
College, which has been a collegial and supportive environment and I wish
to thank my colleagues. I am especially grateful to Cristina Beltrán, Anita
Isaacs, and Laura McGrane for their critical insights, helpful suggestions,
and most of all for their encouragement in this process.
In Mali, I owe a profound debt of gratitude to all the individuals who
engaged in lively conversations with me as I grappled to better understand
contemporary Malian politics—most especially the women who took time
away from all their responsibilities to sit down with me and share with me
their knowledge. I am also indebted to my research assistant and friend
Mariam Sawané Diakité for her transcriptions and translations that con-
tributed to this study. She and her family continue to make me feel like I
have a home in Mali every time I return. Thanks are certainly in order for
Fatoumata Dembélé Diarra, Seguire Moussa Diepkilé, Claudie Gosselin,
Aminata Maiga, Geeta Narayan, Saloum Sacko, Daniel Tessougué, and
Saouty Traoré—each of whom has been welcoming and encouraging and
contributed to this project along the way.
In graduate school numerous friends provided intellectual feedback,
encouragement, and laughter throughout this process. These include Mary
Dillard, Lloys Frates, Michael Goodhart, Dennis Laumann, Rebecca
VanDyck-Laumann, Andrew Lister, and Jasmine Rostam-Kolayi. Thanks
xii / acknowledgments
to each of you. Michael deserves special thanks for his ongoing willingness
to read chapters and proposals and provide a critical eye. I am grateful for
his insights, but most importantly for his continued friendship.
Aspects of this project were funded by a Fulbright Dissertation
Fellowship, a Chateaubriand Fellowship from the French government, the
UCLA African Studies Center, and Haverford College’s generous research
support that has made ongoing field work feasible. I also wish to recognize
the able assistance of my students H. Allyn Gaestel, Elizabeth Rich, and
Rachel van Tosh. Each of these remarkable undergraduate students con-
tributed to different aspects of this work with skill and good cheer and I
am grateful for that.
It is difficult to express the extent of intellectual and emotional support
that has come from my family. My father, Nathaniel Wing, has provided
me with encouragement and academic wisdom that guided me from the
beginning. My mother, Betsy Wing, has provided invaluable enthusiasm,
emotional support, skillful editing, and translation advice at a moment’s
notice. Both my parents instilled in me a sense of intellectual curiosity
that was always at the root of this project. My sister Eliza and brother
Alexander deserve thanks for their friendship and patience as travel and
research impinged on family visits, and seemingly life in general.
Finally, I am eternally thankful to Wesley, who has been there at every
moment with encouragement even as I flew off to faraway places. His tire-
less support has made this project possible and this book is for him.
Ac ron y ms
ACDI Association Canadienne du Développement International

Canadian International Development Association
ACTM Association des Travailleurs Compressés du Mali
Association of Malian Workers Downsized as a Result of
Structural Adjustment
ADEMA-PASJ Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali, Parti pour la
Solidarité et la Justice
Alliance for Democracy in Mali, Solidarity and Justice
Party
ADIDE Association des Diplómés Initiateurs et Demandeurs
d’Emploi
Graduate Association of Innovators and Job-Seekers
AEEM Association des Elèves et Etudiants du Mali
Student Association of Mali
AJDP Association des Jeunes pour la Démocratie et le Progrès
Youth Association for Democracy and Progress
AJM Association des Juristes Maliennes
Malian Association of Women Lawyers
AMDH Association Malienne pour les Droits de l’Homme
Malian Human Rights Association
AMUPI Association Malienne pour l’Unité et le Progrès de l’Islam
Malian Association for Unity and the Progress of Islam
AOF Afrique Occidentale Français
French West Africa
APDF Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des
Femmes Maliennes
Association for the Progress and Defense of the Rights of
Malian Women
CADEF Comité d’Action pour la Défense des Droits de I’Enfant de
la Femme
Action Committee for the Protection of the Rights of
Women and Children
xiv / acronyms
CAFO Coordination des Associations et ONG féminines au Mali

Committee of Women’s NGOs and Associations in Mali
CCA-ONG Comité de Coordination des Actions des Organisations
Non-Gouvernementales au Mali
Coordination Committee for NGO Initiatives in Mali
CECI Centre Canadien d’Étude et de Coopération Internationale
Center for International Cooperation and Study
CERDES Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le
Développement Économique et Social
Center for Study and Research on Democracy and
Economic and Social Development
CESC Conseil Économique, Social, et Culturel
Economic, Social, and Cultural Council
CNCDH Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de I ‘Homme
de France
French National Advisory Commission on Human Rights
CNTD Comité National d’Initiative Démocratique
National Committee for Democratic Initiative
COPADEM Community for Peace and Development in Mali
Collectif pour la Paix et le Développement au Mali
CPF Commissariat de la Promotion des Femmes
Commissariat for the Advancement of Women
CTSP Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple
Transitional People’s Salvation Committee
EID Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique
Question and Answer Assembly
FIAA Front Islamique Arabe de l‘Azaouad
Arab Islamic Front of Azaouad
FIDH Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues
FPLA Front Populaire pour la Libération de l‘Azawad
Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad
GFDS Groupe Féminin Droit de Suffrage
Women’s Voting Rights Group
HCC Haut Conseil des Collectivités
High Council of Collectivities
JLD Jeunesse Libre Démocratique
Youth for Free Democracy
MIAAC Ministère des Forces Armées et des Anciens Combattants
Ministry of Armed Forces and Veterans
MIPA Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad
Azaouad People’s Movement
acronyms / xv
MIRIA Mouvement pour l’Intégration et la Renaissance de l’Intégration

Africaine
Movement for Integration and the Renaissance of African
Integration
MPR Mouvement Patriotique pour le Renouveau
Patriotic Movement for Renovation
ODEF Observatoire Des droits de la Femme et de ‘Enfant
Watch Group for the Rights of Women and Children
OIIP Observatoire Internationale des Prisons
International Observer of Prisons
ORTM Office de Radio et Télévision du Mali
Malian Office of Radio and Television
PAREM Programme d’Appui à la Réinsertion Socio-économique des
Ex-combattants du Nord du Mali
Support Program for the Socioeconomic Reintegration of
Ex-Combatants in Northern Mali
PARENA Parti pour la Renaissance Nationale
National Renaissance Party
PDP Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès
Democracy and Progress Party
PRODEC Programme Décennal de l’Éducation
Ten-Year Guideline Policy for Education Reform
PRODEJ Programme Décennal de la Justice
Ten-Year Policy for Judicial Reform
RDM République du Mali
Republic of Mali
RDP Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès
Democracy and Progress Union
UDD Union pour la Démocratie el Développement
Democratic and Development Union
UIDH Union Inter-Africaine des Droits de /‘Homme
Inter-African Union for Human Rights
UNTM Union Nationale des Travailleurs Maliens
National Union of Malian Workers
US-RDA Union Soudanaise Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
Sudanese Union-African Democratic Assembly
I n t roduc t ion
Since 1989, when democracy’s third wave began its sweep across Africa,
over fifty-seven new constitutions have been adopted in forty-one African
countries. And yet only a handful of these have laid the groundwork for
more democratic states. This stunning statistic leads us to ask: Why has
African constitutionalism failed so consistently? The answer seems to lie
in the fact that successful democratic transitions depend not just on refor-
mulating the rules that govern society by writing new constitutions, but
on establishing governmental and institutional legitimacy. After years of
centralized rule and routine abuse of power, the challenges to establishing
legitimate postcolonial states are immense. While the sovereign National
Conference of Benin remains a landmark event that cleared the path for
democratic transitions in several Francophone states, the memory of Zaire
weighs heavily as an example of elite manipulation of the constitutional
conference that was to liberalize that famously corrupt state. Since the
collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime, the people of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) have been besieged by a devas-
tating conflict that has taken nearly four million lives to date. This con-
flict was exacerbated by the genocide into which Rwanda plunged in 1994
as a result of attempts to democratize the deeply divided country. The con-
sequence of failed democracy becomes far-reaching as the aftermath of the
genocide spreads its tendrils into the DRC and continues to destabilize the
region. The problem is not Africa’s alone as the recent experience in Iraq
has underscored the inability to build democracy from the top down or
from the outside in. Without a doubt, the prevalence of failed transitions,
subsequent instability, and violent conflict reminds us that constructing
democracy and building the rule of law are vastly more complicated than
holding elections and implementing new constitutions.
Political transitions in Africa have rarely been based upon constitutional
principles. In West Africa, extra-constitutional and violent transfers of
power have been commonplace since independence and Senegal is the only
country in the region that has never experienced a military coup d’état. In
Benin, formerly Dahomey, political turnovers have been routine and coups
2 / constructing democracy in africa
d’état occurred seven times in less than ten years (1963–1972). Indeed,
Benin’s 1990 National Conference might be considered a civil coup d’état
in which the government was overthrown by a group of civilians rather
than by the military.1 The 1980s was a period of political autocracy in
Africa. Military dictatorships and patrimonial rule were the norm. During
the 1990s, political transitions, of varying durability, took place around the
world and from 1989 to 1994, over 50 percent of the sub-Saharan African
states experienced political transitions. Dramatic changes took place as
Africa experienced its “second liberation.”2 While the first liberation had
marked freedom from colonial powers, the second represented the over-
throw of oppressive domestic powers.
Stunned by the wave of democratization that swept Africa in the 1990s,
scholars and practitioners alike were startled by the flood of failed demo-
cratic experiments that soon followed. Looking back over the four decades
since independence, the existence of “constitutions without constitutional-
ism” may be easily explained given colonial histories and elite interests in
state power.3
The present book provides original insight into how deliberation and
constitutionalism actually operate in a society in transition. I argue that a
process of inclusive constitutionalism is central to building governmental
and institutional legitimacy and challenge the notion that one democratic
model fits all. Rather than analyzing only the final product, I focus on
process and emphasize the procedure used by societies in transition to
produce their new constitutions as well as subsequent and ongoing public
deliberations concerning policy and legal reform. Because there is often
little connection between a state’s so-called founding documents and the
people who must live by their rules, it is little surprise that this disconnect
frequently contributes to a lack of institutional and governmental legiti-
macy. The process by which constitutions and democratic institutions are
created and the interaction between these institutions and the people are
thus of prime importance to any understanding of how legitimate institu-
tions and democracies are constructed.
Although many scholars emphasize the importance of institutional
structures and the presence of a vibrant civil society in the transition pro-
cess, these elements may be seen as the conduit rather than cause of demo-
cratic results. I maintain that effective participation in an ongoing process
of constitution-writing and policy-making helps nations avoid violent con-
flict and build democracy by encouraging the expression of diverse citizen
concerns. Decentralization and dialogue increase opportunities for inclu-
sion of groups previously excluded from political decision-making, such as
women, minority, or geographically remote populations. It is this partici-
patory inclusiveness that fosters legitimacy among a state’s populace and,
introduction / 3
ultimately, constructs democracy. Amidst the numerous failed transitions

in Africa, the West African Republic of Mali is one of the most cited exam-
ples (alongside Benin) of a successful transition to democracy in Africa. As
a poor, ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim country, however, Mali
challenges nearly every understanding of why and where one would predict
that democracy might thrive. But in Mali constitutional dialogues serve as a
laboratory for deliberative democracy, where they represent the experimen-
tal approach necessary to adapt democratic principles to any given country.
My empirical analysis of the process of constitutional development in Mali
from 1991 to 2005 shows how these dialogues have helped create engaged
citizens who seek to promote political dialogue as a method of government.
Dialogue between the government and the people helps to demystify the
state for its citizens by engaging them in decision-making and consequently
in governmental legitimacy, thus avoiding one of the persistent problems
of African democratic development. Challenges faced by Mali are not
unfamiliar to scholars of Africa. They include the continuing gap between
the legal and the actual environments and the enduring rural and urban
divide. This book also demonstrates that despite significant advances to
constitutional development in Africa, constitutional illiteracy, consensus
politics and the breakdown of dialogue, a persistent gender hierarchy, and
entrenched class interests in an anemic economic environment continue to
be central obstacles to constitutionalism.
Following analysis of constitutionalism, this book then turns to
an analysis of transitions in Francophone West Africa where National
Conferences took place across the region; only in Mali and Benin, how-
ever, were they broadly participatory and inclusive. The deliberative nature
of constitutionalism in Mali underscores the central role such inclusive
dialogue plays in the country’s relative success. Despite economic struggles
and a history of centralized government there, widespread participation
and dialogue have been crucial to building democracy. I emphasize two
features of political development in Mali, namely, constitutional literacy
and constitutional dialogue, both of which underlie the creation of what
is widely perceived to be a just constitution. A just constitution, as under-
stood by James Tully, is one that is viewed as legitimate by those living in
accordance with its rules because it was founded through negotiation and
recognition of diverse societal interests. Constitutional literacy refers to the
citizens’ understanding of the accountability of the state to the people, as
well as their rights and duties. Constitutional dialogue, the avowed policy
of the Malian government under Alpha Oumar Konaré, was designed to
achieve both horizontal and vertical accountability through inclusion of
citizens in the political process (while admittedly maintaining majority
control of the government itself).
Constitutionalism and Africa

Despite the relevance of constitutionalism to understanding societies
in transition, few political scientists have explored constitutionalism in
Africa—those who do rarely focus on the process of constitutionalism.
An important exception is Jennifer Widner whose recent work surveys
constitution-writing and conflict resolution around the globe and analyzes
nearly two hundred new constitutions. Her project reveals that participa-
tion in constitution-writing makes a difference in levels of post-ratification
violence in Africa but has little effect in Europe, which raises this impor-
tant question: Why does participation in constitution-writing matter in
Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific, but not in Europe? I argue that in
postcolonial states governmental legitimacy is a central concern because
years of abuse of government power have led to a demand for a more
inclusive form of governance, beginning with a just constitution. Pervasive
instability of African regimes may be linked directly to the lack of govern-
mental and institutional legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. Therefore,
interrogating the relationship between constitutionalism and legitimacy
is critical. Mali is an important and understudied case of such inclusive
constitutionalism and democracy, and we can better understand what has
gone wrong in Africa on the basis of such success stories.
The rule of law is widely recognized as a founding principle of any
stable democracy. In the African context, the idea of constitutionalism
(a system of government, centered on accountability, which gives primacy
to the rule of law) is often criticized for having little, if anything, to do
with the common will of the people. As a result, both the idea of consti-
tutionalism and the study of principles included therein have been mar-
ginalized. This is not surprising given that across Africa, “the landscape
during 1963–89 was as constitutionally bleak as it was politically chaotic.”4
Constitutional government faltered in many postcolonial states during the
era of so-called developmental dictatorships. The history of constitutions
in Commonwealth Africa has been labeled “one of abrogation, derogation
and retrogressive amendment.”5 Despite the brief flurry of interest in con-
stitution making when numerous African countries attained independence
in the early 1960s, the subsequent era of single-party presidents, military
rulers, and “big man” politics directed scholars away from constitutional
studies.6 Indeed, constitutionalism seemed to have very little to do with
the dynamics of state and society in Africa. However, an interest in the
study of constitutionalism coincided with a global surge of democratic lib-
eralization in the 1990s when “strenuous efforts (were) being made to pro-
vide popular and durable national constitutions legitimated by the consent
of the people.”7 The problem remained that constitutions and institutions
introduction / 5
of government had routinely been imposed on Africa. This legacy was

one of alienation of society from the state and made the establishment of
legitimate and democratic government all the more difficult. It is from this
foundation that scholars and practitioners alike have sought to find new
approaches to understanding constitutionalism and democracy in Africa.
Highlighting the essence of constitutional development and underscor-
ing its ongoing nature, Jürgen Habermas observes that “A constitution
can be thought of as an historical project that each generation of citizens
continues to pursue.”8 Given the enduring qualities of successful constitu-
tions, constitutional development should be central to analyses of politi-
cal change in democratizing countries. But this has not been the case in
African studies, where political economy and ethnicity engage the atten-
tion of the vast majority of researchers.9 With the collapse of apartheid in
South Africa much attention has been paid to constitution making in this
particular state.10 However, to my mind, the particularities of the South
African example lead to the necessity of broadening our analysis to a wider
array of cases within Africa.
This book analyzes constitutional development during the Malian
transition toward democracy, from 1991 to 2007. By examining the role of
citizens in the nation-building process I shall show how inclusion and delib-
eration have been central to building the rule of law. While every country
has its own unique history, valuable lessons regarding how we think about
constructing democracy can be learned from this particular case.
A Participatory Approach
While democracy does imply standards of governmental accountability to
the people, the methods of democratic accountability vary among societies
and these understandings are likely to change over time as historical expe-
rience and political learning broaden the meaning of democracy for people
everywhere. Citizen participation is a defining principle of the democratic
state, and yet the nature and level of participation, as well as the obstacles
to its fulfillment, differ widely throughout the world. As societies strive to
create democratic forms of government, they must experiment with insti-
tutions that help to bring citizens and their governments together in order
to achieve the degree of accountability and participation that democracy
requires. With reference to the idea of a “republican” dimension of citizen-
ship, Jürgen Habermas has argued that “the institutions of constitutional
freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them.”11 From
that perspective, increasing public participation in the processes of gov-
ernment is a condition of effective democratic citizenship. How does a
government that strives for democracy ensure the growth of opportunity
for active participation on the part of all citizens, and how does this effort
relate to democratic sustainability?
This book examines the processes of deliberation in constitution- and
policy-making with a view toward assessing their overall contribution to
governmental legitimacy, constitutional sustainability, and democratic
consolidation. I suggest that the creation of both institutionalized and per-
ceived potential spaces for dialogue in an emergent democracy promotes
citizen participation in its constitutional development. To the extent that
the process is open and inclusive, a veritable contract between state and
society—the product of dialogue between citizens and the state—provides
a foundation for sustainable democratic government. As Pierre Englebert
has shown, governmental legitimacy depends on this link between state
and society. When the state is viewed as an exogenous entity, it is also
viewed as illegitimate. And this, alas, has been the curse of the African
state and has hindered political and economic development.12 I argue that
in a continent laden with the burden of artificial states inherited from
colonialism, processes of participatory constitutionalism can help establish
the deep connection between government and society that is necessary to
achieve lasting and effective democratic government. A more participatory
and inclusive constitutionalism allows for citizens to have a sense of owner-
ship of their democracy and to begin to see the state as more legitimate.
Constitutional legitimacy has been critical to the process of democra-
tization in Mali and to the overall strength of a new regime that is widely
regarded as a beacon of democratic hope in Africa. In the course of politi-
cal transitions toward democratic governance, states create institutions
and processes that may be considered fragments of a more fully developed
democratic polity. In addition to a constituent assembly, Mali has created
experimental institutions and made use of auxiliary supports in order to
help promote democratic government. With each of these innovations, the
legitimacy of the state has been reinforced. Constitutional dialogues are
one such innovation. Because they allow for a space in which the values
and interests of citizens can be articulated and recognized within the rules
that govern the polity, constitutional legitimacy is reinforced. These very
dialogues contribute to nation-building and help shift the relationship of
the state to society from an exogenous to endogenous entity.
Constitutional literacy, an idea introduced in Constitutionalism and
Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (1993), is, in addition,
vital to constitutionalism in Africa.13 Constitutional literacy includes not
only a population’s knowledge of its political rights but also of the rules
that reinforce “responsible” government and its accountability to the pop-
ulace. This concept embodies the importance of rooting the very process
of constitution building in society rather than imposing on the people
introduction / 7
constitutionalism created from the top down. Constructing Democracy

demonstrates how constitutional dialogues and constitutional literacy are
essential to citizen participation in constitutional development. They
underlie the creation of a more just constitution for the country and are
basic features of democratization.14
This study addresses the importance of constitutional development by
considering constitutional dialogues and their role in the development of
an increasingly legitimate form of government and, subsequently, their
ongoing role in legitimizing the government once established. I argue that
Mali’s democratic transition and constitutional development are rooted in
a deliberative, decentralized process, and that Konaré’s policy of promot-
ing dialogue as a means of governing was a critical element of constructing
democracy in that country. I contend that the principles of constitutional
literacy and constitutional dialogue should inform our understanding of
democratic government. Indeed, where newly established governments
strive to create a foundation upon which democratic nation states can
flourish, these principles are second to none in their analytical value.
Through an analysis of constitutional development in the case of Mali
I seek to contribute to scholarship on African politics as well as to the
broader study of democracy and deliberation. My analysis of the partici-
pation of citizens in political life during the transition and in the crucial
years that followed highlights the role that civil society plays in demo-
cratic change. In this study I have emphasized the role of women because
of their position as leaders of civil society movements in several African
states. Too often, women’s important contributions to democratization
are not adequately analyzed. This work seeks to incorporate gender into
its analysis in order to provide a more complete picture of democracy
in Africa. Citizenship and national sovereignty are increasingly inter-
twined in Africa, and an examination of how the construction of citizen
identities through participation in constitutional dialogues may serve
to strengthen national identity is highly relevant to broader debates on
citizenship.
It has been suggested that participation in different realms of daily
life would likely reinforce the connection between the public and private
spheres for individuals.15 As Carole Pateman observed in a seminal work,
The ordinary man might still be more interested in things nearer home, but
the existence of a participatory society would mean that he was better able
to assess the performance of his representatives at the national level, better
equipped to take decisions of national scope when the opportunity arose to
do so, and better able to weigh up the impact of decisions taken by national
representatives on his own life and immediate surroundings. In the context
of a participatory society the significance of his vote to the individual would
have changed: as well as being a private individual he would have multiple

opportunities to become an educated, public citizen.16
However, she found, despite its honored place in the history of political
thought, this ideal “has become lost from view in the contemporary theory
of democracy.”17 Recently, participation has once again risen to impor-
tance in the works of other contemporary theorists, among them Iris
Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib, James Tully, Charles Taylor, and Jürgen
Habermas.18 In her early work, Pateman challenged the notion that liberal
democratic principles could exist outside of national politics if citizens were
not allowed to participate in decision-making at the local level. Similarly, I
show that by extending the processes of participation by means of consti-
tutional dialogues, the government of Mali has enhanced the prospect for
democracy at the national level. Invariably, as people grow accustomed to
participating at the local level, they discover promising opportunities for
political efficacy at the national level.
Mali: An Improbable Democracy

Malians witnessed the overthrow of the socialist leader Modibo Keita by
General Moussa Traoré in 1968. On that occasion, the usurping soldiers
were hailed in the streets of Bamako by supporters waving banners that
read “long live the liberating army.”19 Twenty-three years later, in 1991,
Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré (known fondly as ATT) became a
national hero when he brought an end to the dictatorial Traoré regime
by military force. Until the 1992 presidential election, Malians had never
experienced a change in government by means other than a coup d’état. A
decade later, the 2002 election of ATT to the presidency marked the first
time in Mali’s history that power would be passed from one democratically
elected president to another.
In Mali, the use of experimental forums that facilitate public delibera-
tion and criticism of the government’s institutions, policy-making strat-
egies, and human rights record during the presidency of Alpha Oumar
Konaré (1992–2002) helped to create a political culture of dialogue for the
reinforcement of democracy. While a French model had indeed been used
for the constitution of Mali’s Third Republic, the leadership of President
Konaré and his ability to capitalize on a political culture of dialogue con-
tributed to the ongoing transformation of politics.
Mali is a landlocked country located in the Sahelian region of West
Africa. A former French colony, Mali became independent in 1960. Of a
population of approximately twelve million, over 80 percent live in rural areas,
and more than 90 percent are Muslim. While 73.3 percent of adult males
introduction / 9
are illiterate, a startling 88.1 percent of the female population aged fifteen
and over cannot read or write.20 The principal ethnic groups of Mali are the
following: the Mandé-speaking people (including Bambara, Malinke, and
Sarakole) make up approximately 50 percent of the population, the Fulani
amount to 17 percent, “Voltaic” groups 12 percent, Songhai 6, and Tuareg, 5.
Despite the country’s ethnic diversity, Malian politics seem never to have
been shaped mainly by ethnic interests. During the drive toward national
independence, several political parties were created, primarily in the cap-
ital Bamako. These parties were not established along ethnic lines, but
rather in response to the social and economic concerns of urban dwellers.
This development is quite remarkable given the durability of personal rule
in Mali and the likelihood that personal rule would segue into ethnic pol-
itics. However, voluntary associations based on social and cultural events
were promoted by the French in the 1930s and expanded in urban areas
where they became networks for an urban elite that consisted of many
ethnicities.21 In rural areas, tonw (associations) were used, at first by the
French colonial administration, and then by socialist and one-party gov-
ernments, as organizational tools for the collection of taxes. Thus, over the
years associations have played a historical role in the networking of elites
across ethnicities as well as serving as mechanisms of the centralized state
structure.
Mali is ranked among the three least developed nations in the world.22
Many scholars argue that such a low level of development signifies
an environment in which the growth of democracy is very unlikely.23
Furthermore, the prevalence of neo-patrimonialism, or personal rule based
on resource control, is without question a threat to open political com-
petition and democratic institutions.24 To be sure, clientalist networks,
rooted in a history of access to state resources by patrons who provide
economic security to their followers, are still a prominent part of Malian
politics. Without undue pessimism, Richard Sandbrook has noted that
Mali, along with Mozambique and Niger, “exhibits some of the most
unfavourable conditions for democracy to be found anywhere.”25 And yet,
despite these conditions, each of these three countries underwent politi-
cal liberalization during the 1990s. Mozambique and Mali have remained
on the path toward democracy while Niger briefly fell back into military
rule (1996–1999), but since that time has continued to pursue democracy.
From the presidential election in 1992 to 2002, Alpha Oumar Konaré
and his party, Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali–Parti Africain pour la
Solidarité et la Justice (ADEMA–PASJ), controlled the government. The
2002 presidential elections marked the end of Konaré’s mandate and are
an important milestone in Mali’s political history. A peaceful, multiparty
election, in which power was transferred from Konaré to ATT, is a valuable
sign of successful democracy in Africa. Despite the pessimism generated by

adverse economic and political environments, Mali has become an African
success story, from which valuable lessons can be learned.
The important, and largely neglected, role of women in Malian politi-
cal history warrants their highly prominent place in my own analysis. Prior
to independence, Africans in Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF) were
allowed to vote in French elections and to send deputies to the French
National Assembly. However, the ability to vote was restricted and only
available to those with certain professions or skills, such as merchants,
bureaucrats, and literate citizens. These categories routinely excluded
women. After women in France won the vote in 1944, there was a push to
broaden the electorate in French colonies to include women. In 1951, an
amendment was passed by the French assembly that permitted mothers
with two children, living or dead for France, to vote.26 From 1946 to 1951,
the number of voters in Soudan (the colonial territory that became Mali)
rose from 160,464 to 916,944. Unlike men, women were not required to
be registered for the electoral lists; they simply had to show up with their
two children, or their birth certificates.27 Women were therefore able to
vote prior to independence and may indeed continue to outnumber male
voters in Mali.28 I contend that any study of democracy is incomplete
without exploring the contributions that women make as leaders in con-
stitutional dialogues and in spreading constitutional literacy across the
country. Women’s associations are among the most vibrant groups in Mali;
their civic activities are discussed in chapter five, where I consider women
as active participants in the creation of Mali as a nation.
Research for this study took place on several different trips between 1994
and 2006. In 1994 my interest in associational life and democracy in Mali
developed and I gained my first access to numerous women’s associations.
It was also a lively period in Malian politics. The “problem of the North,”29
which included violent outbreaks between nomadic populations and both
the military and sedentary peoples, was aflame. The government’s reaction
was to launch concertations régionales (regional dialogues) in order to help
resolve the conflict that threatened not only Mali’s fledgling democracy,
but the viability of the nation-state itself. Women’s associations were among
the most dynamic groups in terms of their struggle to protect the consti-
tutional rights of their members and to assure the continued role of their
members in the new democracy. Although I began to conduct interviews, in
French, with my questionnaire, I soon decided that open-ended interviews
would result in more candid exchanges, which would not be directed by my
own preconceived notions of the political questions discussed.
Integral to my research was the Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique, EID
(Question and Answer Assembly), which I attended on December 10, 1997,
introduction / 11
and the Conseil Économique, Social et Culturel, CESC (Economic, Social and
Cultural Council). I had the opportunity to interview the president
and secretary general of the CESC and the sole representative for youth,
and was also able to attend both two-week sessions of the CESC. Both of
these institutions represent experiments undertaken by the government to
create broader access for civil society groups to governmental leaders and
the policy-making process. I also attended numerous international forums
on democracy that took place in Bamako.
As a result of interviews conducted with U.S. government officials, as well
as local women’s organizations, I learned of numerous sensibilisation projects
designed to promote civic participation for women.30 Once I had established
a foundation for my understanding of the government’s efforts to lead the
transition to democracy, I traveled outside of the capital to interview Malians
in rural areas, or regional capitals. In the Mopti region, I interviewed women
who had participated in the recent “Training Seminar on the Participation
of Women in Political and Civic Life,” organized by the Groupe Féminin
Droit de Suffrage (GFDS). I was eager to see to what extent these individu-
als would implement the lessons that they had learned from the seminar. In
April 1998, I was able to participate in a repeat of this three-day seminar
in Sikasso. I interviewed the participants individually (in both French and
Bambara); over the course of the seminar, I gained insight into how these
women viewed themselves as political actors in a democratic Mali.31
It was during my interviews in the regions of Koulikoro, Mopti, and
Sikasso that I became acutely aware of the divide between Bamako and
the rest of the country. Even formally educated, elite women in rural areas
were unfamiliar with institutions that were established in Bamako to
encourage civil society groups to participate more broadly in the demo-
cratic process in Mali. Surprisingly few of the participants in the GFDS
seminars knew of these institutions; and yet these women were exploring
and creating their own roles in the new political system, often through
women’s associations.
In addition to interviews, a critical reading of Malian newspaper reports
was integral to my ability to follow daily events and political discussions.
Since the political opening in 1992, many newspapers have been cre-
ated, and by 1997, forty-two were being published regularly in Bamako.32
Videotapes of the National Conference, taped by the national television,
l’Office de Radio et Télévision du Mali (ORTM); other resources such as
government documents and reports have also been critical to my under-
standing of the process.33 These sources, to be sure, tend to provide a rosy
perspective on the processes. This perspective needs to be taken into con-
sideration; nevertheless, the extent to which the government relies on the
rhetoric of dialogue is an important turn of events.
It is my hope that this empirical analysis will stimulate comparable stud-

ies of constitutional development in Africa and other regions of the world
where transitions to democracy command the attention of scholars. A cur-
sory look at articles in leading newspapers and monographs published on
Africa reveals stories of ethnic conflict and failed states fueling a familiar
afro-pessimism. This study seeks to change that perspective by present-
ing a “success story” of institutional innovation and constitutionalism. In
Mali, social dialogue became a method of government, while participation
and transparency have contained ethnic tensions that rend the fabric of
many African countries. As former President Konaré observed, “the more
people participate, the more importance they attach to the work of build-
ing our nation.”34 And, it is hoped, the more clearly will they accept the
electoral process as the mechanism of political change, to the exclusion of
military coups d’état.
Ch a p t e r O n e
P r i nc i p l e s of Const i t u t iona l i sm
Constitutionalism, referring to either the principles of constitutional

government or the adherence to such principles, is an elusive idea; and yet
it is central to the establishment of an enduring constitutional democracy.
Bolanle M. Mustapha has rightly argued that a constitution is not viable
unless it incorporates “fundamental beliefs of the people” with respect to
government.
In a free society, no constitution is likely to work, or to endure, unless its

basic provisions are compatible with the fundamental beliefs of the people
about government and major groups have a chance to effectively operate
within the constitutional framework.1
The determination of these “fundamental beliefs” and definition of “the

people” are basic aspects of constitutional thought.
The legitimacy of a constitution is strengthened when the people par-
ticipate fully in its creation through a deliberative process that allows for
their “fundamental values” to be revealed. Constitutions imposed on a
polity are unlikely to establish effective constitutional government that
has widespread legitimacy from the society governed by it.2 Constitutional
development of a particular society may be considered as “a dynamic pro-
cess, rooted in underlying, local social realities.”3 While some scholars
emphasize the structural aspects of constitutions, others dwell on the pri-
macy of the rule of law in constitutional thought.
In his seminal work Constitutional Government and Democracy (1950)
Carl J. Friedrich argued that an attack on constitutionalism was nothing
less than an attack on the vast realm of freedom and creativity. To stifle
constitutionalism was to stifle humankind. Due to the rise of absolutism
in Europe, he observed,
Science and art and religion, the whole realm of free creative effort, are in
fact threatened. It is clear, at last, that there can be no more important study
than the study of the conditions of the rise of constitutionalism in general

and constitutional democracy in particular.4
As World War II engulfed Europe, constitutional scholar Charles Howard

McIlwain wrote, “The time seems to be propitious for an examination of
the general principle of constitutionalism . . . For perhaps never in its long
history has the principle of constitutionalism been so questioned as it is
questioned today, never has the attack upon it been so determined or so
threatening as it is now.”5
Despite the examples of Friedrich and McIlwain, relatively few
twentieth-century political scientists have devoted their energies to the
study of constitutionalism. During the decades following independence
of African states constitutions held little authority and were routinely
abrogated by government leaders. Today, however, as questions are raised
regarding the durability of democratic transitions of the 1990s, scholars
would be remiss to once again turn away from constitutional thought.
Nevertheless, scholars and policy-makers in Africa are not much fur-
ther along in their quest for the meaning of constitutionalism than they
were sixty years ago. Where a new democratic era has dawned, the forms
of democracy are rooted in disparate legal traditions. In many African
societies, “indigenous”6 and religious law play an important role in the
everyday lives of people.7 Failed constitutions often did not acknowledge
the multiple realms of law that influence daily life. By contrast, constitu-
tions created through deliberation and broad participation have resulted in
far greater legitimacy. During the course of such deliberations indigenous
or religious values can be considered and conflicts can be negotiated, if not
entirely resolved. As James Tully has written, “Understanding comes, if it
comes at all, only by engaging in the volley of practical dialogue. We need
the dialogue itself to become aware of all the aspects of our association that
ought to be recognised and accommodated in the constitution.”8
The process of constitutional dialogue weaves together a myriad of
social interests—geographic, linguistic, religious, ethnic, economic, and
gender-related. Increased awareness of diversity and pluralism also helps to
sensitize people to various forms of discrimination and exclusion. Purely
liberal forms of constitutionalism need to be enriched with conceptions
of communal rights and “traditional” values. The creation of space for
the inclusion of communal and traditional values is a critical step toward
establishing legitimate government.
This chapter examines the progress of constitutionalism in Mali, a
country that has experienced the rejection and retrieval of constitutional
thought. I shall argue that governmental legitimacy and constitutional sta-
bility are rooted in an open process of constitution- and policy-making in
principles of constitutionalism / 15
Mali. The processes of deliberation have helped to reestablish constitu-

tional legitimacy and have encouraged nation-building as a result. Prior to
analyzing Mali, I shall discuss the principles of constitutionalism, address-
ing the modern history of the concept, the creation of a just constitution,
and its relationship to deliberation, sources of authority, and governmental
legitimacy.9 I shall also consider the role that experimental institutions
may play in the consolidation of constitutional democracy. Critical to this
discussion of constitutional development are the concepts of universal and
traditional rights. Thus the chapter concludes with an analysis of the pro-
tection of these rights in the Malian polity.
Contemporary Constitutional Theory

The Greek and Roman roots of constitutionalism have been ana-
lyzed authoritatively in the works of Francis D. Wormuth and Charles
H. McIlwain.10 I will begin with twentieth-century analyses of constitu-
tionalism, among them the structural interpretations of constitutionalism
that are the bases of works by Francis Wormuth and Carl J. Friedrich. With
reference to Alexander Hamilton and The Federalist Papers, Wormuth
characterized constitutionalism as the auxiliary precautions that, together
with a state’s citizens, enable the government to control itself.11 Recently, a
government’s ability to control the actions of others within the government
has been referred to as horizontal accountability.12 Both Wormuth and
Friedrich centered their definitions of constitutionalism on the necessity
of separation of powers.13 Friedrich claimed that constitutionalism “is a
body of rules ensuring fair play, thus rendering the government ‘responsi-
ble.’” He called upon scholars of constitutionalism to “explore the methods
and techniques by which (effective government) restraints are established
and maintained.”14 Friedrich’s argument thus relied on the institutional
structures that promote fair play on the part of the government. American
constitutionalism has always maintained that separation of powers, checks
and balances and federalism are central doctrines to governmental fair
play.15 In addition to these widely accepted principles, Wormuth argued
that constitutionalism relied on laws that were general (with all people
being equal before the law) and prospective (forward-looking rather than
retrospective) in scope.
Given these precepts, one might think that essential institutional struc-
tures could be designed and lifted from effective constitutions, and trans-
planted to diverse environments. In Latin America, attempts were made in
the nineteenth century to ensure horizontal accountability through ready-
made institutional packages. Such packages were often modeled on the
constitutions of the empires to which they belonged. The “transplantation
of constitutions and legislation” led to heated debates over the pays légal
and pays réel and the vast divide between them.16
Similar examples arose across Africa. Colonies that were part of the
French empire were ruled under the French constitution. At independence,
the French constitution often remained the model for government in many
countries; however, adherence to the structural guidelines of these constitu-
tions may lead to constitutional models that are foreign to the non-Western
context. While separate legislative and executive branches of government and
an independent judiciary have become central to many newly designed con-
stitutions, experimental models that help to close the gap between pays légal
and pays réel must be considered or risk the continued alienation of the people
to the rules that bind their actions. However, rather than relying too heavily
on structuralism, the conception of horizontal accountability allows us to
imagine diverse institutions that have served this function in non-Western
contexts.17 In reference to the important essay “Horizontal Accountability in
New Democracies” by Guillermo O’Donnell, it has been stated that
although O’Donnell has traced the origin of republicanism to ancient

Rome, and that of liberalism to the feudal societies of medieval Europe
as well as seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France,
non-European historical origins of limited (or liberal) and responsible (or
republican) government can be identified in every part of the world with
reference to the political histories of the peoples concerned.18
Thus, structuralism is an important approach to constitutionalism if it

relies on the principles of horizontal accountability, rather than on histori-
cal models of Western constitutions and their institutions.
By contrast with structuralist thought, a juristic approach, with its
emphasis on natural law, is derived from principles of reason and religion
that are grounded in Western thought. Charles McIlwain, who was stead-
fastly opposed to the idea of separation of powers, believed that a juristic
approach was the essence of constitutionalism.19 According to this school of
thought, no particular structure was essential for the rule of law to prevail;
rather, issue-oriented political parties would ensure democratic accountabil-
ity of the rulers to the people.20 For McIlwain, “constitutionalism is viewed
in the context of an ongoing dialectic between people and power. Power
is expressed through government (gubernaculum) and popular control of
government is expressed through the rule of law (jurisdictio).”21 Electoral
institutions, it was believed, would ensure the voice of popular will, and
government would then be forced to abide by the rule of law.22 Experience
has shown that elections alone are insufficient to ensure the rule of law.
Indeed, institutions that have facilitated constitutional governments in the
West have often died when they have been transplanted. We may think that
legitimate constitutional governments depend on both vertical and hori-
zontal forms of accountability. The crucial question is how can both forms
of accountability be achieved? An answer may be sought in the multiple
political traditions that influence postcolonial states.
Between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, agents of Western imperial

expansion propagated Western political ideas, including the concepts of nat-
ural law and rights, throughout the world. In our time, the intellectuals of
non-Western countries increasingly rely on their own philosophical traditions
for constitutional and political guidance. Although the “grand tradition” of
Western political ideas is universally respected, it is no longer the supreme
source of moral authority for most of the world. By contrast with juristic con-
ceptions of constitutionalism, structuralist conceptions are imbued with little
spiritual content. For that reason, they are likely to appeal to proponents of
liberty in many different cultures who wish to establish the principles of free
government on philosophical principles derived from indigenous sources.23
Adherents to both structuralist and juristic schools of thought argue

that the validity of the state will be determined by the people. The
issue between them involves the manner of government of this source of
validity.24 McIlwain viewed constitutionalism as an ongoing dialectic.
Central to a dialectic between people and power is an awareness of the
rules on the part of the people. This was seldom the case in Africa where
centralized government predominated and overwhelming percentages of
the population could not read and learn these rules for themselves. After
years of constitutional failure across the continent, scholars question the
ability of rules alone to restrain governmental action. During the indepen-
dence era, African constitutions routinely made references to democracy,
the sovereignty of the people, a republican form of government, and the
guarantee of a secular state.25 Yet, the people were rarely aware of these
constitutions and they had little relationship to governance in many post-
colonial countries. Government leaders certainly did not act as if they were
bound by these constitutions; on the contrary, they acted with great hubris
as they modified or dissolved them. As Victor T. Le Vine observed,
a democratic constitution is the political contract that the people make with
themselves. In West Africa such contracts were soon abrogated by the new
governments, which generally preferred to rule without the constraints that
they embodied. In the process, a constitution more often than not became
simply another instrument of rule if not discarded altogether.26
Clearly, the constitutions of African states failed to protect the people;

these contracts were ignored and the rights of citizens were trampled by
rulers that preferred absolute, patrimonial power. Before exploring the

concept of constitutional literacy, which refers to the citizens’ understand-
ing of the accountability of the state to the people, as well as their rights
and duties, it is valuable to first examine notions of citizenship.
Citizenship and its Meanings

It is not surprising that citizenship with its entanglement of member-
ship, identity, allegiance, sentiment, and obligation is a contested concept.
According to liberalism, the state protects the rights of the individual, and
the individual as a citizen has an obligation to the political community.27
John Locke’s seventeenth-century work Two Treatises of Government has
become a hallmark of the conception of liberal government despite the
fact that Locke’s understanding of citizenship would likely have entailed
a franchise that included only propertied male adults.28 Today, liberal
perceptions of citizenship have grown more inclusive; however, questions
remain concerning the protection of minority rights. Multicultural citi-
zenship, proposed by Will Kymlicka, is a theory that presumes to protect
minority rights while at the same time preserving tenets central to liberal
justice.29 His argument rests on accepting “external protections” for ethnic
groups and national minorities, while questioning “internal restrictions,”
or the rights of such groups to limit the liberty of its members “in the name
of group solidarity or cultural purity.”30
In Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, emerging democracies must address
the status of national minorities and indigenous peoples.31 The principles
of liberal constitutionalism serve as guidelines for policy-makers in these
states, but the liberal tradition does not adequately address diversity.32
Despite the fact that most political communities are multiethnic, it may
be argued that many Western political theorists continue to have an ideal-
ized vision of the polis in which fellow citizens share a common descent,
language, and culture.33 Challenges to such a model rightfully contend
that this vision denies participation to those outside of any “common cul-
ture.” If we recognize the diversity of cultures within a state, the issue
becomes: must we recognize each group as a group with particular rights
and duties? Or is it enough to protect individuals, thus protecting cultural
differences among individuals. Although liberalism may be perceived as
applying to all individuals, historically, it has been based on the exclusion-
ary idea of a male citizen operating in the public sphere. Little room was
made for women and their contributions in the private realm. The great
leap necessary to recognize women’s responsibilities in the private realm as
part of the obligations of citizenship has yet to be taken. However, exclu-
sion of women from participation in civic duties once reserved for men is
no longer acceptable in democratic thought. Since a reevaluation of the

private sphere and its relation to citizenship is unlikely in the near term,
efforts to increase the participation of women in civic activities assume
greater importance for the immediate future.
Communitarians argue for an approach in which citizens, as social beings,
are tied to the values and cultural ways of particular communities.34 Thus,
they claim, definitions of citizenship must recognize these social aspects,
rather than focus on the individual. While communitarians recognize the
importance of social ties, it is unclear how communities are to be defined
and how changing alliances will be addressed.35 A similar perspective has
arisen from cultural relativist critics of universal human rights who argue for
an “African” concept of human rights. These thinkers contend that because
Africans are more group- or community-oriented than individualistic,
universal human rights are simply not relevant in Africa.36 Rhoda Howard
asserts that although many Africans may be “group-oriented,” it does not fol-
low that human rights are irrelevant to African societies.37 Dangers involved
in protecting particular group rights are raised by Kymlicka’s concern over
“internal restrictions” and their infringement on individual liberty.
Republicanism, derived from the work of Aristotle and associated with
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1968) [1762], highlights the
importance of active civic life for citizens. The French revolution “insti-
tutionalized political rights as citizenship rights, transposing them from
the plane of the city-state to that of the nation-state, and transforming
them from a privilege to a general right.”38 Citizenship, it may be argued,
is “constituted by the possession and exercise of political rights, by partici-
pation in the business of rule, not by common rights and obligations.”39
In the eighteenth century, individuals with the time and money to par-
ticipate actively in political life were frequently wealthy men of property.
Women and the citoyen passif were excluded because of the necessity to feed
themselves and their families rather than concentrate on civic activities.40
While the conception of participatory citizenship implied by republican-
ism is important, its emphasis on politics in the public sphere increases the
danger of exclusion based on class and gender.
Citizenship, to my mind, relates to the rights of communities, as well
as individuals. As individuals’ identities are fluid and change according to
different situations, so must the conception of citizenship remain fluid.
In chapter five, I discuss women’s identities that may connect at different
times to a global women’s movement, a local association, or to citizenship
in a democratizing state. This fluidity is common for most individuals,
not simply women. Individuals are likely to belong to several different
groups and therefore their citizenship cannot be associated with any one
particular group.
In addition, various communities may negotiate with the state to

guarantee certain protections for their members. Thus, women may come
forward to argue for the creation of maternity clinics in their commu-
nities. These negotiations, which may take place in regional forums and
may include state and local government representatives, are an example of
the expansion of dialogue between the state and citizens. Without orga-
nization of women within a community, such necessities are likely to be
unmet. Seminars that encourage activism on the part of formerly excluded
communities, such as those discussed in chapter five, illustrate women’s
involvement in promoting civic action. By bringing together women as a
group, these women are able to discuss the ways that they can participate as
individuals with the interests of the group in mind. Similarly, with respect
to ethnic minorities such as the Tuareg, discussed in chapter seven, active
inclusion in decision-making concerning local projects such as community
schools has helped to reinforce their citizenship. What may be considered
little more than development assistance on the surface is also critical to
assuaging violence between communities and preserving Mali as a nation.
Any attempts to “theorize citizenship” ought to be viewed with these reali-
ties clearly in mind. Liberalism tends to overlook the importance of com-
munity and cultural allegiances, while communitarianism risks protecting
harmful internal restrictions on individual rights within particular com-
munities. By encouraging civic participation and constitutional literacy, an
effort must be made to avoid the exclusionary tendencies that were famil-
iar to early liberal and republican doctrines. In order to avoid precluding
those less able to participate in dialogues far from their homes, our under-
standing of civic participation must be broadened to include both local
level politics, and, ideally, the private realm. The more we understand the
importance of decentralization to democratic politics, the more inclusive
our understanding of citizenship is likely to be.
Constitutional Literacy
It has been stated that constitutionalism, as a dynamic process, “is the cross-
roads of law and society, culture and history, economics and politics.”41 In
countries that have experienced recent political transitions, a better under-
standing of constitutionalism as the foundation of legitimate government
is directly related to the ultimate success of new democracies. In Africa, the
social dynamics of culturally plural societies must be considered seriously
by constitutional thinkers. To be sure, “broad-based political socialization,
generally expressed as the creation of civil society, is a prerequisite to stable
constitutionalism.”42 Legitimacy must be embedded in the constitution so
that it sustains what Friedrich referred to as a “responsible” government
that operates under a system of rules respected and considered legitimate

by the nation’s citizens.43 Respect for the system of rules depends on con-
stitutional literacy. Although constitutionalism is often considered to be
synonymous with the rule of law, the rule of law itself “is meaningless
unless one knows who makes the rules and enforces them.”44 Responsible
government is derived not from a “body of rules,” but rather from the com-
bination of these rules, how they are created, and how the polity under-
stands them. Both the rule of law and, more broadly, constitutionalism are
dependent on the process by which laws are created and enforced, as well
as the relationship between society and this process. It follows that “any
understanding of constitutionalism must inevitably involve not only the
‘rules for making rules’ but also local processes of institution building and
value formation.”45 If citizens are aware of their rights as protected by the
constitution, they will be more likely to understand the links between this
set of rules and their lives, thus closing the gap between pays légal and pays
réel. Analysis of the creation of such rules is intended to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the connection between these rules and the people.
In 1989, the American Council of Learned Societies organized global
conferences and workshops on comparative constitutionalism. The many
themes of the workshops are discussed in the comprehensive volume
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World.46
During the project,
a theory of constitutional literacy emerged that contends that the polity

must be educated about the idea of limited government before such a gov-
ernment can succeed. This view is based, in part, on the principle that con-
stitutionalism imposed from above, rather than being allowed to develop
from below, is actually authoritarianism, and has insufficient basis in civil
society to be considered a ‘genuine’ constitutionalism.47
Historically, constitutions were created by a very select part of society.

Emphasizing the hazards of imposing constitutionalism from above, a
theory of constitutional literacy rooted in civil society and broad-based
political socialization would help to understand the process of constitu-
tional construction. It has been claimed that “[t]he survival of any rights,
individual or communal, depends not only on what is laid down in the
constitution but on the substantive ability of persons and collectivities
to act to defend or realize those rights.”48 Without an understanding of
rights, as protected by the constitution, both the constitution and the
rights it protects become nebulous and obscure. Hence, constitutional
literacy is an important aspect of achieving both vertical and horizontal
accountability.49 Through dialogue, constitutional literacy expands so that
a broader segment of society can demand both the vertical and horizontal
forms of accountability that are central to constitutionalism.
Constitutional literacy in Mali has expanded in several ways. The
National Conference of 1991 incorporated citizens in the process of nego-
tiating a constitution. The Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique (EID) or
Question and Answer Assembly, discussed in chapter six, was an annual
event established during Konaré’s term in office that was followed on
radio and television by many urban residents not attending the forum.
The debates allowed for the spread of discussion of human rights viola-
tions, and thus a broader understanding of these rights. Importantly, the
EID spawned similar events including a regional EID in Sikasso in 2001.
Women’s associations have led the way through seminars in rural areas that
focus on women’s political activism and civil rights. Whereas the National
Conference and the EID are institutional means to promote constitutional
literacy, women’s actions underscore the critical role women are playing
in promoting a broader understanding of constitutional rights and in so
doing are critical to constructing democracy. Each of these examples con-
tributes to constitutional literacy.
An influential Western case, Canada, involving the struggles of its
indigenous populations to be recognized in the National Charter, high-
lights conflicts between the established constitutional order and previously
excluded populations. The challenge of the new century is how to establish
a just constitution within a pluralist culture so that the constitution and
government are considered legitimate authorities by the people. Maxwell
Owusu refers to the critical concept of domesticating democracy:
Domesticating democracy in the African context amounts to a dynamic

and continuous process of institutionalization in which democratic ideas,
beliefs, values, practices, actions and relationships, and new forms of politi-
cal behavior gain acceptance and popular support in society and become
successfully integrated with other features of the culture and society,
endowing them with popular legitimacy.50
In this book I argue that in order to domesticate the process of consti-

tutionalism, and thus reinforce its legitimacy, participation and delibera-
tion are crucial in that they offer an opportunity for diverse voices to be
included in establishing the rules that will govern them.
Because of the cultural pluralism that is evident across the conti-
nent, when we analyze constitutionalism in Africa we must consider the
important roles of other authorities that coexist with secular law. Culture
and local tradition must be central to theorizing African politics and
constitution-making and the importance of discerning and defining forms
of local knowledge is critical.51
The Construction of a “Just” Constitution

Broad-based deliberation provides the basis for legitimacy and last-
ing constitutionalism. In his aptly entitled book Strange Multiplicity:
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995), James Tully argues that
polities must seek dialogue in which every group participates and puts
forth its view concerning a new “just” constitutional order. His concept of
contemporary constitutionalism implies mutual recognition of differences,
continuity of such differences, and consent to the established forms of
government that can be assured through open processes of deliberation.
Without dialogue between all those affected by the constitutional order,
Tully maintains that the constitutional authority is not legitimate as it
presents only particular, privileged points of view.52 He writes, “the basic
laws and institutions of modern societies, and their authoritative tradi-
tions of interpretation, are unjust in so far as they thwart the forms of self-
government appropriate to recognition of cultural diversity.”53 Typically,
the “cultural ways of the citizens” were not recognized when agreement
was made on a form of constitutional association and the “world of every-
day politics that it constitutes.”54 When the diversity of “cultural ways” of
citizens is either excluded or lost through assimilation the resulting con-
stitution is unjust. According to this argument, negotiation and mutual
accommodation are necessary to the establishment of just constitutional
government.
Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and
Steven C. Wheatley also argue for a constitutionalism that is not bound by
Western culture but is aligned with local realities and in which broad par-
ticipation is part of the process. “The form of political arrangements that
might emerge from such a popular process could then coexist with tradi-
tional values, and the developing constitutionalism would not be bound
by or defined by Western culture.”55 I argue that constitutionalism must
respect and coexist with traditional values, and it will be more just if there
is dialogue allowing for the inclusion of numerous voices “from below.” As
these principles will guide the present study, we must determine the ways
in which people participate in the development of constitutionalism from
below and how traditional values are respected in the process.
Legitimacy is central to an effective constitution. For the constitution to
be legitimate, the people must have a say in its creation and their interests
must be incorporated. Friedrich wrote that “[t]he will of the people is the
magic source of all legitimate power.”56 With this in mind, it is crucial to
consider how best to determine the will of the people. For Friedrich, elec-
tions at regular intervals were the answer in that they would allow the peo-
ple to evaluate key officials.57 With many others, I say that elections, while
critical to democratic government, are an insufficient means to determine
the will of the people, particularly in a context in which participation in

elections may be restricted, or understanding of the process of elections may
be minimal. One cannot imagine a “will of the people” with respect to a
governing power unless the people have taken part in a process that brings
them closer to the law. By this I mean a process that allows them to par-
ticipate in making the constitution and encourages them to play an active
role in its operation. This is especially important when we consider the
other forms of law governing peoples’ lives, that is, religious and traditional
laws.
As le Vine has noted, the success of a constitution is determined in
part by legitimacy and consultation.58 With respect to legitimacy, le Vine
refers to Jon Elster, who argues that the constitution-making process
involves:
1. “upstream legitimacy,” that which a constitution enjoys when the assem-

bly which produced it has itself come into being in a legitimate way;
2. “process legitimacy,” that which attaches to a constitutional document
if the internal decision-making procedures are perceived as demo-
cratic; and
3. “downstream legitimacy,” that which a constitution has acquired if
ratified by popular vote and thus has “stronger claims to embody the
popular will.”59
Upstream, process, and downstream legitimacy can be combined to determine

the overall level of legitimate constitutional authority in a nation. In Mali,
upstream legitimacy stems from the National Conference. The ratification
of the constitution in 1992 established downstream legitimacy. Upstream
and downstream legitimacy are interconnected in that the National
Conference was considered legitimate because of the broad-based partici-
pation of civil society in the process. Thus, it is not only through popu-
lar ratification of the constitution, but through popular participation in
its creation that this legitimacy is derived. Process legitimacy is tested over
time by the ongoing process of constitutionalism. Legitimacy is explored
in greater detail in chapter two where we look at this concept in various
West African states.
As new constitutions are formed in Africa, traditional legal authori-
ties are perceived by some as essential buttresses for stable modern gov-
ernments. In light of the colonial experience and the subsequent years
of corrupt, one-party post-colonial governments, consent together with
continuity and mutual recognition are crucial attributes of new constitu-
tional orders.60 Indeed, I would argue that it is only by incorporating such
recognition of diversity that a “just” constitution may be established in
African states.
Constitutionalism in Africa
(There is a) . . . necessity for the new constitutionalism to explore seriously

how to root the state in indigenous structures, beliefs, and practices, and
how to draw strength from them. As long as the “ideological contradiction”
exists between the institutions and practices of the modern state and those
of the traditional systems in Africa, political alienation and instability will
continue. Constitutionalism will also have to develop and incorporate a
broader conception of rights appropriate to Africa’s distinctive diversity,
which will include protection for the rights of national, religious, and cul-
tural minorities as well as workers, women and children.61
Political alienation and instability can only be avoided if we address the

three systems of often contradictory laws that operate concurrently to gov-
ern peoples’ lives. These are (i) statutory constitutional law, (ii) customary
law, and (iii) religious law. Maria Nzomo argues that while “in theory stat-
utory law is viewed as constituting the supreme municipal law, in practice
customary and religious law tend to prevail especially on issues deemed
to be of a private rather than a public nature, such as marriage, divorce,
custody of children, inheritance, property ownership and reproduction.”62
Nzomo notes that male-dominated African governments prefer to treat
issues of gender relations as falling within the realm of “African culture”
and hence beyond the jurisdiction of government. This approach denies
women freedom in the private sphere. Despite the fact that women were
given the right to vote at independence across Africa, women as citizens
continue to take second place to women as wives and mothers—a situation
with which we are also familiar in the Western context.
Ancient constitutions as they exist in the context of a dominating
modern constitution are referred to as hidden constitutions within Tully’s
text. Through the hidden constitutions continuity is maintained “under-
ground” in order to preserve the ancient constitutions of diverse cultures
and groups. However, in the African case these constitutions were never
hidden. Indeed their norms have influenced the decisions made by the cre-
ators and implementors of modern constitutions. In much of Africa dur-
ing the colonial era, traditional authorities were instrumental in the ways
that colonial powers asserted their authority. In Commonwealth Africa,
British authorities often relied on Indirect Rule and used these authorities
and their institutions to their advantage.63 The French, though known for
Direct Rule and an assimilationist approach to colonial rule, used asses-
sors in the colonial courts. These assessors were appointed as authorities of
traditional law and cultural values.
Mali has had three postindependence constitutions. The first was
implemented in 1960 as Modibo Keita took office as president following
the collapse of the short-lived Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan

(June–August 1960). In November 1968, following a military coup led
by Moussa Traoré, the National Assembly was dissolved and the constitu-
tion was annulled.64 A new constitution was implemented under Moussa
Traoré in 1974. This constitution remained in effect until the coup d’état
of March 1991. The Malian constitution at independence did not for-
mally incorporate traditional authorities but continued to rely on assessors
to interpret and apply traditional law in the courts, as does Mali’s 1992
constitution.
In Africa today, major groups within every polity must be given the
opportunity to have their legal structures recognized within the consti-
tutional framework. Bolanle Mustapha suggests preservation of a role for
traditional authorities in the new governmental framework that is being
created during the current era of political liberalization. He observes
African decision-making processes were subordinated to European consti-
tutional ideas.65 This implies a legacy of dual (sovereign and traditional)
authority in African polities. In light of this dualistic political inheritance,
Richard L. Sklar has proposed the concept of mixed government to explain
the nature of political authority in most African states.66 Central to this
conception is the idea of dual authority involving both traditional and
modern forms of governmental authority. “All government,” he writes, “is
founded on authority, or values held in common between those who make
binding decisions and those who abide by them.”67 In African societies,
he suggests, modern and traditional authorities need not be regarded as
being antagonistic or rival agents of government.68 In Southern Africa, he
observes, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland have
constitutions that feature varying degrees of incorporation of traditional
authorities.69 Such arrangements require a willingness to act experimen-
tally, in order to address the particular realities of each state. As Emmanuel
Gyimah-Boadi observes, “Some of the new African constitutions boast
highly innovative features that attempt to marry aspects of existing politi-
cal culture and local experience with the practice of democratic govern-
ment.” Examples include the council of traditional rulers (South Africa
and Namibia) and council of elder statesmen (Ghana and Benin).70
Rather than the dichotomy between modern and ancient that Tully
finds in North America, where hidden constitutions have struggled to sur-
vive under the yoke of modernism, the ancient constitutions of Africa are
widely respected both by governing officials and by local communities.
Sklar writes,
The African national governments are fragile, and there is great need for
authority based on consent of the governed. In this circumstance, a separate
source of authority, embedded in tradition, could powerfully reinforce social

discipline without abandonment of democratic forms of government.71
Durable authority depends on legitimacy. The legitimacy of a constitu-

tion gives it its lasting power. Without legitimacy a constitution has no
lasting authority. However, the necessary balancing of dual authorities—
traditional and modern law—has an effect on the concept of rights and
the protection of such rights within a society in transition that we must
not neglect.
Constitutionalism and Universal versus Traditional Rights

Following World War II and the genocidal policies of Nazi Germany, it
was clear that minority rights were not adequately protected by existing
political traditions. Many thinkers believed that by promoting universal
human rights, minority rights would be protected by the guarantee of
basic civil and political rights to all individuals. Thus, the United Nations’
Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not include any reference to
the rights of ethnic or national minorities.72
Some scholars argue that “The content of rights, as that of democracy,
must necessarily vary, not only according to historical circumstances, but
also from one social context to another.” 73 Others such as Maria Nzomo
note that women’s rights are often subordinated to traditional male author-
ities. While states such as Mali have ratified international human rights
agreements, local traditions often contrast with these protections. In soci-
eties in transition, in which constitutional government is relatively unsta-
ble, challenges to traditional authority threaten governmental authority in
general. How then can such societies cope with this conflict over rights?
Legally, international charters and declarations ratified by Mali over-
rule both Malian constitutional law and tradition; however, practice rarely
leads to cases being brought before the courts. To the extent that women’s
rights are protected by the constitution we can argue that, at least in theory,
all women are recognized as equal citizens. I argue that the existence of
these universal rights, and the local discourse that relates these rights to the
democratization process and nation-building (see chapter five), are essen-
tial to protecting the rights of women and minorities. The discourse on
rights requires a dialogue between communities involved—and dialogue
must be applicable to the communities themselves, rather than appearing
to be derivative from the West.
In what way is the Malian government legally committed to the protec-
tion of group rights? The government has ratified numerous agreements
for the protection of human rights. The African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights protects group rights, and civic and political rights as well
as economic, social, and cultural rights.74 Even though many of the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights are simply aspirations, African states
have agreed to them in principle.
In order to shed light on the dynamic involved here, I will first address
the crucial issue of women and conflicting rights between the Malian con-
stitution of 1992 and the “ancient constitutions” of religious and tradi-
tional law. Malian women have the right to own property and to inherit
property according to the written constitution. However, in the tradition
of Islamic law as practiced in Mali, daughters can only inherit half of what
their brothers inherit and women’s husbands own all of the family’s prop-
erty. When the husband dies, all of the property goes to the husband’s
family if he has no children, and traditionally the widow remarries the
husband’s brother. The transfer of a woman to another man, and the prac-
tice of a woman inheriting less property because she is a woman, clearly
conflict with the constitution. While the written constitution protects a
woman’s rights, the cultural authority by which the majority of the people
live conflicts with those rights.
The constitution of 1992 was created through negotiation. Muslim
authorities and the leaders of women’s groups negotiated with one another
and agreed to the current constitutional structure; yet actual practice still
conflicts with the compromise that was reached. I do not argue that all
Muslim women would protest the tradition of widow inheritance. This
practice is linked to the economic support of the family in which the
woman and her children are taken care of by her husband’s brother, a carry
over from times when women were not permitted to work at all. If a woman
inherits only half of what her brother inherits, she is more likely to remain
economically dependent on a man. Often the decision for the woman to
move into the brother-in-law’s home is discussed and the woman is given a
choice. However, if she has children and chooses not to move into her in-
law’s compound, she is unable to remarry without facing the risk of losing
the financial support the children receive from their father’s pension. Once
she remarries, her support is expected to come from her new husband.
There is still no official inheritance law in Mali. Inheritance disputes
are still determined by either traditional or Islamic law and assessors (sup-
posed specialists in traditional law, although some argue that this is a sine-
cure for retired civil servants who have no training in or special knowledge
of traditional law) play a critical role in the evaluation of contested cases.
Therefore, women are at the mercy of the assessors’ interpretation of tra-
ditional or Islamic law. In the 1990s, women’s associations advocated the
creation of an inheritance law that protects the rights of women, particu-
larly those of widows without children who risk losing everything upon the
death of their husbands (this matter is discussed in greater detail in chapter

five). While the new Malian constitution was created and agreed to by
all of the representatives at the National Conference and then ratified by
referendum, the protection it provides for all Malian citizens conflicts with
both customary and religious laws. If, as Tully suggests is necessary, we
make certain that ancient constitutions of diverse peoples remain intact,
how do we justify what this does to women’s rights? Can we simply pro-
tect the traditional ways in which women are treated? The common law
of coverture in England suspended the legal existence of a woman during
marriage and both incorporated and consolidated her legal existence into
that of her husband.75 Thus, women lost all civil rights once married. This
familiar history reminds us of the dangers of relying too heavily on pro-
tecting such traditional laws.
Recent discussions concerning violence against women have included
debates concerning cultural issues such as widow inheritance, polygamy,
and early marriages (particularly among the Peulh, who often marry
daughters who are only twelve or thirteen years old). In addition, excision
or infibulation while widely practiced are rites of passage that are increas-
ingly debated both in cities and in rural areas. Performance troops have
been traveling to small towns and villages to increase awareness of health
problems associated with excision and early marriage. Following perfor-
mances, a forum for debate is opened for the community to discuss issues
of concern. Each of these issues has become part of the social discourse
in Malian society, a result of both dual authority and the broadening of
discourse within Mali since political liberalization. Inclusion in the pro-
cess of creating the institutions that form the polity was critical during
the transition to the Third Republic and remains critical today. Critiques
of the current regime, however, represent obstacles for democratization,
although, in the context of constitutional literacy in a society in transition,
these critiques are not surprising. Exclusion can be a result of intentional
centralization on the part of the government, or it can be a result of the
lack of familiarity with institutions on the part of a population that has a
minimal infrastructure for formal education and public communication.
Most Malian citizens are only just becoming aware of their role within
the decentralized local administrative structure and, by extension, their
regions and the state.
It is understandable that the traditional structures will not conform
immediately to a new constitutional order. In a famous case in Kenya in
1987, there was a legal battle over the burial of a man’s body. The widow
did not want to follow the custom of sending her husband’s body back
to his childhood village from which he was estranged. However, jurists
deferred to the burial customs of the man’s clan and sent the body back to
his clan.76 This ruling emphasizes the dual nature of authority in Kenyan
life. The continued importance of customary law may rise above the very
wishes of individual citizens concerning their bodies after death. While
legal battles do not live up to discourse ethics, it may be argued that dual
authority has opened up the debate concerning women’s rights on the local
level, while the constitution allowed for the legal battle in the first place.
In accordance with contemporary constitutionalism, women and tradi-
tional authorities have agreed to the rights that they will have in the new
constitutional association. Despite the protection of women’s rights that
was agreed to in Mali, the practices to which many are opposed still con-
tinue. This is the process of constitutionalism at work, over the years as
women continue to fight for changes in interpretation of the law—or sim-
ply for a new inheritance law, awareness of the issues involved will spread.
The resolution of the conflict will take place over time and any resolution
will be achieved through dialogue.
When rights in Africa are considered, rural life requires particular
attention. In many countries, rural populations were effectively excluded
from centralized systems of government. Thus, in Niger, the so-called
Development Society led by Lt. Col. Seyni Kountché illustrates top-down
development planning. It was meant to recreate “indigenous participatory
democracy for the people of Niger” 77; yet, village authorities were appointed
to their posts, rather than elected. The result was a system that was “pater-
nalistic and characterized by an unwillingness to regard the mass popula-
tion as a mature citizenry ready to engage in political life.”78 In Tanzania,
Ujamaa was designed to promote rural development through relocation of
communities to newly created villages. Rural inhabitants were therefore
forced to leave behind their own communities in order to participate in
the socialist experiment of Julius Nyerere. While these policies focused on
the peasantry, they failed in part because of the top-down approach that
was used. Both were economic development models that relied on social
engineering. Such restructuring was imposed upon the people, rather than
derived from their concerns with respect to reforms.
We must not confuse the general with the particular in the implementation
of reforms in Africa. In the present situation, any movement towards con-
stitutionalism and the rule of law that calls for state structures to be reor-
ganised so as to institutionalise the principles of the division and check of
power must be welcomed as a step towards democratisation. But it cannot
be assumed that a legal system operated by legal professionals will ensure
that the rights of the peasantry are protected, since this will depend on the
balance of political forces and the nature of the process that leads to this
reform. In other words, the actual institutional guarantee for the defence of
rights will depend on how the question of power is settled.79
Negotiations over the rights of women, of rural inhabitants as a group, and

those of ethnic minorities that may have been previously excluded, must
be incorporated into the process of democratization. Throughout this
study I address the methods of incorporation within Mali. The creation
of local communes, regional concertations, and the Éspace d’Interpellation,
all represent efforts to decentralize power and decision-making in Mali.
Democratization has contributed to a rise of women’s associations in
Bamako and other urban areas and their influence has spread to rural
regions. The Association of Women Lawyers, for example, focuses on the
protection of women’s rights and informing women (particularly those
without formal education, in predominately rural areas) of their consti-
tutional rights. As a result of this dialogue, women at the local level have
become increasingly involved in defending their rights as citizens.
Although the constitution legitimizes the cause of women’s rights as
citizens, the system of dual authority necessitates dialogue at the local level
as well. The relationship of customary and statutory law is clarified by the
concept of dual authority. Dialogue on the rights of women at the national
level tends to legitimate similar discussions at the local level where cus-
tomary norms predominate. In other words, women can argue at the local
level with local authorities that they have equal rights as citizens that are
infringed upon by local authorities. This argument is backed in principle
by constitutional authority.
Concerns may be raised about whether or not we can expect women to
take on the issue of criticizing and possibly offending traditional authori-
ties. Most authorities are held in great respect; it can be a fearful step
to challenge the laws they represent. Recent data from the Afrobarometer
project reveal that when conflicts occur in Mali they are least likely to
be disputes within families, but rather between groups (such as pastoral-
ists versus herders).80 It follows therefore that the two primary sources of
conflict are based on land disputes and “wandering” animals (the two are
linked as animals enter into planted fields). Inheritance is the least likely
source of conflict. Importantly, in terms of seeking outside resolution to
conflicts women have significantly lower rates of contacting outsiders
to resolve conflicts than do men.81 The authors argue that this is due to
women’s “less dense public life.” Certainly in land disputes regarding tres-
passing animals it is most likely that men would negotiate such problems
with religious or traditional authorities. However, to what extent is the
lack of dispute over inheritance linked to the structural position of women
in society and their relative inability to demand respect for equal rights?
The important point in this case is that a space has been created for that
debate, in which the legitimacy of traditional authorities is protected as are
the rights of women as individuals.
Jürgen Habermas, specifically his theory of discourse ethics, provides

a logical way to explain the process that takes place as the discourse of
rights moves from the national to the local level.82 If we can argue that
the universal norm of ethical discourse has been adopted in Mali, then the
extension of dialogue to the local level is a continuation of the pursuit of
dialogue as a way of governing. The continuing debate now takes place in
a space that was not open to debate before the National Conference took
place. It was the legitimation of constitutional law, and the broadening of
constitutional literacy that took place at this conference that contributed
to the opening of this discussion of rights.
Conclusion
The processes that I have begun to describe in this chapter are closely
related to two primary goods of constitutionalism—civic participation
and civic dignity.83 Civic participation is certainly evident, and will be fur-
ther discussed, in the following chapters. Civic dignity, on the other hand,
refers to “speaking in one’s own cultural voice,” whereas civic indignity is
the “speaking for others or of being compelled to speak in the dominant
language and traditions of discourse.”84 Civic dignity may be achieved in
improbable ways. It may perhaps be achieved by listening by radio to those
who are engaged in creating the constitution, even if this discussion is in
a language not spoken by the listener. The act of listening is a choice to
participate in the constitutional dialogue. The listener can tell others that
the discussion was on the radio and he or she heard the discussion as it
progressed. Suddenly a process that in the past may have been closed is
now relatively open.
Culturally diverse groups participate in the creation of a new constitu-
tion, but who actually takes part in the discussions? Unless literally every-
one in the society is enabled to participate, then those who are speaking in
their own cultural voice must represent the cultural voice of their group.
Can a line ever be drawn between speaking for these people and repre-
senting them? It has been argued that it is through the representation of
diverse groups in civil society that this is able to occur.85 However, in
order for Tully’s ideals of negotiation, accommodation, and recognition
to be achieved, at some point someone must represent the voice of oth-
ers within their group. Realistically, for decisions to be made, consensus
and compromise must be reached. When such decisions are made, is it
enough to say that women are represented, various aboriginal groups are
represented, and the Tuareg are represented? 86 Do those who represent
“the cultural ways” of each group represent all of the interests within a
particular group? Tully appears to make that case. Is it realistic? In the
case of women in Mali, they acquired civic participation and dignity, but
the result is a conflict between the constitution and actual, especially
local, practice.
The norm of discourse ethics does appear to help us better understand
constitutionalism in Africa in which dual authority is critical. In Mali,
because the rights could not have been debated in the traditional realm, an
alternative space for discourse concerning women’s rights is opened up.87
Traditional authority and national authority open a dialogue that did not
previously exist. Thus, discourse ethics does not undermine traditional
authority because all of the groups agreed to the constitution. On the other
hand, we need to recognize groups explicitly in order to understand the
interplay between groups and individuals taking place in Mali. Within the
context of dual authority the norm of discourse ethics broadens the politi-
cal discourse even further. As a result, we are likely to see both national
and traditional structures continue to evolve over time as long as dialogue
is intertwined in both realms.
Tully presents a procedure for achieving a just constitutional order;
however, he does not address any of the problems that may arise even when
these procedures are achieved in as realistic a manner possible. “If a con-
temporary constitution is to be culturally mutual it should not promote one
culture at the expense of others, but mutually recognize and accommodate
the cultures of all citizens in an agreeable manner.”88 With this duly noted,
one must remark that what the constitution says is one thing, and what
is practiced is quite another. Therefore, Tully’s argument is unrealistic.
There are bound to be conflicting interpretations of his three conventions,
and even cases where the two sides cannot be reconciled without somehow
discontinuing a central aspect of the so-called cultural ways of another.
How would the contemporary constitution respond to such a situation?
Tully remains confident of the importance and value of the ancient consti-
tution. Unfortunately, groups are not the same as individuals.
I argue that when it is the case that there exist two very different
authorities of rule that may come in conflict with one another, as we see in
many African states, the broadening of the discourse first at the national
level and then at the local, traditional level is a critical step toward the
recognition of different normative claims. In order to understand this new
arena for dialogue better, we must have a clear picture of both the groups
concerned and the processes of deliberation.
The following chapter explores political transitions in francophone
West Africa and their trajectories in the current wave of constitutional
change. Using the critical analytical framework of constitutional dia-
logue and constitutional literacy, the subsequent chapters explore in
depth the ways in which deliberation and participation have played a
role in the development of constitutionalism in Mali. The National

Conference, discussed in chapter three, is the crucial beginning of the
important role of dialogue in contemporary Mali. Despite the tremen-
dous steps taken to be as inclusive as possible in this process, familiar
and unmistakable signs of exclusion linger and hover as possible threats
to this model African democracy.
Ch a p t e r Two
D e moc r at ic Tr a nsi t ions
a n d t h e i r L e g ac i e s i n
Com pa r at i v e Pe r spec t i v e
As the global surge of democratization spread rapidly across Africa in the

1990s, a pervasive optimism about Africa’s “second chance” swelled just as
quickly. Postindependence democracies missed their “first chance” when
they were eclipsed by personal rule and military regimes, but by the end
of the century political transitions were commonplace. Indeed, during the
decade of the 1990s, fifty new constitutions were adopted across the con-
tinent. Today, the wave of optimism has receded and only a few states
remain steadfast in the pursuit of democracy. By the mid-1990s even Côte
d’Ivoire, Africa’s former miracle of stability and economic growth, suc-
cumbed to civil war shortly after Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the country’s
president for thirty-three years, succumbed to old age. In Zimbabwe, a
country that symbolized African liberation under the leadership of Robert
Mugabe, political freedoms are now smothered by the same man who has
retained power since independence in 1980.
The United Nation’s 2004 Human Development Index reveals key
challenges faced by West Africa, which includes the world’s poorest and
least developed countries—namely, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sierra
Leone. Despite their ranking at the bottom of the United Nation’s list of
177 countries, today, against the odds, 3 of these countries appear to be
taking the bumpy path toward a democratic future: Mali has become a
symbol for democracy in Africa; Niger has survived two coups d’état and
expanded its freedoms over the decade; and, finally, Sierra Leone is piecing
together a democratic government following a devastating civil war.
Through comparative analysis of transitions in Francophone West
Africa this chapter explores the link between participatory constitutional-
ism and democratization. The most successful democratic transitions in
the Francophone states of the region, namely Benin and Mali (and Niger,
although its transition proved to be more tumultuous), are analyzed here
as are the failed (or perhaps more accurately uncommitted) attempts at

reform in Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire.1 As we will see,
where constitutional dialogues have broadened democratic spaces available
to citizens they have contributed to constructing democracy in transition-
ing societies in the region.
Senegal has held elections regularly since independence, setting it apart
from other countries in the region. This electoral legacy placed Senegal
in the category of a so-called quasi-democracy. Although recognized as a
democracy, it was not until March 2000 that Senegal experienced its first
alternation of power when Abdoulaye Wade beat Abdou Diouf for the
presidency ousting the Parti Socialiste for the first time in thirty-five years.
Despite Wade’s campaign platform of sopi (meaning change in Wolof),
this campaign, his fifth since 1978, seemed to mark little change from
the past in which politics was heavily influenced by Muslim authorities.2
A new constitution that limits the president’s terms to two and allows the
president to dissolve Parliament was approved by referendum in 2001.
Senegal is not included as a case in this study because there has been no
fundamental change in the nature of government (or attempt to change)
there and thus no transition per se.
A relatively open process of constitution-making was pursued by the
governments of Mali and Benin; whereas other countries adopted the rhe-
toric, but not the inclusive model. Still others refused popular calls for
dialogue and more widespread participation. By focusing on the inclusive-
ness of the process of constitutionalism we gain insights into the nature of
the transitions and the durability of the democracies to which they have
given birth. As we will see, inclusion that has been integral to the transi-
tion period often continues in the form of a government’s commitment
to ongoing popular participation in policy-making and politics (beyond
elections).3 Participation in constitutionalism, by which I mean an open
process that is inclusive of many different points of view from civil society
as well as current political and military leaders (as opposed to a process
controlled from the outset by government authorities), is a central factor
in determining the legitimacy and durability of democratic transitions in
Africa today.4 This is not to say that a National Conference alone could
determine a democratic outcome—rather, it is the nature of the conference
itself, the extent to which it was inclusive and able to imbue politics with
an inclusive, participatory quality that contributes to democratization. It
is this legacy of the transition period and the opening of spaces for dem-
ocratic deliberation that contributes to a country’s political development
and democratization.5
The argument that an inclusive, and thus more democratic, constitu-
tional process leads to a more stable democracy may not sound surprising to
democratic transitions / 37
many. However, the key to this argument is that by focusing on the process
of constitutionalism and its impact on the stability of the consolidation
of democracy over time I am interested in ways in which this process has
bearing on institutional outcomes. When the process is inclusive it vali-
dates the legitimacy of the constitution and, importantly, the institutions
of government and the rule of law. The content of the laws becomes less
important (so long as they are in principle democratic) than the process
through which they have been adopted and accepted. (This varies from
deliberative democrats who would argue that the outcome is critical.)
Scholars of constitutionalism have often perceived it as an elite-driven
process in which getting the institutions right is the primary goal. Once
the institutions have been carefully constructed they can be presented to
the people to vote on. My argument is different, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the process of constitution-making as well as the ongoing nature
of building the rule of law in a society. Only through a decentralized and
inclusive process can we bolster the legitimacy of the constitution and in
so doing create a foundation for a legacy of participation and democracy.6
Constitutional dialogues are an important part of this process because
such dialogues can contribute to increased constitutional literacy, which is
at the heart of engaging citizens in constructing democracy.
This point of view is counter to conventional wisdom that has been
based on the American model of constitution-making in which a select
group of elites design a constitution meant to endure for centuries. The
process was never imagined as either an inclusive or an ongoing one.
Amending the constitution was possible, but was clearly made difficult so
that it would be hard to overturn what the draftees deemed essential from
the start. However, the U.S. constitution was given legitimacy by the pub-
lic debate that took place concerning the constitution itself. Certainly
there were concerns about how participatory the process was (excluding
women, landless individuals, and African Americans to name a few) but
the public debate resulted in the foundation for the Bill of Rights. Anti-
federalist claims on the problems with the constitution were summarized
in the Bill of Rights. The constitution was adopted and the first act of
the first Congress was to adopt the Bill of Rights that came from the
concerns raised by the public over the constitution itself. The U.S. con-
stitution has been a stable foundation for our democracy. While undergo-
ing amendments overtime, the fundamental model has been accepted as
legitimate. This may be contrasted with the French experience in which
constitutions have been reformulated numerous times. New leaders have
insisted on new constitutions that alter the institutional structure of gov-
ernment. French constitutions have not had the enduring quality of the
U.S. constitution—an example that reinforces the idea of the process
of constitutionalism being at the very foundation of stable democratic

consolidation.
Participatory constitutionalism has been more widely called for in
recent literature but few are the studies that analyze in depth transitions in
Francophone Africa.7 This analysis balances two important understand-
ings of democracy in Africa. The first is the essential nature of a more
broadly based participation in all aspects of politics. Following years of
centralized power and arbitrary rule that brought many economies and
societies to their knees, in Africa citizens have demanded an active role in
designing the future of state–society relations. The extent to which this
demand is met influences the stability of the states’ democratic future.
Therefore this people-driven or grassroots-based process is linked not only
to politics but to constitution-making itself and is the very foundation on
which state–society relations depend. Certainly in postcolonial states that
have suffered years of centralized authority structures, formal rules that
merely pay lip service to participation are unlikely to result in stable de-
mocracy. Rather, constitutional dialogues that include public consultation
conferring authority and legitimacy to the institutions of government is
critical. Even where new democratic spaces are being created, great strides
still need to be taken to more adequately close the gap between rural and
urban areas, elite and nonelite populations—nevertheless, the changes tak-
ing place are significant. The second conception is the importance of au-
tonomous institutions. Independent electoral commissions that challenge
the fairness of manipulated elections and constitutional courts that dis-
pose of fraudulent electoral results can reassure the people that a real effort
is being made to evaluate the opinion of the people and to incorporate
their voice into the democratic process. While the aforementioned institu-
tions are familiar to many, the willingness to experiment with institutions
may also be critical in postcolonial African states. Indeed, the National
Conference movement itself resulted in a horizontal, South-South, sharing
of a unique model for democratic change.8 Democratic innovation builds
legitimacy and ownership of the transition process and is central to a just
constitutionalism. As we see in Mali, the creation of multiple venues for di-
alogue created spaces for voices to be raised outside of the still fragile con-
stituent assemblies of representative democracy (the National Assembly)
and provided another site for decentralization. These spaces include the
Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique and its regional offspring the Éspace
communal d’Interpellation Démocratique in Sikasso. The series of états-gé-
néraux in Benin in multiple policy sectors is another example. It is too early
to judge if these venues will remain in addition to the formal structures of
the national and regional assemblies, or if they will prove to serve a more
transitory purpose in turbulent political times.
Julius Ihonvbere argues for process-oriented constitutionalism, “by con-

stitutionalism, we refer to a process for developing, presenting, adopting,
and utilizing a political compact that defines not only the power relations
between political communities and constituencies, but also defines rights,
duties and obligations of citizens in any society.”9 A participatory approach
that incorporates constitutional dialogues, reduces the influence of the state,
and allows for issues of nationality, identity, and gender to be incorporated
into building democracy is what is needed in transitioning societies.
An independent judiciary, critical among autonomous institutions, is
not distinct from the notion of a more inclusive constitutionalism. That
is, rather than perceiving the courts as merely representing interests of the
regime in power (as has so long been the case in many African states),
a judicial system that has displayed its independence from the regime is
likely to be perceived as a more legitimate institution that represents the
interests of the people and provides a venue for the protection of their
rights. If we understand vertical legitimacy as connecting the people and
the state in which individuals in society view the state and the constitution
as representing their interests and societal norms, then a court that is will-
ing to defend a legitimate constitution against the authorities in power is
defending the interests of the people. Constitutional courts can be exam-
ined with respect to their accessibility and the rulings that they make.
As we will see, constitutional courts exist in each country considered by
this study, and have exhibited their independence in Benin and Mali. The
common alternative includes judicial institutions that while independent
by law display bias rather than autonomy and are composed of regime loy-
alists who rule consistently in favor of the president or his regime. Togo’s
constitutional court is an example of just such an institution. Whereas
constitutional dialogues are important to participatory constitutionalism,
constitutional literacy is critical to vertical legitimacy and the likelihood
that citizens can and will insist on the need for autonomous institutions.
Conceived in the Republic of Benin, the sovereign National Conference
(SNC) is a contemporary experiment in building the nation-state and is
the model used (with varying degrees of success) for numerous transitions.
The fact that Benin’s transition was a model for the region requires a more
in-depth analysis of this particular case; therefore, before turning to an
explanation of transitions across the region, the following section is a more
detailed study of the process in Benin.
Benin: A Model Transition

Unlike its neighbors, Benin’s former constitution institutionalized an
Afro-Marxist regime and a Socialist path to development.10 It was this
ideology that hastened the transition in 1990. The collapse of the Soviet
Union left Benin with empty coffers and without a patron state. Ideology
had limited the country’s access to low-interest loans from the West and,
dangerously, civil servants and military personnel went months without
pay. President Mathieu Kérékou was interested in seeking a new direction,
away from Afro-Marxism, and perhaps toward a more democratic form
of government. The National Conference was instigated by President
Kérékou and Robert Dossou who held multiple responsibilities includ-
ing minister of economic planning, president of the Bar Association,
and dean of the Faculty of Law at the Université nationale du Benin. On
December 18, 1989, the president entrusted Dossou and eight additional
ministers to bring together “all the living forces of the nation, whatever
their political sensibilities.”11 Less then two weeks later, on December 27,
1989, Kérékou invited the public to suggest in writing how best to reform
the country—correspondents overwhelmingly supported multiparty
democracy, filling seven volumes with their suggestions.12 By inviting the
public to contribute their visions of reform, a participatory constitutional-
ism had been launched.
From February 19 to 28, 1990, 493 delegates assembled at the Conférence
des forces vives de la nation. The outcome was unexpected. In the past,
authoritarian regimes have designed public forums to let off steam. The key
to such gatherings was to maintain regime control while allowing for just
the right amount of discussion, followed by little, if any, concrete action in
response. It would seem that for Kérékou, the Benin National Conference
was originally designed to follow this familiar pattern. For instance, the
vague notion of “ forces vives” was a small number of people, less than 500,
selected from a wide array of civil society members, but in no way rep-
resentative of society. As Daniel Bourmaud and Patrick Quantin argue,
this may have been a strategy by Kérékou to limit the possibility that the
forum be a substitute for a constituent assembly and in so doing limit its
legitimacy.13 History has shown that regardless of Kérékou’s original inten-
tions the National Conference carried great legitimacy and a legacy that
endures far beyond Benin’s territorial boundaries.
During the conference, no one in the private or public sector worked. The
sellers of transistor radios were doing the biggest business in the country.
Everyone would buy himself a little transistor radio and you would see them
on their motor scooters in the street holding the handlebar with one hand
and the radio with the other.14
The conference spilled into all aspects of life. Participation in the confer-
ence extended from those in the Assembly hall to the avid listeners across
the country and the region as a whole.
The National Conference was led by Bishop Isodore de Souza. Clergy

were often selected to lead these conferences as a way to assert civility into
the process. On the second day of the conference a motion was introduced
to declare the forum sovereign, raising excitement throughout the region
as the proceedings were broadcast by radio. On February 25, six days into
the conference, the participants passed the motion. Kérékou’s response to
the declaration of sovereignty was to argue that given the unrepresenta-
tive nature of the delegates the conference did not have the authority of
a constituent assembly and was therefore unlawful. With the support of
the Army, with which he was popular, Kérékou might have forcefully
rejected the conference’s autonomy, but instead he accepted the delegates’
offer of amnesty, clearing the way for the first democratic transition in
the region.
The 1990 constitution, Benin’s seventh in its thirty years of indepen-
dence, was written by a Constitutional Commission appointed by the
National Conference and passed by referendum held on December 2,
1990. The legitimacy of the National Conference conferred legitimacy to
the Constitutional Commission. The draft constitution was publicized
and widely debated in the press.15 A wide range of perspectives were delib-
erately included in the process. A contentious issue, such as whether or not
there ought to be an age limit for the president, was resolved by allowing
the people to vote by referendum for one of two constitutions. One ver-
sion included the age range of forty to seventy, the other did not. A great
debate had taken place on this issue in the press and between conference
delegates. By approving the age limit of seventy, the people would effec-
tively prevent Kérékou from seeking reelection in 2006.
The High Council of the Republic (HCR), though small, included
diversity of opinions from those exiled under Kérékou as well as repre-
sentatives from different ethno-regional areas. “The HCR’s tendency to
make decisions by consensus meant the outcome was not a foregone con-
clusion, and all perspectives could enjoy a hearing.”16 This sort of inclusive
process was fundamental to the legitimacy of the constitution. The 1990
constitution established a presidential system but underscored the idea of
division of power by establishing six different institutions of authority that
include the president, the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court,
the Supreme Court, the High Court of Justice, the High Authority of
Audiovisuals and Communication (which monitors state-run television
and radio). With this groundwork in place, mayoral elections were held
in November 1990 and resulted in an impressive 62 percent participa-
tion rate.17 Electoral participation remained very high for the December
1990 constitutional referendum (64 percent) and as we see in table 2.1,
continued through subsequent elections.
Table 2.1 Participation rates by election in Benin

Election Date Participation rate (%)
Legislative February 1991 52
Presidential second round * March 1991 64
Legislative March 1995 76
Presidential second round * March 1996 78
Presidential first round March 2001 88
Presidential second round ** March 2001 54
Presidential first round March 2006 82
Presidential second round March 2006 70
* First round participation rates not available.
** The candidates in second and third place (Nicéphore Soglo and Adrien
Houngbédjie) boycotted the second round elections arguing electoral irregularities;
electoral participation dropped precipitously as a result.
Source: http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html. Accessed July 19, 2007.
These high rates of participation reveal citizens’ sense of legitimacy of

electoral institutions and convey a willingness on the part of citizens to
engage actively in constructing democracy in Benin.
Abiding by the spirit of the National Conference, a series of états-généraux
have been held to address policy issues in various sectors including education
(October 1990), territorial administration and decentralization (January
1993), and judicial system (November 1996).18 These discussions are the
very constitutional dialogues that I argue help to reinforce state–society rela-
tions and improve constitutional literacy. They illustrate the ongoing nature
of constitutionalism in Benin. The états-généraux were just part of the “den-
sity of representational venues” that were created in Benin throughout the
transition.19 This ongoing, just constitutionalism, I argue, is the foundation
for the consistently and impressively high participation rates in elections.
Despite the decade that was required to enact the legislation needed
for decentralization, the success of recent administrative decentralization
has also contributed to strengthening participation in Benin and establish-
ing venues for local involvement in politics. Four laws passed on January
15, 1999, provided the groundwork for decentralization. These included:
Law 97-028, which divides the country into twelve provinces headed by
prefects who are appointed by centralized government; Law 97-029, which
creates communes led by elected mayors, local assemblies, or community
councils; Law 98-005, which establishes the organization of urban com-
munes; and Law 98-007, which establishes the finances of communes. It
was not until March 9, 2000, that the final and critical piece of legislation
was passed. This law, Law 98-006, establishes the electoral code for
municipal and communal elections. Seventy-seven new communes were
created and elections were finally held in December 2002 and January
2003. Approximately one thousand new council seats were created and
many were filled by new, younger political actors.20 Constitutional dia-
logues and decentralization in Benin are evidence of a participatory pro-
cess that I argue is integral to improving state–society relations.
The second critical element to constructing democracy in Africa, namely,
building autonomous institutions, is evident in Benin’s seven-member
Constitutional Court, which has consistently asserted its independence.
By allowing direct access to the court by private citizens it has even been
called a “people’s court,” and thus “a veritable instrument in the promotion
of the rule of law.”21 It is one of the few courts in the world to offer direct
citizen access. The court is composed of three members appointed by the
president and four appointed by the National Assembly (members serve
five-year terms that may be renewed just once). The court’s independence
was clearly established in the case The President of the Supreme Court vs.
The President of the Republic, in which the president tried to dismiss the
president of the Supreme Court prior to the completion of his five-year
term. The Constitutional Court in an outright challenge to the president
of the Republic ruled that the dismissal was against the law. Remarkably,
the president accepted the court’s ruling.22 As Bruce Magnusson notes,
The court’s decisions . . . in which both the National Assembly and the pres-
ident were called to account, fundamentally transformed national percep-
tions about the feasibility of the rules established in the 1990 constitution,
while establishing the court as the arbiter of interinstitutional disputes, dis-
placing the usual recourse to military intervention.23
This marks a major hurdle finally cleared by the government. Benin’s

“renouveau démocratique,” which began in 1989–1990 has had many
important successes culminating in local elections in 2002 and 2003 fol-
lowed by the April 6, 2006, inauguration of a new democratically elected
president, Yayi Boni. Outgoing president Mathieu Kérékou respected the
constitution’s age limit of seventy and handed over the reins of power to
President Boni. Proud of the democratic changes that had taken place
since he left office for the first time in 1990, Kérékou celebrated Benin’s
Independence Day in July 2005 with the following words:
After fifteen years of democratic experience, our country lives in peace.

The institutions of the republic function properly, Benin’s people enjoy
their fundamental liberties. Freedom of the press is guaranteed. The legal
environment is cleaned up.
The constitution favours the change of power and the change of heads of
state. These fundamental prescriptions of our constitution of 11 December
1990 must resist all opportunistic revisionism, short-term interests and sub-
jectivism. The constitution was made as a basic reference and the test of
authenticity of the new democratic culture is whether the political actors
from now on stick to it responsibly.24
These words from the country’s former military head of state signal a
remarkable transition that has taken place and with them Benin rein-
forces its role as a model of the rule of law and democracy in Africa. The
building of a more just constitution, constitutional dialogues, and insti-
tutional autonomy were indeed at the heart of establishing a legitimate
system of government and improving state–society relations in the coun-
try. Challenges of course remain (such as gender inequities and persis-
tent urban/rural, elite/nonelite divides) and should not be discounted,
but a critical step securing institutional legitimacy as the foundation for
Benin’s democracy has clearly been taken. Efforts to expand opportuni-
ties for women continue. Breaking down the urban/rural divide is a great
challenge and the extent to which Benin continues decentralization and
dialogues across elite and nonelite populations will determine its ability to
build democracy.
Transitions across the Region

Because of their similar histories, analysts frequently compare the transi-
tions of Togo and Benin, while their Sahelian neighbors Mali and Niger
are rarely incorporated into such analyses. All four of these Francophone
countries held National Conferences—Benin and Mali with the most suc-
cess. As we will see, Togo’s conference (July–August 1991) never broke
free from the grip of General Gnassingbé Eyadéma. The bloody coup
d’état in Mali in March 1991, prior to the National Conference (August
1991), had already brought down the dictatorial regime of General Moussa
Traoré. As a result of this event the conference became the primary venue
for constructing a more democratic state and the former dictator could
not control the agenda. Niger’s sovereign National Conference took place
from July 29–November 3, 1991. Although a brief transition occurred, a
stalemate with opposition forces led to a coup in 1996, derailing democ-
racy altogether. This was followed by a second coup in 1999 that, it would
seem, has put democracy back on track.
As is evident in the following review, holding a National Conference does
not guarantee any real opening of democratic space and democratic con-
solidation. Any conference controlled by government authorities, or their
representatives (as in Togo), failed to contribute to democracy. Whereas
Benin declared its National Conference to be sovereign in a peaceful tran-

sition, Mali faced bloodshed in the overthrow of the previous regime but
subsequently convened a National Conference. In neither of these coun-
tries were former government officials able to take the reins and control the
transition. Rather than the newly established rules of the game being the
primary determinant of democratic consolidation, the process by which
these rules are achieved is critical.25 The following sections provide a brief
analysis of the nature of the transition period in each country and show
how the process of the transition is a crucial indicator of the likely dura-
bility of the transition itself.
Togo
The Togolese transition was effectively halted by General Eyadéma’s
refusal to relinquish control of the National Conference. The June 12
Accords (1991) between President Eyadéma and opposition parties marked
Eyadéma’s agreement to hold a National Conference and confirmed that
“les orientations et les décisions de la Conférence ne seront pas remises en
cause par le chef de l’Etat.”26 It was also agreed that decisions made at
the conference could not be overturned by any signatory to the Accords,
“which appeared to give the opposition-controlled National Conference
sovereignty in everything but name.”27 The conference began on July 10,
1991, with the general’s inaugural address outlining the context for the
discussions to follow. Despite the regime’s declaration that the National
Conference was not to be sovereign, heated debates took place over this
issue, leading both the government and the military to abandon the con-
ference. Although government delegates did return to the table, the mili-
tary refused to do so. The National Conference finally ended fifty-two
days later, on August 30, when Eyadéma suspended all proceedings.
Scholars have explored the reasons for such a stark variance in the end
results of Benin and Togo’s National Conferences. Without a doubt, the
economic destitution of Benin left that country with little alternative but
drastic change, both politically and economically. Eyadéma, on the other
hand, not only had a more viable economy, but the support and loyalty
of the military (a more viable economy also suggests that he was able to
keep paying the salaries of those in the military). Further, whereas Benin’s
delegates debated institutional questions, in Togo the speeches made dur-
ing the conference focused on the past, with 69 percent emphasizing anti-
regime sentiments and 50 percent concentrated on human rights abuses
of the regime.28 The delegates were not fundamentally concerned with
how to institutionalize a more democratic government, but instead focused
on critiquing the country’s recent history. As a result, these debates did
not result in genuine participation in reconceptualizing the Togolese state.

Critical to creating a just constitution is participation and negotiation of
all members of society. Eyadéma ensured that a democratic space was not
established and effectively blocked the transition process.
The Togolese Conference was not without some positive results. A tran-
sition government was created and a young human rights lawyer, Joseph
Koffigoh, was elected by delegates to the post of prime minister. A seventy-
nine-member High Council of the Republic (HCR), or transition legislature,
was also established. The opposition dominated the transition institutions
and angered the regime by dissolving the ruling party, Rassemblement du
Peuple Togolaise (RPT), a move that backfired. Eyadéma, with the back-
ing of the military, responded swiftly with force, kidnapping Koffigoh and
forcing him to publicly retract the party’s dissolution. A new cabinet was
formed, this time one that included the RPT. With this move, Eyadéma
had successfully brought the transition government under his control. Prior
to its approval by referendum on September 27, 1992, he unilaterally modi-
fied the constitution to do away with Article 62 designed by the HCR to
prevent his running for office. This article stated that “persons wishing to
run for President must first resign from the armed forces if applicable.”29
Eyadéma was not relinquishing any real power in this so-called transition.
As Jennifer Seely writes,
Though the permanent institutions laid out in the constitution were

democratic on paper, the strategies of both the regime and pro-democracy
opposition for controlling those institutions were often extra-legal. Because
the transition was not inclusive, contesting political decisions and problem-
solving took place in temporary decision-making bodies, rather than in the
institutions of government.30
The Togolese case illustrates the primary challenges to inclusive constitu-

tionalism. The legacy of the transition period only serves to reinforce years
of centralized power, a perpetuation of the constitution as little more than a
document, and the continuation of ad hoc extra-institutional politicking.
Presidential elections were held in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2005; how-
ever, each election was marred with suspicious activity. In 1993, voter rolls
were inflated, opposition candidate Gilchrist Olympio was disqualified,
and the opposition boycotted the election. In 1998, Olympio was receiv-
ing so many votes that the “regime had to scramble to take control of
ballot-counting away from the quasi-independent electoral commission.”31
As we search for the establishment of independent institutions, it is impor-
tant to note that although a national independent electoral commission
(CENI) had been established it never asserted its independence in the face
of the regime.
On July 29, 1999, an accord called the “Lomé Framework Agreement”

was signed in which Eyadéma agreed to respect the constitution and not
run for another term in office when his expired in 2003. The president
also agreed to dissolve parliament and hold new legislative elections to be
observed by CENI. Elections were delayed and by May 2002 CENI was
dismantled and in its place the government appointed seven magistrates
to oversee elections. This was a final blow to democracy in Togo and the
opposition boycotted the vote.32 The following year, Eyadéma refused to
observe the constitution and ran for office. The same problematic voter
rolls were used, Olympio was once again disqualified, and the opposition
failed to rally behind any single candidate.
More recently, Togo faced another possible opportunity for democratiza-
tion when Eyadéma, Africa’s longest serving president, died on February 5,
2005, after thirty-eight years of rule. Togo’s armed forces announced his
son Faure Gnassingbé to be the successor, rather than the constitution-
ally designated successor, the president of the National Assembly, Fambare
Ouattara Natchaba. His son was sworn in and, following pressure from its
neighbors and the African Union, he agreed to hold presidential elections.
These hastily organized elections used the same familiar bloated voter
rolls. Turnout shows that Northern pro-government areas reported par-
ticipation rates of 90 percent while Lomé, home of the opposition parties,
reported 44 percent voter turnout.33 Gnassingbé was declared the winner
by the already suspect electoral commission earning 60.22 percent of the
vote as opposed to opposition coalition leader Emmanuel Bob-Akitani’s
38.91 percent.34 As the U.S. State Department observes, these “deeply
flawed elections” were “marred by violence and widespread accusations
of vote tampering, and caus(ed) tens of thousands of Togolese to flee into
neighboring Benin and Ghana.”35 Togo had failed to overcome the legacy
of centralized rule and flawed electoral competitions.
Inclusiveness had evaded the National Conference and this legacy
persisted in the years that followed. Shutting down any opportunity for
constitutional dialogues to take place across the country, as Jennifer Seely
clearly articulates,
the opposition continued to contest elections, even though Eyadéma and
his RPT routinely won. This suggests that there emerged a new system
of political contestation in Togo after the transition, but that inclusive-
ness in government was still lacking. The pattern of increased competition
without increased inclusiveness in government was set during the transition
period.36
It is this very lack of inclusiveness that continues to undermine Togolese

democracy. The failure of the military to abide by the constitution and to
instead name Gnassingbé as his father’s successor is yet another example of

constitutional abrogation. Despite riots in Lomé the people of Togo were
unable to change this pattern of politics in their country. Unlike Benin,
Togo’s highest court, the Supreme Court, has never stepped up to the plate
and challenged the un-democratic maneuvers of the RPT regime. The
role of the court in 2005 elections illustrates the inability of the court
to assert its independence and therefore its ruling in favor of the ruling
party (RPT) was not surprising. Its unwillingness to challenge the uncon-
stitutional transfer of power from father to son further reveals its lack of
independence inspite of a flagrant disregard for the constitution. The elec-
tions in 2005 in Togo were not free and fair and the country has been
labeled as “not free” by Freedom House (2006). Togo clearly illustrates
the many challenges of constructing democracy from a neopatrimonial
regime. Exclusionary politics has been a way of life for elites in power in
Africa. Dismantling this model in favor of participatory constitutionalism
is perhaps the greatest challenge to building democracy.
Niger
Niger has had a turbulent relationship with democracy. The 1991 National
Conference (NC) laid the foundation for the creation of the country’s
Third Republic and the end of the military regime of Ali Saibou. Saibou
came to power in 1987 upon the death of Lt. Col. Seyni Kountché who
had ruled the country for thirteen years. The conference helped create a
semi-presidential system institutionalized by the 1992 Constitution and
the subsequent election of Mohamane Ousmane to the presidency in 1993.
Unfortunately, the choice of a proportional representation electoral system
for the National Assembly resulted in a fragmented legislature with mul-
tiple parties represented and, ultimately, cohabitation.37 The fragility of
the transition was underscored in 1996 when Ousmane was overthrown
by a military coup d’état and then in 1999 the military head of state,
Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Baré, was assassinated. This event, which was
officially labeled as an “unfortunate accident,” paved the way for Niger’s
fourth constitutional referendum in a decade.38
As Leonardo A. Villalón and Abdourahmane Idrissa illustrate, political
struggles among elites over institutional design were commonplace in Niger
throughout the 1990s.39 Indeed, from the outset Niger faced difficulties
surrounding institutional choice and inclusion. A preparatory commission
for the NC was created in a compromise deal between the government
and opposition. The opposition managed to dictate the very composition
of this commission resulting in only seven of the commission’s sixty-eight
members representing “le pouvoir.” Other delegates included: seven from
the Workers’ Union (USTN), seven students (USN), seven representatives

of employers unions, other unions and the eighteen official political par-
ties each had two seats. Absent from the commission were representatives
of official women’s associations, traditional chiefs, and Islamic groups. Not
surprisingly, the presence of one single woman on the commission resulted
in an “unprecedented set of protests by women’s groups” resulting in six
more women being added to the commission.40 The eight hundred and
eighty-four delegates at the National Conference included one hundred
seats for Saibou’s party, the MNSD (Mouvement National de la Societé de
Développement, or former “pouvoir” ), one hundred seats each for aforemen-
tioned unions and student groups plus an additional three hundred and
twenty “resource persons” with no voting power. Importantly, non-voting
attendees included sixty-four rural representatives, forty from the army,
and thirty from the state administration.41 In a scathing description of the
NC’s composition one scholar noted,
One is led to wonder about the representativity of the conference when we

see that the representatives of the “rural world” have no vote, the representa-
tion of such important associations as that of women and traditional chiefs
is limited to two delegates, while the USN has one hundred delegates and
each party has fourteen.42
Rather than a transition based on widespread inclusion or dialogue the NC

was marked by a small, elite segment of society that sought to control the
direction of the transition. Villalón and Idrissa argue that
The Nigerien National Conference must thus be understood as a seizure
of the political agenda, in the context of the crisis of the early 1990s, by
a civilian elite comprised of people in the modern (nonagricultural) and
formal sectors of the urban economy . . . The proceedings of the national
conference concentrated on discrediting the mismanagement of politics
by the military and the MNSD regime, and effectively marginalized them
from the discussion of the country’s political future during the subsequent
transition.43
The focus of the conference on criticism of the former regime, rather than
new directions for the country, is similar to the proceedings of the Togolese
conference, although in the latter case Eyadéma was able to dissolve the
National Conference and effectively suffocate the transition itself. This
was not to be the end result in Niger.
At the outset of the Third Republic a concerted effort was made to
ensure that a dominant party could not easily emerge. As previously men-
tioned, the constitution established a proportional representation system
for parliamentary elections. This resulted in many small parties having
representation in the National Assembly. Despite the presence of multiple

parties, effectively the same political players competed in elections.
In the 1993 presidential elections, the MNSD candidate Mamadou
Tandja won the first round. The opposition joined together behind the
runner-up Mahamane Ousmane (CDS, Convention Démocratique et Sociale)
and created the Alliance des Forces du Changement (AFC). Ousmane’s 1993
bid for the presidency was ultimately successful; however, not surprisingly,
legislative elections did not result in a parliamentary majority. Following
a vote of no confidence President Ousmane held new legislative elections.
The results were virtually the same and cohabitation was leading to insti-
tutional paralysis. It was this deadlock that Col. Ibrahim Baré Mainassara
used to rationalize the coup on January 27, 1996. Baré banned political
parties and dissolved the National Assembly.44
It is interesting to note that during the reign of Colonel Baré there was
a National Forum for Democratic Revival, headed by a “Council of Wise-
men.” Although this was reminiscent of the National Conference, the mil-
itary remained in control of the proceedings.45 This is a clear example of
the familiar façade of dialogue meant to ease tensions without relinquish-
ing governmental control and therefore does not represent constitutional
dialogues designed to incorporate citizens into the process of constructing
democracy. A new constitutional referendum took place May 12, 1996, and
the Fourth Republic was created. Presidential elections were held, but real-
izing that he would lose, Baré prevented the CENI (Commission Électorale
Nationale Indépendante) from counting the ballots. CENI resisted and the
military took over counting; Baré was declared the winner August 7, 1996.46
Baré’s term in office came to an abrupt end when he was shot on April 9,
1999. The struggle to establish independent institutions continued.
The Fifth Republic was formed under the leadership of Major Daouda
Wanké. The military orchestrated a Council of National Reconciliation
(CRN). Civil society groups agitated, strikes were widespread, and the
transition was accelerated. A constitutional consultative committee was
appointed by the CRN. This group included retired Col. Moumouni
Adamou Djermakoye (Alliance Nigérienne pour la Démocratie et le
Progress), political party leaders, lawyers, human rights activists, traditional
chiefs. The Consultative Committee of eighty members deliberated over
the new constitution and voted forty-one to thirty-nine in favor of a semi-
presidential system. Facing such a divided group, the CRN demanded a
consensus position and proposed a five-year national unity government.
“The proposal was widely decried in the press as a transparent effort to cre-
ate jobs for all politicians.”47 The Committee sought an independent elec-
toral commission (CENI) and the creation of an impartial constitutional
court.48 The CRN then imposed the semi-presidential constitution again,
virtually identical to the constitution of the Third Republic. Wanké’s

government organized elections and the top candidates were familiar ones,
having run in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2004 (Mamadou Tandja, Mahamane
Ousmane, Mahamadou Issoufou, and Adamou Djermakoye).49 Mamadou
Tandja was elected president in 1999 and again in 2004.
Each of the hurdles faced by Niger reveal the lack of inclusion
throughout the democratization process. Although the constitution of the
Third Republic was designed to allow for widespread participation, the
same political class has remained dominant in the political arena. While
this is not uncommon in African states, the lack of dialogue outside of the
entrenched group of elites serves to reinforce the divide between the people
and the politicians. The ongoing constitutional dialogues that took place in
the états-généraux in Benin and, as we will see, the concertations régionales in
Mali served to incorporate voices from across the country even as familiar
political elites vied for power. In Niger, the exclusion of women, traditional
authorities, and religious leaders in stages of decision-making has meant the
exclusion of the majority of the population, while the elites challenged each
other. The subsequent political bottleneck justified for many the January
1996 coup by Baré.50 Thus, there was support for the return of the sta-
bility offered by the military after the collapse of the Third Republic. In the
face of previous criticism, the eighty-member consultative committee had
broadened participation in deliberating the new constitution.
The country appears to be making persistent progress toward more
democratic government. Freedom House has reported improvements in
both political rights and civil liberties over the last year, categorizing Niger
as “partly free.”51 To date there has been no clear assertion of the inde-
pendence of institutions (by the CENI or the Constitutional Court). The
Nigerian Constitutional Court is made up of seven judges, each serving
nonrenewable six-year terms. The judges, appointed by various entities,
include one presidential appointment, one appointed by the National
Assembly, two appointed by judges, one professor, one bar association
member, and one human rights organization representative.52 The com-
position of this court is the broadest of any of the courts in West Africa
although access is linked to certain designated bodies, rather than to indi-
viduals and until this body asserts its independence skeptics will remain
uncertain of its democratic potential. In the past, CENI had resisted the
military takeover of counting of votes, but ultimately was unable to assert
its own independence. Niger has struggled with two critical elements of
constituting democracy in Africa—namely, participatory constitutional-
ism and the establishment of independent institutions. By restricting par-
ticipants in the National Conference, Saibou’s regime intended to control
the agenda. The Consultative Committee of the CRN marked small steps
toward a more inclusive political process. With such a history, how can the
current regime be other than fragile?
Burkina Faso
Despite electoral reforms in Burkina Faso, as well as significant political
gains by opposition parties, accusations of electoral fraud and mistreat-
ment of members of the opposition are widespread. In 2006, Freedom
House, Freedom in the World, 2006 reports a decline in political rights in
the country and considers the country “partly free.”
President Blaise Compaoré came to power by coup in 1987. In June
1991 a referendum for a new constitution that provided for separation of
powers was “staged.”53 Compaoré called together a roundtable of political
parties to discuss the possibilities for political reform. Twenty-four par-
ties were originally included but only thirteen remained at the table when
the president made it clear that he was unwilling to transform the meet-
ing into a National Conference.54 As the opposition continued to call for
a National Conference, the government sponsored organization Alliance
pour le Respect et la defense de la Constitution (ARDC) held counterdemon-
strations. Violence culminated in the banning of public demonstrations on
November 1, 1991.55
In an all too familiar pattern, presidential elections were held in
December 1991 with Compaoré as the sole candidate. Opposition parties
continued to boycott in light of the government’s refusal to hold a National
Conference. The illegitimacy of the election is illustrated by the fact that
75 percent of registered voters abstained.56 Presidential and parliamentary
elections occurred throughout the 1990s; yet their legitimacy was often
questioned.
In January 1997 the constitution was revised to remove the two-term
limit for the president, paving the way for a lifelong presidency. Following
the 1997 Parliamentary elections in which an opposition boycott resulted
in only ten opposition members in the National Assembly, electoral reforms
were deemed critical. The death of journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998,
linked to his knowledge of public officials’ refusal to divulge their assets
as required by Article 77 of the constitution, then triggered a sociopoliti-
cal crisis in the country.57 Not unlike Colonel Baré of Niger, Compaoré
created a collège des sages or council of wisemen (in May 1999), composed
of former heads of state, eight traditional elders, and five staff members to
review in a brief forty-five days all of the political crimes that had occurred
since independence in 1960. This insurmountable task undermined the
legitimacy of the council. In 2000, under pressure from civil society and
opposition groups, presidential terms were reduced to five years and the
two-term limit was reinstated, with the proviso that the change was not
retroactive and therefore Compaoré would be eligible for two more terms
in office.
A Constitutional Council exists; however, the president of this body
claims he does not have means to enforce the law that requires public offi-
cials divulge assets (Article 77). The judiciary is weak and lacks indepen-
dence, in part because magistrates can be removed from office at any time.
“An arsenal of laws intended to ensure transparency and to fight corrup-
tion lacks effectiveness, and in practice, corruption continues because the
political will to tackle it remains weak.”58
Dialogue and consultation were meant to be at the root of 2000 and
2001 reforms in districting, as well as a shift to a single ballot, and the
reinforcement of the independence of the electoral commission.59 It seems
clear that these discussions were restricted to a particular group of elites
in Ouagadougou. For instance, workshops held from June 29 to July 2,
1999, entitled “Dialogue for the democratic development of Burkina Faso”
and “Democracy and elections: Electoral system reform in Burkina Faso,”
are referred to as evidence of the inclusive nature of the dialogues but they
were attended primarily by deputies to the National Assembly, govern-
ment ministers, and delegates from European embassies and neighboring
countries.60 These dialogues were never spread across the country to reach
the people of Burkina Faso and cannot therefore be considered constitu-
tional dialogues. Without more comprehensive dialogues and participa-
tion, democracy and a just constitution are nowhere in sight.
The electoral code was reformed again in 2004, but the ruling party
was accused of redrawing districts to their advantage.61 The opposition
was further angered by the Constitutional Council of the Supreme Court
that threw out an opposition challenge to prevent Compaoré from running
for a third term. As one opposition member noted, the court’s ruling was
not surprising given the fact that four of the nine members were former
ministers or ambassadors appointed by the head of state.62 Institutional
independence was therefore not evident in Burkina Faso.
Presidential elections took place in 1998 and 2005. Although the insti-
tutions of democracy appear to be in place, little has changed and power
remains centralized within the ruling party. The opposition claims that
the government CDP has an unfair advantage now that there are forty-
five provinces with proportional representation (as opposed to fifteen dis-
tricts that existed previously).63 Only the ruling party has such widespread
coverage across the country (not surprising given its nearly twenty years
in power). While the opposition claimed “One cannot unilaterally undo
what had been done by consensus,” and most of the opposition boycotted
the parliamentary vote, the electoral reform went ahead with sixty-three
out of one hundred and eleven MPs (a few small parties aligned with the
government) voting in favor of reform.64
The example of Burkina Faso displays the difficulty of challenging a rul-
ing party that has maintained control for decades. In Benin the challenge was
successful because Kérékou was willing to allow events to proceed. In Mali, it
required the violent overthrow of Moussa Traoré and the democratic tenden-
cies of the coup leader Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré to hand over power
to a transitional government. Some argue that Burkina Faso’s political trou-
bles are also linked to a divided opposition. In the most recent presidential
elections the opposition alliance (Alternance 2005) could not agree on three
candidates to run against Compaoré. As a result the president faced eleven
challengers, the closest, Benewende Stansilas Sankara, won 4.94 percent of
the vote, compared to Compaoré’s 80.3 percent.65 Parliamentary elections
have been held in 1992, 1997, and 2002. In 2002, the opposition parties won
54 of the total 111 seats in the National Assembly.
It is clear that the regime seeks to legitimize its rule in the eyes of the
international community by participating in elections and consensus build-
ing negotiations. Indeed, with respect to the term limits for Compaoré,
a vote took place in the National Assembly and majority rule prevailed.
However, when push comes to shove the regime is intent on securing its
majority in the National Assembly and stamping out any opposition hope
for term limits that would be imposed on Compaoré. The very fact that
the dialogues that took place on reform were limited and not decentralized
underscores the refusal of the government to pursue open discussions on
democracy in the country. Certainly Burkina Faso has made great strides
and yet without a clear commitment to the process itself, democracy
remains a long way off for this country.
Troubled States: Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire

Guinea’s Sekou Touré famously cut ties with France in 1958 when the
people of Guinea voted to become an independent state. Touré held on to
power until his death in 1984. In Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouet-Boigny
was one of France’s closest allies on the continent and he became presi-
dent at independence in 1960. These two countries have similar histories
linked to the legacies of the leadership of their presidents-for-life. In each
case the turmoil of succession has led to troubled political environments.
These two countries will not be explored in detail given their absolute lack
of political freedom and democracy. Along with Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and
Guinea earned the “Not Free” label from Freedom House’s Freedom in the
World, 2006. Their experiences reveal the problematic nature of central-
ized rule in Francophone Africa.
General Lasana Conté came to power in Guinea in April 1984 and

remains there today. Although he was elected to the office of president on
December 19, 1993, the country has made few advances toward demo-
cratic rule. The constitution was written by those in power, presented to
the people, and passed by referendum on December 23, 1990, garnering a
suspicious 98.68 percent of the vote.
Alpha Condé, head of the Rassemblement Populaire Guinéen (RPG),
called for a National Conference but the regime ignored his pleas despite
President Conté’s claim that he supported a rapid transition to multi-
party democracy. In December 1998, opposition leader Alpha Condé was
imprisoned and charged with intending to overthrow the government.
The Parliamentary Assembly of Francophonie and others in the region
demanded Condé’s release. The entire region was taking a stance against
the Conté regime. Nevertheless, in 2000 Condé received five years of hard
labor in prison.
Antidemocratic maneuvers by the regime have been numerous, includ-
ing the appointment (as opposed to election) of local officials and a consti-
tutional change allowing Conté to be president for life.66 Guinea recently
held the first local elections in the government’s history. Under pressure
from the international community for political reforms, the government
agreed to hold municipal elections in December 18, 2005. Although these
elections were considered a step forward for political reform, they were
marked by apathy and allegations of fraud.
There is no question that Guinea stands out in the region. It has no
private radio, whereas radio stations flourish across West Africa and have
been considered critical to the consolidation of democracy in Mali. Guinea
is also unique in that opposition leaders cannot meet with their followers or
travel across the country to campaign.67 By May 2006 President Conté had
sacked the prime minister Cellou Dalien Diallo who had led Guinea in its
efforts for increased political and media reform and reshuffled his cabinet
signaling an unwillingness to continue to liberalize the government.
The exclusionary nature of politics in Guinea is evident. Despite the
1990 constitutional referendum, the democratic process has been orga-
nized and controlled by the government. A national electoral commission
has been created but it has remained under the influence of the govern-
ment, unable to assert its independence. The Supreme Court and indeed
the entire judicial system is also unable to act independently.68
From independence to his 1993 death Felix Houphouet-Boigny ruled
Côte d’Ivoire. In 1993 his designated successor Henri Konan Bedié came
to power and was subsequently elected president in 1995. However, in
1995 Bedié launched an exclusionary campaign of Ivoirité, which in theory cel-
ebrates Ivoirian culture but was clearly designed to prevent opposition and
Northern candidate Allassane Ouatarra from running for office in 2000.

The Supreme Court approved of a law that permitted presidential candi-
dates to run for election only if both parents had been born on Ivoirian
soil. This interesting maneuver reinforced the national identity of Côte
d’Ivoire as being linked to the artificial territorial boundaries of the state
but also excludes the large immigrant and predominately Muslim popula-
tion living in the north from representation. Bedié’s exclusionary politics
led to his downfall as he earned enemies in the military and he was over-
thrown in 1999 by General Robert Guéi. In October 2000 presidential
elections were held with Guéi and Laurent Gbagbo as the leading can-
didates; Ouattara had been disqualified by Ivoirité. Chaos soon followed
when the military mutinied in 2002 and Guéi was killed. Ouattara took
refuge in the French Embassy and his home was burned down. A unity
government was created in 2003, French and UN troops came to establish
peace. The current government does not control the North. The division
in the country between the North and South was exacerbated by Ivoirité
because many workers from Mali and Burkina Faso felt threatened by the
anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim environment and have fled as a result.
Ivoirité symbolizes the very exclusive nature of politics in Côte d’Ivoire.
René Le Marchand referred to Ivoirité as venomous flowers that threaten
to lead to very evil and deadly outcomes premised on the principle of
exclusion.69 And so it has played out in Côte d’Ivoire.
Constitutional Courts and Democracy

There may be times when strong constitutional courts are more democratic than
elected parliaments and elected executives.70
Courts, with their appointed judges and relatively lengthy terms

of office, have frequently been viewed as counter-democratic or
counter-majoritarian.71 The term counter-majoritarian “consists in the
fact that elected politicians, with their democratic and majoritarian man-
date, must sometimes be reigned in by judges who do not have to sub-
ject themselves to direct electoral certification.” 72 Given this prevalent
belief, any such democratic tendencies in the court system may come as
quite a surprise. However, in the African context, both constitutional
dialogues and the courts themselves have proved crucial to the consoli-
dation of democracy. In instances where these courts are willing to rule
against a dominant political party, there is a visible check on power in
which the populace can see that those in power are not above the law.
This is crucial, particularly in countries where constitutional abrogation
and military coups d’état have been the norm. It is true that dialogues
in new democracies may challenge the lawmaking role of the legislature

and raise concerns for those who see the sovereignty of legislatures as a
crucial element of democracy. Indeed, legislators themselves may com-
plain that constitutional dialogues infringe upon the intended role of
the National Assembly in making the nation’s laws, as we will see in the
case of Mali. Yet, these dialogues are important during transitional times
when institutions themselves may lack legitimacy. As Heinz Klug argues,
“Constitutional courts . . . may in some situations function as key institu-
tions in consolidating the democratic transition, maintaining social peace
and stability while addressing, or at least ‘judicializing,’ often severe prob-
lems of political and economic dislocation.” 73 In the case of South Africa,
the Constitutional Court has been critical of and respected by those who
were in disagreement with legislative choices (e.g., the Inkatha Freedom
Party). The court played a critical role in ensuring the transition by earn-
ing the respect of diverse groups in the country.
For the victims of apartheid, the new reliance on constitutionalism, even
with the establishment of a genuinely democratic government, is based
on the expectation that constitutional rights will protect individuals and
society from the return of injustice and oppression. This understanding
assumes that the constitution will enable the newly enfranchised majority
to achieve a significant democratic shift in the balances of both public
and private power, while promoting a long-denied equality among South
Africans. The old ruling elite, however, see the shift to constitutional-
ism as a protection against the redistributive demands of the new demo-
cratic majority and view judicial review as the last bastion protecting their
property and freedom against threats they perceive to be implicit in the
notion of an unrestrained democratic will with access to the levers of pub-
lic power.74
The Constitutional Court played a critical role in the treacherous South

African transition and has also contributed to transitions in West Africa.
In Mali, the constitution established separation of powers, creating no
less than eight institutions, namely, the president, the government (led
by a prime minister), the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Court, the High Court of Justice, the High Council for
Territorial Collectivities, and the Economic and Social Council. These
institutions, it should be noted, are primarily judicial (to ensure establish-
ment of the rule of law), representative, or consultative in nature.75
In Benin, the Constitutional Court has shifted from the French model
of a conseil constitutionnel in which citizens have standing only in electoral
disputes and not in matters concerning constitutionality of laws or treaties.
In Germany citizens must exhaust all other appeals processes, whereas in
Benin they can go directly to the court. This makes Benin a remarkable
case in which the court is a model for guaranteeing human rights. As Anna
Rotman argues,
The fundamental role the Beninese court plays in guaranteeing human

rights is born of the fact that any individual or non-governmental human
rights organization or association, as well as the President of the Republic,
has standing before the Court for matters involving laws or regulatory acts
that threaten the fundamental rights of the individual and public liberties,
and in general, are deemed to violate human rights.76
Such a court depends on constitutional literacy but also seems to reinforce

state/society ties by providing a venue for people to hold the state (and
actors within it) accountable. This is an important transition in postco-
lonial Africa. As Julius Ihonvbere writes, “Any constitution that does not
emerge from widespread consultations with all nationality and interest
groups cannot be regarded as legitimate. The basis of constitutional legiti-
macy must now be measured by the extent to which the masses were part
of the process of compacting the constitution.” 77 The preceding exam-
ples show the extent to which a participatory process has been critical to
democracy in West Africa. While it is certain that elites still play a primary
role in politics, there is no doubt that decentralization of democracy, con-
stitutional dialogues, as well as access to courts have all broadened the
participatory scope of politics. As Kayode Fayemi writes, in this region,
It is now common place to argue that the process of producing a constitu-

tion is as important, if not more important than the eventual product. To
ensure that the process is open and participatory, certain principles have
become the standard benchmarks for judging . . . a constitution . . . These
principles include—legitimacy, inclusivity, participation, accessibility,
ownership, accountability and transparency.78
After years of exclusionary politics it is not surprising that many citizens

have taken a stand against those regimes that fail to offer a more inclusive
and democratic politics.
Bruce Ackerman in his work The Rise of World Constitutionalism (1997)
argues that new beginnings offer the possibility of a probationary period
for new governments and their constitutions.79 Although he is discuss-
ing postwar West Germany, where the violation of probation could lead
to Allied intervention, this concept has value for understanding 1990s
constitutionalism in Africa. After failed efforts at third-wave democracies,
African states were indeed on probation. This implies a symbolic value in
success. A wide range of institutions have an important role to play during
this probationary period; they include Constitutional Courts, independent
electoral commissions, and constitutional dialogues including the concer-

tations régionales and national forums that have taken place over the years
(Mali), états-généraux in Benin.
As Julius Ihonvbere has argued, constitutionalism is focused on two
issues:
first, the process of constitution-making and the extent to which it is pop-

ular, inclusive, participatory, and democratic; and second, the available
openings, institutions, and processes of making the constitution a living
document by taking it to the people do that they are in a position not just
to have access to it, but that they understand it, claim ownership, and use it
in the defense of the democratic enterprise.80
Further, he argues that “the process of consultation and debates pro-

motes public political education. By involving people and giving promi-
nence to their ideas and contributions, the process builds a more informed,
educated and mobilized populace.”81 This is at the heart of constitutional
literacy. From the crisis of transition arises the need for dialogue and not
all states responded openly to such demands.
Perhaps most important is the notion that the participatory approach
builds ownership of the constitution.82 It is this endogenous process
and ownership that can have long-term ramifications for legitimacy and
development of the state. Any process that is participatory but alienates a
segment of the population such that they feel disassociated with the con-
stitutional process will ultimately not pass the test of inclusion and owner-
ship that I argue is required for democratic consolidation in Africa today.
By exploring how governance through dialogue has been pursued in the
case of Mali—a symbol of democratic success—I hope to shed light on the
importance of participatory constitutionalism for transitioning societies.
While Mali represents only one case, it is a laboratory for constructing
democracy in the region.
Ch a p t e r Th r e e
O r igi nat i ng Pa rt ic i pat ion: Th e
S ov e r e ig n Nat iona l Con f e r e nc e
Constitutions are too frequently imposed on citizens and the consequences

for democracy in Africa can be dire. James Tully argues that “if the cultural
ways of the citizens were recognised and taken into account in reaching an
agreement on a form of constitutional association, the constitutional order,
and the world of everyday politics it constitutes, would be just with respect
to this dimension of politics.”1 Thus, a just constitution must be the result
of dialogue that incorporates all citizens and allows for their differences
to be adequately addressed. Ultimately, such a constitution requires each
citizen have a voice in the framing of the constitution under which they
are governed. National conferences in Mali and Benin provided such a
forum and as such the conferences provide the foundation for democracy
in these countries.
While National Conferences do not always lead to democratic govern-
ment, they were considered the most important predictor of political liber-
alization in a recent comparative analysis of African political transitions.2
As such, critical analysis of the forum itself is important. An example of
open dialogue at the heart of constitutional construction in contemporary
society, National Conferences provide a glimpse at a real world example of
democratic deliberation at work.
The National Conference of Mali, held from July 29 to August 12,
1991, was part of a great experiment that swept across Francophone
Africa in the 1990s. As the previous chapter illustrated, Benin’s 1990
sovereign National Conference marked the beginning of that country’s
transition from authoritarian rule toward democracy. The subsequent
National Conference movement helped to change the political map in
Africa as people participated in the overthrow of dictatorial regimes and
took part in laying the groundwork for liberalization throughout the
region.3 Mali is the only state to first experience a coup d’état, estab-
lish a transitional government, and then hold a successful National
Conference. In this chapter I argue that the National Conference helped

to embed the democratic ideals of dialogue and debate in contemporary
Malian political culture; it is in such lasting ideals that democracy can
be firmly grounded. To be sure, these ideals may be difficult to maintain
on an ongoing basis in newly forming democracies as they set a very high
standard of participation in which anything less may be unacceptable
to many citizens.4 However, the National Conference did change the
political culture in Mali. “(T)he national conference constituted a point
of departure for a new political culture centered on the democratic prin-
ciples of dialogue, the healthy debate of ideas, and the deeper analysis of
questions that are at the heart of Malian development.”5 The legitimacy
of the National Conference also serves to ensure Jon Elster’s “upstream
legitimacy” for the constitution-making process. Without a doubt, this
upstream legitimacy contributes to democracy’s durability.
I wish to suggest that this forum served not only as an arena for con-
stitutional construction but also, and perhaps more importantly, it now
signifies the ideal of democratic participation in Malian politics. The par-
ticipants in this conference were faced with a formidable challenge—to
create a government that would preserve national unity, reconcile all
Malians, and establish security in all regions of the country.6 The National
Conference may have been a singular event in Malian history, but the col-
lective memory of the conference continues to influence everyday politics
in Mali. Throughout his decade long presidency, Konaré used dialogue as
the foundation for policy-making. This legacy of the national conference
is evident not only in the Regional Conferences of 1994, in which people
gathered in every region to discuss the so-called Northern problem (and
any other issue that was of critical importance to the people of the region),
but also in the National Political Forum of January 21–28, 1999, con-
vened to address the “political crisis,” and the National Forum for Judicial
Reform, March 30–April 3, 1999, assembled to attend to the critical need
for judicial reform.
The model was the same for each of these cases—following regional con-
ferences, a national forum was held in Bamako to address the issues raised
by people throughout the country and recommendations were made to the
National Assembly. From 1994, Konaré faced a growing political crisis. In
response, fundamental texts of the Third Republic (i.e., the constitution,
the electoral law, the party charter, the press law, and the Status of the
Opposition) were reread and revisions proposed at the National Forum on
Politics. From March 30 to April 3, 1999, the National Forum for Judicial
Reform, a part of the Programme décennal de la Justice (PRODEJ), was
held in Bamako. As one observer noted, because of the success of
past forums (such as the concertations régionales), which helped to resolve
originating participation / 63
the conflict in the North, Konaré chose a participatory approach to judi-

cial system reform.7 In addition to these conferences, educational and
health care reforms have been negotiated in a similar manner throughout
the country. Each of these forums is an example of what I have called
constitutional dialogues that continue the inclusive legacy of the National
Conference.
In this chapter, I examine the make-up of the National Conference orga-
nizing committees and the diversity of the conference participants. I treat
the Malian forum as a new model for democratic participation in polity-
building and argue that these forums serve as auxiliary supports to the Third
Republic, helping to stabilize and legitimize the government.8 While these
forums are not sovereign constituent assemblies, their recommendations are
presented to the National Assembly, where they are then deliberated upon by
the elected representatives of the people. The continued use of such assemblies
highlights the recognized need for continued public consultation in order to
achieve and preserve governmental legitimacy. These forums contribute to
the entire picture of democratization in Mali, in so far as each forum serves
as a fragment of democratic consolidation. With each fragment, a culture of
participation is more deeply embedded into the political arena. Following
my analysis of the participants in the National Conference and the primary
issues that were debated, I turn to the role of women and history, and their
relationships to the continued legacy of the national conference. Dialogue
and participation help to promote the idea of a Malian nation—a nation in
which every citizen plays a role in its creation.
The Transition
The Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP) led the Malian gov-
ernment during the transition period from March 1991 to January 1992. It was
created by a compromise between the Comité de Coordination des Associations
et Organisations Démocratiques (CCAOD) and the Conseil de Réconciliation
Nationale (CRN). CCAOD was made up of associations at the forefront of
protests against the Traoré regime, including unions, students, and the new
political actors—UNTM, AEEM, ADIDE, ADEMA, CNID, AJDP, and
JLD. In addition, it included military officials that supported democratic
pluralism.9 The CCAOD, referred to as the Mouvement Démocratique,10 was
the heart of the Malian transition. The CRN, on the other hand, included
the military leaders who had led the March 26 coup d’état. While the mili-
tary was offered a role in the transition, the CRN and CCAOD agreed that
the twenty-five member CTSP would include ten military and fifteen civil-
ian members, preserving the dominant role for civilian members.11 Table 3.1
indicates the breakdown of the affiliations of the CTSP.
Table 3.1 Members of the Comité

de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple
Military 10
UNTM 3
ADEMA 2
CNID 2
AMDH 2
AEEM 1
AJDP 1
ADIDE 1
JLD 1
MPA 1
FIAA 1
Total 25
Source: Diarrah, 1996, p. 28.
ADEMA and CNID received two representatives each and represented

political associations that became predominant political parties. Youth
groups (AEEM, AJDP, ADIDE, and JLD) received a total of four repre-
sentatives, while associations affiliated with the North (MPA and FIAA)
received only one representative each. The individuals on the CTSP were
key players in the transition because the immediate role of the CTSP was
to write and adopt the Acte Fondamentale that served as the constitutional
framework operating during the transition.12
In addition, the CTSP determined who would be able to participate
in the National Conference; specifically, participants were to be Malian
nationals, at least eighteen years of age, who “enjoy his/her civic rights,
and who have never been condemned of an afflictive and dishonorable
punishment.”13 Participants were also forbidden to have participated in
any effort to block the democratic process. Political parties were to be reg-
istered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MTA) and were to
exist under the newly established guidelines.14 Associations were required
to have legal standing, thereby excluding any association not officially
declared with the MTA. Conference rules permitted only three partici-
pants for each political party and one for each registered association. It is
not surprising that prior to the conference the numbers of political parties
rose dramatically to over forty and those of associations to include hun-
dreds. The viability of these new organizations was not questioned at the
time. The CTSP designated Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré as president
and head of state during the transition.
The Preparatory Committee for the National Conference and the Acte
Fondamentale also formulated the conference agenda. Decisions were
made through debate despite widely diverging opinions. It was such nego-
tiation that, it was hoped, would characterize the National Conference.
As described in the government newspaper L’Essor, the meetings of the
Preparatory Committee were marked by
(t)he existence of a reasonable, though certainly disparate majority, that

while taking diverse paths and moving unevenly, end(ed) by tending
toward the same reasonable expectations. It is possible to think that the
National Conference will adopt the same outline for moving ahead with its
inevitable confrontations, most importantly with an overall will to perform
a necessary task.15
As it was conceived, the National Conference would bring together an

unknown number of participants in order to redesign Mali’s government.
How this would be achieved and how diverging views would combine to
create guiding documents for the state was unknown. Following years of
centralized rule, it was, however, clear from the start that in order to be
successful a vast majority of Malians in all walks of life must consider
themselves to be part of the process.
Participants in the National Conference

The legitimacy of the National Conference stems from the fact that it groups
together all political points of view and all the energetic forces of the nation. It
can boast about that legitimacy in order to request its total or limited sover-
eignty of its operations.16
The legitimacy of the sovereign National Conference is virtually unques-

tioned in Mali today. The extent to which organizers sought to be
all-inclusive is evident not only in the Conference itself but also in its
preparation. Given the country’s history, if the conference was formulated
and operated in a centralized manner, it would not have been considered a
legitimate forum of the people. Table 3.2 displays those who participated
in the preparation17 of the National Conference and illustrates the attempts
that were made to be broadly inclusive in this process. Of the 575 partici-
pants in the Preparatory Commission, a minimum of 232 (or 40 percent)
had a government or military affiliation. The majority were members of
civil society. This inclusion of the government and military is important
because it recognizes the stake that these actors have in the outcome of
the Conference, excluding such stakeholders might have undermined the
entire process. A Verification Commission was created to examine the
official list of participants as well as the individual forms filled out by the
delegates. The Commission, led by Dr. Mamadou Sarr, complained of the
many forms that were incomplete, and that some delegates did not fill out
forms at all, which resulted in errors in the numbers that were presented
to the conference attendees on July 30, 1991.18 The breakdown, accord-
ing to government records, of those who participated in the conference
is presented in tables 3.2–3.5. The numbers in table 3.3 are not accurate
because while the official total was 1518, over 1800 badges had been dis-
tributed by the closing of the National Conference.19 Other sources state
that over 2,000 people participated in the proceedings of the conference.20
Nonetheless, it is clear that careful attention was paid to including asso-
ciations, particularly at the conference itself where they represented the
largest single group totaling 30 percent of all registered participants. In
preparation for this role, on July 26, 1991, the CCA-ONG (Comité de
Coordination des Action des Organisations Nongouvernmentales au Mali)
held a meeting attended by 70 members. The CCA-ONG was founded in
1986 as an organization that united NGOs focusing on drought relief and
food aid; however, as the transition to democratic government evolved,
they recognized the opportunity presented to claim a new political role.
Table 3.2 Participants in the National Conference

Preparatory Commission
Political parties 105

Associations 50
Unions 16
Cooperatives 18
Religious communities 9
Socio-professional organizations 30
Malians living abroad 60
Cercles and communes 169
Coordination Committee 24
Ministerial Departments 22
Regional governors 9
MPA 3
FIAA 3
CTSP 25
Government 22
Armed forces 10
Experts and others 30
Total 575
Source: “Réunion de la Commission Préparatoire de la Conférence
Nationale une Étape Décisive de la Transition s’Approche,” L’Essor,
June 27, 1991, 5.
Table 3.3 Participants in the National Conference
CTSP and Cabinet 28

Members of the government 21
Ministerial departments 82
Ambassadors, Chargés d’affaires, and consuls 19
Governors 8
Security and armed forces 15
Famous Malians invited from abroad 20
Professionals 42
Commission experts 63
Malians living overseas 77
Delegates from regional coordination committees 118
Delegates from Cercles 135
Delegates from communes 19
Delegates from cooperatives 11
Delegates from political parties 125
Delegates from associations 467
Interpreters 10
Press 126
Organizing committe 132
Total 1518
Source: “Participants à la conférence nationale,” CTSP, 208.
Table 3.4 Participants registered in the National

Conference, July 29, 1991
Category Number
Political parties 116
Regional and local coordinations 95
Delegates from cercles 126
Communes 19
Members of the government 21
Members of CTSP 24
Professionals 52
Associations 396
Malians from abroad designated
by associations 43
Military 17
Invited guests 30
National press 21
Ambassadors 18
Governors 8
Others 143
Total registered participants 1129
Source: Commission de Vérification.
Table 3.5 Participants registered in

the National Conference, July 29, 1991,
categorized by age group and sex
Age groups Number
Less than 20 4
20–30 122
31–40 338
41–50 319
51–60 162
61–70 78
Over 70 7
Undetermined age 56
Maximum age 78
Minimum age 18
Average age 48
Male 1034
Female 52
Source: Commission de Vérification.
This meeting was an attempt to unite NGOs so that they would better
understand their relationship with the government and their participation
in the National Conference. To enhance this ability and act as a more uni-
fied force, an attempt was made to define the role of NGOs in Mali and
take inventory of their socioeconomic functions as well as the constraints
that they face.21
In order to guarantee geographic diversity of the participants, delegates
were named from administrative regions, cercles, and communes. The
participation from the commune level (the smallest administrative unit)
was probably low (only nineteen) because many of those who represented
the cercles and the regional coordination committees were also most active
at the commune level. Alternatively, it is likely that there was simply not
enough organization at the commune level to produce significant repre-
sentation.
Inaccuracies notwithstanding, these numbers are valuable because they
classify the participants by age and sex, and thereby display a remarkable
imbalance of 1,034 men and 52 women in attendance. Any changes in
numbers of participants would not be expected to significantly alter the
ration of men to women. Considering this difference it is remarkable what
the female representatives were able to achieve (as will be shown in chapter
five). It can be assumed that the number of participants grew dramatically
throughout the conference.
Appendix one shows the over one hundred individuals and groups that
were unable to attend the conference, but nonetheless communicated their
concerns directly to the conference committee. Letters were sent from
abroad, and from Malian towns far from Bamako, including the northern
desert communities of Taoudéni and Timbuktu. Other individuals, living
in Bamako but unable to participate in the conference, also sent their con-
cerns to the conference. Included among these letters was an anonymous
contribution of 750 fcfa for the conference coffers.22 Such a donation is
symbolic and demonstrates a shift in mentality concerning the state, from
one that cannot be trusted with the people’s money or that must provide for
the people, to a state to which the people are willing to contribute in order
to help it succeed. The final budget was 226,593,591 fcfa and a total of
9,777,600 fcfa in goods and services were donated to the conference by local
businesses; the government faced a shortfall of nearly 24,000,000 fcfa.23
Issues at the National Conference were discussed in specialized
Commissions. The Commission on the State of the Nation, created
July 31, 1991, included five subcommissions for topics that would become
the “themes” of the conference.24 These subcommissions were:
1. Institutions and Policy—to discuss questions concerning territorial

administration, justice, armed forces and their organization, secu-
rity, foreign policy, and the press;
2. Economic, Social, and Cultural—covering financial and economic
problems as well as social and health problems, also cultural and
sport questions, and housing;
3. Rural Community;
4. Youth and Jobs;
5. Crimes and Problems in the North.25
The most heated debates arose concerning youth, the North, and rural
community.26 This is not surprising if we consider the role that students
had played in the overthrow of Moussa Traoré as well as the looming issue
of the incorporation of the North into the nation. In addition, the exclusion
of the rural population, 80 percent of the country, was an issue that would
become central to the processes of democratization and decentralization.
It is interesting to note that issues of women’s rights were not mentioned in
this overview of the work of subcommissions, although it would become
an important topic with respect to the constitution and subsequent debates
about democracy in Mali.
Participatory constitutionalism was at the heart of Mali’s approach to
democracy. At the time of the National Conference, emphasis was given
to the need for open dialogue as the foundation of Mali’s new democracy.
Following the conference, this participatory approach toward policy was

continued by President Konaré. The conference itself boasted participa-
tion from representatives of varying religious groups. Issues of language
were important concerns for individuals representing smaller minority
ethnic groups who were concerned about the predominance of certain lan-
guages over others. Ahmed Sekou Touré,27 a participant in the National
Conference as a representative of youth who became the representative
for youth on the Conseil Econimique Social et Culturel (CESC), argued
that practically all levels of society were represented at the National
Conference. While anyone could speak, you had to be persuasive in order
to convince others to adopt your point of view. People spoke in Bambara
or in French, whichever language they preferred. Indeed, other languages
were also used and translators were provided for them.
Critics may argue that while the participant lists include a broad range
of social groups, they are limited to a narrow range of individuals, namely
the members of an elite class, predominately male. While this is indeed a
challenge to the transition, it is important to note that for the first time,
the voices of farmers, students, and representatives from the North were
being heard in the political realm in Bamako. Although women were vastly
outnumbered, their voices were also heard and, as we shall see in chapter
five, they achieved goals that they had set before the conference. For the
first time, every region would have a say in the creation of the new consti-
tution and government. Many individuals would find their voices through
newly created associations. Others would rely on delegates from their local
commune to represent them at the assembly. The National Conference
is certainly not an ideal form of deliberation: however, it must be recog-
nized as a leap forward toward increased inclusion of citizens and it pro-
vides a model for constitutional dialogues. The following section presents
a more detailed analysis of the predominant issues at the historic National
Conference of 1991.
The Constitution, le Monde Rurale, and the North

Quarrels of schools or of generations, rows, oral duels of rare emotional intensity,
the adoption of the Draft Constitution of the Third Republic unquestionably
will have been the one of the most significant moments of our National
Conference . . .28
Bringing together all levels of Malian society to debate a new constitution

resulted in debate over fundamental issues faced by the new republic. In order
to provide a framework for discussion, a proposed constitution was prepared
by the Constitutional Commission. One of the critical issues debated
concerned horizontal accountability. Malians had inherited a French-type

constitution involving the principle of judicial oversight of legislative acts.
Certainly, past experiences with dictatorial regimes helped persuade the
participants in the National Conference of the need for a mechanism that
would judge the constitutionality of the law and the validity of elections, and
guarantee fundamental human rights.29 Negotiations over a proposed vote
on a Supreme Court rather than a Constitutional Court resulted in a con-
flict in which many participants did not want to vote, stating that they did
not understand the dynamics and the differences between the two courts
and thus they wanted “experts” to decide. In this case, while the organizers
wanted to assure the participation of all conferees in these decisions, many
delegates were reluctant to choose. As one participant noted, “what we do not
understand, you should not ask us to vote on . . . these are aspects that are the
business of the lawyers and judges.”30 We see here a dilemma for participa-
tory democrats. When the process of liberalization involves decision-making
by individuals with vastly different levels of formal education, what is the
appropriate response to those who wish to opt out of the vote, because of their
own self-perceived lack of “expertise”? One speaker argued “The conference
needs to give these people the confidence they need to settle the question,
it is at their level that we should handle these questions . . .”31 Unfortunately,
attempts to reformulate the choice between a Constitutional and a Supreme
Court were not successful; at length all conferees were asked to vote. They
voted to create a Supreme Court at once, with a plan for the subsequent
establishment of a Constitutional Court that would rule on the constitution-
ality of laws.32 As chapter two explained, the constitutional court is a criti-
cal institution for democracy and in Mali it has asserted its independence
on more than one occasion in rulings that annulled controversial election
results. The very nature of the discussion on the draft constitution is quite
remarkable. There was no easy answer to how to resolve the dilemma pro-
posed by such widespread participation. Ultimately, the decision was made
on the side of inclusion allowing individuals to abstain if they so chose. The
very act of participating in the discussion increases the constitutional literacy
of those involved and the legitimacy of the conclusion reached.
While the new Constitution was modeled on the constitution of the
French Fifth Republic, there were several major departures. First, the
Malian president must declare the size of his estate prior to taking office, an
innovation clearly designed to prevent greedy rulers from enriching them-
selves at the state’s expense, in the manner of Zaire’s infamous Mobutu Sese
Seko, or Nigeria’s Sani Abacha. Second, there would be an Haut Conseil des
Collectivités as well as a Constitutional Court. Third, judicial power would
reside in the Supreme Court, lower courts, and tribunals; and fourth, coups
d’état were specifically prohibited as a method to obtain power.33
In an effort to portray Malian citizens’ limited understanding of the

constitution, one speaker observed,
90% of the population is illiterate so there will be a problem with respect to

the interpretation by the masses. The preamble is very subtle . . . it refers to
the preservation of culture and linguistic differences, but we know that the
history of society did not start with the republican form, so each constitu-
tion is the mixture of a culture that is many centuries old. In the preamble
there is nothing that accepts the customary laws that serve as the cement,
the harmony of the collectivity and that the law ought not intervene except
in the last resort . . . it shouldn’t be the case that the farmer goes to the
arrondissement etc. for every problem that needs to be solved.34
Thus while the constitution was to be created to protect rights, at the local
level this participant wanted to ensure the important role of traditional
leaders and customary laws as the first step toward resolving conflicts.
Another issue of concern was discrimination. One of the few female
speakers wanted to add a Statut Sociale that would list different classes
among those not to be discriminated against.
A flagrant example of this sort of discrimination took place during the first
2 days of the conference by a proposition not adopted by the participants.
Since independence, until today, no change has taken place with respect to
(the poor that represent 99% of Malians). Despite the vain words of trans-
parency, of democracy and equality, the reality is bitter. The future of our
country is now more than ever, somber. A government leader that agrees to
a per diem, to free handouts of money to the participants, I find that to be
an insult to the poor.35
Receiving much applause, she rallied support from among those delegates
who were critical of politics as usual by and for an elite political class that
lined its pockets with government money. Of concern to many members
of the assembly was how the voice of villagers would be heard in this new
government and how the majority, made up of Malians living in poverty,
would obtain their fair participation in the Third Republic.
In this vein, a debate arose over the creation of a Haut Conseil des
Collectivités (HCC) intended as a separate assembly to represent clans,
cercles, arrondissements, and villages. However, concerns were raised over
whether or not the HCC would divide the people’s representatives in such
a way that the interests of the majority rural population would be removed
from the National Assembly. One speaker spoke at length on this issue.36
There are people who say that we must put a house into place for
farmers . . . The error is separating the farmers from the others. That way,
the farmers are alone. Won’t they be represented in the National Assembly?
It is necessary that the farmers understand that when there is a vote of the
deputies, they can elect a farmer to the National Assembly, if they are con-
fident in that farmer, they can do that.
The National Assembly, is where all of the affairs of the country will
take place, it is not just the things that concern farmers. The House of
Deputies will be established and it will be one chamber, everything con-
cerning the country will take place there. Farmers, functionaries, those that
speak French, women, children, so farmers must be there, they must not be
in a separate house.37
Farmers at the National Conference often referred to themselves as the

voiceless and those who have been forgotten. Katouka Sissoko, a delegate
from Bafoulbé cercle, argued for village associations to lead villagers down
the right path to participation in the new democracy.38 Sissoko’s support
for the important role of village associations in Mali’s new democracy
is important considering the complex history of such associations. Tonw
(associations) have existed in Bambara society since well before colonial-
ism and are associated with age-sets that served as mutual aid societies,
political groupings, and social organizations.39 During French rule, a
cooperative system that relied on the ton structure was created to assure
centralized control over rural areas and facilitate revenue collection.
In the colonial era, tonw became referred to as cooperatives within the
legal system. At independence, Modibo Keita depended on cooperatives
for local governance, and in 1963 under a general statute, cooperatives
became a branch of the state in which the ruling single party appointed
heads of each cooperative to operate as local-level party units.40 Although
tonw remained in use in Bamanakan, it was not until 1974 that the term
became part of the government’s rural development strategy when Moussa
Traoré’s party attempted to eliminate “‘imported Western’ cooperative
forms” and replace them with the “traditional” ton villageois.41 However,
the tonw were no longer “traditional” village associations. Rural adminis-
trators, who earned promotions based on the numbers of tonw that they
created, helped ensure that these organizations were run by party support-
ers. Although established in practice, tonw did not become official struc-
tures until the Décret No. 53/PG-RM of February 27, 1982. By 1988,
a law was passed that gave different status to cooperatives (voluntary
organizations with legal standing), Ton Villageois (representative orga-
nizations with obligatory membership for village inhabitants, only one
per village) and Associations villageoises (pre-cooperative structures, with
several existing per village).42 The dynamics among village associations,
ton villageois and cooperatives reveals the complexity of the roles played
by these associations within the political process. Without exception, all
those interviewed believed that cooperatives should no longer play the

political role that they had in the past.43
During the National Conference, rural delegates rarely spoke pub-
licly about the system of laws being put into place. Mostly they discussed
economic and development issues; primarily, they voiced concern about
the endless harassment by employees of the Ministère des Eaux et Forêts.
Government regulation of their activities, such as taxes and fishing per-
mits, were viewed as bureaucratic means to exploit the rural inhabitants.
Delegates were also interested in addressing the conflict between farmers
and herders. The conference allowed the rural delegates to discuss their
problems; but, it would be left to the experts to propose solutions. The
depth of the need to reform urban/rural relations was evident; conse-
quently the États Généraux du Monde Rural was planned for December
1991. Over three hundred participants, including farmers, herders, fisher-
men, and woodcutters, convened in Bamako to “inscribe their demands
and concerns on the Third Republic’s development agenda.”44 An addi-
tional États Généraux du Développement Rural took place March 9–13,
1992. Unfortunately, this meeting, though successful in terms of continu-
ing the push for decentralization, appeared to repeating familiar patterns
in which bureaucrats were speaking for farmers.45 This is a real challenge
to the participatory model presented. However, despite this hurdle decen-
tralization or sensibilisation can improve the ability of rural populations or
those with limited formal education to participate.
While the National Conference was unable to resolve the situation in
the North, it did, however, help to reconfirm the need for continued dis-
cussion of the issue. While the Northern regions of Mali had been virtually
ignored by previous governments, the National Conference presented an
opportunity to include the North in the institutional reconfiguration of
the State. As one representative from the North stated,
We came to the National Conference, leaving behind the hundreds of thou-

sands of exiles in order to follow dialogue and to find a solution. Today, we
are designing the outlines of the Third Republic, we have a great respon-
sibility to history. Without a doubt we have the occasion in this room,
today even, to throw away the basis for a durable solution to the problem
of the North. We also have the possibility to make a great step towards
peace . . .46
The CTSP convened a special conference on the North, naming Baba

Haidara as the official in charge of the negotiations.47 Haidara organized a
meeting, in Ségou, on November 25–27, 1991, that brought together civil
society groups from Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal regions, as well as repre-
sentatives of authorities and political parties.48 At a subsequent conference
in Mopti, on December 16–18, 1991, a commitment to national unity was

affirmed by those present. Unfortunately it would take several years before
the “problem of the North” was finally resolved.49
Throughout the conference, many of the speakers acknowledged the
authority of the interim president ATT, and spoke as though they were
addressing him, rather than one another as founders of the prospective
Third Republic. Uncomfortable with this approach, ATT tried to remind
conferees to let go of old habits.
Truly I do not want to be a pessimist to this point, but it is more important

that the suggestions be made to all the assembly, not to me. Because I am
under the impression that people think that it is me who will fix the prob-
lems. That is not the case . . . It is not me who solves the problems here. I give
each their turn and I move on to the next.50
This statement reveals a good deal about the nature of the discussions.
Conference delegates were not accustomed to an open forum in which
formalities were put aside. Deeply rooted in their actions was a respect
for authority that was formally, verbally, acknowledged by stating
“M. le Président” prior to announcements. Excessively deferential attitudes
to authority were not easily put aside.
Women and the Transition

Women played a crucial role in the movement to dislodge the regime of
Moussa Traoré. Their activities during the transition will be analyzed in
chapter five. However, it shall be noted here that there were no women on
the CTSP. Men were asked individually to participate, while women were
linked to their associations and considered to be represented by these asso-
ciations.51 An examination of the organizations that took part as members
of the CTSP reveals that they do not include any women’s associations. No
more than a few such organizations had been created by that time. Despite
Mali’s ratification of the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), it proved to be a struggle to
provide constitutional protection of the equal rights of Malian women.
Yet, this goal was achieved.
Three women were chosen to serve as members of the Conference
Committee. Mme. Soumaré Assa Diallo,52 the president of CADEF
(Comité d’Action pour les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme), was asked to
participate in the preparatory constitutional commission. As she explained
it, she was there to make sure that the constitution lived up to the standards
of CEDAW. While there were other women representatives (represent-
ing UNTM and the Islamic women’s association, for instance), Soumaré
argued that they were not there to fight for the rights of women. She stated
in an interview that dialogue was difficult for the women because it was
hard to speak out and be heard. During the preparatory meetings there
was tension between the participants over whether to discard entirely the
former constitution or to proceed cautiously and continue with the con-
stitution of the French Fifth Republic as a model. Ultimately the French
constitution prevailed as a model and the Malian constitution included a
clause on the protection of women.
The exclusion of women from CTSP and the perspective that women
would be adequately represented by women’s associations participating in
the National Conference is not particularly surprising. What is interesting
is the extent to which the small number of women participating in the con-
ference was able to have an important say in the constitution itself and in
particular the inclusion of the equality of women in the document. Cultural
norms perpetuate the view that men can adequately represent women in the
public sphere (indeed it is often viewed as their responsibility to represent
their wives and children) and yet a handful of women were able to ensure
that the founding document declared the equality of women. As we will
see, the application of this protection is a different matter altogether and the
hotly contested arena of Family Law and inheritance was not addressed and
therefore remains in conflict with the constitution itself.
History and a Nation

In 1236, in Kouloukafouga, after the fall of Soso, Sundiata and King Aliou,
created a constitution in 4 days that defined the state and external influence.
Today we are in the same situation . . . Since the conference began people are
listening to the radio, in French, but they don’t understand French, but they
listen, for the love of their country.53
Speaking in both Bambara and French for broadcast across the country on
radio and television, this participant’s testimony emphasized three criti-
cal issues in the National Conference: the role of history, language, and
nationalism. By drawing on the history of the region, he reminded listeners
that although the proceedings of the conference represent a new method of
framing a constitution, this was not the first time Mali has forged its own
constitution. Thus, he noted, Sundiata, the great ruler of the thirteenth-
century Mali Empire, created a constitution in just four days. The par-
ticipants in the National Conference, he said, are faced with an equally
daunting, but manageable task. The use of historical reference on the part
of this speaker served to unite Malians on the basis of a common heritage.
Even those who are not Bambara are likely to connect with the image of
Sundiata and the great empire of yore.
The history of the Mali empire may unite Malians of various ethnicities
but the multitude of languages spoken at the conference remained a daunt-
ing hurdle. Only 10 percent of the population can speak French and yet
this was the principal language in which the proceedings took place.
Translations were not available for several days. The speaker mentioned
earlier claimed that Malians, whether or not they spoke French, were lis-
tening to the proceedings of the National Conference, “simply out of love
for their country.” Such an image, whether real or imagined, indicates a
degree of eager participation throughout the country in the creation of a
nation. It emphasizes the way in which the conference served to unite all
Malians and include them in the process of transition. Significantly, broad-
casts of the discussions concerning problems particular to “le monde rural”
were predominately presented in national languages, not in French.
Early on, prior to the distribution of translations, a journalist noted,
“The farmers at the conference also complained about the lack of trans-
lation of the debates into the national languages that they speak . . . our
brothers feel a bit neglected in a debate to which they have something
to say.”54 A delegate from the Mopti area complained about the national
radio broadcast in Dogon and not Bozo. He discussed this at length argu-
ing that the Dogon have so many dialects and one cannot be understood
by another, whereas this is not the case in the Bozo language. Apart from
the discussion of the “Northern problem” with its overtones of ethnicity,
this was one of the few speakers that brought up a conflict between minor-
ity languages. My review of conference documents indicates rarely were
issues ethnic in nature, and therefore could not be defined as pertaining
specifically linked to minority groups rights. One clear exception is the
Albino Association that argued successfully for the constitutional protec-
tion against discrimination of minorities.
As Cheick Oumar Diarrah noted, the conference helped to assert the
interests of two groups previously ignored by the government, namely, the
rural populations and expatriate Malians living abroad.55 In addition to
Diarrah’s observations, one may be tempted to add Northern populations;
however, it was not until years later that these populations received the
attention they demanded and deserved.
The participatory nature of constitutional reconstruction in Mali is
linked to the legitimacy of the state and the preservation of national unity.
During the first wave of independence movements throughout sub-Saharan
Africa nationalism was the word of the moment. This political perception
is reflected in the works of leading scholars, among them Rupert Emerson
and James Smoot Coleman, who argued that nationalism suggests a
“greater awareness of a closeness of contact with ‘national’ compatriots as
well as with the ‘national government.’”56 Coleman was careful to point
out that nationalist movements combined traditionalist, syncretistic, and

modernist elements.57 The National Conference was an effort to instill
pride in being Malian when the state was wrested away from dictatorship.
As in the 1960s, democracy plays a key role in African nationalism today.
Where dictators were once able to centralize governments as a response
to a sometimes real, oftentimes created, threat of ethnic division and vio-
lence, Malian leaders now would attempt to draw on principles of broad
participation to allow all Malians to feel that they belong to the Third
Republic. Their efforts brought Malians together by linking their tradi-
tional, syncretistic, and modernist sentiments. This, I argue, is the new
African nationalism, one that draws on the important role that all citizens
share in the building of a democratic nation. Although it was written over
forty years ago, this statement by Coleman remains salient.
(African nationalism) is the inevitable end product of the impact of Western
imperialism and modernity upon African societies; it is also the inevitable
assertion by the Africans of their desire to shape their own destiny. Imperial
systems are disintegrating, new nation-states are emerging, and new
forms of political organization transcending the national state are under
experiment.58
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the experiment of nation-building

has been renewed in Africa.
Deliberative democracy is widely cited as the most representative and
participatory form of democracy and the transition period in Mali is a lab-
oratory for the study of deliberative democracy. The National Conference
represented many sectors of society that came together to debate how to
create a more legitimate system of government. This process involved writ-
ing a constitution, creating a Party Charter, and confronting head on the
problems faced in the northern regions. It is just this sort of open constitu-
tional forum that is encouraged by theorists of deliberative democracy who
argue that open debate and agreement is critical to the creation of a con-
stitution that will be suited to the governance of diverse peoples. Indeed,
Mali provides insight into the dynamics of such a forum in a “real-life”
context. The kinds of problems faced by the organizers of the conference
were in part due to lack of organization, and lack of time for preparation,
as well as a lack of finances.
Today, Malians, whose economy is growing steadily, although it is still
one of the poorest in the world, are striving to create a system that responds
to the needs of 80 percent of the population that lives in rural areas.
President Alpha Oumar Konaré, it may be argued, was a true believer in the
importance of dialogue in democracy. Although Konaré’s party ADEMA
was often critiqued by members of opposition parties as smothering the
opposition with its majority position in government, ADEMA enjoyed

widespread support across the country. While criticisms were plenty con-
cerning ADEMA’s dominance, it should be noted that from 1992 to 1999
Mali “moved from a single radio station (the national radio station) and
a single newspaper (L’Essor) to 30 newspapers and 115 radio stations. The
number of journalists (went) from 300 to 2,000.”59 Such growth opens
avenues for criticism of the government and promotes dialogue that is
critical to a thriving democracy. After more than twenty years of mili-
tary rule, popular participation in governmental decision-making and
agenda setting was far from being a reality for the vast majority of Malians.
Although Northerners and most rural citizens were excluded from the pro-
cess, the National Conference nonetheless helped to reestablish faith in the
government.
Deliberative democracy rests on the idea of open participation of all
sections of a given society. While it may be virtually impossible to achieve
this goal in full, this chapter has emphasized the wide range of participants
in the National Conference. In addition to those discussed, we must also
consider those whose participation includes simply listening to the process,
whether or not they understand the intricacies of the debates. This mode
of participation links the citizens to the historic process taking place and
its enduring legacy.
Ch a p t e r Fou r
I n t e g r at i ng Ci t i z e ns a n d
t h e Stat e: D e c e n t r a l i z at ion
a n d Elec t ions
Following the independence era in Africa, there was a brief period of

democratic ambition, but centralized governments remained the norm
throughout the continent. As transition movements were launched across
the region in the 1990s, decentralization became a key element of democ-
ratization. In West Africa, those states that failed to pursue inclusive con-
stitutionalism and decentralization, failed to democratize. After decades
of centralized government that routinely ignored the needs of the Malian
population, particularly of the geographically remote Tuareg population
and the rural majority, the Malian National Conference had paved the way
for decentralization. Conference participants overwhelmingly agreed that
democracy would depend on the incorporation of local interests and con-
cerns into government and that the top down governance approach of the
past would not lead to a sustainable democratic future for the country. As
a result, delegates to the conference incorporated decentralization into the
constitution of the Third Republic (articles ninety-seven and ninety-eight).
Decentralization was not new to Mali although previous efforts were
merely “cosmetic reform” that rarely included actual devolution of power to
local government.1 Indeed, immediately prior to the collapse of the Traoré
regime, the ill-fated Tamanrasset Accords, signed on January 6, 1991,
between President Moussa Traoré and Tuareg separatist leaders of the MPA
(Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad) and FIAA (Front Islamique-arabe de
l’Azaouad), included increased autonomy for Northern regions. This agree-
ment, which failed to bring peace to the region, established councils of
local representatives to govern economic and social affairs.2 Thus, as the
transition unfolded, demands for real decentralization were already on the
agenda and had been acknowledged by government authorities.
Mali’s recent decentralization has been deemed an exportable model
that focuses not simply on administrative reform, but also on political
reform that shifts power toward communities themselves.3 International

recognition of the former director of the Decentralization Mission (Mission
de la Décentralisation) and minister of territorial administration and local
communities Ousmane Sy underscores the importance of Mali’s approach
to democratic consolidation. Honored in Belgium in May 2005 with the
King Baudouin International Development Prize for his contribution to
democracy in the southern hemisphere, Sy stated that decentralization
secures the process at the local level by submitting democratization to the

test of reality on a local scale . . . It also constitutes a lever to make the local
economy more dynamic by moving the political decision-making closer to
local agents . . . The decision-makers are now the people on the ground, local
people, and not those appointed by central government.4
This chapter explores the links among decentralization, elections, and

democracy. The ability for individuals to influence policy and politics in
their own communities and at the national level is a critical element of
decentralization. Elections shed light onto the extent to which the rules
of the game are respected in newly democratizing states and are there-
fore a key element to the study of constitutionalism.5 Analysis of electoral
participation at all levels contributes to our overall understanding of how
society relates to institutions of democracy. If voting is a fundamental right
of citizens, what assessment can be made of their decision to partake (or
not) in the process? The electoral fallacy, in which elections are regarded
as the sole determinant of democracy, can lead to premature pronounce-
ments of democratic consolidation and therefore it is important to consider
elections as just one part of constructing democracy. After over a decade
of multiparty politics in Mali, election results and participation rates are
useful tools for evaluating the dynamic between institutions and society.
From the founding elections in 1992 to 2002 we see the rise of ADEMA to
a dominant party—as well as its internal rupture in the face of competing
presidential ambitions of the party elite.
By analyzing electoral outcomes and voter participation at the national,
legislative, and local levels, we are able to assess one important aspect of
the country’s effort to decentralize. This analysis begins with a review of
local government and its relation to democracy and then turns to elections
held since the transition. The presidential contest influences the overall
political environment, while legislative and municipal elections illustrate
the extent to which decentralization has helped to increase participation
in governance structures. We find that while ADEMA lost the presidency
and its control of the legislature in 2002, the primary political actors are
the same, having only changed party affiliation. This outcome emphasizes
integrating citizens and the state / 83
the difficulty of broadening the field of political actors in the country.

The continued dominance of the ruling class remains a challenge to
building democracy—a widespread problem in neo-patrimonial states.6
Nevertheless, the opening up of opportunities for participation cannot be
denied and is a first step to a more inclusive political system. Data reveal
that voters have routinely participated most actively in local elections and
by 2002 political parties were gaining influence in local communities.
Party competition at the local level and active voter participation are signs
of the vitality of political participation at the grassroots level.
Assessing the Role of Local Government

in Democracy
At the end of the 1990s, the decade that began with great optimism for
African democracy, Michael Bratton and Daniel Posner made the follow-
ing sobering assessment: “In perhaps half of Africa’s new democracies,
elections at the local level were either held late or not at all . . . Until elected
local governments are established or restored in African countries, how-
ever, the task of building democracy will remain seriously incomplete.” 7
This emphasis on the importance of local elections to democratic gover-
nance is particularly pertinent when we reflect that, since independence,
many local governmental authorities have served merely as extensions of
a centralized national government.8 Local governmental authorities across
Africa were once generally regarded as corrupt, inefficient, and dominated
by patronage networks.9 The interest in local governmental authorities and
their role in democracy involves a leap of faith—a belief that for democ-
racy to become real for the people at all levels of society, they must be able
to elect those officials who make local decisions. Only thus will they enter
into the political life of the state.
During the colonial era, “local governments were regarded as critical
for training both citizens and the political leadership in democratic life.”10
Unfortunately the postcolonial history of centralized government and cor-
ruption did little to achieve these ends. Dele Olowu challenges the com-
monly argued list of benefits brought about by local government noting
that across Africa local governments have failed to reinforce democracy.
Local governments have not created “improved” politicians, or officials
less corrupt than their national counterparts, and a lack of autonomy has
restricted the ability of municipalities to promote economic growth.11
This perspective indeed reinforces the need for real decentralization that
includes economic and political devolution of power, rather than continued
centralized control under the guise of decentralized administrative struc-
tures. Olowu emphasizes the contribution of local organizations (such as
informal credit and savings associations and other village associations) to

political and economic development. In many states in Africa, observers
note, there exists an increasing reliance on civic associations to help create
an infrastructure for development at the local level. In Mali, associations of
this kind must be “apolitical” to qualify for donor funds, yet their activities
often revolve around discussions of democratic rights and civic political
participation. Village associations, credit unions, garden cooperatives, and
so on, all create networks within communities that are useful for politi-
cal mobilization. Certainly the reinforcement of local level associational
life often leads to more direct changes (such as increased access to credit
or land) in the daily lives of individuals participating in organizations.
However, reforming local government structures remains a necessary step
to the process of democratic consolidation. Undoubtedly such structures
can benefit from civil society that reinforces trust and accountability
within a community. The challenge of decentralization is then to establish
respected local level political institutions and representatives. The recent
history of failures in this regard has not gone unnoticed by democratic
reformers. As Olowu suggests, successful local governance can benefit
from the incorporation of preexisting local structures, local control, and
accountability to the community.
Senegal, Mali’s neighbor and former partner in the short-lived Mali
federation, has had a decentralized system of government since 1972, when
320 rural communities were established as rural administrative structures.
The rural communities have since served to incorporate rural inhabitants
into politics, thus giving them confidence in Senegalese democracy and
their role within it.12 It is hoped that this confidence will prevail as a result
of the state’s more decentralized structure.
Designing Decentralization
Decentralization was designed to bring local communities in Mali together
in over seven hundred newly organized territorial collectivities or com-
munes, allowing communities themselves to prioritize their development
needs and to pursue these needs through locally elected officials. This
was a major departure from the previous structure in which the country
had only thirteen municipalities, each run by political appointees. The
Decentralization Mission worked with elders in over eleven thousand vil-
lages, gained their “consent and support for the democratic system, which
they then promoted in their respective villages.”13 In response to commu-
nity concerns that commune boundaries might bring together villages with
less mutual affinity than they had with other nearby villages, extensive
analysis of local communities and their relationships to one another took
place in order to avoid the arbitrary linking of villages. Responsibilities for

local development, budget, taxes, environment, police, and infrastructure
that once rested in the hands of the chef d’Arrondissement, the commandant
du Cercle, and the regional governor (all political appointees) came under
the immediate jurisdiction of elected commune officials. Today, com-
munal mayors are appointed by fellow counselors from within the elected
communal council. Their performance is supervised by the governmental
delegate of the Cercle. At the commune level, state employees of services
déconcentrés provide services to the commune. Preexisting village associa-
tions (tonw) are also incorporated into local development and are used to
promote community schools and community health centers. Historically,
the budgetary relationship between territorial collectivities and the cen-
tral government was opaque. While taxes were consolidated into one tax
contributed to the Regional and Local Development Fund (FDRL), it was
never established what proportion of the tax would remain in local cof-
fers or go to the administrative cercle or region.14 This lack of codification
reinforced the arbitrary nature of tax collection and many people’s distrust
of the system. One of the greatest challenges facing local governments
remains tax collection. Chiefs regularly work with mayors to collect taxes.
Transparency is crucial and yet it rarely exists. Citizens do not have the
information needed to hold their leaders accountable and therefore sen-
sibilisation is crucial and currently promoted by organizations such as the
Association d’Appui de Developpement Integré in the Mopti region.
Decentralization is an ongoing process dependent on local elections
that required tremendous infrastructure building. After years of delay,
elections took place in stages as regions were deemed prepared to pull off
the event. Not surprisingly, the electoral timeline related to overall infra-
structural development in each area. Nineteen urban communes held the
first municipal elections on June 21, 1998, the remaining 682 rural com-
munes held their elections nearly a year later on May 2, 1999, in the south-
ern regions and on June 5, 1999, in the North. A second round of elections
took place in all communes in 2004 and the next round of elections are
scheduled for 2009.
Within the communes, elected local officials are responsible for eco-
nomic, social, and cultural development of the locality. In addition, lit-
eracy training, preschool training, and primary education as well as
maternity hospitals, pharmacies, and local health units are the responsibil-
ity of the commune.15 While the state still maintains certain responsibili-
ties, the new administrative structure is meant to resolve the conflicts that
were prevalent in the past when outsiders (such as agents of the Water
and Forest Ministry) demanded taxes and levied fines on populations in
order to augment their own salaries. With finances controlled by elected
officials within the community, who serve five-year terms in office (there
is no limit on the number of terms), it is hoped that communities with an
interest in the resulting expenditures will take responsibility for local level
finance. The national government retains responsibility for general over-
sight and must assure the legality of decisions made by the commune.
Party Politics and Elections 1992–2004

Political parties are critical to the process of decentralization. Mali’s
party system has evolved since the post–World War II period when the
French-supported PPS (Parti Progressiste Soudanaise) and the anticolonial
US-RDA (Union Soudainais-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) were
the most influential political parties. Fily Dabo Sissoko, the leader of PPS,
accepted electoral defeat in 1956 National Assembly elections and joined
US-RDA, which became the dominant political party at independence in
1960. Under socialist leader Modibo Keita, US-RDA remained in power
for nearly a decade. In 1968, when Keita was overthrown by General
Moussa Traoré, political parties were suppressed and in 1975 the single
party UDPM (Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien) was created and
it remained in power until Traoré’s overthrow in March 1991. ADEMA
(Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali) began as a coalition of several previ-
ously clandestine organizations opposed to the seizure of power in 1968
by Moussa Traoré. In 1990 ADEMA became an official association as a
result of a legal technicality and international pressure for democratization.
ADEMA subsequently became a political party and under the leadership
of Mountaga Tall, CNID (Congrés National d’Initiative Démocratique)
also emerged as a relatively successful party.16 US-RDA, although rocked
by internal conflict prior to the 1992 elections, continued as an important
party during the transition period.
Following “les évenéments” of 1991, Mali held a series of votes that
served to launch the new government. In the four months from January
to April 1992, Malians were asked to come to the ballot box no less than
six times. By the time of the presidential elections in 1992, ADEMA had
established a strong rural network in every cercle and arrondissement,
helping bring their presidential candidate Alpha Oumar Konaré face to
face with rural voters. ADEMA’s “well-articulated organization became
an unbeatable electoral machine.”17 Emerging from the 1992 elections,
ADEMA and US-RDA had the strongest party organization and depth
in the rural areas. Selecting Konaré as president in 1992 helped to solidify
ADEMA’s powerful position relative to opposition parties and the party’s
legislative majority would remain for the duration of Konaré’s two terms
in office. This dominance would subside only when Amadou Toumani
Touré (ATT) was elected president in 2002 as an independent candidate

and the subsequent legislative election resulted in no single party obtaining
a clear majority in the National Assembly. Tables 4.1–4.4 provide data on
the distribution of votes between all candidates. In both 1997 and 2007
the incumbent candidate won in the first round, signaling the distinct
advantage of being the presidential incumbent.
Table 4.1 Presidential elections, 1992

Candidate, party affiliation Percent votes received, Percent votes received,
round one round two
Alpha O. Konaré (ADEMA) 45 69
Tiéoulé M. Konate (USRDA)* 15 31
Mountaga Tall (CNID) 11
Almamy Sylla (RDP) 9
Baba A. Haidara (USRDA) 7
Idrisa Traoré (PDP) 7
Amadou A. Niangadou (RDT) 4
Mamadou M. Diaby (PUDP) 2
Bamba M. Diallo 2
* USRDA split into two factions prior to the election.
Source: Mozaffar, 1999.

Candidate, party affiliation Percent votes received,
round one
Alpha O. Konaré (ADEMA) 84.4
Mamadou M. Diaby (PUDP) 3.6
Mountaga Tall (CNID) 1.8
Soumana Sako (CPP) 1.8
Choguel K. Maiga (MPR) 1.8
Seydou B. Kouyaté (US-RDA) 1.6
Abdoul W. Berthe (PMDR) 1.3
Idrissa Traore (PDP) 1.2
Mamdou L. Traoré (MIRIA) 0.9
Source: Mozaffar, 1999.
The presidential elections of 2002 were noteworthy for three primary

reasons. First, Alpha Konaré accepted his constitutionally mandated limit
of two five-year terms, not always a given in African states. Second, it
is significant that each prior election included a field of nine presiden-
tial candidates and that 2002 had a remarkable twenty-four candidates
vying for the office. Third, the election resulted in a transfer of power away
Candidate, party affiliation Percent votes Percent votes
received, round received,
one* round two
Amadou Toumani Touré (independent) 27.98 (28.71) 64.4
Soumaïla Cissé (ADEMA) 22.74 (21.31) 35.7
Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita (RPM) 20.65 (21.03)
Tiébilé Dramé (PARENA) 3.93 (3.99)
Mountaga Tall (CNID) 3.86 (3.75)
Moussa Balla Coulibaly (UDD) 3.41 (3.21)
Choguel Kokalla Maïga (MPR) 2.75 (2.71)
Mamadou Sangaré (CDS) 2.08 (2.21)
Mandé Sidibé 1.81 (2.01)
Ahmed El Madani Diallo 1.67 (1.63)
Daba Diawara (PIDS) 1.06 (1.10)
Oumar Mariko 0.86 (0.88)
Madiassa Maguiraga (PPP) 0.78 (0.80)
Youssouf Hassan Diallo 0.77 (0.80)
Mamadou Gakou 0.73 (0.74)
Modibo Sangaré (UNPR) 0.73 (0.75)
Mady Konaté (PDP) 0.70 (0.72)
Mamadou dit Maribatrou Diaby 0.59 (0.57)
Modibo Kane Kida 0.58 (0.62)
Almamy Sylla (RDP) 0.54 (0.57)
Habibou Dembélé 0.49 (0.51)
Sanoussi Nanacassé 0.48 (0.50)
Ibrahim Diakité (FNRSIT) 0.43 (0.44)
Abdoulaye Sogolomba Konaté 0.43 (0.43)
* The results in parenthesis reflect the outcome after some 541,019 votes cast in the first round
were annulled by the Constitutional Court.
Source: African Elections available online at http://africanelections.tripod.com/ml.
html#2002_Presidential_Election. Downloaded on June 21, 2005.

Candidate (party) [coalition] Percent votes received
Amadou Toumani Touré [ADP] 71.2
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (RPM) [FDR] 19.15
Tiébilé Dramé (PARENA) [FDR] 3.04
Oumar Mariko (SADI) 2.72
Mamadou Sangaré (CDS) [FDR] 1.58
Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga [FDR] 1.46
Sidibé Aminata Diallo (REDD) 0.55
Madiassa Maguiraga (PPP) 0.30
Source: African Elections database online at http://africanelections.tripod.
com/ml.html. Downloaded June 25, 2007.
from ADEMA. With an independent (ATT) elected to the presidency, the

political playing field was now open for multiple political parties to contest
local and legislative elections without the inside backing of the presiden-
tial office. Results from legislative elections, presented later, illustrate the
changes in the political environment.
Legislative elections are held with closed party lists in both single-member
and multi-member districts. ADEMA’s electoral dominance is evident in
1992 and 1997 (see table 4.4), a result in part of being the most well-known
political party and thus the party perceived to have the most influence in
government. In a country with a history of neo-patrimonialism in which
political power has always meant access to resources and to influence, it is
not surprising that Konaré’s role as president would lead voters to concur
that if local leaders were also members of the dominant political party then
resources would flow to their communities more readily. This had been the
nature of politics in the past and was presumed to be the character of poli-
tics in the present environment as well. Indeed, while democratic reforms
changed political institutions, such deep-rooted political behavior will be
slow to reform.
Elections were not a smoothly run affair throughout the decade. In
April 1997, legislative election results were annulled by the Constitutional
Court. The disarray of the electoral process and refusal of the opposi-
tion to participate in legislative or presidential elections in 1997 was
a crisis for the Third Republic and yet, the willingness of the govern-
ment to accept the ruling of the Constitutional Court reinforced respect
for that institution and in so doing provided a glimmer of optimism
for Malian democracy. As argued in chapter two, the independence of
institutions such as the Constitutional Court is critical to construct-
ing democracy. The Court could not be disregarded as a rubber stamp
for the administration—instead it had asserted its independence by
annulling the April 1997 elections. This institution would weigh in
on the 2002 presidential election as well, voiding over half a million
votes (nearly 25 percent) cast in the first round due to irregularities. In
that election, former ADEMA prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
(IBK) alleged “massive and grotesque fraud” that prevented him from
winning the first round and his claim was supported by the coalition
of five parties known as Espoir 2002.18 These parties included RDT
(led by former ADEMA ally and 1992 presidential candidate Amadou
Niangadou), MPR (led by 1997 presidential candidate Choquel Maiga),
and CNID (led by Mountaga Tall, a longtime member of the opposi-
tion and presidential candidate in 1992, 1997, and 2002). IBK not only
accepted the court’s ruling but Espoir 2002 participated in the subse-
quent legislative elections, won a plurality, and selected IBK as president of
the National Assembly. The willingness of political leaders to accept

the outcome of the court’s ruling is essential for constitutionalism as it
underlines a commitment to institutions of democracy. Although the
2002 presidential election was declared generally free and fair by elec-
toral observers, irregularities at the polls and persistent mismanagement
of elections remain important challenges to Mali’s “model” democracy.
Nevertheless, increased constitutional literacy and voter participation
may ultimately result in increased expectations on the part of citizens
for more smoothly run elections.
Table 4.5 shows the results of legislative elections over a decade. The
startling electoral outcome in 1997, in which ADEMA held 75 percent
of the seats and no other major political party was represented in the
National Assembly, is the result of a rupture in party politics (la crise
Table 4.5 Legislative elections, 1992–2002

Political party Percent of Number of Percent of Number of Percent of Number of
votes 1992 seats 1992 votes 1997 seats 1997 votes 2002 seats 2002
(116) (147) (160)
ADEMA 48.4 76 75.3 128 45 **
US-RDA 17.6 8 *
CNID 5.6 9 * 13 ***
PDP 5.1 2 *
RDP 4.4 4 *
UDD 4.4 4 *
RDT 3.8 3 *
PMD 2.7 6 *
PSP 1.7 *
UFDP 1.6 3 *
UMDD 0.4 1 *
RPM 46 ***
ACC 10
SADI 6
Nonpartisan 6
Malians from 13
abroad ****
Others 4.3 24.7 19 6**, 7 ***
Annulled
8
elections
* Boycotted election.
** Member of Alliance for the Republic and Democracy (ARD), party alliance.
*** Member of Hope 2002, party alliance.
**** In 2002, thirteen seats were added for Malians living overseas.
Source: Mozaffar, 1999; 2002 elections results available from http://www.ipu.org/english/parline/
reports/2201 percent5Fe.htm.
politique) and the boycott of legislative elections, which only served to

reinforce ADEMA’s presence in the National Assembly. This crisis and
the role of dialogue in its resolution are analyzed in more detail in chapter
seven. ADEMA’s political dominance is evident in elections in 1992 and
1997. By 2002 the party no longer held a majority of seats in the National
Assembly. However, closer analysis of the 2002 elections and the results of
the municipal elections of 2004 reveal little change in leadership and the
political class. In the period leading up to the 2002 elections, ADEMA
divided as the end of Konaré’s two terms in office left the political arena
open for presidential contenders and different personalities vied to be the
party’s presidential candidate.
The former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita left ADEMA when
it became clear that he would not be selected as the party’s 2002 presidential
candidate. He then created his own party, the RPM (Rassemblement pour
le Mali), which received the largest number of seats in the subsequent leg-
islative elections (2002). RPM had the third largest number of municipal
seats (13 percent) in 2004 behind ADEMA’s 28 percent and URD’s
(Union pour la République et la Démocratie) 14 percent. URD was cre-
ated by Soumaila Cissé, ADEMA’s unsuccessful presidential candidate in
2004. Cissé and his supporters were reportedly disappointed with what
they perceived as the party’s lukewarm backing of his candidacy and
Konaré’s apparent preference for ATT to become president.19 Presidential
politics not surprisingly had an important influence on the legislative and
municipal elections that followed.
In order to be more inclusive, local elections are based on a sys-
tem of proportional representation. Individuals are permitted to par-
ticipate independently of political parties.20 Local elections have now
occurred twice in all of the new communes allowing us to analyze the
results with respect to participation and results for political parties. The
participation of women in local politics and support of their candidacies
for local council positions have been encouraged by women’s associa-
tions and donors, such as USAID. ADEMA responded by maintaining
an informal policy requiring every third candidate on their party lists
to be female.
The results in table 4.6 show the major administrative restructuring
that took place between 1992 and 1998. Decentralization involved an
increase from 751 councilors nationwide to over 10,000 local government
seats in 1998/99 and 2004. Local elections in 1998/99 allowed for a wider
range of political parties to obtain municipal seats, although ADEMA
held nearly 60 percent of the total seats available with its closest competitor
(PARENA) holding only 10 percent (see tables 4.6 and 4.7). The results
with respect to women (table 4.8) remained disappointing with females
Table 4.6 Municipal elections, 1992–2004

Candidate list Number of seats 1992 Number of seats Number of seats
1998/99 2004
ADEMA 214 6244 3051
US-RDA 130 350 146
CNID 96 15 412
UDD 63 578 280
RDP 61 0
UFD 50 38
PDP 40 96
PSP 29 88
UFDP 24
RDT 11 38
PEI 6 12
PUDP 5 56
PDJ 4 11
PDT 4
UMADD 16
BDIA 223 107
CDS 204 154
MPR 388
PARENA 1045 544
RPM 1380
URD 1518
RND 143
PDR 145
MC CDR 120
COPP 97
PMDR (PMD?) 152
Other parties 14 56 648
Party alliances 131 1173
Independent 384 970
Total 751 10545 10,771
Source: Dissa, December 1999; 2004 results from Ministère de l’administration territoriale.
making up only 4.18 percent of those elected. In the district of Bamako

women represented 16.87 percent of all councilors, their largest percentage
achieved in any district or commune.
The 2004 election witnessed a smaller number of parties gaining a
larger share of local seats. The consolidation of party strength at the
local level, along with the decline of ADEMA’s dominance, is a prom-
ising outcome of the decentralization process. The tables presented ear-
lier illustrate not only ADEMA’s dominance at the national and local
Table 4.7 Municipal elections, percentage of seats won by party,

1992–2004 *
Political party Percentage of seats Percentage of seats Percentage of seats
1992 1998/99 2004
ADEMA 28 59 28
USRDA 17 3 #1
CNID 13 #1 4
PARENA 10 5
UDD 8 5 3
CDS 2 #1
BDIA 2 #1
MPR 4
URD 14
RPM 13
Independent 4 9
Groupe partis #1 11
Other parties 2 #1 6
* Results include parties receiving the most votes for each election.
Source: Dissa, December 1999; 2004 results from Ministère de l’administration territoriale.
Table 4.8 Women and municipal elections, 1998–1999

Region Total number of Number of women Percentage of
seats elected women elected
Kayes 1,815 60 3.3
Koulikoro 1,695 95 5.6
Sikasso 2,077 87 4.18
Segou 1,798 86 4.78
Mopti 1,591 60 3.77
Tombouctou 720 4 .55
Gao 467 7 1.49
Kidal 139 2 1.43
District of Bamako 237 40 16.87
National 10,540 441 4.18
Source: Ministère de l’administration territoriale.
levels, but the instability of the political arena. It is evident that all
alternative parties that were moderately successful in 1992 (excluding
CNID) failed to obtain legislative seats in 1997 or 2002. This may be
linked to the boycott of 1997 elections and voter fatigue with opposi-
tion tactics. It is also evident, as noted earlier, that very little change
has occurred within the political class. Indeed, most municipal seats
are divided between the parties of the principle vote getters in the 2002
presidential elections. The three contenders for the presidency, or their
parties, were the largest winners in the municipal elections. This is
hardly surprising given that they have the infrastructure and network
in place following the presidential elections. ADEMA maintained loy-
alty across the country, despite the departure of Cissé to create URD.
Independents and coalitions or “groupe partis” had relative success as
well, perhaps in an attempt to benefit from ATT’s status as an indepen-
dent. However, since his election, ATT made it clear to all candidates,
independent or not, that he would give no financial support or other-
wise to any party or candidate.
It may be argued that this moment in Mali, in which the president
supports no particular party, is a time from which all parties can ben-
efit. Rather than one party having the president’s influential backing and
greater access to resources, the field is open. In a best case scenario, this
would allow for differences between parties to emerge, ideologically or
organizationally. The positive results can be seen in municipal elections
where there no longer exists the dominance of a single party. While
ADEMA holds more seats than other parties, its margin of difference has
dwindled from 50 percent in 1999 to 14 percent in 2004. The less optimis-
tic analysis is that the current political situation results in no opposition
from political parties, or even from civil society itself. As Richard Vengroff
noted in reference to ADEMA’s dominant political position in the 1990s,
“democratic governance is unlikely to survive without a viable opposition
because of its crucial role in helping to establish long-term legitimacy and
stability of the country’s political system.”21 The lack of opposition evident
today is clearly the result of a president who is unaffiliated with any politi-
cal party. Rather than organizing in opposition to the president, at the
national level, would-be opposition figures have remained relatively quiet,
perhaps hoping to be included in the regime with a powerful ministerial
appointment.
This era of “consensus” politics has been a disturbing trend in the
country because of the lack of coinciding dialogue. At the heart of any
real consensus should be the free expression of ideas. Indeed, Konaré often
made reference to consensus in conjunction with dialogue. Unfortunately,
consensus during the first term of ATT’s government has been linked to
the concurrent disappearance of any real opposition—consensus without
dialogue is a threat to democracy. The year 2007 was hailed by the press
as the end of consensus politics, marking, perhaps, the return of a vibrant
opposition. A lively critique of tactics of the political class is vital and an
important sign that the country is likely to overcome the significant chal-
lenges to constructing democracy.
Assessing Voter Participation

An assessment of voter turnout since the founding elections in 1992
provides insight into citizen responses to the changing political arena. As
table 4.9 reveals, on January 12 a referendum on the new constitution was
held and a remarkable 43.5 percent of the registered voters turned out,
voting 98.4 percent to approve the Constitution of the Third Republic.
Elections that followed included municipal, legislative, and presidential
votes. Not until 2004 would participation rates match those of the con-
stitutional referendum that served as a symbol of the end of the Traoré
era and ensured the “downstream legitimacy” of the constitution as the
approval by popular vote is a symbol of the “popular will” in support of
the new document.22
The 1992 municipal elections had a substantially higher level of partic-
ipation than did the legislative and presidential elections of the same year.
Given the number of times that voters were asked to come to the polls in
a four-month period it is little surprise that participation rates plummeted
as voter fatigue settled in. Differences in turnout rates may also be contrib-
uted to the belief that locally elected officials have a more direct impact on
the daily lives of voters than would the president or legislative representa-
tives. Elections in 1992 launched ADEMA into the role of the dominant
political party, a role it would maintain throughout the decade. Such dom-
inance implies that voter choice is indeed restricted and that few candidates
offer real alternatives to the dominant political party. Candidates of major
political parties have a distinct advantage, especially those parties in power
at the national level, because it is often believed that their connections will
offer more opportunities for municipalities to reap financial benefits for
Table 4.9 Electoral participation rates in 1992

Elections of 1992 Participation rate, national Results (percentage)
average (percentage)
January 12, Constitutional
referendum 43.5 Yes: 98.4
January 19, Municipal 32.1 ADEMA: elected 214
out of 751 municipal
counselors
February 23, First round legislative 22.3 ADEMA: 35.4
March 8, Second round legislative 20.5 ADEMA: 46.9
April 12, First round presidential 23.6 A.O. Konaré: 44.95
April 26, Second round presidential 20.9 A.O. Konaré: 69.01
Source: Bertrand, October 1992, p. 20.
their communities. This analysis implies that the choice of president has
distinct ramifications for voters’ choice of candidates at the local level.
Participation rates presented in table 4.9 show significantly higher par-
ticipation in round one of the presidential election of 2002 (38 percent)
than in the presidential race ten years earlier (May 11, 1997) in which the
national participation rate was 29 percent and ADEMA won easily in the
first round with 84 percent of the vote.23 A national rate of participation of
21.60 percent for the legislative vote on July 20 and August 3, 1997, that
replaced the annulled election is comparable to legislative and presidential
election participation rates of 1992. The increased participation signals
a rebound from the frustration with the electoral process that took place
in the mid-1990s. The disparity between regional participation rates and
those of the district of Bamako is also evident in each election for which
regional data is available. For the July 1997 legislative elections, the lower
participation rate in Bamako and Segou (12 and 15 percent, respectively) is
likely the result of opposition party support in the capital and in the Ségou
region (home of CNID leader Mountaga Tall).
The 1998 municipal elections were the first local elections held fol-
lowing the major restructuring that accompanied decentralization. It
is significant that relative to the national urban municipality participa-
tion rate (29.61 percent) the northern cities of Timbuktu (50.49 percent)
and Gao (46.41 percent) had very high participation in these elections.
Such an outcome reinforces the notion that northern populations, many
of whom argued vigorously for real decentralization, are willing to par-
ticipate actively in creating a more democratic Mali that responds to their
concerns. Municipal elections have had increased participation over time
in every region except in Kidal and in the district of Bamako. As is evident
in table 4.10, participation in the 1998 local elections was high in relation
to the 1997 legislative elections, and comparable to the 1992 participa-
tion rates for municipal elections. We also see a trend of increasing par-
ticipation rates in municipal elections. The results from urban communes
reveal a large difference between levels of participation in Bamako and
those from towns across the country. Timbuktu and Gao, both capitals of
Northern regions had remarkably high levels of participation, as did Kita,
located to the west of Bamako on the road to Kayes.
It may be argued that participation in local elections will bring people
into the democratic process such that they will be more active at the regional
and national levels. In both 1992 and 1997, participation in municipal
elections increased and was much higher than it was in other elections,
and rates of participation in the presidential races increased substantially
despite the opposition boycott. The first round of legislative elections in
1997, also boycotted by opposition parties, did not have increased levels of
Table 4.10 Participation rates* for elections, 1997–2007
Area Presidential elections Legislative Municipal
Regions/ May 11, First round, Second round, First round, April July Second round, Municipal 1998 (%, for Municipal rural Municipal 2004
Municipalities 1997 April 28, May 12, 2002 April 29, 1997 ** 1997 *** July 28, 2002 urban municipalities, communes, May 2 and (%, region)
2002 2007 not regions) June 6, 1999,(%, region)
Kayes 34 30.02 30 26.23 28.50 33.28 38.97 43.15
Koulikoro 29 26.33 32 20.54 28.05 33.72 39.73 43.72
Sikasso 26 26.75 39 21.04 23.01 40.23 41.08 44.59
Ségou 27 27.32 34 15.06 27.02 26.04 34.33 43.76
Mopti 32 39.94 36 24.50 31.64 33.27 41.77 52.66
Timbuktu 35 48.71 33 31.76 31.39 50.49 46.54 53.55
Gao 33 44.39 32 33.37 40.14 46.41 43.29 49.29
Kidal 43 59.16 32 44.08 42.06 44.55 37.40
District of Bamako 17 23.59 32 12.02 14.68 20.37 23.30
Commune I 13.76 17.46
Commune II 16.86 20.89
Commune III 18.51 25.47
Commune IV 12.68 16.72
Commune V 11.61 21.78
Commune VI 19.88
Nioro 43.52
Kita 49.2
Kati 42.34
Koutiala 33.72
Bougouni 43.26
San 32.15
Embassies and
consulates 32 19.69
National 29.02 38 30.17 36.2 34 21.6 29.61 33.14 43.31 43.07 (46.09
excluding
Bamako)
* Results are provided as percentages.

** Results annulled by constitutional court. Elections boycotted by opposition.
*** Second round necessary in only two areas. Circonscription de Banamba, participation rate 27.46%.
Sources: N’Diaye, 1998, pp. 24, 43–50. “Élections Municipales du 21 Juin 1998: Tous les Résultats,” Le Républicain, June 26, 1998, 4; “Résultats officiels définitifs des élections communales du 21 juin: Régions de
Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou,” Le Républicain, July 2, 1998, 2; Diallo, June 24, 1998, pp. 2–3. Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales du Mali. www.africanelections.tripode.com/ml.html.
voter participation; yet, because the results of this election were annulled,
it is unwise to draw conclusions from the data available.
Local Power Structures and Decentralization

Village elders played an important role in bringing about decentralization.
As respected authorities in communities, the Decentralization Mission
relied on these individuals to speak with their communities about the pro-
cess. In this way, uneven power structures continue at the local level as
elders and traditional authorities maintain privileged positions. However,
it is important to recognize that while this has indeed been the case for
the implementation of the commune structure, local elections have opened
up the political community to individuals (both as electors and as candi-
dates) previously excluded (women in particular). Decentralization also
helps political parties build strength through grassroots support that may
culminate in greater representation on the national scale.
Previously, I discussed the phenomenon of dual authority in postcolonial
Africa. The director of the Decentralization Mission stressed this idea
when he stated:
If we must bring something new to democracy, it is decentralization which

permits democracy to come into contact with Malian reality. The commu-
nal counsels that are going to be put into place according to a democratic
process are going to have to compromise with the institutions already in
place; in effect, in our villages, there is not only democratic legitimacy,
there is also the long standing traditional legitimacy that even the coloniz-
ers were not able to sweep away: it is necessary to find the meeting point
between the two categories of power. I do not think that democratic ambi-
tion includes eliminating traditional legitimacy.24
This recognition of the importance of dual authority within the Malian

communities is important to the overall legitimacy of the process of decen-
tralization. If local government officials are perceived as disregarding “tra-
ditional legitimacy,” then the legitimacy of newly elected officials may be
challenged.
Further, if the political system is built on the foundation of a just con-
stitution then there will likely be an expectation for continued inclu-
sion in the political arena. In his discussion of participatory democracy,
David Held writes that if people know opportunities exist for effective
participation in decision-making, they are likely to believe that participa-
tion is worthwhile, to participate actively, and to maintain that collective
decisions should be binding. However, if people are systematically mar-
ginalized and/or poorly represented, they are more likely to believe that
their views and preferences will rarely be taken seriously. As a result, they
may find few good reasons for participating in, and regarding as author-
itative, the decision-making processes that affect their lives.25 In order to
avoid this outcome, complaints of exclusion are important and continued
observation of the relationship between rural and urban communities is
necessary in light of decentralization efforts. Increasing access to educa-
tion, consolidating decentralization efforts, and improving constitutional
literacy throughout the country will surely increase the quality as well as
the extent of participation.
Conclusion
Through decentralization of the administration and local level
governmental decision-making, the state policy of dialogue has an oppor-
tunity to continue. The creation of 682 additional rural communes allows
for the incorporation of rural communities in decision-making processes
that affect their daily lives.26 Past experience has shown that local govern-
ments are often controlled by a centralized power.27 Thus, the process of
decentralization is often perceived as ineffective rhetoric, rather than as
an actual devolution of power away from the state and into the hands of
the people. Mali’s decentralization experiment has strengthened political
parties at the grassroots and increased citizen participation in elections.
Further research is critical to access the extent to which policy decisions
are in the hands of elected officials at the local level and citizens vote
to change those officials of whom they disapprove. Decentralization not
only opens opportunities for more individuals to participate in govern-
ment as local counselors but it also serves as a mechanism to incorporate
citizens into the electoral process through municipal elections that are
often perceived as having a direct impact on the daily lives of those in the
commune.
The role of government at the local level is attenuated by local associa-
tions that have become increasingly active across the country and help to
maintain local schools and health clinics. Because Mali continues to be
dependent on international aid, financing of community schools and local
health clinics has been supported in large part by international NGOs
such as CARE and Save the Children, working in conjunction with local
organizations. In many instances, local organizations promote develop-
ment and fulfill roles that the state has recognized it can no longer per-
form due to lack of resources. Nation-building requires a balance between
local and national power; without such balance people may perceive the
inability of the state to provide for them and, as a result, lose their faith in
the government. It is too early to judge if this balance has been achieved.
Decentralization serves to promote local infrastructural development

while it brings rural communities into regional and national politics.
Constitutional literacy is increased as citizens learn about local govern-
ment and their role in it. By so doing, decentralization strengthens Malian
democracy through inclusion. Indeed, given time, the newly established
communes and the ongoing process of communal elections across the
entire country are likely to alter politics at the local level so that individu-
als become more aware of regional and national politics and their relation-
ship to the communities in which they reside. For instance, as budgetary
restrictions are faced by communal councils, the linkages between the
national budget and the commune are likely to become more apparent,
and as a result engage citizens in politics at all levels. Similarly, it is hoped
that by granting more financial control over local finances to the com-
mune, individuals will be more likely to pay taxes to support development
efforts within their communities. Systematic data on tax collection will
have to be gathered and analyzed in order to determine if such a change
has occurred.
Women are likely to play an increasingly important role in decentral-
ization through the quickly multiplying women’s associations. Over time,
it will be important for scholars to analyze whether or not the expansion
of women’s presence in politics has an impact on political accountability
and transparency in local and national government. The following chapter
explores how constitutional dialogues create a space for female citizens to
discuss and demand protection of their rights.
Ch a p t e r Fi v e
Ch a ll e ng e s t o I nc lusion:
Const i t u t iona l i sm a n d t h e
R ig h t s of Wom e n
Constitutional literacy is an important element of constructing democ-

racy because constitutionalism is only useful insofar as the people of the
country are aware of their rights and of the rules that are meant to rein-
force “responsible” government. This is even more important in countries
in transition because stability depends on the establishment of the rule
of law. Constitutional dialogues are critical in this process. The previous
chapter focused on the decentralization efforts of the Malian government,
designed to give individuals more direct influence in politics of their com-
munities and the state. Throughout the 1990s Mali also established the
Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique (the Question and Answer Assembly
is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter), a unique forum
designed to increase awareness of human rights and promote dialogue
between the citizens and their government. Participants in the forum
included a predominately urban male populace further emphasizing
the need for a gender analysis of Malian politics. Women comprise over
51 percent of the Malian population and despite their diversity often face
particular barriers to citizenship and constitutional literacy. Previous chap-
ters have briefly considered the role of women in the National Conference
as well as in the electoral process.
This chapter explores the ways in which constitutional dialogue, the
critical means by which Mali has pursued constitutional literacy and the
construction of the rule of law, has created a space within which female
citizens can talk about their rights. Unfortunately, like so many other citi-
zens, one of the reasons many women are prevented from exercising their
rights is that they do not know of the existence of such rights. This is com-
plicated by low female literacy and low gender and legal awareness that
are a result, in part, of gender relations.1 These barriers to dialogue must
be overcome in order for women to participate effectively. The examples
provided in this chapter explain the ways that associations are addressing
this issue. I consider the history of women’s participation in political mat-
ters and analyze the strategies that women developed under Konaré in
order to strengthen their role in Mali’s nascent democracy. Organizations
such as AJM (Association des Juristes Maliénnes), an association of female
jurists, GFDS (Groupe Féminin Droit de Suffrage), a group for women’s
voting rights, ODEF (Observatoire des Droits de la Femme et de l’Enfant), a
watch group for the protection of the rights of women and children, thrived
on the promotion of civic rights and growing awareness of these rights and
illustrate the extent to which globalization has influenced the dialogue
within Mali on democracy and human rights. I consider the complicated
issue of women’s citizenship in light of legal pluralism and the continuing
struggle to guarantee women’s constitutional rights despite Family Laws
that discriminate against them. This chapter centers on power and poli-
tics surrounding the debate over legal reform. It is a familiar case of the
struggle to maintain traditional norms in a democratizing state while at
the same time sacrificing women’s rights as citizens.
Through an in-depth analysis of the role of women in Malian politics,
this chapter explores the dynamic relationship between constitutionalism
and women’s rights. I shall address the broad gap between rural and urban
women, elite and nonelite women. Considering these familiar dichotomies,
we might wonder if it is possible to determine “women’s interests”; how-
ever, it is true that gender-shared identities such as ethnicity and class cross
the urban and rural divide. Similarly, the role played by extended families
in Malian society establishes a link between urban and rural areas. Despite
women’s diverse backgrounds, many have chosen to organize themselves
in gender-based associations, recognizing that they have similar interests
as women.
Chapter three focused on the National Conference as a venue in which
representatives from a broad segment of the society participated in consti-
tution making, including a large number of rural delegates. In the months
following the conference, the États Généraux du Monde Rural was held for
delegates to formulate their concerns regarding the development agenda of
the Third Republic. It is evident that the rural community was no longer
ignored by the CTSP as had so often been the case in previous regimes.
However, the startlingly low representation of women at the National
Conference (52 of the 1087 officially registered participants) reveals the
challenges that women would face with respect to political participation in
a democratizing Mali. Since its debut in 1994, women have participated,
if only in meager numbers, in the annual Question and Answer Assembly.
Women’s associations grouped together under the Committee for the
Tenth of December to unify their position and concerns and have used
challenges to inclusion / 103
this forum to demand respect for the constitution and the protection it
affords women and children. Thanks to women’s activism, by 1998, wom-
en’s rights were on the agenda of the concertations régionales for PRODEJ
(Projet d’Appui à la Réforme de la Justice), and were discussed in detail in
each of Mali’s eight regions.2
Women’s associations, once a source of vibrant criticism of the govern-
ment, underwent a transformation with the 2002 transition from Konaré
to ATT. Political parties, as evidenced in the preceding chapter, have rarely
challenged the government since 2002. Civil society is no different. Instead,
in the face of an independent, nonpartisan president, these essential voices
in the political realm have fallen silent most likely because of the lucrative
possibilities of project funding or political appointments. Although Malian
women had mobilized throughout the concertations régionales to support a
new Family Law, they did not continue their efforts following the election of
Amadou Toumani Touré (widely known as ATT) to the presidency. During
interviews in 2004, leaders of women’s associations who were asked about
the status of the reforms repeatedly replied, “It is in the National Assembly.
We are waiting for them to vote on this.” The lack of lobbying of legislators
by these organizations is certainly linked to the ability of ATT to co-opt
these groups. Independent of political affiliation, ATT successfully silenced
civil society with the merest hint of the prospect of a lucrative government
post. Whereas under Konaré many women leaders were part of a vocal op-
position to the majority party ADEMA, to date there has been little or no
opposition to ATT’s government. As a result, anyone might become part of
the administration with all the perquisites included therein. This possibility
alone silences dissent and is a great challenge to the strides women have
made throughout Mali’s process of democratization. Critical to continued
protection of women’s rights will be the decentralization of activism and in-
creasing participation by women across the country. Consensus politics was
a direct shift away from the dialogue of the past. While consensus may have
benefited a few select women, the loss of dialogue was a devastating blow to
the rights of women in the country. This chapter analyzes women’s political
roles in Mali, including their successes and the hurdles that they continue
to face in achieving their rights as citizens.
A History of Activism
Malian women have a long history of political activism. Women’s associa-
tions (musotonw) in Bamana villages regularly sent representatives to village
meetings.3 Throughout the 1950s, women were active in local and inter-
national women’s organizations. Under French colonial rule rural women
throughout the French Soudan voted in greater numbers than did men as
a result of the 1951 electoral law reform that favored women.4 Following
independence in 1960, women’s organizations were officially linked to the
ruling party, US-RDA, and later UDPM. Nonetheless, as in many societies,
a gender hierarchy persists and the patriarchal structure of Malian society in
which men overwhelmingly dominate the public sphere of politics remains.
Although women were poorly represented at the 1991 National
Conference, the few women in attendance managed to achieve the protec-
tion of equal rights for women and children in the constitution. Women’s
rights, however, were clearly peripheral to the debates at the conference.5
Despite these indicators, the participation and influence of women in
Malian politics increased dramatically throughout the 1990s. Since 1991,
as Mali pursued political liberalization there was a remarkable increase in
female representatives in the National Assembly from 2 percent in 1992 to
12 percent in 1997, after just one round of legislative elections.6 During
the same period the number of female ministers in the president’s cabi-
net rose from 2 to 6 of 22.7 Legislative elections in 2002 resulted in a
decline in female delegates from 12 to 10.2 percent with 15 of the 147 seats
held by women.8 In May 2004 ATT’s newly created cabinet included 27
ministers, 5 of whom were women. Administrative decentralization has
increased the available local government seats for women with the creation
of over 700 local government structures. Local elections held on May 30,
2004, resulted in the election of 704 women of the total 10,777 coun-
cilors elected across the country, or 6.5 percent.9 According to USAID,
between 1999 and 2004 the number of female candidates in local elections
has increased by 274 percent and the number of elected female councilors
has increased by 86 percent in sixteen communities targeted by USAID
programs.10 While a great deal still needs to be done to improve women’s
participation, these numbers are encouraging.
Informal mechanisms for women’s participation in politics are deeply
rooted in Malian society as evidenced by the following story.
The village chief held meetings in his home. In the same room, his wife
sat behind a curtain. After hearing his visitor’s case and before making any
decisions, the chief announced that he had to think about his stance on the
matter presented to him. His guest would then leave and the chief would
be free to discuss the issue with his wife. Only after deliberating with her,
would he make his final decision.11
This account is frequently told by Malians who advocate a more significant

role for women in contemporary politics. In this particular instance, it was
told by a participant in a GFDS (Groupe Féminin Droit de Suffrage) seminar
on women’s civil and political rights, held in the town of Sikasso. Women,
she argued, have always been integral to the politics of their communities.
Whereas they were once consulted only behind closed doors, today women
must not be afraid to lift the curtain and participate openly and publicly
in political campaigns and events. Other women chimed in, saying that
Malian women are taught that if they choose to speak out they will be con-
sidered arrogant and disrespectful. Thus, in public, they have learned to let
others speak for them.12 Another informal mechanism designed to include
women in political decision-making involves male villagers who will post-
pone decisions following meetings. This allows men to “sleep on” ideas
and go home to discuss them with their spouses. In some cases women
may gather the following day to discuss the issue and offer advice to their
husbands from a more unified position.13
Women’s long-standing importance in community decision-making was
clearly balanced against the deeply rooted cultural impediments to their own
public political participation. In the continuing process of democratization,
these women from rural communities find themselves in an environment
that encourages their participation as Malian citizens. Yet, how are they to
balance these disparate ideas, remain true to their own culture, and still
participate fully in the vigorous political changes taking place? Certainly,
the continued urban/rural divide and persistent gender hierarchy remain
critical challenges to constructing democracy in Mali. Continued dialogue
and improved constitutional literacy are not only central to improving
women’s rights but they are essential tools for building democracy.
Let us begin with a brief historical account of women’s political par-
ticipation in Mali. In her work on women’s formal associations in Mali,
Rosa de Jorio provides a familiar description of the role of women in poli-
tics. Her analysis of the colonial period prior to independence and the
period of socialist rule (1960–1968) emphasizes the role of women as
mothers. Their primary obligation was to nurture the citizens and dedi-
cate themselves to the creation of a domestic environment that promoted
good health, proper education, and morals within the family. It was by
these means that women were expected to contribute to national construc-
tion.14 They were also given tasks within the party, including “diffusion of
information, party cards, and folkloric performances.”15 Such tasks were
considered to be within the realm of acceptable female activity. Women’s
associations are therefore not new to Mali. Musotonw existed long before
independence and their role in ceremonial activities is both familiar and
widespread. Frequently called upon to participate in naming ceremonies
and similar family events, women’s associations helped to provide not only
the necessary numbers of women at such events, but they were also able to
assist in meeting the expenses associated with such events.16
Women were also revered as the embodiment of the nation’s traditions:
“Since the US-RDA (1960-68) and throughout the CMLN (1968-1979)
and the UDPM (1979-1991) periods, women have been represented as

receptacles of traditional African values. Women are ‘gardiennes averties
des lois et règlements garantissants la stabilité des foyers, la pérennité de nos
valeurs morales et culturelles’ (Kante 1987:2).”17 When women are perceived
as “receptacles of African traditional values,” protecting them from the
influences of “modern” life becomes critical so that as mothers pass tradi-
tions on to their children, they would help to preserve African cultures.18
Women’s political activism presents an obvious challenge to this role.
Of course the role of women as mothers and protectors of a culture’s
values and morals is familiar to feminist scholars worldwide. Modern states
rely on the political duty of mothers to give birth and increase the national
population. “The performance of women’s duty is vital for the health of the
state, yet the duty lies outside citizenship —indeed, motherhood is seen as
the antithesis of the duties of men and citizens.”19 Thus, it is feared that the
only way for women to become citizens is by taking on the roles of men and
relinquishing their duties and privileges as women. Similarly, in the United
States the struggle for the Equal Rights Amendment stirred fears among the
population that traditional roles of women would be challenged and women
would lose the protections afforded them by married life (in which the hus-
band had an obligation to support the family).20 The nature of the discourse
in Mali is not far removed from that in Europe and the United States.
A national women’s association, UNFM (Union Nationale des Femmes du
Mali), was created in December 1974 with the first lady, Mariam Traoré,
serving as the president. Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria are three of the many
countries where the wives of political leaders have been chosen to lead
either the national association for women or the women’s wings of rul-
ing political parties. Thus, these groups instead of being effective voices
against authoritarian regimes were often co-opted by the regimes them-
selves. Nonetheless, it has been argued that women in Mali retained a
certain amount of autonomy.21 Despite this autonomy, with the fall of
Moussa Traoré and his party UDPM in 1991, UNFM was dissolved. In
1994, many women in power were considered suspect by leaders of wom-
en’s associations as a result of the history of co-optation. The female head
of the CPF, according to numerous women interviewed, was described as
a “sell-out” and women representatives to the National Assembly were not
widely supported by women’s associations whose members felt that they
did not fight for the “interests of women.”22
Since 1991, as the political arena opened up, women’s associations
have spread quickly. An umbrella organization for women’s associations,
CAFO (Coordination des Associations et ONG Féminines du Mali) was cre-
ated in order to serve as a liaison between the Commissariat à la Promotion
Féminine and women’s associations across the country.23 The CAFO
included 50 member organizations in 1994,24 and after just four years,

by 1998, that number had more than tripled reaching 191 member orga-
nizations.25 Only four years later, in 2002, membership had skyrocketed
to 2044 member associations.26 CAFO has used its widespread following
to increase women’s presence in politics. In Mopti, the CAFO was instru-
mental in the election of Bintou Sanankoua to the National Assembly in
1997, having organized its members to support her candidacy. Regardless
of their party affiliations, members came together to support Mme.
Sanankoua.27 Similar examples exist across the country.
Women’s Associations at Work

Examples of the work being done today by women’s associations, partic-
ularly in the area of women’s rights and civic participation, are numer-
ous. Elite urban women have used their international networks to their
advantage at the regional and local levels. Throughout the country they
have created local branches of national organizations and have used these
organizations to help promote political campaigns, as well as development
projects. The ties among women throughout the country have contributed
to an ever broadening awareness of women’s rights.
A technician at the laboratory at the Mopti hospital described the dif-
ference between the Traoré and Konaré regimes thus:
Everything changed with the opening. Women didn’t have rights, or know
their rights before the Transition. With the Transition there was a flourish-
ing of associations and it was with these new groups that women became
aware of their rights. Women had been marginalized. In 1991, everything
changed. Women see on television that women from Bamako are fighting
for rights and that changes are taking place for women. This makes them
want to create associations to fight for their rights. Associations are the
means of empowerment for women . . . Because of the problem of illiteracy,
especially among women, people do not know their rights. Women used
to believe that they didn’t have any rights, they followed what happened at
home, what their husbands said.28
By stepping beyond the confines of the home, she argued, women can
raise awareness of women’s rights within the community. Associations and
television were helping to spread the word concerning human rights.
During a visit in 1994 to a garden project in Tibo, a village outside of
Mopti, a member of the Association Féminine Multifonctionnelle dennenso
stated her impression of the struggle to protect women’s rights in Mali.
She believed that those fighting for rights were women from Bamako and
she supported them, trusting them to fight for her. But, as she explained,
she was a rural woman and had other issues to think about; namely, would
the garden produce enough food for her to feed her family and allow her
to sell the surplus at the market, or would a broken water pump devastate
the entire crop?
Her story illustrates the principal issues to be considered. While some
women may have steady incomes, or are provided for by their families,
others, especially widows or single women, face structural economic con-
straints that make participation in politics virtually impossible. However,
this woman did not resent the struggle taking place in Bamako; perhaps
because she was a member of an association that provided a small garden
plot that she tended, and in return she helped with communal activities
necessary to maintain the project. The funding for the project was ini-
tiated by the American Embassy and over the years, it attracted other,
European, donors. The hospital worker from Mopti was the link between
the international donors and the widows and single women working their
land. The local association relied on the ability of an educated member to
complete grant proposals for funding that helped to maintain their proj-
ects. This same leader organized political campaigns to promote women
in politics.
Scholars have highlighted the tendency of Western analysts to homog-
enize “third world women” and in so doing to view these women in an
ahistorical context. The earlier examples provide just a glimpse of different
women’s relationships to politics. Considering the diversity of experiences
and expertise of women is critical to any analysis of the women’s move-
ment in Mali, which depends on the links between rural and urban, edu-
cated and nonformally educated women. Misunderstandings and conflict
between non-literate and literate women have been commonplace in Mali.
The conflict between women of different economic, social, and cultural
backgrounds was exacerbated by the role that UNFM, and other earlier
centralized women’s organizations played in perpetuating state interests,
rather than promoting so-called women’s interests. This divide is evident
more recently in the skepticism of some women toward the participation in
the 1995 UN World Conference of Women held in Beijing.
Aside from difference among women described earlier, individual women
each have numerous concerns that they must balance. For instance, women
frequently belong to numerous associations, each with its own purpose. In
Mopti, most women interviewed were members of three or four associations.
Several women were members of COFEM, a politically focused collective
of women. Other organizations listed were often professional associations
or credit associations that provided funds to women on a rotating basis.29
Credit associations have long been a part of Malian life. Of interest here
is the explosion in the numbers of existing associations and the numerous
groups to which any one individual belongs. The flourishing of associations,

I argue, is a result of the events of 1991, which led to democratic elections
in 1992. The environment in which rights and political participation are
discussed freely was a result of Konaré’s emphasis on dialogue as a mode
of governing as well as the role played by international donors encouraging
transparency and democratic governance.
In Sikasso in 1998, I asked participants in a seminar on civic rights of
women to describe the difference between their lives prior to the 1991 tran-
sition and their lives seven years later. Several women replied “on est libre
maintenant.” One woman noted that the three-day seminar in which they
were taking part would never have taken place before. It was also argued
that women were more politically active than men.30 Many women argued
that men support the women’s associations because they see them as being
financially beneficial to the family. Concrete changes are taking place for
Malian women with respect to their associational and political lives.
Analysis of three women’s associations, all of them active with respect
to women’s rights, may serve to illustrate the growing national dialogue of
the 1990s. Reports from legal clinics of AJM as well as ODEF provide a
glimpse of how women are using these NGOs to access their rights. AJM
sponsored a mobile legal clinic that provided local women an opportunity
to discuss issues directly affecting their lives. Lawyers from AJM traveled
to communities outside of Bamako and contributed to debates on citizen
rights taking place in remote areas, thus creating one of the more suc-
cessful arenas for discussing human rights. AJM also spearheaded a radio
show, “La Voix des Femmes,” broadcast on Radio Guintan nearly everyday
for a month. This was an important vehicle for discussing women’s rights
in a forum that both men and women would use. ODEF provided cliniques
juridiques as well as debates concerning topics either selected by women
within the target community or by ODEF members. Topics included the
rights of women in marriage and parental obligations to the family. In one
Bamako neighborhood, the women of the area requested a discussion of
the sensitive matter of inheritance rights.31 Such neighborhood meetings
included fifty to one-hundred people.
In addition, the seminars provided by GFDS in Mopti and Sikasso
illustrate another forum used to raise awareness of women’s rights in
these regions. The seminars included representatives of women’s asso-
ciations throughout the region. For three days, participants learned
the technicalities of presenting themselves as candidates as well as the
intricacies of the Malian electoral system. In one instance, women from
Yanfolila described how their local women’s association had created a play
in which they discussed the importance of women voting and being politi-
cally active. They presented this skit at numerous locations in the area.
While these examples cover only a brief period of time (1996–1998), they
each represent constitutional dialogues and give a sense of the issues that
were of the most immediate concern to the participants.
With respect to the activities of both AJM and ODEF, the primary
issues discussed by participating women revolved around divorce. In many
cases women are unaware of their rights in a marriage and their ability to
end a marriage. In Ségou, fifty-five participants attended a clinic sponsored
by AJM in 1997 to discuss marriage law. During a clinic in Kayes, the
marriage law was discussed and many questions revolved around divorce,
monogamy, inheritance, and responsibilities within a marriage. In certain
instances, women were assisted in assuring that their complaints were
brought to court to be tried. Participants wondered, for instance, “what is
the position of a married woman with respect to the monogamy settlement
when the husband wants to remarry?” Or, with respect to inheritance and
marriage, one participant asked, “In the case of the husband’s death, how
can the widow or widows be protected from abuse by their brothers-in-law
(expulsion from the house)? Is it legal to divide the inheritance between
married women and those who are divorced?”32 AJM encouraged women
to have civil weddings so that their rights are protected. A religious mar-
riage, which is commonly practiced throughout the country without a civil
procedure, does not legally bind the spouses in the eyes of secular law.
While many Malians respect the obligations of religious marriages, oth-
ers use the lack of a civil union to their advantage and leave their spouses
without resources. A civil wedding at least provides the partners with legal
recourse. As a result of this discussion, a participant asked “comment faire
coordonner coutume et lois? Vous dites qu’on ne doit pas tenir compte de la
croyance religieuse pour accepter les mariages.”33 Her concern was that with
an emphasis on the importance of civil marriages, Malians would become
less tolerant of religious differences and lose sight of what she viewed as the
importance of religion over civil law.
In 1998, AJM had planned a public awareness project concerning exci-
sion. Women often request that men be included in discussions concern-
ing women’s rights. In one extreme case, AJM representatives arrived in
Kasila, a village 45 km from Bamako, the women who met them said they
should go to greet the village chief. Upon arrival in the chief’s compound,
they found that all the men from the village had gathered together. They
wanted to know what the visitors had planned to discuss with the women
of the village. The anatomically explicit discussion concerning excision
took place in front of the men, with a griot, a member of a certain caste
(jeliw), asking questions for the male participants. The topics being dis-
cussed are often viewed as not suitable for mixed audiences. The use of a
griot to relay questions permits the asking of questions that may not be
considered appropriate for discussion by other village men. Ironically, the

representatives from AJM were not able to speak to the women of the vil-
lage that day because of the interest of the men in discussion on the topic.
However, the chief encouraged the women to return and discuss the same
information with the women, as previously planned.34 This example is
important in that it illustrates aspects of Malian culture that impact the
discussion of rights. In this instance, men who are so often excluded from
public awareness campaigns were involved in this campaign to stop exci-
sion. And it is hoped that the women of Kasila were able to participate in
the campaign as well.
Each of these clinics took place in small towns, outside of the capitol,
and regularly included 50 participants, and in some instances, over 100.
The clinic in Markala included a remarkable 128 participants.35 It is in
these forums that traditions are often discussed and questioned. Women
are curious how constitutional law protects them and how this relates to
traditional practice. In Bamako, the need to revise the practice of dowry
was raised in an ODEF clinic.36 This newly created discursive space thus
allows for deliberation over the importance of the various types of law that
function in Mali; namely, secular, religious, and traditional.
In addition to legal clinics, AJM has also created a support unit for
the exercise of civic rights by citizens, which began in December 1995.
Funding for these projects comes from such sources as USAID, CECI
Canada, and Coopération Belge, and the discussion created supports the
education of Malian citizens. It is increasingly evident that dependence
exists between the international arena and the national, regional, and local
level discussions that center on the constitution, its protections of Malian
citizens, especially women, and that this dependence blurs the divide that
exists between “authentic” and “Western influenced.”
Finally, the first GFDS seminar on women’s civic and political rights
took place in Sevaré, with participants from all over the Mopti region. The
second was in Sikasso and once again included a wide array of selected
participants who were representatives of women’s associations. It was hoped
that these women would form the foundation needed to create networks of
women in more remote areas that would encourage women’s active political
participation. Follow-up on the results of the seminar in Sevaré revealed
that several participants complained of a lack of funds as the reason that
little networking had taken place since the seminar. However, women in
Bandiagara, in the Dogon region, were very successful in using a federation
of women’s associations to continue dialogue on rights at the village level
across this very rural area.
During the Sikasso seminar, women discussed, in a jovial manner,
the issues relating to their political activism. The participants argued
that money is an important factor to women participating in politics as

candidates. Describing the likelihood that the activities of economically
dependent women be curtailed by their husbands, one woman stated, “I
have been unemployed for a while now. My husband always gave me gas
money. When I started coming and going for politics, he stopped all gas
money.” The women laugh. This woman argued that one can skimp and
save small amounts of money, as she does, to allow freedom.37
Women debated why they should present themselves as candidates, or
why they should vote and encourage others to vote as well. These debates
in which women are learning to negotiate in the new democracy are part
of the changes in Mali. Concerns over electing women representatives who
cannot read or write were also raised. Although many local level counsel-
ors are not formally educated, the consensus was that the most effective
persons should be elected. This frequently meant that candidates would
need to be able to read and write. Emphasis on female literacy has spread
throughout the country and efforts are being made not only to increase
the numbers of girls in schools, but to increase their rate of retention until
graduation. This is seen as central to the women’s rights as a whole as well
as to development and democratization.38
As we have seen, women’s associations play an important political role
in Mali by encouraging the candidacy of women in elections, educating
them of their rights as citizens, and in some cases providing legal assistance
for those whose rights have been violated. Constitutionalism and women’s
rights intersect in another important sphere and that is legal pluralism. For
women, their willingness to pursue the protection of their rights depends
on their knowledge of those rights (constitutional literacy), the support of
other women (one who is either in a high-level position or is educated), and
the willingness, in some cases, to contravene customary law.39 Fulfillment
of the first two requirements is linked to the growing numbers of women’s
associations and the networks and dialogue that they promote. It is to this
third complex issue that I now turn our attention.
Legal Pluralism and the Rights of Women

In Africa, and throughout the postcolonial world, civil law, or in many
cases common law, exists in conjunction with religious and “customary”
legal norms. Every individual must juggle multiple identities including
those based on his or her nationality, ethnicity, religion, and gender. These
numerous identities often include various norms for dispute resolution.
This multiplicity of norms is further complicated by colonial history and
imposition of European legal structures onto African societies and con-
tributes to current difficulties in establishing judicial institutions that
are accepted by citizens as legitimate legal authorities. Richard L. Sklar,

Stephen Ndegwa, and Peter Ekeh have each discussed the dual nature of
citizenship in Africa where the authority of religious and/or traditional
norms coexists with constitutional law.40 Sklar has shown how dual author-
ity has frequently provided a buttress for the state undergoing tumultuous
transitions. However, as is often the case, dual authority and legal plural-
ism prevent countless women from exercising their legal rights as citizens.
In many newly democratizing states in Africa (Mali included) women have
equal rights guaranteed by recently adopted constitutions and countries
have signed and ratified international agreements protecting women’s
rights. Legal pluralism, a topic that is increasingly gaining international
attention, challenges these commitments.
In this section I examine Malian constitutionalism with particular ref-
erence to legal pluralism and women’s rights. In Nigeria in 2002, Amina
Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning for extramarital sex, sending shock
waves across the region and around the world. As this case so clearly illus-
trates, the legitimacy of Nigerian constitutional law is tested by the imple-
mentation of the Shari’a criminal code in twelve northern states. Although
Lawal was acquitted in September 2003, her acquittal by an Islamic court
did not question the authority of the Shari’a and thus the fundamental
conflict between constitutional and religious law remains. In a less well-
known case in South Africa a landmark decision by the Cape High Court
declared unconstitutional the customary law principle that allows only the
eldest male to become an intestate heir. The court found that the only rea-
son the two girls in the case could not inherit from their father’s estate in
terms of customary law was because they were black and female. “This
discrimination on the grounds of race and gender was ‘offensive to their
right to equality’ and therefore unconstitutional and invalid.”41 In a similar
example involving inheritance, a headline from Lagos, Nigeria, implored
husbands to write their wills because widows have no capacity to inherit
under Nigerian Customary law. Government officials and other leaders
have stressed the importance of writing a will that clarifies the distribution
of an estate. Importantly their reports explicitly link poverty to a widow’s
loss of property.42 Discrimination against women is serious in the case of
widowhood when women end up without inheritance rights. Even when
fathers or husbands ensure that a written will is left behind to provide
for their daughters and/or wives, disgruntled relatives may not accept the
legitimacy of such documents. A striking case in Uganda led to the murder
conviction of the in-laws of a woman whose husband left his land to her
upon his death. The relatives killed her to prevent the land from leaving her
husband’s family. Fortunately, the Ugandan justice system convicted these
individuals of their crime, but only after the woman had lost her life.43
Debates concerning legal pluralism are often argued as resting on

group rights versus individual rights. Literature on group rights and mul-
ticulturalism has time and again relied on an argument for cultural sur-
vival, which removes the political nature of the struggle and the resulting
loss of power (by men) related to changing the status quo. When arguing
for women’s rights as individuals, the debate revolves around challenges to
the constitutional rights of generally 51 percent of the population. A study
of customary law and women’s rights in former Soviet states revealed that
“When women participate in the (political) process, and when women
become leaders in the community, all women within the community have
better access to the courts and government officials, and are more able
to exercise their rights.”44 This has been the case in Mali, Uganda, and
many other African states. Significant barriers often prevent women from
considering challenges to community norms. I contend that protecting
women’s rights in plural societies depends on three factors: (1) increas-
ing legitimacy of the judicial structures; (2) recognizing the political
nature of the conflict over constitutional and customary or religious law;
and (3) increasing education of citizens’ rights (constitutional literacy) in
democratic society.
As people begin to use courts to resolve problems, judicial legitimacy
so critical to democracy may be increased. In many countries, courts are
the last resort and disputes are resolved when possible within the family
or village. Recent land disputes in Yerere, Mali, have led to deaths (in
this case over the construction of a Sunni or Shiite mosque). A deputy
blamed deaths on the reopening in the courts issues “resolved” by com-
munities. Of course issues were never actually resolved if either party
chose to appeal to the courts to pursue the matter further. Court deci-
sions may be difficult to enforce, hence the importance of increasing the
authority of the courts. Courts are often viewed as suspicious because of
the history of corruption and the slow moving nature of the judicial pro-
cess. Legitimacy, it may be argued, is granted to the constitution because
of the participatory process by which it was created and it serves as the
foundation from which they can build judicial legitimacy. Malians are
extremely proud of their democracy and particularly the participatory
nature of their democratic transition; over time this may serve to help
reinforce judicial legitimacy.
The implementation of the Shari’a in Nigeria illustrates the dangers of
a situation in which a democratic government has been unable to provide
judicial structures free from corruption and cannot establish the rule of law.
Northern authorities have taken advantage of this void to help legitimize
the expansion of the Shari’a. The alternative legal structure takes the place
of the illegitimate legal structures of the state. With the implementation
of Shari’a criminal code an alternative legal institution has taken hold in

the North as result of political advantages sought by Northern leaders to
discredit the Obasanjo regime. It is unlikely that if the Nigerian govern-
ment had legitimate and effective judicial system, one void of corruption,
the political leaders in the North would have been able to be elected on the
platform of the expansion of the Shari’a.
The implementation of justice is a source of power. In Nigeria the state
has been unable to secure this power, whereas the Northern authorities have
successfully asserted their power through the Shari’a and challenges the
institution of the state. Amina Lawal’s case revealed how women’s rights
are threatened by the Shari’a. This example of conflicting legal institutions
in a state seeking to consolidate democracy illustrates the manipulation
of legal institutions for political purposes. It also reveals the need of the
state to establish justice within its territorial boundary. The state Nigerian
government depends on its ability to assert constitutional law throughout
Nigeria and to protect the rights of all Nigerian citizens.
The state in an effort to consolidate democracy must be successful in
increasing the legitimacy of the legal institutions in order to establish the
rule of law. Civic training has become a central aspect of this effort. In
Mali, the Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique brought to the public eye
the constitution and the rights that it protected. Konaré’s regime made an
effort to publicize the rights of citizens throughout the country, under-
standing that democracy and the rule of law have little meaning if people
do not know their rights. Democracy must also include increased legiti-
macy of judicial structures so that all citizens can seek protection of their
rights. Judicial autonomy and transparency are critical to the legitimacy of
these institutions.
The political nature of conflict over constitutional and customary law
is often overlooked, particularly in discussions of group rights versus indi-
vidual rights. The current debate in Mali over legal reform of Family Law
illustrates the political nature of the process. Legal reform is often perceived
as confronting authority within the community. This may have serious
consequences for women who challenge customary law and pursue their
constitutional rights, including the risk of being ostracized from the com-
pound or community in which the individual lives. Women rarely have the
economic security to live independently if they are indeed removed from
the family. Those women who go to court may be in a state of desperation
in which they “have nothing to lose” and have already been separated from
the support structure of family (often the case for widows). Nevertheless,
the numbers of cases across the continent in which women are challenging
customary norms has increased. In Benin a revised Family Code recently
passed after lingering in the legislature for several years. As Aili Mari Tripp
outlines, women across the continent are challenging the preservation of

versions of customary law that have eroded women’s rights.
Women’s movements have been particularly concerned that heightened pro-

tection of customary land tenure arrangements has taken place in a context
where the customary and religious laws and practices that have been retained
have selectively preserved those elements that subordinate women. These
arrangements have included customary divorce and inheritance practices,
keeping women as minors (e.g., Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe), bride-
wealth, widow inheritance (levirate), dehumanizing rituals pertaining to
widows, early childhood marriage, polygamy, and female genital cutting.45
Family Law is currently determined in the Malian courts by customary

norms and religious law. In many communities women cannot inherit
property. This property-less status maintains women in a position depen-
dent on men and susceptible to poverty. Maintaining a system established
by the French, judicial assessors serve in the courtroom and represent the
cultural norms of the individuals that are party to each case. Assessors were
considered local experts used to assist French administrators who had little
knowledge of local laws. However, analysis of the assessors shows that they
are frequently urban residents (always men) and often do not come from
the same religion or culture from those involved in each case (which was
the original purpose of assessors). As a result they have come to represent
an amorphous claim to the “traditional.” It is therefore relevant to ask to
what extent such cultural norms and cultural survival are being protected
by their presence in the courts.
In Mali negotiations for reform of Family Law (in which a central issue
includes women’s inheritance rights) included both women’s associations
and Islamic associations. The former president Alpha Konaré’s effort to sign
an ordinance to put the reforms into effect during his last week in office
(2002) was blocked. Muslim leaders interviewed in 2003 criticized Konaré
for attempting to make a unilateral decision and exclude the Islamic associ-
ations and their concerns at the last minute. The president had included the
associations throughout the process, holding regional and national forums
on the issue, and requesting input from religious leaders along with other
associations. Leaders interviewed stated that they support reform and rec-
ognize the need to reach agreement on reforming Family Law.
The legacy of the National Conference includes the demand for direct
participatory democracy. Regional debates and National Conferences con-
tinue on nearly all issues for policy reform. The unilateral move by the
president stopped the reform of the Family Law in its tracks. The political
nature of such reform is evident as the power of religious leaders was clearly
challenged and by threatening to create a crisis in the state they were able
to show their strength and prevent the passage of the law. Konaré who had
successfully resolved the political crisis of the late 1990s, did wish to leave
office having alienated important Muslim leaders in the predominately
Muslim country.
In Mali, women who seek to enforce their rights are often labeled as
“Western” women who do not espouse the values of their own culture. Aili
Tripp has carefully argued that this is not a struggle between “us versus
them” or the West and the rest. Rather, there exists a global movement for
challenging the gender hierarchy. First, we must be reminded that this is
not a struggle to which the West is immune. Second, as previously men-
tioned, the tendency to divide the North and South in such categories
mistakenly homogenizes these regions and their inhabitants. Nevertheless,
these challenges reveal the alienation faced by women who choose to pur-
sue their constitutional rights.46 In the following section I explore the links
between this global challenge to the gender hierarchy and the struggle for
women’s rights in Mali.
Globalization and Women’s Rights

The existence of legal pluralism illustrates the ways in which women’s
rights are being negotiated in postcolonial societies. This negotiation has
depended on the dialogue on women’s rights, which is linked to the par-
ticipation of Malian women in a global discourse on women’s equality
and protection of their universal human rights. The discourse by necessity
varies in content at the international, national, and local realms of political
life. Different communities experience the pursuit of human rights differ-
ently and therefore global arguments on rights must be adapted to local
conditions relative to the role of women in politics, the economy, and the
family. Malian women leaders are critical to this task. In an effort to close
the perceived gap between the urban and rural environments, these lead-
ers emphasize women’s rights as integral to the democratization process,
rather than a more “distant” global struggle for women’s rights.
Globalization has broadened dialogue on women’s rights through-
out the world. International networks created during the United
Nation’s Decade on Women (1975–1985) and particularly in the wake
of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing
(September 4–15, 1995) have helped put women’s rights as human rights
on the international agenda.47 As Lois A. West notes, “women’s presence
at UN conferences has redefined global agendas. Through international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), computer networking, and
other new communications technologies, feminists have been able to
insert women-oriented concerns and agendas into international discourse
and practice.”48 In July 1985, at the end of the UN Decade for Women,
a program entitled “Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of
Women” (FLS) was adopted by delegates from 157 governments meeting
in Nairobi. By 1995, 131 countries had ratified the UN Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).49
Discussion of CEDAW arises in interviews with leaders of women’s associa-
tions in Mali’s capital, Bamako, as well as in development program reports
from donor organizations50 and is evidence of the extent to which the
global discourse on women’s rights has permeated the discourse of interna-
tional donors as well as local elites. However, it is important to understand
how this international discourse relates to women’s lives farther afield.
In Mali, women have created networks to promote their interests at
the local, regional, and national levels. Computer technology is only
available to the wealthiest associations based in Bamako and a few other
towns across the country limiting reliable access to the Internet for most
organizations. Direct links to bilateral donors and international organiza-
tions based in the country have helped to provide the financial means that
have contributed to an increase in programs encouraging the protection
of women’s constitutional rights as well as the augmentation of their roles
in political life.51 Across the continent, bilateral and multilateral donors
have increasingly made development assistance conditional on political
and economic liberalization; Mali is no exception. The United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) has established strategic
objectives for its development initiatives, which include democratic gov-
ernance. Donors such as USAID, the French Ministry of Cooperation,
Germany’s Frederik Ebert Foundation, and the Centre Canadien d’Étude et
de Coopération internationale (CECI) are particularly active in programs that
promote public awareness of issues such as excision and civic education.
Throughout the 1990s it became evident that despite the reliance of
women on international funding, the success of this dialogue on rights
within Mali, paradoxically, depended on the ability of women leaders
in Mali to present themselves as separate from the international human
rights movement. Instead, they presented themselves as part of the new
Malian democratic initiative. This separate identity allowed leaders of the
movement to become insiders and gain acceptance into local communities.
As one woman who had not attended the Beijing conference explained,
women returning from China quickly learned that mentioning Beijing
often led to negative remarks labeling a woman “Westernized” and “fem-
inist” and thus not connected to Malian realities.52 The divide between
the elite women leaders who would participate in the Beijing conference
and those who were concerned with issues that were directly relevant to
Malians hobbled the Malian women’s movement in the early 1990s. In
May 1993, the government mandated the creation of the Commissariat de

la Promotion des Femmes (CPF), an official government body that would
advise the prime minister’s office on issues concerning women. The CPF
did not become operational until 1994, and critics believed that it disre-
garded concerns from la base, focusing instead on the upcoming confer-
ence in Beijing.53 By supporting institutional contacts or participation in
international women’s conferences, the CPF often offended women who
were occupied with local issues.54 Furthermore, as a government entity,
the CPF created disaffection of la base from the activities of the Konaré re-
gime. The extent of this division was evident at a legal clinic sponsored by
AJM in Kayes, located in Mali’s westernmost region. A participant noted
that with respect to the Beijing conference, “nous n’avons rien compris.”
Mme. Douré Bamou Diarra, the representative of AJM responded,
(The Beijing platform) is a platform (in) which the difficulties confronted

by women were raised. However, certain subjects evoked do not relate to
our realities. Our battle is a question of economic means. We must give
women the means to blossom while freeing them of weighty tasks, and
teaching them how to read and write.55
Despite the concerted effort made in Beijing to be inclusive of problems

facing women in the developing world, many Malians felt that the confer-
ence had little to do with what they faced on a day-to-day basis. Thus,
women eager to participate in international women’s conferences were
forced to balance their international experience with local Malian issues.
Mme. Diarra, representing AJM, was partaking in a project to promote
the rights of women and yet she distanced herself and her organization
from Beijing. The participation of these women in a global movement,
though central to their understanding of women’s rights, places them in
a precarious position in which they must establish a strong connection
to local women, or risk being ineffectual. In order for the human rights
discourse to be effectual in Mali, it must emphasize issues raised within
particular communities at the local level. Both AJM and ODEF helped
this process with the success of their mobile legal clinics, going into vil-
lages where efforts to preserve what is viewed as “traditional” and Malian
is most evident. If the dialogue on women’s rights is to be effective, clearly
it must take place at this level.
The effort to balance global interaction with local participation is also
evident in organizations such as APDF (Association pour le Progrés et la
Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes), GFDS, and ODEF whose mem-
bers include internationally prominent leaders. The president of APDF
Mme. Fatoumata Siré Diakité was awarded the Chevalier d’ honneur from
the French government in 1998; a female lawyer Maitre M’Bam Diarra

N’Douré, president of GFDS, was the sole member of the transitional
government, CTSP, and became the coordinator of a judicial assistance
program operated by the United Nations Center for Human Rights in
Burundi. Finally, Maitre Diarra Fatoumata Dembélé, vice president of
GFDS, president of ODEF, and vice president of the Federation of African
Women Lawyers, FJA (Fédération des juristes Africaines), is currently a
member of the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Despite the
international status of the leaders mentioned earlier, these women’s asso-
ciations operate numerous grassroots oriented projects throughout the
country. APDF has a very extensive membership base in each of the eight
regions in Mali. Fatoumata Siré Diakité is perhaps one of the most crit-
icized figures in the women’s movement. She is labeled as Westernized
because of her close ties with France, and as one of the leaders who, after
participating in the NGO Forum on Women in Huairou outside of
Beijing, had priorities that were not “Malian.” Yet, she has successfully
promoted a network of women throughout the country who preach wom-
en’s rights and lead the debate against excision. The outspoken nature
of Diakité’s attempts to transform Malian society has enflamed many
moderates and certainly more conservative elements of society, particu-
larly Islamic leaders.
Globalization has brought increased communication between these
women leaders and donor organizations. Many donors encourage develop-
ment projects from women’s associations or require a certain number of
women to benefit from a project. Aware that projects frequently have been
controlled by men who often used women to gain access to funds, donors
have made efforts to ensure that women are placed in decision-making
roles. The increase in women’s associations has helped improve the odds
of a successful project. Where women’s associations are vibrant, they are
useful in insuring that those intended to benefit from projects actually do.
Thus, decisions made at the national level are implemented with consulta-
tion at the local level.
The reaction to the Beijing conference and the criticism of those Malian
women who attended (often with government support) resulted in the cur-
rent situation in which women are more involved in projects at the local
level. The women who participated in the conference were forced, upon
their return to Mali, to address the issues of human rights as raised from
within their communities. The CPF, in conjunction with CAFO, CCA-
ONG, SECO/ONG (Secrétariat de Coordination des ONG Nationales),
established a Policy Plan for 1996–2000, which makes reference to Beijing,
as well as CEDAW and the African Platform for Action. Education, health,
women’s rights, economic development, women’s participation in public
life, and the environment were prioritized in the Plan. Budget allocations
for 1996–2000 reveal eleven billion fcfa to be spent over four years; 42
percent on economic development, 32 percent on education, 15.8 per-
cent on institutional “reinforcement,” 5 percent on health, 2.7 percent on
eenvironment, 1.6 percent on rights, 0.9 percent on public life.56 With 75
percent of the budget allocated for economic development and education,
the CPF and NGOs were responding to a growing concern that economic
roles of women must be increased and that promoting education would
help to address this problem. Economics and education are also the issues
most easily linked to political and economic development of the Malian
nation as a whole.
Conclusions
The gender sensitive development index, created by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), provides a measure for quality of life,
including life expectancy, educational attainment, and income, as adjusted
for gender disparities.57 Mali is one of the ten countries in the world with
the widest gender gap between men and women; over 45 percent Malian
families are polygamous.58 Today, thanks to legal reforms, Malian women
can marry and sign a pact of monogamy with their husbands. While prob-
lems still exist, this marks a significant change from the recent past in
which a woman had little choice in the man she would marry, let alone
whom else he may choose to marry in the future.
Despite the changes taking place, we must be aware of the restrictions
that women still face. Barbara J. Callaway argues in her discussion of Hausa
women that they were not encouraged to fight for issues of family plan-
ning, or inheritance rights, and so on, but were restricted to such issues as
education and the right to vote.59 She states that “men who believe in more
human equality and who are supportive of education and other opportu-
nities for women can gain female support for their parties, programs, and
policies, for there is female electoral support to be tapped.”60 Further,
Although the co-optation of women’s issues and concerns might provide

entry into the political sphere and give legitimacy to questions concerning
Islamic interpretations of proper roles for women, it is not likely that the
political “awakening” of women will be allowed to threaten mechanisms of
male social control over them.61
Certainly men have found women’s political participation beneficial.

However, it is unlikely that they control women’s decisions once women
are provided an education and can vote. Callaway believes that secular
laws are not likely to change practices linked to religious law. While it
is true that entry into the political sphere is limited at first, it is impor-
tant to recognize the strides that have been made and consider whether
men have as much control as is suggested. Do they have the ability to
“allow” women to act in certain ways, or will women continue to unite
and choose how to challenge male authority and when to do so? In Mali,
marriage law, inheritance rights, and excision are key issues now being
discussed across the country. Slowly, changes are taking place with re-
spect to excision and dowry. With reference to education, criticisms have
been made concerning male-biased classrooms and the need to pro-
vide environments that are conducive to learning for both males and
females.62 Such changes have an effect on the control that men will be
able to exercise over women.
During the Sikasso seminar women were asked whether or not their
husbands influenced their vote in elections. The overwhelming majority
of participants stated that they voted for the candidate of their choice,
not necessarily one their husbands preferred. One woman acknowledged
pressure from her husband and was encouraged by other women to insist
on her right to vote as she wished. If that was not possible then they sug-
gested that she simply remain nonconfrontational and vote behind the
curtain for whomever she wanted to support. Her choice would always
be secret. If asked who she had voted for, the other women encouraged
deception if she felt threatened by her husband. This example illustrates
the ways that women currently come together to support one another,
recognizing the conflicts that other women may face within their mar-
riages. By offering support to their co-participant, they encouraged her
at least to follow her own path, even if she did not wish to confront her
husband openly.
We must remember that the struggle for womanhood suffrage in the
West lasted for many years. Throughout Africa, women gained the vote
along with men at independence. In Afrique Occidentale Française, women
already had the vote. Indeed, French women rallied to expand the fran-
chise in the colonies during the 1950s, leading to the extension of the
franchise to include more women than men.63 Carole Pateman considers
the suffrage movement, primarily in the United States and Britain, and
raises critical issues concerning why the struggle for womanhood suffrage
took so many years, and no less important, why this has not been a topic of
debate within the field of political science. In part, she argues that suffrage
threatened men as a sex, and the power they enjoyed within a patriarchal
system. 64
Why then in discussions of rights and law in West Africa do we see a
willingness to include women in the electoral process, and recently in the
case of Mali, as candidates in elections? In Mali, as Callaway argues in

the case of Kano, Nigeria, men are not likely to give up their positions of
power to women, so while they support women’s education and political
activism, religious and traditional law concerning inheritance are rarely
challenged. Traditional and religious laws today provide a similar back-
drop to the discussion that cultural norms and morals provided in the late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century struggle for universal suffrage in
the United States, as well as the long debate over the ill-fated Equal Rights
Amendment. In each case, there exists a fear of altering the roles tradition-
ally ascribed to men and women.
As Malians deliberate their understandings of traditions and cultural
preservation in their new nation, the rights of individuals versus those of
ethnic groups are central to the debate. A leader of the struggle for women’s
rights expressed clearly the conflicts that they face. She noted, “I am in
favor of culture, but never culture that oppresses women.”65
While women’s associations were present at the National Conference,
were they representative of women’s interests in general or were the specific
interests of elite, urban women alone addressed? As shown in chapter one
and through the examples in this chapter, elite women assured the protec-
tion of women and children in the constitution. The divide that continues
between urban and rural women is slowly closing thanks to initiatives of
the women’s associations.
Some scholars have argued that resistance to the Beijing Platform
stemmed from “conservative male-dominated religious institutions,
states, and movements.”66 Yet, such criticism negates the validity of argu-
ments made by women who did not attend Beijing and complain of a gap
between the discussions in Beijing and their own realities. In the sense
that these realities are based on the status quo, they represent conservative
views. While examples throughout this chapter illustrate the connections
between the global discourse on rights and local initiatives, it is impor-
tant to recognize the ways in which the discourse was adapted to Mali.
Specifically, “Beijing” was rarely referred to directly by women leaders pro-
moting women’s rights (both those who had attended the conference and
those who had not), instead, reference was frequently made to Mali’s new
democracy and the role of dialogue within it. Helping to build a more
democratic nation and women’s role in this nation-building effort became
central to discussions on rights.
We must consider the slow steps over the centuries that the feminist
movement has taken in the West. No movement can be successful without
a strong foundation with a basis in local values. Just such a foundation is
being created today in Mali through women’s associations and their net-
works across the country. Certainly resentment existed between Malian
women who were funded to attend Beijing and those who were rebuffed by
CPF when seeking funds to promote their own small-scale projects. The
CPF, along with the Konaré regime, were forced to balance demands on
meager resources and pay more attention to issues critical to la base and
true dialogue within concertations were part of the solution.
Ch a p t e r Si x
Ex pe r i m e n t s i n Di a lo gu e
The previous chapter explored the challenges of inclusion, specifically with

respect to women. This chapter analyzes the experiments in dialogue cre-
ated in direct response to the need for inclusion and the continuation of the
dialogue that Konaré had made a calling card of his government. The Éspace
d’Interpellation Démocratique (EID or Question and Answer Assembly) is
the principal institution created and an annual forum in which individuals
publicly ask questions of government officials. Questions are submitted to
an honorary jury, read by individuals at the forum, and broadcast across
the nation on radio and television. Ministers are expected to respond
directly to the questions posed. It is a unique and remarkable example of
individuals being able to question publicly government officials on issues
involving their constitutional rights. The impact of this assembly is evident
in the fact that it has been replicated in the Sikasso region in Mali. The
next example of dialogue that I examine here is the Programme Décennal
de la Justice (PRODEJ). The National Forum on Justice took place in 1999
as part of PRODEJ and followed a series of concertations régionales in 1998.
While the judicial system in Mali has serious flaws, PRODEJ should be
highlighted as an important experiment in judicial reform and dialogue
that illustrates the legacy of the National Conference.
In this chapter I analyze the evolution of the Question and Answer
Assembly from its inception in 1994 to its current status in 2006 and assess
its utility as a form of auxiliary support for Mali’s constitutional govern-
ment. This forum played an important role in constitutional development
and constitutional dialogue in the country. Women in particular used this
forum to demand the protection of women’s rights as integral to democ-
racy and development. The EID was a welcome development in Mali’s
pursuit of democratic government and, despite criticisms raised against it
the forum symbolized the government’s commitment to the protection of
human rights. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade it became clear that
its continued value as a democratic institution would depend on the ability
of government leaders to prevent the exclusion of those wishing to raise
legitimate complaints against the government. Challenges to the forum

were manifest in the frequently repeated phrase “L’EID est du folklore,”
which implies quaintness, absurdity, and general aura of performance sur-
rounding the event. By 2002 the need to decentralize and revitalize the
EID was clear. With the transition from Konaré’s government to ATT the
forum lost its most fervent supporter, the president of the Republic, and
entered a phase of uncertainty.
Exclusion from the EID was often the result of the inability of the gov-
ernment to respond publicly to the numerous interpellations received, but
also of the lack of knowledge of the institution, and hence lack of participa-
tion from those outside of Bamako, the capital city. This was an important
issue particularly in the early years of the EID and remained a problem
with other venues. In fact a familiar criticism of PRODEJ was that wide-
spread knowledge of the project was lacking across the country and that
follow-through on judicial reform was slow. This chapter illustrates that
as knowledge of EID spread across the country, the forum was unable
to handle the rapidly increasing demand for participation. While critics
believe that the forum was not a genuine effort on the part of the Malian
government to broaden participation, my evidence indicates that the EID
expanded the scope of public discourse on justice and human rights and in
so doing enhanced the legitimacy and reputation of Konaré’s regime. In so
doing, this unique forum helped to solidify the foundation of democracy
and human rights across the country. PRODEJ took place over a defined
period of time and therefore did not benefit from increasing awareness that
the Question and Answer Assembly has benefited from over the years.
While the 1991 National Conference in Mali was modeled on Benin’s
National Conference of February 1990, Mali’s EID is original and unique
in the region. This forum is a natural response to the expectations of the
people following the National Conference. Since the National Conference,
Malian expectations of governmental performance have changed radically.
The participatory nature of that conference was designed to be as broadly
inclusive as possible. However, once the legislature was created and the first
elections of the Third Republic took place in February and March of 1992,
it became clear that the government would not necessarily continue to oper-
ate in forums as open as the National Conference had been. Opposition to
the majority party was increasingly excluded from the governing process as
a result of the overwhelming success of ADEMA in municipal, legislative,
and presidential elections.1 In 1994 President Konaré, along with his newly
appointed prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, began to emphasize
“governance through dialogue” to encompass a broad scope of society in
policy discussions, including the creation of the concertations régionales and
the EID. Whereas the three previous prime ministers had failed to reconcile
experiments in dialogue / 127
differences between the political parties, Keita changed the terms of politi-
cal debate and succeeded, if only momentarily.2
The concertations régionales and the EID were the result of Keita’s
moves to incorporate civil society in the process of government. In 1997
the consolidation of ADEMA’s power continued and those outside of the
majority party felt increasingly shut out of the system. A first round of leg-
islative elections in April 1997 was annulled by the Constitutional Court.
However, after apparently “free and fair” elections in July and August
1997,3 the opposition was barely represented in the National Assembly.4
In order to preserve a reasonable degree of political openness, the Malian
government actively pursued forums such as EID to offset criticism to
the effect that it was becoming a one-party state given the overwhelming
majority of ADEMA members in the legislature. Venues for dialogue (such
as those associated with PRODEJ) were being created across the country
while at the same time ADEMA’s political dominance was strengthened
much to the dismay of a vibrant opposition. Rather than political debate
taking place among different parties within the legislature or regional and
local governments, ADEMA created different institutions for criticism
and interpellation, thereby sidelining the opposition. In order to illustrate
the experiments in dialogue and their challenges, I now turn to a complete
analysis of EID, followed by a discussion of PRODEJ.
Constitutionalism and Justice

Charles McIlwain has argued that constitutionalism is an ongoing di-
alectic between the people and power.5 Central to such an exchange is
awareness, on the part of the people, of the rules of government or, in
other words, their constitutional literacy. Constitutional development can
only be achieved by increasing the people’s awareness of the rules cre-
ated to establish accountability between the government and the people.
Given the constitutional histories of the continent, Richard L. Sklar sug-
gests that this is an era of experimental government in Africa. He writes,
“Regardless of their intrinsic qualities, or records of early successes, exper-
imental governments are relatively fragile and likely to be upset in heavy
political weather. They require an auxiliary architecture to bolster their
stability in the short run and for the indefinite future.”6 Mali’s Éspace
d’Interpellation Démocratique is a case in point. It helped to reaffirm the
credibility of the state during unstable times and continued to serve as a
symbol of transparency. It represents an effort to increase democratic cul-
ture in Mali and, in so doing, augmented the legitimacy of the regime and
the future of democracy in Mali. Those participating in the EID, whether
by being physically present or by listening to the proceedings on the radio,
are informed of the numerous international conventions that protect their

rights as well as their own constitutional rights. Thus, improved constitu-
tional literacy enabled citizens to demand the enforcement of those rights
by the government. This broadening awareness and debate over rights is
critical to constitutionalism and the legitimacy of the regime in power.
By providing people with a space in which they can project the power of
their own voices, the government has taken a leap forward from relying
merely on electoral politics to ensure participation in government and
the protection of citizen rights. PRODEJ was a shorter term effort and
arguably reached a narrower audience. Nevertheless, it reflects a similar
effort to increase participation in the process of improving justice and
constructing democracy.
Critical questions can be raised concerning the EID. Some argue that
this forum, which endured for eight years during Konaré’s administra-
tion, does not play a significant part in constitutionalism because of its
uncertain future. By 2006, following internal and external evaluations, the
recommendation to institutionalize the EID was presented to the National
Assembly. Despite attestations of evaluators declaring the importance of
the forum, there was a period of uncertainty when it was unclear if there
existed a commitment to the institution on the part of the Department of
Justice, the National Assembly, and indeed the new president (Amadou
Toumani Touré) to ensure its continuation. A series of evaluations and
then the return of the forum assuaged these fears somewhat for supporters
of the EID.
Essential to the consolidation of democracy in Mali will be the strength-
ening of democratic culture and the expectation of continued dialogue
on rights. Over the years, the EID has played a significant role in the
process of constitutionalism by broadening the debate on human rights.
It is widely recognized that the Malian judicial system is viewed as cor-
rupt and in need of substantial reform. PRODEJ was meant to address
these failures and yet, to this day, reforms have been slow. This study
considers whether or not institutions such as the EID and PRODEJ have
allowed the government to address human rights on a purely superficial
level. During the 1990s opposition political parties showed little support
for the forum and labeled the EID a governmental charade. The extent to
which it has become institutionalized by practice and expectations of the
people will determine its future. Unfortunately, after a decade of the EID
in which similar questions were raised year after year and growing num-
bers of questions were excluded from the public forum, the notion that the
EID was theater was reinforced. Attempts to resolve this issue have been
made through initiatives to educate Malians across the country about the
EID and to focus on resolving issues brought to the forum. Despite the
criticisms raised and recommendations made during PRODEJ, deep flaws

within the judicial system remain.
Although the EID is but a fragment of the picture of constitutionalism
in Mali, its existence provides significant insight into governmental pro-
cesses as one of several methods chosen to encourage debate and provide a
space for dialogue between officials and the citizenry.7 I do not assert that
the EID makes up for weaknesses within the judicial system. Nor would it
be fair to state that the existence of such a forum was able to resolve peren-
nial conflicts between the majority party Alliance pour la démocratie au
Mali (ADEMA) and its critics in opposition political parties. However, the
EID did enable Malians to raise their voices and participate in negotiations
for the extension and protection of their rights as citizens. Many Malians
mistrust the capacity of the slow-moving courts to dispense justice and
the EID is often perceived as a popular check on the judicial system. It is
a forum for human rights and therefore its ultimate concern is with justice
for the people, and access to the institutions of justice. The EID is a con-
stant reminder of the extent to which the judicial system serves the people,
and of the problems that remain. This is by no means an effort to claim
that all Malians are familiar with the forum and have used it to voice their
concerns (this issue is addressed at a later point in this study); rather, I wish
to emphasize that it is a significant step toward more open participation in
the pursuit of justice within Mali. The problem of awareness of the forum
has come into focus for the government and prior to the 2004 EID del-
egates were sent to regional capitals to inform the people about the forum
and encourage participation.8
The EID is an institution for consultation with the people that exists out-
side the realm of the National Assembly and electoral politics. Theorists of
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy such as James Tully, Joshua
Cohen, and Seyla Benhabib have often commended the establishment of
assemblies in which citizens can deliberate openly and influence policy.9
While the EID falls short of the completely open deliberative forums rec-
ommended by such scholars, auxiliary supports such as the EID should be
welcome innovations in a constitutionally bleak environment. In this vein,
the lessons learned from Mali’s experimental forum may be of significance
to those scholars and policy-makers searching for new institutions that
enable democracy, particularly across Africa where constitutionalism has
failed so consistently over the years.
The Roots of the Interpellation

The practice known as interpellation was a tool used by the deputies
of the French National Assembly from the late eighteenth century to
the mid-twentieth century to secure information directly from cabinet

ministers. As Herman Finer explained,
The interpellation is a kind of a question, long and rather querulous, of

the nature of an English vote of no confidence, and its purpose is to put
the Government to the trouble of explaining its objects and methods in the
particular branch of its policy and administration which is attacked.10
Such attacks led to the resignation of many French ministers, indeed, in

France, “3/5 of all ministerial defeats were due to interpellations.”11 As
Carl Friedrich observed,
(interpellations) enabled the individual representative to challenge the gov-

ernment to an explanation of its policy in a particular branch of activity
and to provoke a general debate in the course of which anti-ministerial
sentiment could crystallize to the point where the assembly was ready to
overthrow the government. In the French parliament the total number
of interpellations between 1924 and 1928, which actually consisted of a
discussion followed by a vote of confidence or no-confidence, was 152.12
Although interpellations were originally intended to provide deputies with

direct and immediate access to government ministers, by 1950 they had
“become instruments for securing redress from administrative errors, as
well as important occasions for embarrassing the government . . .”13 In
1958, the method of interpellation was superseded by the adoption of the
motion of censure.14
Although the Malian instrument of interpellation reflects a French
intellectual legacy, it differs markedly from the French example. Whereas
the right to interpellation was restricted to French deputies in the National
Assembly, the EID does not rely on elected representatives to negotiate with
cabinet ministers; instead, this political “space” is opened to the constitu-
ents directly. Although questions must first be submitted to the Honorary
Jury for approval prior to action by the assembly, at its peak the EID had
increased participation by allowing nearly one hundred interpellations
annually from the citizenry, directed toward the most powerful members
of the government.15 As one journalist noted, “[the EID] seems to be the
last resort for many citizens who are discouraged by administrative slow-
ness and opaque judicial procedures.”16 Such access temporarily lowers the
barriers created by the judicial bureaucracy. A kind of popular authority is
manifest in the voices of the people as they publicly proclaim their rights
and ask for the government to enforce those rights.
Friedrich cautioned that, in France, while “the interpellation often pro-
duced brilliant debate; it precluded sound deliberation.”17 The structure of the
EID is very different from the French format and relies on the presentation of
all interpellations to the EID, followed by ministerial responses. The Malian

version provides the means by which individual citizens can challenge the
government directly, before a jury of national and international observers,
thereby incorporating them directly into the process of democracy. Critics
may argue that the Malian forum also lacks sufficient, sound deliberation.
Evaluating the first decade of the EID reveals a tendency for pontificating
on the part of both citizens presenting their challenges to the government
and ministers reading prepared statements that often seem to have little to
do with the fundamental questions raised. While focused deliberation con-
cerning human rights abuses was not evident, the public exposure of such
violations served the purpose of informing citizens of their rights and thus
improving their constitutional literacy. This is a critical step to the process of
building the rule of law and constructing democracy.
Origins of the Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique

In the early 1990s, Mali was in a state of crisis concerning human rights
and the widespread violence in the Northern regions. In order to coun-
teract the negative impressions created by the environment in the North,
in 1994 the government established the concertations régionales. The EID
emerged in that same year as a response to the concertations régionales in
which pervasive human rights abuses had been raised by the Malian people
as a critical issue in their lives. In particular, due to the violence experi-
enced as a result of the conflict with the Tuareg population, the EID may
have been an attempt to provide an outlet for those who felt as though the
state had acted unjustly and violated their rights.
“The concertations régionales had permitted the resumption of the dia-
logue between the rulers and those governed, between political actors and
civil society, and within each political family.”18 The dialogue thus begun
helped resolve the educational crisis of the time and reach out to both
the sedentary and nomadic populations of the North. “The concertations
régionales can be considered as the point of departure for reconciliation
between the authorities of the State and public opinion.”19 In what appears
to have been an effort to improve public opinion, the government created
the EID in order to promote dialogue on an annual basis.
In his opening statement at the 1994 EID, the minister of justice dis-
cussed the constitution, its importance to the day’s events, and the protec-
tions it guarantees.20 Two years later, he stated:
By creating a public space for direct exchange between civil society and the
government, the (EID) inverses the traditional logic of institutional relations,
and the debates of (the first) two editions (of the EID) have demonstrated
the importance and the significance of human rights in the consolidation of
democracy, and the reinforcement of social peace in Mali. Its repercussions

will progressively promote the emergence of a solid national democratic cul-
ture, and consolidate human values so that the anchoring of democracy and
its democratic principles will be irreversible in Mali. The EID is the contri-
bution of the Republic of Mali to the universal program of the conception
and execution of the promotion and protection of human rights.21
The forum was institutionalized by presidential decree number 96-159/

P-RM on May 31, 1996. Subsequently calls have been made for the National
Assembly to provide the EID with its own budget.
Participation and the Question and Answer Assembly

A spokesman for retired officers was incensed by the extremely slow pro-
cessing of their retirement portfolios. No one had seen the money that
they were owed. In 1997, he made his claim to the Éspace d’Interpellation
Démocratique. When he returned to the forum in 1998, he praised the
speed with which the committee had redressed the complaint, declaring
the Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique is neither folklore, nor a mas-

querade, even less so a mirror introduced by the government to gain the
people’s esteem while allocating a false image of Malian democracy. It is,
above all, a tribune where the authorities agree to listen to the citizens’
complaints and accepting their critiques, plan to find a legal solution to
their problems. Mr. President, we are proud to be Malian, because in all of
Africa, it is only in Mali that the government agrees to sit down to listen
to the population that comes to express themselves publicly, with complete
freedom, without any fear of prosecution or reprisals.22
In 1998, Mahomet Touré returned to the Palais de Congrès in order to

thank and praise the government personally. M. Touré stood before the
“Honorary Jury” of the EID and the members of the Cabinet in 1997.
Having lost his job as a railroad worker on October 16, 1995, he disputed
his dismissal, arguing that he was owed back payment from the railroad.
His case was stalled in the Court of Labor.23 He stepped from the micro-
phone and handed all his documentation directly to the prime minis-
ter, imploring him to help rectify the situation. In December 1998, as a
follow-up on this particular case, it was announced that the matter was
currently being reviewed by the Appeals Court. M. Touré was confident
that the issue would soon be resolved.24
Whereas in the past the EID failed to address the recommendations of
the Honorary Jury adequately or sufficiently respond to the complaints
of the participants, by 1998, as my two examples indicate, the govern-
ment was making efforts to resolve this issue. One journalist noted, “The
responses given by the government to the interpellations from last year

(1997) are proof to people of modest means that the EID is the best tri-
bune to expose attacks on their rights.”25 Over the years, the EID has
evolved from a forum in which human rights organizations, both national
and international, addressed the government on such issues as prison con-
ditions, the death penalty, and women’s rights into one in which individu-
als expressing personal injustices, as well as local associations concerned
with community issues come forward to demand their rights. This shift in
participation is an important example of an expanding discussion of rights
within the country, and hence a strengthening of constitutionalism. It is
also a sign perhaps of the failures of the judicial system itself, which has
not adequately protected the rights of citizens. It is important to consider
the EID as an auxiliary support to rather that a replacement of the justice
system. The public nature of the assembly does serve to improve constitu-
tional literacy in ways that even a functioning judicial system cannot.
The official objectives of the Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique are:
• to develop in an original manner the research and application of

national instruments for the promotion of human rights;
• to constitute a space for exchange that contributes actively and edu-
cationally to the realization of a national democratic culture;
• to inform national and international public opinion on the state of
human rights in Mali;
• to develop a valid reflection on the evolution of human rights in
Africa and in the world.26
The objectives of the EID promote the uniqueness of the forum and the
necessary search for innovative national tools to protect human rights.
Educating the populace in order to promote a national democratic culture
and informing public opinion on the state of human rights are both goals
that revolve around constitutional dialogues that improve constitutional
literacy. Described as “a new democratic space for communication,” the
hope is that the EID will contribute to the creation of means to promote
“effective application of different juridical instruments relating to human
rights as signed and ratified by Mali.”27 Without a doubt, the EID is a
critical space for constitutional dialogues.
The EID began as a forum in which Malians could come forth and
claim before a jury that their rights had been violated. It was an attempt to
ensure that the government would abide by the international conventions
guaranteeing the protection of human rights, to which it had subscribed.28
By highlighting not only the efforts of the state to protect human rights
but its violations of these rights, the EID has served as a mechanism for
consolidation of the rule of law. This institution, in conjunction with

reforms initiated by PRODEJ, are promising for the protection of human
rights in Mali.29 Throughout Konaré’s administration, the EID enabled
Mali’s fledgling democracy to shine in the eyes of the international com-
munity as had been anticipated by the organizing committee of the EID
in 1994.
The numerous themes relative to the exercise of human rights and pub-
lic liberties that will be brought up in the open public debate before the
Honorary Jury is an occasion for our country to make known all of the
efforts taken for the protection of these rights, but also to exchange ideas
in order to better consolidate the rule of law and to reinforce the practice of
the human rights in Mali.30
Each year, from 1994 to 2001, the Ministry of Justice announced the occa-
sion of the EID in both opposition and majority-party affiliated news-
papers, as well as on television and radio. The announcement called for
“political parties, corporations, individuals, associations, unions” to sub-
mit interpellations to the president of the organizing committee for the
EID, located at the Ministry of Justice, no later than five days before the
event.31 Interpellators are reminded that all questions must pose problems
linked exclusively to the protection of human rights as recognized by the
United Nations Declaration or the African Charter.32 Questions selected
for presentation at the EID are chosen by the Honorary Jury. Hence, jury
members play an important role in assessing the inclusiveness of the forum.
Because of the restriction of the sorts of questions permitted, only those
people familiar with their rights under these international conventions
would be able to submit questions. Thus, the diffusion of information
concerning these rights is important to the success of the forum.
The utility of the EID as an auxiliary support to the government depends,
in part, on its inclusiveness, which can be evaluated by considering the num-
bers and identities of the forum’s participants. In order to accomplish this
I have incorporated an extensive collection of tables that provide evidence
of the evolution of the forum since its beginning in 1994 to 1998. For the
period from 1998 to 2001 tables illustrating the participation in the forum
by profession and region have been presented. These tables reveal the grow-
ing number and diversity of participants and jury members each year from
1994 to 1998. From 1999 until 2001 there was a sharp decline in participa-
tion in the EID. While this may be explained by growing disillusionment on
the part of the Malian people with respect to the value of the EID, it is also
linked to the inability of the forum to handle its rapid growth. The shift away
from public responses to questions posed toward the creation of a “follow-up”
category was an attempt to respond to increasing numbers of complaints.
Unfortunately, this method led to very little follow-up at all and growing
disillusionment in the process. The EID as a one-day event simply could not
handle the numbers of complaints brought to its attention and the percentage
of rejected interpellations increased dramatically as the percentage of pub-
licly presented questions plummeted. In addition, the apparent disconnect
between participants’ concerns and the responses presented by government
officials are also likely to have contributed to the sharp drop in participation.
In part, the troubles for the EID were rooted in its increasing popularity and
thus its success at raising awareness of human rights. In 2002, an evalua-
tion of the 2001 EID took place, and on December 8–10, 2003, a national
evaluation forum took place. The EID returned in 2004 with markedly lower
numbers of participants than witnessed in earlier years of the forum.
The EID had a modest beginning in 1994. All of the participants were
residents of Bamako; the process involved only sixteen speakers, whose inter-
pellations were followed by the responses of ministers. The president of the
Honorary Jury was the only international figure (a Senegalese lawyer) and
two of the members were women (M’Bam Diarra N’Douré, president of
the Malian human rights association AMDH, and Diop Sira Sissoko, the
president of the Foundation of Women of Africa). Each major religion was
explicitly represented on the committee: the Catholic community had a rep-
resentative on the Jury, the president of Evangelical Protestant churches in
Mali was a member, as was an Imam, representing the Islamic community.33
The questions presented during the first EID focused on prison condi-
tions, women’s rights, the death penalty, arbitrary arrests, and the conflict in
the North. Only four individuals spoke who did not appear to be representing
the interests of organized associations. From the very beginning, women have
used the forum to voice their concerns over the conflict that exists between
their constitutional rights and the numerous conventions ratified by Mali, on
the one hand, and the daily life of many Malian women, on the other. Mme.
Soumaré Hadja Diallo of the Comité d’Action pour la Défense des Droits de
l’Enfant de la Femme (CADEF) congratulated the state for providing “a win-
dow of democracy to Africa” and called for the creation of a committee that
would address the application of the numerous human rights conventions
ratified by Mali.34 She stated that Mali was among the first to ratify conven-
tions protecting women and is one of the first democratic countries to have
taken into consideration, in its constitution, the rights of women, children,
and minorities. She asserted that “there will never be a true democracy in
Mali if the rights of women continue to be violated.” Mme. Diarra Fatoumata
Dembélé pointed out in her interpellation that Mali had ratified numerous
conventions concerning human rights and women’s rights but that there had
been no effect on domestic policy.35 The broadcast of such interpellations on
the radio and on television served to increase the public’s awareness of women’s
rights within Malian law. In so doing, the population has become increas-
ingly, if indirectly, involved not only in issues of constitutional concern but
also controversial issues concerning women’s rights. As we have seen in chap-
ter five, one of the greatest challenges facing Malian democracy centers on
legal pluralism and the rights of women. It is important to note that women
have responded to the opening of venues for dialogue such as the EID with
active participation. It is not surprising that those who have historically been
excluded from public participation in politics would jump at the chance to
demand their rights in the new spaces created through democratization. As
noted previously, women were important players in the events of 1991 and as
you would expect they continued to participate actively to ensure that their
constitutional rights are protected.
Responding to the interpellations, the minister of justice argued that
the organizers wanted to avoid a philosophical debate on human rights
and instead pay specific attention to cases. However, he spoke in general
terms and did not address cases specifically. This sort of eloquent but vague
response would not be the exception over the years. Other ministers handled
cases in more detail, and the minister of territorial administration called for
those claiming corruption of individuals to bring evidence to the forum.
The commissioner of the North spoke of the insistence by participants in the
concertations régionales on dialogue as the key to peace and security in the
North. The prime minister, on the occasion of the first EID, claimed that
the annual forum allowed citizens to participate in taking an “inventory of
Malian democracy.”36 This approach, in which the state is willing to openly
take an inventory of the rights of citizens in practice, attests to the reality
of democratic change based on the principle of transparency. However, it is
evident from the response provided that the ministers would have to submit
to follow-up evaluations of the questions raised, otherwise the very strength
and importance of the EID would be undermined.
By 1995, the number of interpellations had more than doubled from the
previous year, increasing to a total of thirty-nine questions. The Honorary
Jury, led by the Burkinabé president of Union Internationale des Droits de
l’Homme (UIDH), included an increasingly international presence. While it
had retained five of the original members from 1994, notable international
figures, including members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Human Rights Commission, the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des
Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), and Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits
de l’Homme de France (CNCDH) were now represented.37 In 1994, all the
participants in the forum had come from Bamako. By 1995, participants
sent interpellations from Ségou, Fana, Koulikoro, and Siama, while several
local associations and unions also participated—illustrating a progression
toward a more inclusive forum. Table 6.1 provides the name of each person
Table 6.1 Question and Answer Assembly (Éspace d’Interpellation
Démocratique)—participants in forum, 1995
Name Affiliation Interpellation topic
Benkafo Association for the Conflicts in commune between
defense of the interests of police and association, resettling
Commune 1 of individuals
M. Theirno Diallo President of the Association Concerns of discrimination and
of Albinos Albinos in schools
Maitre Issiaka Keita Representative of the lawyers Criticizes slowness of Ministry
of Finance
Maitre Aliou Diarra, Lawyer Fraudulent recruiting procedures
in Custom’s Office
Daniel Tessougué Secretary general of the Housing for magistrates not
Syndicat Autonome de la provided though guaranteed by
Magistrature law. Discusses prime minister’s
violations of the law
M. Maiga Representative of the Block for Format of EID, is it a
Democracy and African masquerade that hides all the
Integration states’ numerous violations,
which he lists
Mme. Diarra Fatoumata Committee of the December Constitutional rights of women
Dembélé 10 [representing AJM, violated: excision, prison
Association pour le Progres et la conditions, violence, inheritance
Defence des Droits des laws, marriage code, education,
Femmes (APDF), Collectif des and so on
Femmes Maliènnes (COFEM),
Observatoire des Droits
de la Femme et de l’Enfant
(ODEF), CADEF]
M. Diakardia Yossi Student from the École Resettlement in Bamako,
Normale Superieur (ENSUP) student scholarships, military
tribunal, press
M. Tieblen Coulibaly Kati Malibougou I Independent candidates,
language policy
M. Youssouf Traoré Deputy, represents UFDP Prison conditions, preventative
detention, press, and opposition
parties
M. Amadou Sangaré President of the Collective Incorporation of handicapped in
of Handicapped Persons the workplace. Asks why Mali
has not ratified the International
Labor Organization convention
M. Mamadou T. Touré Kalaban Coura Lodging as constitutional right.
Electricity and water in the
neighborhood
M. Sekou Ouattara, Sortant IPR Katibougou Particular case of land disputed
Mme. Coumare Fanta From Faladié Bamako Hospital conditions and rights
Coulibaly of patients
M. Kaba Sacko Juriste Bamako Security (same question from
last year)
Continued
Table 6.1 Continued

M. Cheick Fantamady President of the Association for End death penalty, conditions of
the Defense of Children in prisons
Prisons (ADEP)
M. Hamidou Doumbia Representative of the Union of Legal standing for house guards
Security Workers
Elhadji Aliou Mare Bamako Personal security
Source: Minstère de la Justice, 1996.
participating in the 1995 edition (when available), their affiliation, and the
topic of the interpellation. This information is particularly useful as it con-
veys the array of questions being asked of the government. Some questions
relate to fraud and corruption, others relate to unfilled legal rights. The com-
ments from Daniel Tessougué, the secretary general of the Syndicat Autonome
de la Magistrature, criticized the prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita for
violating the law. This direct, public criticism of the prime minister is in and
of itself a valuable moment for Malian democracy as it conveys freedom of
expression without fear of reprisal. In this Question and Answer Assembly we
also see the Comité du 10 décembre, a committee representing the most promi-
nent women’s associations questioning the government on the violation of
women’s constitutional rights. Table 6.2 provides information on those indi-
viduals or groups who submitted interpellations via mail. It is interesting to
note that some of these questions are raised by those concerned about justice
as it relates to the role of international actors and multinational corporations
in the Malian economy rather than focusing entirely on national politicians
and the justice system. Tables 6. 1 and 6.2 illustrate the breadth of issues pre-
sented at the EID and indeed the high expectations of the forums participants
with respect to the role of their newly democratic government.
By 1997,38 198 interpellations were submitted, 92 were presented pub-
licly while 106 were rejected. This is the first year in which the numbers
of interpellations increased to such an extent that the forum would begin
to face the problem of too many questions for the one-day event. However,
the rise in rejected interpellations served to increase criticism as the EID
could no longer be considered a forum open to everyone if time is allotted
for only 90–100 questions. Table 6.3 provides a partial list of participants
compiled while attending the forum on December 10, 1997.39
In 1998, 7 of the 15 members of the Honorary Jury were women. A
tremendous shift had occurred in the nature of the forum with many more
submissions and consequently many more rejections. A new category had
also arisen—that of the interpellation retained for follow-up. As we see in
table 6.4, 269 letters were received40 of which 98 were presented, 105 were
examined by Ministers, and 66 were rejected.41
Démocratique)—interpellations received by mail from those absent, 1995
Association of the former Nonpayment of money owed
workers of the textile factory to workers removed due to
COMATEX, Ségou structural adjustment
A contract worker of IEF Nonpayment of salary for 3
Ségou II months
M. Mohamed Kimbirir Business employee Pornography, betting, Islamic
courts, immorality of
television, violence against
women, Arabic in schools,
beauty pageants, and droit de
cuissage within Malian
administration
Dr. Yacouba Coulibaly Bamako Political exclusion
Y.T. Student second-year juridical Association des Elèves et
sciences École Nationale Etudiants du Mali(AEEM),
d’Administration (ENA) democracy, education
Bamako
Mme. Abderzak Maiga Bamakokouro Bamako Unfair system of patronage in
scholarship allocation
M. Adama Samba Traoré Bamako Malian schools
M. Sekou Samaké Cultivator in Konok Corruption and dependency
Arrondissement Fana, Cercle on exterior
Diola
M. Moussa Sidibé Business employee, Brush fires, dispersal of
Hamdallaye information concerning laws
to countryside
Bakary Samaké “Etablissements” Bamako Compagnie Malienne du
Développement des Textiles
(CMDT) and suppliers
The Cabinet Tidiani Etude de Maitre Cheick Police, Bandiagara judicial
Amadou Tall Oumar Aguibou Tall assistance office
M. Issa Diallo Bamako Bank
Amadou Lamine Diarra Treasury of Koulikoro 14 Unexplained arrest and seizure
of bank accounts, still doesn’t
understand why
Group of workers from the How are multinational
gold mines in Siama, corporations’ actions
Sikasso region restricted? Treatment of
mining workers, and pollution
levels at the mines
Démocratique)—partial listing of participants, 199742
AMDH Socioeconomic problems, congratulates
government on pardons for those on
death row, discusses the Commission
Électorale Nationale Indépendente (CENI)
LADH-Mali Revision of electoral codes
CARPA Criticizes lack of action after last EIDs
Amnesty International Congratulates government for pardon of
those on death row, discusses Amnesty
International
Committee of the Tenth of Number of women in legislature,
December excision, marriage code, Family Law,
children as beggars
CADEF Slavery, hospitals, closing of Kidal prison
Wells in Kati, electricity needed
Pave roads in village
Association of Koutiala Visitors to village
Marché Rose still not open, why?
Lost job with railroad, why has he not
been paid, handed prime minister his
documents
Practical training for graduates of law
school
Association for the Electricity, education
Development of
Kalabankoro
Association of Benkafo Commune 1, mayor’s performance,
follow-up on previous year’s questions
Ibrahim Maiga Land dispute
Mopti
Ibrahim Sidibé Agriculture People jailed without trial
Code for social protection (returned from
last year)
Association for Judicial
Reform
Workers
Juriste
National Committee for
Media access
Workers Union of
Koulikoro
ODEF Traffic of children, death of newborns
Cisse Inspector of treasury
Retired Officer
Continued
Table 6.3 Continued
Association of Victims of
the Gulf, Kazimbougou
Association of South
Kalabankoro
Retired Policeman Spoke in 1996
Djenne retired worker Unpaid money
Homes destroyed near airport
Union of the Grand Hotel
Association of Workers
from the Timbuktu Airport
Source: Data collected while attending 1997 EID, notes in possession of author.

Démocratique)—interpellations, 1998
Departments Interpellations Total
Retained for Retained for Rejected
December 10, follow-up
1998
Ministry of Justice 23 40 21 84
Territorial Administration and Security 16 13 6 35
Finance 16 4 2 22
Town Planning and Housing 7 1 1 9
Employment, Civil Service, and Work 5 11 4 20
Transportation and Public Works 5 3 0 8
Secondary Education and Scientific
Research 4 2 7 13
Water and Rural Development 4 5 3 12
Primary Education 3 4 3 10
Veterans and Armed Forces 2 6 0 8
Advancement of Women, Children, and
Family 3 0 0 3
Health, Elderly, and Solidarity 3 5 1 9
Advancement of Youth 2 1 0 3
Responsible for Institutions and Political
Parties 2 3 2 7
Foreign Affairs and Malians Abroad 1 0 2 3
Communication 1 3 3 7
Prime Minister’s Office 0 1 7 8
Industry, Commerce, and Artisans 0 1 2 3
Culture and Tourism 0 1 1 2
Mines and Energy 1 1 1 3
Total 98 105 66 269
Source: Ministère de la Justice, 1999, p. 3.

This table displays that the largest numbers of interpellations

concerned the Ministries of Justice, Territorial Administration, Finance,
and the Civil Service. The examination of questions by ministers out-
side of the forum appears to be a new method of reviewing only some
of the questions publicly. The number of questions addressed publicly
was ninety-eight, under the apparent logistical limit of one hundred. Of
course, the result of such a limit is that as participation in the forum
increases, the ministers are not required to respond publicly to every ques-
tion that they receive. This presents a challenge to the very purpose of the
Question and Answer Assembly. Without a public response, ministers
can avoid important questions. While public discussion of rights contin-
ues, the possibility for exclusion rises sharply. As participation in the EID
increases, the government must find a way to be accountable for each
question that is approved by the jury. Without such accountability, the
value of the Question and Answer Assembly is undermined. Indeed this is
the very path taken by the EID from 1998 to this day. As table 6.5 reveals,
the numbers of participants plummeted after 1998 and the numbers of
rejected interpellations are, for the most part, not made public.
As table 6.5 shows, following ATT’s election, the Question and
Answer Assemblies have continued in a much more restrained fashion.
Only time will reveal if attempts to spread the word about the forum
across the country will result in an increase in interpellations. It is also
possible that people are unwilling to participate if their efforts seem fruit-
less. Therefore, people will need clear indications of concrete results and
Table 6.5 Overview of interpellations, 1994–2005

Year Interpellations Interpellations for Rejected Total
read publicly follow-up
1994 16 n/a Unknown 16
1995 39 n/a Unknown 39
1996 Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable
1997 92 n/a 106 198
1998 98 105 66 269
1999 55 90 Unknown 145
2000 34 99 Unknown 133
2001 17 63 90 170
2004 27 14 5 46*
2005 30 18 7 55*
Total 351 357 172 880
* Does not include interpellations received after the deadline.
Sources: Ministère de la Justice, 2004 and “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique:
Un Exercice toujours utile” L’Essor (December 12, 2005).
responses to those who have come to the EID in the past. Press reports
of the 2005 EID show that there remains a small core of human rights
activists that continue to pose questions year after year on behalf of their
human rights associations. These include CADEF (Coalition Africaine des
Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme), ODEF (Observatoire pour la Défense de
l’Enfant et de la Femme), LJDDH (Ligue pour la Justice et le Développement
des Droits de l’Homme), RJPRODH (Réseau des journalistes pour la promo-
tion des Droits de l’Homme), to name a few. Two of these organizations are
important women’s associations. It will be a shame if the EID becomes
an event in which only the leading actors in the fight for human rights
participate. While this may serve to improve awareness of human rights
through public broadcasts of the event, it underscores the idea that the
forum is an event for elites.
In 2004, a Commission á l’organisation was organized. This group was
made up of human rights organizations and was led by Fatoumata Siré
Diakite, a controversial figure and president of APDF, the most widely
recognized women’s association in the country. The Jury d’ honneur was
reformulated to include six Malians and three foreigners—a change that
represented an increase in Malian participation. Despite a few changes
in the organization of the EID, the purpose of the event remains the
same, “Son objectif est principalement de contribuer à la promotion de la
culture démocratique tout en instaurant un dialogue entre gouvernants et
gouvernés.”43
Over the years the lack of debate permitted in the structure of the
EID has been raised as a principal flaw in the process. Ministers respond
at the end of the presentation by all of the interpellators; following
recommendations by the Honorable Jury, the forum ends. The ministers’
responses were often accused of being vague and eloquent statements that
had little to do with the questions directed to them. In one year a minister
took his time to speak about Ramadan and the approaching New Year,
rather than the EID and questions directed to his Ministry.44 Despite jury
recommendations, for years, the government was accused of not follow-
ing up on any such recommendations; however, by 1998, this problem
was addressed in part, as indicated by the public presentation of the gov-
ernment’s responses to each of the 12 recommendations of the 1997 EID
jury.45 Such follow-up must be central to the EID and has been central to
recent evaluations of the forum.
The EID clearly provides an opportunity for the government to dis-
play, with fulsome speeches about democracy, democratic advances that
have been made. However, we must analyze the extent to which this
forum reaches beyond Bamako to people throughout the country so that
their concerns may also be heard. The 1995 president of the organizing
committee of the EID introduced the forum by emphasizing the essentially

experimental nature of institutionalizing democracy.
Different institutions are progressively put into place and permit democracy
to settle in little by little. But, one of the major stakes in the stability and
force of all democratic systems resides in the ability of its government to
imagine, to invent and to create legal instruments that promote them and
permit, through education and teaching, the emergence and taking root of
a democratic culture. In order to do this, deep reflection must constantly
fall on the improvement of existing institutional instruments and the imple-
mentation of new legal mechanisms for the promotion and defense of fun-
damental rights and liberties. The current democratic demands expressed by
new trends in national public opinion, express simply the need to broaden
and enrich our classic institutional environment, by the possibility of a direct
dialogue between those who govern and those who are governed.46
This passage echoes the frequent demands made by international donors for
“good governance,” as well as the increasingly common suggestion on the
part of scholars of deliberative democracy that we must consider experimen-
tal institutions in order to create more inclusive democratic government.47
It is clear that Malian leaders have successfully imagined and created a
unique forum for dialogue. All too frequently, however, such dialogue does
not sufficiently reach those who reside in remote areas. I have analyzed
the Question and Answer Assembly in terms of participation in the forum
itself; in the following section I present data from throughout the country
that shows the gaps in the government’s attempt to decentralize the dia-
logue on human rights through the EID.
Regional Participation in the Question

and Answer Assembly
Interviews conducted in Ségou, Mopti, and Sikasso48 reveal another story
about the EID—a story in which the politics of Bamako are a world away
from the consciousness of those living beyond its environs. I interviewed
several women participants in a regional civic education seminar conducted
by Groupe Féminin Droits de Suffrage (GFDS).49 These women represent a
select group of women leaders from each region chosen to participate in a
workshop organized to increase women’s political activity. Yet, they came
from different villages and cities to attend the seminars, and because of
their status we might expect them to be more, rather than less, aware of
activities concerning human rights, particularly women’s rights. In response
to the common failure of studies to adequately address women’s voices, I
have made the interviews that I conducted with women in Mali central
to my analysis. Each of these women were often members of three or four

different associations, including national women’s associations such as the
Association pour le Progrés et le Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes
(APDF) or GFDS, as well as village or professional associations. However,
I have also interviewed leaders of NGOs, networks of NGOs, and interna-
tional PVOs for information concerning their roles in the EID.
The two most common responses to questions about the Question and
Answer Assembly in the cities visited were either simply that there was no
knowledge of the forum or “that is Bamako,” implying a different world of
politics in the capital that rarely reaches even the major towns outside its
limits (such as Mopti, Sevaré, and even Ségou). The three women (outside
of Bamako) who were aware of the forum and followed it closely included
a civil servant (a secretary for the Cercle of Bougouni who had followed the
EID on television), the president of Coordination des Associations et ONGs
Féminines (CAFO) in Mopti who asserted that “everyone followed the
EID,” and the treasurer of GFDS in Sikasso and regional coordinator for
the advancement of women, who knew of its existence, but had not partici-
pated. Other women with extensive formal education and professional work
in Mopti and Sevaré, who were considered locally as “leaders,” knew that
the central office of APDF had participated in the EID, but nothing more.
Alternatively, several women in the government-financed Office for the
Promotion of Women in Mopti had not heard of EID. They were, however,
very familiar with politics, having been leaders in the successful 1997 cam-
paign of Mme. Fatoumata Bintou Sanankoua for election to the National
Assembly. In Sikasso, a member of GFDS had never heard of EID. Women
from Kolondieba, located near the border of Côte d’Ivoire, who participated
in the GFDS seminar did not know of EID nor did members of APDF
in Douentza. Women interviewed in Bandiagara, who were members of
women’s associations and the AGVF (Association des Groupements Villageois
Féminin), a network of women’s village organizations throughout the region
had never heard of the forum. In Ségou, an interview with a representative
of the Coordination Régionale des ONG-Ségou revealed that she believed few
people from Ségou sent interpellations to Bamako.50 She had followed the
EID briefly on television but was not actively involved with it. Her organiza-
tion includes forty-one NGOs working in the Ségou region, and she is well-
placed to be informed of the participation of other NGOs in the forum.
Because the Question and Answer Assembly is on the radio and televi-
sion in these regions, it is understandable that women would be unlikely to
have followed the dialogue, unless they worked in offices where they were
able to listen to the radio. Indeed, only 4 percent of the interpellations
addressed by the EID were signed by women. Confirming these findings,
table 6.6 presents the percentage of interpellations accepted by region.
Table 6.6 Interpellations by region, 1998–2001

Regions Percentage of interpellations
Bamako 57
Sikasso 12.7
Ségou 8.6
Koulikoro 8
Mopti 5.7
Other regions 1.65
Non-residents 6.35
Total number 561 100
Source: Ministère de la Justice, 2004.
This data, along with the voices of women interviewed, illustrate how
little participation in the EID exists beyond the confines of Bamako.
Unsurprisingly, interviews conducted with male leaders of local coopera-
tives in villages near Bamako, such as Ouelessebougou and Sougoula, had
a similar result: no awareness of the forum.
On the other hand, the participants listed from previous years provide
evidence for a small number of cases from outside of Bamako that are heard
and addressed. Significantly, in 1995 workers in the Siama gold mines
used the forum to question the role of multinational corporations in the
mining industry and to demand better working conditions. In that same
year, 25 percent of the interpellations originated from outside of Bamako.
In 1997, Timbuktu airport workers used the forum to demand payment of
past-due salaries. These examples show that news of the forum has spread
over the years. Virtually no one interviewed was aware of the EID—and
yet participation from regions outside of Bamako has increased. It would
be unreasonable to expect that each individual interviewed would be aware
of the EID, but the extent to which politically active women were unaware
is significant. As dialogue has clearly been broadened, much of the popula-
tion remains isolated.
Government decentralization will, if successful, likely elevate aware-
ness of the institutions of government, including forums such as the EID.
While the concertations régionales discussed previously took place through-
out the country, the EID has yet to take such an approach. The success
of the 1994 concertations régionales was based on the fact that dialogue
among government representatives, political parties, as well as representa-
tives of civil society, was actively promoted in each of Mali’s eight regions.
As a result, rural inhabitants, a population frequently excluded from the
government and its decision-making, were effectively included in finding
ways to resolve the problems facing the country. By following the model
of the concertations régionales and expanding the EID to take place in each
region, the problems of unawareness and exclusion would be diminished
significantly. The government must take steps such as this in order for the
EID to be effectual. By 2004 the report on the National Evaluation of
the EID emphasized the need to involve local and regional officials in the
EID and to ultimately decentralize the process so that it takes place over a
period of at least two days throughout the entire country.
Sikasso was the first region to attempt a regional version of the EID. The
Éspace Communal d’Interpellation Démocratique (ECID) took place across
the region from November 6 to 8, 2001. In all thirty-two communes of the
region questions for locally elected officials were collected. Each commune
presented five questions and every woman’s question was retained. The end
result was a series of back and forth, questions and responses from elected
officials and people. As one observer explained, these were “ les premiers
pas du contrôle citoyen de la démocratie communale au Mali” 51 Remarkably,
in January 2006 another ECID took place. This event was organized by
the regional assembly and the forum included forty-three farmers (male
and female) brought together to discuss the use of genetically modified
organisms in Mali. The selection of participants was carefully regulated
to include 30 percent women and a variety of farmers (including those
without association affiliation and a diverse representation of all income
levels). The Sikasso case illustrates the embracing of dialogue as a method
of governing in a particular region of the country. This has clearly been the
philosophy of the representatives in the regional assembly of Sikasso and is
an excellent example of decentralization and inclusiveness in governance.
Further, it shows the ways in which elected officials have sought to reach
out to the people rather than to simply make decisions without directly
involving them in the process. While important challenges remain to the
success of the Question and Answer Assembly, the decentralization of the
forum to Sikasso is a sign of the remarkable contribution that this auxiliary
support has made to constructing democracy.
Opposition Responses to the Question

and Answer Assembly
Throughout the 1990s, opposition political parties insisted that the forum
was “theater” on the part of the government and that it did not illustrate
legitimate transparency. Many opposition party members refused to par-
ticipate in the 1995 EID because of a lack of debate (only three repre-
sentatives from opposition parties participated), arguing that because the
interpellators had no recourse to respond to the ministerial answers, the
government would always get the last word. Leaders of political parties
who often claimed that members of their parties were harassed, criticized
the government for violating the freedom of association granted by the
constitution. One journalist argued that the “EID is a veil that hides a
more tyrannical reality.”52
Without prejudice to criticisms of the Konaré regime, it remains the
case that diversification and internationalization of the Honorary Jury
diminished the regime’s ability to control the EID process. In order for
the EID to serve as a veil for repression of dissent, the regime would have
to prevent questions from reaching the floor of the EID. Ultimately the
selection of interpellations rests in the hands of the Jury. By simply open-
ing this space for public discussion of human rights, the government is
contributing to the creation of a more open and democratic environ-
ment. However, as the government fails to address the growing number
of questions in a satisfactory and public manner, this environment is
threatened.
It should be noted that with the creation of the EID, and other forums
meant to diversify participation, the opposition parties are no longer the
sole important mechanism for the people to voice their disagreements
with the government. This is not to suggest that opposition parties are
not crucial to the practice of democracy; rather, it sheds light on the
criticisms that they level against the EID. The role of political parties in
expressing and representing public opinion has been supplemented by
the process of direct public interpellation. Forums such as the EID, the
National Conference, PRODEJ, and the 1994 concertations régionales, all
represent an opening of debate to include people directly, without inter-
mediation by a political party.53 In so far as opposition leaders regard
this development as a threat to their own political capacity, they are apt
to be resentful.
The Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique is important with respect
to the rights of minorities and women as they can broadcast the abuses
they suffer under customary law and engage in discussion concerning the
best way to address violations of their rights. In 1995, the president of
the Association of Albinos used the forum to bring to light issues affect-
ing this particular minority. Similarly, the president of the Collective of
Disabled Persons used the 1995 forum to insist on the protection of dis-
abled people in the workplace. Minority voices are easily lost in legisla-
tive assemblies, as are the voices of underrepresented women. The EID
allowed for such voices to cry out and be heard clearly. Just as the emphasis
on dialogue and transparency is critical to the process, so too is the gov-
ernment’s legitimacy augmented when international and national opin-
ion acknowledges the regime’s willingness to face public criticism and to
respond directly to it.
It would appear, from evidence presented throughout this chapter,

that from 1994 to 1998 the EID had managed to become a political
space within which Malians could count on having their concerns
with respect to human rights not only raised before the Cabinet and
the prime minister, and broadcast throughout the state, but responded
to in a satisfactory fashion. Its popularity unfortunately led to a more
exclusive process that betrayed its fundamental goals. The EID is
an important institution in Mali’s efforts to consolidate democracy.
In turbulent times a unique forum was created and in a rather short
time span, it earned a significant amount of respect. The government
must now confirm its commitment to the forum through significant
decentralization of the process and institutionalization of the EID
through the legislature. Further, international praise and support for
the EID cannot absolve the Malian government from the responsibili-
ties that it has to reform the judicial system and to make courts not
only accessible, but also trustworthy institutions. In order to be truly
successful, the forum faces significant hurdles. For example, evidence
clearly highlights the extent to which the forum remains unknown to
large parts of the Malian population. The government must ensure
that the forum is indeed inclusive and make every effort to increase
awareness and participation in the EID by those individuals living
outside Bamako. In order to become more inclusive, the government
will have to address the need for reorganizing the EID so as to enable
all approved questions to be addressed publicly. By adopting a format
such as the one used for various concertations régionales, the EID may
continue to expand participation in the event. If the government fails
to find a way to include the increasing number of voices that are likely
to demand to have their interpellations heard, then the very essence
of what makes the EID an important and powerful institution will be
undermined.
By emphasizing the direct interaction between the people and the
government on issues concerning human rights, Konaré brought constitu-
tional concerns to the voices of the people. As an auxiliary institution, the
EID contributed to consolidating democratic culture and promoting dia-
logue concerning the rule of law in Mali. Conceived with the intention of
dramatically increasing governmental transparency and dialogue between
the government and all Malians, the EID is an innovative institution that,
together with its successes and failures, can serve as a model for coun-
tries seeking democratic consolidation and the establishment of the rule
of law. If Malians view the EID as more than an “Éspace d’Interpellation
Démagogique,” 54 then Konaré successfully led Mali along an innova-
tive path of governance. Konaré pursued other venues for constitutional
dialogues. Principal among these is PRODEJ, analyzed in the following

section.
Dialogue and Judicial Reform

The Programme Décennal de la Justice (PRODEJ) is an example of partic-
ipatory policy-making. Just as the National Conference was viewed as an
Estates-General of sorts, Yaya Sidibé stated, “we are truly headed towards
an Estates-General for Justice.”55 According to Deputy Bintou Sanankoua,
the National Forum on Justice was being held because,
Mali had a favorable experience with this form of participatory, direct democ-
racy (which permitted the resolution of the problem of the North). Moreover,
justice in our country proved to be the soft underbelly, the Achilles heel of our
democracy. We cannot construct democracy and rule of law without justice, a
true justice for all, fair, equitable, transparent and balanced justice.56
Thus the government was committed to judicial reform in a participatory

manner. The process depended on the organizing committee of PRODEJ,
which included members of civil society, executive, legislative, and judiciary
branches. The committee had an eighteen-month mandate during which
time its members would propose to Mali’s partners and the Malian govern-
ment a ten-year program for judicial reform.57 Four themes were established:
1. justice and society (corruption, human rights);

2. justice and institutions (inventory and inspection of justice, indepen-
dence and responsibility of judges);
3. justice and citizens (access to justice, protection of rights of women,
children, and disadvantaged groups); and
4. justice and partners.
Unlike the agenda for the National Conference, the protection of women,
children, and the rights of the disadvantaged have been included as central
to discussions. This addition was a result of the efforts of increasingly visible
women’s associations that ensured that women’s rights be included as fun-
damental to democracy. In preparation for the National Forum for Judicial
Reform, concertations régionales took place on October 15–November 14,
1998, across the country.
The concertations régionales permitted all levels of society to share fully in

the process in progress: socio-professional groups, economic actors, agricul-
turalists, NGO, leaders of opinion, traditional authorities, elected officials,
religious individuals, members of the judiciary, associations for the promo-
tion and defense of human rights . . .58
The questionnaire used in December 1997 and January 1998 by the

National Preparatory Commission for the concertations and the Forum
is complicated and indicates the difficulty of presenting such questions
to populations that may have had little, if any, contact with the judicial
system. Procedural questions such as who shall administer the question-
naire, in what language, and to whom are supremely important. While
it is highly desirable to obtain information from rural inhabitants, it is
reasonable to consider if they are still being excluded if they do not un-
derstand the technicalities of what is being asked. And yet, the fact that
their viewpoints are being sought in the first place represents a drastically
different and more inclusive approach from what they have experienced
in the past.
The National Forum on Justice took place on March 30–April 3, 1999,
under the slogan “la justice, une résponsabilité partagée,” nearly eight years
after the National Conference.59 As is the case with the National Political
Forum, references were frequently made to the National Conference. In an
interview with Chahana Takiou, journalist Albert Bourgi argued:
This forum falls directly within the tradition of the National Conference of
1991. We participated in open public debates. Concertation must be system-
atic and permanent. The importance of this forum is to permit everyone to
say what they think and to have, for once, the pulse of the leaders. We are
in a form of “direct democracy.”
I think that the participatory approach falls within an overall approach
followed by Malian authorities for all the great questions of the society. Do we
not have the national conference syndrome? (I do not use this term in a pejora-
tive sense.) To listen to others we are tempted to say what we cannot say.60
Invocations of the legacy of the National Conference bespoke a con-

scious effort by the government to evoke a time when Malians eagerly
participated in a democratic transition. In order to prevent the waning of
such enthusiasm in the continued transition and daily politics, attempts
were made to preserve and draw from the conference’s energy. Encouraging
broad participation Deputy Bintou Sanankoua stated, “this forum is your
forum. Participate.”61
Such remarks are encouraging, and yet the reality is that only 10 percent
of Malians are able to speak French, and French is the “language of jus-
tice.” In addition, today, the distance of courts from villages is often as
far as fifty kilometers, so that courts, the main symbol of justice, are far
from the village. Efforts are being made to resolve this problem through an
ongoing process of decentralization that has established over seven hundred
communes in the country.62 In addition to the commune structure, it was
suggested during the forum on justice that a mechanism to serve as a space
for dialogue, exchange, and debate at all levels of society was needed. Such
a mechanism would serve as a liaison between communities and justice. In
addition, participants agreed that the decrees specifying the enforcement
of laws should not challenge intercommunity or intervillage conventions.63
These discussions reiterate that the transition to a more democratic gov-
ernment is an ongoing one. The process of judicial reform will require an
evaluation of the relationship of traditional law to the new constitution.
How to balance the conflict between the two remains a critical issue. As
Me. Abdoul Wahab Berthe states,
Diverse legal bodies exist, including traditional bodies which include the
head of the household, the village council, religious leaders. These people,
because of their social position, play an important role in the regulation of
controversies, therefore they are taken into account. The institution of the
cadi, which is a survival of Muslim, occupies a prominent position in the
settling of disputes.64
On the other hand, several participants, notably Mme. Diourté, remind

everyone of the dangers involved with giving powers of conflict resolution
to chiefs as this is where women’s rights are often violated.65 This is an
issue that continues to confront human rights activists and those con-
cerned with preserving group identity and rights in Mali. From the time
of the National Conference to the present, issues concerning women’s
rights have moved to the center of any discussion of rights and democracy
in Mali. In an interview, Atchrimi Emma Agounke, the Togolese direc-
tor of the Projets Droits et Citoyenneté des Femmes en Afrique Francophone
(DCF), reacts to PRODEJ and its importance not only in Mali, but in
the region.
The forum is an exceptional occasion to bring out the elements of a true

forum on justice on Mali. It is an important and innovative initiative not
only in Mali but for the sub-region. The exercise is led with conviction and
effectiveness and I think that out of it will come the great roads of a justice
for all, particularly for women in Mali.
I think that the forum is a sign of the concern to respect human rights.
I do not mean to say that all will be perfect in Mali in this regard, but I
would like raise the fact that this is a good opening and good will to respect
human rights. This opening and will must be carried by everyone, state,
civil society, individual, men and women.
I am preoccupied by women’s rights in particular. Traditions, customs,
the socio-cultural weight is heavy. Many female speakers have given . . . an
impressive catalogue of the daily difficulties of women, the discrimination
in judicial texts with respect to women, reforms will be necessary to permit
women to achieve their share of justice. I hope that their voices in the course
of these conferences will be heard and the specific problems of women will
be taken into account in the judicial reform.66
Agounke’s comments reveal how the legacy of the National Conference

has not only helped to promote women’s rights in Mali but has contributed
to broadening the debate on rights generally throughout the region.
The national Question and Answer Assembly, its Sikasso counterpart,
and PRODEJ illustrate three venues in which constitutional dialogues are
taking place in Mali. Without a doubt, hurdles remain before the judicial
system will run smoothly; however, each institution helps close the gap
between citizens and those in power. These examples illustrate institu-
tional innovation and evidence that constitutionalism has found fertile
ground in Mali.
Ch a p t e r Se v e n
D i a l o g u e i n Ti m e s of Cr i si s
The Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique along with the Programme

Décennal de la Justice (PRODEJ) reflect innovation on the part of President
Konaré and his government. Nevertheless throughout the 1990s the regime
faced daunting crises that threatened the ongoing democratic experiment.
The Tuareg, an ethnic minority and geographically remote transnational
population, had long felt little connection to Mali and continued their
decades-long struggle to secede. Disparate political opposition groups
grew ever more frustrated with their inability to match the organizational
strength and popular familiarity of the country’s dominant political party,
ADEMA. High inflation and rising unemployment triggered an economic
crisis following the January 2004 devaluation of the subregional currency,
the CFA, by 50 percent. Frustrated students, most studying far from home
and trying to live on meager stipends, were disillusioned by their prospects
for employment after graduation, and sought answers through strikes and
riots in the nation’s capital. The judicial system was in dire need of reform
and legitimacy as few Malians trusted the courts, further destabilizing
this young democracy. Each of these crises severely tested the durability
of Malian democracy.
This chapter analyses the Konaré administration’s efforts to resolve these
conflicts. The August 1994 concertations régionales underscored Konaré’s
commitment to dialogue as a method of engaging the public in resolving
these numerous crises. The concertations set the stage for the resolution of
“ le problème du Nord,” the conclusion of which was symbolically marked
on March 27, 1996, with “ la flamme de la paix.”1 The second crisis, la crise
politique, reached its boiling point during the 1997 elections. In each case
resolution was achieved through the insightful creation of venues for debate
in which community concerns were raised by the populace at large and dia-
logue between communities and the state followed. The educational crisis
(la crise scolaire) is not explored in great detail here; however, throughout the
region, students played a central role in democratization movements and in
continuing demands placed on states in transition—Mali was no different.
It may be argued that following the transition in Mali, the students were
used by the political opposition to perpetuate a crisis that demanded resolu-
tion. This controversial position does not deny the importance of students
in “ les evenements” of 1991 but recognizes their susceptibility to manipula-
tion and willingness to resort to violence in the political crisis that ensued.
As I have argued, dialogue is linked to a more participatory and inclu-
sive citizenship. At a time in which xenophobia and exclusionary politics
are on the rise in Africa (consider Ivoirité in Cote d’Ivoire, discussed in
chapter two), the Malian commitment to inclusion is praiseworthy and
an important step toward democratic consolidation.2 By analyzing Mali’s
historically alienated Northern populations, with particular reference to
the Tuareg whose political leaders have long encouraged separatism and
the formation of the State of Azawad, the policy of incorporation of the
Tuareg into the Malian state unfolds through their induction into the mili-
tary and civil services, and, with cultural cunning, by giving televisions to
villages in the North. For the first time inhabitants of the villages were able
to see national news with programming that always includes the national
anthem, governmental activities and ceremonies.
At one time the lack of material assistance to the North was used to
illustrate the exclusion of the area by the government, but during the
1990s development assistance began to flow to the region to help build
roads, schools, and health clinics. Residents in the North, regardless of
ethnicity, have worked to recreate economically viable markets and estab-
lish schools where they had never before existed. In 2002, the resolution
of the conflict in the North seemed evident as ATT selected Ahmed
Mohamed Ag Hamani to serve as his prime minister (his term lasted from
June 2002 until April 2004). By 2003, fifteen European hostages cap-
tured by an extremist group of Islamic militants in Algeria (the Salafist
Group for Combat and Preaching, GSPC) were taken by their captors into
the remote desert in Mali. The Tuareg have strong family, cultural, and
economic ties to Southern Algeria where the kidnappers reside and the
Malian government relied on Iyad Ag Agaly, formerly of MPA (Mouvement
Populaire de l’Azaouad) and a leader of the Tuareg rebellion from 1990 to
1996, to help negotiate the hostages release.3 The successful release of the
hostages in August 2003, nearly six months after their capture, would not
have been possible without the willingness of Tuareg leaders to partici-
pate in a peaceful solution. This event symbolizes an important moment
in Malian democracy in which those once excluded from the state par-
ticipate on behalf of the government to resolve a crisis that had gained
international attention. Far from being outsiders within Mali, Tuareg
leaders were now integral to the regime. The New York Times reported
efforts by international charities and governments to preserve the ancient
dialogue in times of crisis / 157
manuscripts of Timbuktu and to make the city once again an international

center of learning.4 The Malian government established the Ahmed Baba
Institute and supports the promotion of tourism and academic research in
Timbuktu. The fact that the Malian government now embraces and pub-
licizes the city’s history as Malian history reveals the extent of integration
of the North into the nation.
This chapter demonstrates how an excluded population was incorpo-
rated more fully into the nation as citizens with dialogue—a principal
means to resolving the conflict. Although le probléme du Nord was resolved,
the Konaré regime still faced the ongoing political crisis. This crisis was
the result of a tenuous legitimacy of the government and its institutions
coupled with an evolving political context in which stakeholders jockeyed
for electoral laws that most benefited their interests. A complete break-
down in dialogue had taken place—violence and instability ensued.
Dialogue is central to the process of decentralization and the formation
of institutions of representative democracy. Indeed, it is the foundation for
the transition to a more decentralized democratic form of governance that
incorporates the populace allowing for grassroots input into the creation
of institutions and the prioritizing of issues to be addressed by govern-
ment representatives affiliated with these new institutions. Dialogue not
only played a central role in bringing an end to le probléme du Nord, but,
as discussed in chapter four, also in decentralization, from the creation of
local communes to the rise in electoral participation, particularly at the
local level and in the North. Decentralization and dialogue have begun to
incorporate citizens into governance. It was this very process that brought
an end to la crise politique as political opposition members broke away from
an intransigent coalition to participate in municipal elections.
Constitutional dialogues were not always well-received. National
Assembly representatives were threatened by the emergence of concertations
régionales in the mid-1990s arguing that they impinged on their role as
representatives of the populace. However, these forums played an impor-
tant auxiliary role during a time when representative democracy was still
being formulated. The question remains as to whether or not citizens will
demand the continuation of these novel forms of participation or accept
representative democracy as sufficient for their needs.
Legacy of the National Conference Dialogue

The national conference in our country laid down a certain constitutional and
institutional framework that emanated from the aspirations of the people.
Moreover, it determined the principles that guide the creation of political par-
ties and the rules conducive to the broadening of their activities in a democratic,
multiparty, pluralist context.5
As I argued in chapter three, the National Conference established the

guiding framework of the Third Republic and has had lasting effects
on the state and the norms of political participation. During his term of
office, President Konaré responded to calls for more open government
by holding “concertations régionales” periodically on topics of concern to
the nation and relied on public consultation, with varying degrees of suc-
cess. Since 1991, such forums included the concertations régionales and
national forums on the ten-year project for educational reform (PRODEC,
Programme Décennal de Développement de l’Education), the ten-year project
for health care reform (PRODES Programme Décennal de Développement
de la Santé), rural development, the North, reform of political institutions,
and PRODEJ (discussed in chapter six).
Amidst the tumult created by each of these crises that threatened the
survival of the nation, on June 8, 1994, Alpha Konaré stated:
Faced with the numerous disturbances and the violence, both physical and
verbal, which have characterized the past two years, I could have chosen
alternative policies to those of dialogue and consensus . . . As a modern state,
Mali needs to add to its ancestral heritage of dialogue a modern institutional
infrastructure which demonstrates that there is a real democratic process
taking place . . . With this in mind, I shall ask my government to organize a
series of regional “concertations” in which every current of opinion will be
able to express its views. Each participant will be invited to contribute to the
debate, seeking to define solutions for tomorrow’s problems. Our purpose
will exclude systematic opposition to the ideas of others; nor will there be
room for narrow sectoral demands. The government will bring to the dis-
cussion both its point of view, and its proposals for change: and together we
shall seek the necessary consensus to achieve the transformation which we
have started.6
From August 15 to 31, 1994, the government held a series of discussions

(concertations) in each of the eight regions, followed by a national forum
(la synthèse nationale) in Bamako from September 7 to 9, 1994. The three
critical issues debated were the North, the education crisis, and insecurity;
other issues on the agenda included structural adjustment and currency
devaluation, democracy, rights, liberty, national reconciliation, decentral-
ization, foreign policy, and African integration.7 These issues were deter-
mined by the participants themselves, not by the government. In a form of
“national brainstorming,” the concertations took place with no previously
set agenda and the format was adapted to local needs and customs. This
process was based on mechanisms rooted within Malian cultures in which
problems are discussed in public by everyone who believes they have a
stake or can help resolve the problem.8 The concertations were spearheaded
by Konaré’s prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) who, as we
saw in chapter four, would ultimately break from ADEMA and become a
presidential contender in 2002.
These concertations are important examples of constitutional dialogues.
They conveyed a commitment on the part of the Konaré regime to lis-
ten to the populace to help resolve the young democracy’s crises and in so
doing provided added legitimacy to the government. The following sec-
tions explore the ways in which dialogue and consensus were integral to
governance during the early years of Malian democracy. I begin with an
analysis of the North, an example that represents the incorporation of an
entire region into the state. The “problem of the North” threatened the ter-
ritorial integrity of the country and posed a real challenge to any notion of
a just constitution existing in Mali. The various methods of participatory
constitutionalism through constitutional dialogue that we see as a response
to the crisis in the region reveal the ways in which inclusion became inte-
gral to peace and governmental legitimacy. Next, I turn to la crise politique.
Whereas the crisis in the North was about regional integration, the political
crisis challenged the legitimacy of Mali’s political institutions. Both cases
represent serious threats to the regime’s legitimacy and ultimately democ-
racy. Understanding their resolution is therefore critical to our analysis.
The Problem of the North

One of the great challenges to government in Mali is the historic exclu-
sion of nomadic fractions of the population. The marginalization of the
North resulted in that population’s loss of faith in its Malian nationality.9
Furthermore, the droughts of 1974 and 1984 produced economic devasta-
tion in the region and an increasing number of émigrés, many of whom
migrated to Libya. In 1980, Col. Muhammar al-Qaddafi claimed that Libya
was the natural homeland of the Tuareg, offered them Libyan nationality,
and recruited them into Libya’s Islamic Legion, in which capacity they were
sent into action in Chad, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.10 By the late 1980s,
many of these armed and seasoned émigré fighters were returning to Mali.
Historically the Northern populations lacked the financing, training, or
weapons to rebel against the government—this situation had changed.
In June 1990, violence erupted with an attack on a police outpost in
Niger that had detained a group of Tuareg. Further violence ensued in
the form of random retaliation for that particular event. Challenges were
made to the integrity of the Malian state as organized Tuareg political
groups sought to establish the independent state of Azawad, the territory
that covers parts of northern Mali, Niger, southern Algeria, and Libya.11
Throughout the years, the Tuareg had received little development
assistance from the Malian government. Many blamed the government of
Moussa Traoré of misusing aid earmarked for the North for unfruitful oil
exploration. This exploration continues, with enough promise that in June
2004 the government adopted a new law governing oil exploration and
exploitation in the country.12 Mismanagement by the centralized govern-
ment and drought increased tension between the military and the Northern
populations. Traditional practices in which the land was left fallow for
nine years were altered and the government claimed “untended” land as
state property, angering the regions’ inhabitants.13 Meanwhile, Moussa
Traoré, facing demands for political liberalization, used the violence in the
North as a reason to postpone reform toward multiparty elections.14 His
regime continued to instill hostility on all sides by portraying the Tuareg as
a “‘white’-dominated feudal society” that relied on black slavery to preserve
their traditional way of life.15 This position made a clear, racial distinction
between the Tuareg in the North and the vast majority of Malians and
further fueled anger by stirring up a history of enslavement of blacks by
the Tuareg. Despite the rhetoric, the Tamanrasset Accords were signed in
Algeria on January 6, 1991, by Moussa Traoré’s chief of general staff, Col.
Ousmane Coulibaly, and representatives from the Front Islamique-arabe de
l’Azaouad (FIAA) and the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad (MPA). Both
sides had agreed to an end to violence, increased development assistance, as
well as decentralization of the region. Many residents of the North rejected
the idea of decentralization because they considered it merely a disguise for
increased government control of the region.16
Less than three months after the Accords were signed, the Traoré regime
was overthrown and the Accords were jeopardized by uncertainty as to
whether or not the new authorities in Bamako felt bound by the agreement.17
By the time the agreement was made public many Northerners claimed that
they had been excluded from the resolution process. The lack of inclusive
dialogue meant that the Accords had not established a foundation for lasting
peace in the region and they were annulled.18 Recognizing the reasons for
the failure of the Accords, the leader of the 1991 coup and current president,
Amadou Toumani Touré, insisted on the inclusion of Tuareg representa-
tives in any decision-making that concerned Mali and its Northern region.
He made certain that the transitional government (CTSP) included repre-
sentatives from the North. During the National Conference delegates from
across the country discussed the need for increased aid to the vast Northern
region. The National Pact was signed on April 11, 1992, between CTSP
and the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA). As a result,
a Commission de Suivi du Cessez-le-feu (The Cease-fire Commission, CCF)
was established and was comprised of military officers from Algeria and
Mali as well as representatives of the rebel movements who were to patrol
the region to control banditry. However, funds to support the CCF were
not forthcoming and the government could not afford its maintenance.
In addition, funds promised to help create small enterprises and integrate
former refugees never materialized.19 The new government had little money
to support development initiatives in any region, and despite the creation of
the new government office, the Commissariat du Nord, little international
money was committed to assisting the Malian state to resolve the conflict.
The Pact was broken when, in May 1992, the offices of Norwegian
Church Aid were attacked in Gossi. Thirty armed Tuareg killed four
people and kidnapped eight others. In response, the army came to Gossi
and shot and killed ten Tuareg, including those who had worked for the
Norwegian nonprofit organization. The bias of the military against all
Tuareg, including civilians, was stark.20
Violence in the region continued unabated. In May 1994, members of
the Songhai, a black settler population, formed an armed “self-defence”
force called Gandha koi or “masters of the land.” Gandha koi enflamed
the existing tensions between sedentary and nomadic populations. Attacks
and reprisals became commonplace in the North and extended as far south
as the Ségou region. In 1994, over one thousand people lost their lives and
one hundred and sixty thousand became refugees displaced to Mauritania,
Algeria, and Burkina Faso.21
By 1995 international pressure from France, Algeria, Libya, and
Mauritania contributed to a decrease of violence in the North. It was clear
that more than a peace agreement was needed, but that those living in the
region had to come together to discuss the problems facing their com-
munities. International funding helped support intercommunal meetings
across the country that addressed “the problem of the North.”
Born of the spirit of national consensus in the regional concertations, the
inter-communal meetings in the regions of northern Mali, discussing rec-
onciliation and the consolidation of peace have generously illustrated the
commitment to peace of civil society and of the other actors involved, and
more specifically their commitment:
• to restoring confidence between various communities
• to re-establishing dialogue on the basis of alliances and complimentarities
between ethnic groups
• to reinforcing the dynamics of peace and reconciliation
• to re-establishing trade and supply routes through the re-opening of
markets
• to struggle against all forms of violence.22
“Restoring confidence” and “re-establishing dialogue” became critical to
the peace process.
Table 7.1 provides a list of the locations of the meetings promoted by
civil society groups. Inspiration for this method of negotiating peace came
Table 7.1 Community meetings organized by civil society
Place Cercle/région Date Support fcfa
1. Bambara M. Gourma Oct. 14–15, 1995 2,500,000
2. Gossi Gourma Oct. 20–22, 1995 1,000,000
3. Madiakoy Gourma Oct. 30–31, 1995 1,000,000
4. Bahondo Bourem Nov. 10–11, 1995 1,200,000
5. Gabero Gao Nov. 17–18, 1995 2,000,000
6. Hamman Koira Bourem Dec. 16–17, 1995 1,000,000
7. Tin Aouker Gao Nov. 20–22, 1995 1,650,000
8. Almoustarat Bourem Nov. 25–26, 1995 1,500,000
9. Agharous Kidal Dec. 10–11, 1995 1,650,000
10. Amasrakad Gao Dec. 23–24, 1995 1,600,000
11. Anou Zigrène Menaka Jan. 13–14, 1996 1,300,000
12. Tin Kar Kidal Jan. 15–16, 1996 2,000,000
13. Talataye Ansongo Dec. 27–28, 1996 1,800,000
14. Inazzar Gao Jan. 5–6, 1996 1,000,000
15. Tedjerert Menaka Jan. 9–10, 1996 1,500,000
16. Ber Tomboucto Jan. 15–16, 1996 1,500,000
17. Ouatagouna Ansongo Jan. 20–21, 1996 1,500,000
18. Aguelhok Kidal March 5–6, 1996 1,000,000
19. Diré Diré Feb. 5–6, 1996 2,500,000
20. Ibiket Bourem Feb.5–6, 1996 2,000,000
21. Iminass Gao Mar 2–3, 1996 1,500,000
22. Tinahama Ansongo Feb. 10–11, 1996 1,500,000
23. Djébock Gao Feb. 27–28, 1996 1,500,000
24. Tiderméné Menaka Feb. 21–22, 1996 1,500,000
25. Hamakouladji Gao Feb. 25–26, 1996 1,500,000
26. Dofana Niafunké Feb. 27, 1996 2,500,000
27. Temera Bourem beginning of June 1,500,000
28. Atta Goundam March 5–6, 1996 1,300,000
29. Tamalet Menaka March 9–10, 1996 2,000,000
30. Eghacher Gourma March 9–10, 1996 2,000,000
31. Toya Tomboucto March 28–30, 1996 500,000 *
32. Agounni Tombouctou March 20, 1996 2,000,000
33. Akirche Bourem March 14–15, 1996 2,000,000
34. Lerneb Goundam March 15–16, 1996 2,000,000
35. Tehergui Tombouctou March 18, 1996 1,500,000
36. Sehene Menaka Not fixed** 2,000,000
37. In-Tillit Gao March 22, 1996 200,000
38. Gossi Gourma March 22, 1996 471,000
* Mission de Réconciliation.
** Mission d’information et sensibilisation.
Source: Information presented in Poulton and Youssouf, 1998, pp. 247–248, collected from
Lode, 1996.
from the 1994 regional concertations organized by the government, and

organizations such as Oxfam, ACORD, World Vision, and others. Local
NGOs and associations also organized meetings.
A small amount of money was used in each town and a large area was
covered by this single effort. Governors and local officials were never in
charge of, or dominating, the discussions in meetings; rather, they were
run by communities themselves, while governors or local administrators
listened and participated along with others, but never controlled the
discussions.23 In total, AEN (Aide des Églises Norvégiennes, Oslo, and
Gossi) spent 18,400,000 fcfa; FAR-Nord (Fonds d’aide pour la réconcili-
ation et la consolidation de la paix dans le Nord du Mali), jointly created
with German, Canadian, and Swiss support, spent 38,000,000 fcfa; and
the German government, in conjunction with AEN, spent 1,800,000
fcfa.24
For six months, from October 1995 through March 1996, residents
of villages across the North were brought together to discuss local and
national issues.
Points which had been the exclusive domain of the one-party state were
now debated as part of the responsibility of the local community; such as
mediation over the use of land and water and pastures, and interventions
to reduce violence and armed robbery. Many participants said that this was
the first time in history that they had met to discuss such issues without
being manipulated.25
In addition to the dialogue taking place, men were asked to surrender

their weapons as part of the peace process. A critical issue up to this
time had been the exclusion of the Tuareg from the military and the
bias held by the military against Northern populations. Malian leaders
had come to believe that only by integrating Northerners into the mili-
tary and civil service, and achieving genuine political inclusion through
decentralization, would peace be achieved. The government launched
a “cantonment” process in which men came to a camp where they gave
up their weapons and waited to be recruited into service for the Malian
government.26 As a result, 1,500 men were selected from the camps to
undergo six months of military training. 1,479 took an oath of allegiance,
and 150 were approved for civil service. This process was contentious
as other Northerners, including members of the Songhai, felt an unfair
bias toward the Tuareg.27 Nevertheless, the government remained com-
mitted to integration. Table 7.2 presents the distribution of integrated
ex-combatants.
Those not selected to serve the government were assisted by the
UNDP-directed Programme d’appui à la réinsertion socio-économique
Table 7.2 Numbers of ex-combatants from

the North integrated into the public services
Service Number
Armed forces 1,199
Police 150
Customs 100
Forestry service 50
Sub-total uniformed forces 1,479
Civilian administration 149
Total 1,648
Source: Poulton and Youssouf, 1998, p. 119.
des ex-combattants du nord du Mali, PAREM (Support Program for the

Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Northern Mali) and
given 55,000 fcfa (approximately $100) to reintegrate into society.28
Ultimately, 4,860 Tuareg civilians were hired into the civil service.29
The Malian government addressed ethnic bias in the military and
government posts in general through targeted inclusion of the Tuareg
minority.
Following five months of communal meetings, on March 27, 1996, a
ceremony was held to mark the dissolution of the five armed movements.
President Konaré, Ghanaian president J.J. Rawlings, and four Tuareg
leaders including Zeidane ag Sialamine of the FPLA (Front Populaire
pour la Libération de l’Azouad), Abdramane Agala of the ARLA (Armée
Révolutionnaire pour la Libération de l’Azouad), Bokar Sadek of FIAA,
and Iyad Ag Agali of the MPA. On this internationally momentous
occasion three thousand arms were destroyed by flames.30 The Flame of
Peace “symbolize(d) the end of ethnic violence in Mali, and the return of
Tuareg and Arabs into the Malian nation.”31 Informal discussions with
residents of Timbuktu in 1998 revealed that they routinely referred to
the Flame of Peace as a symbolic turning point for the region. Since
the ceremony, peace has prevailed in the vast northern sector.32 Today a
monument stands at the site of the Flame of Peace commemorating this
important event.
In addition to government commitment to dialogue and decentraliza-
tion, without the actions of local associations such as Mouvement National
des Femmes pour la Sauvegarde de la Paix et de l’Unité Nationale, MNFPUN
(a particularly active women’s organization), as well as international aid,
it is unlikely that the “problem of the North” would have been resolved.
Civil society and government combined their efforts with donor support
to create a basis for dialogue that included all those concerned with the
conflict in order to get at the heart of the issue. It was this interdependence
that led to their success.
The MNFPUN used radio and television to inform the population
of what the group viewed as the root causes of the conflict (poverty and
drought) and to encourage the population to disarm. Established on
October 25, 1991, MNFPUN took part in the signing of the National
Pact on April 11, 1992. Since its inception, the group has informed women
of the proliferation of small arms in the North and the dangers that this
proliferation poses to the region. They have played a role in politics by
advocating for the change of laws concerning the manufacture and the sale
of arms in the region. The group has also created committees at the com-
mune level that support women candidates in the local elections as well
as encouraging women’s participation in the elections. The president of
the association Dr. Mariam Maiga believes that women in office are more
likely to fight for peace than are men.33 The actions of the MNFPUN
incorporated women in the North into the process of conflict resolution.
This conveys an awareness of the importance of inclusion on the basis
of gender as critical to a durable peace. Not addressing conflict resolu-
tion with over 50 percent of the population would be to ignore a valuable
resource for building peace. Maiga and the MNFPUN were pioneers in
this regard.
While agreements had been signed in the past, implementation of such
top-down approaches had proved to be a stumbling block. In addition to a
commitment to integrate Tuareg into the military and civil service, resolu-
tion required grassroots participation in evaluating the problems faced by
each community and formulating the possible solutions to those problems.
Economic realities contributed to the inability of the government to pro-
vide financial support to struggling populations. The North was made
even more remote by the lack of telephones and television. A breakthrough
came about when television first arrived in Timbuktu in September 1996.
Eighteen major villages were given five sets each. Robin-Edward Poulton
and Ibrahim ag Youssouf report that in response to the new television, “A
delighted villager exclaimed, ‘For the first time we can actually see what is
happening in Bamako and in Mali. Now we really feel like Malians!’” By
1998, Internet cafés had arrived in Timbuktu and the steady influx of cell
phones furthered the end to the city’s isolation from the South. To be sure,
however, sustained efforts will be required for these populations to be fully
integrated into the nation. As one woman living in the North described
decentralization, she stated that nothing had changed for her and the proof
lay in her meager surroundings.34
The apparent resolution of the problem of the North is an impor-
tant example of bringing a sub-nationalist group into the state. Once
the Northern populations were able to feel that they were members of
the Malian nation, violence subsided. Electoral participation is highest in
northern Mali. Although still an impoverished region, citizens have taken
an active part in elections—reinforcing the importance they see in their
representation in government. It is this dialogue and subsequent decentral-
ization that helped build national legitimacy between the state and society
in the North. Dialogue laid the foundation for incorporation and partici-
pation in representative government—critical to the shift from a highly
centralized to a more democratic decentralized state.
La crise politique
The birth of a multiparty democracy is an agonizing process. In Mali,
parties are created only to divide and divide again as personalities vie for
the spotlight. Elections require laws to govern them but la code électoral is
a contentious document that determines not only who can vote and who
can run for office, but what method of voting will be used. Institutions
that may have existed prior to the constitution of the Third Republic must
be transformed into the tools of democracy. Legislators must be elected to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court
must make judgments on the constitutionality of the process.
Stumbling on any one of these steps can lead to failure of the dem-
ocratic experiment, but juggling all of these events at the same time
requires an even-handed and steadfast commitment to democracy. La
crise politique simmered beneath the surface in early 1996 as political
parties prepared for the 1997 legislative and presidential elections. In
June 1996, a lively debate between opposition parties and the govern-
ment over the electoral code was broadcast nationwide on television.35
ADEMA joined forces with PARENA (Parti pour le Renouveau National),
a political party formed in September 1995 by former opposition leaders
and members of CNID, and proposed a voting system in which smaller
constituencies would elect legislators by proportional representation
while others would use simple majority. Although the vote was boycotted
by opposition parties, the electoral law was approved by the ADEMA-
dominated National Assembly.
In a move that reasserted the institutional checks on the presidency
and the National Assembly, the Supreme Court declared the electoral
code unconstitutional in October 1996 because citizens in different
constituencies would have their votes counted differently. This left very
little time to draft a new code in time for the March 1997 elections. In
January 1997, the National Assembly approved a code that included a
two-round simple majority system in which independent candidates could
run for office. Again members of the opposition overwhelmingly boycot-

ted the vote.36
Due to the disarray of the electoral system, legislative elections, sched-
uled for March 1997, were delayed until April 13. In a heavy-handed
(but constitutional) move, Konaré dissolved the National Assembly on
March 4, arguing that he wanted to ensure that elections would not be
further delayed. Although elections were held in April, their organization
was abysmal. Polls opened late, electoral lists did not match voting cards,
and members of the independent electoral monitoring group (Commission
Électorale Nationale Indépendante, CENI) were poorly trained.37 The
election was boycotted by members of the Collectif des Parties Politiques
de l’Opposition or COPPO, which included eighteen political parties.
Allegations of corruption within CENI spread and riots erupted in Bamako
after the government banned a march by the opposition. ADEMA won
the polls overwhelmingly, further raising suspicions by political opponents
that widespread corruption had taken place.
As discussed previously, reinforcing the overall commitment to dem-
ocratic elections, the Constitutional Court annulled the results due to
irregularities including improper administration and supervision of the
elections by CENI and delayed the upcoming presidential poll by one
week. Opposition parties argued that the pervasive problems with electoral
polls could not be resolved in that time frame and vowed to boycott the
presidential election in May 1997 as well.
It is unclear that the opposition would have fared well in any of these
polls, regardless of the irregularities that existed. ADEMA had an enviable
support base across the country. Nevertheless, the opposition resorted to
rioting and violence in the capital and the government responded unequiv-
ocally, arresting three principal opposition leaders, including Mountaga
Tall (CNID), Almamy Sylla (RDP), and Choquel Maiga (MPR).
The gap between both sides had grown so vast that resolution seemed
impossible. There was little ideological difference among all of the fifty-
nine political parties in Mali and so there was little chance to unseat the
majority party familiar to all Malians.38 This situation, in conjunction
with the poor organization of elections, contributed to the political crisis
that evolved from 1993 until 1998. In 1992, forty-eight political parties
participated in legislative elections and eleven parties won seats, however,
ADEMA held seventy-three of the one hundred and fifteen seats.39 While
COPPO had garnered widespread support for election boycotts in 1997,
their attempt to boycott municipal elections scheduled for June 1998 in
the nineteen urban communes was a misstep that alienated some adher-
ents. Perhaps to avoid political suicide, several former members of COPPO
broke from their parties and chose to run as independent candidates. The
Constitutional Court had confirmed the irregularities of the 1997 polls;

however, the adamant refusal of COPPO to participate in local elections
was seen by many as obstinacy. Interviews revealed that COPPO had little
support and that it was widely regarded as the “radical opposition.”40 A
representative from the Carter Center, which was called in to bring an
end to the political impasse, labeled COPPO as “obstructive” and gave up
efforts to resolve the political conflict.41
COPPO’s complaint of unjust exclusion rests on a concern over the fair-
ness of elections and the openness of dialogue. With regard to elections,
irregularities were discovered in legislative elections; on inspection of the
complaint, however, there appeared to be problems that did not system-
atically favor any particular party. Nonetheless, under scrutiny from local
and international observers, the government annulled the results. Many
Malians believed that the members of the coalition were simply unwilling
to participate in the democratic rules of the game because they had little
support.
It is interesting to note that the discourse of dialogue is central to
the tactics of both sides in this crisis. As one journalist noted, “Those in
charge of COPPO hold the conclusion that ‘M. Konaré decided to close
the door on all dialogue and must assume the consequences.’”42 In another
instance, Camara Sadi, a member of the opposition, stated that “the will
of the opposition, its interest, is constructive dialogue so that democratic
interaction can be preserved.”43 Dialogue is used by the Konaré regime as
well as by COPPO to represent the essence of democracy and the key to its
own position. Yet, the constant attempt to manipulate dialogue erected an
obstacle within the democratic process.
La crise politique was a struggle for political gains. It is of little sur-
prise that ADEMA, with its widespread support, was in favor of simple
majority voting for legislative elections as they would be most likely
to win such seats. The government’s willingness to propose a mixed
system that included proportional representation signifies a commit-
ment to innovation and compromise for the sake of democracy. The
Constitutional Court’s ruling against the proposed mixed system
opened the door for the possibility of an electoral system determined
solely by proportional representation and so the government response
that institutionalized simple majority voting alienated opposition
parties even further.
COPPO dissolved as members broke away to stand for election. By
1998, politicians, opposition parties, and journalists all agreed that a
National Political Forum was needed. “The only way to move forward and
to resolve the problems between the opposition and the majority party, is
through a national forum.”44 The National Forum was organized under

the Decree #98/384/P-RM of November 20, 1998, and its objective was
to evaluate and reread the Constitution, Electoral Law, the Party Charter,
the Statute of the Opposition, and Press Law. However, the National
Forum was boycotted by some opposition parties, including those that
disapproved of the participation of US-RDA led by Seydou Badjian
Kouyaté.45 The concertations took place in each region in December,
following the model of the 1994 concertations; key issues of concern to
the communities involved were laid out at the regional forums and then
brought to the national forum. Participants in the concertations régionales
consisted of churches, human rights groups, unions, federations, and lead-
ers of umbrella associations, NGOs, and unions. In addition, summaries
of the proceedings and analyses of the discussions were made available on
the Internet and criticisms were encouraged to be sent via electronic mail
to the organizing committee. This helped to incorporate those Malians
living abroad into the reform process. The political crisis was resolved
through constitutional dialogues that spread across the country and to
those Malians living overseas as well.
Despite the intransigence of the past, by 2002 and 2004, candidates
from multiple parties joined in the electoral contests. Indeed by concen-
trating on local elections political parties hoped to build a larger constitu-
ency throughout the country. As we saw in chapter four, 2002 elections
brought active participation from several political parties, with twenty-
four presidential candidates. Electoral competition is vibrant although the
apparent lack of opposition as a result of consensus politics is a concern.
This is likely to be short-lived as parties gain footholds in local communi-
ties. Some newspapers labeled the presidential elections in 2007 as mark-
ing the end of consensus politics.
Challenges to Dialogue
The tumultuous “problem of the North” and the violence, arrests, and
intransigence of la crise politique threatened Mali’s democracy. Dialogue
had broken down as the state was building and attempting to legiti-
mize the institutions of democracy. The Northern populations were
incorporated into dialogues that set forth solutions to their national
exclusion. This inclusive process preserved the Malian nation and
resulted in decentralization and increased state legitimacy. Ultimately
resolution of the political crisis was achieved as political voices broke
from COPPO and chose to take part in electoral contests. Throughout
this tumultuous period, the government maintained a commitment
to participatory policy-making (PRODEJ and PRODEC), and the

National Forum on Political Reform. Unlike many countries in transi-
tion, opposition parties flourish in Mali and provide a critical outlet
for disagreement with government policies. The persistent voice of the
opposition, although at times destructive, helped to consolidate democ-
racy by resorting to the Constitutional Court and holding the govern-
ment accountable.
While “the Northern problem” has been substantially resolved through
dialogue and the process of decentralization has begun, dialogue has not
always been a successful tool. There are still many voices of complaint
about their own exclusion. To be sure, it is difficult to draw a line between
those who reject the process of dialogue and those who are explicitly pre-
cluded from it by the government. Challenges to Mali’s ability to construct
democracy remain and primary among these is corruption, which may be
embedded in the very institutions that have helped to promote dialogue.
PRODESS, Programme de Développement Sanitaire et Social, although not
examined in this book was a government program (1998–2007) to recon-
ceive of health care policy and social development through a process that
included consultations across the country with all stakeholders, includ-
ing women. It is yet another example of policy-making through dialogue.
PRODESS was audited by the Office of the Auditor General and in 2006
the auditor general’s annual report noted a shortfall of funds totaling 1.96
billion CFA (over $4 million).46 As donor funds pour into the state to pro-
mote good governance and democracy, the opportunities for corruption
are increased exponentially. By publicizing suspicious activity involving
public funds, the auditor general’s report is the first step to eradicating
misuse of funds. The goal is to do away with the illegal squandering of
state resources, not the institutions or the principles on which these insti-
tutions were founded.
Corruption also threatens the process of democratization by leading
to disillusioned citizens. Peter Ekeh’s enduring notion of two publics in
Africa and the amorality of the civic sphere (as opposed to the morality
of the primordial sphere) remains one of the greatest dangers to democ-
racy in Africa.47 Government legitimacy can be established by improving
state/society relations through dialogue and participation but unless and
until citizens hold their governments accountable, democracy remains
tenuous. If the civic sphere is amoral, not only is it easy to rational-
ize corruption in order to redistribute state funds to one’s family and
friends, but citizens are unlikely to feel obligation and duties that, ide-
ally, citizenship entails.
Anticorruption mechanisms must not only be established but they must
be able to function properly. Despite the challenges, the steps taken by
Mali to build democracy should be recognized and appreciated for their

innovation and indeed their ability to build a foundation for sustainable
democracy. African states are rarely looked to as models for other societies
in transition and yet the continent is a laboratory for democratic experi-
ments and innovation from which there is much to be learned.
Conc lusions
D i a l o g u e a n d L e g i t i m ac y
On June 25, 2000, over a hundred nations gathered in Warsaw, Poland,

to issue a pledge to uphold the principles of democratic rule. The result-
ing Warsaw Declaration acknowledges that although democracy will vary
among nations, common aspects remain. These include: free and fair elec-
tions, equal treatment under the law, respect for religion and the press,
freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, and the right of opposition par-
ties and trade unions to organize freely.1 On this occasion, remarking that
democracies are obliged to support one another, the U.S. secretary of state
Madeline K. Albright stated, “Good democracies, like good neighbors can
help and strengthen each other by showing solidarity, sharing knowledge,
and providing concrete assistance whether in good times or bad.”2 Six states
took part in the organization of this meeting, including the United States,
India (the world’s most populous democracy), and, remarkably, Mali, which
was “chosen as a model for a continent largely bereft of democratic ways.”3
This role was not only an acknowledgment of Mali’s acceptance into the
circle of democratic nations, but it also reinforced the country’s distinction
as a hallmark for African democracy. Despite important questions concern-
ing the transition process then and now, Mali achieved such status in just
ten years and remains a valuable model for democratic transition.
Malians have forged their own unique path toward governmental
accountability and the rule of law. Timothy William Docking argues that
Malian democracy is rooted, in part, in a rich tradition of dialogue. Among
the Bambara, as I discussed previously, tonw (associations) are used as com-
munity organizational tools. Ton-sigiw (formal meetings of associations) are
carefully structured so that any individual is given the opportunity to speak
in turn. This historical method of policy-making and governance within
Bambara communities has been re-created at the national level.4 Although
this is a distinctive Bambara tradition, members of other cultures within
Mali have welcomed this method of governance. Its success in transform-
ing a precolonial model of governance to the postcolonial nation-state and
across cultures is a positive sign for the adaptability of the model to other
states. The fact that the model is not culturally specific is further illustrated
in Benin’s approach to participatory constitutionalism.
During the World War II era, constitutional scholars implored others
to recognize constitutionalism for the role that it could play in overcoming
the world’s destructive elements. Nonetheless, scholars lost interest in the
study of constitutional development as their attention turned to political
economy and ethnicity. Since the independence era, African people have
witnessed numerous attempts and failures at democratic government. The
processes described here, however, provide hope for experimental approaches
to democratization that are based on the experience and the voices of the
Malian people. By broadening the range of those included in the actual pro-
cess of democratization, it seems possible that a more legitimate and lasting
government will take root. I note that Mali has witnessed an impressive rise
in association and political party membership. From 1938 to 1949, there
were 5 registered civic associations; there were 345 from 1985 to 1989, and
as demands for democracy grew and the transition began, from 1990 to
1994, there were 2,449 registered associations. From April 1991 to January
1996, 58 political parties were formed.5 As one scholar observed, “If Mali’s
democratic experiment succeeds, it may well be because so many associa-
tional and partisan supporters have, by their actions under the law, con-
firmed the fairness and legitimacy of the new constitutional system.”6
I began this book with the intention of showing how deliberation and con-
stitutionalism play a part in constructing democracy. Dialogue and constitu-
tional literacy are at the heart of governmental legitimacy in Benin and Mali
and I have illustrated the various ways that the Malian state has pursued con-
stitutional legitimacy and explored the relationship between constitutional
development and citizen participation. The ongoing process of constitutional
dialogue incorporates citizens in nation-building and is the principal method
used to achieve both vertical and horizontal accountability. At the outset of
this book I proposed that both history and political learning inform people’s
understanding of democracy differently, and that the methods of democratic
accountability and participation would therefore vary among societies. As I
have shown, in Mali, the National Conference, the Espace d’Interpellation
Démocratique and its regional counterpart, concertations régionales, and other
institutions and organizations have served as auxiliary supports to facilitate
public deliberation and criticism of the government. These “democratic frag-
ments” contributed to the creation of a political culture of dialogue at all
levels of society that is the very essence of democracy.
When the people do not participate in open dialogue with respect to
policy-making and resource allocation, their role as citizens is intangible.
However, when a government creates a space for dialogue and participa-
tion, and people are given the opportunity to explore the rights and duties
conclusions / 175
of citizenship, they gain a sense of membership in the nation. It is this very

membership and belonging that leads to an expectation of state account-
ability to its citizens. Without inclusive constitutionalism it becomes more
difficult to build a just constitution on which democracy depends.
Participation in democracy is often described as the participation in
choice of decision-makers, that is, electoral participation. Naomi Chazan
defined the concept more broadly by describing it as the action on the
part of people to impact policy or resource expenditure.7 This book has
considered participation on many levels. Active participation in building
democracy may include participation in elections as well as policy-making
and resource allocation. It may also encompass citizen dialogues concern-
ing rights because the resulting discourse is rooted in an individual’s role
as a citizen, which is central to democracy. These dialogues help to ensure
constitutional literacy, which enables citizens to demand their rights and
partake in their duties as citizens. I have also considered the act of lis-
tening to proceedings, such as the National Conference and concertations
régionales on the radio or following these events on television, as a form of
indirect participation capable of reinforcing ties not only among citizens
themselves, but between citizens and the state. Any individual following
the events in the media will know that the event took place because they
have been able to listen to the proceedings unfold. Without the radio or
television coverage, such events take place behind closed doors, regardless
of who takes part in them. Each of these forms of participation improves
constitutional literacy and is essential to democracy.
It is my hope that reconsidering the relationships that exist among
democracy, participation, and constitutional development and question-
ing the assumptions about what defines a democracy will lead to a further
understanding of the transition process. In light of the many failed experi-
ments in democratic rule, reconsideration of the people’s role in democracy
and nation-building is essential. The ways in which Malian women have
taken full advantage of the newly emerging spaces available for dialogue
put them at the forefront of debates on human rights, and in the larger
picture, their activism at the local and national level has already promoted
discussions concerning women’s rights at the local level, where formerly
the subject was taboo.
Inclusive National Conferences are the foundation on which just consti-
tutions are built. Constitutional dialogues incorporate the people in democ-
ratization; without them, an individual’s ties to a specific community would
likely overpower his or her ties to the nation. Participation at the local level,
in conjunction with administrative decentralization, allows people to dis-
cover promising opportunities for political efficacy at the national level. Both
participation and decentralization reinforce the ties among communities as
well as between the communities and the state. These ties also reinforce the
connection between individuals and the state. Constitutionalism’s founding
principle, the rule of law, diminishes in value when the people have no direct
link with those who make and enforce the rules. In order for a population
to know its political rights, as well as the rules that inform “responsible gov-
ernment,” it must achieve a certain level of constitutional literacy. Therefore,
constitutional dialogues are a source for exchange of information and partic-
ipation at all levels of society. Democracy will not last if it is imposed on the
people; rather, it must be allowed to develop and an informed connection
between the people and the government must evolve. By emphasizing dia-
logue outside of the National Assembly and in towns and villages across the
country, President Konaré signaled to the nation’s citizens that they are vital
to the democratization process and that their concerns and values can be
expressed openly and incorporated into the democratization process. During
the presidency of Amadou Toumani Touré, concerns have been raised that
this commitment to dialogue has been neglected in favor of a democratic
model built on consensus (without dialogue). As discussed in chapter five,
the pursuit of consensus in many cases has brought a silencing of outspoken
challenges to the government and in so doing has challenged Malian de-
mocracy itself. Importantly, consensus without dialogue is an exclusionary
process because voices that might otherwise have taken part in building con-
sensus are never actually heard. In the streets, taxis, and cafés of Bamako
people are willing to speak openly about the dangers that ATT’s “consensus
model” holds for Mali today, namely cooptation and centralization of power.
Critics of ATT, however, frequently raise the issue of the interconnection of
dialogue and democracy and the National Conference continues to mark
the beginning of such dialogue, the loss of which is seen by many Malians
as the primary challenge to democracy in the country today. Despite this
recent trend, the government’s legitimacy or the institutions of democracy
(Constitutional Court, National Assembly, and elections) have not been
challenged. This is no small feat given the prevalence of coups d’états in the
region’s history. Only time will tell what is in store for this country, but it
remains the case that current critics of the government are primarily citizens
who are frustrated by the lack of a vocal opposition, dialogue, and the pur-
suit of consensus by the regime in power.
Mali still has important hurdles ahead, particularly the broader inclu-
sion of rural inhabitants into dialogue, combating widespread illiteracy,
and ensuring the path of dialogue now threatened by ATT’s consensus
model of politics—all continuing challenges to democratic development.
The transition to democracy is a long process, and ultimately only time
will determine the success or failure of the Malian method of constitu-
tional dialogue and participatory democracy.
conclusions / 177
Africa is at a crossroads. Democratic transitions have faltered in many

African states. War tears at the Sudan, Somalia, the Congo, and other
areas of the continent. Grassroots approaches to development and projects
to promote vibrant groups in civil society have become more widespread
and central to the mission of development agencies such as the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA). Although these approaches
mark important steps toward more inclusive democratic and economic
development, constitutionalism has remained on the outside of the debate,
despite its central importance to constructing democracy. To be sure, the
rule of law has become a buzzword among development agencies, however,
constitutionalism must be understood in relation to the limitations and the
potential inherent in grassroots participation and constitutional dialogue.
Recognition of the value of constitutional literacy may provide us with an
important analytical tool and bring us a step closer to understanding how
sustainable democratic governments may be created in Africa.
Women, gathered together at the GFDS seminar on women’s politi-
cal participation in Sikasso, Mali (analysis of the seminar can be found
in chapter five), were exhilarated by the political opportunities that
they saw ahead of them. When asked to describe life under the rule of
General Moussa Traoré as compared to President Alpha Oumar Konaré,
the women all agreed that such a seminar would never have taken place
without the fall of Traoré’s regime. Open dialogue concerning the politi-
cal role of women in Mali’s democratic project, women’s rights, and even
how to organize a political campaign was an exciting change for the par-
ticipants. They spoke of the growing political activity of women in their
communities and how they were fighting for increasingly powerful roles
in decision-making. Several participants were interested in running for
local office. For the women in that room, these dialogues were a part of
their newfound freedom. The changing relationship between Mali and
its citizens was evident as one participant enthusiastically declared, “on
est libre maintenant.”8 Now we are free. Such sentiments were stirred by
decentralization and dialogue across the country. I suspect that it is not
unduly optimistic to believe that any effort to suffocate this enthusiastic
support for greater freedoms and for democracy will face great challenges
of its own. As the story of Malian democracy continues to unfold, so too
will our understanding of African constitutionalism.
A pp e n di x O n e
Data f rom t h e Q u e st ion a n d
A nsw e r Assem bly (É S PAC E
D ’I N T E R PE L L AT I O N D É M O C R AT I Q U E )
Table A1.1 Participants in the Question and Answer Assembly (Éspace

d’Interpellation Démocratique), 1994

Maitre Mahamdou Sylla Association Malienne Ministers never respond to
pour les Droits de l’Homme AMDH questions on cases.
(AMDH) Government should control
NGO activities so that they
cannot discriminate in
disbursement of NGO funds
Maitre Magatte Sèye President of the Malian Complains of disorganization
Bar Association of EID Detentions
awaiting trial
Mme. Soumaré Hadja President of Comité Women’s rights. Wants a
Diallo d’Action pour la Défense committee to address
des Droits de l’Enfant et application of conventions
de la Femme (CADEF)
M. Belco Tamboura Representative of the Previous complaints
Reporters without Borders concerning arrests and
violence toward press have
gone unnoticed. Hopes
EID will change this
Maitre Seydou Sidiki President of the African Celebrates the anniversary
Coulibaly League of Human Rights of the Declaration of
(LADH) Human Rights
Maitre Diarra President of Association Women and children in
Fatoumata Dembele des Juristes Maliennes prison. Excision
(AJM), who is also vice
president of the Federation
of African Female Lawyers,
and vice president of the
International Federation of
Women in the Legal
Profession
Table A1.2 Question and Answer Assembly (Éspace d’Interpellation
Démocratique), 1994 *
Organization Interpellation topic

Amnesty International Torture, death penalty, violence in the North
International Red Cross Violence in the North, underreporting of
deaths
South American Committee for Students on strike
the Defense of Indigenous Peoples
Tuareg Commission of the Center Violence in the North
for Human Rights, Geneva
International Helsinki Federation Outlines deaths by Army that need
of Human Rights investigations
* Public readings of reports received from international organizations absent.

Démocratique), 1994—interpellations from individuals

M. Kaba Sacko President of the Association Customary law
of the Defense of the Interests
of People Living in Accordance
with Customary Law in Bamako
M. Bamba Sacko Malian living abroad Support for Malians living
abroad
Mamadou Dabo None Stifling of democracy
with new prime minister
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
Assoumane Koné Researcher for Centre Respect for human rights
Djoliba
Samaké None Violations of law protecting
cooperatives

Démocratique), 1994—members of the Honorary Jury
Name Affiliation
President, Maitre Sidiki Kaba Lawyer, member of Senegalese Lawyers
Association, representative of FIDH and the
African Commission for the Rights of Man and
People, vice president of the Senegalese National
Organization for Human Rights
Continued
Table A1.4 Continued
Name Affiliation
Reporter, Maitre M’bam Diarra President of AMDH
N’Doure
Mme. Diop Sira Sissoko Retired primary school inspector, former
UNESCO expert, founding director of the
Kabala Women’s Cooperative, president of the
Foundation of Women of Africa, “Chevalier” of
the National Order of Mali, Lions’ Club in
Senegal
Maitre Boubacar Sidibé Lawyer, former president of the Malian Supreme
Court, former minister of justice, commander of
the National Order of Mali, officer in the French
Foreign Legion
M. Oumar Makalou Economist, retired employee of International
Financial Institutions, president of Centre
d’Études et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le
Développement Économique et Social (CERDES)
M. Daniel Konaté Representing the Catholic community
M. Taddèe Diarra President of the Evangelical Protestant churches
in Mali
M. Mahmoud Diko Imam, representative of the Islamic Community
Source: Ministère de la Justice, 1995, p. 3.

Name Affiliation
President, M. Halidou Ouedrago President of UIDH (from Burkina Faso)
Reporter, Maitre. Maguette Seye President of the Malian Bar Association
M. Regis Degouttes French CNCDH
Mme. Catherine Choquet FIDH
Mme. Christine Daure Serfaty President of International Observer of
Prisons (OIP)
M. Atsu Koffi Amega Member of OAU Commission on Human
Rights
M. Oumar Makalou President of CERDES
Maitre Boubacar Sidibe Lawyer
Daniel Konaté Catholic Church
Maitre N’Doure M’Bam Diarra Lawyer and president of the AMDH
Maitre Sidiki Kaba Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme
(ONDH), Senegal
Démocratique), 1995—contributors*
Name Affiliation Topic
Mr. Hamidou President of the UIDH Hopes other states will follow
Ouedrago Mali’s lead
M. Degouttes CNCDH Discusses CNCDH
Maitre Dante Member of AMDH Democratic institutions, Conseil
Économique, Social et Culturel
(CESC), Constitutional court,
poverty, liberty of association,
education, lotteries, North, and so on
Maitre Coulibaly African League for the Uniqueness of forum,
Rights of Man and decentralization, traditional law,
Peoples, Malian chapter abolition of death penalty
Maitre Lagdaf Amnesty International, Death penalty
president of the Malian
Chapter
Maitre Issaka Keita Bar Application of laws protecting
human rights
M. Amega OAU Human Rights Mali as example for Africa,
Commission human rights
* Contributors is a term used by the coordinators of the forum. They are distinct from those considered
“participants” and appear to have been invited speakers as opposed to those who had sent interpellations
to the government.

Name Affiliation
Mme. Catherine Choquet FIDH

Mme. Christine Daure-Serfati President of the International Prison Watch
Mme. Dadaye Laurence President of the Fondation Melchoir pour les Droits
de L’Homme (Belgium)
M. Francois Clavier General secretary of the International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH)
Mme. Mauricelle Sociologist from the French Centre Nationale de la
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Maitre Dige Go Cutinier Lawyer, member of the French National Advisory
Commission on Human Rights
M. Jacques Lai Lavoix Magistrate and consul to the Appeals Court Paris
M. Sain Martin Former secretary general of Amnesty International
for Mali
Nogigoto Tamyé National Consultative Commission on Human
Rights, Chad
Source: Data collected while attending 1997 Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique.
A pp e n di x Two
M e s sag e s R e c e i v e d b y t h e M a l i a n
Nat iona l Con f e r e nc e
Name Affiliation Location

Mamadou Coulibaly School Principal Kati-Noumorila
Bencounda Association for Malian France
Solidarity in France
Association Bencounda Solidarité
Maliènne en France
Bocar Camara Mopti
Mamadou Samba Diarra Bamako
Kadiatou et Hawa Konaté Elementary School Students
Mgr Luc Sangaré Episcopalian Society of Mali
Association of Malian Workers
Downsized as a Result of
Structural Adjustment
(ATCM) Association des
Travailleurs Compressés du Mali
Youth, Progress and Integration
Association, Association Jeunesse,
Progrès, Intégration
Hawa Sow Banconi
Flabougou,
Bamako
Anonymous individual
with a constribution of
750 F CFA
Secretariat of the Free and Secretariat of the Free and
Democratic Youth, Jeunesse Democratic Youth, Jeunesse
Libre et Démocratique (JLD) Libre et Démocratique (JLD)
asking for the prompt
reappointment of Professor
Mamadou Lamine Traoré,
member of the CTSP
Adama Traoré Retired director general of state Bamako
companies
Continued
Appendix Two Continued
Bouba Coulibaly Laboratory Hospital in Nioro Nioro du Sahel
du Sahel
Lamine Traoré, Bougouzié Dakar, Sénégal
Koné et Friends
Modibo Konaté Mapmaker Sikoroni
Mohamed Macalou Permanent admistrative Bamako
secretary, Malian Soccer Federation
Fédération Malienne de Football
Banny Mariko Businessman Bamako
Tiécoura Coulibaly Land use section, Kaarta Integrated Nioro du Sahel
Development Operation (ODIK)
Mohamed Keita Youth Association for Democracy Bamako
and Progress, Coordination of
Democratic Organizations of
Bamako Association des Jeunes pour
la Démocratie (AJDP)
Sikasso Region Rural Delegation to Sikasso
the National Conference
Hassane Kafa Cissé Member of AJDP
Docteur Mohamed Thienta Secondary hospital in Nioro du Sahel Nioro du Sahel
Kita Office of the Malian Association Kita
for Unity and the Progress of Islam,
Association Malienne pour l’Unité et le
Progrès de l’Islam (AMUPI)
Abdoulaye Albadia Dicko Secretary general of the assocation Diré
of the wisemen, Association “Les Sages”
Tahirou Balobo Maiga, Civil and mining engineer Timbuktu
Oumar Chirfi Haidara Provisional committee director for Timbuktu
US-RDA, Timbuktu
Souleymane Diallo Vice president, committee director of Gabon
CNID Gabon
Amadou Mamadou Maiga President of ATCM
Association of Retired Civil Sévaré
Servants of Sévaré, Association
des Fonctionnaires Civils Retraités
de Sévaré
Ibrahim Assibanga Maiga National Statistical and Computing Bamako
Headquarters of the Bamako Section
of AMUPI
Président Mamadou Youth Association for Progress and
Noumouké Cissé Integration, Association de la Jeunesse
pour le Progrès et l’Intégration
Mr. H. Maiga President of the Community for Peace France
and Development in Mali, Collectif
pour la Paix et le Développement au
Mali (COPADEM)
Continued
Union of Malian Nationals in Cameroon
Cameroon, Union des Ressortissants
Maliens au Cameroun
COPADEM
Abdoul Aziz Kane Collective of Mauritanian Refugees Cote d’Ivoire
in Cote d’Ivoire
Secrétaire Général Ahmed Committee for the Rehiring of
Diaroukou Diall Agents Downsized from OPAN
Mahamane Kanglaye Animal Breeding Technician
Association of Civil Servants
Voluntarily Taking Early Retirement,
Association des Fonctionniaires
Retraités Volontaires par Anticipation
Association of Malian Widows and
Orphans, Association des Veuves et
Orphelins du Mali
Association of Physically
Handicapped Malians, Association
Malienne des Handicapés Physiques
Committee director of CNID Gabon Gabon
Malian Civil Service interns in Dakar Dakar, Senegal
N’Faly Filifing Sidibé s/c Kati
Capitaine Moussa Sidibe
Mme Wagué Oumou Diby Housekeeper Tiokoumbougou
Kolokani
Malian Association for the Homeless,
Association Maliènne des Sans-abri
Balladji Cissé Malian Boxing Federation
Noumoutié Keita Goundam Clerk of the Court Goundam
Seydou Karim Sidibé Lafiabougou
Malian Association of Working Class
Ex-Warrant Officer Bamba Ségou
Keita
“A Citizen in the time and
space”
Mamadou Dia Head of the Animal Breeding Nioro du Sahel
Sector Nioro du Sahel
Malian Students in Sudan
Alassane Amadou Maiga ASECNA
Ingénieur
Dr. Barry née Diallo Liliane Representative of the World Health Lomé, Togo
Organization
lbrahima Koureichy Association of the Retail Sabougnouman
Grain Merchants of
Sabougnouman, Association des
Commerçants Détaillants de Céréales
de Sabougnouman
Continued
Bakary Fodé Traoré and Organizer for Youth Activities and Kangaba
Youssouf Keita Junior High School (Second Cycle)
Teacher in Kangaba
Fasségé Dembélé “Engaged democrat” Sogoniko,
Bamako
MM. Siaka Traoré et Malian Association for the Support Sanibougou I
Lassana Coulibaly of Islam, Association Malienne pour Sikasso Bougoula
le Soutien de l’Islam ville Sikasso
Noumouté Mariko S/C Agricultural engineer Lafiabougou/
Kambé Traoré Bamako
Almamy Diawara Vice-president of US-RDA San
Oumar Sy, Mahamane Malian Youth in Lomé (Togo) Lomé, Togo
Tiégoum Traoré, Bakary
Coulibaly
Souleymane Diallo Committee director Graduate
Association of Innovators and
Job-Seekers, Association des Diplómés
Initiateurs et Demandeurs d’Emploi
(ADIDE)
Ibrahima Traoré Ecologiste Party for
Integration, Parti Ecologiste
pour l’Intégration (PEI)
Bakary Sanogo AMUPI Sikasso
Moussa Keita, Representative of Technicians Bamako
D.G.WETTEM Affiliated with Very High Tension
(THT) Electrical Systems
Bassoma Coulibaly Sabalibougou,
Bamako
Issa Balobo Maiga Assocaition for the Development Hombori
of Tourism and Mountain
Climbing, Association pour le
Développement du Tourisme et de
l’Alpinisme (ADTAN)
Mamadou Maiga Lafiabougou
Mady Awa Fainké Young unemployed graduate Bamako
Tiéblen Coulibaly “Envoy from God to lead prayers
in all languages”
Noumoutié Mariko Engineer in agricultural applied Bamako
sciences
Yaya Mamadou Diarra P.E.S.G. Bamako
Continued
Kya Kaysiré Gitéra United Nations Development
Program – Bamako (UNDP) in the
name of Malians in Addis-Ababa:
Louis Sangaré, Abdoulaye Niang,
Demba Diarra, Mamadou Bagayoko,
Kaba Camara, Macono Coulibaly,
Gaoussou Traoré, Oumar Mariko
Malian civil servants from the Islamic
Conference Organization (OCI)
Youssouf Tata Cissé Malian researcher Paris
Dionousou Soumaré Union of Malian Nationals in Kinshasa
Kinshasa, Union des Ressortissants
Maliens (URM) de Kinshasa
Siriman Sakho Support technician for Community Bamako
Development
Tiémoko Diallo Association for the Reconciliation
of Hearts, Association pour la
Reconciliation des Coeurs
Employees of the Malian Malian Embassy in Cairo Cairo
Embassy in Cairo
Wagué Modiba Diaby Islamic Popular Socialist Association, Bamako
Association Islamique Socialiste
Populaire (AISP)
Cheickh Abdoulaye Cissé Authorized accountant Bamako
Guédiouma Samaké Survivor from Taoudénit Taoudénit
Fousseyni Traoré Administrative secretary of the Bamako
Friends Club, Club des Amis
A poem by Ousmane Librarian from the French Cultural Bamako
Diarra Center
Protest movement from ADIDE
members of ADIDE
Unsigned message relating
to the fate of maids and
housekeepers
Moussa Doumbia Retired health technician Badalabougou
Boubacar Sy Niossombougou/
cercle de Kolokani
Cheik Koita Law professor from the Central
School of Industry, Commerce
and Administration (ECICA) who
deplores that the National Conference
did not discuss establishing a court
martial system for the military
Henry Niaré English professor Lycée Askia Bamako
Mohamed Bamako
Continued
Dr. Mamadou Sangaré President of the Ecologist
Associations of Mali, Associations
des Ecologistes du Mali
President of the Veterans Veterans from Mali
from Mali
Mamadou Diarra General secondary education teacher Bamako
Declaration from SOS
Fundamental Education
Yéro Haidara Association of Malian Nationals in
Germany, Association des Ressortissants
Maliens en Allemagne (ARNA)
Bakary Diallo Former agent from Mali Import Sabalibougou
Export Company (SOMIEX)
Broulaye Doumbia Coordinator of Small-scale Projects,
Canadian-Malian Overseas
Development Cooperation
Source: Table compiled from data in CTSP, “National Conference: Listes des Annexes,” 1991.
No t e s
Introduction
1. Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu, “The Role of the National Conference in the
Transition to Democracy in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Mali,” Issue: A
Journal of Opinion 21, no. 1–2 (1993): 44–50.
2. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., Governance and Politics in Africa
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992).
3. See Julius O. Ihonvbere on the concept of constitutions without constitu-
tionalism in “Constitutions without Constitutionalism,” in The Transition
to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle, edited by
John Mbaku, John Mukum, and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere (Westport:
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003).
4. Victor T. Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa,”
The Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (1997): 197.
5. John Hatchard, “‘Perfecting Imperfections’: Developing Procedures for
Amending Constitutions in Commonwealth Africa,” The Journal of Modern
African Studies 36, no. 3 (1998): 397.
6. E. Gyimah-Boadi, “The Rebirth of African Liberalism,” Journal of
Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998): 20.
7. Ibid.
8. Jürgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional
State,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by
Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 107.
9. Chapter one in this work includes a discussion of constitutional thought and
the bleak constitutional landscape in Africa that prevailed for many years,
creating an environment that certainly contributed to the disillusionment
with constitutional studies that prevailed among scholars at that time.
10. See, e.g., Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa’s
Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
11. Jürgen Habermas cited in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of
the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” in Theorizing
Citizenship, edited by Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York,
1995), 284.
12. Pierre Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 2000).
13. Constitutional literacy is explored in Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz,
Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven C. Wheatley eds., Constitutionalism
190 / notes
and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1993).
14. The idea of a just constitution is discussed further in chapter one.
15. See, e.g., David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1996), 263–273.
16. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 110.
17. Ibid.
18. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990); Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model
of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting
the Boundaries of the Political, edited by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 67–94; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity:
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,”
in Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition, edited by Amy
Guttman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25–74; Habermas,
“Struggles for Recognition,” 107–148.
19. Zeric Kay Smith, “Building African Democracy: The Role of Civil Society-
Based Groups in Strengthening Malian Civic Community,” PhD disserta-
tion, University of North Carolina, 1998, 83.
20. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2004,
available online http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty_f_MLI.html.
Cited July 26, 2005.
21. Pascal James Imperato, Mali: A Search for Direction (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1989), 55.
22. The 2004 United Nations Human resources development index places Mali
as third from the bottom of a list of 177 countries.
23. For a discussion of the relationship between economic growth and demo-
cratic development, see Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck,
“Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis,” American
Journal of Political Science 88, no. 4 (1994): 903–910.
24. See Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in
Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), particularly chapter two.
25. Richard Sandbrook, “Transitions without Consolidation: Democratization
in Six African Cases,” Third World Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1996): 85.
26. The idea of “living or dead for France” was a reference to the African soldiers that
fought for France during World Wars I and II, many of whom lost their lives.
27. Rosa de Jorio, “Female Elites, Women’s Formal Associations, and Political
Practices in Urban Mali (West Africa),” PhD dissertation, University of
Illinois, 1997, 76.
28. No gender specific data is available for voter turnout in Mali. However, in
Senegal, which was also part of Afrique Occidentale Francophone, women
voters outnumber male voters. Gorgui Ciss, “Senegal: Democracy and the
Presidential Electoral Process,” lecture presented at the James S. Coleman
African Studies Center, UCLA, May 15, 2000.
29. To be discussed in chapter seven.
notes / 191
30. Sensibilisation projects most often focus on civic training, but the term sensi-
bilisation may be understood as something that raises awareness. I researched
sensibilisation projects directed by USAID in conjunction with local NGOs.
Many other foreign donors conducted similar projects.
31. I taped the discussions during the seminar and had my research assistant,
Mariam Sewané Diakité, transcribe the recordings. She also transcribed and
translated heated discussions that took place in Bambara into French.
32. CERDES, le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours (Bamako:
Éditions Donniya, 1997), 214–215. Yaya Sidibé, Justice et media: Vivement
des chroniquers judiciares Justice pour tous: Le journal du forum national sur
la justice, 1999 [cited April 2, 1999]. Available at www.panaf.net/jpt1.htm; it
states that in 1999, thirty newspapers existed.
33. I relied on Mariam Sawané Diakité’s transcription and translation of Bambara
into French from the ten video cassettes of the National Conference, partic-
ularly for discussions concerning “ le monde rural,” which often took place in
Bambara.
34. Quoted by Howard W. French, “In One Poor African Nation, Democracy
Thrives,” The New York Times, October 16, 1996, A3.
One Principles of Constitutionalism

1. Bolanle M. Mustapha, “Problems and Prospects of Constitutionalism in
Africa,” in African Traditional Political Thought and Institutions, edited by
John A.A. Ayoade and Adigun A.B. Agbaje (Lagos: Centre for Black and
African Arts and Civilization, 1989), 289.
2. Rhoda Howard argues that one reason constitutionalism and the rule of law
have faltered in Commonwealth Africa is because they were imposed from
above and as a result, they were foreign institutions. See Rhoda E. Howard,
Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1986), 165. Similarly, Pierre Englebert argues that the exoge-
nous institutions of the African state have contributed to the state’s lack
of legitimacy and economic stagnation across the continent. See Pierre
Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder: Lynne
Reinner, 2000).
3. Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven
C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the
Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), xvii.
4. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn
and Company, 1950), 6.
5. Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1940), 3.
6. Indigenous is placed in quotations in an effort to recognize the complicated
nature of the term. Indigenous law is inevitably syncretic in nature and there-
fore never “purely” indigenous. The terms traditional and customary are
similarly contested.
7. For an important analysis of constitutionalism and dual legal traditions in
Commonwealth Africa, see Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa,
especially 164–172.
192 / notes
8. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 133.
9. Throughout this chapter I refer to the idea of a just constitution. This is not
an absolute condition, rather it refers to a constitution created in such a man-
ner that certain conditions have been fulfilled within a particular society,
thereby creating a constitution that is more “just” in its relationship to the
people. See “Creating a ‘just’ constitution” in this chapter for more detail.
10. See Francis D. Wormuth, The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism (New
York: Harper and Borthers, 1949) and McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient
and Modern.
11. Wormuth, Origins of Modern Constitutionalism, 3.
12. For a discussion of Latin America, see Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal
Accountability in New Democracies,” in The Self-Restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies, edited by Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond,
and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999), 29–51.
13. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, 5.
14. Ibid., 26.
15. Harvey Wheeler, “Constitutionalism,” in Handbook of Political Science, edited
by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1975), 37.
16. O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” 36.
17. Richard L. Sklar, “Democracy and Constitutionalism,” in The Self-Restraining
State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, edited by Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder: Lynne Reinner,
1999), 55.
18. Ibid., 55.
19. See ibid. and Wheeler, “Constitutionalism.”
20. Sklar, “Democracy and Constitutionalism,” 54.
21. Wheeler, “Constitutionalism,” 36.
22. Ibid.
23. Sklar, “Democracy and Constitutionalism,” 57.
24. Wheeler, “Constitutionalism,” 37.
25. D.G. Lavroff, and G. Peiser, Les constitutions Africaines: L’Afrique Noire
Francophone et Madagascar (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, Librarie de la Cour
d’Appel et de l’Ordre des Avocats, 1961), 2.
26. Victor Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa,”
Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (June 1997): 188.
27. For a discussion of liberal democracy and citizenship, see David Held,
Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 66–71.
28. Ibid., 82.
29. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
30. Ibid., 7.
31. This is not restricted to emerging democracies. Established democracies such
as Canada also struggle with the need to recognize indigenous and minority
rights in the context of the National Charter.
32. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 194–195.
33. Ibid., 2.
notes / 193
34. In his important critique of liberalism, Walzer argues that common culture
links members of a community to a common understanding of justice. See
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Other com-
munitarian critiques of liberalism include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 1981); and Michael Sandel, Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
35. For a discussion of borders and citizenship, as well as a critique of the com-
munitarian perspective, see Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The
Case for Open Borders,” in Theorizing Citizenship, edited by Ronald Beiner
(Albany: State University of New York, 1995), 229–253.
36. Josiah A.M. Cobbah, “African Values and the Human Rights Debate:
An African Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly 9, no. 3 (August 1987):
309–331.
37. Rhoda E. Howard, “Group Versus Individual Identity in the African Debate
on Human Rights,” in Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives,
edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1990), 160.
38. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 43.
39. Ibid., 40–41.
40. For a discussion of women and contract theory, see Carole Pateman, The
Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
41. Greenberg et al., Constitutionalism and Democracy, xvi.
42. Ibid., xix–xx.
44. Greenberg et al., Constitutionalism and Democracy, xviii.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., xix–xx.
48. Samuel C. Nolutshungu, “Constitutionalism in Africa: Some Conclusions,”
in ibid., 369.
49. For an important discussion of the relationship between education and
human rights, see Ajuji Ahmed and Ronald Cohen, “Education and Rights
in Nigeria,” in Human Rights and Governance in Africa, edited by Ronald
Cohen, Goran Hyden, and Winston P. Nagan (Gainesville: University Press
of Florida, 1993), 215–234.
50. Maxwell Owusu, “Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and
Constitutionalism in Africa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 39,
no. 1 (1997): 121.
51. Ibid., 146.
52. Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 24.
53. Ibid., 5.
54. Ibid., 6.
55. Greenberg et al., Constitutionalism and Democracy, xx.
57. Ibid.
58. Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism,” 203–205.
59. Ibid., 204.
194 / notes
60. See Nolutshungu, “Constitutionalism in Africa,” 366–378.

61. Eboe Hutchful, “Reconstructing Political Space: Militarism and
Constitutionalism in Africa,” in Greenberg et al., Constitutionalism and
Democracy, 231–232.
62. Maria Nzomo, “The Status of Women’s Human Rights in Kenya and
Strategies to Overcome Inequalities,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 22, no. 2
(1994): 17.
63. See Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, 165; also William
Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1993), 30–31.
64. Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism,” 189.
65. Mustapha, “Problems and Prospects of Constitutionalism in Africa,” 289.
66. Richard L. Sklar, “The African Frontier in Political Science,” in Africa
and the Disciplines, edited by Robert H. Bates, V.Y. Mudimbe, and Jean
O’Barr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 83–110, and “The
Significance of Mixed Government in Southern African Studies: A
Preliminary Assessment,” in African Democracy in the Era of Globalisation,
edited by Jonathon Hyslop (Witwatersrand: Witwatersrand University Press,
1999), 115–121.
67. Sklar, “The African Frontier in Political Science,” 87.
68. Mahmood Mamdani presents an alternative perspective that emphasizes the
colonial role in creating an “all-embracing world of the customary” and the
legacy of this role. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary
Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996).
69. Sklar, “The Significance of Mixed Government.”
70. E. Gyimah-Boadi, “The Rebirth of African Liberalism,” Journal of
Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998): 20.
71. Sklar, “The African Frontier in Political Science,” 96.
72. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 3. For interesting analyses of inter-
national human rights agreements, see Virginia A. Leary, “The Effect of
Western Perspectives on International Human Rights,” in Human Rights in
Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im
and Francis M. Deng (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1990),
15–30; and Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, chapter one.
73. Mahmood Mamdani, “The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa,”
Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 3 (1990): 359.
74. U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997).
75. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 91.
76. Atieno Odhiambo and David W. Cohen, Burying SM: The Politics of
Knowledge and the Sociology of Power in Africa (Portsmouth: Heinemann,
1992).
77. William F.S. Miles, “Partitioned Royalty: The Evolution of Hausa Chiefs
in Nigeria and Niger,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 2
(1987): 255.
78. Pearl Robinson, “Grassroots Legitimation of Military Governance in Burkina
Faso and Niger: The Core Contradictions,” in Governance and Politics in
notes / 195
Africa, edited by Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Boulder: Lynne

Reinner, 1992), 158.
79. Mamdani, “The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa,” 366.
80. The Afrobarometer is an independent research project that conducts public
opinion surveys in Africa. Partners in the project include Michigan State
University, The Center for Democratic Development (CDD) in Accra,
Ghana, and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDSA). Information
and publications are available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.
81. Massa Coulibaly and Amadou Diarra, “Working Paper no. 35, Démocratie
et legitimation du marche: Rapport d’enquete Afrobarometre au Mali,
Decembre 2002,” p. 38.
82. For a discussion of the theory of discourse ethics, see Stephen K. White, The
Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
84. Ibid., 34.
85. See Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).
86. The Tuareg are a nomadic population in the Sahel and have been in fre-
quent conflict with the government of Mali. They took part in the National
Conference and violence has not erupted in recent years between the state
and the Tuareg populations. For further discussion, see chapter five.
87. Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes (APDF), La
Voix de La Femme October 1993, 9–10.
Two Democratic Transitions and their Legacies

in Comparative Perspective
1. I have restricted this study to the former members of Afrique Occidentale
Francaise (AOF) while excluding Mauritania and Algeria because of their
very different histories and cultures. I have added Togo, which was not ac-
tually part of the AOF but was ruled by the French as a League of Nations
Mandate after 1918.
2. Pierre Englebert with Rebecca Hummel, “Senegal: Sopi?” Africa Contemporary
Record 27 (2004): B195.
3. See Jennifer Seely, “The Legacies of Transition Governments: Post-
Transition Dynamics in Benin and Togo,” Democratization 12, no. 3 (June
2005): 357–377.
4. For an important analysis of the relationship between participation in con-
stitution writing and conflict resolution, see Jennifer Widner, “Constitution
Writing and Conflict Resolution,” Research Paper No. 2005/51 United
Nations University.
5. For an excellent analysis of legacy of transition governments, see Seely, “The
Legacies of Transition.”
6. As Devra Moehler as shown in her compelling analysis of Uganda, partici-
pation does not guarantee legitimacy. Instead it is the message that elites
communicate to citizens that matter. See Devra Moehler, “Participation
196 / notes
and Support for the Constitution in Uganda,” Journal of Modern African

Studies 44, no. 2 (2006): 275–308. Indeed, a process that is inclusive and
seeks to address the concerns of all interests is only successful to the extent
that elites would not find it in their interest to communicate a negative per-
spective on to citizens, but would rather recognize and accept the legitimacy
of the process themselves and convey this position to others.
7. For an important exception to this, see Victor T. Le Vine Politics of
Francophone Africa (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2004).
8. See Daniel Bourmaud and Patrick Quantin, “Le modèle et ses doubles: Les
conférences nationales en Afrique Noire (1990–1991),” in Les politiques du
mimétisme institutionnel. La greffe et le rejet, edited by Yves Meny (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 1993), 165–182.
9. Julius O. Ihonvbere, “Constitutions without Constitutionalism,” in The
Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle,
edited by John Mbaku, John Mukum, and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 144.
10. Le Vine, Politics of Francophone Africa, 191. While Burkina Faso was also an
Afro-Marxist regime, they suspended their constitution in 1980 and were
guided by Thomas Sankara’s Discours d’orientation politique until the June
1991 constitution (see ibid., 192).
11. Robert Dossou quoted in John Heilbrunn, “Social Origins of National
Conferences in Benin and Togo,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 2
(1993): 286.
12. Ibid., 286.
13. See Bourmaud and Quantin, “Le modèle et ses doubles.”
14. Robert Doussou quoted in “Hopes on the Horizon: Africa in the 1990s: Benin,”
transcript. Available online http://www.pbs.org/hopes/benin/transcript.html;
accessed July 22, 2007.
15. Chris Allen, “Benin: A Weakened State,” Africa Contemporary Record 23
(1990–1992): B3.
16. Seely, “The Legacies of Transition,” 366.
17. Heilbrunn, “Social Origins of National Conferences,” 294.
18. Bruce A. Magnusson, “Testing Democracy in Benin: Experiments in
Institutional Reform,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by
Richard Joeseph (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 221.
19. Ibid.
20. Thomas Bierschenk, “The local appropriation of democracy: An Analysis
of the municipal elections in Parakou, Republic of Benin, 2002/03,”
Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien Working Papers No. 39
(2004): 22.
21. Benin: Institutional Situation, http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/anglais/
institutionnel/benin.html. Downloaded on July 6, 2006.
22. Magnusson, “Testing Democracy in Benin,” 225.
23. Ibid., 225.
24. “Benin: President Mathieu Kérékou Leaves after 29 Years,” Irin news
Cotonou April 7, 2006. Available online at http://www.irinnews.org/report.
asp?ReportID552665&SelectRegion5West_Africa&SelectCountry5BE
NIN. Downloaded July 4, 2006.
notes / 197
25. This is not to say that process alone can ensure democratic consolidation. In
the case of Uganda it is clear that a broadly participatory process was viewed
with suspicion in districts dominated by opposition. The end result of the
Ugandan constitution restricts civil liberties and therefore opposition groups
are likely to remain unsatisfied with the legitimacy of such a constitution so
long as they see it as unfair and infringing upon their rights. See Moehler,
“Participation and Support,” 275–308, for a discussion of legitimacy and
participatory constitutionalism.
26. “The orientations and decisions of the Conference will not be overturned by
the head of State.” Translation my own. Tètè Tété, Démocratisation a la togo-
laise (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998). Also available online http://www.diastode.
org/Droits/tete3c.html.
28. Ibid., 367.
29. Ibid., 368, also fn 41 (p. 377).
30. Ibid., 369.
31. Ibid., 371.
32. Background Notes: Togo, p. 5.
33. “Doubts Hang over Togo election,” BBC News UK (April 29, 2005), avail-
able online http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4497787.stm.
34. “Togo Election Commission Declares Gnassingbe Winner in Disputed Poll,”
Jurist April 26, 2005.
35. Background Notes, Togo, U.S. Dept. of State (March 2006): 6.
37. Cohabitation refers to the sharing of power in which the prime minister
and president are from different political parties. Cohabitation has occurred
repeatedly in the French Fifth Republic, most recently with Jacques Chirac
as president and Lionel Jospin as prime minister.
38. Leonardo A. Villalón and Abdourahmane Idrissa, “Repetitive Breakdowns and
a Decade of Experimentation: Institutional Choices and Unstable Democracy
in Niger,” in The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments, edited by Leonardo
A. Villalón and Peter VonDoepp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2005), 41–42.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 31.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 31.
43. Ibid., 32.
44. Ibid., 38.
45. Ibid., 39.
46. Ibid., 40.
47. Ibid., 42.
48. David E. Gardinier, “Assassination of President Ibrahim Baré Mainassara
Leads to Restoration of Multiparty Rule,” in Africa Contemporary Record
Vol 27, 1998–2000, edited by Colin Legum (New York: Holmes and Meier,
2004), B158.
49. In 1999 Hamid Algabid received 10.83 percent of the vote, more than
Djermakoye’s 7.73 percent. In 2004, Amadou Cheiffou received 6.35 percent
198 / notes
of the vote ahead of Djermakoye’s 6.07 percent and Algabid’s 4.89 percent.
See African elections database.
50. John Uniack Davis and Aboubacar B. Kossomi, “Niger Gets Back on Track,”
Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3 (July 2001): 82.
51. Freedom in the World 2006.
52. Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 52.
53. Pearl T. Robinson, “The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone
Africa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36, no. 3 (July
1994): 592.
54. Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa (Boulder:
Westview, 1996), 66.
55. Ibid., 67.
56. Ibid., 71.
57. Augustin Loada, Burkina Faso Freedom House Report (2005), avail-
able online at www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/2005/burkina.
faso2005.pdf; p. 143.
58. Augustin Loada, Burkina Faso Freedom House Report (2005), avail-
able online at www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/2005/burkina.
faso2005.pdf; p. 130.
59. Augustin Loada and Carlos Santiso, “Elections historiques au Burkina Faso:
Vers une maturité démocratique?” available online from the Centre pour la
gouvernance démocratique Burkina Faso, http://www.cgdbf.of/french/docu-
ments/loadasantoso.pdf.
60. International IDEA, La réforme du système électorale au Burkina Faso
(Stockholm, Sweden: IDEA, Juillet 1999), 137–143.
61. Augustin Loada, “Burkina Faso,” in Freedom House Report (2005) 131.
62. “Burkina Faso: Compaoré gets green light to run for third mandate,”
IRIN (October 17, 2005) downloaded from IRINnews.org http://www.
irinnews.org /report.a sp ? ReportID549602 & SelectRegion5West _
Africa&SelectCountry5BURKINA_FASO. Judges in the Court serve nine-
year, nonrenewable terms. There are nine judges, three appointed by the president,
three by the National Assembly, and three are nominated by the minister of jus-
tice. Ginsburg, Judicial Review, 50–53. http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?R
eportID549602&SelectRegion5West_Africa&SelectCountry5BURKINA_
FASO.
63. “Burkina Faso: Electoral Code Changed Ahead of Presidential Poll” (April
29, 2004) downloaded from IRINNews.org.
64. Ibid. (4/29/2004 Irin).
65. Burkina Faso: Compaoré wins new mandate in country’s first multiparty race
(November 18, 2005), IRIN news available online at http://www.irinnews.
org/print.asp?ReportID550188.
66. Robert J. Groelsema, “Guinea: Cross-Border Attacks Intensify,” in Colin
Legum, Ed., Africa Contemporary Record 27 (2004): B87.
67. Cheikh Yérime Seck, “La descente aux enfers,” Jeune Afrique
(September 25–October 1, 2005), 54.
68. “Guinea: Institutional Situation” http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/
institutionnel/guinea.html. Downloaded July 5, 2006.
notes / 199
69. Cited in Le Vine Politics of Francophone Africa, 193.

70. Kim Lane Scheppele, “Democracy by Judiciary. (Or, why the Courts Can
be More Democratic than Parliaments),” in Rethinking the Rule of Law after
Communism, edited by Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier, and Wojciech
Sadurski (Budapest: Central European Press, 2005), 25–26.
71. Ibid., 26.
72. Term from Alexander Bickel, “The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). Citation from Scheppele, “Democracy by
Judiciary,” 27.
73. Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s
Political Reconstruction (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 14.
74. Ibid., 181.
75. Eloi Diarra, “Constitution et état de droit au Mali,” Revue Juridique et
Politique Independance et Cooperation 49, no. 3 (1995): 265.
76. Anna Rotman, “Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model
for Guaranteeing Human Rights,” Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 17
(Spring 2001): 291.
77. Julius O. Ihonvbere, “Towards Participatory Mechanisms and Principles of
Constitution-Making in Africa,” in Paths to People’s Constitution, edited by
Segun Jegede, Ale Ayodele, and Eni Akinsola (Lagos Nigeria: Committee for
the Defence of Human Rights, 2000), 83.
78. Kayode Fayemi, “Building a Regional Network for Constitution-Making:
Prospects and Challenges in West Africa,” in State Reconstruction in West
Africa, edited by Segun Jegede, Ayodele Ale, and Eni Akinsola (Lagos,
Nigeria: Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, 2001), 255.
79. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997); emphasis in the original.
80. Ihonvbere, “Towards Participatory Mechanisms,” 144.
81. Ibid., 146.
82. Ibid.
Three Originating Participation: The

Sovereign National Conference
1. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6. Emphasis added.
2. See Michael Bratton, and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments
in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 188. National Conferences took place in
Benin (1990), Gabon (1990), Congo (1991), Mali (1991), Togo (1991), Niger
(1991), Zaire (1992). For an analysis of the National Conference movement,
see Pearl Robinson, “The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone
Africa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36 (1994): 575–610.
3. For discussion of the National Conference movement and a careful analysis
of the National Conferences of Benin and Togo, see John R. Heilbrunn,
“Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo,” Journal of
Modern African Studies 31, no. 2 (1993): 277–299. See also Jennifer Seely,
200 / notes
“The Legacies of transition Governments: Post-transition Dynamics in Benin

and Togo,” Democratization 12, no. 3 (June 2005): 357–377.
4. For an interesting analysis of the expectations of participation and the sub-
sequent political reality in Uganda, see Devra Coren Moehler, Informed
Distrusting Democrats: The Effects of Citizen Participation in Ugandan
Constitution-Making, PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2003.
5. CERDES, Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours (Bamako:
Éditions Donniya, 1997).
6. Amadou Toumani Touré, “Discours de son excellence le Lieutenant-Colonel
Amadou Toumani Touré Président du CTSP, Chef de l’etat à l’occasion
de l’ouverture de la conference nationale,” paper presented at the National
Conference, Bamako, July 29, 1991.
7. Bintou Sanankoua, Justice pour tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice
(No. 2) March 30, 1999 [cited March 30 1999], available from www.panef.
net/jp2.htm#la presse.
8. For the concept of auxiliary supports, see Richard L. Sklar, “African Polities:
The Next Generation,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by
Richard Joseph (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999), 165–177.
9. CERDES, Le processus démocratique, 218.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 37.
12. Ibid.
13. “Le CTSP arrête les critères de participation à la Conférence Nationale,”
L’Essor, July 22, 1991, 4.
14. Guidelines were outlined in Article 5 of Ordinance n.2/P-CTSP of April 5,
1991.
15. L’Essor, July 15, 1991, 3.
16. Ali Cissé, “Comment assumer notre specificité?” L’Essor, June 31, 1991, 5.
17. The primary source for analyzing the origins and activities of the partici-
pants in the conference is the collection of videotapes of the conference that
were shown on national television by the only television station, ORTM. No
government documents include lists of those who addressed the assembly.
Indeed on the videotapes of the conference, the speakers are not identified.
This problem was resolved a few days into the conference, at which point
the speaker was announced, and the speaker to follow was asked to come
forward. On the other hand, those who submitted proposals and concerns to
the conference in writing but were unable to attend were carefully recorded
and the list is included herein.
18. “Rapport de la commission de vérification des mandats,” July 31, 1991,
CTSP.
19. “Participants à la conférence nationale,” 1991, CTSP, 208.
20. Cheick Oumar Diarrah, Le défi démocratique au Mali (Paris: L’Harmattan,
1996).
21. Comité de Coordination des Actions des Organisations Non-
Gouvernementales au Mali, CCA-ONG, “Rapport préparatoire pour la par-
ticipation des ONG à la conférence nationale” (Bamako Mali: CCA-ONG,
1991), 1–3.
22. The fcfa in 1991 was valued at approximately 300 fcfa per U.S. dollar.
notes / 201
23. Annexes, Conférence Nationale, “Rapport d’exécution du budget de la

conférence,” 214.
24. It is clear that most of the work took place in the commission meetings. The
first three days were formalities and the presentations by those who presented
advance projects on each subject. The next five days were spent in commis-
sions. August 6–9 were plenary sessions on the Charter for Parties, the Draft
Electoral Code, and the Draft Constitution. August 9–10 worked on the
Commission for the State of the Nations. The Plenary on the State of the
Nation took place on August 11. On the final day, August 12, religious groups
and ATT spoke at closing ceremonies. See Programme des travaux de la con-
férence nationale.
25. Commission sur L’état de la nation, “Rapport de présentation de la commis-
sion sur l’état de la nation” (Bamako: CTSP, 1991), 1–4.
26. L’État de la Nation.
27. Interviewed November 26, 1997.
28. A. Niakaté, “Conférence nationale: Le difficile accouchement de la
Constitution,” L’Essor, August 12, 1991, 3.
29. Title IX in République du Mali, “Décret No. 92–0731 p-CTSP portant pro-
mulgation de la Constitution” (Bamako: CTSP, 1992).
30. National Conference ORTM tapes, Draft Constitution.
31. ORTM tapes.
32. Diarrah, Le défi démocratique au Mali, 313.
33. Ibid.
34. Speaker on National Conference ORTM tapes, Draft Constitution.
35. ORTM video cassette.
36. These quotes are provided in length in order to better illustrate the sorts of
discussions that took place.
37. Hamidou Diabaté, ORTM tapes.
38. Katouka Sissoko, Cercle Bafoulbé, from ORTM videotape.
39. See Rosa de Jorio, “Female Elites, Women’s Formal Associations, and Political
Illinois, 1997, chapter two.
40. Jesse Ribot, Political-Economic Analysis of Cooperatives Reform in Mali:
“The State is the Best Hen,” USAID/Management Systems International
(September 30, 1998): 10.
41. Ibid., 11.
42. Ibid., 12–15.
43. See Ibid., 29.
44. R. James Bingen, “Agricultural Development Policy and Grassroots
Democracy in Mali: The Emergence of Mali’s Farmer Movement,” African
Rural and Urban Studies 1, no. 1 (1994): 57.
45. Chéibane Coulibaly, “Mali: Les ruraux et la gouvernance démocratique,”
Annex IV, USAID/ARD (April 1994): 29.
46. Cheick Ag Baye, president of MPA. Notes from National Conference
Commission Reports.
47. CERDES, Le processus démocratique, 107.
48. Ibid., 111.
49. See chapter seven for further discussion of the Northern conflict.
202 / notes
50. Amadou Toumani Touré, ORTM tapes.

51. Coordination des Associations, “Les femmes et la politique” (Bamako:
Coordination des Associations, 1991), 3.
52. Interviewed on November 12, 1997, at CADEF, Badalabougou.
53. An unidentified speaker at the National Conference discussion on the consti-
tution. From ORTM tapes of the National Conference.
54. A. Niakaté, “Les trancheés de la procédure,” L’Essor, July 31, 1991, 3.
56. James Smoot Coleman, “Nationalism in Tropical Africa,” originally pub-
lished in 1954, reprinted in Nationalism and Development in Africa: Selected
Essays/James Smoot Coleman, edited by Richard L. Sklar (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1994), 21.
57. Ibid., 21–23.
58. Ibid., 42.
59. Yaya Sidibé, “Justice et media: Vivement des chroniquers judiciaires,” Justice
Pour Tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice no. 5 (April 2, 1999),
www.panaf.net/jpt1.htm.
Four Integrating Citizens and the

State: Decentralization and Elections
1. Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg
Threat in Mali,” Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3 (2001): 500.
2. For an important analysis of decentralization in Mali, see ibid.
3. “Mali Democracy Activist Honoured in Belgium,” May 4, 2005, afrol news.
Downloaded June 20, 2005, from http://www.afrol.com/articles/16271.
4. Ibid.
5. For analysis of elections in Africa, see Michael Bratton and Daniel N. Posner,
“A First Look at Second Elections in Africa, with Illustrations from Zambia,”
in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1999), 377–407.
6. See Leonardo Villalón and Abdourahmane Idrissa, “Repetative Breakdowns
and a Decade of Experimentation: Institutional Choices and Unstable
Democracy in Niger,” in The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments, edited
by Leonardo A. Villalón and Peter VonDoepp (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2005), 49–74.
7. Bratton and Posner, “A First Look,” 387.
8. For analysis of decentralization in Commonwealth Africa, see William
Tordoff, “Decentralisation: Comparative Experience in Commonwealth
Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no. 4 (1994): 555–580.
9. Robert Charlick, “Popular Participation and Local Government Reform,”
Africa Notes, April 2000, 3; Dele Oluwu, “Local Governance, Democracy,
and Development,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by
Richard Joseph (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999).
10. Oluwu, “Local Governance,” 286.
11. Ibid., 286–288.
12. Discussion with Gorgui Ciss, May 15, 2000.
13. “Mali Democracy Activist Honoured in Belgium.”
notes / 203
14. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation,” 510.

15. Mission de Décentralisation, République du Mali. La commune en questions.
Bamako: Mission de Décentralisation, PNUD, nd, 12–18.
16. Richard Vengroff, “Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political
Parties and the Party System in Mali,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31,
no. 4 (December 1993): 546.
17. Ibid., 546.
18. “Constitutional Court Cancels 0.5m Votes But Confirms Poll Result,” http://
allafrica.com/stories/printable/200205090688.html, May 9, 2002.
19. Anonymous interview with a member of URD, June 2004.
20. Municipal elections are conducted under proportional representation; legis-
lative elections use closed party lists and the same two-round majority system
used in the presidential elections.
21. Vengroff, “Governance and the Transition to Democracy,” 562.
22. Downstream legitimacy should not be confused with the fraudulent electoral
exercises and ubiquitous “popular vote” for dictatorial regimes that have been
commonplace across the continent. Free and fair ratification of a newly writ-
ten constitution does however convey popular will.
23. Iba N’Daiye, Les elections 1997 au Mali (Bamako: Jamana, 1998), 24.
24. “Ousmane Sy tranche ‘La légitimité démocratique ne doit pas éliminer la
légitimité traditionelle,’” Le Zenith, November 12, 1997, 5.
25. David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1996), 268.
26. See RDM, Loi N. 96-059 Portant Creation des Communes, 1996.
27. For an interesting discussion on the Tanzanian case, see Aili Mari Tripp,
“Local Organizations, Participation, and the State in Urban Tanzania,”
in Governance and Politics in Africa, edited by Goran Hyden and Michael
Bratton (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992), 221–242.
Five Challenges to Inclusion: Constitutionalism

and the Rights of Women
Parts of this chapter have appeared in “Women Activists in Mali and the Global
Discourse on Human Rights,” in Women’s Activism and Globalization: Linking
local struggles and transnational politics, Nancy A. Naples and Menisha Desai eds.
(New York: Routledge, 2002) 172–185. Reproduced by permission of Routledge,
a division of Taylor and Francis Group.
1. When resources are scare, boys are given preference and attend school. Girls,
if lucky enough to go to school, are often removed for marriage at an early
age, or withheld because they are perceived as a risk (it is often feared that
they will return pregnant, frequently the result of rape).
2. PRODEJ is discussed in further detail in chapter six.
3. Rosa de Jorio, “Female Elites, Women’s Formal Associations, and Political
Illinois, 1997, 42. See the autobiography of Aoua Kéita for analysis of politics
and colonialism in Soudan. Aoua Kéita, Femme d’Afrique: la vie d’Aoua Kéita
racontée par elle même (Paris: Présence Africaines, 1975).
204 / notes
4. Ibid. Also see chapter three.

5. See chapter one for further analysis.
6. Sékou Tamboura, “Les femmes deputés: quelle défense pour quelles armes?,”
Nyéléni Magazine 4, no. 16 (1997): 4, 10.
7. Maïmouna Traore, “Femmes et institutions: enfin le bout du tunnel,” Nyéléni
Magazine 4, no. 16 (1997): 3.
8. See Inter-Parliamentary Union data on women in national parliaments,
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.
9. Results are available at the website for the Ministère de l’administration territo-
riale et des collectivités locales: http://www.matcl.gov.ml/election/communale/
communale.asp (accessed July 10, 2006).
10. USAID Africa: Mali http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/
countries/mali/ downloaded July 10, 2006.
11. This story was told by a participant in the GFDS seminar in Sikasso, and is
part of the oral tradition in Mali.
12. GFDS seminar, Sikasso, April 1998.
13. See Marcia E. Greenberg and Rachel-Claire Okani, “Strengthening Women’s
Participation in Decision-making at the Local Level in Mali,” Development
Alternatives, Inc. January 2001, iii.
14. See de Jorio, “Female Elites,” 132.
15. Ibid., 154.
16. See ibid., especially parts two and four.
17. Ibid., 260.
18. It is important to emphasize the changing nature of cultures, and therefore
the misconception of preserving culture, as if it was ever authentic and pure.
19. Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1989), 11.
20. Jane Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1986).
21. De Jorio, “Female Elites,” chapters four and five.
22. Interviews conducted in Bamako, August 1994.
23. De Jorio, “Female Elites,” 205.
24. Ibid.
25. Coordination des Associations et ONG Féminines du Mali (CAFO), “Liste
des associations membres de la CAFO,” 1998.
26. Coordination des Associations et ONG Féminines du Mali (CAFO), inter-
view, Bamako office, 2004.
27. Interview, March 11, 1998, at the Coordination de la Promotion des Femmes.
28. Interview, March 9, 1998.
29. Interview, March 11, 1998, at the Coordination de la Promotion des Femmes.
30. Mme. Keita Siranda Diallo, GFDS Seminar, April 2–4, 1998.
31. Observatoire des droits de la femme et de l’enfant (ODEF), “Rapport
d’activités du 1ère décembre 1996 au 31 mars 1997,” ODEF Bamako.
32. ODEF, “Rapport de Mission à Ségou, avril 1996,” ODEF Bamako, 7.
33. Keita Djeneba Karabenta, Report for AJM, “AJM Clinique juridique mobile
à Kayes,” January 16–18, 1996, 4. Unfortunately, unlike other AJM reports,
this one does not include responses given to participants.
34. Interview with Mme. Bouaré Bintou Samaké, AJM, March 18, 1998.
notes / 205
35. See earlier mentioned Ségou reports, 11–13.

36. Report from ODEF mission, December 19, 1995.
37. GFDS, Sikasso seminar transcript, April 3, 1998, 38.
38. See UNICEF, 1998; Robert B. Charlick and Susanna D. Wing, “The Political
Economy of Educational Policy Reform in Mali: A Stakeholder Analysis”
(Washington, D.C.: USAID/Management Systems International, 1998).
39. Renée Giovarelli and Cholpon Akmatova, “Local Institutions that Enforce
Customary Law in the Kyrgyz Republic and their impact on Women’s Rights,”
Agricultural and Rural Development e-paper, World Bank: Washington
D.C., March 2002.
40. See Richard L. Sklar, “African Politics: The Next Generation,” in State,
Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1999); Stephen N. Ndegwa, “Citizenship and Ethnicity:
An Examination of Two Transition Movements in Kenyan Politics,”
American Political Science Review 91, no. 3 (1997): 599–617; and Peter
Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A theoretical Statement,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 17, no. 1 (1975): 91–112.
41. “Daughters’ Challenge to Intestate Law Succeeds,” Business Day
(September 30, 2003).
42. Ngozi Nwaogu, “Why Husbands Must Write their Will,” Daily Champion,
Lagos (September 25, 2003).
43. “I Have a Problem Madam,” IKON/Frame Mediaprodukties; New York,
N.Y.: First Run/Icarus Films [distributor], c1995.
44. Giovarelli and Akmatova, “Local Institutions that Enforce Customary Law,” 19.
45. Aili Mari Tripp, “Women’s Movements, Customary Law and Land Rights in
Africa,” African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 3.
46. Aili Tripp, “The Politics of Women’s Rights and Cultural Diversity in
Uganda,” in Gender Justice, Development, and Rights, edited by Maxine
Molyneux and Shahra Razavi (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 413–440.
47. Lois A. West, “Introduction: Feminism Constructs Nationalism,” in Feminist
Nationalism, edited by Lois A. West (London: Routledge, 1997), xiv.
48. Lois A. West, “The United Nations Women’s Conferences and Feminist
Politics,” in Gender Politics in Global Governance, edited by Elisabeth Prügl
and Mary K. Meyer (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1999), 177.
49. V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1999), 218.
50. Interviews with CADEF and ODEF. See UNICEF and RDM, “Programme
de cooperation Mali-UNICEF 1998–2002” (Bamako: UNICEF, 1998).
51. In 1998, some associations had computers provided to them by donors.
Access to the Internet was severely restricted by the difficulty in establishing
phone lines to offices, or the frequent electrical and phone outages. In 2004
nearly all association leaders had cell phones and cell phone use had risen to
four hundred thousand across the country (CIA WorldFactBook 2006).
52. Interview, Hippodrome, Bamako, February 1998.
53. De Jorio, “Female Elites,” 203–204.
54. Ibid., 204.
55. Karabenta, Report for AJM, 4.
206 / notes
56. Commisariat à la Promotion des Femmes Maître d’Oeuvre du Plan d’Action,

“Plan d’action pour la promotion des femmes 1996–2000” (Bamako: RDM,
Commissariat à la Promotion des Femmes, nd).
57. Joni Seager, The State of Women in the World Atlas (London: Penguin
Reference, 1997), 104.
58. Ibid., 16, 19.
59. Barbara J. Callaway, “The Role of Women in Kano City Politics,” in Hausa
Women in the Twentieth Century, edited by Catherine Coles and Beverly
Mack (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 157.
60. Ibid., 158.
61. Ibid.
62. Aminata Maiga Soumaré, “Factors that Affect Girls’ Access to and Retention
in School in Mali, 1965–1992,” PhD dissertation, University of Illinois,
1995.
63. De Jorio, “Female Elites,” chapter three.
64. Carole Pateman, “Three Questions about Womanhood Suffrage,” in Suffrage
and Beyond: International Feminist Perspectives, edited by Caroline Daley and
Melanie Nolan (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994), 331–348.
65. Interview November 12, 1997, Badalabougou.
66. West, “The United Nations Women’s Conferences,” 187.
Six Experiments in Dialogue

Portions of this chapter appeared in Susanna D. Wing “Questioning the
State: Constitutionalism and the Malian éspace d’interpellation démocratique,”
Democratization 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 121–147. http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/
titles/13510347.asp. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group.
1. The January 19, 1992, local elections resulted in seats being divided among
numerous parties, with ADEMA clearly ahead with 214 of 686 coun-
selor seats. Other parties with significant numbers of seats included Union
Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA) with 130, the
Comité National d’Initiative Démocratique (CNID) with 96, and Union pour
la Démocratie et Développement (UDD) with 64. Legislative elections after
the second round on March 8, 1992, resulted in ADEMA with 76 of the total
116 deputies in the National Assembly and all other parties receiving less than
10 seats, including CNID with 9 and USRDA with 8. Seven other parties
divided the remaining 23 seats. For a complete list of the election results, see
Cheick Oumar Diarrah, Le défi démocratique au Mali (Paris: L’Harmattan,
1996), 163.
2. Ibid., 286.
3. National Democratic Institute monitored the elections along with a local
monitoring group, APEM, and announced them free and fair.
4. ADEMA held 42.6 percent of the seats, followed by US-RDA at 7.83 per-
cent, Mouvement Patriotique pour le Renouveau (MPR) at 6.79, Parti pour
la Renaissance Nationale (PARENA) at 6.14, BEDIA at 5.26, CNID at
4.87, Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (PDP) at 2.88, UDD at 2.87,
Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (RDP) at 2.32, Mouvement
notes / 207
pour l’Intégration et la Renaissance de l’Intergration Africaine (MIRIA)

at 1.72. See Iba N’Diaye, Les Élections 1997 au Mali (Bamako: Jamana,
1998), 53.
5. Quoted in Harvey Wheeler, “Constitutionalism,” in Handbook of Political
Science, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1975), 36.
6. Richard L. Sklar, “African Polities: The Next Generation,” in State, Conflict,
and Democracy in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph (Boulder: Lynne Reinner,
1999), 174.
7. This dialogue directly between citizens and government officials removes
political parties as an intermediary between the government and the people,
a point to be addressed in greater detail further on.
8. www.afribone.com, information downloaded on December 9, 2004.
9. See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of
Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Joshua Cohen,
“Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy and
Difference: Changing the Boundaries of the Political, edited by Seyla Benhabib
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 95–119; Seyla Benhabib,
“Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and
Difference, 67–94.
10. Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government (New York:
The Dial Press, 1932), 869.
11. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn
and Company, 1950), 327.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 326.
14. Michel Ameller, Les questions instruments du contrôle parlementaire (Paris:
Bibliothèque constitutionelle et de science politique, 1964), 143.
15. Members of the Honorary Jury are listed in tables A1.4, A1.5, and A1.7 in
appendix one. This international committee is given the task of eliminating
questions that may be personal attacks on certain individuals, rather than
violations of individual rights.
16. B. Touré, “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique: la tribune des sans voix,”
Les Echos (December 11, 1997): 3.
17. Friedrich, Constitutional Government, 327.
19. Ibid.
20. Ministère de la Justice, 1995.
21. Ministère de la Justice, 1996, 2–3.
22. Ministère de la Justice, “Cinquième édition de l’éspace d’interpellation
démocratique” (Bamako: RDM, 1999), 300.
23. Data gathered while attending the 1997 EID.
24. B. Touré, “éspace d’interpellation démocratique 98,” Les Echos 1998. Available
online at http: www.malinet.ml/palabre/presse/les_echos/pages/ecdec98/
ec1119act1a.html.
25. Ibid.
26. Minstère de la Justice, “Deuxième édition de l’éspace d’interpellation
démocratique 10 Décembre 1995” (Bamako: RDM, 1996), 2–3.
208 / notes
27. Ministère de la Justice, “éspace d’interpellation démocratique 10 Décembre

1994: Éclairage croisés sur les droits de l’homme au Mali” (Bamako
Mali: RDM, 1995), statement made by the Organizing Committee of the
EID.
28. These include the following: International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights of 1966, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and Optional Protocol of 1966, Convention for the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979, Convention against
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhumane Treatment of 1984, African
Charter for the Rights of Man and People of 1981, Project for the Creation of
an African Human Rights Court, OAU Convention on the Proper Treatment
of Refugees in Africa (1969).
29. PRODEJ, the ten-year program for judicial reform was inaugurated in 1998
through concertations régionales on justice. The ongoing process of decentral-
ization is intended to bring tribunals closer to the population.
30. Ministère de la Justice, 1995, 3.
31. Daniel A. Tessougoué, “Communiqué de presse 4ème édition de l’éspace
d’interpellation démocratique,” Le Républicain (December 3, 1997): 3.
32. Ibid.
33. Tables A1.1–A1.4 in appendix one provide a complete list of participants of
the 1994 EID, their questions, and the complete affiliation for the members
of the jury.
34. Ministère de la Justice, 1995, 12–13.
35. Ibid., 25.
36. Ibid., 52.
37. See table A1.5 in appendix one for a complete list of members.
38. There is no data available for the 1996 EID. Data for 1997 is not complete
and the government has not published official lists of the participants and
their interpellations.
39. Members of the jury are listed in table A1.7 in appendix one.
40. “Many Complaints, Some Satisfaction,” Africa Confidential 40, no. 2 (1999): 5.
41. Ministère de la Justice, “Cinquième Édition de l’Éspace d’Interpellation
Démocratique” (Bamako: RDM, 1999).
42. Despite the incomplete nature of the data for this table it has been included
because of the wealth of information that such limited data provides, par-
ticularly when compared to the limited number of participants from previous
years.
43. Idrissa Maiga, “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique: Le nouveau départ,”
Le Républicain (November 24, 2004).
45. Ibid., 13–25.
47. For further discussion of deliberative democracy, see Benhabib, Democracy
and Difference.
48. Interviews were conducted from 1997 to 1998.
49. These seminars were sponsored by USAID and held in Sevaré (November
1997) and Sikasso (April 1998).
50. Mme. Oulla Santara.
notes / 209
51. Association DJOLIBA Hommes et Développement, December 2001.

52. Ousmane Malle, “Crise politique et l’éspace d’interpellation démocratique:
Offensive tous azimuts du collectif,” Le Zénith (December 11, 1997): 3.
53. PRODEC, PRODEJ, and the 1999 National Forum on Political Reform
called for regional concertations and national forums to incorporate rural
populations into the policy-making process.
54. This reference to the Demagogic Interpellation Forum was a comment made
by several members of the opposition during interviews.
55. Yaya Sidibé, “Les enjeux du forum: réhabiliter et moderniser la justice,” Justice
pour tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice No. 1 (March 29, 1999),
56. Bintou Sanankoua, “Editorial: Vivement le forum,” Justice pour tous: Le
journal du forum national sur la justice No. 2 (March 30, 1999), www.panaf.
net/jpt2.htm#la presse.
57. Justice Pour Tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice No. 1.
58. Ibid.
59. Sanankoua, “Editorial: Vivement le Forum.”
60. Chahana Takiou, “Interview de Albert Bourgi: Journaliste et universitaire,”
Justice pour Tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice No. 4, 1999 [cited
April 1, 1999]. Available from www.panaf.net/jpt1.htm.
61. Sanankoua, “Editorial: Vivement le forum.”
62. Saouti Haidara and Chahana Takiou, “Interview du ministre de la justice
Hamidou Diabate, Un forum pour bâtir une justice nouvelle,” Justice pour
tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice No. 2 (March 30, 1999), www.
panaf.net/jpt1.htm.
63. Ibid.
64. Chahana Takiou, “Modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits,” Justice
pour tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice No. 4 (April 1, 1999),
65. Ibid. Mme. Diourté is not identified by Takiou.
66. Chahana Takiou, “Entretien avec Atchrimi Emma Agounke: Le forum est
une intitiative novatrice pour la sous-région,” Justice pour tous: Le journal du
forum national sur la justice No. 5 (April 2, 1999), www.panaf.net/jpt1.htm.
Seven Dialogue in Times of Crisis

1. Throughout the book I refer to the resolution of le problème du Nord, as such, I
am referring to a particular conflict during a specific time period. Recent spo-
radic fighting in the North has taken place but has not escalated to previous
levels and to date has not appeared to be a threat to overall peace in the region.
2. For an important analysis of nationalism and xenophobia, see Beth Whitaker,
“Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in
Africa,” African Studies Review 48, no. 1 (April 2005): 109–126.
3. “Tuareg Intermediaries Negotiate Release of European Hostages,” August 1,
2003, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Downloaded from
Lexis-Nexis, July 1 2005.
4. Lydia Polgreen, “Timbuktu Hopes Ancient Texts Spark a Revival,” The New
York Times, August 7, 2007.
210 / notes
5. Hassan Camara, “Pourquoi le Forum National: une chance pour Mali?” Le

Républicain (March 18, 1998): 4.
6. Excerpt from Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, A Peace of
Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peace-Making
(New York: United Nations, 1998), 106, quoted in Karé Lode “The
Regional Concertations Process: Engaging the Public,” downloaded on
July 3, 2005, from http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/mareg.
shtml.
7. Drissa Diakité, “La crise scolaire au Mali,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 9,
no. 3 (2000): 19.
8. Lodé, “The Regional Concertations Process,” 2.
9. Poulton and Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuktu, 30.
10. Ibid., 55.
11. Azawad has come to mean the sixth, seventh, and eighth regions in Mali. It
shows ambiguities in referring to the term that can include peoples (Tuareg,
Songhoy, Bozo, Fulani, and Moor) living in these regions, or only Tuareg and
Moor nomads, according to political needs. See ibid., 31.
12. “Mali gets New Oil Code,” June 29, 2004, Bamako, Pan-African News
Agency Daily Newswire, downloaded from Lexis-Nexis, July 1, 2005.
13. Ibid., 32.
14. “Niger/Mali,” Africa Report, November–December 1990, 7.
15. Pascal James Imperato, “Mali: The Emergence of Multi-Party Democracy
Conflict with the Tuareg” in Colin Legum ed., Africa Contemporary Record
Vol. 24 (1992–1994): B87.
16. Cheick Oumar Diarrah, Le défi démocratique au Mali (Paris: L’Harmattan,
1996), 48. See chapter four for detailed analysis of decentralization.
17. “Touaregs: Influx into Algeria,” Africa Research Bulletin, September 1–30,
1991, 10261.
18. Poulton and Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuktu, 59.
19. Ibid., 65.
20. Imperato, “Mali: The Emergence of Multi-Party Democracy,” B88.
21. Timothy W. Docking, “Mali: Success in Sustaining a Nascent Democracy,”
in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record Vol 25 (1994–1996),
B104.
22. Preface to Karé Lode, Synthèse du processus des rencontres communitaires (Oslo:
L’Aide de l’Église Norvégienne, 1996) cited in Poulton and Youssouf, A Peace
of Timbuktu, 114.
23. Poulton and Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuktu.
24. Ibid., 113. In 1995, CFA 4995$1. Approximately $116,000 was contributed
by these groups.
25. Ibid., 110.
26. Ibid., 118.
27. See Docking, “Mali: Success in Sustaining a Nascent Democracy,” B104.
28. Ibid., 119. By 1997, nearly 9,500 ex-combatants had received help from
PAREM (2,423 in Kidal, 3,796 in Gao, and 3,235 in Timbuktu), see Poulton
and Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuktu, 124.
29. Imperato, “Mali: The Emergence of Multi-Party Democracy,” B88.
notes / 211
30. Ibid., 114.

31. Ibid., 121.
32. What are referred to as “bandit attacks” continue in remote regions of the
North. But these are not associated with organized political movements.
33. http://courantsdefemmes.free.fr/Assoces/Mali/MNFPUN/MNFPUN.
html accessed on July 2, 2007.
34. See Emile Adriaan van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and Maarten van Rouveroy
van Nieuwaal, J’y crois—I believe in It: The Road to Decentralization in Mali
(New York: First Run/Icarus Films, 2003), VHS.
35. Jennifer C. Seely, “Mali: Democracy Stumbles but Doesn’t Fall,” in Colin
Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record Vol 26 (1996–1998): B109.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. There were fifty-nine political parties in Mali in 1997. For a complete list,
see CERDES, Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours (Bamako:
Éditions Donniya, 1997).
39. Ibid., 212.
40. Robert B. Charlick and Susanna D. Wing, “The Political Economy of
Educational Policy Reform in Mali: A Stakeholder Analysis” (Washington,
D.C.: Management Systems International, Report for USAID/Mali
Democracy and Governance Team, 1998), 5–7.
41. Seely, “Mali: Democracy Stumbles but Doesn’t Fall,” B112.
42. Valentin Mbougueng, “A qui profite la pagaille?,” Jeune Afrique, May 19–25,
1998, 29. Note that in this quote, as elsewhere, members of COPPO refuse
to address Konaré as president and always refer to him as M. Konaré.
43. “Débat politique,” Le Republicain, May 8, 1998, 3.
44. Ibid.
45. This represented a division in US-RDA; see chapter four.
46. GoM, Vérificateur Générale, Rapport Annuel 2006.
47. Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical
Statement,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 17, no. 1 (1975): 91–112.
Conclusions
1. Jane Perlez, “100 Voices for Democracy, as France Clears Its Throat,”
The New York Times, June 28, 2000, A10. Viewing the entire meeting
as largely controlled by the United States, France refused to sign, chal-
lenging, it would appear, what they viewed as yet another instance of Pax
Americana.
2. Jane Perlez, “A Vast Rally for Democracy Opens in a Polish Castle,” The New
York Times, June 26, 2000, A3.
3. Ibid.
4. See Timothy William Docking, “International Influence on Civil Society in
Mali: The Case of the Cotton Farmers’ Union, SYCOV,” PhD dissertation,
Boston University, 1999, chapter three and 249–256.
5. Zeric Kay Smith, “Civil Society and Political Learning: the Case of Malian
Associations of Students and Pupils,” American Political Science Association,
212 / notes
San Francisco, 1996, cited in Victor T. Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of
Constitutionalism in West Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 35,
no. 2 (1997), 204.
6. Le Vine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism,” 205.
7. Naomi Chazan as quoted in Amy S. Patterson, “The Dynamic Nature of
Citizenship and Participation: Lessons from Three Rural Senegalese Case
Studies,” Africa Today 46, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 4.
8. Interview conducted in Sikasso, April 4, 1998.
Bi bl io g r a ph y
Africa Confidential 40, no. 2 (1999): 5.

(CADEF), Comité d’Action pour les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme.
“Justification de l’amendment proposé par les femmes à la constitution à la
conférence nationale du Mali du 29 juillet au 12 aout 1991.” Bamako: CADEF,
1991.
(COPPO), Collectif des Partis de l’Opposition. “Livre blanc sur les élections
générales de 1997 au Mali (2ème Edition).” Bamako: COPPO, 1997.
(CTSP), Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple. “Acte fondamental N. 1.”
Bamako, Mali: Republic of Mali, 1991.
———. “Actes de la conférence national.” Bamako, Mali: Republic of Mali,
August 1991.
———. “Conférence national: Listes des annexes.” Bamako: Republic of Mali,
1991.
———. “Participants à la conférence nationale,” Bamako: Republic of Mali,
1991.
———. “Rapport de la sous commission institutionnalisation de la prise en
charge des questions relatives aux femmes: Quelle forme préconiser?” Bamako:
Republic of Mali, 1991.
———. “Rapport de la commission de vérification des mandats.” Bamako:
Republic of Mali, 1991.
———. “Decret No. 92-0731 P-CTSP portant promulgation de la constitution.”
Bamako, 1992.
(GFDS), Groupe Féminin Droit de Suffrage. “Séminaire de formation sur la
participation des femmes à la vie politique et civique: Mopti-Sévaré, du 3 Au 6
Novembre 1997.” Bamako: GFDS, 1997.
(PRODEC), Équipe de préparation du Programme Décennal de Développement
de l’Éducation. “Programme décennal de développement de l’éducation:
Les grandes orientations de la politique éducative.” Bamako: Primature,
Commissariat au Plan, 1998.
(UDPM), Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien. “États généraux de
l’éducation: Textes des communications.” Bamako: République du Mali,
1989.
(UNDP), United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Ackerman, Bruce. The Rise of World Constitutionalism. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997.
214 / bibliography
Ahmed, Ajuji, and Ronald Cohen. “Education and Rights in Nigeria.” In Human
Rights and Governance in Africa, edited by Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden, and
Winston P. Nagan, 215–234. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993.
Allen, Chris. “Benin: A Weakened State.” Africa Contemporary Record 23 (1990–1992):
B3–B11.
Ameller, Michel. Les questions instruments du contrôle parlementaire. Paris:
Bibliothèque constitutionelle et de science politique, 1964.
An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed, and Francis M. Deng, eds. Human Rights in Africa:
Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1990.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the
Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition. London: Verso, 1991.
Andrews, William G. Constitutions and Constitutionalism. Princeton, NJ: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961.
Annan, Kofi. “Flamme de la paix: Un succès de diplomatie préventive Malienne.”
Le Républicain, March 18, 1998, 6.
APDF. “Femmes et politique au Mali: Trop d’obstacles à leur participation.”
La Voix de la Femme, September 1992.
———. “La voix de la femme.” La voix de la femme, October 1993.
———. “La voix de la femme.” La voix de la femme, June 1994.
Apter, David E., and Carl G. Rosberg, eds. Political Development and the New
Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1994.
Askia, Mohamed. “L’avancée démocratique au Mali: L’émergence d’un pluralisme
socio-politique.” In Les nouvelles constitutions Africaines: La transition démocratique,
edited by Henry Roussillon, 109–124. Toulouse: Presses de l’Institut d’études
politiques de Toulouse, 1995.
Atieno, Odhiambo, and David W. Cohen. Burying SM: The Politics of Knowledge
and the Sociology of Power in Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1992.
B.R.T. “L’état de droit peut-il fonctionner maintenant?” Les echos, July 26, 1991, 6.
Baqué, Phillipe. “Des Touaregs doublement dépossédés.” le monde diplomatique,
February 1993, 21.
Barker, Jonathan. Street-Level Democracy: Political Settings at the Margins of Global
Power. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1999.
Beiner, Ronald. “Introduction.” In Theorizing Citizenship, edited by Ronald
Beiner, 1–28. Albany: State University of New York, 1995.
Benhabib, Seyla. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” In
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, edited by
Seyla Benhabib, 67–94. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Benin: President Mathieu Kerekou Leaves after 29 Years, April 7, 2006, http://
w w w.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID55266&SelectRegion5West_
Africa&SelectCountry5BENIN (accessed July 4, 2006).
Benjamin, Chantal. “Daughters’ Challenge to Interstate Law Succeeds.” Business
Day, September 30, 2003. http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.
aspx?ID5858920 (accessed July 10, 2007).
Bertrand, Monique. “Un an de transition politique: De la révolte à la transition.”
Politique africaine 47, no. October (1992): 9–22.
Beyene, Asmelash, and Gelase Mutahaba. The Quest for Constitutionalism in
Africa: Selected Essays on Constitutionalism, the Nationality Problem, Military
Rule. New York: Peter Lang, 1994.
bibliography / 215
Bierschenk, Thomas. “The Local Appropriation of Democracy: An Analysis of

the Municipal Elections in Parakou, Republic of Benin, 2002/03.” Institute fur
Ethnologie und Afrikastudien Working Papers No. 39 (2004).
Bingen, R. James. “Agricultural Development Policy and Grassroots Democracy
in Mali: The Emergence of Mali’s Farmer Movement.” African Rural and
Urban Studies 1, no. 1 (1994): 57–72.
Boahen, A. Adu, ed. Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935. Abridged ed.
Vol. VII, General History in Africa. London: James Currey Ltd., 1990.
Boubèye, Maiga Tiégoera. “Coordination de 22 partis: Est-ce le front du blocage?”
Les echos, July 29, 1991, 2.
Bourmaud, Daniel, and Patrick Quantin. “Le modèle et ses doubles: Les con-
férences nationales en Afrique noire 1990–1991.” In Les politiques du mimé-
tisme institutionnel: La greffe et le rejet, edited by Yves Meny, 165–182. Paris:
L’Harmattan, 1993.
Bratton, Michael. “Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa.” In Civil
Society and the State in Africa, edited by John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild
and Naomi Chazan, 51–81. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
Bratton, Michael, and Daniel N. Posner. “A First Look at Second Elections in
Africa, with Illustrations from Zambia.” In State, Conflict, and Democracy
in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph, 377–407. Boulder: Lynne Reinner,
1999.
Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. “Popular Protest and Political Reform
in Africa.” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 419–442.
———. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1992.
Burkhart, Ross E., and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. “Comparative Democracy: The
Economic Development Thesis.” American Journal of Political Science 88,
no. 4 (1994): 903–910.
Burkina Faso: Compaore Gets Green Light to Run for Third Mandate http://
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID549602&SelectRegion5West_
Africa&SelectCountry5BURKINA_FASO (accessed July 9, 2007).
Burkina Faso: Compaore Wins New Mandate in Country’s First Multiparty Race
(November 18, 2005) http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId557234
(accessed July 10, 2007).
Burkina Faso: Electoral Code Changes Ahead of Presidential Poll (April 29, 2004) http://
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId549695 (accessed July 10, 2007).
Callaway, Barbara J. “The Role of Women in Kano City Politics.” In Hausa
Women in the Twentieth Century, edited by Catherine Coles and Beverly Mack,
145–162. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
Camara, B. “EID, édition IV: La capacité de recours reste intacte.” L’Essor,
December 11, 1997, 3.
Camara, Hassan. “Pourquoi le forum national: Une chance pour Mali?”
Le Républicain, March 18, 1998, 4.
Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” In Theorizing
Citizenship, edited by Ronald Beiner, 229–253. Albany: State University of
New York, 1995.
216 / bibliography
“Carte d’identité des 42 partis politiques.” Les Echos, July 29, 1991, 2.
CCA-ONG. “Rapport préparatoire pour la participation des ONG à la conférence
nationale.” Bamako, Mali: CCA-ONG, 1991.
CERDES. Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours. Bamako: Éditions
Donniya, 1997.
Charlick, Robert. “Popular Participation and Local Government Reform.” Africa
Notes, April 2000.
Charlick, Robert B., and Susanna D. Wing. “The Political Economy of Educational
Policy Reform in Mali: A Stakeholder Analysis.” Washington, D.C.:
Management Systems International, Report for USAID/Mali Democracy and
Governance Team, 1998.
“Cheick Oumar Diarrah ‘L’essentiel est fait.’ ” Les Echos, August 16, 1991, 3.
Ciss, Gorgui. “Senegal: Democracy and the Presidential Electoral Process,” lecture
presented at the James S. Coleman African Studies Center, UCLA, May 15,
2000.
Cisse, Ali. “Comment assumer notre spécificité?” L’Essor, 5, August 1991.
“Clôture de la conférence national: Le 3ème république reçoit son acte de
naissance.” L’Essor, August 13, 1991, 1.
Cobbah, Josiah A.M. “African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African
Perspective.” Human Rights Quarterly 9, no. 3 August (1987): 309–331.
Cohen, Jean L., and Andrew Arato. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1992.
Cohen, Joshua. “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy.” In
Democracy and Difference: Changing the Boundaries of the Political, edited by
Seyla Benhabib, 95–119. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Cohen, Ronald, Goran Hyden, and Winston P. Nagan, eds. Human Rights and
Governance in Africa. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993.
Coleman, James Smoot. “Nationalism in Tropical Africa.” In Nationalism and
Development in Africa: Selected Essays/James Smoot Coleman, edited by Richard
L. Sklar, 20–47. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994.
Commission sur l’etat de la nation, RDM. “Rapport de présentation de la commis-
sion sur l’etat de la nation,” 1–4. Bamako, Mali, 1991.
Conac, Gérard, ed. Les cours suprêmes en Afrique. Vol. I-IV. Paris: Economica, 1988.
Constitutional Court Cancels 0.5m Votes but Confirms Poll Result 2002 [cited].
Available from http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200205090688.html
(accessed on July 10, 2007).
Associations, Coordination des. “Les femmes et la politique,” 3. Bamako Mali,
1991.
Coulibaly, B. “Le label mali reçoit sa consécration.” L’Essor, March 18, 1998, 4.
Coulibaly, Cheibane. “Retour des réfugiés et conflits liés aux ressources naturelles
au Nord-Mali.” Cauris, January 12, 1998, 3.
———. “Mali: Les ruraux et la gouvernance démocratique (Annex IV).”
Washington D.C.: USAID/ARD, 1994.
Coulibaly, Massa, and Amadou Diarra. “Working Paper No. 35, Démocratie et
légitimation du marché: Rapport d’enquête Afrobarometre au Mali,” December
2002.
Dabo, Mamdou. “Concertations régionales: Le Nord sur le problème Du Nord.”
Nouvel Horizon Quotidien, August 31, 1994, 4.
bibliography / 217
Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
Daniels, W.C. Ekow. The Common Law in West Africa. London: Butterworths, 1964.
Daou, Boukary. “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique: Le dialogue direct.”
Le Républicain, December 17, 1997, 3.
———. “Le jury interpelle Alpha.” Le Républicain, December 17, 1997, 3.
———. “Toumbouctou face à la reforme du développement rural: Les besoins
sont humains et matériels.” Le Républicain, March 24, 1998, 6.
Darbon, Dominique, and Jean du Bois Gaudusson, eds. La création du droit en
Afrique. Paris: Karthala, 1997.
Davis, John Uniack. “USAID/Mali Democratic Governance Strategic Objective
Performance Measurement Survey II Data Analysis Report.” Washington
D.C.: Management Systems International, 1998.
Davis, John Uniack, and Aboubacar B. Kossomi. “Niger Gets Back on Track.”
Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3 (2001): 80–87.
“Débat politique.” Le Républicain, May 8, 1998, 3.
Decalo, Samuel. “The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in
Africa.” African Affairs 91, no. 362 (1992): 7–35.
Diakite, Drissa. “La crise scolaire au Mali.” Nordic Journal of African Studies 9, no.
3 (2000): 6–28.
Diallo, A. “Visite à la commission constitutionnelle.” Les Echos, August 7, 1991, 2.
Diallo, Bakara. “Élections communales: Contradiction entre le taux de participation
et la réalité du terrain.” Le Soir de Bamako, June 24, 1998, 2–3.
Diallo, Hamadi. “Avocats Ou Défenseurs.” Les Echos, 1991, 3.
Diallo, Mahamadou. “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique: Le chemin à par-
courir est bien long.” Le Soir de Bamako, December 11, 1997, 2.
Diallo, Mamadou Madeira. “Démocratie pluraliste et développement.” Les Echos,
July 26, 1991, 5.
Diarra, Aboubacar Saliph. “Les espérances d’une nouvelle ère.” Les Echos,
August 16, 1991, 3.
Diarra, Aboubacar Saliph, and Mahmadou Sidy Sangho. “Signé Att.” Les Echos,
1991, 7.
Diarra, Eloi. Revue juridique et politique independance et cooperation. 49 No. 3.
(1995): 252–284.
Diarrah, Cheick Oumar. Le défi démocratique au Mali. Paris: L’Harmattan,
1996.
Dicko, Mohamed. “Représentation des associations une décision qui ne fait pas
l’unanimité.” L’Essor, August 1, 1991, 4.
Dietz, Mary G. “Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship.” In
Feminism and Politics, edited by Anne Phillips, 378–400. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Dissa, Mamadou. “Résultats des premiers élections communales générales au
Mali: 1997–1999, Présentation et commentaires” December 1999, unpub-
lished manuscript
Docking, Timothy William. “International Influence on Civil Society in Mali:
The Case of the Cotton Farmers’ Union, SYCOV.” PhD dissertation, Boston
University, 1999.
Docking, Timothy William. “Mali: Success in Sustaining a Nascent Democracy.”
Africa Contemporary Record 25 (2001): B103–B112.
218 / bibliography
“Doubts Hang over Togo Election.” BBC News, April 29, 2005. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4497787.stm (accessed on July 10, 2007).
“Droits humains des femmes et démocratie au Mali.” Paper presented at the
conference Droits Humains des Femmes et Démocratie au Mali, Centre
Djoliba Bamako Mali, March 25, 1995.
Ekeh, Peter. Social Exchange Theory: The Two Traditions. London: Heinemann
Educational Books, 1974.
Ekeh, Peter P. “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement.”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 17, no. 1 (1975): 91–112.
———. “Colonialism and the Development of Citizenship in Africa: A Study
of Ideologies of Legitimation.” In Themes in African Social and Political
Thought, edited by Onigu Otite, 302–334. Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension
Publishing, 1978.
“Élections municipales du 21 juin 1998: Tous les résultats.” Le Républicain, June
26, 1998, 4.
Englebert, Pierre. Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa. Boulder:
Westview, 1996.
———. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder: Lynn Reinner, 2000.
Englebert, Pierre, and Rebecca Hummel. “Senegal: Sopi?” Africa Contemporary
Record 27 (2004): B195–B206.
Fatton, Robert. “Liberal Democracy in Africa.” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3
(1990): 455–473.
Fayemi, Kayode. “Building a Regional Network for Constitution-Making Prospects
and Challenges in West Africa.” In State Reconstruction in West Africa, edited by
Segun Jegede, Ale Ayodele, and Eni Akinsola, 255. Lagos: Committee for the
Defence of Human Rights, 2001.
Finer, Herman. The Theory and Practice of Modern Government. Vol. 2. New York:
The Dial Press, 1932.
Foltz, William J. From French West Africa to the Mali Federation. New Haven: Yale
Fomba, Brahima. “La jurisprudence de la cour constitutionnelle du Mali.” Les
cahiers du CERES 1, no. 2 (1998): 49–60.
French, Howard W. “In One Poor African Nation, Democracy Thrives.” The New
York Times, October 16, 1996, A3.
Friedrich, Carl J. Constitutional Government and Democracy. Revised edition.
Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950.
———. Limited Government: A Comparison. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1974.
Gakou, Kissima. “Problème du Nord: Le nœud Gordien.” Nouvel Horizon-
Quotidien, September 2, 1994, 3.
Gardinier, David E. “Assassination of President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara Leads
to Restoration of Multiparty Rule.” In Africa Contemporary Record 27 (2004):
B155–B172.
Ginsburg, Tom. Judicial Review in New Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge
Giovarelli, Renee, and Cholpon Akmatova. “Local Institutions That Enforce Customary
Law in the Kyrgyz Republic and Their Impact on Women’s Rights.” Agricultural
and Rural Development e-paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002.
bibliography / 219
Gluckman, Max, ed. Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1969.
Gonidec, Pierre-François. Les systèmes politiques Africains: Troisième édition les
nouvelles démocraties. Vol. 55. Paris: Libraire Générale de Droit et de
Jurisprudence, 1997.
Gouvernement, Secrétariat General du. “Textes constitutifs du Conseil
Économique, Social, et Culturel.” Bamako: Journal officielle de la République
du Mali, 1994.
Graber, Mark A. “Asking Better Questions: The Problems of Constitutional
Theory.” PS: Political Science and Politics 26, no. 2 (1993): 216–222.
Greenberg, Douglas, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven
C. Wheatley, eds. Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in
the Contemporary World, American Council on Learned Societies Comparative
Constitutionalism Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Greenberg, Marcia E., and Rachel-Claire Okani. “Strengthening Women’s
Participation in Decision-Making at the Local Level in Mail.” Development
Alternatives, Inc. (2001).
Gregor, A. James. Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
Groelsema, Robert J. “Guinea: Cross-Border Attacks Intensify.” Africa Contemporary
Record 27 (2004): B87–B100.
Guindo, Ibrahim. “Flash Back Sur L’année 1997.” L’Observateur, January 8,
1998, 2.
Guinea: Institutional Situation. http://www.etat.sciencespobordeaux.fr/_anglais/
institutionnel/guinea.html (accessed July 5, 2006).
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson, eds. Democracy and Disagreement.
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. “The Rebirth of African Liberalism.” Journal of Democracy 9,
no. 2 (1998): 18–31.
Habermas, Jürgen. “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity:
The Federal Republic’s Orientation to the West.” In The New Conservatism:
Cultural Criticism and the Historical Debate, edited by Shierry Weber Nicholsen,
249–268. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
———. “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.”
In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy
Gutmann, 107–148. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
———. “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of
Europe.” In Theorizing Citizenship, edited by Ronald Beiner, 255–282. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1995.
Haidara, Saouti, and Chahana Takiou. “Interview du Ministre de la Justice
Hamidou Diabate, un forum pour batir une justice nouvelle.” Justice Pour
Tous: Le Journal du Forum National sur la Justice, no. 2 (1999).
Halisi, C.R.D. “From Liberation to Citizenship: Identity and Innovation in
Black South African Political Thought.” Comparative Studies in Society and
History 39, no. 1 (1997): 60–85.
Halisi, C.R.D., Paul J. Kaiser, and Stephen Ndegwa. “Guest Editor’s Introduction: The
Multiple Meanings of Citizenship—Rights, Identity and Social Justice in Africa.”
Africa Today 45, no. 3–4 (July–December 1998): 337–350.
220 / bibliography
Harbeson, John W. “Rethinking Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Eastern

and Southern Africa.” In State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by
Richard Joseph, 39–55. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999.
Harbeson, John W., Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds. Civil Society and
the State in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1994.
Hatchard, John. “ ‘Perfecting Imperfections’: Developing Procedures for
Amending Constitutions in Commonwealth Africa.” The Journal of Modern
African Studies 36, no. 3 (1998): 381–398.
Heilbrunn, John R. “Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo.”
Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 2 (1993): 277–299.
Held, David. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
———. Models of Democracy. Second edition. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1996.
Hickman, Martin B. “Double Majesty: Madison’s Middle Ground.” In Toward
a Humanistic Science of Politics, edited by Dalmas H. Nelson and Richard
L. Sklar, 361–384. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983.
Howard, Rhoda E. Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa. Totowa, NJ: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1986.
———. “Group Versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on Human
Rights.” In Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, edited by
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, 159–183. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1990.
———. Human Rights and the Search for Community. Boulder: Westview Press,
1995.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Hutchful, Eboe. “Reconstructing Political Space: Militarism and
Constitutionalism in Africa.” In Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions
in the Contemporary World, edited by Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz,
Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven C. Wheatley, 215–234. Oxford: Oxford
Hyden, Goran, and Michael Bratton, eds. Governance and Politics in Africa.
Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992.
I Have a Problem Madam. New York: First Run/Icarus Films, 1995.
IDEA, International. La reforme du systéme électorale au Burkina Faso. Stockholm:
IDEA, Juillet, 1999.
Ihonvbere, Julius O. “Towards Participatory Mechanisms and Principles of
Constitution-Making in Africa.” In Paths to People’s Constitution, edited by
Segun Jegede, Ale Ayodele, and Eni Akinsola, 83–116. Lagos: Committee for
the Defence of Human Rights, 2000.
———. “Constitutions without Constitutionalism.” In The Transition to
Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle, edited by John
Mbaku, John Mukum, and Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere, 137–152. Westport:
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003.
Imperato, Pascal James. Mali: A Search for Direction. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
———. “Mali: The Emergence of Multi-Party Democracy Conflict with the
Tuareg.” Africa Contemporary Record 24 (2000): B82–B95.
bibliography / 221
Imrane. “Dossier Nord: L’armée en croisade contre l’insécurité: Les dessous de la

grève des militaires.” Le Malien, August 15, 1994, 3.
———. “Attaques rebelles à Youwarou: L’odyssée Saharienne.” Le Malien, August
22, 1994, 3.
Inter-Parliamentary Union Data on Women in National Parliaments http://www.ipu.
org/wmn-e/classif.htm (accessed July 9, 2007).
Jacob, Jean-Pierre, and Phillipe Lavigne Delville, eds. Les Associations Paysannes En
Afrique. Paris: Karthala, 1994.
Jorio, Rosa de. “Female Elites, Women’s Formal Associations, and Political Practices
in Urban Mali (West Africa).” PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, 1997.
Justice, Ministère de la. “éspace d’interpellation démocratique 10 Décembre 1994:
Éclairage croisés sur les droits de l’homme au Mali.” Bamako: Ministère de la
Justice, 1995.
———. “Deuxième édition de l’éspace d’interpellation démocratique 10
Décembre 1995.” Bamako: Ministère de la Justice, 1996.
———. “Cinquième édition de l’éspace d’interpellation démocratique.” Bamako:
République du Mali, 1999.
Kalambry, Alexis. Aucun gouvernement Malien ou même Africain n’a payé autant
de grosses de justice 1998. http://www.malinet.ml/palabre/presse/les_echos/
pages/ecdec98/ec1119act1a.html (accessed 1998).
Kamto, Maurice. Pouvoir et droit en Afrique Noire. Vol. 43. Paris: Librairie
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1987.
Kanouté, Abdoulaye. “Lettre ouverte à Alpha.” Le Malien 1998, 2.
Kanté, Mamadou, Harlan Hobgood, Barbara Lewis, and Chéibane Coulibaly.
“Governance in Democratic Mali: An Assessment of Transition and
Consolidation and Guidelines for near-Term Action.” Washington D.C.:
USAID/ARD, 1994.
Karabenta, Keita Djeneba. “AJM clinique juridique mobile à Kayes.” 1996, 4.
Keita, Abdrahamane. “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique: La montagne a
accouché d’une souris.” Le Zénith, December 11, 1997, 4.
Kéita, Aoua. Femme d’afrique: La vie d’Aoua Kéita racontée par elle même. Paris:
Présence africaines, 1975.
Keller, Edmond J., and Donald Rothchild, eds. Africa in the New International
Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1996.
Klug, Heinz. Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa’s Political
Reconstruction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Konaré, Cheick O. “Éspace folklorique.” Le Zenith, December 11, 1997, 1.
Konaté, Mohamed. “ATT serait-il atteint par le virus de la démagogie?” Les Echos,
August 12, 1991, 2.
Konfo, Idrissa. “Nord: Le temps des tourments.” Tribune, August 11, 1994, 5.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent
Work on Citizenship Theory.” In Theorizing Citizenship, edited by Ronald
Beiner, 283–322. Albany: State University of New York, 1995.
“L’armée au nord: Manque crucial de moyens.” L’Observateur, August 15,
1994, 4.
“L’avenir politique au Mali: ATT sauve son âme.” L’Essor, August 14, 1991, 3.
222 / bibliography
Laakso, Liisa. “Changing Notions of the Nation-State and the African Experience:
Motesquieu Revisited.” In Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa, edited
by Adebayo O. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, 40–49. Uppsala: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 1992.
Laakso, Liisa, and Adebayo O. Olukoshi. “The Crisis of the Post-Colonial Nation-State
Project in Africa.” In Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa, edited by Adebayo O.
Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, 7–39. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikinstitutet, 1996.
Lachenmann, Gudrun. “Civil Society and Social Movements in Africa.” In Les
associations paysannes en Afrique, edited by Philippe Lavigne Delville and Jean-
Pierre Jacob, 61–98. Paris: Karthala, 1994.
Lavroff, D.G., and G. Peiser. Les constitutions Africaines: L’Afrique Noire Francophone
et Madagascar. Vol. 1. Paris: Editions A. Pedone, Librairie de la Cour d’Appel et
de l’Ordre des Avocats, 1961.
“Le CTSP arrête les critères de participation à la conférence nationale.” L’Essor,
July 22, 1991, 4.
“Le monde rural à la conférence nationale: Les nouvelles voies des sans-voix.”
L’Essor, August 14, 1991, 4.
Leary, Virginia A. “The Effect of Western Perspectives on International Human
Rights.” In Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, edited by
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im and Francis M. Deng, 15–30. Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institute, 1990.
Le Vine, Victor T. “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa.” The
Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (1997): 181–206.
———. Politics of Francophone Africa. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2004.
Lewis, Barbara. “The Role of Urban Civil Society in the Malian Democratic
Transition (Annex V).” Washington DC: USAID/ARD, 1994.
Loada, Augustin. “Burkina Faso.” In Freedom House Report, 130–143, 2005.
Loada, Augustin, and Carlos Santiso. Elections Historiques Au Burkina Faso: Vers
Une Maturité Démocratique? http://www.cgdbf.org/french/documents/loadas-
antoso.pdf (accessed on July 10, 2007).
Lode, Kare. “Synthèse du processus des rencontres communautaires.” Oslo: L’Aide
de L’Église Norvégienne, 1996.
———. The Regional Concertations Process: Engaging the Public. http://www.c-r.
org/accord/peace/accord13/mareg.shtml (accessed July 3, 2005).
Lydon, Ghislaine. “The Unraveling of a Neglected Source: A Report on Women
in Francophone West Africa in the 1930s.” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 147, no.
37–3 (1997): 555–584.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 1981.
Magnusson, Bruce A. “Testing Democracy in Benin: Experiments in Institutional
Reform.” In State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph,
217–237. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
Maiga, Abdoulaye Idrissa. “Le douloureux problème du Nord.” Les Echos 1991, 4.
Maiga, Aboubakarine Hamida. “Nuit noire à Gao: Des éléments incontrôlés se
vengent.” Le Malien, November 2, 1997, 6.
Maiga, Idrissa. “Espace d’interpellation démocratique: Le nouveau départ.”
Le Republican, November 24, 2004.
Maiga, Oumar. “Quatrième éspace d’interpellation démocratique: Les problèmes
restent entiers.” L’Observateur, December 11, 1997, 2.
bibliography / 223
Maiga, Tiégoum Boubaye. “Conférence nationale ou catastrophe nationale?”

Les Echos, July 26, 1991, 4.
Maître d’oeuvre du Plan d’Action, Commissariat à la Promotion des Femmes.
“Plan d’action pour la promotion des femmes 1996–2000.” Bamako: GRM,
Commissariat à la Promotion des Femmes, nd.
Mali Democracy Activist Honoured in Belgium 2005. http://www.afrol.com/
articles/16271 (accessed June 20, 2005).
“Mali Gets New Oil Code.” Pan-African News Agency Daily Newswire, June 29,
2004.
“Mali: The Road to Timbuktu.” Africa Confidential, September 27, 1991, 5–6.
Malle, Ousmane. “Crise politique et l’éspace d’interpellation dèmocratique:
Offensive tous azimuts du collectif.” Le Zénith, December 11, 1997, 3.
Mamdani, Mahmood. “The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa.” Journal
of Modern African Studies 28, no. 3 (1990): 359–374.
———. “State and Civil Society in Contemporary Africa: Reconceptualizing
the Birth of State Nationalism and the Defeat of Popular Movements.” Africa
Development 15, no. 3–4 (1990): 47–70.
———. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Mangaliso, Zengie A. “Gender and Nation-Building in South Africa.” In Feminist
Nationalism, edited by Lois A. West, 130–146. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Mann, Kristin, and Richard Roberts, eds. Law in Colonial Africa. Portsmouth:
Heinemann, 1991.
Mansbridge, Jane. Why We Lost the Era. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
———. “Feminism and Democracy.” In Feminism and Politics, edited by Anne
Phillips, 142–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
“Many Complaints, Some Satisfaction.” Africa Confidential 40, no. 2 (1999): 5.
Mariko, O. “Conférence nationale: Présidence et per diem en question.” L’Essor,
July 8, 1991, 3.
Mbougueng, Valentin. “A qui profite la pagaille?” Jeune Afrique, May 19–25,
1998, 28–29.
McIlwain, Charles Howard. Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1940.
Mikell, Gwendolyn. “African Feminism: Toward a New Politics of Representation.”
Feminist Studies 21, no. 2 (1995): 405–424.
Miles, William F.S. “Partitioned Royalty: The Evolution of Hausa Chiefs in
Nigeria and Niger.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 2 (1987):
233–258.
Miller, Alice M. “Realizing Women’s Human Rights: Nongovernmental
Organizations and the United Nations Treaty Bodies.” In Gender Politics in
Global Governance, edited by Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prügl, 161–176.
New York: Rowman and Littlefiled Publishers, Inc., 1999.
Miller, David. “Citizenship and Pluralism.” Political Studies 43, no. 3 (1995):
432–450.
Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités. http://www.matcl.gov.
ml/election/communale.asp (accessed July 10, 2006).
Mission de Décentralisation, République du Mali. La commune en questions.
Bamako: Mission de Décentralisation, PNUD, nd.
224 / bibliography
Moehler, Devra. “Informed Distrusting Democrats: The Effects of Citizen

Participation in Ugandan Constitution-Making.” PhD dissertation, University
of Michigan, 2003.
———. “Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda.” Journal of
Modern African Studies 44, no. 2 (2006): 275–308.
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989.
Morris, H.F., and James S. Read. Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972.
Mozaffar, Shaheen. “Mali.” In Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook, edited by
Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernard Thibaut, 567–584. Oxford:
Murvar, Vatro, ed. Theory of Liberty, Legitimacy, and Power: New Directions in the
Intellectual and Scientific Legacy of Max Weber. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1985.
Mustapha, Bolanle M. “Problems and Prospects of Constitutionalism in Africa.”
In African Traditional Political Thought and Institutions, edited by John A.A.
Ayoade and Adigun A.B. Agbaje, 279–291. Lagos: Centre for Black and
African Arts and Civilization, 1989.
Ndegwa, Stephen N. “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two
Transition Movements in Kenyan Politics.” American Political Science
Review 91, no. 3 (1997): 599–617.
N’Diaye, Iba. Les élections 1997 au Mali. Bamako, Mali: Jamana, 1998.
Niakaté, A. “Conférence Nationale: La fièvre du dernier jour.” L’Essor, August 13,
1991, 3.
———. “Conférence nationale: Le difficile accouchement de la constitution.”
L’Essor, August 12, 1991, 3.
———. “Les trancheés de la procédure.” L’Essor, July 31, 1991, 3.
Nieuwaal, Emile Adriaan van Rouveroy van, and Maarten van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal. J’y crois—I Believe in It: The Road to Decentralization in Mali. New
York: First Run/Icarus Films, 2003.
“Niger/Mali.” Africa Report, November–December 1990, 7.
Nolutshungu, Samuel C. “Constitutionalism in Africa: Some Conclusions.” In
Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World,
edited by Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and
Steven C. Wheatley, 366–378. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
“Notre volonté de résoudre par la concertation les problèmes du Mali n’est pas une
manifestation de faiblesse.” L’Essor, August 13, 1991, 5.
Nwaogu, Ngozi. “Why Husbands Must Write Their Will.” Daily Champion,
Lagos, September 25, 2003.
Nzomo, Maria. “The Status of Women’s Human Rights in Kenya and Strategies
to Overcome Inequalities.” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 22, no. 2 (1994):
17–20.
Nzouankeu, Jacques Mariel. “The Role of the National Conference in the
Transition to Democracy in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Mali.” Issue:
A Journal of Opinion 21, no. 1–2 (1993): 44–50.
ODEF. “Rapport d’activités du 1 décembre 1996 au 31 mars 1997.” Bamako.
———. “Rapport de mission à Ségou, avril 1996.” 7–13. Bamako.
bibliography / 225
O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” In The

Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, edited
by Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, 29–51. Boulder:
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999.
Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O. “Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections
on an African Political Paradox.” In Constitutionalism and Democracy:
Transitions in the Contemporary World, edited by Stanley N. Katz, Douglas
Greenberg, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven C. Wheatley, 65–82. Oxford:
Olukoshi, Adebayo O., and Liisa Laakso, eds. Challenges to the Nation-State in
Africa. Uppsala: Nordika Afrikainstitutet, 1996.
Oluwu, Dele. “Local Governance, Democracy, and Development.” In State,
Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph, 285–298. Boulder:
Lynne Reinner, 1999.
Onishi, Norimitsu. “2 Tents, Some Chalk: For Nomads a School.” The New York
Times, January 30, 2000, A4.
“Ousmane Sy tranche ‘La légitimité démocratique ne doit pas éliminer la légit-
imité traditionnelle.’ ” Le Zenith, November 12, 1997, 5.
Owusu, Maxwell. “Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and
Constitutionalism in Africa.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 39,
no. 1 (1997): 120–153.
Parpart, Jane L. “Women and the State.” In The Precarious Balance: State and
Society in Africa, edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, 208–230.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
———. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
———. The Disorder of Women. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.
———. “Three Questions About Womanhood Suffrage.” In Suffrage and Beyond:
International Feminist Perspectives, edited by Caroline Daley and Melanie
Nolan, 331–348. Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994.
Patterson, Amy S. “The Dynamic Nature of Citizenship and Participation:
Lessons from Three Rural Senegalese Case Studies.” Africa Today 46, no. 1
(1999): 3–28.
Paul, James C.N. “Participatory Approaches to Human Rights in Sub-Saharan
Africa.” In Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural Perspectives, edited by
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im and Francis Deng, 213–239. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1990.
Perlez, Jane. “100 Voices for Democracy, as France Clears Its Throat.” The New
York Times, June 28, 2000, A10.
———. “A Vast Rally for Democracy Opens in a Polish Castle.” The New York
Times, June 26, 2000, A3.
Peterson, V. Spike, and Anne Sisson Runyan. Global Gender Issues. Second edition.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997.
Polgreen, Lydia. “Timbuktu Hopes Ancient Texts Spark a Revival.” The New York
Times, August 7, 2007.
226 / bibliography
Poulton, Robin-Edward, and Ibrahim ag Youssouf. A Peace of Timbuktu:

Democratic Governance, Development and African Peace-Making. New York:
United Nations, 1998.
Przeworski, Adam, and Frenando Limongi. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.”
World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997): 155–183.
Ranger, Terence, and Olufemi Vaughan, eds. Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-
Century Africa. London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1993.
“Rapport sur l’état de la nation et de la République.” L’Essor, August 1, 1991, 4.
République du Mali, Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale et du
Développement à la Base. “Recueil de textes: Législatifs et réglementaires régis-
sent le mouvement coopératif en République du mali.” 1–120. Bamako, Mali:
RDM, 1989.
“Résultats officiels définitifs des élections communales du 21 juin: Régions de
Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou.” Le Républicain, July 2, 1998, 2.
Ribot, Jesse. “Political–Economic Analysis of Cooperative Reform in Mali: ‘The
State Is the Best Hen.’ ” Washington D.C.: Management Systems International,
1998.
Roberts, Richard. “Representation, Structure, and Agency: Divorce in the French
Soudan During the Early Twentieth Century.” Journal of African History
40 (1999): 389–410.
Robinson, Pearl. “Grassroots Legitimation of Military Governance in Burkina
Faso and Niger: The Core Contradictions.” In Governance and Politics in
Africa, edited by Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, 143–165. Boulder: Lynne
Reinner, 1992.
———. “The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone Africa.”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 36 (1994): 575–610.
Rosander, Eva Evers. “Transforming Female Identities: Women’s Organizational
Forms in West Africa.” Paper presented at the Transforming Female Identities:
Women’s Organizational Forms in West Africa, Cameroon, 1997.
Rotman, Anna. “Benin’s Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for
Guaranteeing Human Rights.” Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 17
(2001): 291.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
Sanankoua, Bintou. Justice pour tous: Le journal du forum national sur la justice
(No. 2) 1999. www.panef.net/jp2.htm#la presse (accessed March 30, 1999).
Sandbrook, Richard. “Transitions without Consolidation: Democratization in Six
African Cases.” Third World Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1996): 69–87.
Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. New York: Cambridge
Sangaré, Boubacar. Les Echos, August 12, 1991, 3.
———. “Double nationalité pour les Maliens de l’extérieur.” Les Echos, August 9,
1991, 3.
———. “Affaires sociales de Toumbouctou: L’humiliation des indigents.” Les
Echos, November 26, 1997, 4.
———. “Toumbouctou: Le développement en panne.” Les Echos, July 2, 1998, 5.
Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Democracy by Judiciary. Or, Why the Courts Can Be
More Democratic Than Parliaments.” In Rethinking the Rule of Law after
bibliography / 227
Communism, edited by Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier, and Wojciech

Sadurski, 25–60. Budapest: Central European Press, 2005.
Schwartz, Herman. “A Brief History of Judicial Review.” In The Self-Restraining
State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, edited by Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, 145–150. Boulder: Lynne
Reinner, 1999.
Seager, Joni. The State of Women in the World Atlas. New edition. London: Penguin
Reference, 1997.
Seck, Cheikh Yerime. “La descente aux enfers.” Jeune Afrique (2005): 54.
Seely, Jennifer. “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg
Threat in Mali.” Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3 (2001): 499–524.
———. “Mali: Democracy Stumbles but Doesn’t Fall.” Africa Contemporary
Record 26 (2002): B108–B119.
———. “The Legacies of Transition Governments: Post-Transition Dynamics in
Benin and Togo.” Democratization 12, no. 3 (2005): 357–377.
Sengho, M.S. “Après la naissance d’une coordination de 22 partis.” Les Echos, July
29, 1991, 3.
Sidibé, Ousmane Oumarou, and Gérard Kester. Démocratie et concertation
nationale; La mise en oeuvre du Conseil Économique, Social, Et Culturel. Paris:
L’Harmattan, 1994.
Sidibé, Yaya. Justice et media: Vivement des chroniquers judiciaires justice pour tous:
Le journal du forum national sur la justice, 1999. www.panaf.net/jpt1.htm
(accessed April 2, 1999).
———. Les enjeux du forum: Réhabiliter et moderniser la justice (No. 1) Justice
pour tous: Le Journal du forum national sur la justice, 1999. http://www.
justicemali.org/jpt1.htm (accessed July 10, 2007).
Sissoko, Mohamed Moustapha, and Secrétaire Général CESC. “Compte rendu
de la 9ème session ordinaire.” Bamako: Conseil Économique, Social et
Culturel, 1998.
Sklar, Richard L. “The African Frontier in Political Science.” In Africa and the
Disciplines, edited by Robert H. Bates, V.Y. Mudimbe, and Jean O’Barr,
83–110. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
———. “Social Class and Political Action in Africa: The Bourgeoisie and the
Proletariat.” In Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan
Africa, edited by David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, 117–144. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1994.
———, ed. Nationalism and Development in Africa: Selected Essays. Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1994.
———. “African Polities: The Next Generation.” In State, Conflict, and Democracy
in Africa, edited by Richard Joseph, 165–177. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999.
———. “Democracy and Constitutionalism.” In The Self-Restraining State: Power
and Accountability in New Democracies, edited by Andreas Schedler, Larry
Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, 53–58. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1999.
Sklar, Richard L. “The Significance of Mixed Government in Southern
African Studies: A Preliminary Assessment.” In African Democracy in the
Era of Globalisation, edited by Jonathon Hyslop, 115–121. Witwatersrand:
Witwatersrand University Press, 1999.
228 / bibliography
Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991.

Smith, Zeric Kay. “Building African Democracy: The Role of Civil Society-
Based Groups in Strengthening Malian Civic Community.” PhD dissertation,
University of North Carolina, 1998.
Sogoh, Soumaïla. “Question du Nord: La rapport des députés.” Le Républicain,
November 26, 1997, 6.
Soumaré, Aminata Maiga. “Factors That Affect Girls’ Access to and Retention
in School in Mali, 1965–1992.” PhD dissertation, University of Illinois,
1995.
Femmes, Sous Commission Institutionnalisation de la Prise en Charge des
Questions Relative aux. “Rapport de la sous commission institutionnalisa-
tion de la prise en charge des questions relative aux femmes: Quelle formule
préconiser?” 1–7. Bamako, Mali, 1991.
Sow, Moussa. “Conférence national: La commission interministérielle
d’organisation définit ses taches.” L’Essor, July 15, 1991, 4.
Sow, Yoro. “Echo dans le Nord Mali: Juillet 1997–juillet 1998.” Le Soir de Bamako,
December 11, 1997, 4.
Suret-Canale, Jean. French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900–1945. Translated
by Till Gottheiner. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1971.
———. Essais d’ histoire Africaine: De la traite des noirs au néocolonialisme. Paris:
Editions Sociales, 1980.
T.B.M. “Les grands absents.” Les Echos, August 16, 1991, 8.
———. “Les hommes de la conférence.” Les Echos, August 16, 1991, 8.
———. “Leçons d’humanisme.” Les Echos, December 12, 1997, 3.
Takiou, Chahana. “Entretien avec Atchrimi Emma Agounke: Le forum est
une intitiative novatrice pour la sous-region.” Justice pour tous: Le journal du
forum national sur la justice, no. 5 (1999). http://www.justicemali.org/jpt5.
htm#ENTRETIEN (accessed November 20, 2007).
———. “Interview de Albert Bourgi: Journaliste et universitaire.” Justice pour tous:
Le journal du forum national sur la justice, no. 4 (1999). http://www.justicemali.
org/jpt4.htm#INTERVIEW (accessed November 20, 2007).
———. “Modes alternatifs de reglement des conflits.” Justice pour tous: Le journal
du forum national sur la justice, no. 4 (1999). http://www.justicemali.org/jpt4.
htm#MODES (accessed on July 10, 2007).
Tamboura, Sékou. “Les femmes deputés: Quelle défense pour quelles armes?”
Nyéléni Magazine 4, no. 16 (1997): 4, 10.
Taylor, Charles. “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Guttman, 25–74. Princeton: Princeton
Tessougoué, Daniel A. “Communiqué de presse 4ème édition de l’éspace
d’interpellation démocratique.” Le Républicain, December 3, 1997, 3.
Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff. French West Africa. Stanford: Stanford
Tivey, Leonard. “Constitutionalism and the Political Arena.” Political Quarterly 70,
no. 2 (1999): 175.
Tordoff, William. Government and Politics in Africa. Second edition. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1993.
bibliography / 229
———. “Decentralisation: Comparative Experience in Commonwealth Africa.”

The Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no. 4 (1994): 555–580.
“Touaregs: Influx into Algeria.” Africa Research Bulletin, September 1–30, 1991,
10261.
Touré, Amadou Toumani. “Discours de son excellence le Lieutenant-Colonel
Amadou Toumani Touré Président du CTSP, Chef de l’état à l’occasion
de l’ouverture de la conference Nationale.” Paper presented at the National
Conference, Bamako, July 29, 1991.
Touré, B. “éspace d’interpellation démocratique la tribune des sans voix.” Les
Echos, December 11, 1997, 3.
———. “Éspace d’interpellation démocratique: La tradition respectée, le rituel
aussi.” Les Echos, December 12, 1997, 5.
———. “Espace d’interpellation démocratique 98.” Les Echos 1998.
———. “Consolidation de la paix au Nord: Le HCR passe le relais au
gouvernement.” Les Echos, July 1999.
Traoré, Adama, Kader Maiga, and Tiégoum B. Maiga. “Conférence nationale.”
Les Echos, August 16, 1991, 5–6.
Traoré, Georges François. “Aspects d’urgence évacués amarrer le Nord-Mali au
développement.” Le Malien, April 10, 1998, 3.
Traoré, I. “La paix de Tombouctou: La caution des Nations Unies.” Le Républicain,
March 18, 1998, 6.
———. “Insecurité à Gao: Terreur sur la ville.” Le Républicain, September 29,
1998, 3.
Traoré, Maïmouna. “Femmes et institutions: enfin le bout du tunnel.” Nyéléni
Magazine 4, no. 16 (1997): 3.
Traoré, Modibo Bobo. “Situation des droits de l’homme au Mali: L’indispensable
effort d’amélioration.” Le Zénith, December 11, 1997, 4.
Traoré, Soungalo. “Conférence nationale bis?” Le Tambour, August 9, 1994, 3.
“Trial and Error.” Africa Confidential 40, no. 2 (1999): 5–6.
Tripp, Aili Mari. “Local Organizations, Participation, and the State in Urban
Tanzania.” In Governance and Politics in Africa, edited by Goran Hyden and
Michael Bratton, 221–242. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992.
———. Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal
Economy in Tanzania. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
———. “The Politics of Women’s Rights and Cultural Diversity in Uganda.”
In Gender Justice, Development, and Rights, edited by Maxine Molyneux and
Shahra Razavi, 413–440. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
———. Tuareg Intermediaries Negotiate Release of European Hostages UN Integrated
Regional Information Networks, 2003. Available from Lexis-Nexis (accessed
July 1, 2005).
———. “Women’s Movements, Customary Law and Land Rights in Africa.”
African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 4 (2004): 3.
Tully, James. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Umozurike, U. Oji. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Vol. 2, The
Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Library. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1997.
230 / bibliography
UNICEF, and Gouvernement de la République du Mali. “Programme de

coopération Mali-Unicef 1998–2002.” 54. Bamako: UNICEF, 1998.
Unterhalter, Elaine. “Citizenship, Difference and Education: Reflections Inspired
by the South African Transition.” In Women, Citizenship and Difference,
edited by Nira Yural-Davis and Pnina Werbner, 100–117. London: Zed Books,
1999.
USAID Africa: Mali http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/
mali/ (accessed July 10, 2006).
Vengroff, Richard. “Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political
Parties and the Party System in Mali.” Journal of Modern African Studies 31,
no. 4 (1993): 546.
Vérificateur générale, Rapport Annuel, 2006.
Vile, M.J.C. Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967.
Villalón, Leonardo A., and Abdourahmane Idrissa. “Repetitive Breakdowns and
a Decade of Experimentation: Institutional Choices and Unstable Democracy
in Niger.” In The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments, edited by Leonardo
A. Villalón and Peter VonDoepp, 49–74. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2005.
Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books, 1983.
———. “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.” Political Theory 18, no. 1
(1990): 6–24.
Weber, Max. “The Concept of Citizenship.” In Max Weber: On Charisma and
Institution Building, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt, 239–249. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1968.
West, Lois A. “Introduction: Feminism Constructs Nationalism.” In Feminist
Nationalism, edited by Lois A. West, xi-xxxvi. London: Routledge, 1997.
———. ed. Feminist Nationalism. New York: Routledge, 1997.
———. “The United Nations Womens Conferences and Feminist Politics.” In
Gender Politics in Global Governance, edited by Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth
Prügl, 177–193. London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999.
Wheeler, Harvey. “Constitutionalism.” In Handbook of Political Science, edited
by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 1–91. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1975.
Whitaker, Beth. “Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of
Exclusion in Africa.” African Studies Review 48, no. 1 (2005): 109–126.
White, Stephen K. The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and
Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Widner, Jennifer, ed. Economic Change and Political Liberlization in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
———. “Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution.” Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, 2004.
Williams, Melissa S. “Justice toward Groups: Political Not Juridical.” Political
Theory 23, no. 1 (1995): 67–91.
Wing, Susanna. “Experiments in Dialogue: Espace D’interpellation Démocratique.”
Democratization 9, no. 2 (2002): 121–147.
“Women Activists in Mali and the Global Discourse on Human Rights.”
In Women’s Activism and Globalization: Linking local struggles and
bibliography / 231
transnational politics, edited by Nancy A. Naples and Menisha Desai, 172–185.

New York: Routledge, 2002.
Wormuth, Francis D. The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1949.
Young, Crawford. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1976.
———, ed. The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton
———. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship.” In Feminism and Politics, edited by Anne Phillips, 401–429.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Yuval-Davis, Nira, and Pnina Werbner, eds. Women, Citizenship and Difference,
Postcolonial Encounters. London: Zed Books, 1999.
I n de x
Abacha, Sani, 71 American Council of Learned

accountability, 5, 84, 127, 142, 173 Societies, 21
horizontal, 3, 15–16, 17, 21–22, 71 apartheid, 5, 57
vertical, 3, 17, 21–22 APDF (Association pour le Progrès et la
Ackerman, Bruce, 58 Défense des Droits des Femmes
ADEMA (Alliance pour la Démocratie Maliennes), 119–120, 137, 143,
au Mali), 9, 63–64, 78–79, 145
86–96, 129, 166–168 ARDC (Alliance pour la Respect et la
dominance of, 82, 126–127, 155, Defense de la Constitution), 52
206n1 Association des Juristes Maliennes.
AFC (Alliance des Forces du See AJM
Changement), 50 Association of Albinos, 137, 148
Afghanistan, 159 Association of Women Lawyers, 31
African Charter on Human and Association pour le Progrès et la Défense
People’s Rights, 27–28, 134 des Droits des Femmes Maliennes.
African Union, 47 See APDF
Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF), ATT. See Touré, Amadou
10, 195n1 authoritarian regimes, 21, 40, 61, 106
Afrobarometer project, 31, 195n80 Azawad, State of, 156, 159–160, 210n10
Afro-Marxism, 39–40
Agala, Abdramane, 164 Bamako, 9, 11, 92, 96–97, 144–145,
Agaly, Iyad Ag, 156, 164 146
Agounke, Atchrimi Emma, 152–153 Bambara language, 11, 70, 76
AGVF (Association des Groupements Bambara peoples, 9, 73, 76, 173
Villageois Féminins), 145 Baré, Ibrahim Mainassara, 48, 50–52
Ahmed Baba Institute, 157 Bedié, Henri Konan, 55–56
AJM (Association des Juristes Beijing. See 1995 UN World
Maliennes), 102, 109–111, 119, Conference on Women in Beijing
137, 179 Benhabib, Seyla, 8, 129
Albright, Madeline K., 173 Benin, 3, 26, 36, 38–44, 47, 51, 115
Algeria, 156, 159, 160–161 Constitutional Commission of, 41
Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali. constitutional courts in, 39, 43,
See ADEMA 57–58
234 / index
Benin—continued CESC (Conseil Économique, Social et

constitutionalism in, 36, 174 Culturel), 11, 70
democratization in, 54 Chad, 159
états-généraux in, 38, 42, 51, 59 Chazan, Naomi, 175
National Conference of, 1–2, CIDA (Canadian International
39–42, 45, 61, 126 Development Agency), 177
Berthe, Abdoul Wahab, 87, 152 Cissé, Soumalia, 88, 91, 94
Bill of Rights, 37 citizenship, 5, 7, 18–20, 113, 156, 170,
Bob-Akitani, Emmanuel, 47 174–175
Boni, Yayi, 43 women and, 101–102, 106
Botswana, 26 civic associations, 84, 174
Bourgi, Albert, 151 civic associations (tonw), 9, 73, 84, 85,
Bourmand, Daniel, 40 173
Bratton, Michael, 83 civic dignity, 32–33
bridewealth, 116 civic sphere, 170
Britain, 16, 25, 29, 122 civil rights, 22, 29
Burkina Faso, 35–36, 52–54, 161 See also rights, women’s rights,
“council of wisemen” in, 52 human rights
Burundi, 120 civil unions, 110
See also marriage
CADEF (Comité d’Action pour la clergy, 41
Défense des Droits de l’Enfant et de clientalist networks, 9
la Femme), 75, 135, 137, 140, CNCDH (Commission Nationale
143, 179 Consultative des Droits de
CAFO (Coordination des Associations l’Homme de France), 136
et ONG Féminines du Mali), CNID (Congrès National d’Initiative
106–107, 145 Démocratique), 63–64, 86–90,
Callaway, Barbara J., 121, 123 92–93, 96, 166, 206n1
Canada, 22, 163, 177 cohabitation, 48, 50, 197n37
CCAOD (Comité de Coordination des Cohen, Joshua, 129
Associations et Organisations Coleman, James Smoot, 77–78
Démocratiques), 63 Comité d’Action pour la Défense des
CCA-ONG (Comité de Coordination Droits de l’Enfant de la Femme.
des Organisations See CADEF
Nongouvernmentales au Mali), 66 Comité de Transition pur le Salut du
CCF (Commission de Suivi du Cessez- Peuple. See CTSP
le-feu), 160 Commission on the State of the
CDS (Convention Démocratique et Nation, 69
Sociale), 50, 92–93 Committee for the Tenth of
CECI (Centre Canadien d’Étude et de December, 102, 138
Coopération Internationale), 118 communes, 31, 67, 84–85, 98, 99–100,
CENI (Commission Électorale 147, 151, 157
Nationale Indépendante), 50–51, urban, 42–43, 96, 167
167 communitarianism, 19–20
index / 235
community meetings, 161–163 in Mali, 3, 63, 149, 153, 157, 169,

Compaoré, Blaise, 52 174
concertations régionales, 126–127, 136, in Nigeria, 50
146–148, 147, 148, 150, 157–159, process of, 14, 174
169 radio and, 32
constitutional dialogue and, 51, 125 in Togo, 47
creation of, 10, 31 women and, 10, 110
EID and, 131, 149, 174 See also dialogue
Konaré and, 155 constitutionalism, 4–5, 13–18, 20–24,
success of, 62, 175 32–34, 127–128, 174–177
women’s rights and, 103 in Africa, 25–27, 30, 58, 81
Condé, Alpha, 55 in Benin, 42
conflict resolution, 4, 30, 112, 150 challenges to, 46, 48
“problem of the north” and, EID and, 128–129, 133
155–156, 165 elections and, 82
women and, 31, 152, 165 failures of, 1, 129, 191n2
Congo, Democratic Republic of, in Mali, 3, 12, 14–15, 153
1, 177 participatory, 6, 36–39, 40, 51, 59,
Congrès National d’Initiative 69–70, 159, 174
Démocratique. See CNID process of, 2, 4, 6, 24, 30, 32 ,
consensus politics, 3, 41, 50, 94, 103, 36–37, 39, 128
161, 169 process-oriented, 39
Konaré and, 158 rights and, 27
Touré and, 176 in South Africa, 57
Constitutional Commission women’s rights and, 101–102, 112,
of Benin, 41 113
of Mali, 70, 75 constitutional law, 25, 27, 32, 111,
Constitutional Council (Burkina 113–115
Faso), 53 constitutional literacy, 3, 6–7, 18,
constitutional courts, 39, 56–59 20–22, 59, 127–128, 175–177
of Benin, 43 courts and, 58
of Mali, 41, 50, 71, 89, 127, decentralization and, 100
166–168, 170, 176 dialogue and, 37, 42, 133, 174–175
of Niger, 51 legitimacy and, 39, 174
constitutional development, 5, 6–7, in Mali, 90, 99, 101
12, 127, 174–175 women and, 10, 105, 112
in Mali, 3, 7, 125 constitutions, 5, 13–14, 15–17, 61, 133
process of, 3, 13 African, 1, 4, 24, 26, 35
constitutional dialogue, 6, 7–8, 14, ancient, 25, 26, 28–29, 33
36–39, 51, 159, 175–177 of Benin, 41, 43–44
in Benin, 43–44 of Burkina Faso, 52, 196n10
in Burkina Faso, 53 of France, 16, 37, 76
democratization and, 56–59, 101 of Guinea, 55
EID and, 125, 133 hidden, 25, 26
236 / index
constitutions—continued CTSP (Comité de Transition pur le

just, 3–4, 22–24, 33, 44, 61, 98, Salut du Peuple), 63–64, 67,
175 74–76, 102, 120, 160
just, 3–4, 22–24, 44, 61, 98, 175, customary law, 25, 29–31, 72, 112,
192n9 114–115, 191n6
legitimacy and, 20, 23–24, 27, 37, women and, 113, 115–116, 148
39, 58, 114, 197n25 See also traditional law, religious law
of Mali, 8, 25–26, 28–29, 57, 62,
70–72, 76, 81, 95 Dahomey. See Benin
of Niger, 48–49, 50–51 DCF (Projets Droits et Citoyenneté des
rights and, 21, 148 Femmes en Afrique Francophone),
of South Africa, 57 152
of Togo, 46–48 decentralization, 2, 20, 81–86,
traditional law and, 152, 166 99–100, 175–177
of Uganda, 197n25 in Benin, 42–44
of the United States, 37 democratization and, 58, 81–82
without constitutionalism, 2 EID and, 146–147, 149
women’s rights and, 27–28, 30–31, local power structures and, 98–99
75–76, 103–104, 111, 113, in Mali, 38, 69, 91–92, 96, 151,
123, 135 158, 169
constitution-writing, 2, 4 “Problem of the North” and, 160,
process of, 6, 36–37, 58–59, 62 163–166, 170
Conté, Lasana, 55 process of, 69, 92, 98, 99, 151, 157,
Convention for the Elimination of all 170
forms of Discrimination against women and, 7, 103–104
Women (CEDAW), 75 Decentralization Mission, 82, 84, 98
COPPO (Collectif des Parties Politiques deliberation, 2, 8, 14–15, 70, 130–131,
de l’Opposition), 167–168, 169 174
corruption, 24, 53, 83, 136–138, 150, constitutionalism and, 22, 23
167, 170 democratization and, 36, 61
judicial, 114–115, 128 process of, 6, 23, 33
Côte d’Ivoire, 54–56, 156 rule of law and, 5
failure of democracy in, 35–36 deliberative democracy, 3, 78–79, 129,
Coulibaly, Moussa Balla, 88 144
Coulibaly, Ousmane, 160, 182 Dembéle, Maitre Diarra Fatoumata,
council of wisemen, 50, 52 120, 135, 137, 179
coups d’état, 1–2, 44, 56, 61, 176 democracy
coverture, 29 African constitutions and, 17
CPF (Commissariat à la Promotion domesticating, 22
Féminine), 106, 119, 120–121, 124 participation in, 175
credit associations, 84, 108–109 Warsaw Declaration and, 173
La crise Politique, 166–169 Democratic Republic of Congo, 1, 177
CRN (Counseil de Réconciliation democratization, 2, 35–36, 175–176
Nationale), 50, 63 corruption and, 170
index / 237
decentralization and, 81–82 Dossou, Robert, 40

in Mali, 6, 31, 63, 86, 174, 176 Dramé, Tiébilé, 88
in Niger, 51 dual authority, 26, 29–30, 31, 33, 98,
obstacles to, 29 113
process of, 6, 27, 31, 50–51, 54, 69, See also religious authority,
84, 103, 105, 117, 170, 174 traditional authority
students and, 155
in Togo, 47 ECID (Éspace Communal
women’s contributions to, 7, 31, d’Interpellation Démocratique), 147
103, 105, 112–113, 117, 136 education, 29, 42, 85, 114, 120–122,
developmental dictatorships, 4 131, 155, 158
development assistance, 20, 118, 156, decentralization and, 74, 99
159–160 international organizations and,
development planning, 30 111, 118
Diaby, Mamadou M., 87 political, 59
Diakité, Fatoumata Siré, 119–120, 143 women and, 31, 105, 123, 144–145
Diallo, Cellou Dalien, 55 EID (Éspace d’Interpellation
Diallo, Soumaré Assa, 75–76 Démocratique), 10, 22, 101,
Diallo, Soumaré Hadja, 135, 179 125–144, 146–149, 155, 182
dialogue, 3, 7, 8, 23, 51, 156–157 criticism of, 126, 138, 147–148
in Burkina Faso, 53–54 dialogue and, 38
citizenship and, 174–175 human rights and, 115, 133–135,
constitutional literacy and, 21 143–144
decentralization and, 2, 157 interpellations and, 129–131, 130
Konaré and, 7, 8, 62, 109, 158 Malian democracy and, 174
legitimacy and, 174 official objectives of, 133
in Mali, 12, 32, 34, 173 opposition response to, 147–150
multiple venues for, 38 origins of, 31, 131–132
National Conference and, 49–50 participants in, 134, 136–142,
“Problem of the North” and, 164, 137–138, 139–142,
170 179–181
rhetoric of, 11 regional participation in, 136,
women and, 31 144–147, 149
See also constitutional dialogue women and, 125, 135–136, 138,
Diarra, Douré Bamou, 119, 181 145, 148
Diarrh, Cheick Oumar, 77 See also Honorary Jury (of
Diouf, Abdou, 36 the EID)
Direct Rule, 25 Ekeh, Peter, 113, 170
discourse ethics, 30, 32–33 elections, 12, 16, 23–24, 38, 83, 173,
discrimination, 14, 72, 77, 113, 152 175
Djermakoye, Moumouni Adamou, in Benin, 41–43
50–51 in Burkina Faso, 52–54
Docking, Timothy William, 173 communal, 43, 85, 100
Dogon people, 77 in Côte d’Ivoire, 56
238 / index
elections—continued Finer, Herman, 130

legislative, 42, 47, 50, 82, 87, FJA (Féderation des Juristes Africaines),
89–91, 95–97, 104, 126–127, 120
166–168, 203n20, 206n1 Flame of Peace (la flamme de la paix),
in Mali, 82, 85, 86–94, 104, 155, 164
166–167, 169, 206n1 Foundation of Women of Africa, 135
municipal, 43, 55, 82, 85, 91–97, France, 10, 25, 54, 120, 130, 161,
126, 157, 167, 203n20 190n26
in Niger, 49–50, 51 constitution of, 16, 37, 76
presidential, 9, 42, 46–47, 50, Fredrik Ebert Foundation, 118
52–54, 56, 86–91, 94, 95–97, Freedom House, 51, 52, 54
126, 166–167, 169 Freidrich, Carl J., 13–14, 15, 20, 23,
in Senegal, 36 130
in Togo, 46–48 French Ministry of Cooperation, 118
women and, 93, 122 Front Islamique-Arabe de l’Azaouad.
electoral commissions, 38, 46–47, 50, See FIAA
53, 55, 59 Fulani people, 9
electoral process, 12, 89, 96, 99
women and, 101, 122 Gandha koi, 161
Elster, Jon, 24, 62 Gao, 74, 96–97
Emerson, Rupert, 77 gender sensitive development index,
Englebert, Pierre, 6 121
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), genocide, 1, 27
106, 123 Germany, 27, 57, 58, 163
Éspace d’Interpellation Démocratique. GFDS (Groupe Féminin Droit de
See EID Suffrage), 11, 102, 104, 109, 111,
Espoir 2002, 89 119–120, 144–145
États-généraux, 38, 42, 51, 59 Ghana, 26, 47, 106
États Géneraux du Monde Rural, 74, 102 globalization, 102, 117–121
ethnic minorities, 9, 20, 27, 31, 70, 155 Gnassingbé, Faure, 47–48
ethnic politics, 9 governmental legitimacy, 2–3, 4, 6,
Europe, 4, 13–14, 16, 18, 106, 112 15, 63, 164, 170
excision, 29, 118, 122 in Mali, 14–15, 159, 176
infibulation, 116 Greenberg, Douglas, 23
Eyadéma, Gnassingbé, 44–47, 49 Groupe Féminin Droit de Suffrage.
See GFDS
Family Laws, 102, 115–116 Guéi, Robert, 56
farmers. See rural populations Guinea, 36, 54–55
Fayemi, Kayode, 58 Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, 26
FIAA (Front Islamique-Arabe de
l’Azaouad), 64, 81, 160, 164 Habermas, Jürgen, 5, 8, 32
FIDH (Fédération International des Haidara, Baba, 74, 87
Ligues des Droits de l’Homme), Hamani, Mohamed Ag, 156
136 Hamilton, Alexander, 15
index / 239
Hausa, 121 inheritance law, 28–30, 109, 113–115,

HCC (Haut Conseil des Collectivités), 116, 121–122, 123
72 institutional autonomy, 44
Held, David, 98 international aid, 99, 108, 111, 118,
High Council of the Republic (HCR), 160
41, 46 interpellation, 129–130
Honorary Jury (of the EID), 130, 132, Iraq, 1
134, 135–136, 148, 207n15 Islam, 49, 75, 116, 120, 135
members of, 181, 182 militants and, 156, 159–160
women and, 138 See also religion, religious law
See also EID (Éspace d’Interpellation Issoufou, Mahamadou, 51
Démocratique) Ivoirité, 55–56, 156
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 35, 54, 55
Howard, Rhoda, 19 de Jorio, Rosa, 105
Human Development Index judicial legitimacy, 114, 115
(2004), 35 judiciary, independent, 39, 43, 55
human rights, 12, 22, 27–28, 117, 136
EID and, 101, 125–126, 128–129, Katz, Stanley N., 23
133–135, 143–144, 148–149 Keita, Ibrahim Boubacar, 88, 89, 91,
in Mali, 8, 71, 102, 119, 131–132, 126–127, 138, 158–159
152 Keita, Mobido, 8, 25–26, 73, 86
PRODEJ and, 150 Kenya, 29–30
in Togo, 45–46 Kérékou, Mathieu, 40–41, 43, 54
women and, 107, 109, 118, 120, 175 Kidal, 74, 96
See also civil rights; rights; women’s Kita, 96–97
rights Klug, Heinz, 57
Koffigoh, Joseph, 46
IBK. See Keita, Ibrahim Boubacar Konaré, Alpha Oumar, 3, 9, 12,
Idrissa, Abdourahmane, 48–49 62–63, 70, 86–87, 157–158
Ihonvbere, Julius, 39, 58–59 crise politique and, 167, 168
illiteracy, 3, 9, 17, 72, 176 criticism of, 148
women and, 101, 107–108, 112 democratic policies of, 7, 8, 115,
imperialism, 17, 78 155, 176
inclusion, 2, 5, 20, 36, 59, 98 dialogue and, 78, 94, 109, 125, 126
decentralization and, 100, 263 EID and, 126, 128, 149
in Mali, 3, 29, 70–71, 156, 176 Muslim leaders and, 116–117
in Niger, 48–49, 51 “Problem of the North” and, 164
“Problem of the North” and, 159, Traoré regime and, 107, 177
160, 164–165 Kountché, Senyi, 30, 48
India, 173 Kouyaté, Seydou Badjian, 169
indigenous people, 18, 22 Kymlicka, Will, 18
Indirect Rule, 25
infibulation, 29, 116 Latin America, 15
excision, 118, 122 Lawal, Amina, 113–115
240 / index
laws. See constitutional law, customary constitutionalism in, 14–15, 34, 36

law, statutory law, Family Laws, constitutional literacy in, 22
inheritance law, religious law, constitutions of, 25–26, 28–29, 57,
traditional law 70–72, 76
Lebanon, 159 decentralization in, 81–82, 84–85,
legal pluralism, 102, 112–114, 117, 91, 98–100, 99
136 deliberative democracy and, 78
legitimacy, 1, 20, 23, 38, 59, 127–128, democratic transition in, 151
169 democratization in, 6, 31, 38,
constitutional, 6, 15, 27, 58, 174 44–45, 54, 55, 61–62, 63–65,
downstream, 24, 95, 203n22 66, 128, 174, 176
dual authority and, 98 dialogue in, 59, 144
judicial, 114, 115 See also EID (Éspace d’Interpellation
process, 24 Démocratique)
upstream, 24, 62 EID and, 126–129, 149
vertical, 39 elections in, 82, 86–94, 206n1
Lesotho, 26, 116 Family Law in, 115–116
Le Vine, Victor T., 17, 24 human rights in, 27, 131, 133–134
liberalism, 16, 18, 20, 193n34 judicial system in, 125, 128–129
liberalization, 1, 4, 26, 55, 61, 71 and la crise politique, 155, 157, 159,
in Mali, 29, 104, 118, 160 166–169, 169
Libya, 159 land disputes in, 114
literacy. See illiteracy National Conference of, 24, 61–63,
LJDDH (Ligue pour la Justice et le 65–70
Développement des Droits de political parties in, 9, 64, 86–88,
l’Homme), 143 88, 92–93, 170, 174, 206n4
local governments, 83 poverty of, 35–36
See also communes “Problem of the North” and, 10, 62,
Locke, John, 18 74–75, 81, 155–157, 158–161,
Lomé Framework Agreement, 47 163–166, 169–170, 169–171
rural populations of, 69, 72–74
McIlwain, Charles Howard, 14, 15–17 voter participation in, 95–98
Magnusson, Bruce, 43 women in, 75–76, 102–112, 117–121,
Maiga, Choquel, 88, 89, 167 122–124, 177
Maiga, Mariam, 137, 165 women’s rights in, 30, 135–136,
Mainassara, Ibrahim Baré, 48, 50–52 152–153
Mali, 8–12, 76–77, 173–174 Mali Empire, 76–77
challenges faced by, 176–177 Mali Federation, 26
civic associations in, 84 Malinke people, 9
constitutional courts in, 39, 71 Mande-speaking people, 9
constitutional development in, Le Marchand, René, 56
3–4, 7 Mariko, Oumar, 88
constitutional dialogue in, 51, 59, marriage, 25, 29, 109–110, 116, 122,
101, 153 203n1
index / 241
Mauritania, 161 of Niger, 44, 48–49, 51

MFUA (Unified Movements and of Togo, 44–47, 49
Fronts of Azawad), 160 women and, 102, 104
Military Committee for National national conference movement, 38,
Liberation (CMLN), 105 44–45, 53–54
military governments, 2, 9, 35–36, 44, National Forum for Judicial Reform,
48, 50, 79 62, 125, 150
Ministry of Territorial Administration See also PRODEJ (Programme
(MTA), 64 Décennal de la Justice)
mixed government, 26 nationalism, 76, 77–78
MNFPUN (Mouvement National des National Pact, 160–161, 165
Femmes pour la Sauvegarde de la National Political Forum, 168–169
Paix et de l’Unité Nationale), nation-building, 5, 6, 15, 27, 78, 99,
164–165 174–175
MNSD (Mouvement National de women’s role in, 123
la Societé de Développement), N’Doure, Diarra, 120, 135, 181
49–50 Ndwega, Stephen, 113
Mopti, 144–145, 146 negotiation, 3, 31, 32, 65, 117
Mouvement Démocratique. See CCAOD and creation of constitutions, 23,
Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad. 28, 46
See MPA neo-patrimonialism, 9, 83, 89
Mozambique, 9 newspapers, 11–12, 79, 134
MPA (Mouvement Populaire de Niangadou, Amadou, 87, 89
l’Azaouad), 64, 81, 156, 160, 164 Niger, 9, 30, 48–51, 52, 159
Mugabe, Robert, 35 CENI (Commission Électorale
multiculturalism, 18, 114 Nationale Indépendante) in,
municipalities. See communes 50–51
musotonw. See women’s associations Constitutional Court of, 51
Mustapha, Bolanale M., 13, 26 council of wisemen in, 50, 52
democratization in, 35, 51
Namibia, 26 National Assembly of, 48, 50
Natchaba, Ouattara, 47 National Conference of, 44,
National Assembly, 57 48–49, 51
of Benin, 43 National Forum for Democratic
of Burkina Faso, 52–54 Revival in, 50
of Mali, 26, 38, 72–73, 167, 176 Nigeria, 71, 106, 115, 123
of Niger, 48, 50 religious law in, 113–115
women and, 106–107 Non-Governmental Organizations
National Conference (NGOs), 68, 99, 145, 163,
of Benin, 1–2, 39–42, 45, 61, 126 169
of Mali, 11, 22, 24, 34, 44–45, women’s rights and, 109, 117, 121
61–71, 74–75, 79, 81, 126, North America, 26
148, 157–159, 174 Nyerere, Julius, 30
messages received by, 183–188 Nzomo, Maria, 25, 27
242 / index
Observatoire des Droits de la Femme et PPS (Parti Progressiste Soudanaise), 86

de l’Enfant. See ODEF Preparatory Commission, 65–66
ODEF (Observatoire des Droits de la primordial sphere, 170
Femme et de l’Enfant), 102, process-oriented constitutionalism, 39
109–111, 119–120, 137, 143 PRODEC (Programme Décennal de
O’Donnell, Guillermo, 16 Développement de l’Education),
Olivero, Beth, 23 158, 170
Olowu, Dele, 83–84 PRODEJ (Programme Décennal de la
Olympio, Gilchrist, 46–47 Justice), 62, 125–127, 128–129,
Organization of African Unity 148, 150–153, 155, 170
(OAU), 136 PRODES (Programme Décennal de
Ouatarra, Allassane, 56 Développement de la Santé), 158
Ousmane, Mahamane, 48, 50–51 PRODRESS (Programme de
Owusu, Maxwell, 22 Développement Sanitaire et
Social), 170
PAREM (Support Program for the Programme Décennal de la Justice.
Socio-economic Reintegration of See PRODEJ
Ex-combatants in Northern proportional representation, 48, 49,
Mali), 164 91, 166, 168, 203n20
PARENA (Parti pour le Renoveau
National), 91, 92–93, 166, 206n4 al-Qaddafi, Muhammar, 159
participation, 8, 12, 166, 175 Quantin, Patrick, 40
citizen, 5–7, 99, 174 Question and Answer Assembly.
civic, 11, 20, 32–33, 107 See EID (Éspace d’Interpellation
See also voter participation Démocratique)
Pateman, Carole, 7–8, 122
patronage networks, 83 radio, 32, 40–41, 55, 79, 109, 145, 175
Peulh. See Fulani people Rawlings, J.J., 164
pluralism, 14, 22 Regional Conferences of 1994, 62
political alienation, 25 religion, 13, 14, 110, 112, 173
political participation, 83–84, 102, constitutionalism and, 16, 25
158, 177 political participation and, 66, 70,
of women, 105, 111, 121 116, 135
political parties, 9, 16, 56, 83, 103, See also Islam
106, 157 religious authority, 31, 51, 113
decentralization and, 86, 98 religious law, 14, 24, 25, 29, 111, 114,
in Mali, 50, 64, 89–90, 99, 103, 116, 122, 123
166–167, 206n1, 206n4 “ancient constitutions” of, 28
opposition, 128–129, 147–148 Islamic, 28, 113
See also ADEMA, US-RDA Shari’a, 113–115
political socialization, 20–21 See also customary law, traditional
polygamy, 29, 116, 121 law
Posner, Daniel, 83 republicanism, 5, 16–17, 19, 20, 72
Poulton, Robin-Edward, 165 rights, 21, 25, 28
index / 243
group, 19, 27–28, 114–115 Ségou, 96–97, 144–145, 146

individual, 20, 114–115 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1, 71
minority, 18, 27, 192n31 Senegal, 1, 26, 36, 84
natural, 17 sensibilisation, 74, 191n30
traditional, 15, 27 Sevaré, 145
See also human rights; women’s Shari’a, 113–115
rights See also religious law
RJPRODH (Réseau des Journalistes Sialamine, Zeidane ag, 164
pour la Promotion des Droits de Sidibé, Yaya, 150
l’Homme), 143 Sierra Leone, 35
Rotman, Anna, 58 Sikasso, 125, 144–145, 146, 147
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 19 Sissoko, Diop Sira, 135, 181
RPG (Rassemblement Populaire Sissoko, Fily Dabo, 86
Guinéen), 55 Sissoko, Katouka, 73
RPM (Rassemblement pour le Mali), Sklar, Richard L., 26, 113, 127
90, 91, 92 Somalia, 177
RPT (Rassemblement du Peuple Songhai, 9, 161, 163
Togolaise), 46, 48 Soudan. See Mali
rural populations, 3, 30–31, 38, 44, South Africa, 5, 26, 57, 113–115
99–100, 146, 209n53 de Souza, Isodore, 41
communes and, 84–85 sovereignty, 7, 17, 41, 45, 57, 65
États Géneraux du Monde Rural and, Soviet Union, 40, 114
74, 102 structuralism, 16–17
in Mali, 8, 11, 69, 72, 78–79, 86, student movements, 49, 63, 69, 70,
102, 176 155–156
representatives of, 49, 74 Sudan, 177
tonw and, 9, 73 Sundiata, 76
women and, 22, 105, 108, 117, 123 Supreme Court, 41, 43, 48, 55–56, 71,
Rwanda, 1 166
Swaziland, 26, 116
Sadek, Bokar, 164 Sylla, Almamy, 87, 89, 167
Sadi, Camara, 168
Saibou, Ali, 48–49, 51 Takiou, Chahana, 151
Sako, Soumana, 87 Tall, Mountaga, 86, 87, 88, 89, 96,
Salafist Group for Combat and 167
Preaching (GSPC), 156 Tamanrasset Accords, 81, 160
Sanankoua, Fatoumata Bintou, 107, Tandja, Mamadou, 50–51
145, 150, 151 Tanzania, 30
Sandbrook, Richard, 9 Taoudéni, 69
Sangaré, Mamadou, 88, 137 taxes, 9, 74, 85, 100
Sankara, Benewende Stansilas, 54 Taylor, Charles, 8
Sarakole, 9 television, 22, 107, 135, 145, 156, 165,
Sarr, Mamadou, 66 175
Seely, Jennifer, 46, 47 Tessougué, Daniel, 137, 138
244 / index
Timbuktu, 69, 74, 96–97, 157, 165 UDPM (Union Démocratique du

Togo, 36, 44, 45–48, 49, 54, 195n1 Peuple Malien), 86, 104, 106
Constitutional Court of, 39 Uganda, 113–114, 197n25
National Conference of, 44–47, 49 UIDH (Union Internationale des Droits
ton-sigiw, 173 de l’Homme), 136, 182
tonw. See village associations (tonw) Ujamaa, 30
Touré, Ahmed Sekou, 70 UNFM (Union National des Femmes
Touré, Amadou Toumani, 8, 9, 54, 75, du Mali), 106, 108
86–89 unions, 49, 63, 84, 134, 136, 169, 173
CTSP and, 64 Union Soudainais-Rassemblement
dialogue and, 176 Démocratiuqie Africain.
EID and, 128, 142 See US-RDA
“Problem of the North” and, 160 United Nations Center for Human
women’s associations and, 103–104 Rights, 120
Touré, Mahomet, 132 United Nations Convention on the
Touré, Sekou, 54 Elimination of all Forms of
traditional authority, 25–26, 27, 33, Discrimination Against Women
49–50, 51, 113, 150 (CEDAW), 118
decentralization and, 98 United Nations’ Decade on Women
women and, 30–31 (1975–1985), 117–118
See also dual authority, religious 1995 United Nations World
authority Conference on Women in
traditional law, 24–27, 28–29, 111, Beijing, 108, 117–118, 119, 120,
123, 152, 191n6 123–124
See also customary law, religious law United States, 106, 122–123, 173
Traoré, Mariam, 106 Universal Declaration of Human
Traoré, Moussa, 26, 73, 81, 86 Rights, 27, 134
Konaré regime and, 107, 177 URD (Union pour la République et la
overthrow of, 8, 44, 54, 63, 69, 75, Démocratie), 91, 92–93, 94
106 USAID (United States Agency for
“Problem of the North” and, 81, International Development), 91,
160 104, 111, 118, 177
women’s associations and, 106–107, US-RDA (Union Soudainais-
177 Rassemblement Démocratique
Tripp, Alli Mari, 115, 117 Africain), 86–87, 90, 92–93, 104,
Tuareg people, 9, 20, 81, 131, 155–156, 105, 169, 206n1
195n86
“Problem of the North” and, 159–161, Vengroff, RIchard, 94
163–165 Verification Commission, 65
Tully, James, 3, 8, 14, 23, 25, 32–33, village associations (tonw), 9, 73, 84,
61, 129 85, 173
two publics thesis, 170 village elders, 98
Two Treatises of Government (Locke), 18 Villalón, Leonardo, 48–49
index / 245
“La Voix des Femmes» (radio EID and, 143, 145

programme), 109 in Niger, 49
Voltaic, 9 “Problem of the North” and,
voluntary associations, 9 164–165
voter participation, 9, 82–83, 95–98 rise of, 31
See also participation women’s rights, 27–31, 102,
104–105, 107, 109–112,
Wade, Abdoulaye, 36 144
Wanké, Daouda, 50–51 EID and, 135–136, 148
Warsaw Declaration, 173 Family Law and, 115–116
West, Lois A., 118 globalization and, 117–122
Wheatley, Steven C., 23 legal pluralism and, 112–114
Widner, Jennifer, 4 in Mali, 33, 75, 101, 152–153,
women, 7, 10, 25, 28–29, 122, 177 177
civic participation of, 18–19, 33 PRODEJ and, 150
discrimination against, 72, 113, in United States, 106, 122–123
116, 203n1 Wormuth, Francis D., 15
EID and, 125, 135–136, 138
elections and, 103–104, 122 Young, Iris Marion, 8
illiteracy and, 101, 107–108 Youssouf, Ibrahim ag, 165
Nigerian, 49, 51 youth groups, 64, 70
political participation of, 22, 70,
75–76, 91–93, 102, 103–107, Zaire, 1, 71
111–112, 114, 121, 175 See also Democratic Republic of
women’s associations, 10–11, 22, Congo
102–103, 105–109, 111–112, 119, Zimbabwe, 35, 116
123 Zongo, Norbert, 52

Susanna Wing (Auth.) - Constructing Democracy in Transitioning Societies of Africa)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Susanna Wing (Auth.) - Constructing Democracy in Transitioning Societies of Africa)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Const ruc t i ng D e mo c r ac y i n

2.1 Participation rates by election in Benin 42

7.2 Numbers of ex-combatants from the North integrated

This book began as my doctoral dissertation at the University of California,

ACDI Association Canadienne du Développement International

CAFO Coordination des Associations et ONG féminines au Mali

MIRIA Mouvement pour l’Intégration et la Renaissance de l’Intégration

ultimately, constructs democracy. Amidst the numerous failed transitions

Constitutionalism and Africa

of government had routinely been imposed on Africa. This legacy was

constitutionalism created from the top down. Constructing Democracy

have changed: as well as being a private individual he would have multiple

Mali: An Improbable Democracy

sign of successful democracy in Africa. Despite the pessimism generated by

It is my hope that this empirical analysis will stimulate comparable stud-

Constitutionalism, referring to either the principles of constitutional

In a free society, no constitution is likely to work, or to endure, unless its

The determination of these “fundamental beliefs” and definition of “the

than the study of the conditions of the rise of constitutionalism in general

As World War II engulfed Europe, constitutional scholar Charles Howard

Mali. The processes of deliberation have helped to reestablish constitu-

Contemporary Constitutional Theory

although O’Donnell has traced the origin of republicanism to ancient

Thus, structuralism is an important approach to constitutionalism if it

Between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, agents of Western imperial

Adherents to both structuralist and juristic schools of thought argue

Clearly, the constitutions of African states failed to protect the people;

rulers that preferred absolute, patrimonial power. Before exploring the

Citizenship and its Meanings

no longer acceptable in democratic thought. Since a reevaluation of the

In addition, various communities may negotiate with the state to

that operates under a system of rules respected and considered legitimate

a theory of constitutional literacy emerged that contends that the polity

Historically, constitutions were created by a very select part of society.

Domesticating democracy in the African context amounts to a dynamic

In this book I argue that in order to domesticate the process of consti-

The Construction of a “Just” Constitution

the will of the people, particularly in a context in which participation in

1. “upstream legitimacy,” that which a constitution enjoys when the assem-

Upstream, process, and downstream legitimacy can be combined to determine

(There is a) . . . necessity for the new constitutionalism to explore seriously

Political alienation and instability can only be avoided if we address the

the collapse of the short-lived Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan

source of authority, embedded in tradition, could powerfully reinforce social

Durable authority depends on legitimacy. The legitimacy of a constitu-

Constitutionalism and Universal versus Traditional Rights

death of their husbands (this matter is discussed in greater detail in chapter

Negotiations over the rights of women, of rural inhabitants as a group, and

Jürgen Habermas, specifically his theory of discourse ethics, provides

role in the development of constitutionalism in Mali. The National

As the global surge of democratization spread rapidly across Africa in the

as are the failed (or perhaps more accurately uncommitted) attempts at

of constitutionalism being at the very foundation of stable democratic

Julius Ihonvbere argues for process-oriented constitutionalism, “by con-

Benin: A Model Transition

The National Conference was led by Bishop Isodore de Souza. Clergy

Table 2.1 Participation rates by election in Benin

These high rates of participation reveal citizens’ sense of legitimacy of

This marks a major hurdle finally cleared by the government. Benin’s

After fifteen years of democratic experience, our country lives in peace.

Transitions across the Region

Benin declared its National Conference to be sovereign in a peaceful tran-

not result in genuine participation in reconceptualizing the Togolese state.