USC Warriors' Notes - Criminal Law

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WARRIORS’ NOTES 20_21 | CIVIL LAW | 1
Compiled by Pepita Jane A. Petralba
I. RPC, BOOK 1
A. CONSPIRACY
1. PEOPLE vs. MAGAT, G.R. No. 231882. Sept.15, 2021
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Here, conspiracy is evident from the behavior
and conduct of accused-appellants on the night of the incident. They all acted in unison in
waiting for their victims, firing at them, and escaping. That they escaped separately is
immaterial. What is important is that their acts were coordinated and not dictated by separate
and independent goals.
2. PEOPLE vs. REYES and NUÑEZ, G.R. No. 252295. July 7, 2021
Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. Here, the acts of appellants clearly
indicated a unity of action towards one common purpose: to take turns in raping the victim.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Appellants, therefore, are each liable for
two (2) counts of Rape.
B. MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 251918. October 4, 2021.]
To stress, "relationship and minority in qualified rape partake of the nature of a special
qualifying circumstance which has the effect of increasing the prescribed penalty by degrees.
When either one of the said circumstances is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the
Information and proven by the evidence may be considered merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance which shall entitle the victim to the award of exemplary damages."
2. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 248421. September 27, 2021
The two qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur in

QUALIFIED RAPE as provided in Article 266-B of the RPC and must be alleged in the Information
and duly proven during trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction. Otherwise the
crime would only be Simple Rape.
3. PEOPLE vs. BULTRON , G.R. No. 253651. October 4, 2021
Treachery exists "when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make."
For such attending circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (a) the
employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would ensure the safety of the
malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to
the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method, or manner of execution
was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
To appreciate evident premeditation, the following must be proven: (a) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung
to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
C. PENALTIES
1. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 249148. October 4, 2021
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim of rape is
below 18 years of age and the offender is a relative by affinity within the third civil degree. The
death penalty cannot, however, be imposed in view of RA 9346. In lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole shall be imposed. Hence, the Court
finds proper the penalty imposed by the appellate court upon accused-appellant which
is reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole in the crime of Qualified Rape.
2. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 248421. September 27, 2021.]
However, the phrase "without eligibility for parole" must be deleted as the same is appended
only when the imposable penalty is death.
3. HISOLER vs. PEOPLE AND DE ASIS, G.R. No. 237337. June 6, 2018
Insofar as the penalty, the same must be revisited in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10951 which modifies the penalty for Swindling or Estafa. Section 100 off the same law
provides that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the accused. Thus,
a comparison of the proper penalties imposable under the RPC and R.A. No. 10951 is
imperative.
Article 315 of the RPC which provides for the penalty for Estafa or Swindling, reads:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Considering that the penalty prescribed by law is composed only of two periods,
pursuant to Article 65, the same must be divided into three equal portions of time included in
the penalty prescribed, forming one period for each of the three portions, to wit:
Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years;
Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days; and
Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days.
In arriving at the imposable penalty, the RTC and the CA concluded that since the
subject amount of Php50,000.00 is Php28,000.00 beyond the Php22,000.00 ceiling set by law,
the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner should be taken within the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed; and from the highest allowable duration thereof should be added
the incremental penalty of two (2) years. Therefore, the RTC and the CA set the maximum
period of indeterminate penalty to ten (10) years (8 years from the range of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law plus 2 years incremental penalty).
Then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be within
the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed, which is, prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months. In the case of the petitioner, the RTC and the CA deemed it proper
to impose the lowest term possible or six (6) months and one (1) day.
On the other hand, under Section 85 of R.A. No. 10951, the penalty for Estafa or
swindling committed through false pretenses has been amended, viz.:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). —
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2 (d) hereof shall be punished by:
"4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount
is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two
hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
xxx xxx xxx
Applied in this case, since the penalty prescribed by law is a penalty composed of only
one period, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the penalty into
three portions, thus:
Maximum: 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to 10 years
Medium: 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 9 years and 4 months
Minimum: 8 years and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum penalty should
be anywhere within the medium period. While the minimum penalty should be one degree
lower from the prescribed penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, or prision mayor in
its minimum period. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Under R.A. No. 10951 therefore, the
petitioner is liable to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years and eight (8) months
of prision mayor, as maximum.
With these, the Court is now confronted with a situation wherein the imposable penalty
under the RPC, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, presents a lower
minimum period but a higher maximum period of imprisonment than that imposable under
R.A. No. 10951, which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years and eight (8)
months. TIADCc
As stated, Section 100 of R.A. No. 10951 applies only insofar as it is favorable to the
accused. While the imposable penalty under the RPC and R.A. No. 10951 both have their
advantages, the Court weighing the attendant circumstances, finds that the penalty imposed
under the RPC should apply.
Primarily, it must be emphasized that the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA in
this case is within the range of allowable penalty, and as such is valid exercise of discretion
and must be affirmed by the Court. In fine, jurisprudence dictates that the determination of
the minimum and the maximum terms is left entirely to the discretion of the trial court, the
exercise of which will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of showing that there is grave
abuse.
This notwithstanding, it is worth reiterating that the penalty imposable upon the
petitioner, and the incremental penalty could be added anywhere within the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed or somewhere from six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one
(21) days to eight (8) years. In this case, the RTC deemed it wise to add the incremental penalty
to eight (8) years, thus bringing the maximum period of indeterminate penalty to be imposed
upon the petitioner to ten (10) years. In this regard, the Court notes for the sake of illustration
that had the RTC chosen to add the incremental penalty of two (2) years to the minimum
threshold of the maximum period imposable which is six (6) years, this situation would not
have arisen. As in the latter instance, it is clear that the penalty imposable upon the petitioner
under the RPC would be more favorable to her considering that both the minimum and the
maximum periods are lower than that under R.A. No. 10951. Otherwise stated, the
indeterminate penalty imposable under the RPC in that case would be six (6) months and one
(1) day to eight (8) years as maximum, which is clearly more advantageous for the petitioner
as opposed to the six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years and eight (8) months that is
imposable under R.A. No. 10951.
At any rate, even if the maximum period imposable upon the petitioner under the RPC
in this case is higher than that under R.A. No. 10951, the Court finds that the benefits that
would accrue to the petitioner with the imposition of a lower minimum sentence outweighs
the longer prison sentence and is more in keeping with the spirit of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
In fixing the indeterminate penalty imposable upon the accused, the Court should be
mindful that the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to "uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness." Simply, an indeterminate sentence is imposed to give the
accused the opportunity to shorten the term of imprisonment depending upon his or her
demeanor, and physical, mental, and moral record as a prisoner. The goal of the law is to
encourage reformation and good behavior, and reduce the incidence of recidivism. While the
grant of parole after service of the minimum sentence is still conditional, the flexibility granted
upon the petitioner to immediately avail of the benefits of parole considering the much
shorter minimum sentence under the RPC should inspire the petitioner into achieving the
underlying purpose behind the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
4. In People v. Jugueta, the Court addressed in detail the

award of damages in criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
It held that when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper
amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00
exemplary damages. The award of exemplary damages "is justified under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code to set a public example or correction for the public good."
5. PEOPLE vs. MEDROSO, G.R. No. L-37633. January 31, 1975
Convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, accused-appellant

assails the correctness of the penalty imposed by the trial court, alleging that since he has two
mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely: voluntary surrender and plea of guilty, and none
of the aggravating circumstances to offset them, he is entitled to a penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the offense pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Supreme Court held appellant's contention untenable because the offense charged
is defined and penalized by Article 365, under which an accused is not entitled as a matter of
right to the provisions of Article 64 of the Code.
Paragraph 5 of Article 365 expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties
provided for in the Article, the courts shall exercise sound discretion without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64. The trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64
even if the accused had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating
circumstance to offset them.
Appellant's proposition would indeed be correct if he were charged with any of the
offenses penalized in the Revised Penal Code other than Article 365 thereof. But because
appellant is accused under Article 365, he is not entitled as a matter of right to the provisions
of Article 64 of the Code.
Paragraph 5 of Article 365 expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties
provided for in the Article, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article 64. The rationale of the law can be found in the fact that in
quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence which
characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and
resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application of the
penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what
We may call the mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of
Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor
with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.
6. ISABELITA REODICA vs. CA and PEOPLE, G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in
the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a
duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may
be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365.
This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the
proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this
being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the
reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the
first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence
which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the
damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been
malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then
be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which
is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article
329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21
days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a
maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365
provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public
censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as
infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both.
Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is
considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty
lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier
discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto
mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in
question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
7. JOSEPHINE G. BRISENIO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 241336. June 16, 2021
Below is a comparison of the penalty for Estafa under the relevant provision of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10951:
RPC RA 10951
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any
person who shall defraud another by person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein any of the means mentioned herein
below shall be punished by: below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision xxx xxx xxx

correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is 2nd. The penalty of prision
over 12,000 pesos but does not correccional in its minimum and
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such medium periods, if the amount of the
amount exceeds the latter sum, the fraud is over One million two hundred
penalty provided in this paragraph thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does
shall be imposed in its maximum not exceed Two million four hundred
period, adding one year for each thousand pesos (P2,400,000).
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total (Underscoring supplied.)
penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
(Underscoring supplied.)
On the other hand, the comparison of the penalties for falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents under the old provision of the RPC and RA 10951
is as follows:
RPC RA 10951
Art. 172. Falsification by private Art. 172. Falsification by private

individual and use of falsified individual and use of falsified
documents. — The penalty of prision documents. — The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium and correccional its medium and maximum
maximum periods and a fine of not periods and a fine of not more than
more than P5,000 pesos shall be One million pesos (P1,000,000) shall be
imposed upon: imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall 1. Any private individual who shall
commit any of the falsifications commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document; other kind of commercial document;
and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a

2. Any person who, to the damage of third party, or with the intent to cause
a third party, or with the intent to such damage, shall in any private
cause such damage, shall in any document commit any of the acts of
private document commit any of the falsification enumerated in the next
acts of falsification enumerated in the preceding article; and
next preceding article.
3. Any person who shall knowingly

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the
the false documents embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of the
next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article,
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next
shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree. (Underscoring
lower in degree. (Underscoring supplied.)
supplied.)
In both the RPC and RA 10951, the penalty to be imposed upon a person guilty
of Estafa is based on the amount of damage. Here, the amount defrauded is P1,440,000.00
representing the total amount of money actually released and received by petitioner from
private complainant as shown in the statement of account.
Under Article 315 of the RPC, before the amendment, the penalty for the crime
of Estafa is prision correccional, in its maximum period, to prision mayor, in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00, but does not exceed P22,000.00. If such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty is in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00. With the passage of RA 10951, the prescribed penalty as provided
under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the RPC is now prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods if the amount does not exceed P2,400,000.00.
Thus, the penalty for the crime of Estafa under RA 10951 should be given retroactive
effect considering that it is more favorable to petitioner. 18
With regard to the crime of falsification, the penalty of imprisonment imposed is the
same for both paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC and RA 10951 which is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. But under the RPC, the penalty of fine to
be imposed is not more than P5,000.00 while under RA 10951, the penalty of fine to be
imposed shall not exceed P1,000,000.00.
Evidently, the penalty of imprisonment in the crime of Estafa under RA 10951 is now
lighter compared to the penalty of imprisonment for falsification under paragraph 1, Article
172 of the RPC. Applying the provisions of Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the graver
offense should be imposed in the maximum period. Thus, the penalty for Falsification by
private individuals and Use of Falsified Documents under Article 172 of the RPC should be
imposed in the maximum period, being the more serious crime than Estafa. However, the
penalty of fine of not more than P5,000.00 under the old law should be imposed against
petitioner because this is more favorable to her than the penalty of fine of not more than
P1,000,000.00 under the present law. 19
Based on the considerations, the Court hereby modifies the indeterminate sentence to
be imposed on petitioner so that the minimum term should come from the penalty next lower
in degree, that is, arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period with a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Meanwhile, the maximum term should come from prision correccional, medium, to prision
correccional, maximum, in its maximum period which is four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days to six (6) years. 20 The actual damages of P1,440,000.00 must also be
subjected to legal interest at 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
full payment, in consonance with recent jurisprudence.
D. PRESCRIPTION
1. ISABELITA REODICA vs. CA and PEOPLE, G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose
penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to
determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident
in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription

shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or
are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him.
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether
the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action
on the merits. Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals and People v. Cuaresma, this Court
held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of
the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases
covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in
the instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly
with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation;
provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only
by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal
Code, the latter prevails.
DIFFERENT COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR VIOLATION OF ORDINANCES.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein
was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is
suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly,
this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding;
what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the
proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this
case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged
in the information in this case.
E. STAGES OF A FELONY
1. PEOPLE vs. ORDON and ELICANAL, G.R. No. 204892. June 23, 2021
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
COMPLEX CRIMES: RECKLESS IMRPUDENCE
1. ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE, G.R. No. 125066 July 8,
1998
If a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, this Court declared that where
one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no
complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex
crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may
be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property
and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not
constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See
People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical
injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a
chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to
property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less
grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
Estafa
1. ERNESTO S. MALLARI v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 249374. July 12, 2021
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by

false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury. While concealment is "[t]he unlawful suppression of any fact or circumstance, by one
of the parties to a contract, from the other, which in justice ought to be made known."
Petitioner's deliberate concealment of the fact that he and his E.S. Mallari Trading and
Construction lacks the requisite PCAB license because it was blacklisted, delisted, and
perpetually disqualified from entering into any construction contract amounts to
deceit. DETACa
In accord with Cresencio v. People, the trial court applied the minimum penalty
under Article 315, 4th paragraph of the RPC due to the prosecution's failure to prove the actual
amount of damages or legal injury suffered by complainants. The threshold amount and
corresponding penalty under Article 315, 4th paragraph is P200.00 and arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods, respectively. The trial court, thus, imposed the straight penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor and ordered petitioner to pay the threshold amount of
P200.00 as civil liability.
But with the enactment of Republic Act No. 10951 (RA 10951), the imposable penalties
for estafa have been amended, as follows:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below
shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and

maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000) x x x.
Section 100, on the other hand, provides for the retroactive application of RA 10951
but only to the extent favorable to the accused. Clearly, the increased threshold amount of
P40,000.00 is prejudicial to petitioner for the purpose of determining the extent of his civil
liability. Hence, we sustain the P200.00 civil liability awarded by the trial court.
In People v. Cayabyab, the Court explained that since the new penalty
is more beneficial to the accused and in view of the non-applicability of the
indeterminate sentence law, the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed as
a single or straight penalty.
2. ARIES CAMANTIGUE vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 255265. July 5, 2021
In fine, we affirm the verdict of conviction against petitioner for estafa under Article
315 (1) (b) of the RPC. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found that
petitioner, as barangay treasurer, received in trust the amount of P100,000.00 from Dario for
the purpose of turning it over to John Andres should the latter return to the Philippines.
Petitioner deposited the money in his personal account and failed to account for it or to return
it to Dario, despite demand, thus, causing prejudice to the latter as owner of the amount.
3. HISOLER vs. PEOPLE AND DE ASIS, G.R. No. 237337. June 6, 2018
The elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the RPC are as follows: (1)
the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the
offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.
4. BARLIN, vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 207418. June 23, 2021
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the RPC are: (a) that
money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same; (b) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (c) that the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Petitioner's contention that she was not informed of the cause of accusation against
her in the Information fails to convince. The Information clearly and categorically charged her
with Estafa under Article 315 paragraph (1) (b) for violating the trust receipt agreements she
had entered into with Gacayan. It must be stressed that a violation of trust receipt agreements
would make the accused criminally liable for estafa under paragraph (1) (b) of Article 315 of
the RPC as expressly provided in Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law.
5. JOSEPHINE G. BRISENIO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 241336. June 16, 2021
Records show that petitioner was in possession of TCT No. N-245848, a spurious and
falsified document. It was likewise established that petitioner, through false pretenses or
fraudulent representations, had lured private complainant into entering into a business
venture with her by falsifying TCT No. N-245848, and thereafter obtained from the latter the
sum of P1,440,000.00 as shown by the statement of account presented during trial. In other
words, petitioner used the falsified title, took advantage and profited from it, and successfully
convinced private complainant to invest her money to her own damage and detriment.
"In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a
forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger." Thus, the lower
courts correctly convicted petitioner of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents.
Firearms
1. SANTOS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 251408. June 23, 2021
Computation of Penalty
Petitioner is charged with illegal possession of one (1) .45 caliber gun loaded with one
(1) magazine containing seven rounds of ammunition. Section 28 (e) of RA 10591 provides for
the penalty therefor, viz.:
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in
paragraphs (a) to (c) in this section shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any or combination of the
following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a
loaded magazine;
One degree higher than prision mayor in its medium period is prision mayor in its
maximum period, ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
|||
HAZING
1. CARLOS PAULO BARTOLOME and JOEL BANDALAN vs. G.R. No. 227951. June
28, 2021.]
Hazing, like any other felony, need not be proven by direct evidence; it may be
sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence. Moreover, conviction for hazing is still possible
through a single, credible witness.
However, the Court finds important the legal principle that every person accused of
any crime is considered innocent until the contrary is proven.
The prosecution failed to establish the elements of hazing:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority

or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and
other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
Considering the failure to establish that there occurred an initiation rite or practice as
a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization, there is
no recruit, neophyte or applicant of such fraternity, sorority, or organization to speak of.
Hence, the second element of the offense of hazing is absent.
In stark contrast to the present case, the circumstances in the Dungo case
overwhelmingly proved the elements of hazing.
Interestingly, apart from the circumstantial evidence, the Court in the Dungo case also
considered the presumption in paragraph 6, Section 4 of RA 8049 which provides that the
presence of any person during a hazing is prima facie evidence of his participation as principal,
unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because
a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing,
which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of
hazing. Thus, a person who is found to be present in the commission of hazing may be
convicted as a principal thereof when he fails to rebut the prima facie presumption found
under paragraph 6, Section 4 of RA 8049.
The prima face presumption under paragraph 6, Section 4 of RA 8049, however, finds
no application in the present case. To begin with, the prosecution failed to prove that a hazing
incident occurred.
Nonetheless, this Court in Villarba v. Court of Appeals ruled that conviction for hazing
is still possible through a single, credible witness:
This is not unusual in prosecutions of hazing cases, where the
reluctance of fraternity members to speak about the initiation rites persists.
In Dungo v. People:
Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in
secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek
organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are
reluctant to give any information regarding initiation rites. The
silence is only broken after someone has been injured so
severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point
that the secret is revealed and the activities become public. . . .
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
1. CORAZON ARDE, vs. PEOPLE. G.R. No. 256420. July 12, 2021
RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995.

Illegal Recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment
activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Articles 34
and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as '[a]ny act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or

abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.' As correctly ruled by the CA, the evidence in this case established
that without any license or authority to do so, petitioner promised private complainant Violeta
Kibara (private complainant) overseas employment, prompting the latter to part with her
money.
MURDER/HOMICIDE
1. PEOPLE vs. MAGAT, et. Al., G.R. No. 231882. Sept. 15, 2021.
Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by courts only through external
manifestations. It is proved by evidence that may consist of "(1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused."
Here, intent to kill is clearly shown by the accused-appellants' physical acts of
surrounding the victims' car and simultaneously firing at it, ensuring that whoever was inside
would be hit. That Shirchung sustained only one gunshot wound is insignificant. What is crucial
is that as a result of the shooting, both he and his3 brother were injured. While he survived,
his brother did not. His survival may only be attributed to factors other than the supposed
lack of intent to kill by accused-appellants.
2. PEOPLE V. BULTRON , G.R. No. 253651. October 4, 2021
Jurisprudence further dictates that the elements of murder are as follows: (a) a person was killed;
(b) the accused killed him; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248; and (d) the killing is not parricide nor infanticide.
3. PEOPLE vs. JOVENCIO ROLLAN, G.R. No. 253661. September 13, 2021
The following elements of treachery must be established by clear and convincing

evidence to qualify the killing to Murder: (1) the employment of means of execution which
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (2) that said means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
4. PEOPLE vs. FLORENCIO MIRANDA, G.R. No. 255614. July 28, 2021
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. It requires:
a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or retaliate; and
b) the said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is
done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim
with no chance to resist or escape. A swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that
insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim is an
indication that treachery is present. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to
his determination; (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual
execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.
Similar to treachery, evident premeditation must be clearly proven, established beyond
reasonable doubt and based on external acts that are evident, not merely suspected, and
which indicate deliberate planning. Absent any proof as to how and when the plan was
hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated.
5. PEOPLE vs. SERRANO, ANDRES, &TELIG, G.R. No. 252602. July 28, 2021
The killing of Jackson Camilon (Camilon) was attended by the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength, as alleged and proved by evidence. To support a finding of
abuse of superior strength, it must be proved that there was a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor that was plainly and obviously advantageous to the
latter who purposely selected or took advantage of such inequality in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime. The assailant must be shown to have consciously sought the
advantage, or to have the deliberate intent to use his or her superior advantage. In this context,
to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this
qualifying or aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties.
Here, Camilon was completely unarmed while facing off against three (3) assailants
who were armed with a lead pipe and a gun. Appellants Serrano and Telig ganged up on
Camilon, punched him, struck him with a lead pipe, and even when he was already sprawled
on the ground, appellant Andres further took advantage of Camilon's helplessness by lifting
Camilon's head and shooting him in the head at close range. Clearly, abuse of superior
strength attended the killing of Camilon.
Too, there is no doubt that appellants acted in conspiracy with each other. Appellants
acted in concert with one another — to hurt, disable, and eventually kill Camilon. As stated,
appellants Telig and Serrano punched Camilon and one of them hit Camilon with a lead pipe.
Taking his cue, appellant Andres shot Camilon right in the head. Thereafter, appellants fled
together. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. In conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all.
6. ORLANDO DIEGO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 256399. July 12, 2021
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of Homicide since it was proven that: (a) the victim, Leonardo, was
killed, as evidenced by his Certificate of Death dated June 18, 2011; (b) the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses proved that petitioner physically harmed Leonardo, resulting in his
death; (c) the intent to kill is presumed due to the death of Leonardo; and (d) the killing was
not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide, or infanticide.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong
under Article 13 (3) of the RPC was correctly appreciated in this case as there was no showing
that petitioner intended to cause Leonardo's death during their physical altercation. Case law
provides that '[i]n determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that
since intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention
must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts.' Here, it is evident that petitioner only
intended to maltreat or inflict physical harm on Leonardo, as his actions of boxing and kicking
the latter, without more, cannot be interpreted as intended to end Leonardo's life. Since there
is no indication that the lower courts overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds no reason to deviate from
their factual findings. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was in the best
position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.
7. ONOFRE REYES, JR. vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 250407. July 7, 2021
Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty
of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The elements of homicide are: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.
As for intent to kill, the foregoing pieces of evidence indubitably show that indeed
petitioner pulled the trigger of his firearm which directly resulted in the death of Christopher.
It is well settled that if the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent
to kill is presumed and it is incumbent upon the accused to prove otherwise. Unfortunately
for petitioner, this presumption was rendered conclusive in view of his absolute failure to
present evidence to the contrary.
In any case, Wacoy v. People decreed that even if there is no intent to kill, the crime
is still homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly at the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.
RA 7610
ASELA BRIÑAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 254005. June 23, 2021
There is no crime of grave oral
defamation in relation to Section 10 (a)
of R.A. 7610.
Section 10 (a), R.A. 7610 provides:
SEC 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by Article 59 of [Presidential

Decree] No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
In turn, Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610 defines child abuse and enumerates the acts covered
by it, thus:
SEC 3. Definition of terms. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not,
of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 10 (a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are "not covered by
the Revised Penal Code." Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct — she cannot be convicted of
grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610. From the plain
language of Section 10 (a), the acts punished under it and those punished under the RPC are
mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC are excluded from the coverage
of Section 10 (a).
A conviction for child abuse under
Section 10 (a) in relation to Section
3 (b) (2) of R.A. 7610 requires the presence
of intent to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth of the child as a
human being.
A study of relevant jurisprudence reveals that a specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth of a child as a human being is required for conviction under Section
10 (a) of R.A. 7610 in relation to Section 3 (b) (2). This is especially true if the acts allegedly
constituting child abuse were done in the spur of the moment, out of emotional outrage.
"Debasement" is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of
something; "degradation," on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character
or quality while "demean" means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character.
Hence, the prosecution must not only prove that the acts of child abuse under Section
3 (b) (2) were committed, but also that the same were intended to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the minor victim as a human being.
This requirement of specific intent was first established in the case of Bongalon v.
People. Therein, the accused was charged under Section 10 (a) because he struck and slapped
the face of a minor, after finding out that the latter threw stones at the accused's own minor
daughters and burnt the hair of one of them. The Court therein ruled that the laying of hands
against a child, when done at the spur of the moment and in anger, cannot be deemed as an
act of child abuse under Section 10 (a), as the essential element of intent to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being is not present:
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to

debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
Child abuse cases following Bongalon likewise adopted the specific intent
requirement.
Even in cases where the Court did convict the accused of violation of Section 10 (a),
the Court highlighted the need for the prosecution to prove specific intent to debase in child
abuse. In Torres v. People, the Court affirmed the presence of this intent when accused, with
excessive force, whipped the child's neck with a wet t-shirt, not just once but three times,
causing the child to fall down the stairs and sustain a contusion. The Court said that if the only
intention of the accused was to discipline the child and stop him from interfering in the
conciliation proceedings, he could have resorted to other less violent means.
While the mentioned cases requiring specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth of the child as a human being pertain to child abuse by physical deeds, i.e., the
laying of hands against the child, the same treatment has been extended to the utterance of
harsh words against minors.
While the aforementioned cases pertain to the commission of child
abuse by physical deeds, i.e., the laying of hands against a child, the same
treatment has also been extended to the utterance of harsh words,
invectives, or expletives against minors. In Escolano v. People, which
involved facts similar to the instant case, the Court held that the mere
shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly done out of anger,
frustration, or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse under Section
10 (a) of RA 7610 absent evidence that the utterance of such words
were specifically intended to debase, degrade, or demean the victim's
intrinsic worth and dignity.
For instance, lack of intent to debase may be proven by demonstrating that the
allegedly abusive acts were solely out of emotional outrage in the spur of the moment, as the
Court held in Bongalon, Jabalde, Calaoagan, and Talocod.
Another defense that may refute the attendance of intent to debase the child is that
the accused, in committing the acts complained of, merely intended to discipline or correct a
wrongful behavior of the minor. This holds especially true in cases wherein the accused is
legally entrusted with the care and discipline of the minor victim such as the latter's teacher.
In Rosaldes v. People, The Court, while recognizing the right of a teacher to discipline
his or her pupils, nevertheless convicted the accused of child abuse, ruling that her acts were
unnecessary and excessive which caused the child severe injuries. This effectively refuted the
accused's claim that she merely intended to discipline the child.
Hence, based on the foregoing case law, a prosecution for child abuse under Section
10 (a) in relation to Section 3 (b) (2) requires the presence of a specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Such specific
intent may be refuted by proof that the acts were merely offshoots of emotional outrage in
the spur of the moment and/or that the accused merely intended to discipline the child. In the
case where the defense of disciplining a child is advanced, the Court may likewise consider if
the disciplining acts are commensurate to, and may reasonably address, the misbehavior of
the child being dealt with. If the alleged disciplinary measures are excessive and run counter
to the purpose of disciplining a child, then the defense will be rejected and the accused may
be held liable for child abuse.
Hence, the only acts proven to have been committed by Briñas are the hurling of
invectives, made in a spur of the moment and in the heat of anger, against the private
complainants, after she learned of the latter's mischief against her own daughter.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, these acts, by themselves, do not show intent to debase,
degrade or demean the minors which is an indispensable element of the crime charged. In a
criminal case, the prosecution is burdened to establish beyond reasonable doubt all of the
elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle that an accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
Thus, due to the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of specific intent to
debase, degrade, or demean the victims' intrinsic worth and dignity, Briñas cannot be held
guilty of child abuse under R.A. 7610. This is in line with the 2020 case of Talocod discussed
above which involved similar acts of slandering minors in the heat of anger and without
intention to debase, wherein the Court likewise acquitted the accused of the crime charged.
RAPE
1. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 251918. October 4, 2021.]
The elements of Qualified Rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force,
threat, or intimidation without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time
of the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the victim, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim."
In line with this, "case law instructs that in order to appreciate the qualifying circumstance[s] of
minority and relationship in the crime of Rape, the same must be alleged in the information
and proven during trial." In other words, the minority of the victim and his/her relationship
with the perpetrator should both be alleged in the Information and then proven beyond
reasonable doubt during trial. "This is to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to
be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to
allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during the trial."
2. PEOPLE vs. CCC, G.R. No. 200960. September 29, 2021
When the accused or offender is also the father of the victim, there need not be actual force,
threat or intimidation. When a father commits the crime of rape against his own daughter, who
was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or
influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. AAA need not protest, resist,
shout for help or display any discomfort to prove that force was used against her. The mere fact
that she was the daughter of the accused and also a minor at the time of the incident is enough
to prove the element of force, threat or intimidation.
However, it must be stressed that the proper nomenclature of the crime committed is Qualified
Rape in view of the concurrence of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority.
Moreover, any reference to RA 7610 is deleted pursuant to our pronouncement in People v.
Tulagan. The Court likewise agrees with the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
lieu of death, without the eligibility for parole.
||| 3. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 248421. September 27, 2021
Jurisprudence provides that "the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it
unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by a close kin,
such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation." Simply put, accused-
appellant's moral ascendancy substituted the element of force, threat, or intimidation.
This is in line with the doctrine that the two qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
must concur as provided in Article 266-B of the RPC and must be alleged in the Information and
duly proven during trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction.
4. PEOPLE vs. XXX, [G.R. No. 233748. September 27, 2021.]
In the prosecution of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353 also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, all the following
elements must exist: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or
intimidation or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven
and that there was sexual intercourse.
We find that the appellate court correctly affirmed the findings of the trial court in ruling that
accused-appellant committed Acts of Lasciviousness against complainant on May 20, 2001.
However, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of the crime from Acts of Lasciviousness
to Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (6) of RA 7610.
In Quimvel v. People, We explained that in order for an accused to be convicted of child abuse
through lascivious conduct on a child, the requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under RA 7610.
The following are the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Furthermore, lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 has the following
elements:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the prosecution's evidence established that
accused-appellant committed Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 on May 20,
2001 against complainant, indisputably a minor at the time of the commission thereof.
Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting
and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases) as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus, or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Furthermore, Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 specifically states the following:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
Settled is the rule that full penetration is not required to sustain a conviction of rape.
The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the female pudendum is
sufficient to consummate rape, such as the instant case.
7. PEOPLE vs. YYY, G.R. No. 253366. September 13, 2021
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes rape, viz.:

A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that
natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For
this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent
that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes
rape[,] without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in
committing the act." Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused
and the victim and the latter's mental retardation need to be proved.
As held in People v. Magabo:

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim at the
time of the commission of the crime of rape qualifies the crime and makes it
punishable by death under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. An allegation in the information of such
knowledge of the offender is necessary as a crime can only be qualified
by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. A contrary ruling would
result to a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him, and hence a denial of due process.
Here, there was no allegation in the Information that accused-appellant had
knowledge of AAA's mental condition. Thus, notwithstanding proof that accused-appellant
had knowledge of AAA's mental condition, he can only be held liable for Simple Rape.
The penalty for rape committed under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is reclusion
perpetua in accordance with Article 266-B of the RPC. However, the death penalty shall be
imposed if the victim was killed by reason or on occasion of the rape, viz.:
In such a scenario, the felony is considered as a special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, "which is the treatment of two (2) or more crimes as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse." The following are the elements of
Rape with Homicide: "'(1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal
knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by
reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the
appellant killed a woman.'"
9. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 252294. May 5, 2021
The accused-appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape instead of qualified rape
because the Informations, which alleged that AAA was "7 years old" and that she was the
"step daughter" of accused-appellant were insufficient to support a finding of qualified rape.
As a rule, an Information must allege the acts or omissions constituting the offense
and specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances applicable, if any. In rape cases,
minority and relationship are qualifying circumstances that must be specifically pleaded or
alleged with certainty in the information and proved during trial.
The same rationale applies here. Although the prosecution proved during trial that
AAA was below seven years of age when the offenses were committed, the Informations
merely state that she was exactly seven years of age, and not that she was below seven. Hence,
AAA's age cannot be considered in upgrading the charge to qualified rape.
Similarly, the circumstance of relationship cannot be appreciated against the accused-
appellant. The Informations allege that AAA is accused-appellant's step-daughter. The
relationship between a step-father and step-daughter presupposes a legitimate relationship,
that is, the former should be legally married to the latter's mother. Here, the prosecution
failed to adduce proof, such as a marriage certificate, to establish the relationship between
accused-appellant and AAA's mother, BBB — on the contrary, BBB claimed that accused-
appellant was her live-in partner. Thus, accused-appellant cannot be considered the step-
father of AAA.
10. PEOPLE vs. ZZZ, G.R. No. 247554. May 5, 2021
The Court rejects the argument by appellant that rape was not consummated
considering AAA (victim) admitted that his penis did not enter her vagina.
In People v. Campuhan, the Court has thoroughly explained that rape is consummated
when the labia majora or the labia minora is touched, viz.:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of
the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in
this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the
penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the
labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape
to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the
female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no

consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
The situation in the instant case is similar to that in People v. Matutina, where the
assailant also failed to penetrate the vagina of the private offended party but was convicted
of consummated rape because he succeeded in touching the labias, as shown by the medical
report.
USURPATION
1. PEOPLE vs. NESTOR MALASIG UY G.R. No. 248566. August 4, 2021
Article 177 of the RPC embodies two modes of committing the offense, to wit:
Article 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person
who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or
of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The first mode pertains to usurpation of authority where a person knowingly and
falsely represent himself as an officer, agent or representative of the Philippine government
or any foreign government. While the second mode refers to usurpation of official functions
where a person, under the pretense of official function, does an act belonging to a public
officer or person in authority of the Philippine government or any foreign government without
being lawfully entitled to perform the same.
Tiongco v. People enumerated the elements of the offense, viz.:
To put simply, Usurpation of Official Functions has the following
elements:
1. The offender may be a private person or public officer.
2. The offender performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or
public officer of the Philippine government, any of its agencies, or
of a foreign government.
3. The offender performs the act under pretense of official function.
4. The offender performs the act without being legally entitled to do so.
The case of Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan clarified that good faith controverts usurpation
of official function. Good faith, as a defense, eliminates the element of acting under the
pretense of official function. Ruzol defined good faith, to wit:
The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit
or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." Good faith is
actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can
be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving protestations of good

faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.
RA 3019
1. CRISPULO R. TRUYA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 193222. July 6, 2021
In Martel v. People, the Court En Banc highlighted the wisdom behind RA 3019:
R.A. 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and corruption measure. At
the heart of the acts punishable under R.A. 3019 is corruption. As
explained by one of the sponsors of the law, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino,
"[w]hile we are trying to penalize, the main idea of the bill is graft and
corrupt practices. x x x Well, the idea of graft is the one emphasized." Graft
entails the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways.
In other words, what RA 3019 penalizes are acts committed by public officers done
with corrupt and fraudulent intent.
In order to convict an accused for violation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution
must be able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the confluence of the following elements:
1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and 3) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
Unlike in the commission of ordinary felonies, RA 3019 requires that the intent or
negligence, which must attend the commission of the prohibited acts under the afore-quoted
section, should meet the gravity required by law. Thus, the Court has consistently emphasized
that "mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held
liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place
be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross
and inexcusable."
Gross inexcusable negligence has been defined as "negligence characterized by
the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." It does not refer to a mere omission
of duty or to an exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. Gross inexcusable
negligence, as contemplated under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, entails the omission of care that
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property, and in cases
involving public officials, it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and devious.
2. CAROLYN U. TABORA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 250158. May 12, 2021
To sustain a conviction for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the following elements must be
established: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public
officer's official, administrative, or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference.
At any rate, the fact that the Information alleges the three (3) modalities of committing a
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 does not mean that three (3) distinct offenses are being
charged against the accused. And even when the Information alleges only one of these modes,
the other mode or modes are deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.
Sistoza v. Desierto is apropos:

We note that the Information against petitioner Sistoza, while specifying manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, does not allege gross inexcusable negligence as a
modality in the commission of the offense charged. And, while not alleged in
the Information, it was evidently the intention of the Ombudsman to take petitioner to
task for gross inexcusable negligence in addition to the two (2) other modalities
mentioned therein. At any rate, it bears stressing that Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, is
committed either by dolo or culpa and although the Information may have alleged only
one (1) of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included
in the accusation to allow proof thereof.
Here, both the trial court and the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner's acts amounted to gross
inexcusable negligence. Although the Information did not specifically allege this modality, the
same is deemed included in the allegation of "bad faith" borne by the Information. For in the
context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code, bad faith includes gross negligence.
3. De La Cuesta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 164068-69, 166305-06 & 166487-88,

November 19, 2013
The Sandiganbayan did not agree with the prosecution that the accused may be indicted for
technical malversation, using the same informations without violating their right to know what
they were accused of. The charges were for the violation of a special law, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, a malum prohibitum, which did not embrace or cover any other offense.
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 did not cover technical malversation or misuse of public funds under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, a malum in se offense the elements of which were distinct
from Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.|||
4. JALANDONI vs. OMBUDSMAN, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No.

211751. May 10, 2021; G.R. Nos. 217212-80. May 10, 2021;G.R. Nos. 244467-535.
May 10, 2021;G.R. Nos. 245546-614. May 10, 2021
The elements of infidelity in the custody of public documents by means of
concealment were present: (1) the offender was a public officer; (2) there was a document
abstracted, destroyed, or concealed; (3) the document abstracted, destroyed, or concealed
was entrusted to the public officer by reason of their office; and (4) the removal, destruction,
or concealment caused damage and prejudice to public interest or a third person.
On the charge of falsification of public documents, the Office of the Ombudsman

found that Jalandoni's act of tampering the decisions, resolutions, and orders is an alteration
or intercalation that changed the meaning of the documents.
The elements of this crime under Article 171, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal
Code are the following:
1. An alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;
2. It was made on a genuine document;
3. The alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and
4. The change made the document speak something false.
Concomitantly, changing the signatory of a document alters the import of the issuance,
making it express something false and different from its initial form. As the Office of the
Ombudsman listed, the tampering of signatures evinced falsities, such as the following: (1) the
previous signing authority's decision was set aside; (2) the execution of the issuance was put
on hold; and (3) it appeared that Jalandoni was the only final approving authority who
reviewed and resolved the issuance.
The charges of infidelity in the custody of public documents committed by means of
concealment also have reasonable basis. The elements of this crime are the following:
1. The offender must be a public officer;
2. There must be a document abstracted, destroyed or concealed;
3. The document destroyed or abstracted must be entrusted to such public
officer by reason of his office; and
4. Damage or prejudice to the public interest or to that of a third person must be
caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of such document.
5. JESUS LORETIZO NIEVES vs. PEOPLE, G.R. Nos. 237432-33. April 28, 2021
The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are: (1) that the accused is a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting
in conspiracy with such public officers); (2) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
The Information charged petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when,
through his actions characterized by manifest partiality, Felta was given unwarranted benefit,
advantage, and preference. Under this mode, damage is not required. The word
"unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved
position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
On the other hand, "preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice
or estimation above another. Thus:
x x x it should be noted that there are two ways by which Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 may be violated — the first, by causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or the second, by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference. Although neither mode
constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under either mode
or both. The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that the two modes need not
be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice
for conviction.
x x x Under the second mode, damage is not required.
Petitioner was also charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Documents
punishable under Article 171 of the RPC, viz.:
ART. 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or
Ecclesiastic Minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
xxx xxx xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of falsification under the aforesaid provision are as follows: (1) the
offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of
his or her official position; and (3) the offender falsifies a document by committing any of the
acts of falsification under Article 171 of the RPC.
6. Collao v. People, G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021
The Court held in Peligrino v. People:

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts — (1) demanding or
requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving — any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person,
in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and
any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene
under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and
different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to
warrant conviction.
|||
7. Canlas v. People, G.R. Nos. 236308-09, February 17, 2020
The well-settled rule is that "private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of RA 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto."
In PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court reiterated the well-settled elements
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as follows: (i) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with
such public officers; (ii) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (iii) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
|||
8. DUMALUAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 230323. June 10, 2020 Re

Locational clearance
Section 3 (f) of RA 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending
before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage,
or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage
in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (Emphasis
supplied)
On this score, We quote with concurrence the Sandiganbayan's disquisition, viz.:
x x x a locational certification is issued by the municipal mayor certifying
that the project is appropriate for the land use plan. A locational clearance, on
the other hand, is issued only when the municipality has a comprehensive land
use plan (CLUP). x x x. Since the municipality has no CLUP yet at that time, the
mayor issues a locational certification.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court finds there is no difference insofar as the purpose of the
issuance of a locational certification and locational clearance is concerned. Both
are issued to certify that a project is within the PITE and is appropriate for the
land use plan of the municipality. Since the municipality of Panglao at that time
had no land use plan, then the accused, as the municipal mayor, had the
authority to issue a locational certification instead.
Indeed, EO 72 devolved the power to issue locational clearances for local projects to
cities and municipalities with approved comprehensive land use plans (CLUP). As aptly found
by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot, to negate liability, harp on a mere nomenclature
variance between a locational clearance and locational certification. As it was, the Municipal
Development Planning Coordinator determined that the requirements for approval of a
locational certification have been satisfied. BBC's application for the same, should have been
approved by petitioner were it not for his own vested interest in the property in question.
9. Abid-Babano v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 201176, August 28, 2019
The requirement under Republic Act No. 6713 and similar laws that the sworn
statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) to be filed by every government official
must include assets, liabilities, and net worth of the spouse of the filer is construed not to
include the assets, liabilities, and net worth of spouses whose property regime during the
marriage is by law or by agreement prior to the marriage one of complete separation of
property.
|||
Republic Act No. 6713 was adopted, under whose Section 8 every government official or
employee is required to accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or
her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of his/her
spouse and unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households. The
requirement for the SALN was previously implemented through Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), which relevantly provided:
Xxxx
Both petitioner and her husband were Muslims. She was his second wife. Article 38 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their regime of property relations as
Muslims to be one of complete separation of property.
We cannot subscribe to the simplistic view adopted by CA and the OP that the legal
implications of such marriage property regimes should be disregarded
because Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 6713 are silent on the effect of marriage
property regimes on the SALN disclosure requirement. The view completely ignores the spirit
animating the enactment of the statutory requirement. That is impermissible under any just
and democratic society. Indeed, in the application of the letter of the law, which is usually hard
or harsh, the spirit must not be ignored, for that is the law of the statute.
|||
10. Beroña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142456, July 27, 2004
Petitioners contend that at the time of their preventive suspension they were no longer
holding the positions they were occupying when the transactions, subject of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 23521, happened.
The only issue posed for resolution is whether Section 13, which qualifies the public officer
as incumbent, applies to petitioners since they are no longer occupying the positions they held
when they were charged under RA 3019. HAEIac
Section 13 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending
a criminal prosecution under RA 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This Court has repeatedly held
that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are no 'ifs' and 'buts' about it.
The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information.
The court can then have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the
merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash. 7 In this case, the Sandiganbayan had determined the
validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. Hence,
petitioners' suspension is unquestionably mandatory.
Suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be currently holding
The Court reiterated this doctrine in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan in this wise:
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted
upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective
officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service.
The term "office" in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the
officer might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in
relation to which he is charged.
Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office
The period imposed by the Sandiganbayan is also in accord with our previous rulings
limiting to 90 days the period of preventive suspension under Section 13.
|||
ARSON
1. BANAG vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 201782. June 23, 2021

Simple Arson, as defined and penalized under Section 1 of PD 1613, is essentially the
destruction of property by fire that is not under the circumstances enumerated under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) classified as Destructive Arson. The distinction and
classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless
of the value of the damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons.
On the other hand, PD 1613 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
In both categories of arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity
of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is
satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused.
BIGAMY
PULIDO vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 220149. July 27, 2021
A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even
without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is considered
a valid defense in bigamy.
For one to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) that
the offender has been legally married; (b) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. It is
vital in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
The requirement of Article 40 is merely for purposes of remarriage and does not affect
the accused's right to collaterally attack the validity of the void ab initio marriage in criminal
prosecution for bigamy. HESIcT
In contrast, voidable marriages under Article 45 of the Family Code are considered
valid and produces all its civil effects until it is set aside by a competent court in an action for
annulment. It is capable of ratification and cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. It is considered valid during its subsistence and only ceases upon the finality of
the decree of annulment of a competent court.
Being inexistent under the eyes of the law, the nullity of a void marriage can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any judicial
declaration of nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the
Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence
necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.
Clearly, when the first marriage is void ab initio, one of the essential elements of
bigamy is absent, i.e., a prior valid marriage. There can be no crime when the very act which
was penalized by the law, i.e., contracting another marriage during the subsistence of a prior
legal or valid marriage, is not present. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no last marriage to begin with. Thus, an accused in a
bigamy case should be allowed to raise the defense of a prior void ab initio marriage through
competent evidence other than the judicial decree of nullity.
When the accused contracts a second marriage without having the first marriage
dissolved or annulled, the crime of bigamy is consummated as the valid or voidable first
marriage still subsists without a decree of annulment by a competent court. In contrast, when
the first marriage is void ab initio, the accused cannot be held liable for bigamy as the judicial
declaration of its nullity is not tantamount to annulment nor dissolution but merely a
declaration of a status or condition that no such marriage exists.
In the same manner, when the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage
that is void ab initio, other than it being bigamous, he/she cannot be held liable for bigamy
as the effect of a void marriage signifies that the accused has not entered into a second or
subsequent marriage, being inexistent from the beginning. Thus, the element, "that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage" is lacking. A subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of the second marriage merely confirms its inexistence and shall not render the accused
liable for bigamy for entering such void marriage while the first marriage still subsists.
Article 40 of the Family Code
requires a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity for purposes of
remarriage but not as a defense in
bigamy. Article 40 did not amend or
repeal Article 349 of the RPC.
In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in other instances
for purposes other than remarriage, such as in action for liquidation, partition, distribution,
and separation of property, custody and support of common children and delivery of
presumptive legitimes.
We cannot simply disregard the effects of a void ab initio marriage and penalize the
accused for bigamy despite the clear absence of a valid prior marriage on the mere speculation
that this interpretation may be subject to abuse by those parties who deliberately and
consciously enter into multiple marriages knowing them to be void and thereafter, evade
prosecution on the pretext of a void ab initio marriage. It must be pointed out and emphasized
that these deliberate acts are already penalized under Article 350 of the RPC which reads:
ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements
of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment.
To reiterate, Article 349 of the RPC penalizes parties who contracted a valid or voidable
second marriage when the first marriage, which may be valid or voidable, is still subsisting. In
contrast, Article 350 of the RPC penalizes those who without being included in Article 349,
contract a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with
or in disregard of a legal impediment. Thus, an accused who contracts a void ab initio marriage
may escape liability under Article 349 as it strictly encompasses valid or voidable first and
second marriages. However, the accused in contracting a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or in disregard of a legal impediment
may be covered and penalized under Article 350 which addresses the predicament that to
permit the accused to use the defense of a void ab initio marriage or to present a judicial
declaration of nullity in criminal prosecution for bigamy would make a mockery of the sanctity
of marriage by entering into multiple marriages knowing it to be void and thereafter escape
punishment under Article 349.
Furthermore, it bears noting that in Tenebro, it was held that void ab initio marriages
retroact to the date of the celebration of marriage but also produce legal effects and
consequences as expressly provided under the statute such as on property relations,
inheritance, donations, insurance beneficiary, legitimacy of children, custody of children, and

support of common children.
Penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.
Summary:
To summarize and for future guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages
in order to raise it as a defense in a bigamy case. The same rule now applies to all marriages
celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code did not
amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused the right to collaterally
attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.
However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an
annulment decree as a defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first
marriage is considered valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted. The
crime of bigamy, therefore, is consummated when the second marriage was celebrated during
the subsistence of the voidable first marriage. The same rule applies if the second marriage is
merely considered as voidable.
DANGEROUS DRUGS – RA 9165
Notes: Most of the issues in drug cases revolve around the issue of preservation of the corpus
delicti and compliance of Sec. 21 on chain of custody. The prosecution must prove each link (there
are 4 links usually) in the custody and the handling of the confiscated drugs.
The 3-witness rule apply only to crimes committed prior to the amendment in 2014. After the
amendment, 2 witnesses would suffice.
The insulating witnesses must be present not only during the inventory but also at the time of
the apprehension of the corpus delicti.
1. People v. Rago, G.R. No. 252543. October 11, 2021
For a successful prosecution of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the following elements
must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 58
On the other hand, the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs are as
follows: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited
or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely
and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. 59
In both cases, the drugs themselves are the corpus delicti of the crimes which must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 60 The prosecution should therefore show that the
drugs seized from the accused are the same as those presented before the court during the
trial. 61
The prosecution must establish the apprehending officers' compliance with each link
in the chain of custody, to wit:
First, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
by the forensic chemist to the court. 64
2. In People v. Pajarin
The following matters must be covered by the testimony of the forensic chemist who
examines the confiscated items: (1) that he received the seized items as marked,
properly sealed and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content;
and (3) that he placed his own marking to ensure that it could not be tampered
pending trial. Should the parties decide to dispense with the testimony of the
chemist, it should be stipulated that the chemist undertook all the precautionary
steps mentioned.
3. Ramos v. People:
Aside from marking, the seized items should be placed in an envelope
or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of these items require a
different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall
accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next
officer in the chain of custody. The purpose of placing the seized item in an
envelope or an evidence bag is to ensure that the item is secured from
tampering, especially when the seized item is susceptible to alteration or
damage.
4. People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 250897. July 7, 2021
The following elements must be proven in the prosecution for the Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller; (2) the transaction or sale of the
illegal drug; and (3) the existence of the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution was able to
prove the identity of the seller and the existence of the sale transaction, notwithstanding that
the poseur-buyer was not presented as a witness.
The Court has established the general rule that the non-presentation of the informant
in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is not essential to convict the accused if
the testimony is merely corroborative. If the civilian informant is also the poseur-buyer, his
failure to testify will be fatal to the prosecution's case when: (1) there is no eyewitness to the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs; (2) the prosecution failed to explain the non-presentation of
the poseur-buyer or any other reliable eyewitnesses who could testify in place of the poseur-
buyer; (3) the other witnesses, who were positioned at a considerable distance from the
transaction place, did not hear the conversation between the pusher and poseur-buyer; and
(4) when the accused vehemently denies selling any prohibited drugs coupled with the
inconsistent testimonies of the arresting officers or the possibility that the arresting officers
had motives to falsely testify against the accused.
Marking serves a two-fold function: first, to give the succeeding handlers a reference;
and second, to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time of seizure and confiscation until disposition at the end of the criminal
proceedings, thereby preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
5. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 243671. October 4, 2021.]
The prosecution must establish the following elements under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in
order to secure a conviction for the crime of Illegal Sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, such
as shabu: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti, which literally means
the "body of the crime," pertains to "the fact of the commission of the crime charged or the
body or substance of the crime." In cases involving drugs, the confiscated article constitutes
the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
On the other hand, a case of Illegal Possession of dangerous drugs will prosper if the following
elements are present: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to
be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug.
In the event that any of the foregoing witnesses are absent, this Court held
in Lim that:
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to
the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not
obtained due to reasons such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or
media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code proved futile
through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of
the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets,
prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required
witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
In addition to the foregoing, there must be evidence of earnest efforts to secure the
attendance of the necessary witnesses on the part of the law enforcers.
6. People v. Siat, G.R. No. 233529. October 4, 2021.]
On the substantive aspect, related to establishing the identity of the object of the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the observance of the rule on chain of custody.
In buy-bust operations, the seized items must be photographed and inventoried in

the presence of three witnesses. This requirement, before the amendment of the law,
is admittedly quite strict. Indeed, there are exceptions to this, but the prosecution
must be able to prove that the attendance of one of the witnesses was not procured
due to the reasons such as those provided in Lim. The prosecution must show that
the police officers have exerted earnest efforts in procuring the attendance of the
witnesses.
It is apparent in Diaz that there were two different offenses. The seized items were
also different. However, the manner of handling the seized items that was similar in
both cases paved the way for the application of Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court.
7. PEOPLE vs. GANDAMON, G.R. No. 252018. Sept. 29, 2021
While we are aware that the RTC's Order of August 6, 2003 dispensed with
the testimony of the forensic chemist because of the stipulations of the
parties, we view the stipulation to be confined to the handling of the
specimen at the forensic laboratory and to the analytical results
obtained. The stipulation does not cover the manner the specimen was
handled before it came to the possession of the forensic chemist and
after it left his possession. To be sure, personnel within the police hierarchy
(as SPO2 Sevilla's testimony casually mentions) must have handled the drugs
but evidence of how this was done, i.e., how it was managed, stored,
preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure, to its receipt by
the forensic laboratory, up until it was presented in court and subsequently
destroyed is absent from the evidence adduced during the trial
In People v. Sendad, this Court clarified:

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized,
or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely:
(a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from
the media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "[a]n elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service OR the media.
Since alleged crime took place in 2015 or after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640
in 2014, the required witnesses are: (1) an elected public official; and (2) a representative
of the National Prosecution Service or the media. Nonetheless, the Court allows
substantial compliance with the rule on witnesses if the prosecution proves: (1) a
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. However, the prosecution must acknowledge and
justify its non-compliance with Section 21.
But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption
despite any hint of irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the
agents of the law will thus be fundamentally unsound because such hint
is itself affirmative proof of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands
only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the
regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance
the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence
will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
8. PEOPLE vs. FERNANDO SACOCO, G.R. No. 247556. Sept. 27, 2021
Thus, the foregoing mandate that the marking, photography, and inventory of the
seized items be done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the items, and in
the presence of the (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) a representative

from the media; (3) a representative from the DOJ; and (4) any elected public official.
The presence of these insulating witnesses negates any suspicion of the evils of
switching, planting or contamination of the evidence.
We note that the marking of seized items was done at the police station, and not at
the place of arrest. However, in buy-bust operations, "marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team." While the Court allows substantial compliance with the
mandated procedure, the prosecution must still prove: (1) a justifiable ground for
non-compliance therewith; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. In doing so, the arresting officers must clearly state
such ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with an explanation of the steps they
took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. In this regard, mere statements of
unavailability of the witnesses given by the apprehending officers are not justifiable
reasons for non-compliance with the requirement.
In People v. Sipin, the Court held that the absence of one or more of the required
witnesses must be justified due to reasons such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs
was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any
person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves
were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an
elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers,
who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time
constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips
of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the
presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
9. PEOPLE vs. DANDAN, ARROJO AND DELOS POYOS, G.R. No. 246952.
September 27, 2021
In sum, the law puts in place requirements of time, witnesses and proof of
inventory with respect to the custody of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure
or confiscation;
2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of:
a. The accused or his representative or counsel;
b. The required witnesses:
i. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA
9165 and prior to its amendment by RA 10640, as in this case;
ii. an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service
of the DOJ or the media for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 10640.
Following a plain reading of the law, it is now settled that non-compliance
with the mandatory procedure in Section 21 triggers the operation of the
saving clause enshrined in the IRR of RA 9165. Verba legis non est
recedendum — from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Stated otherwise, in order not to render void and invalid the
seizure and custody over the evidence obtained, the prosecution must,
as a matter of law, establish that such non-compliance was based on
justifiable grounds and that the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items were preserved. Hence, before the prosecution can rely
on this saving mechanism, they (the apprehending team) must first
recognize lapses, and, if any are found to exist, they must justify the
same accordingly.
Since the alleged crimes were committed before the effectivity of RA 10640, the
amendment to RA 9165, the latter law still applies. Thus, the three-witness rule would
still apply to the case.
The CA erred in affirming the finding of the RTC that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drugs were preserved by substantial compliance with Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 and Section 21 (a) of the IRR. Not only did the apprehending
team fail to physically inventory and photograph the seized items in front of the
required three witnesses, namely a media representative, a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and a public officer, the apprehending team likewise
failed to establish the non-compliance as justifiable.
Relatedly, the prosecution also failed to satisfy the two-pronged requirement under
the saving clause of Section 21 (a), IRR of RA 9165 which are: first, present justifiable
ground for the non-compliance, and second, show that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item were properly preserved.
The procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
9. PEOPLE vs. SAMIA AKMAD SARO-MUSOR, G.R. No. 240438. September 27,
2021.]
Since the amendment took effect in 2014 and the alleged crime in the present case
transpired in 2012, the required witnesses are: (1) a representative from the media; (2) a
representative from the (DOJ); and (3) any elected public official. Nonetheless, the Court
allows substantial compliance with the three-witness requirement if the prosecution
proves: (1) a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.
10 . PEOPLE vs. AUGUSTO LEYVA ESTORES, G.R. No. 233886. Sept. 27,
2021
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer
of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
11 . PEOPLE vs.ONGCAL ,G.R. No. 233798. September 15, 2021
In People v. Dahil, the court explained:

Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it
is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of
the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus,
preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.
It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is
different from the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the
said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this Court had
consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of
the corpus delicti.
12. PEOPLE vs. JOED REGALADO, G.R. No. 248693. June 30, 2021
Preliminarily, the CA is correct that the National Prosecution Service representative's

absence is not fatal to the case. The charged crimes took place on December 11, 2015, or
after RA 10640 took effect on August 7, 2014. Thus, the accused, elected public official, and
either the DOJ or media representative's presence during the physical inventory and
photography of the seized drugs will suffice.
In People v. Ubungen, the Court reiterated that if the parties stipulated on the forensic
chemist's testimony, the stipulation should include the precautionary steps taken to preserve
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item. Thus, the stipulation should include the
following points: (1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly
sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (3) that he
placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered pending trial.
In People v. Villalon, Jr. and People v. Rivera, the Court held that the fourth link of
the chain of custody could not be reasonably established absent the required stipulations of
the forensic chemist. Thus, the accused in these cases were acquitted because the required
stipulations were not made.
13. CASTRONUEVO LUNA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 231902. June 30, 2021
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala
prohibita. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime. But if he did intend
to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be
held liable for the malum prohibitum. In other words, "[i]ntent to commit the crime is not
necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown."
Nevertheless, despite the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
being malum prohibitum, "[t]his, however, does not lessen the prosecution's burden because
it is still required to show that the prohibited act was intentional." In cases involving the illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, "the prosecution is not excused from proving that
possession of the prohibited act was done 'freely and consciously,' which is an essential
element of the crime."
Hence, a critical element of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is the
element of intent to possess or animus possidendi.
The Court has held that in criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no
conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly, freely, intentionally,
and consciously possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus
possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such
article.
Stated differently, the concept of possession contemplated under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165 goes beyond mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise,
an unsuspecting person who is victimized by the planting of evidence will be unjustly
prosecuted based on the sheer fact that illegal drugs were found to be in his possession. It
must be proven that the person in whose possession the drug specimen was found knew that
he/she was possessing illegal drugs.
Therefore, to prosecute an accused for illegally possessing illegal drugs, it is not
enough to show that the accused knowingly and intentionally possessed the bag or receptacle
that contained illegal drugs. The prosecution must go beyond and provide evidence that
the accused knowingly, freely, consciously, and intentionally possessed illegal drugs.
Jurisprudence tells us that since knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a
fact and, therefore, courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its
perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Hence, animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into
consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the
attendant events in each particular case.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court believes that there is, at the
very least, reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner Luna possessed the bag with any
knowledge, consciousness, and awareness that the said bag contained the allegedly seized
packs of drug specimen. Otherwise stated, the surrounding factual circumstances, as
established by the evidence on record, fail to clearly establish that there was animus
possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna.
It was Sexy who placed the bag at the backseat of the vehicle. It was also Sexy who
instructed petitioner Luna to immediately proceed to Hap Chan Restaurant and allow a
certain Mike to get the said bag. In short, the person who effectively wielded control over
the bag was Sexy and not petitioner Luna.
Therefore, with petitioner Luna not being the owner of the vehicle where the alleged
drug specimen was recovered, which is an undeniable fact, and with petitioner Luna being
a mere driver for hire who was simply engaged by other persons and merely followed the
instructions of his principal, Lagman, and the latter's client, Sexy, which, on their face, were
lawful instructions, it cannot be said that petitioner Luna exercised control and dominion over
the vehicle where the bag of specimen was recovered. Necessarily, the presumption of animus
possidendi did not arise.
Further, the Court finds that the RTC incorrectly upheld the presumption of animus
possidendi on the basis of Rule 131, Section 3 (j).
Striking is the clear and categorical admission by SPO3 Parreño on cross-examination
that petitioner Luna is not the owner of the alleged illegal drugs found inside the bag:
SPO3 Parreño likewise testified that the bag was not really and effectively controlled
by petitioner Luna as he was merely acting under the instructions of Sexy.
This is in sharp contrast with People v. Peñaflorida, Jr., where the accused therein was
convicted for illegal possession of drugs, even if the latter testified that he lacked knowledge
as to the contents of the package he delivered, because the edges of the marijuana leaves
were plainly evident from the outside of the package, which should have thus reasonably
alerted the accused therein as to the presence of illegal drugs. Such analogous circumstance
is not present in the instant case.
The circumstances of the instant case are likewise vastly different to those in People v.
Lacerna, where the conviction of the accused therein was upheld because "[h]is bare,
unpersuasive, feeble and uncorroborated disavowal — that the plastic bag was allegedly given
to him by his uncle without his knowing the contents — amounts to a denial which by itself is
insufficient to overcome this presumption." In the instant case, petitioner Luna does not
merely rely on his own denial. The prosecution itself, through SPO3 Parreño, admitted
that the alleged drug specimen was not owned and was not controlled by petitioner
Luna.
In fact, SPO3 Parreño expressly admitted under oath that petitioner Luna had
nothing to do with the transaction, referring to the supposed sale of illegal drugs.

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WARRIORS’ NOTES 20_21 | CIVIL LAW | 1

Compiled by Pepita Jane A. Petralba

1. PEOPLE vs. MAGAT, G.R. No. 231882. Sept.15, 2021

1. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 251918. October 4, 2021.]

2. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 248421. September 27, 2021

The two qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur in

3. PEOPLE vs. BULTRON , G.R. No. 253651. October 4, 2021

1. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 249148. October 4, 2021

2. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 248421. September 27, 2021.]

4. In People v. Jugueta, the Court addressed in detail the

5. PEOPLE vs. MEDROSO, G.R. No. L-37633. January 31, 1975

Convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, accused-appellant

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1st. The penalty of prision xxx xxx xxx

Art. 172. Falsification by private Art. 172. Falsification by private

2. Any person who, to the damage of a

3. Any person who shall knowingly

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription

DIFFERENT COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR VIOLATION OF ORDINANCES.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

COMPLEX CRIMES: RECKLESS IMRPUDENCE

1. ERNESTO S. MALLARI v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 249374. July 12, 2021

Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by

4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and

2. ARIES CAMANTIGUE vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 255265. July 5, 2021

4. BARLIN, vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 207418. June 23, 2021

1. SANTOS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 251408. June 23, 2021

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority

RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995.

includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or

2. PEOPLE V. BULTRON , G.R. No. 253651. October 4, 2021

The following elements of treachery must be established by clear and convincing

child's development including those covered by Article 59 of [Presidential

With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to

1. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 251918. October 4, 2021.]

2. PEOPLE vs. CCC, G.R. No. 200960. September 29, 2021

4. PEOPLE vs. XXX, [G.R. No. 233748. September 27, 2021.]

5. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 238456. September 15, 2021

6. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 233540. September 15, 2021

7. PEOPLE vs. YYY, G.R. No. 253366. September 13, 2021

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes rape, viz.:

As held in People v. Magabo:

8. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 238205. September 13, 2021

9. PEOPLE vs. XXX, G.R. No. 252294. May 5, 2021

10. PEOPLE vs. ZZZ, G.R. No. 247554. May 5, 2021

touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no

1. PEOPLE vs. NESTOR MALASIG UY G.R. No. 248566. August 4, 2021

be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving protestations of good

1. CRISPULO R. TRUYA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 193222. July 6, 2021

Sistoza v. Desierto is apropos:

3. De La Cuesta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 164068-69, 166305-06 & 166487-88,

4. JALANDONI vs. OMBUDSMAN, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No.

On the charge of falsification of public documents, the Office of the Ombudsman

xxx xxx xxx

6. Collao v. People, G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021

The Court held in Peligrino v. People:

7. Canlas v. People, G.R. Nos. 236308-09, February 17, 2020

8. DUMALUAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 230323. June 10, 2020 Re

Section 3 (f) of RA 3019 provides:

USC Warriors' Notes - Criminal Law

USC Warriors' Notes - Criminal Law