a Swiss Army Guide To Guerrilla Worfare And Underground Operations Intraduction by Col. Wendell Fertig, U.S.A.-Ret. ited by Capt. R. K. Brown, USARTOTAL RESISTANCE Major H. von Dach Bern, Swiss Army Translated by: Hans Lienhard Special Warfare Language Facility John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Ft. Bragg, North Carolina Edited by: Capiain Robert K. Brown, USAR Introduction by: Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, USA-Ret. FALADIN eee press one nt CONTENTS Acknowiedgments i Notes of the Central Committee, Swiss Neacommissioned ‘Officer's Association Introduction Foreword D Significant Guerrilla Operations of Past and Present PART [. ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE “TP Burpose of Guerilla Warfare eT UL Organization of Guecrilla Warfare a Fomution of Crore. aie Foghat: (oe Cera Cais 2 soy of oe 1v Hol a Ey Sh HGR Eaitnet wal Opie ‘Apia Your Gusila Detachment 15 en of Poult Unis «.. Mepeian-my Ope ne a PART II. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE CIVILIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT cmutlitiansBS SEESAERSOR SPRBESER SGR8RRER Ef Resistance to the Last Let us assume the follewing: Switzer.one has bocome a battle: field. Superior enemy forees hare invaded tne count:y. Here and there our troops have heen cverran. However, many have stecesded in evading the znemy. ‘They are still in possession of their weascns and equipment, They wan: t fight, resist to the lest. But how? Or: The enemy has occupied a sity. The population is under is rule, What does che worser, the enployee, the selfemaloved do such a case What does the teacher. the newspaper editor, the doctor, the state employee do? What about housewives, ailzoad employees. postal emplayees, and policemen? What do the soldiers do? What do the civilians do? Will some throw away their weapans since they believe eon tinued resistanoe is Zatile? Will othore wait for the futero, placing their faith im God, or will hey cooperate with the enemy? So many questions—but where are the enswors? One thing is certain. The enemy will show no mercy. Tae enemy will snuff out one life, dozens, hundreds or thousands wishout any qualms if this would ferther his sims. The captured soldier will face deportation, forced labor or deats. But 30 will the worker, the exe ployee, the self-employed, aad the housewife The enemy will not make any distizction between soldie:s aad ns, Experiences of the recent pest have proved that annihila- ‘of the conque-ed may be exzected sooner or later. Sometimes, is process is only delayed. ‘The office, the noncomraissioned officer, the teaeter, the editor— idual who, at one time or another, has made any deroya: ‘ks about the ideology of the enemy, who. before the war, sto2€ up for democracy and liberty and vocally opposed dictatorship and despotism—all these wil lead the degoriation and liquidation ist. This we must understand! What then must ke done when the enemy is in che country? What has to be done in view of the certainty that danger and death will threaten each citizen, male o: female, regardless of whether 4¢ wants to play an active or passive rol each We believe it is better to evecy Swiss woman or man must resist. We beiieve chat the enemy carnot he allowed te feel a: ease for even ore minute in the con- querec territory. We belie re have to infliet damage upon him, fight him whereser and whenever we have the opportunity! By speaking this way we have clearly and explicitly indicated the pur- pose of his boa In case of war, resistance will come primarily through the Army. Its our duty 1 make-sure with our might that the Army is and remains ready for war. We want this point urderstood very clearly. However, we want te show our people a way to cesist in ease pars of the Army are dispersed, split up or eneizcled. This is in cave prisozers s1cceed) in escaping oF portions of the civilian popula tion fall under enemy rule. We want to demonstra that in the worst situation resistance is 20 « but that it is a primary duty. We feel this book will raske this resistance effective, that it will prevent bloodshed and loss of .ife because of lack of necessary know- how and ability. haps or might say that -t is wrong and unwise to discuss these things publicly, to write about them and to inform a potential cenemny of what ~o intend to do sactld he attack us, We do not be- lieve in this consep:. On the contrary, we believe that, because of our ‘open-y demonstrated will to resist to the last, the enemy will have ‘one more factor to consider when evaluating the ‘pros’ and ‘cons? of 2 plamed “Operation Switzerland.” We publish this book with this in snind and hope that it will find thousand. ¢f readers, The Centra! Commitiee of the Swiss Noncommussioned Officers AssociationSEESAREGSE SEESERES BERERRES E: INTRODUCTION BY WENDELL W. FERTIG, COLONEL USA - RET. ie eather ida ww als Fite Mart Bh eae Jot fe He ar nd da ets Be ea a a To commen: on this bock is cifficult unless it is considered as a test book or Field Manual devoted to the specialized problems of Civitian Resistance ord their solution, ‘The illustrations are superb and the text explicit. It is a how-to-dosit manual in a fiekd that Aas been iomg neglected; i.e. mhat courses 0° action are opem to civilians who reside in an arca occupied by a foreign aggressor. In case of enemy occupation, it is general'y assumed that tke civilians will resist, How such resistance is to be implimented or sustained is left up to the individual who is usualy at a complete loss as to what 10 do. Witt the publication of TOTAL RESISTANCE this is 0 Jorger the case as this book spells out the when, where and bow of developing and orgarizing guerrilla bands, « civilian resistance move~ ‘ment and an underground. Specific comments seem to be in order as there is mo sustained story to review. ‘The first of these camments touches a lace dear to my heart. Among all the famous resistance efforts tabulated the guerrill. warfare in che Philippin2s goes unmentioned. Yet this was a resistence that sprang from the people and was carried on for five months tehind the Japanese lines before receiving recognition or help from the Allies, From this experience came the basis for the ccancept and policy of the U.S. Special Forces. A resstance that can be arganized amd sustained carly in the ‘occupation fnas the best chance of surviv.ng. It must be organized before th: enemy can institute the block control system. in cites, and while some unrestricted movement is possible in the country areas. Further it must be remembered that the most succesful guercilla movements Eave always been based on creas that are isolated by ‘errain, oor roads and bad weather. Operations within a city are iffcult, The Watsew uprising was an exception and this was pos- sible because of ghetto conditions that will not be found in other cities. Evem there, the real effectiveness of the uprising was destroyed when it was tricked into prematare attacks on the Germans, while the Russians awaited the mutual destruction of both acversaries. Secrecy is imperative. It is almost impossibic 10 maintain” but cften cen te beiter achieved through the use of misleading rumors than through tigh: security. To provide the enemy with several stories, all of which require interpretation and decision, will often provide the time needed to carry out an operation: Jn my cemmand in the Philippines, I found that the only way to bbreak out of an ambush action was 0 provide indigenous personnel ‘wich limited ammunition. A guerrll: with an empty rifle will retreat readily, while one with an adecuate supply of ammunition will stay two long and risk ezpivre. ‘Medicines are frequently the best means of financing any type cf resistance. ‘The individual items are easily carried. As an example, thirty atabrine tablets would take a courier further tha. thirty thous- and Japanese occupation pesos, and with much less risk of discovery. Tn preparation “or issuing currency of your own, the adequa supply of paper and ink sre very important. The enemy will actemapt to comirol the supplies of these items, thus negacing any possibility ‘of providing an alternate system of currency. ne need that is mos: important and which is mentioned bat not stressed, is the need of an organization within the Prisoner of War cot Concentration Carips. ‘The basic crganization should be pro- vided before the samender takes place. The lack of this planning ‘was responsible for uncounted deaths in BOW camps in the Philip- Fires, Divide and rule by the enzmy lead to the break: down of all ‘commend authority and the prisoners were at the -narey of the Japa- nese guards. In Singapere, the Aust-alian troops ensered the POW camp with a table of organization and commané. They were able to present a united front toward cheis captors and fared bette: cham the American POW's who cid not have such an organization. ‘These comments do mot lessen the impact of this fine manual which is the first ever published that not only describes the practicesRELR OFERERRS RHBRRE ea Bs eRe ‘of the Communists but offers “nethodls for opposing their oppr: ‘ule, It's interesting to no:e that the Swiss Noncommissioned “Officers Association is able to point where the dangers lay ard hew «hey may be met. In all of ths, its well to be present if such a restsane ackiewed, These are: 1. A. loyal people whe will support the effort a: sreat sk to themselves. . Favoraie terrain, and orgonization to fit particular texrain needs. A possible safe haven, Good connmunications (radio, telephone, ete.) ‘An adequate supply of food to support the units. Support from an ouside cower (most important) The final paragraphs of the bock bear repeating here. “If two (—and this is always the case ideology is involved (religion is part of it) guerra wer Fre ancl resistance will inevicably break out in te final phase, “The military expert who urdervalues or ever disregards guerri la warfare makes a mistake since hz does nat take inte consideretion the strength of heer “The last, and admittedly, riost eruct battle will be fough: by civilians. It wil be conducted ander the fear of deportation, of execution, anc coreentration camps. “We must and will win this battle since each Swiss mele and femal: in particular believe in the innermost part of their hearts— even if they are too shy and soker in everyday life to aulmit or even speak about it—in che old, and yet very up-to-date saying: at six basie principles whic: must Death rather than slavery!” Wendell W. Fertig Cojone] USA - Ret. Introduction ‘The author is fully anare of the fact that he kas touched upon a dificult and anplessant subject, Nevertheless, in the age cf :o:al warfare where aot oaly material but also ideological factors ate at imperative fo discuss these problems, 1y be assured that in case of a war, large arecs—if not lerritory will be temporarily lost :o the enemy. The Array may be large.y neutzalized even though sizecble units should eon- tinue to fight for an extended period im the A.pine regions, However, the majority of the soldiers as well as the masses of the civilian pooulace will survive the campaign. Now comes the question—siould these sucvivors become loyal subjects of the new rulers, waiting for saivat.on and liberation from the outside, or should the figh: be contirued in a new manner with all available Tt may be assumed tha: with the well known love for freedom of the population on che one hand and the proven ruthlessness of the potential enemy on the other, clashes between the occupation forces ard the conquered will sconer ot later become insvitable. ‘Thus it ray not he entirely useless to write about the atmosphere, tactics ard techniques of uertilla warfare as far as these can be rezon- stracted from the experienoes of past wars from the Spanish guerillas fighting against Nepoleon to the French Maquis of World War Il. The AuthorEe SSGSAERRRE RESSREPS BSISSREA ‘The Most Important Guerrilla Actions of the Past and the Present ‘The actions in tke Vendée during the French revolution ‘The Spanish guerzllas fighting, against Nepoleon ‘The uprising in Tyrol against Napoleon Guerrilla operations in Gentral Germany against Napoleon (raid- rng parties) Greek liberation operations aga.nst the Tu Guerilla opera:ions during the Franco-Prussian War of Acatvian “Pacifiestion operations” in Bosnia Activities of Belgian insurgents cf 194 German Army caval:y raids behind French lines during 1914 Serbian insurgent operations during World War I Larweence's desert o2erations against the Turks during World War 1 Activities of resistance fighters in the occupied Rubr area after ‘World War | Schlageter) Ati-bo.shevist cperations in the Baltic coustries after World ar 1 ‘The civil riots (actions of the corps of volunteers) in Germeany after World War [ E “White” ané “Red” partisan actions d ion (especially the campaign: in Bash war in the Grar-Ch byssinian guerrilla 0 War Republic guerrille operations during Communist Cainese guerrilla. oper ernment and! against the Japanese ‘exile organization operat ons during the Second World ng the Russian revolu- Ko.ichak | erations during the Ialign-Abyssinian Astivities of the French resistance movement during World War I (Mequis, uprising of the Intericr French Forees and the Guerrillas and Parsisans) Opecations of the Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian resistance movements during Word War It Activities of the Polish underground movement during the Second Wo-ld War Warsaw uprising led by Genera) Bor) Soviet and Yugoslav partisan operations duriag World War IL British guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines Italian partisan operations against the Germans ancl Neo-Fascists ‘The start of Werwelf operations in Germany Comemanist ELAS-insuretions in Greece aftr the Second Work Operations of the illegal Irish Repablican Army Operations of the Algeria and Tunisian resisance movement ‘gninst the French Mau-Mau operatiors in Kenya against the British North Korean partisan actions against United Nations troops Resistance moveraent agaiast the British in Malaya Vietmich opera:ions against the French (especially du initial staze} AntiCommunist riots in East Berlin AntiCommanist rexelution in Hungary Anti-Commun'st riots ia Poland BOK-Movement on Cyprus, 1g theLB S28SReH P54 08R 8 Part 1 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare 1. Purpose of Guerrilla Warfare A. General ‘The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to continue resistance in those paris of the country cecupied by the enemy, or to continue the fight after the defeat of the regular army. Guerrilla detachments cause Zear snd confusion behind enemy lines; force the enemy to initiate complicated socurity measures thus wasting his strength: and inflicts losses on both personnel and ate ‘The cccnstant unrest so that no invader may move about alone and un- armed. Service and occupation troops of the enemy will huve to take fon extra security measures in addition te theic numerous cther tasks. a state of ire occupied territory must be pushed The final phase will be a general, cpen insurrection whose sim will be te force the enemy from the country. 3. Specie targa: . Transportation routes (reads and railroad lines) 2. Communications net (telephone lines above end be'ow ground, telephone and racio stati |. Powor net |. Vital industrial plants Reepaie shops atid slepots Gouriers, messengers and liaison officers €. Characteristics of Guerrilla Warjare Opposing forces during conventional war are supplied by the factories, warehouses and supply depots; guerrilla units, however, live on the wa Every guerrilla warfare unit commander has an incomparably lacger amount of independence and. freedom ef action that. he would have on the same level of command during « conventional war. 1U1. Organization of Guerrilla Warfare 1. Formation of Guerrilla Units Guerrilla units require a nucleus of experienced txcaps which will seve as instructors and leaders. The enemy tadtics of “leaping over” the front by air mobile units or “over-running” the frost by armored units wil: tndoubtedly leave many Swiss army units intact. ‘These, in turn, of trained, experienced Sgyees ND Line > ® In our army, the majority of the participants in guerrilla war- fare will consist of scaltered portions of the army o: of auxiliary services, It is imperative to bring them togecher as well as to reoruit ian popula Dispersed) Batallion or Regimental staf will , local militia, auxiliary Defense persenael, police, and eivilian voluntoers. Where no staff personnel are prevent, alert affcers of NCO's will assume commard and ereats an organization, Higher headquerte:s—in ease such a headquarter: still exists and maintains communica ” lly stragglers as ces, Civil Nir Guerrilla warface ear ne cn secondary fronts. Witnout the supgcrt of the eiviliar. population, guerilla wa-fare will fail in the long run Guerrilla operaticns will not be ini since the enemy will always 2¢ stronger there and the civilian popula- tion will be less willing to support GW. operations. Ina ‘enemy regula ‘ont Fine troops normally do not oppress the Fopulation. Bebind the front, the civilian population, aroused by toe terror invoked by pclitical and police organizations which fellow the front fine troops, will become willing to engage in and suport guerrille operations. ‘The enemy will hardly commit his strongest Gghting units for and occupation duties or against initial guerrilla opera- i. Ratner, he will utilize second-rate troops which wil. partially ‘compensate for your weaknesses, ‘You must distinguish between: a. Mobive guerzills anits belonging to the army or composed ‘of ariny elerems; b. Local, stationary elemen:s of the civilian resistance move- ment ‘The idea behind euerrlle worfare is o conduct lccal resistance ‘operations in the entire occupied territory by the civilian resistance movement (especially sabotage ard counter.propagande). At the sme time, it is necessary t9 create certain liberated areas held by mobile guerrilla units, However, these areas are not to be held rigidly. They will be changed continually in accerdenee with the foremost rule of guerrilla warfare whicn states that ‘no terrain is held! permanently.” ‘As a rule, liberated areas ean only be held for several weeks 3 er be waged near front lines—onlyor months, until the enemy has concentrated sufficient troops to initi- ate large-scale counter-guerrilla operaticns. By means of continuous small-scale operations conducted by local e:emenis 9° the civilian resistance movement, you will seacter eG Y? enemy forces, retain the initiative, and protect the organization ancl evelopmen: af the mobile 2 WF you are in a position to form réatively large guerrilla units cf approximately attalion size with heevy weapons, the enemy will be unable 10 ceoupy firmly the majority af the country, bet willt a i i i ¢ & i 3 3 5 ¢ i s a t | ; 1 ‘ hhave <0 be satisfied with controlling key installations and the most important points, primarily routes of transportation and communica- tion, Ruins in borbed-out cities will provide gocd hide-outs. Devastation wrought by atomic weapons will provide excellent plac: wo hide taba nlomatcn 7 Following types of copertion oe conceive 2 Strength of Guerrilla Units ‘The main probler is to esta strength among guerilla Urits ‘When only small gue-rilla usits are operating, the enemm to cont:ol oecapied territory by mosns of small, numerous containing a squad or a platoon, He will also form a strong central reserve force and ins:all an elaborate aet of spies, agents and in- Fosmers. His control net thus becomes celatively efficient; conseqruent- Jy, the guerrilla uni: has litile freedom of movement. However, ease guerrilla units fcom company to battalion size with heavy weapons, the enemy will be forced to create strong garrisons. As a result, he will have tc. be satisfied with pro- tecting key installations and roates of communicaticn. If he is forced, however, to withdraw all sonal posts in the intermediate areas and only form a few steor Gifficult for him to mai and informers will be u ‘ean thus be more easily eliminated. The eneray control net becomes thin and your freedom of movement increases. Guerrilla units of regimental size and abeve ars :00 eumberseme and easly succumb to the temptation to eperate openly in a oon- ventional masiner. If they do so, they will easily be destroyed by the superior enemy. Consequently, battalion size units with some heavy afantry weapons (machine guns, mortars) are most appropriate. Bactalion size units are strong enougk to attack larger enemy posts successfully (company strong paints), yet trey axe 100 woak to became tempted, to forget the basic rules of guerrilla warfare hare their protection. From late fall to spring, when no bivowse can be established, unit size will be reduced by dismissing personnel. In suramertime, these perscnnd will be recalled. The same course of ation will be followed when food is in shor: supply. 8 well-balanced ratio of ible peer SEES Bae Ai ae (SQ?) Se =uname 8 rat rm B SSE 3. Replacements for Guerrilla Headquarters In onder to wage an effective guerrilla war, headquarter units vill ned a vay of tained percaad. IT need be, tate peronod can be recruited from the civilian population. Postal, telephone, and ‘nora employees as wel as railroad ‘employers and power technicians can provide ‘echnical advice for sabotage operations. Radio technicians can crgenize communication nets between guerzilla units and the remainder of the army holding out in a rear area, the civilian resistance movement and friendly foreign countries (if oar own army headquarters no inager Engineer officers will serve as demolit Prominent politicians, newspaper ditors, ete., can serve as liaison perscnnel setween guerrilla units and the local populace, and the civ istance movement. Editors and other newspaper personnel controlled presses in evoperation vith the «i ‘ment. 4 list of the abore menticned tech personnel section at headquarters. il opecate guerrilla 12 resistanes move- as will be kept by the 4, Orgunizational Phase ‘Tae enemy will eave certain areas unoccupied due to their lack of importance. He will be unable to cecupy some areas because of insuficien: persorne.. ‘You have to'move into all of taese areas. Assemble small groups of personnel at these glace. Reraain in- active until your group is well organized. ‘You mast not provoke the enemy into taking counter measures rst yeu during your moment oF greatest vulnerability, ic, dur- 15 phases of ‘and ini:ial activation, Never again, not even in the most eritial situations when pursued oF even encircled, will your unit be as vulnerable and as in danger of disintegrating &s i: in ducing this initial phase, Shortage of trained persoand cr technicians can be compensated for by reexuiting suitable personel from among the civilian popula- tion. By tke same means, you will later replace personnel losses. Every Givil an wee joins you ie permmanensly removed from exemy ie-rorist actions—errest of entice clans, degeration, execution of hostages, 9¢ t f : Orgunizetional tasks: Coief of Future Guerrilla Unit Population Guerrilla Unit Find out who is geseral.y re Organize combat units liable. Find out who is willing (equacs, platoons). Precare to help passivdy, ie, supply ammunit.on, Procure food. Ob- focd, provide intelligence in in equipment (clothes, shoes, formation, ec. Find o1t who sacks, olc.), Stockpile arms. is willing to help accively, se, Train pessonnel with captured laying mines, serving as guides, weapons. Convert artillery per ing and’ caring for the sonnel into mortar personnel wounded and sick. Find out Convert auxiliary personnel, who is passively supporting the police, eivil air defense pecsom- ‘follawers, profiteers. nel, members of supgly and who actively works postal units into make-shift with the enemy. “infantry personnel. Even with experienced soldiers iti sill mesessary to implement period. a. to acquaint Jeaders with their new personnel; b. to allow perscnnel to become faniliar with izes personnel with the basic jues of guerrilla warfare such as march, security, aon, eormmunications, reconnazssance, techniques of sabotage and ‘ion; with the use of captured! weapons and ammunition such as land grenades, mines, explosives, ee. ‘This training will take up to one or two months, depending upon whether you are already being pusacd vs atl organ 2ing unmolested, or whether cperations have to be conducted immediately. ‘The lorger the organization phase the zreater the chances of ssurcess as there will be fesrer losses during future engagements. This in turn will ineresse self-eonfidene Reconnaissance of future targets and systematic observation of the enemy can de earcied on concurrently with o:gamizatien and train- ing. Members of engineer and éemolition units as well as infantry pereonnel and combat parol experts will be incorzerated into your ‘guertlle unit. Howerer, since they will orly account for a small per- centage of your personnel it will be necessary to train o-her individ- uals in these fields. 10 Actillery personnel will be converted into mortar personnel. Members of Ii i personnel will be utiized as infantry, Civilian volunteers will be drawn from the following sources a Individuals under draft ege—cadets, pathfinders, premnilitary trainees, and rifle club members. bb, Indisiducls who have completed their obligatory military . Indivicuals formerly found unit for military service or those discharged for medical reasons. d. Individuals exempted from service who worked for iastitu- tions essential to the war effort but which ere now under enemy con- trot such as railroad and postal employees, ete. Recruit amateur radio operators for replacements for operators. 1 necessary, obtair them through the civilian reristanes movement. Assign chaplains and civiicn priests to tho medical section. ‘They ere well suited as .icsion personnel sith the population, espe- cialy in the country. They ean maintain contact with wounced guerrillas whom yeu have leit with che population to be eared for “undercover.” Use armorers, ané perhaps, civil captured weapons. Since they will quickly leern che operation forcige. weapons due to their :echaical backgrounc, they can instract other personnel in their operation. mechanios as instructers 01 5. Leadership Select leaders carefully. Guerrilla pe-sonnel sot their leader. Once behind enemy lines, no military policeman, military court, mor any state power will help the guerrilla leader ‘maintain discipline and fighting spirit. Military rank vill then only play a subcrdinate role ‘Aa ind.vidual who leads by “bluff” is not suitable. He may be able to maintain his position in « conventional unit for some time due to the chain of command and discipline, but never in a guerrilla unit Only real “troap leaders” who kaow how to handle peop.e can maintain cheir position. The leader must also possess same technical knowledge since during guercilla werfare it is less important to make great “leader.tham to conduct efficiently some relatively jans with fines:e, He thoulé be well versed in small unit tactics ts well ar mine and demolition techniques. ple 6. Equipme: Sinee 1 considerable percentage of your people will consist of auxiliary service pessonnal, local militia, plant malitia, police and civilian volur teers, you will lack many items of individual clothing, Sram sheter halves end suitable shoes tc canteens and thermos bottles. Ob:ain some sort of “field uniform,” ie., outer clothing, overalls, sk suits or jackets, windbreakers, etc. Items of personal equipment, such as Knife, fork, and spoon, ress kit, smal. cooking stoves, flashlights, rucksacks, le can be 1; by stripping these items from exc dead enemy, by scl , from shops in larger towns by i nee’ movement. Procure tents from civilian spert.ng goods stores ¢r from aut- doorsmen with whom your men are aoquaint Guerrillas dressed in civilian clothes can collect these items, oF have them brought! to "ou by merakers of the resistance movement. Make proparatiens for winter as early «s possible. These include the procurement of bla. sets, good shoes, and protedtive clothing such ‘8 overcoats, windbreakers ski jackets, warm under garments, Trust- ed women can tailor make-shift snow suits made out of bed sheets. Procure two radios per éetachmert—one for use on a power net and one portable set ries far reception in lonely regions wikere ro power net is available (mountains, forests) Build up the supply of batteries for your por-able radios with help of the resistance movement. Secure and hide these eacly since the eneray will soon requibition all radios and accessories from the population Have your “amateur radio operators” operate your =adies. They are technically skilled and can perform repairs with limited means. With these radios you will be able to moniter enemy broadcasts as well as thase from friendly foreign countries and your own exile government, By equigping each guerrilla deta:hment and cach radio of the civilian resistance movement with ordinary radios, it will be posaible fr your ows army headquarters in the safe area, and your exile gevernment abroad to communicate with yoa. They can comrauni- 1360 kD VL cate over long distances providing advice ard technical guidance for ‘guerrilla opesations or invicatiag specific targets which you are to attack, Furthermore, your morals and ability to resist will increase since you will feel less lonely and lst 7. Supply of Weapons Usually it will be 1» oblain weapens than emmuaition Crewavrved weapons—submachiae guns, ight machine gins, heavy rnachine guns, rocset lanuchors, mortars—will come fom dispersed cloments of the regula: crray. These elements will provice the nucleus ‘ef your battalion firepower. ‘Auxiliary sersice personnel, local militia and police wi Je, he uble to bring their indiviéaal weapons—pistols, cazbines, submachine guns. Supplying civilian volunteers with weapons will pase the greatest problem. Below ace several ways you may solve this problem: ‘a, Collect weapons from poorly policed hattlefieds. Memsove usable weapons from destroyed tanks, fortifications, and downed air- planes. E, Remove weapons from she dead enemy. cc. In practically all Swiss families, you wil. find an older, but usable, weapon (rifle 11, carbine 35). ‘€. Collect privately ovned weapons of hunters and. marksmen. ‘The owners will denate their weepors willingly because they zum the risk cf execution ‘f the enemy finds they have conceal them. . Requisitior. weazcns from eiviliaa arms shops or police star tions which eventually would have to surzender their weapons to the enemy. Supply of Ammunition and. Explosives a Basis sources of supp which dispersed army units have with ther 1 supplied Jrom hidden caches establiched according to plan by the retreating army (3) Ammunition systematically atzipped from each enemy casualty (4) Ammun'tion collected in raids on enemy transport depos a u 15) Ammunition collet frempostly policed hatlefcde— irom dessroyed tank, feld fortifications, downed panes, ee. (6) Explosives retrieved by removal of mines from partial eletred er uncleared mine Belde “mM b. Ponsble sources of suppl (1) Sporadic air drops from (2) Syetematic eur stronghold drops from friendly foreign couatries Collecting weapons and ammut a hunters, macksmen, police stations, civilian rifle clubs, Requisition explosives ard detomatcrs from civilian constructien companies and , farmers and umber jecks. Requisition all air rifles and am:munision from farmers. Sach weapons are especialy cuitable for “special operatiors,” such as private parties sach cutee. Build a grate using boards and logs, so that the packages will not lie on the ground, 6Leave an interval of about the width of a hand between boxes anc containors to affard air circulaticn. Insert rcof lath between rows to provide for air circulation. Air the depot by removing tae roofing paper as often as possi. Homemade Grenades 16 | Improvised, concentrated charges can be used to destroy fixed objects (rail-oad tracks, power line poles, transformers, etc.). Antitank sn:mes serve as exellent, improvised, concentrated charges, Weight of explosive contained is always three to four kio- ‘grams Aniillery projectiles, mortar rounds and eerial bombs can be useil as improvised, concentrated chenges te destroy hard targets. It is 5ea to attach tae projectile to a board wik wire. For a primer, use a small charge which is always attached naar the detora- tor of the projes oe‘Ar leh, ignite At right, iaite Ignite ether wth me with raoteh or by ‘moans of ot fatligher i flse fighter." lighter if used 18 9. Orgenization of Maintenance Facilities Distinguish between repair shops in “liberated areas” and repair shops in “cccupied areas.” Install meke-shift ord.nance shops in civilian locksmith shops, blackamith shops, ani. garages ‘Your maintenance personnel, disguised in civilian clothes, can pecform repairs in thise shops which cannot bse do 10. Organization of Feod Supply Guetrila units ordinarily live off the land us well as fcom material teken from the enemy. Oocasionally they establish depots Tn “liberated areas,” ise in those areas over whi units hare temporary control, food supplies farmers, mills, shops and pechaps warehouses. It is obvious in such situations that fiction may very easily arise botwees the population and guervilla units. Im this case, the “l {see replacements for puerrila headquarterst has te act along with the detachmen: commander to redacs the pos the populace ‘See section on “Relatiorship, with populatio Tre questian of focd supply, a dilfcult ane te solve, has eon- siderable bearing upon the tactics of gerrilla units. As a resal;, detachments (approximately one compsny) live alone and battalions are enky formed for larger operations. It is eas te feed sea:tered detachments of 86 to 100 men each off the iand than it would be it. the case of a 400-enan battalion If you have highsgrade and non-perishable food suyplies or kave captured those, keep tiem for the difficu.t times in winter. High-grade food items ere canned milk, chocolate, ovcmaltine, crackers, canned tems containing lots of off and fat, sw:oked meat, bacon and hard sausages. It is advisable to store these isems in well hidden depots Food supply suggestions: When supplied by the population. be careful not to expose scurseli any longer tkam necessary. In sunracr- tire, send out personnel im advance to have the population prepare the food. Then have it picked up by & “pick-up team” and eat in the open as you are safar tere than in a village. In wintertime, wait under cover and only come ¢o the houses to eu: in a warm place when the food is ac-ually ready. Obviously, these sttit security meuseres cean be relaxed-—especially in wintertime—whea operating in a li ated ace 19LL. Organization of Medical Service amd Procurement of Medical Sup; Do not establish an elaborste medical service. The operation of field hospitals will be impossible, sinee nits are constently moving in a liberated area and often move from one liberated area to anotbe Provide anly first aid. Take wourded and sick personnel to rel able persons among the popalation we Doctors and medics with medical supplies and equipment are indispensable for guer-illa units snd znust b> rectuited from emong the civilian populacion, Medical Supplis. a, Sources: (C1) Supplies still im pessession of dispersed army units (2) Supplies taken from the enemy b. Procuremert—with assistance ef the eivilian resistance move- ‘ment —from: C) Civilian doccors 1n pharmacies and drugstores (3) Civilian hospitals (4) Aid stations in large industrial plans (5) Private homes. ‘systemctically scrounge amall quanti- ties) (6) Pharmaceutical industriss (surreptitious deli civilian resistance movement) ey by 12. Relationshi ‘The population is your greatest friené, Without their sympathy: and active support you mill he unable to exist for extended periods of time. As a result, vou can ill afford to alienate them by brutal be- havior or lack of discipline. Such prevacation shoulc: never happen. ‘Ths possibility exists the: guerilla units may heoome a greater evil than the cecupstior. forces. If you have to requisiticn semething, do not demand it with « submachine gun, but appeal to the common goal and patriotism, Do not forget that the laws of the conventional war hardly apply any more; each old man, each weman and each child can harm you g-vally if they want to. For better or worse, you are prac: tally dependent uen the good will ef the population. You also de- pond upon their steady, “I do not krow, 1 have not heard nor seen ” ceplies 10 enemy interrogators, even when this altitude might mean their deportation and death, » with the Population Initially, the population will be intimidated and without courage. This will change, however, with a longer wa= and oscupation. An awskensd, aroused) population ean support you in many ways. Passive support: Observe enemy systematically and continuously Establish am inconspicuous security net for guerrilla units Procure sup Hide and care for wounded and sick b “ €. Conceal materiel and ammunition {Serve as guides for guerrilla units & Ad b. Identity col.abcratars tive support: Tee wounded and killed personnel e. Lay mines ¢, Sabotage wire cormaunications Even if the population should act only half-heartedly in your bochali, you will always find some people willing to help you as ob- servers, scouts, and messengers. ‘As chief of the guerrilla detachment, you must be extremely ‘cautious in your contact with elements of the civilian resistance move- ‘meng, even in liberated areas, Don't forget that you have to change positions rapid.y. Members of the resistaace movement, howaver, are locally restricted and have to continue eperations accordimg to your \izestives. Consequently, yeu must not expose their “eove:” for the sae of temporary acvantages, or else taey will be captured and liquidated by the eneray after your departure MII. Tactics of Guerrilla Unit 1. Your First Guorrilla Operations For your rst objectives, select simple ta:gets which you can master wthout ary major dificulties such as demolition ‘of high tension power peles, or laying mines on thro.ighfares. Only alter certair. esprit de carps as been established ia your unit and after the seif-confidence of your people has risen because of @ few successful cpecaticns, are you in a position to undertake larger operations—operaticns against railread stations, bricgess ambushing marching columms, ete. aLYou will quite necessarily suffer losses and sethacks. However, your unit will have became sulficient y stable in the meantime ty be able to withstand reverses without falling apart. AAs a leader you must get used to the fact that during gucrrilla vrarfare many more, and sometimes entirdy different, psychological factors have to be taken inte consideration than in the cegular amy. Here you were always suported—perkaoe without your realizing it— by the ever-onesent power of the state (laws, courts, police) to mi tain discipline, Gon small gre posta ‘on individual patrols ————Results in captured on small columns armunition and ‘weapons o You thus gain tactical control cf “No Man's Land” Ambushes, raics, suprise attacks You thus interrupt or enda commutication between individual enemy decachments You occasionally caine eer Heavy weapons encile you to autack fixed strong points; frst sal ones, then larger ones. Your attacks wil! fozes the Secupa ticn troops to withdraw from al smaller strong. points and cutposts, Consequeatly, both no-man's-land tand the indiviclual liberated areas grow larger. Periodically, the enemy will, however, recover and attempt to deal beevy bows against you which you must evade. 22 2% (Operational) Security of Guerrilla Units The security of guecrilla units will generelly be carried out by the civilian resistance swovement throush: a. Espionage ly sound out occupation personnel lesly made remarks (3) Monitor radio and telephone conversa:ions 4) Bribe efficials of the occupation forces |S) Blackmail officials of the occupation forces b. Observation 1) Constantly observe roads, railroads, railroad stations, and irpor's in order to detest the assernbly of airborne or helicooter units as wel as the approach of motorized columas ard railroad transports. {2) ‘The civilian resistance movement can report zesults of reconnaissance missions by radio, messengers, or carrier pigsons, Either members of the resistanes movement or, preferably, liaison personnel of the guerrilla uni's alteched to the headquarters of the Iccal resistances movement can serve as messengers.3. General Behan 4. Prooved with secrecy, care, and cunning—even with slyness. 1b. Only use foree when you can mass supecior forces, © Avoid any fight which might jeopardize the existence of €. The most impertan: thing for your safe:y is maintai secrecy Ambusbes and raids are your main fighting neapons Never engage a strong eremy and never sseept an open fight. Whoa mecting a superior enemy ycu must divice into small reaps, avoid the eneray and reassemble later at grevesig- nated rally points. It you carnot avoid a figh: with pursuing troops, do not ergage decisive fight under any eircurstanees. Rather adopt delaying rm and break contact with the eremy as quickly as possible— ly ne later taan nighitims which will soneeal your moverrents, Once the occupation aroops have ga.ned reef by means of @ successfu aitack and returned to their strcny pointy harrass them again. Guerrilla units should reappear from hiding once the enemy covumns have disappeared ere 4. March ‘After a succesefal large operation you must move to « new area ‘of operations, Prior to moversent, establish contact with reliable persons in the new crea. Send out one or two NCO's in edvance to reconroitre tae area thoroughly. You as the commender will roughly oullirs the soute to be taken on the map und then consider by what means. your will change Theations without being detected by the enemy. ‘Avoid sighways and villages on the ina [No long preperations or preparatory orders should give aotice cof impending change. You must keep your decision to yourself until te tine for movertert has come. Hf you save to make extensive preparations (a, moving emmie ion and food supplies or large-scale recannaissance), try to de- cover hy citculating a rumor about a false plan which seems eredibie anc éoes rot arouse suspicion, Jn order to intercept individuals who might inform the enemy of your plas, sond oat several patrols & few hours before your move in ordet to lay ambushes far ahead on strvets and reads. They vill apprebenc all persons saesing by and detain them during the critical period. If necessary, cut telephone communications also. 24 Whenever you encounter urfamiliar terrain, obtain scouts facnitiar with the area. However, release them orly when they eanno: possibly compromise your operatiors. . Nodody should be allowed to know where you come Srom or where you are going. Your most operational area mus: be kept socze: from everyen. fe the population about your steengih. Always creste tne of being stronger than you really axe (i2., the zemara: we are only the advance guaid of a larger unit which follows over there” possible, only travel during the night in ordsr to minimize possibility of ycu: position being compromised. ince you have to avoid roads, the method of teavel will usually be by foo: Obviously, you will have to march a lot, However, de not require unnecessary foroed marches. Keep your men fresh anc ‘coaserve their strength s0 thes they will be in shape for any operation (or movement. IE posible always boil is close together, Deiter and faster. Provide front and rear security by sending three to fo. several huscred meters ahead and to the cear of your forma 5. Rest Move at night and rest in the woods during the day. Select woods for shelter. When forced to camp out in the open, utilize high poials whieh will provice goad observation, Security elements placed too fa: forward only endanger you. While resting, security-is best esiablished by placing puards in te ch in_o elosed formation, Wher: every: rk decisions ean be made and implemented i al Rimmedi ty of the camp. Also, enlist civilians fer this purpose as they can observe the enemy in n inconspicuous manner Post air observers curing daytime at your resting places. At i you will place two-man ambushes on each likely evenue of approach, If you bivoun> after nightfall, keep the detachment together and post several :wo-ran guard pests at 50 or at the most 100 meters ‘rom the detachment, “As visiility increases after dawn you must increase security. To froclude being surprised by air mobile uaits which are your greatest enemy, be sure to designate guards to scan the skies. Never ue'the sane camp tw9 nights in a row, unloss you are in beraced area,” Never spend the nigh: in the same place where you have rested daring the day. Issue new alert instruc:iont ewery cay so chat everyone will Jbnow what to do ir case of a raid. At the same time designate m rally point “or siragglers. Personnel detailed clsewhore or entire units? must he kept informed cf the location of rally points where they ean join you later oF least find out where the detechrent hos moved ter - Relay Simple Messages by Primi cations Means of Communi- a. From time te tire you will have to enter cestain villages in order to: (2) Replenish food suppl (2) Leave wounded and sick with reliable civilians (3) Use the civilian telephone or the postal system (see ion on “Use of telephone and postal service.”) b. Simple meseages san be selayed to yet by civilians (mostly members of the resistance movement) by: UU) Opening or closing of pre-designated windows or shutters (2) Hanging, ou: clothes (3) Displayirg x conosaling carriages, ete. Smoke and light signals as well as waving of sheos are too obvious and too dangerous for the signaller. It is best t refrain from such signalling. With these primitive, yet inconspicuous means, only very simple messages can be relayed, stich <3 “Atten:ion, danger! Enemy in village!” or “No danger! Village free of enemy! Use the akove mentioned signals in such a way that they can be recogaized with binoculars from the odge of nearby weds. 7. Construction of Road Blocks Telled o- blastod trees are best suited fer road Mocks, De not drop to big a tree in hopes of causing the exemy more work. You only waste a Jot of time and explosive If you do not have the means of instaling booby traps with your rore blocks, at least simulate them. Below are some extmples Separate, ‘half hidden wires leading fram tree branches into the ground which simulate trip wires to hidden charges. Loose and only partially covered pieces af sod next to the read (eneray may assume that poorly conecaled mines sre placed here). 26 Rca See rms Gv ”1h guerrilla warfare you must instal coad blacks c open roads, ere the enemy must expose himself to fire while removing therm, This, of course, is ecntrery to everything you have learned chout the construction of roa: blocks for # cenventicnal war. However, {ou must lean to think differeatly for guerrilla warfare. th smaller tees you will need litle explosives or will need Bitle time to expove yourself to enemay patrals while eulting them. Booby traps oa improvised road blocks are the most importart ‘ing and rot trues as each, ‘The eneray will not cemove the trees by hand but will haul thers eway by vehicle, Howerer, when booby traps are attached he wil need an armored vehicls, either a tank or armored persornel carrier, ix order to bs able to clear the road immodiolely and without regard to any possible explosions, or he has to gee specials {Engi ets) to seazch for the Looay traps and disarm them. In any ease this will eaus> a loss of time. Hi the enemy is so rutaless chat personnel losses caused by mines are of no consequence and he commits everybod y—even untrained personnel—to remove booby traps, the evemy will suiTer casuelties and yeu will have achieved your goal Sabo:age on roacs is less effective than sabotage on zailroads since ewch road block may be essily bypassed by rerouting :raffc. 28 8 Mining of Roads With stake Advantage: Quickly emplaced. Disadvantage: Dangerous to own popula: tion since little tension re: quired to seit off Advantage: No danger to the population as mine cam be only deton- ated by heavy vehicles— trucks, tanks, etc Disadvantage: Much time required while Laying. Placement takes about 10 minutes per during which you may be surprised by enemy patrols, Disadvaniage: Much time requited as for re IS; in addition, it is ous to population— canbe -et oF by litle pressuce Uncontrolled Uncontrolled 9. Sabotage of Road Net Destroy, change or remove road signs. . Piace mails on road. Only elfective when used in lange quantities, ‘The pepalation should be use in tais type operation. ‘The esemy will he “erved to embark on a systematic road clearing operation (theymey Impress the love! pepulace to help ther). At any rate, sabotage spevat.ons of this matare will cause the enemy a great loss of time. Coordination of this type of sabotage with apecat ons at the front i indispensable since such sabotage is only of value when the enemy has to use roads eentinually. Sabotage of Vehicles How can you sebotege a motor vehiele in such a manner that the breakdown will not be deceeted immediately bat will rquire complicated aad tirme eensuming repairs? ‘i. Suger in gas tank be Water in gas tank Loosen oil drainage screw to cause lose of ofl Loosen sercw of el filler e Tousen oil presaze lea How-cat, you miatreat « motor vei without revealing What you eonamitted sabotag. Fl battery with plain water (desteoy battery) Grease partielly or not at all (wear-out bearings) © Do not fill with sufficient oil (will burn eat bearings) 4. Too much tension on fan bet will cause rapid wear Drive with low sressure in tires igh gear to cause excessive tire wear the clutch to inereute wear |. Do not refil. radiator comp ately Increase gas consumption by comtiauously di 30 j- Wear out brake linings by constant use of brakes instead of using lower gear k Wear out engine by constantly driving slowly in high gear Metal spike impedes mater vehi Lele Metal Spice icompars Its size with motch ond match box) Right Emplacement cl sp Menufocture: Take © ural piece of steel about 12 t0 15 contimeters {ong one 5 to B anliimaters in dioneer. File 20th ends to sharp points. Cut bots ends with hacksow aoaut 3.10 5 centimeters. The four parts (They Ore any held togethsr in the midile scetion for cheat centinaterd ore now ber outward, Though the ssike mor {all'to he ground in ary posticn one point sail olwoys be vp. The Srancth ot the apfka and the lowgth cf ech pol ce sulficlent to Pnclvale even the heaviest truce Hees, Coes . Sprcad on sioels ‘eipeciol y ot nicht? E. Loy immedictely in front SF fires of posed veh ces (conceal spike By pushrg |= under tre). 10, Ambushing Indivitlnal Vehicles Fire upon the driver and the assistant driver with an air rifle Wath this type of weapon the sho: ean be harcly heard. However, the force of projectile is great enousk to wound them so thet you can dispose of ther right afterward with a bayonet. By minimizing noise you gain time and remove material aLFonrenied Ingkeut 4 single enemy vehicle i Tab Cay forse and ‘woeng 10 mov Mesto of JPome Ine track less hurriedly. 2t Ceomed’ leasiove, you have the truck driven to a concealed location (Forest, ete.) by one of your drivers in orde: to exomine the loot, Dead exemy personnel must be taken along and buried. ‘A ccllection section aheays immediately follows tke assault slemert, This section removes all usable items and qu.ckly withdraws to pre-cesignated rally points, often before the fight is completely finished. Thus ¢h tinuing fire fight. LL. Rai Nornaily the enemy w:ll be paralyzed by your raid. Nevertho- less, you have to take into cansideration that he may zeuct by attack- ing you oat of despair or due to aa especially ‘orcefal leader. ‘Consequencly, you must have a safe route of withdrawal, either Utilising terrain features which make enemy pursuit dilfcull, or using In our mountainous terrain, raids with light machine guns, machine guns, end mortars upon transport columns om reads, march: ing columns anc: trains promise to be successful, even fron a great istance, AAs the commanier, you must clarify the following points before the raids a. Time of initiating fre (L) Upon your orders (2) Opening fire by one lead weapon (then all others com: rence firing, (3) ‘Automaticaty, when the head of the eoluran hes reached 4 certain point in the terrain b. Stop the lead vehicle: (1) By felling a tree (2) Mines (3) By fing upon it ©. Dastribute your fire throughout the colamn: (2) Determine who fires on the front portion of columa (2) Determine wao Gres on the center of column (5) Determine who fires on the end of column When using moctars, have them commence firing or ly when the entire column has stopped.) A. Signal for disoontinuing the fire fight: (1) Bugle calls (2) Flares 5 Enemy Cohumne