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    STATCON PP 98 185

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    ANTONIOMIGUEL PALPALLATOC

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    - ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ‘pretation of this Code, a including its implementing rules and regulations, shalll be resolved in favor of labor.” Dissenting Opinion, Justice Mclencio-Herrera: Section 1 (b) of Rule 3 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation explicitly provides that for the death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the‘disease is increased by the working conditions. ‘The cause of death was not one of those listed nor did the p tioner present evidence to prove that the risk of contracting it was incre=sed by the working conditions surrounding her son's employment, and its exact cause is yet unknown to medical science. The illness of petitioner's son not having been caused nor aggravated by the nature of his duties as an employee of the Philippine Constabulary, petitioner's claim is not compensable under explicit provisions of’existing laws. _ (Read aiso the debate on the same issue in the case of Floresce vs. Philex, discussed above). FOR DISCUSSION: Note the concurrence (in Manahan) and the dissent (in Villavert) of Justice Melencio-Herrera. What, could account for the difference? CASE: Del Rosario & Sons vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 689 Facts: Petitioner enter for! r ‘The security guards later filed a complaint against the secu- ity agency and the logging company for underpayment of salary, ete. The Labor Arbiter sud the cava agains conpiny Suh bent ah salem els ship. The Labor Arbiter, on the other han: unt curity, agency liable. ‘The security agency appealed to the NLRC. ‘The NLRC gave due course to the appeal notwithstanding VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF S or spectric STATUTES 79 the fact that it was not under oath and the appesl fee was paid late. ‘The issue of non-dismissal was raiged to the Supreme Court, Issue: Whether or not the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal, Held: ‘The formal defects in the appeal of the security agency were not fatal defects. The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by requiring an oath. The appeal fee has been paid al- though it was delayed. The broader interests of justice and the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits demanded that the appeal be given due course, as i fact, it was so given by the NLRC. Moreover, as provided forby Art. 221 af the Labor Code, “In any proceeding before the Commission or any ofthe Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and itis the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Lator Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice.” FOR DISCUSSION: Note that in this case, the Supreme Court apparently ruled in favor of the employer by admitting the NLRC's appeal. Noes this contradict our rule on construction in favor of labor? Is this a conflict between two types of presumptions, one in favor of Labor and the other, the liberal application of procedural rules? 2, HOW ARE RETIREMENT LAWS CONSTRUED? Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retiree. (Tantuico, Jr. vs. Domingo, 76 SCAD 16, 230 SCRA 391, Feb. 28, 1994). ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS? ‘Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retiree, nevertheless, [where] 80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION there is really nothing to interpret x x x x and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt x x x constrains us to rule against petitioners. (Conte vs. Coa, 76 SCAD 16, 264 SCRA 19, 31, Nov. 4, 1996). D. INSURANCE 1. WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE PROVISIONS? In case there is no doubt as to the terms of an insurance ' contract, the provisions must be construed in their plain, ordi- nary and popular sense. (Imperial F. Ins. Co. us. Coos County, 151 US. 452; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; Union Mfg. Co., Inc. vs. Republic Bank, 47 SCRA 271). Compaky However, where # tion by experts and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclu- sively in the interest of, the insurance company. (Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, 52.0.G. 191). Furthermore, ‘entered into by parties bargaining on an equal footing and, therefore, any ambiguity thereon should be resolved against the insurer, the party srepar- ing the contract. (Qua Chee Gan us. Law Union and Rock Ins. Co, Ltd., 52 0.G. 1982, 1989; Fieldman’s Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Songeo, 4833, Sept. 23, 1968; see also Vasquez vs. Manila Underwri ers Ins. Co., 13 Court of Appeals Rep. 1169; Landicho vs. GSIS, 44 SCRA), a. Clear provision given ordinary meaning. CASE: Ty vs, First National Surety & Assurance Co., Ine., 1 SCRA 1324 Vi. INTERPRETATION OP SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 81 D. Insurance Facts: Diosdado Ty obtained personal accident policies which stipu- lated, among others, that for partial disability resulting to the loss of either hand, the insurer shall be liable for P650.00 It was further stated in the policies that, “The loss of a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist." A fire broke out which totally destroyed Broadway Cotton Factory, y's employ r. Fighting his way out of the factary, Ty was injured on the left hand by a heavy object. As a result, Ty suffered a temporary total disability of his left hand which pre- vented him from performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance of his occupation. Issue: Was the insurer liable? Held: - «The insurer was not liable. We cannot go beyond the clear ‘and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which defined partia! disability as loss of either hand by AMPUTA- TION through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputa- tion, All that was found was that the physical injuries caused temporary total disability of Ty’s left hand. We might add that the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are ciear, ex- press and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would iaclude the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted, CASE: De la Cruz vs. Capital Ins. & Surety Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 559 Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy. In connection with the celebration of the New Yesr, the insured, a non-professional boxer, participated in a boxing con- test. In the course =f his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part ofthe back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION of the ring. The insured died with the cause of death reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left, The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the in- sured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by the insurance. Issue: Was the death of the insured covered by the policy? Hel: ‘The terms ‘accident’ and ‘accidental’ as used in the insur- ance contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. An accident is an event that proceeds from an'urknowri cause, or is an unusual effect of a known eause and, therefore, unexpected. Without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he would not hhave received the blow in the head and would not have died. The fact that boxing is attended with some risks of external injuries does not make any injury received in the course of the game not accidental. In boxing. as in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be accidental or produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what occured in this ease. ‘The insurer was liable. b, Ambiguous provision interpreted against insurer. CASE: Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union & Rock Ins. Co.pLtd., 52 0.G. 1982 Facts: A warranty in a fire insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of “oils, (animal and/or vegetable andor mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300 de- grees Fahrenheit.” Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300 degrees Fahr- ‘en heit was stored therein. VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 89 D. Insurance Issue: Was the warranty violated? Held: No. The clause containing the prohibition was ambiguous and must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. In ordinary parlance, ‘oils’ means ‘lubri- cants’ and not gasoline or kerosene. There was no reason why the prohibition against keeping the gasoline in the premises could not be expressed clearly and in the language and terms that the general public can readily understand. CASE: Panaton vs. Malayan Ins. Co., Inc., 2 Court of Appeals Rep. 783 Facts: > A personal accident policy was issued covering ‘loss of legs." ‘The insured met an accident resulting in total paralysis of both legs. The insurer refused to pay because there was no ‘loss of legs’ since the legs of the insured Pereravepersten. Issue Was total paralysis of both legs equivalentito loss on 1egs? Held: * ‘The insurer was liable because ‘loss of legs’ should be inter- preted so as to include the permanent and total paralysis of both legs. The interpretation of the term ‘loss of legs’ as limited to amputation of both legs jermanent total aralysis of both le Permanent, total paralysis of both leg ‘was equivalent to loss of both legs, TY and PANATON DISTINGUISHED. In the case of Ty us. First National Surety & Assuronce Co., Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that since the policy expressly au STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION stipulated that disability means loss of either hand by amputa- tion, the insured whose left hand was injured but not ampu- tated was not entitled to the benefits of the policy. In, distin- guishing the case from the case of Panaton vs. Malayan Insur- ance Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals pointed out that the injuries sustained by Ty caused only temporary total disability of his left hand. On the other hand, the injury suffered by Panaton produced a total paralysis of both legs, resulting in the com- plete loss of the use of both legs for life. It seems, therefore, that even if the policy expressly requires amputation of the legs as a pre-requisite for recovery in an accident insurance, a total per- manent paralysis of the legs would be sufficient to entitle the insured to the proceeds of the policy. After all, where the in- sured suffers from permanent total paralysis of both legs, he ‘would be bedridden for life and the amputation of his legs would not alter the result, Note: All the cases and comments on the interpre-” tation of Insurance provisions were taken from Perez, ‘The Insurance Code and the Insolvency Law. Comment: The Court of Appeals argued that if the prov sion was strictly applied, Panaton might be forced to have his legs amputated just to be able to claim the insurance benefits. Actually, even if he did, he might still not be able to recover as the insurer can argue that the amputation was done deliberately and not the result of an accident. - CASE: Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals & People, 113 SCRA 459 (1982) (already discussed under Chapter 1) E. CORPORATE LAW . WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF COR- PORATE LAW PROVISIONS? CASE: Home Ins. Co, vs. Eastern Shipping Lines, 123 SCRA 425 (1983) ‘The Corporation Law (now Corporation Code) must be given @ reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES a5, P, Naturalization L hamper the development of trade relations and which foster friendship and commercial intercourse among countries. FOR DISCUSSION: The Court could not rely on foreign jurisprudence on the point in issue. There were several but conflicting positions on the issue. What could possibly account for this? F. NATURALIZATION LAWS: WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATU- RALIZATION LAWS? CASE: Co vs. Republic, 108 Phil. 265 ‘The Republic of the Failippines appealed the decision of the Ibert ehh Sheed as iene Seeate ct be issued to*herein petitioner. Petitioner was born on March 15, 1957 in Banged Abra > sod hi lige is ue Puliggiet rere eet een (ataccomerchantaPetitioner contends that he has all the qualifi- Snel ic da gealnnisas tracer eancsraiend Filipino citizen. However, during cross-examination, when he ‘The government therefore contends that because of the above mentioned evi- dence, petitioner has failed to fulfill all the essential require- ‘ments to bgcome a naturalized Filipino citizen Held: The petitioner's statement that he believes in the laws of the Philippines is not suffici isfy the requirement that for the reason that thers are two entirely different statements with di addition, \d his non-fulfillment of the duty to file an income tax return, is an indication that 86 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION on FT, 13 rule that Judgment is therefore reversed. CASE: Velasco vs. Republic, 108 Phil. 234 Facts: Petitioner appealed the decision of the CFI (now RTC) deny- ing his petition for naturalization. Petitioner was born in the Philippines on Ma¥l2/1992 and has lived here ever since. He was, at the same time of \ petitions, employed in and was engaged to a the name of | Bugenio. . In his application for naturalization, Held: The Trial Court found that because petitioner has a limited cir It also appears that petitioner was employed by the Wilson Drug Store, which is partly owned by his mother, only one month before he filed the instant petition. This leads the Court to believe two things: ered as sub ‘onsidering the rule that naturali- zation laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the govern. ment and against the applicant, pelitioner should be denied naturalization Decision appealed from is therefore affirmed. VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 87 P. Naturalization Laws CASE: Lee Cho vs. Republic, 106 Phil. 775 Facts: . 2 Petitioner Lee Cho was born in China but came to the Philippines and was given the corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration. business an associated with some Filipinos. He married re iched and private schools and Peti- tioner’s application was questioned, hence this action. Held: In applying for Filipino citizensbip, one should ior to the filing of'his application, unless exempt from complying with said requirement. One is exempt, according to Section 6 of the Naturalization Law if: (a) he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary edu- cation in any school recognized by the government, and if (b) he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 ‘years or more, provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or in a private school recognized by the government. Petitioner contends that he did not file such declaration of intention because he has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 30 years and that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children. This claim is disputed by the government. Angelita has reached only fifth grade and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her which requires the teach: ing of Philippine Civics, Philippine History and Philignine Gov. ernment. These subjects are required so that aliens can embrace the country’s nationalism. With regard to Lourdes, petitioner claims that she stopped due to her poor health. However, Lourdes admitted in open court that she continued her studies in a Chi- nese school which employs a strict Chinese curriculum. Petitioner has failed to qualify as a Filipino citizen in that he tolerated a deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The Naturalization Law must be strictly construed in order that its nationalistic purpose can be fulfilled a8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION G. AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF AGRAR- IAN REFORM LAWS? CASE. Guerrero ve. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136 (1986) iked Benitez to take care of his c: nice er ould get 3 of the proceeds of the sale of the coconuts, In early 1973, Guerrero and Benitez ment whereby 0 continue ‘aah forms’ 1s passed repealing in its entirety Guerrero now claims that since the basis of the suit before the CAR (and Court of Appeals) was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions have lost their validity. CESSANTE RATIONE , LEGIS, CESSATET IPSA LEX. nea PEPE Respondent's rights as share tenant abolition of share tenancy. As the law: ‘cultural share tenants are given first step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, government program of land reform. ‘The Prosecution filed a tending thatthe appeal should ha i — the diemis contending that judiciary Act directs! that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneous; VI, INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 85 H, Rules of Court goal sought to be achieved by the H. RULES OF COURT 1, WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF ‘THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT? WHERE IS THIS CONTAINED? Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provide: “SEC. 2. CONSTRUCTION. These rules shall be “Although there is no vested right in technicali ties, in meritorious cases, a liberal (not literal) inter rretation of the rules becomes imper: the proper and just determination of a litigation.” (Berkenkotter us. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 228). CASE: Bello vs. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 509 Facts: see spouses; ‘The 90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal. Petitioner appealed ‘to the Court of Appeals but the latter still dismissed the petition. Held: ‘The.Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discre- tion in dismissing the erroneous appeal. Rule 50, Section 3 of the Judiciary Act provides that the Court of Appeals shall not dismiss misdirected appeals but shall certify the case to the proper court. ‘There is no logical reason why in all fairness and justice, the Court of First Instance should not lilsswise be bound by the same rule. It is therefore enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but to certify the case to the Court of Appeals as to proper court. ‘The paucity of the’ language of the rule and its failure to provide for such misdirected appeals to the Court of First In- stance should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right to appeal. It is the duty of the court, in construing Rules of Court, to construe che,rules iiberally to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness. It it within the spirit ‘and purpose of the Rule to'eliminate repugnancy and inconsist- ency by holding that the Court of First Inatance is equally bound not to dismiss misdirected appeals but certify them to the proper appellate court. 2. DO THE RULES ON APPEAL APPLY TO ADMINIS- TRATIVE BODIES? CASE: Gimenez vs. SEC, 183 SCRA 840 Facts: P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, granted the Securities and ‘Exchange Commission quasi-judicial functions to exercise exclu- ‘sive and original jurisdiction over a certain class of cases, spe- Gially regarding intracorperate controversies. The law also pro- vided: “The Commission shall promulgate rules or proce. dures to govern the proceedings, hearings and appeals of cases falling within its jurisdiction.” Pursuant to the above authority, tie SEC promulgated ite ‘own Rules on Proceedings before the SEC. Section 1, Rule XVII of said Rules provid Vi. INTERPRETATION OP SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES HL, Rules of Court a “SECTION 1. When to Appeal. — Any party ag- grieved by the final decision, order or ruling of the Commission en banc may appeal from the same to the Supreme Court by petition for review within THIRTY (80) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.” ‘Thereafter, B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Revamp Law, was passed. Section 39 of said law provides: “See. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or deci- sions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: x x x” ‘The Hearing Officer of the Commission rendered a decision in favor of Gimenez Stockbrokerage. On appeal to the Cor:mis- sion en bane, the decision was reversed, and Gimenez Stockbrok- erage was ordered to pay Ackerman and Co. Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (A party may file a Motion for Reconsideration within the same period for Appeal.) ‘Ackerman and Co. moved that the Motion for Reconsidera- tion be denied, the same having been filed out of time. It is argued that the Motion for Reconsideration having been filed 27 days after receipt of the decision, the same was filed ouf of time, citing the FIFTEEN-DAY period under Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129. The SEC denied the Motion for Reconsideration on that ground Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court, Iss Does Section 29 of B.P. Blg. 129 apply to the Securities and Exchange Commission? Hela: No. Section 99 of B. ‘The SEC is not a court. Iti Repeals by implication. are not favored. Big. 129 expressly refers to ‘courts’. an administrative agency. 92 Bench and Bai follows: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE: Lacsamana vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 643 (1986) “This Court en bane, x x x for the guidance of restated and clarified the rules as xxx xxx Xxx 4) APPEALS FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL BOD- IES TO THE COURT OF APPEALS. “In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section 22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen 18 from notice of the ruling, award, order or decision or judgment, or in case a motion for reconsid- eration is filed within said period, then within ten (1¢) tion denying the’motion and 3 of R.A. No, 5434), No extension of time to file such notice of appeal is needed, much less allowed.” xxx xxx xxx Note: ‘The ruling in the Lacsamana case was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Manila Polo Club, Inc. vs. SEC, GR. No. 81867, Dec. 14, 1988. CASE: Abellana vs. Marave, 57 SCRA 106 (already discussed under Chapter 1) CASE: Del Rosario & Sons vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 669 (already discussed under Chapter VI-C: Labor Laws) 3. WHATIS THE RULE REGARDING PERIOD AND MAN- NER OF APPEAL? “While the Rules of Court are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly aj plied as they are deemed indispensable to the preven- VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES $3 1 Expropriation Lawe tion of needless delays and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.” Alvero vs. de la Rosa, et al., 42 0.6. 316; Valdez vs. Ocumen, et al., L- 13536, Jan. 29, 1960). The same is true with respect to the rules on the manner and periods of perfecting ap- peals. (Gutierrez us. Court of Appeals, L-25972, Nov. 26, 1986) x x x, although these rules have been relaxed on equitable considerations. (Bagalanon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1-43043, March 31, 1977; Pimentel, etal vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L- 39684, June 27, 1975). FOR DISCUSSION: Is the above rule on periods and man- ner of appeal an exception to or an application of the general rule on the construction of the Rules of Court? 4, HOW SHOULD THE RULES ON SUMMARY PROCE- DURE BE CONSTRUED?, ‘The word “shall” ordinarily czanotes an impera- tive and indicates the mandatory character of a stat- ute, This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately de- pends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. (Gachon & Guevara vs. Hon. Devera, etc., et al., G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997, 84 SCAD 12). FOR DISCUSSION: Gachon vs. Devera, G.R. No. 116695, June 20, 1997. Note: The portion on forum shopping need not be discussed (Not a statcon issue). Also, there is no need to read the cited cases of Rosales & Co Keng Kian in the original. The quoted portions are sufficient. 1. EXPROPRIATION LAWS CASE: City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 449 Fact: For the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue, an action was filed to expropriate certain parcels of land where the Chinese “ STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION cemetery was located. The Chinese community opposed the expropriation on the ground the City had no authority to expro- priate the cemetery as it was already devoted to a public pur- pose Issue: May the Chinese cemetery be validly expropriated by the City in order to extend Rizal Avenue? Hela: ‘The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether di rectly by the State, or its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in this case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and none is guarded by the Constitution and laws more scduleuisty, than’ the rights to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislatuire interferes with that right and, for grecter public purpose, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain mean- ing of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpreta- tion. The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercises of government authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny Important as the power may be to the government, the inviola- ble sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal corporations to take property bbe expressly conferred and the use for which it is taken speci- fied, but the power, with all constitutional limitations and di- rections for its exercise, must be strictly construed. Note: After thia ruling, Congress passed a law expropriat- ing that very same portion of land for the extension of Rizal Avenue. ___ Look into the distinction between expropriation by the Na- tional Legislature and delegated power of municipal corporations (through their respective legislative bodies). VI, INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 95, ‘J. Debtor Protection Laws K, Grants of Power ta Local Governments J. DEBTOR PROTECTION LAWS CASE: Javellana vs. Mi 01, 40 Phil. 761 Facts: Javellana was awarded a favorable judgment in a certain case against Maximino Mirasol. In order to satisfy the judgment, ‘execution was levied upon certain properties of Maximino Mirasol ‘These properties were auctioned off to Javellana, the highest bidder. Before expiration of the period of redemption, Alejandro Mirasol (brother of Maximino) redeemed the properties on behalf of Luis Mirasol (to whom Maximino transferred his properties earlier). Javellana now opposes the redemption, claiming that it is void because (1) the payment was effected by means of a check and (2) because the sheriff withheld the amount paid. * Held: . 0 : ‘A redemption of property from an execation of sale was attacked as void because of a supposed coliusive agreement be- ‘tween the redemptioner and the sheriff whereby the sheriff agreed to withhold the money from the creditors and to return it te the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property. This is untenable because upon closer study, evidence shows that the redemption has been made in good faith and in conformity with the legal requirements. | Redemption of property sold under execution is not ren- dered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purposes of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due, neither is redemption rendered invalid by rea- son of the fact that the sheriff received the money without insist ing upon the production of the documents specified in the Code of Civil Procedure as necessary to prove the right of the redemptione?” to effect redemption. ‘A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end that property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. K. GRANTS OF POWER TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: “Grants of power to local governments are to be construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation 96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION thereof should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivisions con- cerned.” (Quimsing vs. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182). L. ELECTION LAWS “The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality.” (Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211). CASE: Villanueva vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 352 (1985) Facts: Mendoza, on the last day for filing, filed his sworn certifi- cate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores, Quezon for the 1980 elections. On the same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn byt hand- written letter withdrawing his candidacy. Immediately after ‘Mendoza’s withdrawal, Villanueva filed his own sworn Certifi- cate of Candidacy in substitution of Mendoze's. Villanueva won. ‘The COMELEC, however, disregarded the votes cast in favor of Villanueva and declared the other candidate as the sole winner. ‘The COMELEC argued that the withdrawal of Mendoza was not valid and consequently, he could not have been substivuted by Villanueva since the withdrawal by Mendoza was not sworn to as required by Sec. 27 of the Election Code, which provides: “xxx no certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn x x x unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate x x x or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal xxx” Held: ‘The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is but technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's w ill in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, which is clearly applicabl mutatis mutandis, the Supreme Court held that “(T)he will of the People cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-complaince therewith before the election VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 97 M. Wills would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the elector- ate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.” (see also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by the Supreme Court in Canceran us. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should be considered a he.mless irregularity.” Note: Initially, the Supreme Court dismissed Villanueva's petition. The Court reconsidered its dismissal when it was shown that the COMELEC ~ proclaimed winner abandoned the posi- tion. Queries: What is the rationale for requiring the oath? Is this a mere formality? Could Mendoza claim had hé not withdrawn? M. WILLS _+7 Contre i -Lyor of fhe Techofer 1. WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF WILLS? CASE: Tampoy vs. Alberastine, 107 Phil. 100 Facts: The trial court denied probate of the alleged will of the deceased Petronila Tampoy because the left hand margin of the first page of the will did not bear the testatrix’ thumbmark, but the second page bears the testatrix’ thumbmark and the signa- tures of the instrumental witnesses. The first page, however, contained the signature of all three instrumental witnesses and these witnesses testified that the will expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased. ‘The trial court nonetheless denjed probate for failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Article 805 of the Civil Code, which requires that the testator and the witnesses sign each and every page thereof. Ay ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Issu Was there substantial compliance? Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the ‘execution of a will must be strictly construed. Failure to comply is a fatal defect. The will, being void, cannot be admitted to probate. (Read the essential requisites’ of @ notarial will under Art. 805 of the Civil Cod 2. WHY IS THE RULE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF WILLS STRICTER THAN THAT OF CONTRACTS? Since the will is opened after the death of the testator, ‘Uiously, his intentions can only be determined irom the Yocu- ‘ment itself, unlike in an ordinary contract. 3. WHAT IS THE RULE ON SUBSTANTIAL COMPLI. ANCE OF WILLS? Art. 809 of the Civil Code provides: “In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects = and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the Janguage used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the require- ‘ments of Article 805.” For a scholarly and detailed discussion of this + issue, /., the seeming conflict between the categorical statement in the Tampoy case ‘und the qualification provided for under Article 809, please read the rational iven by the Code Commission for Article 809 and the criticism to said article by Justice J.B.L. Reyé Caguioa's Comments and Cases on Civil Law, Vol. II], Succession, A suggested safe course is to see if the set of facts ‘one is confronted with falls equerely within any of the decisions interpreting Articles 805 and 809. Several VI INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUTES 93 M. Wille actual situations are presented in Justice Caguioa’s book as well as any other textbook on Civil Law chap- ter on succession 4. LATIN RULES ON WILLS a, Mens Testatoris in Testamentis Spectanda Est. ‘The testator's intention is to be regarded in wills. b. In Contractibus, Benigna; In Testamentis, Benignior; In Restitutionibus, Benignissima Interpretatio Facienda Est In contracts, the interpretation is to be liberal; in wills, more liberal; in restitutioas, most liberal. Chapter Vii PARTICULAR LATIN RULES omen! VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST. : e* Speech is the indication of intent. “If there is one rule of construction for statutes and other documents, it is that you must not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used.” (Re: a Rebior (No. 336 of 1947] [1948] 2 All ER. 533, per Lord Green M.R.) Where by the use of clear and equivocal language : capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced even though it is absurd or mischievous.” (Lord Esher M.R., R.V. City of London Court (1892] 1 Q.B. 273, 290). CASE: IBAA Employees’ Union vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA . 663 (1984) ready discussed under Chapter IV) CASE: Chartered Bank Employees’ Association ve. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 (already discussed under Chapter IV) 100 VIL. PARTICULAR LATIN RULES tor 12. Ratio Legie 3. Mens Legislatorie CASE: Ala Mode Garments, Inc. vs. NLRC, 79 SCAD 736, 268 SCRA 497, 509 (Read only the Statutory Construction issue on page 509 of SCRA.) Question for discussion: If the legislative intent was so “clear, plain and free from ambiguity”, why were there earlier Supreme Court cases (Mercury Drug) to the contrary? What could have been the Supreme Ceart’s basis tor the ruling? membamounciomey.ji0 Loic RATIOLEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS. ‘The reason of the I is the soul of the law. * VERB INTENTIONI, NON E CONTRA, DEBENT INSERVIRE Words ought to be more subservient to the intent, not the intent to the words. QUI HAERET IN LITERA, HAERET IN CORTICE. He who sticks to the letter, gu) inlerrartstion sticks to the bark. Caveat: “It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not know very much = (Dissenting opinion of justice Aquino in Villanueva vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 353, 359; discussed under Chapter IV’ Election Laws) Mil of the Jegiclhne 3. MENS LEGISLATORIS “The literal construction then, has, in general, but Prima facie preference. To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the ‘aim, scope and object of the whole act; to consider, ror ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION according to Lord Coke: 1. What was the law before the act was passed?; 2. What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided?; 3. What remedy Par- liament has appointed?; and 4. What is the reason for the remedy?” (Heydo's Case [1584] 3 Rep. 78). CASE: Prasnik vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 865 Facts: ‘ After his marriage to Catherine Prasnik was dissolved by a divorce decree in the U.S., Leopoldo P»asnik and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of mai riage. Out of this relation, four children were born. Prasnik filed with the CFI [now RTC] a petition to adopt these {tur children. . ‘The Solicitor General opposed the pet'tion for adoption in- voking Article 338 (1) of the Civil Code, which provides: “Art. 338. The following may be adopted: (1). The natural child, by the natural father or mother; xxx x" mother; eee? ‘The Solicitor General argues that this artide refers only to ‘ong who bas NOT been acknowledged as a natural child. Issue: Does Art. 338 (1) refer to unacknowledged natural children only? Held: ‘he law evidently intends to sl!ow adoption of a natural child whether the child is recognized or not" If the intention were to allow adoption only of unrecognized children, then said article would b jose because such children woul een validly adopted even without the provision. This is becat an_unacknowledged natural child has no right whatsoever and being considered by law as a total stranger to his parents, may be adopted under Article 337. It should be borne in mind that the rights of an_acknawl- edged natural child are much less than those of alegitimate-child eee ‘VIL. PARTICULAR LATIN RULES 103 3. Mens Legialatoris and it is indeed to the greater advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status. ‘This view is in keeping with the modern trend that consid- ers adoption as an act not merely to establish the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a legiti mate status. CASE: Matabuena vs. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284 Facts: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Petronila Cervantes, During this period, Felix donated to Petronila a parcel of land. Later, the two were married. ‘After the death of Felix, Cornelia Matabuena, his sister, . sought the nullification of the donation citing Article 133 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.” ‘The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because at the time the donation was made Felix and Petronila were not yet married and were simply living together. ‘The donation, therefore, was not given “during the marriage.” Issue: Does the prohibition apply to donatious between live-in partners? Held: Yes, tis a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written, Since the reason Tor ‘on onaTORS be tween spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of ndue influens presaine alng exerted by one “Spoune-on the other, there sno renson WEy This prohibition should not also apply to common-law relationships. Reason and morality alike demand that disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. Otherwise, one would be putting a premium on immoral relationships and place them on a better footing than a lawful and moral relationship. A 104 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 4. DURA LEX SED LEX CASE: People vs. Macarandang, 106 Phil. 715 Facts: Moro Macarandang was accused andsconviéted @f illegal postussion/f firearms under Sec. 678 ofthe Revised Administras tive Code, which provides: Y Sesim, detached par RPG LaNTN therefor, or any instrument or implement used or in- tended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition.” . a “To whom it may concern, For having shown by previously sur- Gov. Dimakuta” Macarandang now argues that as a secret agent, he now “Pirearms and ammuniti fully issued to offices, ‘cidiem, the Armed Forces of the Phili rovincial governors, lieu: tenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors and guards of provincial == a iv ieee tel ss j 4, Dura Lex Sed Lex Prisons and jails”, are not covered “when such firearms are in the possession of such officials and public serv. ants for use in the performance of their official duties.” Issue: Does Macarandang fall under the exception? Held: Yes, The enumeration of Section 879 involves While a ‘secret agent’ is not specificatly mentioned in the list of exemptions, the intention ofé «Facts: Gee ae ef in the Macarandang case, sat At the time of his arrest, she.pravailing.doctrinesas.the, fapa used the same thus covered under cemption of Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code (see Sec. 879 in the Macarandang case, above). Issue: Does Mapa fall under the exception? Held: io etmptin, te lout iS dear. ‘The law cannot be any clearer, No provision is made for a secret agent. As such, he is 3t. Our task is equally clear. e first and fundamental duty @f courts is to apply the law. CASE: People vs. Santayana, 74 SCRA 25 Fats: ‘Santayana was accused and convicted of illegal possession 106 ‘STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION trative of firearms under Section 878 of the Revised Admit Code. (see Sec. 878 in the Macarandang case above). At the time of his arrest, the prevailing doctrine was the Macarandang case. It was only later that the Supreme Court revoked the Macarandang ruling in the Maps case. Issue: ‘Should Santayana be convicted? Held: . ‘The Supreme Court sustained the Mapa ruling, but did not, apply the same to Santayana and acquitted him because: “At the time of Santayane’s arrest, the doctrine then pre- vailing was the case of People us. Macarandang where we held thot the appointment of a civilian as secret agent to ‘assist in the jenance of peace and order and detectinn of

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