136

FIRE ASPECTS OF HVDC THYRISTOR

VALVES AND VALVE HALLS

Working Group 14.01

Task Force 4

February 1999
FIRE ASPECTS OF HVDC THYRISTOR VALVES

AND VALVE HALLS

Working Group 14.01

“Valves for HVDC and SVC"

Task Force 4
"Fire Aspects of HVDC Thyristor Valves
and Valve Halls"

Edited by JACQUES ALLAIRE

Convenor
Task Force 14.01.04
 Members of
CIGRÉ Working Group 14.01

Task Force 4:
"Fire Aspects of HVDC Thyristor Valves
and Valve Halls"

P.C.S. KRISHNAYYA,
Convenor WG 14.01,
Canada

J.F. ALLAIRE,
Chairman Task Force 4,
Canada

M. ARUNACHALAM, India
A.J. BOLGER, Canada
J.A. DONAHUE, U.S.A.
L. ENGSTROM, Sweden
J.C. GLEADOW, New Zealand
D. GUSTAVSSON, Sweden
J. HOLWEG, Germany
S. KOBAYASHI, Japan
H. MAGOROKU, Japan
A.N. MARTINS, Brazil
B. RAILING, U.S.A.
M. RASHWAN, Canada
M.A. REYNOLDS, U.S.A.
T. SENDA, Japan
D. TIKU, India
G. TONTINI, Italy
M.L. WOODHOUSE, U.K
C.T. WU, U.S.A
 FOREWORD

Two major fire incidents involving HVDC thyristor valves occurred a few years ago, one in May 1989
at Foz do Iguaçu convertor station of the Itaipu ± 600 kV 6300 MW double bipole HVDC system in
Brazil and the other in June 1990 at Rihand convertor station of the Rihand - Delhi ± 500 kV
1500 MW bipole HVDC system in India. CIGRÉ Study Committee 14: DC Links and Power Electronic
Equipment, at the request of its members at the Study Committee meeting in New Delhi, India in
September 1991, assigned the task of studying "Fire aspects of HVDC valves and valves halls" and
producing a report on the subject to CIGRÉ Working Group 14.01: "Valves for HVDC and SVC". A
Task Force 14.01.04: "Fire aspects of HVDC valves and valve halls" was formed in May 1992.

A third major HVDC thyristor valve fire occurred on October 30, 1993 at Sylmar convertor station
(East) of the ± 500 kV 1100 MW Pacific HVDC Intertie Expansion scheme in California, U.S.A.

This report is the result of the review of fire aspects carried out by the Task Force. The report
provides:

. A survey of the possible causes of fires in valves and valve halls.

. Assistance to the users by providing them with information on actual systems and practices.
. Guidelines for the users and suppliers, especially in the areas of specification, engineering and
construction.
. Comparative information on the various fire detection and protection systems.
. Information on fire alarm and fire control systems.
. Guidance with regards to fire fighting, operation and maintenance.
. Guidance with regard to actions after a fire.
. A reference document for discussion with insurance companies.
. A source of information for discussion with the general public on the reliability and safety aspects
of convertor stations.

The report specifically adresses HVDC thyristor valves and valves halls.

However, many of the findings may be applicable to other power electronic equipment used for utility
applications.

The existing international standards related to HVDC thyristor valves, IEC 700 (1981) and IEEE 857
(1997), are about testing of the valves and neither of them discuss anything about the fire aspects of
HVDC valves and valve halls. It is envisaged that this CIGRÉ report will provide a technical
reference on the subject for consideration by the relevant international committees responsible for
standards on HVDC thyristor valves.

CIGRÉ Disclaimer
"While the members of CIGRÉ and the publisher believe that the information and the guidance given
in this work are correct, all parties must rely upon their own skill and judgement when making use of
it. Neither the authors or publisher assume any liability to anyone for any loss or damage caused by
any error or omission in the work, whether such error or omission is the result of negligence or any
other cause whatsoever and howsoever caused and any and all such liability is hereby disclaimed."

Copyright and Copying

"All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means-electronic, or otherwise-without the prior permission of the
publisher"

i
CONTENTS : PAGES

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 2

3. STANDARDS, AND DEFINITIONS 3

3.1 Standards
3.2 Definitions

4. FIRE HAZARDS IN VALVES AND VALVE HALLS 7

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Possible Causes
4.2.1. Valve Insulation Failure
4.2.2. Loose Connections or High Resistance
Joints in the Power Circuit
4.2.3. Valve Component Failures
4.2.4. Thyristor Level Connections
4.2.5. Coolant System Problems
4.2.6. Contamination and Condensation
4.2.7. Failure of Valve Hall Bushings
4.2.8. Failure of Surge Arresters
4.2.9. False Operation of Deluge System
4.2.10. Other Valve Hall Equipment
4.2.11. Work in and Around Valve Hall
4.3 Assessment of Possible Consequences

5. VALVE HALL LAYOUT AND ACCESS 13

5.1 Physical Arrangements
5.1.1. Introduction
5.1.2. Present Practices
5.1.3. Specific Provisions
5.2 HVDC Valve Hall Construction
5.2.1. Introduction
5.2.2. Valve Hall Construction
5.3 Means of Egress
5.3.1. Introduction
5.3.2. Valve Hall Means of Egress
5.3.3. Present Practices

6. SUPERVISION OF VALVE COMPONENTS AND 18

OTHER VALVE HALL EQUIPMENT
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Supervision of Valve Components
6.2.1. Review of the Present Practice of
Monitoring Valve Components
6.2.2. Developments in Valve Monitoring
6.3 Supervision of Other Valve Hall Equipment
6.4 Possible Improvements

7. FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS 21

7.1 Introduction
7.2 Detection and Operating Principles of
Fire Alarm Systems
7.2.1. Air Sampling Systems
7.2.2. Electric Arc Detector Systems
7.2.3. Infra-red Beam Smoke Detectors
7.2.4. Infra-red Flame Detectors
7.2.5. Imaging Video Camera Systems
CONTENTS (continued) PAGES

7.3 Field Tests and Installation Experience

7.4 Operating Experience
7.5 Guidelines for Valve Hall Fire Detection

8. FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 32

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Design Considerations for an Installed
Fire Suppression System
8.3 Types of Fire Extinguishing Agents
8.3.1. Halon
8.3.2. Carbon dioxide
8.3.3. Dry Chemical
8.3.4. Water
8.3.5. Aqueous Foam Systems
8.4 Installation Requirements
8.5 Comparison of Fire Extinguishing Agents
8.6 Survey of Valve Hall Fire Suppression Systems
in Service
8.7 Future Developments

9. SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 42

9.1 Introduction
9.2 Design Considerations
9.2.1. Natural Ventilation
9.2.2. Forced Ventilation
9.3 Example of Design Methods
9.4 Examples of Design
9.4.1. Sandy Pond
9.4.2. New Zealand
9.4.3. Etzenricht
9.4.4.. Baltic Cable

10. CONTROL AND INTEGRATION OF FIRE DETECTION, FIRE 49

PROTECTION AND CONVERTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Fire Alarm Classification
10.2.1. Classification by Detection Principle
10.2.2. Classification by Detection Objective
10.2.3. Detection System Reliability
10.3 Fire Control System
10.3.1. Basic System Functions
10.3.2. Other System Components
10.3.3. Outline of System Design
10.4 Actual Practice
10.4.1. Example of Sandy Pond HVDC
Convertor Terminal
10.4.2. Example of CU HVDC Convertor
10.5 Operating Experience in Japan
10.6 Guidelines for Integrated Fire Control Systems

11. FIRE FIGHTING AND MAINTENANCE 57

11.1 Introduction
11.2 Role of Station and Fire Fighting Personnel
11.2.1. Actions in Case of a Fire
11.2.2. Fire Fighting
11.2.3. Examples of Station Emergency Instructions

iii
CONTENTS (continued) PAGES

11.3 Example of Maintenance Programme (Sandy Pond)

12. ACTIONS AFTER A FIRE IS EXTINGHUISHED 62

12.1 Introduction
12.2 Inspection
12.3 Methods to Evaluate the Level of Contamination
12.4 Cleaning Methods
12.5 Testing

13. GUIDANCE FOR PURCHASER SPECIFICATIONS 66

13.1 Introduction
13.2 Purchaser Specification
13.2.1. General
13.2.2. Thyristor Valves
13.2.3. Valve Hall Bushings
13.2.4. Other Valve Hall Equipment
13.2.5. Valve Hall Construction
13.2.6. Fire Detection Systems
13.2.7. Fire Suppression Systems
13.2.8. Smoke Management System
13.2.9. Fire Alarm and Control Systems
13.2.10. Monitoring of Valve Components and
Valve Hall Equipment

14. CONCLUSIONS 74

REFERENCES 76

APPENDIX 1 - Valve Hall Fire Hazards and Survey

of Fire Incidents 77

APPENDIX 2 - Fire Protection Standards and Codes 95

APPENDIX 3 - Detection of an Overheating Resistor 99

in Sandy Pond Pole 2 Convertor
Station

iv
1. INTRODUCTION

It is a feature of complex, technically advanced equipment, such as a modern

thyristor valve, that random component failures will occur. In a carefully designed
apparatus, over its life, most of the failure incidents will be minor (i.e. in terms of
extent of damage and damage cost) and can be allowed for in the design. Large
impact failures with extensive damage and extremely high damage cost will be rare.
Most of the large impact fires of the past started as a minor incident and for various
reasons developed into a major incident.

The recent experience in HVDC systems has clearly high-lighted valve and valve
hall fires as major incidents, while the occurrence of three catastrophic fires in five
years shows that this type of fault is not as rare as the industry expects and
demands. Clearly a review of the approach to fire hazards in HVDC valves and valve
halls was required.

From a survey of thyristor valve and valve hall fire incidents conducted by the Task
Force in 1993, together with other reports made to the Task Force subsequent to
this, information on 29 incidents has been obtained. The relative severity of these
incidents is illustrated in Table 1.1 in terms of the duration of forced outages. More
information on these incidents is contained in Appendix 1 to this report.

Table 1.1 : Distribution of reported valve/valve hall fire incidents by duration

of forced outage.

Duration of forced outage Number of

incidents*
< 24 hours 10
1 -7 days 8
1 -4 weeks 2
1 -6 months 6
6 -12 months 0
> 12 months 3

* Where the duration of forced outage was not explicitly stated, the Task Force has
made an estimate based on the extent of damage reported.

Investigations of the first two incidents with outage duration in excess of 12 months
concluded that each of them started at first as a minor event and developed into a
major incident. The third major incident which occurred after the survey was
conducted is still under investigation.

The survey shows that some of the minor events might have developed into major
incidents were it not for the timely intervention of on-site personnel who sensed
something amiss and initiated protective action in advance of early warning of
problems via conventional fire/smoke detection systems.

In all three catastrophic valve hall fire incidents the resulting fire was extraordinarily
large, fierce and very destructive. In all cases, the fire completely burnt down the
quadrivalve in which it started and caused extremely severe damage to much of the
other equipment in the valve hall. The valve hall building was damaged. The walls
and ceiling suffered damage (blistering of the ceiling and thick coating of soot on the
walls). At Rihand, the build-up of gases from the fire in the valve hall were such that
an explosion caused by them blew out the heavy steel door of the valve hall, and the
intense heat of the fire deformed some of the structural steel near the roof. The fire
produced highly corrosive black smoke which penetrated the adjacent valve hall,
connecting corridors and the control room causing extensive smoke damage to
sensitive electronic equipment in those places.

The fire damage in each case was catastrophic. The cleaning, rebuilding, re-
commissioning and restoration of the affected convertor station to full service can
1
 take a very long time. In the two earlier cases of Foz do Iguaçu and Rihand, it took
15 months and 18 months respectively. Restoration of Sylmar East is still in progress
but will not take less than 15 months.

If a major valve or valve hall fire occurs, the loss of revenue to the owner utility due
to forced outage of the facility will most likely be extremely high, and there will be a
heavy loss of capital equipment. The long duration forced outage will also impose
severe constraints on the operation of the rest of the interconnected system.

All equipment located in a valve hall has a finite failure rate and exhibits certain
failure modes which have the potential to initiate fires. Efforts should therefore be
made to minimise the probability of a fire starting and to limit the impact of a fire
should it occur. A main purpose of this report is to discuss how these objectives can
be accomplished.

The specific measures adopted to minimise the fire hazard should be chosen on a
cost-benefit basis, talking into account the impact on the reliability, availability and
maintainability of the convertor.

2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This report addresses important aspects which affect fire hazards in the valve and
valve halls of indoor, air insulated HVDC convertors.

Valve halls house the valves, wall bushings or convertor transformer bushings, valve
and group arresters, as well as in some designs smoothing reactor bushings and
other high voltage components such as high voltage capacitors or voltage dividers.
There is also considerable bus-work inside the valve hall for the interconnection of
the valves with the convertor transformers and the arresters. In many designs the
bushings are oil-filled. All these items can contribute to a fire risk. The layout, design
and construction of the convertor station building itself are also important fire
aspects.

At the heart of the convertors are the thyristor valves. The valves in a single hall will
be typically responsible for the conversion between a.c. and d.c. (or vice versa) of
between 100 MW and 1000 MW of electrical power. If a problem develops, rapid
detection of faults and de-energisation is therefore important.

Valve structures contain a considerable amount of combustible material, such as

plastics and dielectric fluids, which pose a potential fire risk if they are exposed to a
source of ignition. Also, if the materials do not exhibit self-extinguishing properties,
there is a risk of a fire spreading, even after the fault is detected and the equipment
de-energized. This can be aggravated by the natural tendency for the valves to
create a chimney effect.

It appears that during the evolution of HVDC thyristor valves, extreme care was
taken to cover all aspects of the electrical, mechanical and seismic stresses in the
design, but insufficient attention was paid to the fire aspects of a valve or valve hall.
Following the first major valve fire this aspect has received greater attention from
both manufacturers and utilities. As a result, it is expected that valves and valve
halls for all future HVDC schemes will employ improved fire retardant materials and
other features to minimise the risk of a major fire.

3. STANDARDS AND DEFINITIONS

3.1 Standards

2
 In the International Community there are numerous codes and standards that could
be applicable to the design of a valve hall depending on the location of the convertor
station. The National Fire Protection Association (USA) has published fire codes
which could be used in conjunction with the appropriate local codes, which individual
countries, states, or cities may require.

Fire codes may be classified as either vertical codes or horizontal codes. Vertical
codes are those codes that are very specific in nature and cover subjects such as fire
testing, piping, design, tanks and fire protection systems, etc. Horizontal codes are
those codes that cover a broad spectrum such as a code for a given industry or
plant. These codes would reference the vertical codes for the application of a given
subject. Valve hall codes would be considered as horizontal codes.

Appendix 2 lists documents or portions thereof which are referenced or contain

information that can be utilized in providing fire protection criteria for valve halls.

3.2 Definitions

In this section, definitions are given for the fire related terms used in this report. They
are taken from: ISO/IEC Guide 52 (ISO), National Fire Protection Association's
(NFPA) fire codes, Swedish Fire Technical Definitions (SW), and others sources (see
Appendix 2).

Alarm System. Installation for initiating an alarm (SW).

Automatic Fire Detector. A device that detects abnormally high temperature, rate of
temperature rise, visible or invisible particles, infra-red or visible radiation, or gases
produced by a fire (NFPA).

Automatic Fire Extinguishing System. Any system designed and installed to

detect a fire and subsequen-tly discharge an extinguishing agent without the
necessity of human intervention (NFPA).

Burn. To undergo combustion (ISO).

(To) Catch Fire, (To) Ignite. Ignition of an object due to an adjacent ignition source
(SW).

Char (Verb). To form carbonaceous residue during pyrolysis or incomplete

combustion (ISO).

Chimney Effect. Upward thrust of smoke and hot gases by convection currents
confined within a vertical enclosure (ISO).

Combustible. Capable of burning (ISO).

Combustion. Exothermic reaction of a combustible substance with an oxidizer,

accompanied by flames and/or glowing and/or emission of smoke (ISO).

Emergency Lighting. That section of the stand-by lighting system that must be kept
in operation whilst a building is occupied and which is primarily used to indicate
emergency exits.

Escape Route. A fire resistant passageway used as an emergency escape route in a

building or a section of a building (SW).

Exit. That portion of a means of egress that is separated from all other spaces of the
building or structure by construction or equipment as required in 5-1.3.1 of NFPA 101
to provide a protected way to travel to the exit discharge. Exits include exterior exit
doors, exit passageways, horizontal exits, and separated exit stairs or ramps (NFPA).

3
Explosion. The abrupt oxidation or decomposition reaction producing an increase in
temperature or in pressure or in both simultaneously (ISO).

Extinguishing Medium - Agent. Solid, liquid or gaseous substance especially

suited to the extinction of fires (SW).

Fire. A process of combustion characterized by the emission of heat accompanied

by smoke and/or flame (ISO).

Fire Alarm, Alarm. Alarm signal for alerting the fire service or people endangered by
fire (SW).

Fire Alarm Box, Call Box, Pull Station. Part of a fire alarm system from which a
fire call is made, either by hand or automatically (SW).

Fire Alarm System. Installation for the giving, transmission and reception of a fire
warning (SW).

Fire Attack. Carrying out measures to extinguish a fire (SW).

Fire Barrier. A separating element which provides, for a stated period of time,
simultaneous integrity and thermal insulation under specified test conditions.

Fire Call. Report of the discovery of a fire to the compentent place (SW).

Fire Cause. Process from which a fire results (SW).

Fire Compartment. An enclosed space in a building that is separated from all other
parts of the building by enclosing construction having a specified period of fire
resistance, within which a fire can be contained (or from which a fire can be
excluded) without spreading to (or from) another part of the building (ISO).

Fire Control System. A system which provides integrated control of fire detection,
fire alarm, fire suppression, smoke management and other services as part of a total
fire protection scheme.

Fire Damper, Smoke Damper. A mechanical plate or shutter which is closed to

restrict the passage of fire/smoke in a flue or duct.

Fire Department Connection. A connection through which the fire department can
pump supplemental water into the sprinkler system, standpipe, or other system
furnishing water for fire extinguishment to supplement existing water supplies
(NFPA).

Fire Door. Door of at least 30 minutes fire resistance which is prescribed for fire
safety reasons and which has to be kept closed in accordance with the authorities
instructions (SW).

Fire Hazard. The potential for loss of life (or injury) and/or damage to property by fire
(ISO).

Fire Load. The sum of the calorific energies which could be released by the
complete combustion of all combustible materials in a space, including the facings of
the walls, partitions, floors and ceiling (ISO).

Fire Load Density. The fire load per unit area (ISO).

Fire Prevention. Total of measures for the prevention of the outbreak and spreading
of fires (SW).

4
Fire Resistance. The ability of an element of building construction, component or
structure, to fulfil for a stated period of time the required stability, integrity, thermal
insulation and/or other expected duty, specified in a standard fire resistance test
(ISO/TC21).

Fire Retardant (noun). A substance added, or a treatment applied to, a material in

order to suppress, significantly reduce or delay the combustion of the material (ISO).

Fire Risk. The probability of a fire causing a loss of life (or injury) and/or damage to
property (ISO).

Fire Stopping. The use of a suitable fire-rated filler material, applied retrospectively
to seal joints, cracks and other openings in a fire wall or compartment.

Fire Suppression System. Any system provided for the extinguishing of a fire.

Fire Wall. Partition wall of specified fire resistance rating.

Fire-fighting. All measures involved in the combat against fire (SW).

Flame. Zone of combustion in the gaseous phase from which light is emitted (ISO).

Flame-Retardant. A substance added, or a treatment applied to a material in order

to suppress, significantly reduce or delay the propagation of flame (ISO).

Flame Spread Rating. Flame spread rating means an index or classification

indicating the extent of the spread-of-flame on the surface of a material or an
assembly of a material as determined in a standard fire test.

Flammable. Capable of burning with a flame under specified test conditions (ISO).

Flash Point. The minimum temperature at which, under specified test conditions, a
substance emits sufficient flammable gas to ignite momentarily on application of an
ignition source (ISO).

Foam. Emulsive extinguishing agent, consisting of water, bubbles of gas or air, and
a foam stabilizer (foam compound which is used to extinguish burning liquids) (SW).

Fuel. Burning material (SW).

Heat of Combustion. The total calorific energy per unit mass which could be
released by the complete combustion of a material (ISO).

Heat Release Rate. The calorific energy released per unit of time by a material
during combustion of a material (ISO).

Heat Transfer. General term for the various forms of the transfer of heat energy
(SW).

Ignite. To initiate combustion (ISO).

Ignition. Initiation of combustion (ISO).

Ignitability (adj. ignitable). The measure of the ease with which a specimen can be
ignited due to the influence of an external heat source, under specified test
conditions (ISO).

Ignition Source. An applied source of heat which is used to ignite combustible

materials or products (ISO).

Ignition Temperature. The minimum temperature of a material at which sustained

combustion can be initiated under specific test conditions (ISO).

5
Incipient Fire. Initial fire.

Initial Fire. Fire in its earliest stage (SW).

Means of Egress. A means of egress is a continuous and unobstructed way of exit

travel from any point in a building or structure to a public way and consists of three
separate and distinct parts: (a) the exit access, (b) the exit and (c) the exit discharge.
A means of egress comprises the vertical and horizontal travel and shall include
intervening room spaces, doorways, hallways, corridors, passageways, balconies,
ramps, stairs, enclosures, lobbies, escalators, horizontal exits, courts, and yards
(NFPA).

Non-Combustible. Not capable of undergoing combustion under specified test

conditions (ISO).

Non-Flammable. Not capable of burning with a flame under specified test conditions
(ISO).

Occupancy. The purpose for which a building or portion thereof is used or intented
to be used (NFPA).

Overheating. Excessive rise in temperature of a material or body (SW).

Portable Fire Extinguisher. A portable device containing an extinguishing agent

that can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing
a fire (NFPA).

Pyrolysis. Irreversible chemical decomposition of a material due to an increase in

temperature without oxidation (ISO).

Quick response sprinkler. A type of sprinkler that is both a fast response and a
spray sprinkler (NFPA).

Rate of Spread of Flame. For a gas: The rate of spread of the flame front, in the
gas. For a solid: The rate of spread of the flame on the surface of a solid (SW).

Reaction to Fire. The response of a material under specified test conditions in

contributing to a fire to which it is exposed (ISO).

Self-extinguishing. The characteristic of a material ceasing to burn, under specified

test conditions, after the igniting source has been removed.

NB. Although in common usage (including this report), this term is depricated in
international standards because it may convey a false sense of security and lead to
misunderstanding. The properties of materials after removal of an ignition source are
better described by the afterflame time, the afterglow time, the extent of combustion
and the damaged area (length) under specified test conditions (compiled from
various sources).

Smoke. A visible suspension of solid and/or liquid particles ingases resulting from
combustion or pyrolysis (ISO).

Smoke Detector. A fire detector which initiates an alarm on the presence of a

certain quantity of smoke.

Smoke Development Rating. Smoke development rating means an index or

classification indicating the smoke development characteristics of a material or an
assembly of a material as determined in a standard fire test.

Smoke Management System. Any system designed and installed to control the
accumulation and spread of smoke in a building.

6
 Smoke Obscuration. The reduction in luminous intensity due to passage through
smoke (ISO).

Smoke Vent. A smoke clearance aperture in the ceiling of a room (in a theatre or
similar building) fitted with a trap which will open and shut automatically; these traps
should also permit manual operation (SW).

Soot. Finely divided particles, mainly carbon, produced and/or deposited during the
incomplete combustion of organic materials (ISO).

Water Spray Deluge System. A special fixed pipe system connected to a reliable
source of fire protection water supply and equipped with water spray nozzles for
specific water discharge and distribution over the surface or area to be protected.
The piping system is connected to the water supply through an automatically or
manually actuated valve that initiates the flow of water. An automatic valve is
actuated by operation of automatic detection equipment installed in the same areas
as the water spray nozzles. (in special cases the automatic detection equipment may
also be located in another area) (SW).

4. FIRE HAZARDS IN VALVES AND VALVE HALLS

4.1 Introduction

Thyristor valve halls house the thyristor valves, wall bushings or convertor
transformer bushings, valve and group arresters as well as in some designs other
high voltage components such as high voltage capacitors or voltage dividers.

The valves are subjected to various mechanical and electrical stresses during
operation. They are designed and constructed from many series and parallel
connected components such as thyristors, capacitors, resistors and saturable
reactors.

To minimize the space requirement in the valve hall, the valves are often vertically
stacked to take advantage of the graded insulation level. The necessary creepage
and electrical clearances between and within the valves are achieved by the use of
porcelain insulators and/or composite insulators. Extensive use of composite
materials is made in the structural components of the valves.

Each valve structure contains a quantity of combustible material, such as plastics,

composites and dielectric fluid, which pose a potential fire risk if they are exposed to
a source of ignition. If non-self extinguishing materials are used and these are
exposed to a source of ignition, then there is a risk that a fire may spread even after
the fire is detected and the equipment de-energised. This can be aggravated by the
natural tendency for a valve stack to create a chimney effect.

The possible causes of fire in a valve hall are discussed in detail in the following
sections.

4.2 Possible causes

4.2.1 Valve insulation failure

Breakdown of electrical insulation within or between parts of the valve which are
common to more than one thyristor level can lead to arcing which could ignite
flammable materials.

7
 Insulation failure could be internal, e.g. due to partial discharges in a dielectric
material, or external due to corona or contamination of insulating surfaces (e.g. as a
result of a coolant leak). Smoke or other ionised by-products arising from e.g. an
overheated electrical component can reduce the withstand of the air insulation within
the valve.

The consequences of insulation failure will depend very much on the location,
materials and energy associated with the event. It should be noted that it is not
necessary for total breakdown of an insulation system to occur before hazardous
conditions can arise. High surface leakage currents, e.g. on a contaminated
insulating surface can, depending on the materials, present a direct risk of
combustion.

4.2.2 Loose connections or high resistance joints in the power circuit

An overheated connection or series arc can arise from improper connection of bus
bars used for carrying the load current. These could be connections between
different sections of the valve, with the series reactor, with the thyristors or any other
connector which forms the path of the load current. Any loose connection or high
resistance joint will overheat. In the case of an open circuited connection, a series
arc will develop. In either case the heat generated will depend on the level of the
current and may cause damage to adjacent components, especially insulating
material. If the temperatures reached are high enough then it may lead to a fire.

4.2.3 Valve component failures

The various electrical components used in the valve are thyristors, capacitors,
reactors, resistors and electronic circuit boards. The failure modes of the above
components differ from each other and are discussed separately.

Thyristors : When overstressed, thyristors fail to an approximate short circuit.

Provided that they remain properly clamped and cooled, short circuited thyristors can
safely conduct normal load current and overcurrents. By providing series redundant
levels, a valve can be kept in service for long periods in the presence of a small
number of short circuited thyristors.

The thyristors themselves are non-flammable and, because failure relieves other
components from significant voltage stress, it is often arranged that other component
faults lead directly or indirectly to thyristor short circuit, thereby avoiding a hazardous
condition elsewhere.

Capacitors : To obtain long life and high reliability at the operating voltage of one
thyristor level, capacitors which experience this voltage should employ an
impregnated dielectric construction.

Non-flammable impregnating fluids based on polychlorinated Bi-phenyls (PCB) exist,

but are prohibited on environmental grounds. Therefore, many capacitors used
contain (usually small) quantities of an impregnating fluid which, if exposed to air and
ignited, will burn. The failure modes of these capacitors are therefore of particular
interest.

In all cases, rupture of the capacitor can is an essential pre-requisite for exposing the
dielectric material and impregnating fluid to air. This could arise from mechanical
damage caused by abuse or resulting from a production defect, or from an electrical
fault inside the capacitor. Internal faults e.g. short circuit of one or more capacitor
elements, sparking at a broken internal connection etc. can cause decomposition of
the dielectric material and/or of the impregnating fluid, leading to a build-up of
pressure inside the capacitor. Unless the process can be arrested (e.g. the capacitor
is rendered open circuit by operation of an over- pressure protection device) or the
pressure is relieved in a controlled and safe manner, then the over-pressure may

8
 lead to rupture of the can. Electrical arcing/overheating of the now disrupted
capacitor provides a likely source of ignition.

Reactors : The saturable reactors within a valve may be liquid cooled. A mode of
failure of valve reactors is overheating due to total or partial blockage of the cooling
pipes within the reactors. If such a condition goes undetected, failure of the reactor is
possible and this may cause a fire within the valve.

Other modes of failure could be turn-to-turn or turn-to-core insulation failure or e.g.

failure of the banding straps used to secure the reactor cores.

The consequences of such failures will depend on the particular valve design.

Resistors : The resistors used in damping circuits are generally wire wound. The
failure of resistors could be due to overheating of the element caused by inadequate
cooling or corrosion of resistor elements which are in direct contact with the coolant.
This may result in open circuit, insulation or housing failure. If the insulation provided
is flammable, then it may ignite.

Another scenario would be that the arcing inside the resistor persists and the resistor
may fail explosively, damaging other adjacent components. This can lead to arcing
and flashover.

Electronic circuits: The electronic circuits for the control, protection and monitoring
of the thyristors are normally of low power. The failure of individual components may
however pose a fire hazard. Two situations could be:

a) The thyristor firing electronics provides gate trigger pulses to more than one
series-connected thyristor via insulated output pulse transformers. Failure of
the insulation of a pulse transformer could result in load current flowing in
low current wiring.

b) The electronic circuits require a source of power which, for HVDC valves, is
normally extracted from one of the voltage grading networks at the
respective thyristor level. The power supply must provide sufficient energy to
meet performance requirements under the worst operating conditions,
therefore, under other conditions, more energy than is needed is available.
The technique adopted to control this surplus energy could influence the
consequences of a component failure in this part of the circuit.

Light Guides : Light guides, either individually or in bundles are not considered to
involve a risk of fire ignition.

Certain types of light guide jacket material may sustain combustion and transfer fire
within the valve structure. Accordingly, unless it is known that the jacket material will
not sustain combustion, it is suggested that light guide bundles be shielded from
flame or enclosed in protective channels with appropriate fire stopping materials.

4.2.4 Thyristor level connections

The thyristors are electrically connected to damping circuits, grading resistors and
other circuitry. This requires auxiliary wiring of low current carrying capacity.

The thyristor control and protection circuitry, including network grading and detection
components, involves a large number of low current connections. If a connection
inadvertently becomes open-circuited, arcing can result which could ignite flammable
material.

4.2.5 Coolant system problems

Water based systems:

9
 In liquid cooled valves the heat is removed from the thyristors, resistors and reactors
by deionized water or a mixture of deionized water and glycol. The flow, temperature
and conductivity of the coolant delivered to the valve are continously monitored
externally to the valve. Internally to the valve, the cooling water and plastic pipes are
required to withstand voltage stresses.

The failure modes of components of the valve cooling circuit are corrosion, leakage
and clogging. Failures can be caused by electrical, chemical or mechanical
phenomena either acting alone or in combination.

Unless the materials in contact with the coolant are carefully selected and applied,
electro-chemical processes within the cooling circuit may cause corrosion of metallic
couplings and other components of the coolant system. In the presence of leakage
currents there is the possibility of erosion and deposition of material in some parts of
cooling water circuit. This process, if continued for a period of time, can result in
leaking or clogging at some critical parts of the water circuit.

The presence of foreign material inside the cooling circuit can also cause clogging if
proper care is not taken.

When series connection of cooling water pipes is used, all components in the series
path (perhaps from more than one thyristor level) can be damaged due to over-
heating as a consequence of restriction of cooling water flow.

If cooling water flow is blocked to the valve reactor, overheating may damage the
reactor insulation leading to an internal fault or to releasing debris on to other
electrically live parts causing smoke or ionized air which may develop into a partial
flashover. If the temperature of the reactor is increased further, ignition of the reactor
insulation materials may occur.

Cooling water leaks can occur at any of the joints due to the failure of gaskets or
`O`rings used in the joints. The cracking of plastic pipes caused by premature aging
could also lead to leakage. In addition, mechanical vibrations e.g from reactors may
cause loosening of joints or cracking of pipes which could lead to a leak.

Generally, small leaks will not cause any harm to the valve, because cooling water is
of high resistivity. However, if the insulating surfaces of the valve are polluted, the
leakage of water can give rise to tracking and eventually flashover.

Air Based Systems:

In air-cooled valves the heat is removed from the thyristors, resistors and reactors by
the forced circulation of air. The flow, temperature and humidity of the cooling air is
monitored externally to the valve.

Corrosion is not known to be a problem in air cooled valves, nor is leakage of cooling
air from the intended path unless this becomes so extreme so as to deprive some
critical heat producing components of adequate cooling. Blockage of coolant
pathways due to the accumulation of dust or other debris circulating in the air can
also lead to overheating of some components with a consequent risk of fire.

Due to the forced air cooling, a fire, once started, can quickly become very intense
and spread rapidly.

4.2.6 Contamination and condensation

The equipment inside the valve hall is subjected to high voltage which contains a
large d.c. component. This creates an electric field which has a tendency to attract
airborne particles which are naturally present in the valve hall air. As a result, the
equipment surfaces may become covered with deposits of foreign material. Build-up
of contaminants increases the risk of flashover.

10
 The electrical creepage distances and electrical clearances inside the valve are
based on a reasonably clean environment.

The size and density of dust particles
efficiency of the ventilation and filtering
(walls, roof, floor, structure, etc.) is not
coating, it can lead to generation of dust
various surfaces of the valve.
inside the valve hall depends upon the
system. Also, if the inside of the building
properly treated with a maintenance-free
which may eventually be deposited on the

Condensation inside the valve hall is possible on any cooled surfaces such as water
pipes and connections if their temperature is allowed to fall below the dew point in
the valve hall. The contaminants deposited on valve hall equipment surfaces
together with high humidity conditions or water leaks further increase the risk of a
major flashover.

For example, contaminants collected by eletrostatic effects in the presence of

moisture or even high humidity may form conducting electrolytes on the surfaces. In
the presence of electrical stress, small leakage currents may form and create
tracking paths. In time, these currents can increase and may damage the insulation,
ionize the surrounding air and could precipitate a high current flashover.

Electrostatically attracted contaminants on corona rings in high potential gaps may

create corona which could also cause flashover.

Flashover arising from any of the above phenomena may create a fire as a function
of the materials involved in or adjacent to the event.

4.2.7 Failure of valve hall bushings

Failure of bushings could be due to external flashover or internal discharges. An

external flashover may puncture the porcelain and expose the flammable materials
(paper/oil). For the case where transformer bushings or oil insulated smoothing
reactor bushings project into the valve hall, the possibility exists for a large quantity
of oil to enter the valve hall.

A severe internal fault in an oil-filled porcelain bushing may cause an explosion,

resulting in the complete destruction of the bushing and consequential damage to
other equipment.

4.2.8 Failure of surge arresters

Because of the absence of flammable material inside arresters their failure will not
directly lead to a fire. Consequences of mechanical failure should be considered.

4.2.9 False operation of deluge system

If a deluge system is used in the valve hall then, in the event of operation, the whole
protected area will be flooded with water. False operation of the water deluge system
could result in a flashover in the valve hall. Even if water of high resistive quality is
used the surfaces already contaminated with pollutants can experience a flashover.

4.2.10 Other valve hall equipment

Other valve hall equipment such as voltage dividers, current transformers or other oil
insulated equipment may cause fire if they fail.

4.2.11 Work in and around valve hall

11
 Due to the large number of electrical and mechanical connections in a valve there is
potential for human error during either commissioning or maintenance. If connections
are left loose or foreign objects left behind it could lead to a fault that may cause a
fire.

4.3 Assessment of Possible Consequences

For a fire to occur, three components must be present: heat (i.e a source of ignition),
a supply of oxygen and a quantity of combustible material.

In the simplest analysis, the severity of a worst case fire can be assessed from the
"fire load"; which corresponds to the product of the mass of all combustible materials
multiplied by their heats of combustion. A derivative, "fire load density", gives the fire
load per unit area. Fire load and fire load density are sometimes used as a basis for
determining building structural components and water deluge system requirements.

The concept of fire load is however, a conservative way of assessing the worst
conceivable fire since it presumes total consumption of all combustible materials
within a defined area. No account is taken of the availability of the various materials
for combustion, their ignitability or the rate at which they may burn. Fire retarding or
self-extinguishing characteristics, if provided, are ignored. As a result, the concept of
fire load is of limited usefulness in determining the likely consequences of a real fire.

Although a thyristor valve hall contains an identifiable quantity of combustible

material, the assessment of the consequences arising from any of the possible
causes of fire identified in Section 4.2 and the comparison of one design with
another, cannot be dependably made on the basis of the fire load that this quantity of
material represents. For example, the introduction of barriers of fire retardant
material in valves will actually increase the valve hall fire load, while it should
decrease the risk for a fire to propagate.The assessment of possible consequences
must therfore consider the totality of measures taken to limit the effects of any fire
incident.

It is not foreseen that thyristor valves and other valve hall equipment will ever be
constructed entirely from non-combustible materials. Therefore, since combustible
materials will be employed, it should be determined what the likely consequences of
any of the possible causes, given in Section 4.2, might be. Consideration should be
given to:

a) The probability of the initiating event occuring;

b) The quantity of combustible material directly involved in any initiating

incident;

c) The flammability characteristics of the materials involved;

d) The method of detecting the presence of a fire and the action taken thereon;

e) The protection measures incorporated in the design to contain and/or limit

the spread of any resulting fire to adjacent materials or equipment;

f) The risk of the protection measures failing;

g) The possible impact of elevated temperature arising from any fire incident on
the mechanical integrity of the valve hall equipment or the valve hall
building;

h) The likely degree and impact of cross-contamination of other equipment by

combustion products;

i) The likely need for and consequences arising from the use of a fire
extinguishing agent to put out a fire.

12
 As can be seen, many complex issues are involved. These are discussed in the
following Sections of the report.

5. VALVE HALL LAYOUT AND ACCESS

5.1 Physical Arrangements

5.1.1 Introduction

The physical arrangement of HVDC valve halls and service facilities is based on a
number of factors (i.e. valve type, building costs, seismic conditions, etc.) which may
not relate to fire protection and safety. If an HVDC facility layout was reviewed only
from the fire protection perspective, the valve hall would be physically separated
from other service facilities such as: control rooms, auxiliary power rooms, convertor
transformers, oil-filled smoothing reactors and maintenance areas. While the
physical separation of valve halls and service facilities may be desirable from the fire
protection perspective, it may create operational and economic concerns that
override the fire protection considerations. If the HVDC valve hall and service
facilities must be constructed within a single facility, fire compartments able to
confine a fire to its area of origin, should be considered.

Walls in fire compartments only resist the spread of fire if their constructional
integrity is not compromised by unprotected openings, such as doors, ducts, grilles,
viewing windows and cable penetrations. Care must be taken in sealing these
openings to ensure the integrity of the fire walls. Protection of these openings can be
in the form of fire doors, fire and smoke dampers, fire-rated window assemblies and
fire stopped cable penetrations.

5.1.2 Present Practices

In the majority of facilities, the valve halls and service spaces are located in a single
building for logistic and operational reasons. Some of the newer types of valves are
located in separate buildings. Where the valve halls and service spaces are in the
same building, there has not been a consistent practice of using fire walls to separate
the valve halls from the main building. However, there is a growing realization that
the valve hall layout must also be looked at from a fire separation perspective.

5.1.3 Specific Provisions

a) Facilities in Physically Separate Buildings

In terms of physical separation, there are four major areas of an HVDC station
that should be considered. The valve halls, service and maintenance areas,
control/relay and auxiliary power rooms, and adjacent oil-filled equipment areas.

The installation of oil-filled electrical apparatus, such as convertor transformers,

can also be looked at from the physical separation perspective. The basic
guidelines of NFPA # 850 and IEEE 979 include a number of criteria for the
spacing of oil-filled equipment away from adjacent buildings.

The basic guidelines of NFPA 850 and IEEE 979 is that oil-filled equipment
with:

- greater than 20,000 litres of oil should be at least 16 m from a building;

- between 2,000 to 20,000 litres of oil should be at least 8 m from a building;
- less than 2,000 litres of oil should be reviewed on an individual basis.

13
 If structures of combustible construction are used greater distances based on a
special engineering analysis are required.

b) Facilities Separated by Fire Walls or Fire Barriers

When equipment is housed in a common building, the valve halls, service and
shop areas, control/relay room and auxiliary power facilities should be separated
from each other by fire walls of a suitable rating (eg. two hours). Openings in fire
walls should have the same rating as the wall. This can be accomplished by
using specially rated glass, automatic drop down shutter doors, special limited
size wired glass assemblies, limited size tempered glass windows with quick
response water spray heads; ducts with rated smoke and fire dampers; fire
stopped cable penetration assemblies of special cementitious mortars and
silicone based foams, putties and mastics; or fire rated doors with latching
hardware and automatic closers, etc.

If, for operational reasons, fire doors must be left open for work functions,
magnetic door holders, designed to close the doors on a signal from the fire
alarm system should be considered. This fire door provision generally precludes
the use of wooden wedges that often prevent fire doors from closing in fire
situations.

Where oil-filled electrical apparatus must be installed closer to the main building
than the physical separation distances noted above, fire barriers, fire walls or
deluge systems should be installed.

Fire barriers are non-combustible fire-rated or unrated free standing walls that
act as a thermal shield between equipment and buildings during a fire. For
transformers, fire barriers should extend a minimum of 1 m above the top of the
transformer conservator, and at least 1 m horizontally beyond the transformer
tank and radiators.

Fire walls are fire resistant non-combustible wall sections incorporated into the
exterior walls. Spacing, vertical and horizontal, and Fire Wall recommendations
are contained in NFPA 850 and IEEE 979.

5.2 HVDC Valve Hall Construction

5.2.1 Introduction

The basic valve hall structure shields the equipment from the weather, and provides
a controlled environment for the operation of the thyristor valves. The normal
components of valve hall construction would be the floor, walls, roof and interior
finishes. From the fire perspective, the valve hall enclosure will contain the heat and
toxic corrosive smoke which will subsequently affect the equipment.

In order to avoid the normal fire related problems in a building, the following
concepts should be considered:

a) The use of non-combustible construction and finish wherever possible. Where it

is not possible, control measures should be incorporated.

b) The use of fire resistant construction materials for the valve hall to increase
endurance against fire exposure and possible subsequent collapse. Not only
should non-combustible material be looked at, but also the fire resistance
characteristics of the materials of construction are important. For example, while
steel construction is non-combustible, it has a very low fire resistance as
compared to reinforced concrete construction.

14
 c) The incorporation of design measures in the construction of the building to
lessen other fire and operational problems such as roof leaks, oil spill
containment and water drainage.

5.2.2 Valve Hall Construction

The following is a review of hazards, practices and recommendations for the

construction of roofs, walls, floors and finishes in an HVDC valve hall.

a) Floors

The floors of an HVDC valve hall should be of non-combustible construction

and provide a clean, stable surface on which to carry out maintenance on the
valve and valve hall equipment. The present practice is to provide concrete
floors. Because there is always a potential for water leakage in a valve hall,
floors should be sloped away from the valves and other critical pieces of
equipment at a minimum of one percent grade. Drainage design should include
containment of water discharged by sprinkler or manual fire fighting.

One hazard, commonly found within the valve halls, is through-the-wall type oil-
filled bushings. The volume of combustible insulating oil in these bushings is
substantial. The concern is that when bushings fail, the oil within the bushing will
ignite and spill to the floor. This pool of burning insulating oil with its high heat
release rates can cause the valve structure to be exposed to an intense fire that
could ignite or destroy components of the valve. A possible solution is to
provide a round rock gravel filled basin under the bushings. The gravel basin
would then form a non-absorbing surface for any oil spilling into the area and
eliminate any oil spill fire and its subsequent exposure to the valves. Another
solution would be to provide oil drainage from the bushing area to an outside oil
containment area.

b) Walls

The walls of an HVDC building not only function as an enclosure, but also
generally support the roof and, in some cases, the actual valve structure. If the
buildings are constructed from materials such as steel, their resistance in a fire
is significantly lower than those constructed of reinforced concrete. At
approximately 370°C, structural steel loses its strength and carrying capacity. As
the fire temperature increases, the structure can deflect and eventually collapse.
A failure of any part of the wall structure supporting the roof can have a
significant impact on the physical damage and plant restoration.

The present practice is a mix of the use of exposed steel construction, protected
(fire resistant) steel construction, and reinforced concrete construction.

An additional factor is that the wall construction may not form an appropriate
seal against the passage of smoke and fire from other higher risk areas of the
plant. There are potentially a number of openings in a wall that can create
breaks in the integrity and performance of the wall.

Walls should be non-combustible, fire resistant, and form a fire separation from
other areas of the building. The rating of the walls depends on the configuration
and material used in the structure, and the fire load of the valve and other
equipment within the valve hall. Where steel construction is used for the wall or
roof support members, special care should be taken to ensure that these
exposed surfaces are protected with approved spray-on cementitious coatings,
intumescent paint, fire-rated enclosures (made of gypsum board, etc.), or
specially designed water spray systems.

c) Roofs

15
 The construction of valve hall roof components is a fire concern, since the roof
structure may be exposed to hot gases and flame during a fire. This exposure
could lead to the collapse of the roof structure and subsequent major damage to
the valve structure. The use of exposed steel and combustible materials for a
roof should be avoided.

It is common practice to use insulated metal deck roof construction, which

consists of open web steel joists supporting a metal deck assembly with varying
depths of foam-plastic insulation and roofing material forming the roof
assembly. This assembly is basically a mix of combustible and non-combustible
materials. The common use of polyurethane and polystyrene foam for insulation
purposes in roof construction creates a fire risk. A fire exposing the underside of
the metal deck could melt and vapourize the foam roofing material, resulting in
highly flammable gases being driven down into the fire space below the roof.
These gases could cause the fire to intensify and could result in a roof collapse.

The present practices for roof construction vary from the use of totally non-
combustible fire-resistant roof structures to the use of insulated roof decking.
The construction of the roof is particularly critical in those applications where the
roof structure is actually the supporting assembly for the valve. The type of roof
construction should be based on an analysis of the arrangement and
configuration of the valve, and the construction and flammability of the valve
structure and its components. The effect of fire protection measures and smoke
management system to be incorporated in the valve hall should also be
considered. Ventilation as part of a smoke management system can
significantly reduce the temperature in the valve hall near the roof during a fire;
see Section 9.

The preferred method of roof construction would be of the non-combustible type

using reinforced concrete with suitable waterproof membranes to prevent the
infiltration of water. Where roof construction incorporates exposed steel support
members, consideration should be given to providing a fire resistant rating as
discussed in 5.2.2 (b).

If combustible roof insulation is used, the roof should be constructed to provide

a fire resistance rating and should include a special vapour membrane to
prevent foam plastic gases and liquids from entering the valve hall space during
a fire. This can be accomplished by applying multiple layers of fire rated
material above the steel deck with properly rated barriers followed by using
foamed plastic with built-up roofing above it.

Membranes on the top of the roof are vulnerable to punctures that permit water
leakage into valve halls and possibly onto the electrical equipment.
Consideration should be given to using a roof in which the foamed plastic
insulation and tar and gravel built-up roofing assembly rest on top of the roof
membrane.

d) Finishes

The exposed finishes in HVDC valve halls are important. The concern is that
the interior finishes in a fire may contribute fuel, or develop smoke and toxic
gases. Interior finishes are assigned a flame spread rating and smoke
development rating by various codes for specific materials. A large number of
major fires have been investigated and a main contribution to the spread of the
fires was found to be the interior finishes. However, this has not been the case
with fires in HVDC valve halls.

The present practice for interior finishes is generally good, since the interior
finishes are mainly of non-combustible construction (steel).

Materials with low flame spread and smoke development ratings should be used
for valve hall interior finishes.

16
5.3 Means of Egress

5.3.1 Introduction

One of the most critical life safety facilities in buildings is the means of egress. Once
the occurrence of a fire has been signalled by the fire alarm system, these facilities
allow the occupants to evacuate the building while being protected against exposure
to smoke and fire. The exit facilities also allow the fire fighting personnel to enter and
gain access to the floor areas of the building without being exposed to smoke and
fire until they reach the fire.

The goals of these exit facilities are:

a) To provide more than one exit from any area of a building, in case one exit is
blocked.

b) To ensure that the exits are protected against fire, smoke and structural collapse
to permit exiting and fire fighting.

c) To provide an appropriate degree of life safety considering the size, shape, use,
and occupancy of the building.

d) To ensure that the exits are clear, unobstructed, and unlocked in the egress
direction.

e) To ensure that the exits and exit access routes are clearly marked so that there
is no confusion in reaching and exiting.

f) To provide adequate lighting of the exit access and exits during emergencies
including power outages.

5.3.2 Valve Hall Means of Egress

An HVDC valve hall creates means of egress related concerns that should be
addressed. The large size of the valve halls creates a condition where long travel
distances can be encountered. This is balanced against the low occupant load of
these halls. The only expected time in which most valve halls will be occupied would
be during maintenance and, for some designs, short operational inspections.
Following are some of the basic criteria for valve halls.

. There should be a minimum of two separate exit doors from each valve hall. These
doors should be indicated by illuminated exit signs and should be located at
opposite ends of the room to provide the greatest reduction in travel distance, and
to reduce the possibility of both exits being blocked by smoke or fumes.

. Exit doors should swing in the direction of the path of travel, to aid in the rapid
evacuation from the room.

. The exit portion of the means of egress from the valve hall can include exit
corridors or doors directly to the exterior or, in special conditions, can involve
horizontal exits whereby the occupants leave the valve hall and enter into a
subsidiary space such as a maintenance area before leaving the building. If a
horizontal exit is used, the exit within the valve hall enclosure should be fire rated.

. Egress, possibly more then one from areas like valve electronic rooms in
basements or attics should be considered.

. The overall exit distance from any point in the valve hall to the nearest exit door
should be in accordance with local codes.

17
 . The exit width and fire rating should be in accordance with local codes.

5.3.3 Present Practices

The present means of egress provisions in valve halls vary considerably. Some
valve halls have only a single exit door which is meant for inspection and
maintenance access instead of a means of egress. Also, generally designated exits
(i.e. corridors) have not been provided for.

6. SUPERVISION OF VALVE COMPONENTS AND OTHER VALVE HALL

EQUIPMENT

6.1 Introduction

The monitoring or the supervision of the valve hall equipment is intended to detect
failures, some of which may lead to major damage. Two types of monitoring are
available:

1. On-line monitoring
2. Off-line checks and inspection.

6.2 Supervision of Valve Components

In order to establish an appropriate monitoring practice for the valve components, a

definition of valve components must be established. The valve components typically
include:

a) The thyristors
b) The gate electronics
c) The damping circuits (capacitors and resistors)
d) The dc grading resistors
e) The saturable reactors
f) The grading capacitors (if used)
g) The light guides between the valve and the valve base electronics
h) The coolant pipes within the valve
i) The support insulators between tiers
j) Load current carrying connections
k) Any connections between the thyristor level components.

It is evident from this list that there are a large number of different component types
within the valve structure and, when it is taken into account that there may be in
excess of 1000 examples of most of the above listed items in a single valve hall, it
will be difficult to devise a common monitoring system for all these components.

6.2.1 Review of the present practice of monitoring valve components

6.2.1.1 On-line monitoring

In most thyristor valve designs the thyristors are directly monitored and alarms are
typically generated to indicate the location and the number of defective thyristors in a
single valve. In some designs, a trip command is issued when the number of failed
thyristors exceeds the number of redundant thyristor levels. Failure of other
components such as resistors or capacitors within the thyristor level is not monitored
directly. However, depending on the design, a failure of such components may lead
to other information being transmitted from the gate electronics indicating the
existence of a problem. The thyristor itself, which is being closely monitored,
presents a low risk of starting a fire (see 4.2.3). It is failure of other components that
creates the greater risk. Interconnections within a thyristor level (wiring) are not
directly monitored on line, neither are the saturable reactors and grading capacitors.

18
 Coolant leakage within the valve structure and the whole cooling system is usually
monitored. There are different methods depending on the design that are utilized to
monitor water leakage within the valve structure. In the majority of cases an alarm or
a trip is generated.

The failure of electrical insulation is not directly monitored unless it leads to a

protection operation from the convertor protection or from the thyristor monitoring. If
neither occurs it may go undetected.

The tightness of bus bar connections within the valve may be monitored through
periodic infra-red heat scans or other means. This is achievable if line-of-sight
access is available to the valve hall joints to be monitored. Air sampling systems
could also be effective in detecting over-heated joints or components.

It is important that any type of on-line monitoring should not complicate the design or
reduce reliability.

6.2.1.2 Off-line checks and inspection

The philosophy for off-line checking will depend on the manufacturer's maintenance
recommendations and the user's maintenance practices, such as the interval
between maintenance outages and the duration of the outage. The following
activities are typical examples of off-line work for thyristor valves:

1. Replacing any defective components such as thyristors or gate electronics.

2. Checking for coolant hose connection tightness and any minor coolant leaks.

3. Cleaning of insulators and possibly large coolant pipes.

4. Testing of components in individual thyristor levels using special test sets if

recommended.

5. Pressure testing of the valve cooling circuit if recommended.

6. Checking for any loose bus bar connections. These may have been identified
through previous on-line infra-red heat scanning.

7. Visual inspection of coolant pipes and connections for any discolouration or

deterioration.

6.2.2 Developments in valve monitoring

Recent developments in valve monitoring include:

1. Sensitive coolant leak detection. It is very important to minimise the size of a

coolant leak that may go undetected. Undetected coolant leaks may cause
damage within the valve depending on the design and the level of surface
contamination of the valve.

2. Off-line checking of thyristor levels to include a check for the integrity of the
wiring between components. This type of checking should minimise dependence
on the judgement of the maintenance personnel.

In recent years the technology of remote monitoring has made significant progress.
In future, it is possible that such techniques could be applied to the sensing of fire
hazards directly within a valve.

While future HVDC thyristor valves might have built-in fire detection within the valve
structure, retro fitting of existing sensors into thyristor valve structures would
introduce more risks than benefits. Existing HVDC systems are constrained to look
for other alternatives (see section 7).

19
6.3 Supervision of other valve hall equipment

The other equipment within the valve hall will, depending on the design, include wall
bushings or transformer bushings, arresters, valve capacitors and voltage dividers.

In the majority of cases, bushings, capacitors and voltage dividers are of an oil-filled
design. Arresters contain non-combustible metal-oxide ceramic blocks.

Bushings are not normally monitored on line except for the oil level within the
bushing. In some cases on-line monitoring of the bushing may be provided (e.g. via
the capacitor tap). Off-line monitoring of bushings is usually by taking oil samples for
gas-in-oil analysis and by off-line measurements of the capacitance and dissipation
factor of the bushing. The load current carrying connections to the bushing may be
monitored by infra-red scanning on load. Other oil-filled equipment housed within the
valve hall, can be monitored using the same practices.

In the case of arresters, on-line monitoring is either through surge counters or

through the monitoring of the arrester current or energy. This information can be
transmitted to earth potential via light guides. Off-line monitoring is either by
recording counter readings or periodic off-line testing. It should be noted that arrester
failures, in the majority of situations, will not lead to a valve hall fire.

6.4 Possible improvements

1. The station design should seek to minimize oil-filled equipment inside the valve
hall.

2. On-line monitoring of gas-in-oil of bushings and other oil-filled equipment could

be considered.

3. The combined use of the most up-to-date, proven technology available in the
fire detection and security surveillance industry that, together, would detect the
fire at the earliest possible stage in a reliable manner. There are several high
speed fire alarm systems with built-in electronic intelligence that have been
found to be suitable candidates (refer to section 7).

7. FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS

7.1 Introduction

As discussed in section 4, there are many potential causes of fire inside a valve hall.
Since the consequences of a major fire in a valve hall can be significant, suppression
of incipient fire is critical. For this purpose, fire detection at a very early stage is
important to alert the operating personnel and to take appropriate actions to limit the
consequences. Since the most important action is de-energisation of the equipment
to stop the electrical energy infeed, the fire detection scheme must be capable of
accurate and reliable detection of the fire to allow for prompt intervention and to
avoid false alarms.

Today, a typical HVDC valve hall is characterized by large valve hall dimensions and
huge building volume. There are complex arrangements of interconnected and over-
layered electrical equipment (thyristor valves, bushings, earth switches, arresters,
etc.) installed inside each valve hall. There can be high forced turnover rate of air
inside the building. Conventional smoke alarms or heat sensing fire alarms simply
are not up to the task of meeting the type of fire detection required. Examples cited
in Appendix 1 show that several potential fires were discovered by operating
personnel and not by the conventional sensors. This illustrates the inadequacy of the
conventional sensors. The required distance between equipment at high voltage and
sensors at earth potential increases the difficulty of achieving sensitive detection.
20
 Future HVDC valves will included improved fire resistant construction and may have
sensitive fire detection capability built into them. However, a practical approach for
existing HVDC systems is to combine the most up-to-date proven technology in the
fire detection and security surveillance industries to reliably detect a fire at the
earliest possible stage.

There are several highly sensitive fire alarm systems with built-in software-
programmable, self-diagnosing, and remotely addressable capabilities that have
been found to be suitable candidates. Several utilities either have installed or are
actively pursuing the installation of such systems.

7.2 Detection and Operating Principles of Fire Alarm Systems

Generally, the method of detection makes use of one or more of the following
principles:

. smoke: detect smoke, gases, and particulates before fire spreads;

. heat: detect overheating before ignition;
. light: detect light spectrum associated with arcs, sparks, corona and flames;
. visual: detect actual fire via surveillance camera/video system inside the valve
hall or via viewing windows.

Fire detection/alarm systems that should be considered for detecting valve hall fires
are described below; these are:

- air sampling systems;

- electric arc detector systems;
- infra-red beam smoke detectors;
- infra-red flame detectors;
- imaging video camera systems.

7.2.1 Air Sampling Systems: There are several such systems on the market. These
systems draw air samples through sampling heads continuously to detect sub-micron
particles generated during the incipient stage of a fire. To detect the presence of
such particles, these systems use either the cloud chamber method (designated
hereafter as System I) or the light scattering method (designated hereafter as
System V). Both methods appear effective in the systems evaluated by different
utilities.

System I: System I operates on the light obscuration cloud chamber method. It uses
a fan driven sampling system to draw air from the protected area. The air samples
are monitored for concentrations of sub-micron particles in a cloud chamber. Upon
entering the cloud chamber, the particles act as nuclei for water condensation in the
chamber. As the water condenses, the particles grow to an optically measurable size
to form a visible cloud which can be detected by a photoelectric detector.

System I can detect particles with sizes from 0.002 to 10 microns. The signal from
the photoelectric detector is digitized and processed, and particle concentration is
calculated. This calculation of concentration minimizes false alarms because
ambient dust concentration generally does not vary very much and can be preset as
the threshold. The calculated concentration is compared with this preset value and
predetermined differences would be used to trigger fire alarms. Different fire alarm
levels are generated depending on the density of the cloud. Again, to minimize false
alarms, the detected alarm level must exist in the cloud chamber for typically 10
seconds before the alarm relay is actuated. Typical system capabilities at present are
as follows:

. Single and multiple zone coverage is available. Maximum zone size is about
800 square meters with 10 sampling heads per zone.

21
 . Sampling system piping can be metallic or non-metallic 6 mm to 19 mm
diameter and can be up to 300 linear meters per zone.

System V: System V operates on the light scattering method. It uses an air pump
(aspirator) driven air sampling system to draw air from the protected area. The air
samples are monitored by means of a broad spectrum Xenon light source and a
photo receiver circuit with a matching response characteristic. Upon entering the
detector, the air sample passes through a 25 micron filter into the light chamber. An
incident portion of the light is scattered by the presence of any air-borne particles
contained in the air sample, towards the receiver. The receiver produces a signal
which is then processed by the detection circuitry to determine if an alarm state
exists. System V can detect particles from 0.0003 to 25 microns in diameter. False
alarms that can be caused by ambient dust are minimized by the filter. Different
alarm levels are determined based on the amount of light which is scattered. The
light scattering signal from the receiver is typically displayed as the smoke level in
the form of a bar graph on the front panel. A typical span of smoke intensity
displayed on the bar graph is 0.01 to 0.1 percent obscuration per meter which is
about three orders of magnitude more sensitive than conventional smoke detectors.
Typical system capabilities at present are as follows:

. Single zone and multiple zone detection coverage is available. Maximum zone
size is about 1800 square meters with over 100 sampling points per zone.

. Sampling system piping can be metallic or non-metallic 5 mm to 30 mm

diameter and can be up to 200 linear meters per zone.

Systems I and V are both capable of several levels of preprogrammed alarm

thresholds. It is therefore feasible to provide a staged early warning regime that
responds to increasing levels of danger. Typically, the alarm levels can be
designated as warning, trouble and fire. Appropriate actions by the operating
personnel may then be taken depending on the alarm level.

Since these systems are capable of detecting the presence of a very small
concentration of sub-micron particles, they become very attractive for detecting
incipient fires in the valve hall. Most fires in the valve hall start by local overheating
of components, arcing faults or tracking. Particulates produced at the early
development of these situations are drawn in via the air sampling pipes and alarm
thresholds may be reached before smoke can be observed.

To achieve complete coverage and area discrimination inside a valve hall, a possible
arrangement is to divide each valve hall into several hazard zones for fire detection
purposes: including one zone for the return air duct. Each zone is protected with a
single zone air sampling system. To improve reliability and security, a multi-zone
detector can be provided to back up all the single-zone detectors. Upon failure of any
primary single zone detector the operation of that specific zone will automatically
switch over to the backup multi-zone detector.

7.2.2 Electric Arc Detector Systems: Commercial electric arc detectors suitable for
HVDC application have not been available. As a result United Power Association
(UPA) developed an arc detection system to detect an arcing fault using photo-
detector (photometer) sensitive to visible light (reference 1). The photometers used
are fast response precision luxmeters. To detect an electric arc in the valve hall, this
system placed several light receptive lenses (with 40 degree acceptance angle) at
different heights and locations aiming at the valve structure with overlapping zones
of coverage. The light from an arc captured by the lenses is brought to the
photometers and the controller, located outside the valve halls, using fibre-optic
cables. Operation of more than one lens is required to generate a trip signal.

Commercially available flame detectors, whose operating principle depends on the

detection of ultra violet light, have also shown promise as arc detectors.

22
7.2.3 Infra-red Beam Smoke Detectors: These are optical devices which utilize infra-red
beams projected between a transmitter and a receiver. The power output of the
transmitter units are adjustable depending on the beam range. The detection of the
smoke is based on the principle of beam obscuration caused by heat or smoke. An
alarm is given if the light beam detection level falls below a preset level.

7.2.4 Infra-red Flame Detectors: These detectors work by monitoring the varying infra-
red energy emitted by flames and gases from a fire. The detector reacts rapidly to all
flaming fires in which carbonaceous materials are burned. The unit has two detectors
operating on slightly different wavelengths and the signals from both detectors are
correlated to enable a clear differentiation between flame radiation and other sources
of radiation.

7.2.5 Imaging Video Camera Systems: Standard high resolution cameras can be
installed at different places on the valve hall walls to provide coverage of the
protected areas. Images from the cameras can be fed into a controller with image
analyzing capability. The controller measures the difference between the new image
and the base-line image stored in the controller to generate alarms to alert operating
personnel who then can make more careful visual inspections via the video camera
system. Additional features such as high resolution infra-red sensors or other
photosensitive devices can be added to the video camera system to detect, for
example, changes in the gradient for added sensitivity and reliability in early
detection of a fire.

A comparison of the detection systems which have been investigated is given in

Table 7.1 below.

7.3 Field Tests and Installation Experience

Air sampling systems

Several utilities have performed tests to evaluate the performance of air sampling
systems. Some of the test results are reported below. It should be noted that these
tests were carried out in valve halls and not in a laboratory under controlled
conditions, and therefore provide only limited comparisons between alternative
systems. Furthermore, the tests were performed in halls with non-operating valves.
For water cooled valves in particular, convection air flows due to heated and cooled
valve components under operating conditions may lead to different sensor operating
times for incipient fires similar to those simulated. The names in the brackets are
stations where the tests were carried out.

In the description below, to differentiate different manufacturers that make use of the
same detection principle, a second character is used. (e.g. I1, I2).

(1) United Power Association (Dickinson)

The tests were carried out in February 1992 inside the valve halls of the Dickinson
station after system installation. The system installed was System I1. Dickinson has
air-cooled thyristor valves. Fans send the cool air from the basement fan room up
through the valves then circulate back through the heat exchangers to the fan room.
There are fourteen heat exchangers through which the air passes. Air sampling
heads are located above and just downstream from where the air exits the heat
exchangers and enters the fan room. The supplier calibrated all units prior to the test.
A hotplate was used to heat a scrap piece of fibre-glass U-channel from the valve
structure. The hotplate was located near the main fans so that all the particulates that
were created were blown up through the valves before returning to the basement and
entering the sampling heads. The test results are consistent with an earlier mock-up
test conducted by the air sampling system supplier prior to the installation.

23
 POLE 1

Unit 1 Unit 2
(Time in Minutes and Seconds)

Time for display meter to 2m 2m

first show an increase

Time to "Alarm" level 3 m 50 s 5 m 33 s

Time to "Trip" level 5 m 27 s 8 m 22 s

POLE 2

Unit 1 Unit 2
(Time in Minutes and Seconds)

Time for display meter to 2m 2m

first show an increase

Time to "Alarm" level 3 m 23 s 3 m 40 s

Time to "Trip" level 4 m 25 s 4 m 40 s

(2) New England Hydro (Sandy Pond)

New England Hydro installed System V at its Sandy Pond station. The valve hall is
divided into four zones: one for each water-cooled quadruple valve structure and one
for the return air duct. The test reported here was conducted after system installation.
The system was tested at each valve structure using artificial smoke aerosol. Smoke
was introduced for three seconds directly into the sampling point most remote from
the detector. In addition, a three-second discharge of smoke was made into the
center of the volume directly above the valve structure. In the case of valve structure
# 3, which is most remote from its detector, a three-second smoke discharge was
made at the floor level next to the valve structure. Test results for the individual
valve structures in Pole 1 valve hall are presented in the following table along with
the calculated response times. The response time for the detector for the air return
duct was not calculated because its sampling points were very close to the detector.

24
 SYSTEM V TEST RESULTS AT SANDY POND
(Time in Minutes and Seconds)

TEST TEST CALCULATED TIME TO TIME TO MAXLEVEL

ZONE LOCATION RESPONSE TIME LEVEL 1 MAX LEVEL REACHED

Valve 1 Farthest sampling 60 s 39 s 43 s 10

point, left piping
circuit

Valve 1 Farthest sampling 60 s 40 s 40 s 10

point, right piping
circuit

Valve 1 Above Valve 1 -- 42 s 57 s 5

Valve 2 Farthest sampling 1 m 38 s 52 s 54 s 10

point, left piping
circuit

Valve 2 Farthest sampling 1 m 38 s 53 s 56 s 10

point, right piping
circuit

Valve 3 Farthest sampling 1 m 53 s 1m2s 1 m 52 s 10

point,left piping
circuit

Valve 3 Above Valve 3 -- 1m4s 2m4s 1

Valve 3 Floor level near -- 1 m 18 s 1 m 18 s 1

valve

Return Lowest grill -- 29 s 53 s 10

air

Floor 6 meters from -- 2m 2m2s 2

level air return

25
(3) Hydro-Quebec (Nicolet and Radisson)

System V was tested by the HVDC supplier at both Radisson and Nicolet stations.
The results are similar to those obtained at Sandy Pond. One observation was that
with a cold valve, the response time was very long for simulated smoke released at
the bottom of the valve structure.

(4) Los Angeles Department of Water and Power/Inter-mountain Power Agency

(Adelanto and Intermountain).

For the Intermountain HVDC System, air sampling systems (System I1) were
installed at both Adelanto and Intermountain stations. Each valve hall is divided into
four hazard zones similar to Sandy Pond. Each zone is protected with a single zone
system. For redundancy, a four-zone detector system is provided to back up all the
single zone systems. In addition to System I1, surveillance cameras were installed in
each valve hall and monitor screens were installed in the control room for continuous
visual monitoring of the valve halls by the operators. This surveillance monitoring
system also provides visual confirmation if the fire or smoke are visible.

Detection systems based on infra-red, imaging, laser, etc were considered but
discarded because of their comparatively slower response and lack of sensitivity.

During the design of the fire detection system, a number of different early fire
detection systems were evaluated and comparative tests were conducted to select
the best alternative for the application. In addition to System I1, other systems
considered were System I2 and System V.

Side-by-side comparison tests under identical conditions using oil smoke, electrical
wire smoke, and arc were conducted to compare the responses of Systems I1, I2 and
System V. These tests were conducted at the Celilo station of the Bonneville Power
Administration who was, at the time, evaluating air sampling systems.

TEST 1: This test was conducted by dipping a heated 15-ohm, 5-watt resistor in
transformer oil. The test was performed at the top of the thyristor valve about 3.5
metres below the ceiling where sample heads/points were located. After 10 minutes
of continuous heating of transformer oil, no alarm was recorded on any system.

Subsequent analysis determined that Test 1 was not a valid test for any of the
systems because the oil was heated at below its flash point resulting in oil
evaporation only. All systems are designed to detect particles from combustion.

TEST 2: Electrical wire and plastic insulation were placed in a pan on a hot plate.
The hot plate was turned on and smoke was generated. This test was performed at
the top of the thyristor valve about 3.5 metres below the sampling heads/points. The
test lasted 10 minutes and the results were as follows:

System Alarm Level 1 Alarm Level 2 Alarm Level 3

(Time in Minutes
and Seconds)

I1 1 m 24 s 4m3 s 5 m 45 s
V 6m 0s 6 m 51 s none
I2 none none none

TEST 3: An arc was generated at the floor level by a welding machine. The test
lasted 10 minutes with the following results.

I1 1m1s 4 m 10 s 10 m 8 s
V none none none
I2 6 m 30 s none none

TEST 4: This test was similar to Test 2 but at the floor level. The test lasted 20
minutes with the followings results:
26
I1 10 m 20 s 11 m 9 s 13 m 53 s
V 13 m 45 s 18 m 0 s none
I2 11 m 40 s none none

Both System I1 and System V were similarly equipped with three alarm levels at
10%, 20% and 30% of combustible particle concentration at Levels 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. System I2 alarm levels were "Warning", "trouble", and "fire" (% values
were not available).

(5) Manitoba Hydro (Dorsey)

In January 1992, a series of tests were performed at the Dorsey station to compare
five different fire alarm systems. The tests were performed in valve hall 42. Various
materials were removed from a defective reactor module and were placed on a pie
plate. It was then placed on a hot plate that was pre-heated to its maximum
temperature. A low voltage tig-welder was also used to simulate electric arc for one
test.

Two of the five systems tested were existing. They consist of ionization type detector
heads that are mounted on the ceiling and a system of fixed light beam detectors
that are mounted above the top of the three valve structures.

Also tested were System I1, System V and a system designated as VK which is
similar to system V but uses a laser beam across the detector chamber. These
systems were temporarily installed by their respective distributors.

TEST 1

Pieces from a plastic cooling-water tube and from a fibre-glass booster shed were
placed in a pie plate on a pre-heated hot plate. Smoke was generated in 30 seconds
and the pie plate was removed from the hot plate after 2 minutes and 30 seconds.

Detector Alarm Level 1 Alarm Level 2 Alarm Level 3

(Time in Minutes
and Seconds)

I1 2 m 21 s 2 m 58 s no response
VK 2m 9s 3m 1s 3 m 30 s
Ionization no response no response no response
Beam detector no response no response no response
V no response no response no response

TEST 2

Pieces of the black insulating materials from the coils of a reactor module were
placed on a pie plate on the pre-heated hot plate.

I1 2 m 58 s 3m 8s no response
VK 2 m 38 s 3 m 11 s 3 m 30 s
Ionization no response no response no response
Beam detector no response no response no response
V no response no response no response

TEST 3

A tig-welder was set at 40 amperes and was operated to draw an arc for one minute.
Very little smoke developed because the tig-welding rod is flux free.

27
 I1 1 m 25 s 1 m 47 s 1 m 52 s
VK no response no response no response
Ionization no response no response no response
Beam detector no response no response no response
V no response no response no response

TEST 4

This test is similar to Test 1 at different location. The hot plate was located at the
farthest point from the detector to simulate the worst case scenario.

I1 1 m 58 s 3 m 20 s 3 m 21 s
VK 2 m 58 s no response no response
Ionization no response no response no response
Beam detector no response no response no response
V no response no response no response

Infra-red camera

Hydro-Quebec considered the possibility of using infra-red (IR) cameras inside the
valve halls. Tests were performed in one of the de-energized valve halls at Nicolet
station. A thermography video camera was used. This camera was equipped with a
microprocessor based image analyzer to provide an immediate comparison with the
pre-stored temperature pattern of the object.

Test 1: A 3/4" nut was heated to 60oC and placed at a distance of 10 m and 24 m
away from the camera. A clean image and accurate temperature were noted.

Test 2: The flame of a cigarette lighter was placed at the same distances as in Test 1
and similar results were obtained.

Test 3: The lighter flame was hidden behind an object. The camera could detect the
hot air leaking around the edges of the object.

Test 4: A welder lighter was struck a few time to produce sparks. The camera
detected the sparks.

The focusing of the camera was difficult. Many attempts to focus were needed to
conduct the above tests.

Other Detectors

As reported earlier, some utilities installed video cameras or arc detectors to

supplement the air sampling systems. No specific test results are available to
determine their effectiveness to provide early warning of incipient fires. Video
cameras strategically installed inside the valve halls can be an important visual
monitoring and inspection tool for operators in the control room or remote control
centers.

One utility, Sellindge Convertor Station in England reported that it is equipped with
two detection schemes: Infra-red beam detectors and 24 Infra-red flame detectors
installed in valve halls and plenum chambers. It reported experience with both false
and real alarms.

7.4 Operating Experience

Since the major fires in Rihand and Foz do Iguacu, many utilities have installed fire
incipient detection systems in their valve halls and others are actively pursuing such
installation. Air sampling systems appear to be most favored.

28
Most installations are very recent (since 1991) and only Sandy Pond has reported an
actual incipient fire incident due to an overheating valve grading resistor, see
appendix 3. It should be noted here that System V appeared less sensitive than
system I during some of the above noted side-by-side tests but operated successfully
and correctly in actual installation at Sandy Pond.

Table 7.2 lists converter stations which have air sampling systems installed or under
construction while table 7.3 shows some HVDC stations with air sampling systems
installed in conjunction with other complemen-tary detection/surveillance systems.

Table 7.2 Convertor stations having air sampling systems installed or under
construction as of May 1994:

29
PROJECT STATION OWNER

Baltic Cable Herrenwyk Baltic Cable AB

Baltic Cable Kruseberg Baltic Cable AB
CU Coal Creek United Power Ass.
CU Dickinson United Power Ass.
DC Hybrid Link (NZ) Benmore TransPower
DC Hybrid Link (NZ) Haywards TransPower
Fenno Skan Dannebo Vattenfall
Fenno Skan Rauma IVO
Highgate Highgate VELCO
HVDC Multiterminal Nicolet Hydro-Québec
HVDC Multiterminal Radisson Hydro-Québec
HVDC Multiterminal Sandy Pond NEH
Intermountain Adelanto IPA
Intermountain Intermountain IPA
Itaipu Foz do Iguaçu FURNAS
Itaipu Sao Roque FURNAS
Konti-Skan 2 Lindome Vattenfall
Konti-Skan 2 Vester Hassing ELSAM
Nelson River I Radisson Manitoba Hydro
Nelson River I and II Dorsey Manitoba Hydro
Nelson River II Henday Manitoba Hydro
PIU and PIE Celilo BPA
PIU/and PIE Sylmar LADWP/SCE/
Rihand-Delhi Dadri NTPC
Rihand-Delhi Rihand NTPC
Skagerrak 3 Kristiansand Statnett
Skagerrak 3 Tjele ELSAM
Square Butte Center MP&L
Square Butte Duluth MP&L
Vancouver Island Arnott BC Hydro
Vancouver Island Duncan BC Hydro
Vindhyachal Vindhyachal NTPC

Table 7.3 Convertor stations with air sampling systems in combination with other
systems.

NAME AIR VIDEO ARC FLAME

STATION/NAME SAMPLING CAMERA DETECTOR DETECTOR

HIGHGATE X X

INTERMOUNTAIN X X

FENNO-SKAN X X

DC HYBRID LINK X X X

CU X X

30
7.5 Guidelines for Valve Hall Fire Detection

The air sampling systems seem to be the most effective systems available today.
Test and operating experience show that the air sampling systems can provide
accurate and reliable detection of incipient fires. Typical response times of a few
minutes appear to be adequate for most situations. However, it should be noted that
a major arcing fault may produce a large amount of energy in a very short time.
Power arcs associated with major insulation failure are usually detected very rapidly
with conventional electronic protection. However, series arcs may not be detected
and therefore these can be sustained until a more substantial fault develops. An arc
detection system that can detect such an event as reported by UPA may be desirable
in conjunction with air sampling. Additional development should be pursued to make
arc detection systems commercially available and reliable.

For un-manned stations, installation of video cameras and/or infra-red cameras

inside the valve hall combined with an air sampling system provides added security
and allows visual confirmation of fire alarm incidents. Such visual confirmation might
be desirable even for manned stations.

8. FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

8.1 Introduction

Fire suppression is an important consideration for valves and valve halls. Its
arrangement and complexity is dependent on a number of factors such as:

. manned or unmanned station;

. valve and valve hall construction;
. valve hall layout;
. proximity of oil-filled convertor transformers and smoothing reactors;
. proximity of adjacent convertors in a bipole;
. requirements of local fire codes;
. advice from fire brigades;
. insurance company requirements;
. consequences of lost capacity.

The review of the above factors will lead to one of the following three options:

a) There is a low risk of a valve hall fire and any fires that do occur will self
extinguish or be safely contained without the need for any intervention. No
valve hall fire suppression system is required.

b) There is a small risk of a fire but the scale of initiating faults is small and the
rate of fire spread is low (or highly contained) so that there is sufficient time
and low personnel risk associated with local attack of any valve hall fire
using portable hand-held fire extinguishers. The fire suppression system
provided therefore comprises the appropriate portable hand-held facilities.

c) There is a risk of a major fire that may not self-extinguish or be contained

after the equipment is de-energised and/or could develop rapidly within the
time scale needed to obtain safe personnel access for the purpose of
attacking the fire. In this case, a fully integrated, permanently installed valve
hall fire suppression system is required.

The level of fire protection at many HVDC installations has been made on the basis
of a) or b) whereas in retrospect, c) may have been more appropriate.

8.2 Design considerations for an Installed Fire Suppression System

31
 When an installed suppression system is required it should be designed to
completely engulf the volume of the area or zone to be extinguished and protected. It
should have sufficient projection to reach or surround all parts.

It is desirable that the fire extinguishing agent be non-toxic to personnel during and
after a fire. If not, proper warnings and protective equipment including portable
breathing apparatus must be furnished.

Considering the need to quickly repair and restore the equipment to service, it is
desirable that the fire extinguishing agent does not cause extensive damage to
adjacent equipment.

The fire suppression system should not require extensive installation that
complicates the station design or adversely affect the operation of the electrical
equipment. Since fire extinguishing agents will cause some damage and may not be
needed over all parts of a valve hall, consideration should be given to arranging the
delivery system so that it may be selectively released over critical areas. This zonal
arrangement may be made compatible with a zonal fire detection scheme as
discussed in section 7.

HVDC valve halls are large in size, contain electrical hazards and require
considerable time to disconnect and earth the equipment. This may constitute an
undesirable delay to releasing the fire extinguishing agent or entering the valve hall.
It also appears undesirable to have an entirely automatic system as false operation
may be as damaging as an actual fire. For these reasons remote operation, manually
initiated with electrical and mechanical interlocking may be desirable.

Modern HVDC systems should be designed to reduce the probability of a fire

occurrence. This infers that the fire extinguishing agent should have a long shelf life
and equipment must be provided to monitor its condition periodically.

To assure viability of a delivery system to the valve hall and to avoid the possibility
of leaks it is desirable that the valve hall piping be normally kept dry and that fittings
be furnished to perform on-line maintenance.

The fire suppression system should be self-contained on site. Redundancy with

respect to storage or pumping facilities, electrical energy sources, interlocks, alarms
and signaling devices should be considered.

Connection means should be furnished so that outside support may be attached for
assistance or recharging of the extinguishing agent. This access should be remote
from the valve halls, and adjacent to roadways but in an area that can be made
electrically safe.

Products of combustion and fire extinguishing agents may be harmful to the

environment. Drainage and storage means should be considered for facilitating
clean-up and later safe disposal. If different extinguishing agents are used
simultaneously to suppress different types of fires, dividers and seals may be
required to contain them in separate areas as they may not be compatible with each
other or with different electrical equipment and may cause additional damage.

The operation of the fire suppression system should be clearly marked as to

operational sequences, the zone(s) to be activated, indications that the proper safety
procedures have been followed and that detection has been verified and equipment
de-energized. Early detection of fire on self-extinguishing materials followed by de-
energization may make it unnecessary to activate additional suppression. The
procedure should allow an appropriate delay after de-energization to determine
whether the fire self extinguishes.

8.3 Types of fire extinguishing agents

The agents available on the market that can be used to extinguish a fire are:

32
 - Gases
Halon, CO2, Others

- Dry chemicals
Powder

- Water
Water deluge, water fog

- Aqueous-foams

8.3.1 Halon is an effective fire extinguishing agent particularly in relatively small occupied
areas. It is not harmful to electronic equipment but may form hazardous by-products
of decomposition in the presence of high temperatures which may accompany power
faults. The major objection to Halon is its detrimental effect on the environment.
Consequently it is being outlawed in most countries. Halon substitutes are now
available but can also produce hazardous by-products. They are also very costly in
the quantities required for extinguishing a valve hall fire.

Table 8.3 included at the end of this section provides information on new clean
agents that can be used for extinguishing fires.

8.3.2 Carbon dioxide is effective on fires because it cools and displaces oxygen and does
not chemically harm insulation. Carbon dioxide can cause thermal shock and large
pressure changes in an enclosed volume. C02 systems are relatively expensive and
require pressure vessels and large quantities sufficient to maintain a 50%
concentration in the valve hall volume. It is hazardous to life as suffocation is a
possibility. Precautions should be taken to avoid accidental operation of the system
during maintenance.

Recharging of the system usually cannot be performed by local fire departments nor
can a refill be obtained quickly from suppliers as they do not normally store such
large quantities.

8.3.3 Dry chemical may be effective against small local fires if they can be reached from
floor level but are generally not suitable for a permanently installed fire suppression
system. In storage they may cake up and have the tendency to clog up if delivered
by piping and nozzles. They can be corrosive to metallic materials and are extremely
difficult to clean up. In general great care must be used if they are activated in HVDC
valve halls.

8.3.4 Water fire suppression systems are the most available and the least expensive. They
can cause extensive damage to electrical equipment unless non-hygroscopic and
hermetically sealed materials are used throughout the valves. Local fire departments
can usually support water systems with standard equipment. Large HVDC valve hall
water fire extinguishing systems should be designed with water storage, redundant
pumps and power sources if local services are not sufficient. Remote standard
connection fittings and piping should be installed to permit outside support. There are
several methods of using water to extinguish valve hall fires. Their major advantage
is their cooling effect.

Water deluge systems require the greatest volume of water but yield the quickest
delivery means and so the most rapid cooling effect. They can be delivered above
selected zones which match a zonal fire detection system. The deluge system does
not have to involve the entire valve hall volume unless required.
This will minimize water damage and can also protect structural and support
members. Dividers, seals, suitable drains and storage facilities should be provided to
avoid contamination of other areas or the environment.

33
 Water fog systems can be very effective against fires in small confined areas and
effective against oil fires. They are economical in the use of water, provide a cooling
effect and tend to settle smoke. They are difficult to apply for large valve halls
because of the large projection distances involved. The smaller nozzles required
have a greater tendency to clog, especially if not used for a long period of time.

8.3.5 Aqueous foam systems are most effective against oil type fires such as might
occur in a valve hall if transformer and reactor bushings penetrate the valve hall. A
good valve hall design would include any necessary internal berms, seals, suitable
drains, storage tanks and foam delivery systems that maintain separation of oil and
foam from other equipment in the valve hall. Foam extinguishing agents would be
extremely difficult to clean up from valves as they are chemically corrosive.

If different fire extinguishing agents are used in adjacent areas, separation of these
different types of products of combustion should be maintained to facilitate clean-up
and avoid contamination of the environment.

There are several types of foam in use. Storage and delivery systems should be self-
sufficient and independent of outside support. The capacity should anticipate a
bushing rupture that might involve much of the oil in a transformer tank. Provision
should be made for safe connection of the local fire brigade's foam systems as a
back-up.

8.4 Installation Requirements

The electrical environment in a valve hall provides many challenges to the designer
in obtaining an effective installation of a fire suppression system. The electrical
clearances are usually large and should not be diminished. Delivery systems must
project their materials across these clearances. For very high voltage systems where
projection distances may be greater than about four to five metres, the most effec-
tive position may be from above. This position has the additional advantage that fall-
out from above will help to engulf lower levels and their delivery position will be in
the most probable hot spot.

Foam systems are usually used on oil type fires and may direct their materials to
float over the surfaces of the burning pool of oil. Every attempt should be made to
minimize the affected area by providing barriers of non-combustible materials of
sufficient height to form a containment volume adequate for the maximum amount of
oil and foam expected and/or suitably dimensioned rock pits with adequate drainage
systems.

False operation or a leakage from a fire suppression system, especially into an

energized valve hall, may be as damaging as a fire. In addition to a forced outage, it
may create electric arcs that can decompose fire extinguishing agents. Electrical
interlocks and manual initiation of operation after verification of a fire by redundant
means should be considered. Remote manual activation is desired to provide
adequate separation between the operator and possible heat and smoke of the fire.

The fire suppression installation should be arranged to be compatible with the fire
detection system, especially if the latter is zonal in arrangement. This will permit
selective operation, thus minimizing contamination and clean-up. It will also
conserve fire extinguishing materials.

Redundant electrical supply systems should be considered such as redundant

electrical service or self-contained diesel pumps and generators. Specific safety
consideration should be given to the possible need to de-energize certain areas and
equipment during fires. (see section 11).

Most large HVDC terminals are located in remote areas and, even if they are not so
located, reliance on public services may not always be good practice as accidents,

34
 storms or natural disasters may make them unavailable. For these reasons on-site
storage of chemicals, water supply and fire pump fuels may be desirable.

Re-supply of materials required for extinguishing a fire in a valve hall should be

made via standard type fittings located at a safe distance from the valve hall. This
will permit support from local services even during a fire.

On-site drainage, storage and containment equipment should be considered to

collect fire residue and to protect the environment from contamination. Where
possible, oil-water separators should be furnished to contain these materials.

Electrical and mechanical interlocks and signalling devices should be provided to

avoid inadvertent operation into energized valve halls or misoperation into the wrong
zone if zonal operation is provided.

Since it is not practical to test fire suppression system installations in an actual valve
hall, it is desirable to provide means to test the system periodically without operation.
Auxiliary control valves and piping for limited testing or temporary connections
should be restored to the proper arrangement and carefully checked after testing.
Monitoring and mimic panels may be furnished to assure a proper arrangement.

8.5 Comparison of fire extinguishing agents

The main advantages and disadvantages of the most common fire extinguishing
agents are listed in the table 8.1 below.

35
 TABLE 8.1

COMPARISON OF FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENTS

GASES
Main CHARACTERISTICS DRY CHEMICALS WATER AQUEOUS FOAM
(Halon CO2 Others)
1. Equipment + installation costs High High Low Low
2. Material replacement cost High Low Low Low
3. Material replacement delay Very long Long Very short Very short
4. Extinction time Fast Medium Long Long
5. Installation impact High Medium Medium Medium
6. Material impact on valves and other valve hall Low High Medium Medium-high
equipment
7. Long term reliability Low Medium High High
8. Environment impact High (1, 2) Medium Low Low
9. Personnel intervention Impossible (3) Impossible Possible Possible
10. Flexibility of system None High High High
11. Complexity of system High Medium Medium Medium
12. Personnel hazards High Medium Low Low
13. Zoning application Not practical Possible Possible Possible
14. Probability of fire restart Medium Low Medium Low
15. Efficiency in large volume Low Low High High
16. Efficiency against major oil fire in valve hall Medium (4) Low Medium High
17. Efficiency against localized or small fire High High Medium (5) Low (5)
18. Compatibility with smoke evacuation system Impossible Difficult Possible Possible

Note :
(1) Low with O-DP agents such as FM 200
(2) Very High for Halon. Use of Halon not recommended
(3) Restricted access may be possible for trained personnel with a portable fire-fighting equipment to fight small localized fires.
(4) Could be higher depending on the design
(5) The efficiency is high if the agent can be launched on the fire

36
8.6 Survey of valve hall fire suppression systems in service

The survey conducted by the Task Force indicates that few fire suppression systems
have been installed so far in valve halls. They are summarized in table 8.2.

8.7 Future Developments

It is anticipated that the use of improved (more fire resistant) materials, better
segregation and faster/more sensitive fire detection systems as described elsewhere
in this report will make the need for installed valve hall fire suppression systems less
likely in the future. At some stage, the capital and maintenance costs of an installed
fire suppression system, and the risk/costs arising from a false operation will exceed
the risk/cost of a valve hall fire.

37
TABLE 8.2 : FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN VALVE HALLS
(As reported )
SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS INSTALLED
NAME OF VALVES AC/DC WALL VALVE HALL
STATION/SYSTEM BUSHINGS CEILINGS
EEL RIVER 2.1

SHIN SHINANO 4.1

DAVID A. HAMIL 4.3

NELSON RIVER 2 1.1, 4.3 1.1 1.1

CU 1.1, 4.3 11, 2.1

HOKKAIDO-HONSHU 4.1

DURNROHR 1.1, 2.1 1.1, 2.1

DES CANTONS 3.0, 3.2

VIRGINIA SMITH 4.3

KONTI-SKAN 2.1
(LINDOME)

RADISSON 3.0, 3.2

SANDY POND 1 (a) 3.0, 3.1, 3.2,3.3 1 (a)

SAKUMA 4.1, 1.1

NICOLET 3.0, 3.2

WELSH-MONTICELLO 1.1, 2.1 1.1, 2.1

VIENNA SOUTH-EAST 1.1, 2.1 1.1, 2.1

VANCOUVER ISLAND 1 (a) 3.2

DC HYBRID LINK,NZ 1 (a) 3.2

INTERMOUNTAIN 1 (a) 4.3 1 (a), 3.2

POWER PROJECT

1. Water Sprinkler 3.2 Rock filled oil pits and/or

a) Manual release sloping floor
b) Automatic 3.3 Berms at floor level
1.1 Water - hand - held - fire dept. 4.1 Chemical (hand-held or portable)
2.0 Carbon dioxide installed 4.2 Halon - installed
2.1 Carbon dioxide - hand held 4.3 Halon - hand-held
3.0 Foam - installed
3.1 Foam assist fire dept.

38
39
40
9. SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

9.1 Introduction

One of the least obvious requirements in the design of HVDC terminals, until
recently, was the requirement for smoke control/pressure relief systems, natural or
forced. Where no smoke management system has been incorporated in the building,
the first thing the fire professionals would do upon reaching a terminal, after checking
the fire, would be to "chop a series of big holes in the roof to let the smoke out".

The products of combustion, smoke, are both hot and toxic, and can reduce the
visibility to zero. Smoke control reduces damage to valve hall components by
lowering the temperature and reducing the contamina-tion. It also keeps smoke out
of other areas and makes it possible for fire fighters (equipped with breathing
apparatus) to fight the fire. This will reduce the outage time following a fire.

A further advantage of smoke management is reduction of pressure inside the valve

hall. Natural ventilation of the valve hall will reduce the overpressure and structural
stress in the valve hall, and will reduce the risk of transfer of smoke from the valve
hall to other parts of the terminal. Forced ventilation systems may be used to
improve this effect by drawing a negative pressure in the valve hall in order to more
positively keep smoke and toxic fumes from other parts of the terminal.

An HVDC valve hall is considered a "simple building" from the standpoint of

designing a smoke management system since it is basically a large room. In a fire,
hot gases will rise from the burning item and entrain cooler ambient air as they rise
towards the ceiling in a buoyant plume. When the plume gases impinge upon the
ceiling they spread across it, forming a distinct layer of hot gases near the ceiling. As
long as the fire grows the smoke layer near the ceiling grows in both depth and
temperature. The interface between the ambient air and the hot smoky region, would
be relatively sharp if not disturbed by the air conditioning system. If roof mounted
smoke vents are provided to give natural ventilation, the smoke layer will develop a
pressure head to drive the smoke out and at some stage an equilibrium will be
reached when the mass of smoke and hot gases leaving the enclosure is equal to the
mass of air sucked into the enclosure and entrained in the fire-plume. This is the
basis for the design of roof venting systems, which requires adequate air to be drawn
into the building through openings at the lower levels of the enclosure to replace the
hot gases flowing out. Forced mechanical ventilation can achieve the same effect as
shown in figure 9.1.

41
 Figure 9.1

Proper ventilation will decrease the temperature near the ceiling and can provide a
layer of clear air near the floor. The degree of cross-contamination will be reduced
the higher the smoke layer can be maintained. This also allows the fire fighters to
enter the valve hall to fight the fire at its source. Smoke ventilation works as a
pressure relief system to reduce overpressure in the building and the concentration
of unburned hydrocarbons is reduced.

If a fire occurs in a nearly closed building without ventilation, the internal pressure
and temperature may rise to such an extent that the building components fail.
Further, due to the consumption of oxygen, unburned gases may gather in the hot air

42
 at the ceiling and may at some point exceed the flammability limit. When a door or
equivalent is opened, oxygen enters the building and incrases the risk of an
explosion. Since it is difficult to clear a building once it has become smoke filled, the
smoke management system should be activated at an early stage of a fire but must
be coordinated with the fire suppression method adopted. Clearly, if suppression by a
gaseous agent is employed, the building must remain sealed until the fire is
extinguished.

9.2 Design considerations

Factors to be considered when selecting on a naturally or forced ventilated system.

9.2.1 Natural ventilation

- Natural ventilation depends on the basic physical property of hot gases to be

more bouyant than the surrounding air. This makes it automatically self-
compensating according to the intensity of the fire; the more intense the fire the
more efficient the ventilation process. The negative side of this is that a low
intensity, but very smoky fire may not be effectively vented.

- Natural ventilation can only reduce the over pressure in the valve hall. This is
usually adequate from the perspective of reducing the stresses on the building
structure but can still leave a positive internal pressure which could force smoke
products through openings into adjacent areas. This may not be a problem if the
base of the smoke layer is above the level of adjacent rooms (e.g. as in high
voltage applications) but is more problematic for low voltage applications where
valve hall and service building heights can be similar.

- Efficient operation requires that the smoke vents be fitted in the roof or high on
the walls. This is a relatively straight forward exercise for buildings designed
with the requirement in mind but could prove very difficult to incorporate as a
retro-fit. Roof mounted vents breach the roof deck and therefore represent
potential sites of rain water leakage. The design, taking into account wind, rain,
snow and ice loadings, can be complex. With the vents open (even if only for
maintenance checks) the valve hall is exposed to the weather.

- Activation is simple and can easily be made independent of external sources.

Alternatively it can be made "fail safe" - i.e. automatically open if supply is lost.
Redundant supplies should be considered to avoid false operation.

- Operation can be manual or via precharged mechanical/gas spring systems with

heat activated release. It must be possible to reclose the vents after they have
served their primary purpose in order to prevent adverse weather conditions
contributing to the valve hall contamination.

9.2.2 Forced ventilation

- Forced ventilation depends on active aspiration of the valve hall by large

capacity fans. The dimensioning of the fans must be carefully addressed since
the capacity is inversely proportional to the intensity of the fire: the more intense
the fire the lower the mass flow rate of the fans. This is likely to require a degree
of conservatism in design.

- Forced ventilation can actively produce negative pressure in the valve hall,
which reduces the risk for smoke migration into other areas of the building.

- Efficient operation can be achieved by locating fans on the outside wall of the
valve hall, at high level, thereby preserving the waterproof integrity of the roof
deck and providing a high level of security against external environmental
conditions. The system is relatively expensive but can more easily be
incorporated as a retro-fit to existing buildings.

43
 - Activation is dependent on the availability of auxiliary supplies which must
therefore be secure. The location, routing and supervision of the auxiliary
supplies should ensure that they are protected, as far as possible, from the
consequences of a developing fire and that, also, they satisfy local fire codes
with respect to the preservation of supplies while fire fighting action is being
taken. The fan motors must be rated for operation at the maximum temperature
of the smoke layer.

Automatic closure of fire/smoke dampers in air conditioning ducts, if any, should

preceed activation of the smoke management system, which could be either a
natural or a forced ventilation system.

9.3 Example of design methods

The actual design of a smoke management system should be undertaken with the
assistance of experienced fire professionals. Great care is needed to ensure that the
system will operate properly and not only vent the affected valve hall, but prevent
the products of combustion from reaching unaffected areas. Computer programs are
available for simulating the smoke-filling process in single enclosures such as HVDC
valve halls. Examples of these are FAST, version 18, in the environment of the
HAZARD 1 package which uses the zone model approach and the Harwell field
model FLOW3D which uses the field model approach.

A zone model typically models an enclosure by dividing the volume into two
homogeneous layers (zones), one layer next to the ceiling which contains the hot
combustion products and one next to the floor which contains fresh air. For a given
fire size and ventilation condition the conservation equations of mass and heat are
solved for the two layers, yielding the smoke layer height and temperature in the
enclosure as a function of time.

A field model, on the other hand, divides the space into thousands of cells or
elements and, hence, provides a detailed description of the fire variables over space
and time. The model is two-dimensional or three-dimensional. The primary
advantage of a field model is that it can provide detailed information on the heat and
flow conditions at any point in the enclosure, while the zone model cannot. The
primary advantage of a zone model is its relative simplicity. Also, cases are run far
more rapidly and inexpensively with a zone model.

As an example, an assumed case of a fire starting at a height of 10 metres above

the valve hall floor in a hall of 800 square meters and height of 18 metres has been
used. The fire is assumed to grow exponentially to a maximum horizontal area of 10
square metres. The initial fire area is 0.5 square metres and the doubling time is 5
minutes. A power of 1 MW/square metre is assumed to be generated. The ceiling
vents are 12 square metres in area. The inlet vents are assumed near the floor and
are 8 square metres. The computer program FAST has been used to generate the
data shown in figures 9.2 and 9.3 which show the height above the floor to the
bottom of the smoke layer and the average temperature of the smoke layer,
illustrating the benefits of the smoke management system. For this example, natural
ventilation was used. These benefits could be increased with appropriate forced
ventilation.

Note that because there will be a strong vertical gradient to the temperature in the
smoke layer and the smoke layer without ventilation is 10 m deep compared with 3
m deep for the case where the vents are open, the difference in temperature at the
ceiling for the two cases will be very much greater than the 50oC difference in
average temperature indicated by figure 9.3. When performing a detailed analysis,
the vertical (and horizontal) temperature gradients in the smoke layer may need to
be determined and the results interpreted carefully with the help of specialist fire
technical experts.

44
 HEIGHT OF SMOKE LAYER VS TIME

AVERAGE TEMPERATURE OF SMOKE LAYER VS TIME

45
9.4 Examples of design

9.4.1 Sandy Pond

Sandy Pond illustrates the solution found by one U.S. utility and exemplifies the use
of forced ventilation applied retrospectively to an existing convertor station. This is a
2000 MW bipolar terminal which operates at 450 kV. The smoke management
system at Sandy Pond was developed in consultation with the building codes
specialists and Factory Mutual Research Personnel.

Equipment for each valve hall:

1. Two (2) 25,000 CFM axial flow type exhaust fans including 15 hp direct drive
480 volt electric motors, starters and disconnects.

2. Four (4) 91 x 193 cm positive seal dampers, two (2) serving the fan intakes and
the other two for purge air inlets. Each damper is furnished with two (2) 91 cm
diameter wafers, interconnecting linkage and piggy-backed electric drives.

3. Two (2) combination fire/smoke dampers; one in the valve hall supply air duct,
the other in the valve hall return air duct.

4. Two (2) 55.7 cm x 254 cm tunnel air isolation dampers; one for the supply air,
the other for the return air.

5. A control panel including switches and indication lights required to control and
monitor the smoke management system.

A smoke exhaust fan is installed at each end of each valve hall. The fans are located
on a steel platform attached to the outside wall, located approximately 2 metres
below the roof line of the valve hall. A positive seal damper is mounted at the inner
surface of the valve hall (the inlet to the ductwork leading to each exhaust fan). The
outlet from the fan discharges to the atmosphere through a discharge duct equipped
with a bird screen.

Inside each valve hall there are two additonal positive seal dampers identical to
those installed on the exhaust fan intake ductwork. These dampers are called the
intake air dampers and are installed on the same walls of the valve hall as the fans,
but are approximately 4 metres above ground and serve to permit smoke free
outside air to enter the valve hall when they are opened while the fans are operating.

Combination fire and smoke dampers are installed inside the supply and return air
ducts of the valve hall air conditioning system where each duct penetrates the valve
hall wall.

The control panel for a given valve hall is located in the control room adjacent to the
valve hall observation window to which the panel corresponds. It contains push-to-
test status indication lights for all dampers and the smoke exhaust fans mentioned
above as well as smoke evacuation and purge air switches.

Further information on the Sandy Pond system is given in Reference 2.

9.4.2 New Zealand

The New Zealand HVDC stations at Benmore and Haywards are equipped with a
smoke management system based on natural ventilation.

46
 A total of 24 smoke relief vents have been installed within the valve hall building.
Twelve, (totally 23m2 geometric area) are within the roof and twelve (totally 14.5m2
geometric area) within the main exterior wall. The ventilators are fail safe, pressure
to close type and are specified to be 100% weather proof.

The smoke vents are closed by a pneumatic cylinder, while a pneumatic latch
provides a seal when closed. A signal from the fire control system releases the air
pressure, and gas springs open the vents.

The compressed air system within the mechanical workshop comprises two air
compressors (duty/stand-by).

The compressed air lines are connected to the valve hall smoke vents by copper
pipes. Two separate pneumatic lines are provided to each vent to ensure that any
inadvertent pressure loss or damage to any single line will not cause the vents to
open unintentionally.

Each smoke vent is provided with local isolation valves which can be used when a
single vent requires maintenance.

The smoke vents can be activated either by level 3 of the air sampling detection
system (60 sec time delay) or manually.

During the 60 sec time delay the operation of the Auto-Activation Timer Interrupt
switch located in the control Mimic Panel will prevent opening.

9.4.3 Etzenricht

The smoke management system of the back-to-back link at Etzenricht in Germany is

based on natural ventilation.

The size of the inlet and outlet smoke vents has been designed according to German
standards and reviewed with the customer and insurance representatives. Due to the
required height of a smoke free layer in the valve hall (half of the valve hall height)
and the time fire fighters need to arrive at the valve hall (20 min.), an overall
ventilation area of 1.4% of the cross section of the valve hall has been realized by 3
smoke vents in the roof (approximately 6m2) and 4 vents in the side wall
(appproximately 6m2).

The vents are both opened and closed by pneumatic cylinders with a self-locking
mechanism in both end positions (pressure free tubes). The smoke vents in the roof
are driven in parallel by a CO2 gas cartridge (each direction a separate cartridge).
The vents in the side wall are connected to a second group with independent
cartridges. They are released manually by pushing a button in a control safety box
outside the valve hall near the window in the door (one button for each group).

Each smoke vent in the roof is additionally equipped with a thermally controlled
release, which operates independently of other control signals. Both end positions of
each smoke vent are indicated by redundant switches. Annual maintenance is
required for the gas cartridges.

9.4.4 Baltic Cable

The following information is taken from the design of a smoke management system
based on natural ventilation made for the Baltic Cable HVDC project and which will
be installed in the valve halls at Kruseberg (Sweden) and Herrenwyk (Germany).

The stations are 500 MW monopole terminals at 450 kV DC. Internal dimensions of
the valve halls are L = 28 m, W = 17.5 m, H = 18.7 m. The fire loads are mainly
represented by the thyristor valves and the transformer bushings.

47
 The smoke management system is dimensioned by using a computer program,
simulating the temperature rise and smoke gas layer growth caused by the smoke
design load.
The main objective has been to prevent excessive temperatures to the building and
its installation structures, and to limit uncontrolled growth of the smoke gas layer.
This feature also achieves pressure relief, smoke handling and maintains the
integrity of the adjacent fire components.
Two calculated cases have been used for dimensioning of the ventilation opening,
first a fire in a thyristor valve and second an oil spill fire on the valve hall floor. The
oil fire requires the largest ventilation capacity and thereby has provided the imput
data for the design.
The system consists of six roof mounted smoke vents totaling 22.5 m2 (14.6 m2
effective area) and three wall mounted inlet vents totaling 12.2 m2 (8.6 m2 effective
area).
The smoke vents and installation are designed to be weather proof (including snow
loads) and has the required thermal insulation to avoid condensation of water on the
inside due to thermal differences, between inside/outside temperatures.

The vents are pneumatically operated (basic function generally as described in the
New Zealand installation) and can be activated either by level 3 of the air sampling
smoke detection system or manually from the smoke ventilation control panel. They
are further equipped with thermal fuses set for activation at + 93°C.

10. CONTROL AND INTEGRATION OF FIRE DETECTION, FIRE PROTEC-TION AND

CONVERTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS

10.1 Introduction

Fire detection and active fire extinguishing systems of the size necessary for HVDC
convertor stations are available. These systems combine a number of new detection
and fire extinguishing technologies, with a goal of providing comprehensive fire
protection. These systems should be designed to be a complementary arrangement
with the control and protection system of the HVDC convertor.
The integration of these systems into an overall fire control system is necessary to
ensure a proper coordination of actions to effectively detect the fire, locate the area,
trip the HVDC convertor, control the extinguishing agents, manage the Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system, and manage the removal of smoke.
Many factors need to be considered in the selection of major items of each of the
Fire Protection system. These factors include:

. Detection system method and zone arrangements for deployment.

. Speed of detection, with cross zoning or backup of different detection methods.

. Visual verification system including video cameras, viewing windows/ports,

valve hall access arrangements and annunciation systems.

. HVDC convertor arrangements such as standard valve protections, thyristor

valve coolant leak detection, HVDC convertor protection arrangements, and
valve hall humidity monitoring.

. Local and civil (fire brigade) alarm annunciation requirements.

. Main AC system dispatcher notification configura-tions, including SCADA

control system requirements.

. Fire management and emergency control including water pumping, auxiliary

fail-safe system control and site access control.

. Site staffing levels (if any) and training levels, including fire fighting abilities or
responsabi-lities.

48
10.2 Fire Alarm Classification

The functions and properties to be provided by the fire control system should include
the following:

. Identification of the specific location of a fire so that the actions for prevention of
fire propagation and its suppression can be effectively implemented. The
system should have the capability of sensing the status of propagation of the
fire.

. Capability of promptly and accurately detecting the fire, so that any delay in
initiation of preventive action is avoided.

. High accuracy and reliability so that the system responds when required but
does not cause tripping of the convertor system or operation of the fire
suppression system due to false operation.

The fire control systems which are used in HVDC substations can be classified
according to their fire detection principle, detection objective, degree of importance
and their functions. Figure 10.1 shows the typical interconnections between the
various fire extinguishing, alarm and control systems.

10.2.1 Classification by Detection Principle

The detection systems can be classified into those which detect heat, smoke and,
electrical phenomena such as electric arcs and capable of sensing combustion
products, those that detect fire visually by means of monitoring television systems,
and those employing combinations of the above means (see section 7).

The combination and cross zone arrangement of each detection system will provide
the maximum sensivity of detection assuring the reduction of false alarms. In
manned HVDC substations the use of visual and olfactory (smell) senses should
substantially improve the overall reliability.

Given the availability of network based controls and operator display equipment,
consideration should be given to equipping the operator's control desk with
annunciation, monitoring and visual monitors. This will assure that a quick response
and coordinated action can be taken to safely manage both fire suppression and
HVDC transmission operations.

10.2.2 Classification by Detection Objective

Fire alarm systems can be classified according to the objective of detection into:

. Those particularly designed for prompt detection.

. Those designed to automatically trip the convertor and possibly activate the fire
suppression system.

. Those for which the objective is to alert the operator to initiate the visual
monitoring by television systems, etc.
If the conditions leading to fire can be detected, it may be possible to avoid fire by
tripping the convertor and thereby cutting off the source of energy. This possibility is
very attractive since there will be no need for actuation of the fire suppression
system, thereby minimizing the time required for clean up and restoration. An
example of an alarm system for early detection of fire is one which is designed to
detect the existence of an arc by means of light. If sensors are appropriately located
and set, the generation of an arc can be detected in a matter of a few milliseconds.

49
 Detector systems which sense infra-red or ultra-violet from radiation (the high
temperature of an arc), can also be used for this purpose.

10.2.3 Detection System Reliability

If desired, redundancy for valve hall applications can be achieved by providing two
or more detectors for each valve hall. If two or more detectors are in an alarm state,
the alarm would be considered as confirmed, and relays would be actuated to de-
energize the associated convertor. False fire signals, leading to tripping of the
convertor or activation of automatic fire suppression systems, will seriously
aggravate the reliability of HVDC systems. The following provisions could prevent
such situations:

. Setting the sensors with appropriate sensitivity.

. Providing supervision of the fire alarm system.
. Providing appropriate time delay in the detection circuits to avoid the effect of
interference.
. Providing redundant fire detection systems using the same sensing principles.
. Providing multiple detection alarm systems having different fire sensing
principles.
. Combining the fire detection signal with those of equipment failure detection or
electrical circuit protection relays.

One approach to the reliability issue is to use the system only to alert the operators
who will take action only after they have confirmed the situation visually. For systems
installed to detect major arcing faults, automatic blocking of the convertor will be
essential. Reliability is then dependent on the other provisions listed above.

Serious consequences can arise from false activation of a fire suppression system.
In most cases, fire action should only be taken manually after visual confirmation
that a fire exists, that the affected zone has been properly identified and that,
following de-energisation, the fire has not self-extinguished or remained contained
within limits allowed for in the design.

10.3 Fire Control System

The fire control system may consist of some or all the following, which are shown in
Figure 10.1:
. Fire detection, arc detection, and monitoring system.
. Fire alarm annunciation system (local and remote).
. Smoke management system.
. Fire suppression systems.
. Heating ventilation and air conditoning system emergency control.
. Control desk display.
. Video surveillance system.
. Emergency power and supervision.
. Sequence of events recorder.

The fire control system may be based on conventional and/or microprocessor based
logic systems, depending on the staffing, HVDC station complexity and local fire
codes. This part of the system may also drive the operator interface and
annunciation through window type annunciation, CRT "window type" display or a
combination of methods. Important characteristics of this central component are:

. Fail safe operation.

. Complete system integration.
. Testing and self-diagnostic capabilities.
. Ease of maintenance.
. Flexibility to modify inputs, alarm thresholds and control actions.
. Robust electrical construction to withstand the interference levels encountered
in high voltage substation environments.

50
 . Ability to be expanded and reprogrammed by the owner.
. System support.

It is important to note that the annunciation and interfaces with local fire brigades are
usually subject to country codes and some specific customising may be necessary.
Design of displays for the HVDC system operator need to be straightforward and
uncomplicated so that in the event of an alarm unambiguous and decisive actions
can be taken without having to consult instruction books or supplier documentation.

10.3.1 Basic System Functions

The basic functions in a typical time sequence of the fire control system are:

. The detection of a fire event.

. Location indication alarm.
. Annunciation.
. Alarm verification (cross zone).
. Provide visual verification.
. Notify fire brigade and system dispatcher.
. If convertor not already tripped, alert operators for convertor tripping action.
. Prime fire extinguishing systems.
. Trip, isolate and earth involved equipment.
. Shut down valve hall air handling units.
. Initiate the smoke management system.
. Provide monitoring and control of the fire extinguishing actions.

It is recommended to have the status of operation of fire protection facilities and

operating status of major equipments displayed, as well as the display of the
occurrence of the fire and the location of fire, on the main control desk or nearby
panel. For remotely controlled stations, it is desirable to provide means of monitoring
the station conditions at a manned controlling station.

The fire suppression systems may be controlled manually or automatically. A manual

control scheme is usually adopted at manned stations where individual operators
actions, such as starting up of each equipment, may be performed step-by-step, or
may be controlled in a group to speed up the fire extinguishing operation. In
unmanned stations, the overall control of fire suppression facilities may be
performed automatically. The prevention of faulty actuation of a fire suppression
system is a requirement of the automatic scheme.

Fire suppression systems may cause additional damage if they actuate while the
convertor is energized. Consideration must be given to the inclusion of interlocks
with the main circuit equipment to prevent operation of the fire suppression systems
while the equipment is energised.

In addition, fire control systems should be equipped for the following functions:
. Monitoring function capable of confirming the extent of fire propagation and
extinction of fire including detector system function and zone mapping.

. Recording functions by which the information related to the sequence of

occurrence of fire, extinction of fire, operation of fire suppression systems, and
occurrence of faults on system components can be logged.
. Functions to monitor the system components and detect faults of the fire control
components including the condition of the fire extinguishing agents, e.g. water
and/or gas pressure and precharge status.

The alarm and control system should be independently powered and supplied with
battery backup to provide alarm annunciation and control of fire extinguishing
systems in the event the main auxiliary power systems is unavailable.

10.3.2 Other System Components

51
 Other system components include the following items:

. Fire alarm manual call boxes/pull stations.

. Fire alarm horns, buzzers, strobes and annunciators.
. Fire door control.
. Fire shutters for windows.
. Fire mains (water) control and status.
. System fault alarms.

These systems need to be integrated in accordance with applicable codes and

country regulations. NFPA (US) standards may provide additional guidance on the
acceptable methods and installation requirements of these specific equipment items.

10.3.3 Outline of System Design

The fire control system can have a variety of designs depending on the size of the
HVDC convertor, related AC substation, its importance in the power system,
equipment layout inside the valve hall, the economic consideration and the overall
HVDC design approach. These elements are shown interconnected in Figure 10.1.
Power supplies for the fire control system must not be affected by the fire event and
should have at least 12 hour backup battery systems independent of the HVDC
station control battery. The exact arrangement will be site specific, and the
configuration suggested by Figure 10.1 is provided to show the inter-relationship
between the various subsystems of the overall fire control system.

10.4. Actual Practice

In designing the specific system configuration of a fire control system, the fire codes
enforced in each country must be observed, along with the owners' operating
procedures. The following examples are provided to show different possible
approaches to system design.

10.4.1 Example of Sandy Pond HVDC Convertor Terminal

1. The overall objective at the Sandy Pond Convertor Terminal was to quickly
detect and minimise the impact of a fire in a valve hall. After thoroughly
reviewing past fires involving HVDC facilities, it was determined that five areas
of concern needed to be addressed:

. Personnel safety
. Fire detection and suppression
. Structural integrity
. Clean up requirements

. Smoke management

2. Before selecting a fire detection and location system, ultra-violet and infra-red
sensors, visual and infra-red video, and air sampling particle detection systems
were compared and examined. Based on this study, an air sampling system
Type V (see section 7) was selected. Each multiple valve unit (MVU) is
considered as a separate zone, and the sampling ports of air sampling system
are installed above each of the three MVUs and inside the valve hall air
conditioning return air duct. In addition to the air sampling detection system,
windows are provided in the valve hall so that station personnel can visually
observe the conditions when the location and magnitude of fire is not evident.

3. To provide fire suppression of the thyristor valves, a special spray system was
designed. The system is of the deluge type with a separate piping system for
each quadruple thyristor valve. Fire control and suppression for a wall bushing
fire is provided by a fire fighting foam distribution system using sprinkler heads.

52
 4. Smoke management capabilities, such as smoke dampers and forced valve hall
ventilation are also provided.

5. The fire control panels contain the zone alarms for the air sampling system, the
deluge valve light indicators, smoke damper controls and status lights, and
control for the smoke management system.

6. Each item of the system is independent and requires operator action.

10.4.2 Example of CU HVDC Convertor

1. The thyristor valves used in the CU Project are air-cooled, with high valve hall
airflow. The station is not constantly manned. Therfore, difficult conditions for
fire detection are presented. Based on owner initiated studies, the smoke
detection system and the arc detection system have been adopted as the fire
detection systems.

2. The smoke detection system is based on an air sampling system, Type I, (see
section 7).

3. The detection time of a smoke detecting systems is too long when a severe
failure occurs on the valve hall equipment. For this reason, a system which
detects arcing faults by a visible light sensor has been developed and adopted
for the CU Project, Reference 1. This system can detect an arc with a time lag
of several tens of milliseconds.

4. Water sprinklers, CO2, Halon, other gases and foam have all been examined.
They have all been found to have drawbacks, including clean up cost,
environmental impact and compatibility with the existing building. Therefore, no
fire suppression system has been installed. Operation is based on the
philosophy that, if a valve abnormality is quickly detected, and the electric
power to the valve hall is removed, virtually all events would be self-
extinguishing.

5. Operator intervention is required via SCADA control.

10.5 Operating Experience in Japan

Japanese HVDC substations have operated without a recorded fire. The EPDC and
TEPCO companies of Japan report that strict specification and design review have
minimized the fire risk in the valve halls and inspection of valve components during
maintenance has provided good experience.

Detection and monitoring systems are designed to alert the station operators, but the
tripping of the HVDC system is a manually initiated operation.

No active suppression systems have been installed by EPDC.

10.6 Guidelines for Integrated Fire Control Systems

Since each country has its own relevant fire protection codes, and the design of the
fire control system for valve halls must comply to these national codes, this
document should facilitate the recognition and adoption of reasonable applications of
these codes.

In addition, special conditions may be imposed by local codes and owner

specifications for the design of fire detection/protection systems for valve halls.

53
In HVDC substations there can be either automatic or manual control arrangements.
These arrangements require prudent review to minimize the damage from mis-
operation by automatic action.

Available fire detection/alarm systems do not have long operating histories, making
the reliability of such systems difficult to determine statistically. Since unnecessary
tripping of a convertor or the actuation of a fire suppression system by a false alarm
could substantially degrade the HVDC system reliability, as well as result in lost
revenue, fire suppression systems are usually manually operated.

The selection between an automatic or manual convertor tripping system must be

based on a judgment which takes into account: the specific interconnected a.c.
system impacts caused by a monopolar or bipolar emergency tripping of the HVDC
system, the relative damage to the convertors caused by the fire extinguishing
agents and the skill of the operating staff.

Since continued technology development is expected for the detection systems and
the components that make up a valve hall fire control system, it is recommended
that the HVDC system specifier should consult the HVDC system suppliers, fire
suppression system suppliers, and recognized technical experts in the fire protection
field.

54
55
11. FIRE FIGHTING AND MAINTENANCE

11.1 Introduction

The actual techniques used in fighting a fire in an HVDC installation will depend upon
the type of fire suppression system available, the available personnel and local
practice. For example, if a carbon dioxide gas system were installed, evacuation of
the affected area would be a prime requisite since suffocation of personnel can
occur, whereas if water were used or if no specific provisions had been provided, the
objective would be to enable fire-fighters to approach the fire as quickly and safely
as possible.

Despite the potential technical attractiveness of gas suppression systems, the cost,
complexity and site implications of these systems have prevented their use in valve
halls up to the present time. Therefore, this section will be devoted to fire fighting
issues related to non-gas systems, it being understood that if gas systems are
applied, the procedures would be significantly different. Halon protection of control
and auxiliary areas is widely used and procedures are well documented elsewhere.

11.2 Role of station and fire fighting personnel

Unless the user is prepared to maintain a fire fighting training programme, the role of
station personnel will normally be limited to detecting the fire, notifying appropriate
authorities, isolating the affected areas, initiating installed fire suppression systems
and evacuating personnel. If the valve equipment has been constructed of self
extinguishing fire materials as far as possible and if non self extinguishing materials
have been segregated by fire resistant barriers, actual fire fighting may not be
required. When required, fighting a fire in a valve hall can be extremely hazardous
as a result of the heat, toxic fumes and the possibility of valve collapse. The owner
should consider the extent to which his personnel should be trained to intervene in
fire fighting.

11.2.1 Actions in Case of a Fire

Station personnel will need to be familiar with the correct actions/procedures

associated with the following typical sequence of events.

a) Detection - By means of air sampling systems, visual observation, electrical

monitoring or other means.
b) Verification - By visual means through the viewing windows, cameras if
available, increasing levels of magnitude on more than one channel of the air
sampling smoke detection system or operational abnormalities.
c) De-energisation - If not already de-energised by protective action, block and trip
the affected convertor.
d) Isolation - Isolate and earth the affected valve hall.
e) Evacuation of Personnel.
f) Notification - of systems operators, station management, local fire brigade, etc.
g) Shut down of valve hall air handling units.
h) Initiation of smoke management system.
i) Initiation of fire suppression system
j) Coordination with local fire authorities
k) Other actions in accordance with the contigency plans for dealing with a fire.

11.2.2 Fire fighting

Unless the user has trained the station personnel in fire fighting techniques, fire
fighting will be carried out by the local fire brigade. For example in the US,
requirements for the effective participation of the local fire brigade include:

56
 a) Advanced training which includes information on the construction of the
terminal, location of entrances and exits, the smoke management system,
electrical system problem areas and any special fire fighting requirements.

b) Prompt notification that a fire has been detected, identification of the precise
location of the fire, and a knowledgeable terminal coordinator who will meet
them at the gate with all pertinent informa-tion, including the status of electrical
isolation.

c) Early operation of the smoke management system will be beneficial, but self-
contained breathing apparatus must be available for the fire fighting personnel
since toxic fumes are a characteristic of this type of fire. Without an effective
smoke management system it is possible that visibility will be inadequate for
effective work in the valve hall.

d) Specific instructions and precautions should be provided where applicable for:

1. Use of hand held equipment.
2. Foam systems.
3. Deluge systems.
4. Drains.
5. Smoke handling.

11.2.3 Examples of station emergency instructions

a) Station Instructions (Sandy Pond);

1. Vesda emergency response procedures (flow chart); figure 11.1.

2. Emergency Evacuation Procedures; example 11.1.

b) Station Instructions (New Zealand); example 11.2.

11.3 Example of Maintenance programme (Sandy Pond)

a) Smoke detection air sampling system. Maintenance in accordance with

instruction book every 6 months
b) HVAC - (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning). In accordance with normal
station procedures.
c) Smoke management system. A successful step-by-step procedure was
developed for the installation, checked out and has been implemented.
Frequency of check-out is under review.
d) Fire Department relationships. Since personnel in the local fire department as
well as the station may change with time, refresher meetings are scheduled on
at least an annual basis to make sure all personnel are trained and aware of any
changes which have been made in either the station or the facilities of the fire
department.
e) Valve hall preventive maintenance. Electrical and mechanical maintenance will
be performed annually as a matter of station operation. During this time, special
attention will be paid to potential fire hazards such as loose connections and
water couplings.
f) Training programme. Updating the training of site personnel is as important as
equipment maintenance. Periodic updating of existing personnel and specific
training of new personnel is carried out as required.
g) Portable extinguishers. Maintained in accordance with the state fire code
requirements.

57
58
 EXAMPLE 11.1

SANDY POND

EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURE

GENERAL Follow these instruction anytime everyone must leave the building during
an emergency.

PROCEDURE Detection of a fire, release of hazardous materials, or bomb threat must

be reported immediately to the Network Coordinator. The Network
Coordinator will sound the fire alarm and call the Fire Department.

ALARM SIGNAL The Network Coordinator will announce on the public address system
three times: "Evacuate the Building". All personnel must evacuate the
building immediately. Special instructions will be issued to individuals
whose duties require continued operations following the alarm.
Employees must assemble in the parking lot in front of the O & M
building. It will be announced when safe for employees to return to work.

EXITS Exits and approved access and evacuation routes for each area are
indicated on Building layout Plans (located throughout the building).

Every employee is required to become familiar with procedures and

evacuation routes.

HVDC
SUPERVISOR Must be responsible for making sure all personnel in their departments
are accounted for. Individuals, working under instruction from HVDC
Supervisors, will be given instructions to support fire fighting and clean up
efforts, and will report back to the HVDC Supervisors after assignments
are complete.

SAFETY For your own safety, everyone must evacuate promptly in an orderly
manner.

EXAMPLE 11.2

HAYWARDS AND BENMORE POLE 2 CONVERTOR STATIONS FIRE

ALARM RESPONSE POLICY

The Pole should only be tripped if a fire is going to cause direct or consequential damage to
the Valves or other primary plant.

Note: Haywards sector panel is connected to the New Zealand Fire Services (NZFS) and any
alarm condition will be relayed directly to the NZFS.

CONVENTIONAL FIRE SYSTEMS

On receipt of an alarm initiated by conventional smoke detectors, heat detectors, or manual call
points, in the first instance the alarms should be reset at the building fire panel. If the alarm will not
reset then the source of the alarm should be investigated. If fire is present then:

59
a) Notify Control Centre that Pole 2 is subject to emergency trip.
b) Notify NZFS via 111.
c) TRIP the Pole if the fire is going to cause direct or consequential damage to the valves or other
primary plant.
d) Extinguish fire using portable extinguishers if possible.
e) Evacuate building.
f) Commence isolation and earthing of valve hall and transformer if fire in valve hall or on other
primary equipment.
g) Dispatch operator to meet NZFS at main sector panel.

TRANSFORMER DELUGE SYSTEM

If transformer Deluge system initiated:

1) Notify Control Centre that Pole 2 is subject to emergency trip.

2) Inspect transformer bays.

If fire is present:

a) TRIP Convertor
b) Notify NZFS via 111
c) Commence isolation and earthing of transformer
d) Dispatch operator to meet NZFS at main sector panel

If no fire present:

a) Reset all Alarms

b) Abort deluge water flow

SMOKE ALARM SYSTEM

Valve Hall East and West

This indicates smoke particles in the valve hall.

If smoke alarm received

1) Notify Control Centre that Pole 2 is subject to emergency trip.

Alarm Level 1 or 2

1) Reset Alarm level at control Panel in Pole Control Room.

If alarm does not reset within 10 sec.:

a) Shut down AHU7 and Fan 10.

b) Inspect valve hall via CCTV or windows. If fire present then TRIP Convertor.
c) Notify NZFS via 111.
d) Commence isolation and earthing of valve hall.
e) Dispatch operator to meet NZFS at main sector panel.

Alarm Level 3

1) Reset Alarm at Smoke Alarm System control Panel in Pole 2 Control Room.

60
If Alarm does not reset within 10 sec.:

a) TRIP Convertor.
b) Notify NZFS via 111.
c) Shut down AHU7 and Fan 10.
d) Inspect Valve Hall via CCTV or windows.
e) Commence Isolation and Earthing of Valve Hall.
f) Dispatch operator to meet NZFS at main sector panel.

Valve Hall Supply Duct

This indicates smoke particles entering the air conditioning system outside the building.

If Alarm Received from Smoke Alarm System

Alarm Level 1, 2 or 3

1) Reset Alarm at Smoke Alarm System control Panel in Pole 2 Control Room.

If Alarm does not reset within 10 sec.:

a) Shut down AHU7.

b) Inspect Valve Hall via CCTV or windows. If fire present then TRIP Convertor, then manually
initiate smoke relief damper system.
c) Notify NZFS via 111.
d) Commence Isolation and Earthing of valve Hall.
e) Dispatch operator to meet NZFS at main sector panel.

Control Room Ceiling Space, Floor or Return Duct

Alarm Level 1, 2 or 3

1) Reset Alarm at Smoke Alarm System control Panel in Pole 2 Control Room.

If Alarm does not reset within 10 sec, inspect Room and rest of building, if fire present then:

a) Notify NZFS via 111.

b) Ensure controls selected to SCADA, transfer control to AC station Control room,and prepare to
evacuate building.
c) Attempt to extinguish fire with portable extinguishers.
d) Dispatch operator to meet NZFS at main sector panel.

12. ACTIONS AFTER A FIRE IS EXTINGUISHED

12.1 Introduction

A fire inside a valve hall can cause damage to the electrical equipment, the
mechanical structure of the valve and to the building. The fire damage can be
substantial. In addition, damage could be caused by combustion products deposited
on the various surfaces.

Water from leaks within the valves or from water if used for fire fighting is another
potential source for damage after a fire is extinguished. Combustion products in
combination with water can cause corrosion of metals or leave conductive layers on

61
 insulating materials. Corrosion can start immediately after a fire and progress rapidly.
The degree of damage will tend to be greater the longer the surfaces are exposed to
the contaminants.

The air conditioning or ventilation system can distribute the fire combustion products
throughout the valve hall and also to other rooms through the ventilation ductworks.
To limit this effect, it is beneficial to stop these ventilation systems as soon as a fire
is detected and to activate the smoke management systems.

Before any clean-up or restoration is attempted, it must be recognised that the wide
variety of plastics and other materials used in the thyristor valves and other valve
hall equipment can produce a mixture of solid, liquid and gaseous combustion
products which could be hazardous to human health. No one should enter a valve
hall after a fire, without proper protective clothing, until a responsible authority has
issued clearance to do so.

The first step to reduce the amount of damage is to reduce the valve hall humidity to
as low as possible, ideally to below 40 to 50%; the rate of corrosion will be lowered
significantly. Wet equipment has to be wiped dry or carefully blown dry with dry air at
low pressure. Floors and channels in the floor must be dried. Warm air drying at not
greater than 40 to 50oC supplemented by dehumidification will assist the drying
process.

12.2 Inspection

It is recommended that the damage after a fire should be analysed by the owner, the
manufacturer and restoration experts. This team has to determine the amount of
damage and contamination and determine the course of action.

12.3 Methods to evaluate the level of contamination

The level of contamination can be assessed by visual, optical and chemical analysis.

The composition and concentration of the contaminants are analysed by chemical

methods. Metals can show a much higher contamination than plastics or glass due to
the formation of salts. Samples taken by wiping give the average surface load, but
the local concentration can be much higher.

When the severity and composition of the contamination are determined, the next
step is to plan for the cleaning and restoration of the equipment. The plan should
include the identification of nonrestorable parts, the methods and sequence of
cleaning, a time schedule and the estimated cost of restoration vs. replacement of
various equipment.

12.4 Cleaning Methods

Before cleaning commences, attention should be given to the possible effect of

cleaning agents on the equipment, e.g. compatibility of certain solvents with plastic
materials.

In some cases, the equipment has to be dismantled to ensure thorough cleaning. The
cleaning methods depend on the type and amount of contamination on the equip-
ment. Coarse contamination can be removed by a vacuum cleaner or compressed
air at low pressure (about 0.7 MPa); special care should be taken to prevent
spreading of contamination to other surfaces and equipment.

Usually, clean water is the preferred agent for cleaning. Spray cleaning with
deionized water at low pressure (0.15 - 3.5 MPa) is a typical method. Aqueous
cleaning solutions can be warmed up (40 to 50°C) to increase the cleaning effect. A
pre-wash with a solution of a mild detergent in deionized water, as approved by the

62
 manufacturer, could speed up the process. It is important to avoid any
recontamination during the cleaning process.

After cleaning, the water may be driven out by alcohol. To remove any residual
moisture, some items may be dried in special ovens.

If the fire has contaminated the building as well; the walls, the ceiling and the floor
must be cleaned. Where cleaning with water is not suitable, other cleaning agents as
approved by the supplier can be used.

The examples 1 and 2 of cleaning procedures provided at the end of this section for
the fires in Chateauguay and Dorsey are examples of cleaning instructions inside
valve hall and thyristor modules.

12.5 Testing

After cleaning and restoration is complete, the affected equipment should be

subjected to a programme of mechanical and electrical tests.

Mechanical tests:

All components in the valve hall should be checked for mechanical integrity, torque
and proper fit. Tests as recommended by the supplier should be carried out on the
valve cooling circuit.

Electrical tests :

Affected parts of the equipment should be recommis-sioned in accordance with the

manufacturer's recommendations. Some high voltage dielectric tests may be
necessary to verify the effectiveness of the cleaning.

EXAMPLE 1

FIRE IN CHATEAUGUAY GROUP 1 CONVERTOR

On December 26 1984, the explosion of a neutral dc wall bushing set loose the
flexible dc current cable which carried 3600 A. The resulting series arc struck the
nearest valve base electronic cubicle (which is mounted in the valve hall), setting on
fire all material inside it. The same arc caused melting of steel, damage to concrete
and burning of electrical and optical cables.

The contamination on the thyristor modules after the fire in the valve hall was
analysed. The main component was found to be soot, polluted by aluminium, copper
and chlorides.

The cleaning instructions for the thyristor modules were the following:

- Remove thyristor modules from the valve towers according to the

maintenance manual.

1. Pre-wash cleaning.

1.1 Clean the module cover using a vacuum cleaner.

1.2 Remove the module cover.
1.3 Check the thyristor level, damping capacitors or valve compensating
capacitor for leakage. Disman-tle damaged capacitors.

63
1.4 Clean the whole module using a vacuum cleaner.
1.5 Clean the module with oil-free and dry air (outside the valve hall).
1.6 Remove the thyristor electronics circuit boards.

2. Wet cleaning.

2.1 Install a mechanical support for the RC-unit to prevent the insulators from
mechanical damage during rotation in the cleaning chamber.
2.2 Push the module in the cleaning chamber. Avoid shock stresses.
2.3 Clean the module under high pressure (150 ...200 bar at nozzle outlet).
Cleaning agent: mixture of 94% freon TF, 6% methanol.
2.4 Dry the module. Remove residues of the cleaning agent with oil-free and dry
air.

3. Testing.

Take wiping samples from the surface of the module and analyse the
residual chloride concentration. The permissible surface concentration
should be less than 3 micro g/cm2. For a concentration higher than 5 micro
g/cm2, the module surfaces must be cleaned again.

Retest all modules, install in the valve towers and check for proper
connections.

Regrease all surfaces of zinc chromated steel after the tests.

EXAMPLE 2

FIRE IN NELSON RIVER BIPOLE 2

On October 4, 1987, the explosion and burning of the 500 kV dc wall bushing of the
Nelson River Bipole 2 convertor at Dorsey resulted in smoke, chemical pollution and
oil within the valve structures and valve hall 32.

Cleaning Instructions Following The Bushing Failure:

Samples of the bushing oil on the floor of the valve hall plus swab samples from the
surfaces of the valve structure, the covers of the thyristor and the reactor modules
were taken. The samples were sent for chemical analysis. The results showed that
there were no chlorides.

During the process of cleaning of the valve hall, all access doors were kept closed
except when necessary to transport equipment.

A) Thyristor valves:

- All thyristor and reactor modules were removed from the valve structure
and placed in a separate room.
- All module covers were removed.
- Careful examination of each module was conducted. In areas of the
modules where it was difficult to see, a set of mirrors was used to conduct
the examination.
- Dry vacuum cleaners were used to clean the soot in every module.
- Dry air at low pressure was used to blow any loose soot.

64
 - Using lint-free cloth and electronic contact cleaner spray, all thyristors
within the module as well as any other components were cleaned.
- Each thyristor and reactor module was retested both electrically and
mechanically (flow and pressure tests) as per the original commissioning
instructions.
- The valve structure was inspected closely, especially all the inter-tier
capacitors and the valve support insulators.
- The valve structures were hand wiped using lint-free cloth and deionized
water.
- All valve structures were electrically tested as per the commissioning
instructions.

B) Valve Hall:

- All the valve hall walls and floor were washed with mild detergent and
water.
- Oil samples were taken from all the remaining wall bushings.
- All the wall bushings, bus bars, and any valve hall support insulators were
hand wiped with lint free cloth and water.
- Capacitance and dissipation factor measurements were taken on all wall
bushings.

C) Valve Hall Energisation:

Following a thorough inspection of the valve hall, it was energised from both the
AC and the DC sides but without deblocking it. The valve hall equipment was
kept under observation in this condition for 24 hours. This was followed by
deblocking of the convertor.

13. GUIDANCE FOR PURCHASER SPECIFICATIONS

13.1 Introduction

Recent fire incidents in thyristor valves and in valve halls have shown the need for a
re-evaluation of the convertor station specification.

Purchaser specifications should require measures to minimise the risk of a fire in a

valve hall, to prevent it from spreading should it occur and to minimise the time and
costs associated with restoring the equipment and facilities.

Consideration of fire hazards should be included at all of the following phases of the
project.

. preparation of purchaser specification

. project design and engineering
. selection of materials and components
. manufacturing, assembly and testing
. operation and maintenance.

13.2 Purchaser specification

The specification should at least cover the following aspects.

65
 In this report, only general guidelines are given. These guidelines will have to be
interpreted in the context of each application.

13.2.1 General

The following general aspects should be considered:

. Site and environmental conditions

. National and local safety codes
. Applicable fire standards and guides
. Insurance companies terms and conditions
. Local fire department safety rules and practices.

13.2.2 Thyristor Valves

The specification should emphasise the need for the valves to be designed to
minimise the risk of a fire developing and to limit the consequences.

Fire risks should be minimised by:

- Rating of components for normal and abnormal operating conditions including

electrical, thermal and mechanical stresses which occur throughout the
operating life. Adequate margins for aging and degradation of electrical, thermal
and mechanical properties should be provided.

- Considering possible failure modes and fire risk consequences. This should
guide the selection and positioning of materials and components consistent with
their required function in the design. The aim should be to minimise failure
probabilities or ensure that any resulting fires are contained.

- Applying appropriate quality control, inspection and test procedures at all stages
of the design, manufacture, installation and commissioning to ensure conformity
with the requirements and consis-tency in performance.

- Having comprehensive repair/maintenance instruc-tions in the operation and

maintenance manual to alert the user to potential fire hazards and provide
guidelines on how to deal with them.

- Including supervision/monitoring systems to detect problems at an early stage.

Consequences should be minimised by:

- Reducing the energy infeed during and after a fault. This has two components:

a) Electrical: the electrical energy released will depend on the nature of the
fault and the time taken to detect and de-energize the equipment. Rapid
detection is desirable.

b) Chemical: chemical energy released by combustion should be minimised

by using non combustible or self-extinguishing materials wherever possible:
UL94-VO (or equivalent - see Appendix 2) is a target for self-extinguishing
capability. Where this is not achievable, due to other technical
considerations e.g. impregnating fluid of capaci-tors, then the quantities of

66
 such material should be minimised and special attention given to ensure
compliance with other requirements of this section.

- Providing fire separation barriers (or other features) so that, for the worst cases
of energy infeed per a) and b) above, the following objectives are met:

i) to prevent spread of fire from the immediate vicinity of an initiating fault;

ii) to avoid threat to the mechanical integrity of the valve structure;

iii) to limit consequential damage which would require unacceptably long

restoration time.

Restoration will comprise:

a) Time to repair/replace damaged components. This should be minimised by

ensuring only easily repai-rable/replaceable items are vulnerable to damage and
that adequate contingency spares are provided in the contract.

b) Time to clean-up contaminated but otherwise undamaged components.

Contingency plans for clean-up following a worst case event should be provided
and the basic cleaning methods and materials should be identified. The degree
of contamination should be minimised by:

- limiting the amount of material involved in an incident as stated above;

- providing proper smoke management in the valve hall to limit cross
contamination between valve structures;
- using fire fighting agents only as a last resort.

At the tender stage, the purchaser should request a report describing the design
approach used to deal with the fire hazards discussed in section 4. This should
include details of the types and quantities of materials used in the valve, with special
attention to those items which do not meet UL94-VO rating or equivalent. The report
should address the consequences of and precautions against:

- faults in electrical components such as: damping resistors, damping capacitors,

series reactors, thyristor level electronics, etc;
- series arcs due to an open circuit in auxiliary circuit wiring or in the main current
path;
- shunt arcs due e.g. to insulation failure between tiers caused by pollution or a
coolant leak;

- component overheating due to coolant leakage or blockage arising from a

damaged hose or hose termination, corrosion, or debris circulating in the cooling
system. etc.

The worst case scenario should be identified.

The purchaser could request that, at the contract stage the worst case scenario
should be demonstrated by test not to give rise to fire damage beyond that foreseen
in the design. The test should comprise a flame test of intensity and duration
dependent on the failure mode and the time to detect. The test should be applied to
a sufficient representation of a portion of a valve to demonstrate that the objectives
have been met.
Structural components of the valve assembly (e.g. support/suspension insulators,
valve section structural frames, etc.) should be shown to retain their mechanical
integrity when subjected to the elevated temperatures and exposure times
associated with the worst case fire scenario allowed for in the design.

13.2.3 Valve Hall Bushings

67
 The a.c. connections to the convertor must penetrate the valve hall via bushings.
Except in some back-to-back schemes, d.c. bushings are also required. The
bushings may be separate wall bushings or be the valve winding bushings of the
convertor transformer (a.c.) or the convertor side bushing of an oil-insulated
smoothing reactor (d.c.).

Bushings may be of solid, gas or oil-insulated construction. Oil-filled bushings have

typically been applied for voltages above 350 kV and hence pose a particular fire
hazard because of the large capacity of flammable material they contain and the
speed with which this material can be made available for combustion.

For convertor transformer bushings and oil-insulated smoothing reactor bushings,

there is the further possibility that a bushing fault could lead to large additional
quantities of oil being discharged into the valve hall. Precautions should be taken to
prevent this occurrence but the measures adopted should be examined closely and
the strategy for dealing with the associated fire hazard chosen accordingly.

Solid and gas-insulated bushing technology is evolving and offers the prospect of oil-
free bushings for the future, even at the highest application voltages. This trend is to
be encouraged. It should be noted, however, that an explosive failure of an oil-free
bushing can still lead to discharge of oil from the tank of a convertor transformer or
an oil-insulated smoothing reactor.

Where oil-filled bushings are used, rock pits or containment areas with berms should
be considered, together with aqueous foam deluge, which should be discharged only
over the affected bushing(s).

Regular checks of oil level and quality should be made according to the
manufacturer's guidelines. On-line monitoring of oil or bushing condition may help to
identify early signs of progressive failure.

If the thyristor valves are designed in accordance with 13.2.2 above, then the (oil-
filled) bushings are likely to represent the largest fire hazard in the valve hall.

13.2.4 Other Valve Hall Equipment

Equipment such as voltage dividers, current transfor-mers, arresters, suspension

insulators, bus work and load current connections in the valve hall present a direct or
indirect risk of fire. The purchaser specification for these items should require the
supplier to minimise fire hazards consistent with the other requirements of the
specification. Where possible, use of equipment filled with oil should be avoided. The
impact of equipment failure on other adjacent equipment should be considered in the
design.

13.2.5 Valve hall construction

The following aspects are important to consider:

. valve hall layout

. building materials
. valve hall access and egress
. oil drainage pit or containment berms
. visual inspection or other means.
. external fire exposure.

In addition to the fire aspect of valve hall equipment, the specification should
address more specifically the valve hall construction.

The fire risks and consequences can be minimised by:

68
 - Valve hall isolation against the spread of fire by suitably rated fire walls, floors
and ceilings.

All seals in openings in walls, floors and ceilings should be fire rated to the same
level as the wall, floor or ceiling penetrated. In addition, all openings in walls,
floors and ceilings, whether fire rated or not, should be sealed to prevent smoke
penetration to adjacent areas.

- Ensuring that any viewing windows or video cameras are arranged so that the
maximum practical area of the valve hall is within line of vision. If inspection of
the valves by entering the valve halls via a shielded walkway during energized
operation is required, it must be specified.

- Providing facilities for personnel to smell the air from the valve hall (e.g. via
bleed pipes from a return air-duct or through the valve hall wall into a vestibule,
etc.).

- Including fire rated doors and windows between the service block and valve hall.
The doors should be adequately air tight.

- Provision of emergency exits.

The valve halls should have physical clearances sufficient to permit inspection of
valves, provide access of mobile valve servicing equipment without dismantling of
valve hall equipment, and ensure adequate access for fire fighting personnel.

All the systems and equipment should be designed to meet the requirements of the
National and Local Fire Codes. Systems and equipment that are not covered by local
rules and regulations should be designed in accordance with applicable standards.
Even though valve halls may not be specifically covered by these standards, valve
hall construction should ensure equivalent fire protection measures are included.

Structural steel should be designed to withstand a major fire without unacceptable

permanent deformation.

Suitable fire segregation and compartmentation should be used for all valve hall
services (e.g. cables, fibre optics, cooling pipes, ducts, etc).

13.2.6 Fire detection systems

As mentioned in chapter 7, fire detection systems suitable for valve hall application
have been become available in recent years.

The purchaser specification should include a requirement for a fire detection system
capable of early detection of incipient fire and smoke. This system should be tested
in the field in order to verify that the specification requirements are met.

An air sampling smoke detection system is recommended, possibly reinforced by the

use of arc detectors. In addition, conventional systems could be specified to conform
to local fire regulations and insurance company requirements.

A typical arrangement of an air sampling system for a water cooled valve is given by
figure 13.1.

For unmanned stations and for convertor stations where it is not possible to view all
parts of the valves when energized, a camera system would be very useful.

Typically, an air sampling system should be installed in each valve hall for early
detection of incipient fire and smoke. For fast response there should be sufficent
number and distribution of air sampling points for each valve structure and the

69
 ventilation air ducts. The detector and control unit should be located outside the
valve hall for ease of verification and maintenance.

13.2.7 Fire suppression systems

The specification of the station fire protection should address the special
requirements for protection of the valves and valve hall equipment.

The actual system required will depend on the design of the valves and valve halls
and could include both active and passive systems.

Typically, a fire suppression system should :

a) Contain and/or extinguish a fire in a valve or valve section.

b) Keep the valve and other valve hall equipment structural components and their
supporting arrangements cool in the event of a fire, unless the valve and valve
hall design limits the maximum expected fire temperature to acceptable limits.

c) Provide means to extinguish an oil fire resulting from a rupture or leak of a wall
or transformer bushing in the valve hall.

d) Provide means to extinguish any other fire inside the valve hall.

Active Systems

- Sprinkler/deluge system
A valve hall sprinkler/deluge system may be fed via external sources of supply
such as a fire hydrant via hose and/or a fire truck, or through the station fire
water system. Manual connection can be acceptable.

- Foam System
A valve hall foam system should include a foam induction/mixing apparatus for
mixing foam concentrate and water in the proper proportions. The foam-water
solution should be pumped by a plant system or a fire truck.

- Gaseous Systems
A valve hall gaseous fire suppression system should include all equipment
required for directing the gas discharge at a fire. Gaseous systems include fixed
systems, wheeled carriages loaded with cylinders and hand held extinguishers.
The effective reach of gas jets from portable extinguishers should enable the
suppression of small fires that could develop anywhere in a valve or valve hall.
Fixed systems should cover dedicated areas.

Active systems can be manually or automatically activated, however caution should

be exercised if automatic activation is selected (see section 10).

Passive Systems

- Rock pits/berms

Rock pits and containment basins should be installed below the wall bushings as
described in section 5.

- Oil blocking devices

Oil blocking devices should be incorporated in the bushing design to prevent oil
leakage into the hall, when transformers or oil filled smoothing reactors are adjacent
to the valve hall.

70
71
13.2.8 Smoke management system

Each valve hall should normally have an independent air handling system. In
addition, a smoke management system could be specified to:

a) Evacuate smoke from the affected valve hall so that the source of the fire can
be quickly determined and the degree of cross contamination reduced.
b) Reduce heat and pressure to protect the building structure.
c) Purge the affected valve hall of remaining residual smoke after extinguishing a
fire.
d) Prevent smoke spread to other areas of the building.

13.2.9 Fire alarm and control systems

Each valve hall should have an alarm and control system which reports to the main
station fire control system.

. The control system should initiate alarms on the station fire alarm control panel
installed in the control room. This system should be electrically supervised
against failure of the detection and alarm circuits. In case of failure of an alarm
circuit, a visual and audible alarm, different from those for fire detection, should
appear on the station fire alarm control panel.

Operation of any call box/pull station or automatic detector should cause the
following:

a) Initiation of the visual and audible alarm on the station fire alarm control panel,
indicating the area or the location of the originating alarm.
b) Annunciation of the fire alarm in the station alarm monitoring reporting system.
c) Operation of audible and visible fire alarms throughout the station.

The confirmation of a fire (e.g. via operation of two independent detectors or by

visual verification) shall cause the following:

a) Blocking and de energizing of the convertor (if not already implemented by

protective action).
b) Shutdown of the air handling system.
c) Activation of the smoke management system.

13.2.10 Monitoring of valve components and valve hall equip-ment

As explained in section 6, both on and off-line monitoring and off-line checking and
inspection of valve components and valve hall equipment can only be partially
achieved due to the large number of components.

Additional monitoring should be considered in future specifications for equipments

that are vulnerable to fire such as wall bushings, capacitors, and other components
that contain flammable material.

14. CONCLUSIONS

The potential and actual fire incidents described in appendix 1 to this report
demonstrate clearly that fire can occur within valves and valve halls.

The report addresses fire aspects, especially the probable causes of fire, the means
to detect and suppress fire, the methods to fight a fire and, if necessary, the cleaning
and testing procedures to restore safe operation of the valves after a fire.

72
From the number of incidents reported it is concluded that actions are required to
make HVDC convertor valve halls more secure against the consequences of fire
damage. Accordingly, it would be prudent for owners of existing convertor stations, in
consultation with their original suppliers, to perform a fire risk evaluation of their
valves and valve halls and, if required, to reduce fire risk by adopting improved fire
detection, alarm, control and protection systems as discussed in the report.
The aim should be to ensure that, following a worst case credible fire, a convertor
can be returned to service significantly sooner than 18 months and preferably in a
time comparable with that needed to restore operation following a major fire in other
convertor station equipment; e.g. convertor transformers, oil-filled wall bushings, etc.
The route to achieve the above will not be unique, however, certain aspects have
emerged which point the way:

i ) Thyristor valves should use materials and design practices that minimise the
risk of fire and aim to prevent a fire from spreading within the valve. Such
measures would limit the fire damage and hence minimise restoration time.
It should be a requirement, in future, for manufacturers to demonstrate the
fire resistance capability of the valves.

ii ) As far as is possible, oil-filled equipment should be excluded from the valve

halls.

iii) Improved fire detection is required. The present evidence points to the use of
valve hall air sampling systems as being the best technique currently
available, possibly reinforced by the use of arc detectors.

iv ) Attention should be given to valve hall design and layout to minimise the
consequences of a fire should it happen. In particular:

- Fire ratings of walls and roof to withstand the worst credible fire.
- Inclusion of smoke management systems.
- Design of valve hall floor, slope, trenches, ducts, pits, etc. to contain and
to limit the spread of oil, smoke, water, etc.

v ) In order to reliably detect fires and de-energise the equipment, a fully

integrated fire detection and equipment supervision system should be
installed to provide two or more (preferably independent) means of verifying
that a fire exists, together with visual confirmation via viewing
windows/galleries or from video cameras.

vi ) Provision of fire fighting facilities that are based on due consideration of the
risks of damage to equipment and buildings caused by fires of various
severity and the consequences arising therefrom.

The highest level of protection will be provided by a fully interlocked

manually activated fire fighting system. Where fire suppression systems are
installed, aqueous foam appears to be the preferred method for oil filled
bushings. For the thyristor valves, there are various opinions/practices. The
general opinion is that, if at all possible, the valves should not be exposed to
any fire fighting agents but should exhibit self-extinguishing properties. In
this case, an installed fire suppression system for the valves should be
unnecessary. Where fire fighting systems are installed, on balance, water
deluge systems are preferred over gas or dry chemical systems.

vii) A fully worked out and detailed contingency plan for dealing with a fire and
clean-up operation which will be required. This should include full (and
regular) training of site personnel and/or local fire authority representatives.

The lessons learnt from three catastrophic fire incidents have spurred the industry
into closely examining the important issue of valve and valve hall fire hazards. The

73
 heightened awareness of users and manufacturers alike will ensure that future HVDC
installations will be much less vulnerable to major fire incidents.

REFERENCES

1. Valve Hall fire Detection for the CU HVDC Converters; 1992 HVDC System Operating
Conference in Winnipeg.

2. Detecting and Minimizing Potential Impacts from Valve Hall Fires; IEEE SM 369-9 PWRD.

74
 APPENDIX 1

VALVE HALL FIRE HAZARDS AND SURVEY OF FIRE INCIDENTS

From a survey of thyristor valve and valve hall fire incidents conducted by the Task Force in 1993,
together with other incidents reported to the Task Force subsequent to this, utilities operating 27
HVDC links (see table 1 to Appendix 1) have reported a total of 29 incidents, three of which were
catastrophic. Investigations of two out of the three major incidents concluded that each of them
started at first as a minor event and developed into a major incident. The third major incident which
occured after the survey was conducted, is still under investigation.

1. Hazard categories

- Convertor Control and Protection Malfunction.

- Overheating of valve Components due to Reduced Cooling
- Valve Component Failures
- Loose or High Resistance Connections in the Load Current Carrying Circuit.
- Failure of Auxiliary Circuit Electrical Connections within a Thyristor Level.
- Insulation Failures.
- Unknown Causes.

2. Reported incidents

2.1 Convertor Control and Protection Malfunction

The failure or malfunction of the control system can lead to the operation of the convertor
outside its design limits; for example sustained overload. Unless there is a second failure,
protection should safely switch off the convertor before any damage can occur.

No valve fire incident has been reported under this category.

2.2 Overheating of Valve Components due to Reduced Cooling

Failure of the cooling system for a complete convertor is normally sensed by external
monitoring of flow, temperature, conductivity, etc. However, localized overheating of some
valve components can occur as a result of the total or partial loss of cooling to part of a
valve. The loss of cooling may be due to a coolant leak or partial blocking of an individual
cooling pipe or duct within a valve.

Two incidents were reported under this category:

a) Scheme : Nelson River Bipole 2.

Date :

Transmission capacity 2000 MW.

Convertor station : Dorsey-Inverter.

Capacity forced out: 500 MW.

Cooling medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 6 hours.

The event occurred when a saturable rector overheated due to partial blocking of the cooling
tubes within the reactor. The event was discovered when the maintenance personnel
recognized a very strong odour of burned material in the valve hall. The convertor was
manually tripped and inspected. There was no damage to any other valve components.

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 b) Scheme : Itaipu

Date : July, 1992

Transmission capacity : 6300 MW.

Convertor station : Foz Do Iquacu-Rectifier.

Capacity forced out 787.5 MW.

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 4 days.

A strong odour of burned material was detected by the maintenance personnel. The problem
was traced to an overheated saturable reactor. The reactor was badly damaged to the extent
that the insulating resin had started to melt.

2.3 Valve Component Failures

Thyristor valves are constructed from a number of components, namely thyristors,

capacitors, resistors, saturable reactors and gate electronics circuit boards. The failure
modes of these components are different and each represents a different level of fire hazard.
Thyristor failures do not present a potential for fire, since they do not burn and do not cause
overheating when they fail. On the other hand capacitors usually contain flammable dielectric
fluid and therefore are a specific hazard. Reactors and resistors, depending on the mode of
failure, may cause a fire either in the failed component itself or by consequential overheating
of an adjacent component. The gate electronics circuit boards may cause a fire similar to
other valve component failures.

There were five events attributed to this category of failures.

a) Scheme: Hydro-Quebec - New England (multi terminal).

Date : May 1991

Convertor station : Sandy Pond - Rating 2000 MW.

Capacity forced out of service 1000 MW.

Cooling medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 10.5 hours.

A thyristor damping resistor failed and started to char. The fault was sensed by an air-
sampling smoke detection system and the convertor was blocked before the fault developed
any further. Further information on this incident is given Appendix 3.

b) Scheme : Nelson River Bipole 2

Date : August 1993.

Transmission capacity : 2000 MW.

Convertor station : Dorsey - inverter.

Capacity forced out of service : none.

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

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 Outage Duration : no forced outage since it was discovered during
annual mainte-nance which was not extended.

The failure of an electronic component or a bad connection resulted in partial burning of a

gate electronics circuit board of one thyristor level. The board was discovered during annual
maintenance.

c) Scheme : Intermountain Power Project

Date : November 1987 and October 1990.

Transmission capacity : 1920 MW.

Convertor station : Adelanto.

Capacity forced out of service : none (the system was down for scheduled maintenance
during both incidents).

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 4 hours in 1987 and 1 hour in 1990.

In November 1987, five thyristor level grading capacitors were found to be leaking during a
scheduled thyristor valve maintenance testing. Black tar like substance was found oozed
around the joint of the top cover of the capacitor cans.

In October 1990, during a similar thyristor valve testing, one thyristor level grading capacitor
was found to have failed internally and cracked open at the joint of the capacitor top cover.
This capacitor was mounted sideways on the underside of the water cooled heat sink. The
faulted capacitor spilled dielectric fluid onto a few modules below. Fortunately there was no
fire incident. Nevertheless, this type of capacitor failure is a potential fire hazard.

d) Scheme : Gezhouba-Shanghai project

Date : 1991.

Transmission capacity : 1200 MW.

Convertor station : Nan Qiao.

Capacity forced out of service : 600 MW.

Cooling Medium : deionized water

Outage Duration : not available (1-7 days estimated)

In the Gesha project, at the Nan Qiao station, a fault in a thyristor level gate
electronic card, attributed to a cold solder joint, caused a fire that destroyed six
thyristor level gate electronic cards in three vertically contiguous tiers and four fiber
optic light guides.

The Operator observed smoke rising from phase B quadrivalve through the observation
window and initiated a manual trip.

2.4 Loose or High Resistance Connections in the Load Current Carrying Circuit

Loose load current bus bar connections within a valve or inside the valve hall may lead to
overheating. In extreme cases a joint may become open circuited and a series arc will
develop. Whether it is an overheated connection or a series arc it can damage adjacent
components which can lead to a fire.

There were five events reported for this type of failure:

77
a) Scheme : Chateauguay Back to back

Date : December 26, 1984

Transmission capacity : 2 x 500 MW.

Capacity forced out of service : 500 MW.

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 4 months.

In Chateauguay, a loose connection on the valve hall neutral bushing caused a series arc
that led to failure of the bushing and initiated a fire in a cable trench which led to the
destruction of a valve base electronic cubicle and major smoke damage in the valve hall.
The barriers below the valve group and between the valve sections have probably helped to
prevent a more severe incident.

b) Scheme : CU Project

Date : June 1985.

Transmission capacity : 1000 MW.

Convertor station : Coal Creek - rectifer pole 2.

Capacity forced out of service : 500 MW.

Cooling Medium : air.

Outage Duration : 2 Days.

In the CU project, failure of the clamps used for connecting the busbars between the valve
modules produced arcing which damaged several oil filled capacitors. Some of the
capacitors punctured and the leaking oil caught fire. Severe smoke damage was caused by
the event.
Pole 2 was immediately tripped by the Operator when a technician reported arcing in the
valve hall. Smoke damage was also caused to the valves by this incident.

c) Scheme : Eel River Back to Back

Date : 1972

Transmission capacity : 320 MW.

Capacity forced out of service : 160 MW.

Cooling Medium : air.

Outage Duration : 4 days.

In the Eel River project, a loose current carrying connection melted and created a series arc
within the valve. The ultimate result was the melting of some of the thyristor heat sinks. The
melted aluminium caused a fault to ground which tripped the convertor.

d) Scheme : Vancouver Island dc link; pole 2

Date : January 84.

Transmission capacity : 370 MW.

78
 Convertor station : Duncan (Vancouver Island).

Capacity forced out of service : 185 MW.

Cooling Medium : air.

Outage Duration : 1 hour.

In the Vancouver Island project, an overheated bus connection due to loose bolts caused
some minor heat damage.

e) Scheme : Gezhouba - Shanghai

Date : June 25, 1994

Location : Gezhouba station, valve hall 1, phase A

Transmission capacity : 1200 MW

Capacity forced out of service : 600 MW

Cooling Medium : Deionized water

Outage Duration : 47 days.

A poor contact in a load current connection to a saturable reactor in valve A1 resulted in

overheating which developed into a series arc. This led to melting of metal, burning of the
valve reactor, and partial flashovers within the valve resulting in failure of 30 thyristors. The
short circuit resulting from this actuated a protection. The operators responded rapidly and
extinguished the fire with portable fire extinguishers. Equipment damage was confined to the
immediate vicinity of the valve reactor set on fire, however thorough cleaning was needed of
valve tower A.

2.5 Failure of Auxiliary Circuit Electrical Connections within a Thyristor Level

Loose connections within the auxiliary circuits at a thyristor level may produce either arcing
or overheating at that connection. This type of failure, if undetected for a period of time, may
ignite adjacent materials leading to a fire.

There were six events reported due to this type of failure.

a) Scheme : CU Project

Date : May 1986.

Transmission capacity : 1000 MW.

Convertor station : Coal Creek rectifier pole 2.

Capacity forced out of service : 500 MW.

Cooling Medium : air.

Outage Duration : less than one day.

In the CU project, a loose connection in an auxiliary circuit resulted in the puncture of a

damping capacitor causing some minor smoke damage.
The incident occurred following start up of the pole after maintenance outage; a strong odour
was noticed and the pole was manually tripped.

79
b) Scheme : Intermountain Power Project

Date : October 1990.

Transmission capacity : 1920 MW.

Convertor station : Intermountain.

Capacity forced out of service : none (the system was down for scheduled maintenance).

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 1 day.

In October 1990, evidence that a small fire had occurred in the pole 2 valve hall prior to the
scheduled outage, was discovered during inspection. The fire was caused by arcing from a
loose connection to a grading resistor. The arcing induced heat melted the epoxy resin of the
nonlinear reactor. Three thyristor modules above the damaged reactor showed smoke
contamination. The module with the damaged reactor was removed and replaced.

c) Scheme : Rihand - Delhi

Date : June 24, 1990.

Transmission capacity : 1500 MW.

Convertor station : Rihand - rectifier.

Capacity forced out of service : 750 MW.

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 15 months.

In the Rihand-Delhi project, a major fire destroyed completely one quadrivalve and caused
extensive damage to other valves. The most probable cause is considered to be a loose
connection on a thyristor level grading capacitor.
The incident occurred during commissioning when conducting the open line test. The fire was
discovered after the operator had heard a loud noise from the valve hall and observed
smoke coming through the broken window that separates the control room from the valve
hall.

d) Scheme : Eel River Back to Back

Date :

Transmission capacity : 320 MW.

Capacity forced out of service : 160 MW.

Cooling Medium : air.

Outage Duration : Not available (1-7 days estimated)

At Eel River, a valve hall mounted dry type resistive voltage divider developed a loose
connection which created a high voltage dc arc. The low current arc progressively destroyed
the divider producing smoke damage within the valve hall. The convertor was eventually
tripped by dc overvoltage protection, which operated due to the reducing impedance of the
top-end resistor of the divider.

e) Scheme : Indian National HVDC Experimental Project

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 Date : 1993.

Transmission capacity : 100 MW.

Convertor Station : Lower Sileru.

Capacity forced out of service : 100 MW.

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 4 months.

In the Indian National HVDC Experimental Line project, a loose connection in a valve
auxiliary circuit caused a fire in the valve. A number of thyristors, fibre-optic cables and
cooling water pipes were damaged. There was considerable smoke damage.

f) Scheme : Intermountain Power Project

Date : November 1989.

Transmission capacity : 1920 MW.

Converter station : Adelanto.

Capacity forced out of service : none (the system was down for scheduled
maintenance).

Cooling medium : deionized water.

Outage during : 1 hour.

In November 1989, evidence of burned insulation on a connecting wire to a thyristor level

grading resistor was discovered. The wire connection appeared loose. The wire and the
resistor were replaced.

2.6 Insulation Failures

Insulation failures can be either within a valve or within or across other equipment in the
valve hall, such as bushings or voltage dividers. In both cases it involves a shunt electrical
arc that may lead to a fire. Insulation failures within a valve can be the result of
contamination, increased humidity or coolant leak in a liquid cooled valve. Insulation failure
of other equipment such as bushings can be due to either external or internal flashover of the
equipment. The failure of oil filled equipment represents a major risk of fire, especially if it
leads to its puncture.

There were ten events reported that involved shunt electrical arcs due to insulation failure:

a) Scheme : Itaipu

Date : May 29, 1989.

Transmission capacity : 6300 MW.

Convertor station : Foz Do Iguacu - rectifier.

Capacity forced out of service : 787.5 MW

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 14 months.

81
In the Itaipu scheme a complete quadrivalve was destroyed by fire due to an arc that resulted
from a water leak within a valve.
The fault was detected when the convertor was tripped by valve short circuit protection.

b) Scheme : Nelson River Bipole 2

Date : October, 1987

Transmission capacity : 2000 MW

Convertor station : Dorsey Inverter

Capacity forced out of service : 500 MW

Cooling Medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 7 weeks.

In Nelson River bipole 2, the failure of an oil-filled wall bushing due to an external flashover
led to an explosion and the bushing catching fire inside the valve hall causing severe smoke
damage.

c) Scheme : Pacific Intertie Voltage Upgrade.

Date : October 1989, April 1990 and October 1990.

Transmission capacity : 400 MW.

Convertor station : Sylmar.

Capacity forced out of service : none during the first two events because the system was
down for scheduled maintenance; loss of 200 MW during the third incident.

Cooling medium : deionized water.

Duration : first two incidents less than 1 day

third incident not available (1-7 days
estimated)

Three events similar in nature occurred. All events were related to pin-hole leaks in the
cooling water tubes on the supply side. The first one was found during a scheduled
maintenance in October 1989 when inspection revealed several burned fibre-optic light
guides and evidence of arcing. A pin-hole leak was found on one cooling water tube. The
damaged components were replaced.
Six months later, during another scheduled maintenance, another cooling water tube in the
same group was found to have a similar pin-hole leak and it was replaced. No other evidence
of damage was found.
In the third event the water leak caused a flashover that damaged several thyristor grading
capacitors and resistors and approximately 20 light guides. The convertor tripped due to
persistent commutation failures.

d) Scheme : Vancouver Island DC Link Pole 2.

Date : November 1990 / October 1992.

Transmission capacity : 370 MW.

Convertor station : Duncan.

Capacity forced out of service : 238 MW.

82
 Cooling medium : air.

Outage Duration : First incident : not available (1-4 weeks

estimated)
Second incident: 14 weeks

Two events similar in nature occurred. The first event was attributed to high humidity in the
valve hall which caused a flashover and resulted in a large amount of smoke filling the valve
hall. The smoke detectors did not operate and the convertor tripped by the differential
protection. Following the repair and the clean-up, upon restoration of the convertor, arcing
was noticed again and further cleaning and painting was necessary. Strict control of the
humidity in the valve hall was instituted.
In the second event, tracking occurred on the valve structures at both terminals of the DC
link. The tracking in one was so severe that the valve hall was filled with smoke. The cause
of the tracking again was caused by high humidity coupled with contamination. It is believed
that the contamination was a result of the belts and the grease of the blower motors.

e) Scheme : Gezhouba - Shanghai

Date : January 18, 1991.

Location : Valve hall pole 2 phase A.

Transmission capacity : 1200 MW.

Convertor station : Nan Qiao.

Capacity forced out of service : 600 MW.

Cooling medium : deionized water.

Outage Duration : 1 day.

The event was caused by water due to a leak in a cooling water tube three tiers
above and pollution on insulating material. A flashover destroyed a valve reactor inside the
tier and developed a short circuiting of the valve. The convertor tripped by the differential
protection. Five thyristors failed without causing any major damage.

f) Scheme : Inga-Shaba HVDC Intertie

Date : December 29, 1992.

Transmission capacity : 560 MW.

Convertor station : Kolwezi (inverter).

Capacity forced out : 280 MW.

Cooling medium : Air.

Outage Duration : not available (1-6 months estimated)

Convertor no 21 tripped on December 29, 1992 at 01.09 hours via the convertor short circuit
protection. The fire extinguished by itself.

Each valve hall contains 6 floor-mounted double valves each consisting of 2 sections so that
each structure holds 4 valve sections. The fire started in one side of the top section of the
structure V21 where most damage was concentrated. However, the adjacent valve and the
section under V21 were hit by debris. 66 thyristors (out of 258 per valve) failed as a direct
result of the fire.

83
The cause of the fire has not been identified. However, leaks were found in the valve hall
roof. Also, there was dust on the valves due to degraded filters in the cooling air circuit.

g) Scheme : Vancouver Island DC Link Pole 2

Date : July 28, 1994.

Transmission capacity : 370 MW.

Convertor station : Arnott

Capacity forced out of service : 185 MW.

Cooling medium : Air.

Outage Duration : 29 days.

On July 28, 1994 VIT requested that valve group 8 (V8) be returned to service as quickly as
possible because of low water conditions on Vancouver Island. The group had been out
service for several weeks for maintenance and was not due to be returned to service until the
following day.

One hour and forty-five minutes after energizing and 45 minutes after deblocking, a
flashover to ground occurred on the C phase structure of V8. A large burn mark was found
from the bottom corner module almost to ground, and smaller burn marks were found in
three locations on the B phase and C phase structures. The burn marks were due to arcing
but once power was removed from the valve no further burning occurred.

Repairs were carried out to the structure and on August 17 the valve group was re-energized.
It was immediately discovered that 66 levels of thyristors had failed as a result of the
flashover. The valve group was de-energized and all failed cells were replaced. The valve
group was successfully returned to service on August 25.

Cause of the flashover is assumed to be from humidity in the air. Procedures have now been
revised to ensure that a dryout of up to 8 hours with 2 blowers running in manual is carried
out before the valves are energized after any outage.

2.7 Unknown Causes

a) Scheme : Pacific Intertie Expansion

Date : October 30, 1993.

Transmission capacity : 1100 MW.

Convertor station : Sylmar.

Commissioning year : 1989.

Capacity forced out : 1100 MW.

Cooling medium : Water.

Duration : greater than 15 months.

All valves in one pole were destroyed by fire, heat and smoke and those of the other pole
contaminated by smoke. The cause of the fire is not yet reported.

Final Remarks

84
Examination of the events reported shows that no event had occurred due to overload or
operation of the convertor outside the design limits. Only one incident was detected by a
newly installed smoke and fire detection system. All the remaining incidents either were
discovered by the operating personnel and manual intervention was necessary or the
convertor was tripped by some convertor protection. This highlights the importance of a
sensitive fire and smoke alarm system. It also emphasises the importance of reducing the
spread of a fire in a valve hall through the elimination of oils, sectionalising and choice of
materials.

85
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer vertor(s)
received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
Acaray Ande Siemens 50
Paraguay 1981 25,6 No contact
Back to back
Blackwater Public Ser- BBC 200
vice Company 1985 57 Yes/Yes
USA Back to back
New Mexico
Broken Hill New South Wales ASEA 2 x 17
Australia 1986 8.33 No contact
Back to back
Baltic Cable Baltic Cable ABB 600
- Herrenwyk AB 1994 450 Yes/No
- Kruseberg Germany 250 (cable)
Sweden
Cabora Bassa Mosambique AEG-BBC- 1920
- Songo Eskom Siemens 1978 ± 533 No contact
- Apollo South Africa 1360 (line)
CU United Power ASEA 1000
- Coal Creek Association 1979 ± 400 Yes/Yes
- Dickinson USA 710 (line)
Chateauguay Hydro-Québec AEG-BBC- 2 x 500
Canada Siemens 140 Yes/Yes
Quebec 1984 Back to back
Cross Chanel EDF CGEE Alsthom 2 x 1000
- Les Manda- (FRANCE) GEC ± 270 Yes/Yes
rins National Grid
- Sellindge (ENGLAND) 1986 45 (cable)
Chapad MSEB BHEL/ABB 1500
- Chandrapur India ± 500 Yes/Yes
- Padghe Maharashtra 1997 736 (line)
Chandrapur Power Grid GEC ALSTHOM 2 x 500 Yes/Yes
India 1996 Back to back
Maharashtra

86
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer
vertor(s) received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
David A. Tri-State GE 100
Hamil Generation 1977 50 Yes/No
and Transmis- Back to back
sion Ass.
USA, Colorado
Duernrohr VEAG BBC-Siemens- 550
Austria AEG 140 Yes/Yes
1983 Back to back
Des Cantons Hydro-Québec GE 690
Canada, Québec 1986 ± 450 Yes/Yes
Comerford New England 172 (line)
Hydro, USA Yes/Yes
Massachussetts
DC Hybrid Trans Power ABB 560
link (pole 2) New Zealand 1992 - 350 Yes/Yes
- Benmore 617 (line +
- Haywards cable)
Eel River New Brunswick GE 320
Power, Canada 1972 80 Yes/Yes
New Brunswick Back to back
Eddy County SouthWest GE 200
Public Service 1993 82 Yes/No
Co. Back to back
USA, Texas
Etzenricht Bayernwerk AG Siemens 600
Germany 1993 160 Yes/Yes
Back to back
Fenno-Skan Vattenfall ABB 500
- Dannebo (Sweden) 1989 + 400 Yes/Yes
- Rauma Imamran Voima 200 (cable)
Finland Oy

87
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer
vertor(s) received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
GotlandII+III SSPB(Vattenfall) ASEA 260
- Vastervik Sweden 1983 + 1987 ± 150 Yes/Yes
- Ygne 96(cable)
Gesha BBC-Siemens 1200 Yes/Yes
- Nan Qiao ECPG 1989-90 ± 500
- Gezhouba CCEPG 1000 (line)

Highgate Velco ASEA 200

USA 1985 56 Yes/Yes
Vermont Back to back
Hokkaido- EPDC Hitachi/ 600
Toshiba ± 250
Honshu Japan 1979/1993 168 (line Yes/Yes
+ cable)
Hydro-Quebec ABB 2250/2138/
NEH 2000 Yes/Yes
- Radisson Hydro-Quebec 1990 (R.SP.) ± 450 Yes/Yes
- Nicolet (Canada) 1991-92 (Nic)
- Sandy Pond NEH (USA) 1992(R.N.SP.) 1500 (line)
Haenam Kepco GEC Alsthom 300
Cheju South 1993 180 No contact
Korea 100 (cable)
Itaipu I FURNAS ASEA 3150
- Foz do 1985 ± 600 Yes/Yes
Iguacu Brazil
- Sao Roque 785

ECPG : East China Power Group, Shanghai

CCEPG : Central China Electric Power Group, Wuhan

88
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer
vertor(s) received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
Itaipu II FURNAS ASEA 3150
- Foz do 1987 ± 600 Yes/Yes
Iguacu Brazil
- Sao Roque 805 (line)
Inga ASEA 560 No/via ABB
Shaba ZAIRE 1982 ± 500
1700 (line)
Intermountain LADWP ASEA 1920
- Adelanto (California) 1986 ± 500 Yes/Yes
- Intermoun- Intermountain 784 (line)
tain Power Service
Co. (Utah)
Kontek SEAS ABB 600
- Bjaeversnov Denmark - VEAG 1995 400 Yes/Yes
- Bertwisch Germany 170 (cable)
Konti-Skan II SSPB ASEA 300
- Lindome (Sweden) 1988 285 Yes/Yes
- Vaster ELSAM 88 (cable)
Hassing Denmark
Madawaska Hydro-Quebec GE 350
Canada 1985 140 Yes/Yes
Quebec Back to back
Miles City WAPA GE 200
USA 1985 82 Yes
Montana Back to back
Mc Neil Alberta Power GEC 150
Canada 1989 42 Yes/Yes
Edmonton Back to back
Nelson Manitoba Hydro GEC Alsthom 1000
River I Canada 1991-92-93 - 500 Yes/Yes
(Pole 1) Winnipeg (Valve 930 (line)
- Radisson replacement)
- Dorsey

89
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer
vertor(s) received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
Nelson Manitoba Hydro AEG-BBC 1978 900 (1978)
River II Canada Siemens 1985 1800 (1985) Yes/Yes
- Dorsey Winnipeg ± 500
- Henday 930 (line)
Oklaunion West Texas GE 200
Utilities 1984 82 Yes/No
USA, Texas Back to back
Pacific LADWP ASEA 1600 to 2000
Intertie USA
Upgrade
- Sylmar California 1984 ± 400 to±500 Yes/Yes
- Celilo BPA (USA) 1362 (line)
Oregon
Pacific LADWP ABB 1100
Intertie USA
Expansion
- Sylmar California 1989 ± 500 Yes/Yes
- Celilo BPA (USA) 1362 (line)
Oregon
Rihand-Delhi NTPC (NPG) ABB/BHEL 1500 Yes/Yes
India 1991 ± 500
814 (line)

Sakuma EPDC Toshiba/ 300 Yes/Yes

Japan Hitachi 125
1993 Back to back

SkagerrakI+II Statnett ASEA 500

-Kristiansand (Norway) 1976 ± 250 Yes/Yes
-Tjele ELSAM 113 line+
(Denmark) 127 cable

90
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer
vertor(s) received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
Skagerrak III Statnett ABB 440
-Kristiansand (Norway) 1993 350 Yes/Yes
ELSAM 113 line+
-Tjele (Denmark) 127 cable
Shin TEPCO Toshiba/ 600
Hitachi
Shinano Japan 1977 125 Yes/Yes
1992 Back to back
Square Butte Minnesota GE 500
- Duluth Power (USA) 1977 ± 250 Yes/Yes
- Centre Minnesota 749 (line)
Sacoi II ENEL Ansaldo 300
Italy (GE) 200 Yes/Yes
1992 385 (line +
cable)
Sacoi (Tap) EDF CGEE 50
France Alsthom 200 (Shunt
Corsica 1992 Tap) Yes/Yes
Sileru- India BHEL 100 Yes/Yes
Barsoor 1989 100
196 (line)
Shin- TEPCO Toshiba/ 600 Via
EPDC/Yes
Shinano Japan Hitachi 125
1977/1992
Uruguaiana Uruguay Toshiba 53.7
1987 17.9 No contact
Back to back

91
 Table 1 to Appendix 1
HVDC CONVERTORS
OWNERS/SUPPLIERS REFERENCE LIST
(JANUARY 1994)

Project/ Owner(s)/ Supplier/Year Main Technical Owner

contacted/
Name of con- Country(ies) Commissioned Data: Answer
vertor(s) received
State or Power (MW)/
Province DC Voltage(kV)
Line or cable
(Km)
Vancouver BC Hydro GE 370
Island II
- Arnott Canada 1977 280 Yes/Yes
- VIT(Duncan) Vancouver 77 (cable)
Vienna South HV Wien Siemens 550
East Verbundge- 1993 145 Yes/Yes
sellschaft
Austria Back to back
Vindhyachal National Power ABB 2 x 250 Yes/Yes
Grid 1989 70
India Back to back
Virginia- WAPA Siemens 200
Smith USA 1988 55.5 Yes/Yes
(Sidney) Colorado Back to back
Vyborg Russia Russian 2 x 355
1982 170 No contact
Back to back
Welch SEPC Siemens 600
Monticello USA 1995 Yes/No
Texas Back to back

NOTE: The list may not be complete and some installations were not yet commissioned at
the time of conducting the survey but information was already available concerning
the fire detection and fire suppression systems specified.

92
 APPENDIX 2

FIRE PROTECTION STANDARDS AND CODES

The following documents contain information that may be useful in defining fire protection criteria for
valves and valve halls. It is not an exhaustive list.

1. International Standards Organization

ISO/IEC Guide 52.

ISO 1589, Determination of flammability by oxygen index.

International Organization for Standardization Case Postale 56. CH 1211, Geneva 20.
Switzerland.

IEC 707, Methods of test for the determination of the flammability of solid electrical
insulating materials when exposed to an igniting source.

International Electrotechnical Commission, Case postale 131. CH 1211, Geneva.

Switzerland.

IEEE 979, Guide for Substation Fire Protection, 345 East, 47th Street, New York, NY10017,
USA.

1.1 American Publications

a) NFPA Publications: National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park,

P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101.

Code No. Code Title

1 Fire Prevention Code

10 Portable Extinguishers
11 Foam Extinguishers Systems
11A Medium and High Expansion Foam Systems
11C Mobile Foam Apparatus
12 Carbon Dioxide Systems
13 Sprinkler Systems
13A Sprinkler Maintenance
14 Standpipe, Hose Systems
14A Standpipe, Hose System, Inspection, Maintenance
15 Water Spray Fixed Systems
16 Deluge Foam-Water Systems
16A Closed Head Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems
17 Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
20 Centrifugal Fire Pumps
22 Water Tanks
24 Private Fire Service Mains
25 Water-Based Fire Protection Systems
26 Supervision Water Supply Valves
30 Flammable Liquids Code
49 Harzardous Chemical Data
70 National Electrical Code
72 Protective Signaling Systems
72E Automatic Fire Detectors

93
 72G Protective Signaling Systems
72H Testing Protective Signaling Systems
75 Electronic Computer Systems
77 Static Electricity
80 Fire Doors, Fire Windows
90A Air Conditioning Systems
92A Smoke Control Systems
92B Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, Large Areas
101 Life Safety Code
101M Alternative Approaches to Life Safety
105 Smoke and Draft Control Door Assemblies
220 Types of Building Construction
241 Building Construction Operation
251 Fire Tests Building Construction & Materials
252 Fire Tests Door Assembly
253 Flooring Radiant Panel Test
255 Burning Character Building Materials
256 Tests Roof Coverings
257 Window Assemblies
258 Tests Smoke Generated
259 Test Heat of Building Materials
262 Fire and Smoke Characteristics of Wire and Cable
263 Heat & Smoke Release Rates
291 Fire Hydrants
321 Class Flammable Liquids
325M Prop. Flammable Liquids
491M Chemical Reactions
497A Class of Class I Hazard Locations for Electrical Installations
497M Class of Gases, Vapors, Dusts for Electrical Equipment in Hazard
Locations
703 Fire-Retention Treatment of Buildings Materials
704 Identification of Materials
850 Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Hydroelectric
Generating Plants

1.2 ASTM Publications

American Society for Testing and Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103-1187.

Code No. Code Title

ASTM D229 Test methods for rigid sheet and plate material used for
electrical insulation.

ASTM D635 Test method for rate of burning and/or extent and time of
burning of self supporting plastics in a horizontal position.

ASTM D2843 Test method for density of smoke from burning or

decomposition of plastics.

ASTM D2863 Test method for measuring the minimum oxygen

concentration to support candle like combustion of
plastics.

ASTM E1354 Test method for heat and visible smoke release rates for
materials and products using oxygen consumption
calorimeter.

1.3 Underwriters Laboratories

94
UL-910 Vertical Flame Testing Methods for cables.
UL-94 Standard for tests for flammability of plastic materials for
parts in devices and appliances.
UL-1666 Vertical riser cable flame test methods.

Swedish Publications

SIS, Swedish Standards Institution

Box 3295
S-103 66 STOCKHOLM, Sweden

Code No. Code Title

SS 424 14 75 Cables - testing of flame propagation characteristics.

SS 02 48 21 Fire Tests - Building products - Ignitability.
SS 02 48 20 Fire Test - Fire Resistant Tests - Elements of building
construction.
SS 02 48 22 Fire Tests - Coverings - Fire protection ability.

British Publications. British Standards Institute, Linford Wood, Milton Keynes, MK14 6LE.

Code No. Code Title

BSI 2782/ISO4589 Plastics Method 144 Determina-tion of

Flammability by Oxygen Index.
BSI 4584/IEC 249-2 Metal clad base material for printed wiring
boards for epoxide non-woven/woven glass
reinforced copper clad laminated sheet.
BSI 6334 Methods of test for the determi-nation of the
flammability of solid electrical insulating
materials when exposed to an igniting source.
BSI 6401 Method for measurement, in laboratory, of the
specific optical density of smoke generated by
materials.

Canadian Publications

National Building Code of Canada

178 Rexdale Blvd
Ottawa, Ontario, M9W 1R3

National Fire Code of Canada.

Scandinavian Standards

NORDTEST
Postbox 116
FIN-02151 ESBO, Finland

Nord Testing, NT-Series.

95
96
 APPENDIX 3

Detection of an Overheating Resistor in Sandy Pond Pole 2 Convertor Station.

______________________________________________________________

1.0 Introduction

Table 7.2 of section 7 of the main report lists 31 stations as having air sampling smoke
detection systems installed or under construction as of May 1994. Prior to 1991 there .

In spite of the rapid expansion in the use of air sampling systems, the accumulated
experience is still small and, as a result, only one of the potential fire incidents listed in
Appendix 1 has occured in a valve hall equipped with an air sampling system. This appendix
gives the background to and record of this incident as noted from the operator's log for the
Sandy Pond terminal of the Hydro-Québec (Canada) to New England (USA) multiterminal
HVDC link, where the incident occured.

2.0 Background

February 11, 1991 - The Pole 2 VESDA system, smoke management, and fire suppression
systems are completed and put in service. Pole 2 is returned to service.

March 1, 1991 - Radisson-Sandy Pond high power isolated network network commissioning
begins.

April 6-26, 1991 - The pole 2 convertors were out of service for the manufacturer to complete
the thyristor valve fire modifications.

April 29, 1991 - The manufacturer energized and performed start-up tests of Pole 2. The
Pole 2 convertor transformers were energized at 14:40 hrs. Pole 2 was deblocked at 20:20
hrs and operated at 100 MW until blocked at 21:00 hrs. The Pole 2 convertor remained
energized from the 345 kV.

3.0 Events of May 1, 1991

May 1, 1991, 19:18 hrs - Pole 2 deblocked and held at 100 MW. The manufacturer and NEH
representatives were on site for the commissioning testing. The NEH operators were on site
for operation of the station during the commissioning tests, as well as some of the
maintenance personnel for training and assistance with commissioning.

.......19:22 hrs - VESDA Level 1 (10%) Alarm received for Pole 2, B-phase quadruple valve.
This was the first time the VESDA had indicated an alarm since the system was placed in
service. A visual inspection was made, valve parameters were checked, and the valve hall
doors were slightly opened on Pole 1 and 2 to check for odors. Pole 1 was also operating at
100 MW and was checked for a comparison to Pole 2. Personnel from the manufacturer and
NEH did not notice any unusual odors or anything visual.

.......19:29 hrs - Sandy Pond operator advises REMVEC dispatcher of the Pole 2, B-phase
VESDA alarm and requests that Pole 2 not be ramped until the manufacturer and NEH
investigated.

.......19:46 hrs - Sandy Pond operator advises REMVEC dispatcher that the Pole 2, B-phase
VESDA alarm was investigated and appears to be false and that all is ok.

.......19:48 hrs - H-Q blocks Pole 2 accidently because of a test relay connection at Radisson.
This was a Down Order/Block Order from Radisson Pole 2 to Sandy Pond Pole 2. The Pole 2
convertor transformer did not trip and the valves remained energized from the 345 kV.

......20:27 hrs - Pole 2 deblocked and held at 100 MW.

97
......20:30 hrs - VESDA Level 1 (10%) alarm received for Pole 2, B-phase quadruple valve.
The manufacturer and NEH personnel started a visual inspection. NEH personnel went to
check the Pole 2 valve hall for odors.

......20:32 hrs - The VESDA Level 1 alarm was still on and the concentration LEDS were
bouncing between 10-40%. Then a VESDA Level 2 (50%) alarm was received for Pole 2, B-
phase, VESDA Level 1 (10%) alarm for Pole 2, C-phase, and VESDA Level 1 (10%) alarm
for the Pole 2 valve hall HVAC return air duct. The station operator was ordered to trip the
Pole 2 converter by the EMERGENCY TRIP on the mimic. The station operator then notified
the REMVEC dispatcher of the EMERGENCY TRIP. The NEH personnel then reported a
strong odor (burned circuit board or resistor smell) when the Pole 2 valve hall door was
opened slightly.

......20:34 hrs - The manufacturer and NEH begin procedures to investigated the Pole 2
VESDA alarms.

......20:45 hrs - Sandy Pond maintenance shuts down the HVAC units for the Pole 2 valve
hall.

......20:55 hrs - Application for isolation, grounding, and tags is made to the REMVEC
dispatcher for the Pole 2 valve hall.

......22:03 hrs - Switching and tagging is completed for the Pole 2 valve hall and working
clearance is granted by the REMVEC dispatcher.

......23:23 hrs - The manufacturer and NEH personnel locate a strong odor near one of the
thyristor TCUs in the Pole 2, B-phase quadruple valve at P2-V.VB.V2.A13.V4. This location
is about in the middle of the quadruple valve structure. There were some resistors in the TCU
that were suspected of overheating but the damage was not obvious and did not explain the
strong odor noticed at 20:32 hrs. The manufacturer and NEH decide to return to the area to
take a closer look and perform electrical measurements of the resistors, capacitors, TCUs,
and thyristors.

May 2, 1991, 01:15 hrs - The manufacturer and NEH personnel had located a push-on
connector containing two wires that was not connected on the thyristor heat sink for resistors
R11 and R12 at P2-V.VB.V2.A13.V5. Resistor R12 showed visible blistering of the enamel
from heat. Resistor R11, located immediately above R12, was covered with a soot like
deposit but was not visibly blistered. The R11 and R12 resistors were replaced along with the
TCUs for V4 and V5. The thyristors in the A13 module were all tested following the repairs.

.......01:20 hrs - The manufacturer decides to wait until 07:00 hrs to perform a deblock test on
Pole 2 because there were none of the manufacturers personnel available at Radisson until
07:00 hrs.

.......02:32 hrs - The Pole 2 convertor switching is completed and all tags and grounds are
cleared. The REMVEC dispatcher energizes the Pole 2 345 kV bus, the convertor
transformers, and the convertor valves.

.......07:00 hrs - The Pole 2 convertor is deblocked and held at 100 MW.

.......08:13 hrs - Pole 2 is blocked. There were no VESDA alarms and no thyristor failures.

.......10:46 hrs - The manufacturer notifies NEH that the Pole 2 thyristor valves are released
for operation and the commissioning testing can continue.

VESDA system sensitivity range is 0.003 to 0.030% obscuration per foot. The VESDA alarms
are set up as follows:

Level 1 Alarm - 10% or 0.003% obscuration per foot

98
 Level 2 Alarm - 50% or 0.015% obscuration per foot

Level 3 Alarm - 90% or 0.027% obscuration per foot

4.0 Conclusion

The VESDA air sampling demonstrated its effectiveness in responding to a small but
significant developing fault and ensured that the convertor was shut down before the problem
became serious.

99
Le CIGRÉ a apporté le plus grand soin à la réalisation de cette brochure thématique numérique afin de vous
fournir une information complète et fiable.

Cependant, le CIGRÉ ne pourra en aucun cas être tenu responsable des préjudices ou dommages de quelque
nature que ce soit pouvant résulter d’une mauvaise utilisation des informations contenues dans cette brochure.

Publié par le CIGRÉ

21, rue d’Artois
FR-75 008 PARIS
Tél. : +33 1 53 89 12 90
Fax : +33 1 53 89 12 99

Copyright © 2000

Tous droits de diffusion, de traduction et de reproduction réservés pour tous pays.

Toute reproduction, même partielle, par quelque procédé que ce soit, est interdite sans autorisation préalable.
Cette interdiction ne peut s’appliquer à l’utilisateur personne physique ayant acheté ce document pour
l’impression dudit document à des fins strictement personnelles.
Pour toute utilisation collective, prière de nous contacter à sales-meetings@cigre.org

The greatest care has been taken by CIGRE to produce this digital technical brochure so as to provide you with
full and reliable information.

However, CIGRE could in any case be held responsible for any damage resulting from any misuse of the
information contained therein.

Published by CIGRE
21, rue d’Artois
FR-75 008 PARIS
Tel : +33 1 53 89 12 90
Fax : +33 1 53 89 12 99

Copyright © 2000

All rights of circulation, translation and reproduction reserved for all countries.

No part of this publication may be produced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior
permission of the publisher. This measure will not apply in the case of printing off of this document by any
individual having purchased it for personal purposes.
For any collective use, please contact us at sales-meetings@cigre.org