CRIMINAL LAW

1.) In the heat of anger, Rodrigo pointed a gun at Reyno. With intention to kill the
latter, Rodrigo pressed the trigger but no bullet came out of the gun. When he
checked it, he found that the trigger had jammed. (a) For what crime is Rodrigo
liable? (b) Assuming that the reason why no bullet came out was that there was
no more bullet left inside the gun, would Rodrigo still be criminally liable? Explain.

Answer:

(a) Rodrigo is liable for attempted homicide.

Under the Revised Penal Code, for a person be held liable for homicide, the
following elements must be present:

1. That the offender kills another person;

2. That the killing is not qualified by any qualifying circumstances of
murder.
Furthermore, homicide is in attempted stage, when the offender commences
the commission of the homicide directly by overt acts and he does not
perform all acts of execution which should produce homicide by reason of
causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Here, Rodrigo, with intent to kill, commences the commission of the homicide
by pointing a gun at Reyno and he does not perform all acts of execution
which should produce homicide by reason that no bullet came out of the gun
because the trigger had jammed.

Thus, Rodrigo is liable for attempted homicide.

(b) Yes, Rodrigo would still be criminally liable for impossible crime.

Under the Revised Penal Code, for a person be held liable for impossible
crime, the following elements must be present:

1. The offender performed an act which would have been an offense

against person and property; and
2. The act performed was with evil intent; and
3. That the act was not performed because of inherently impossible of
accomplishing it; and
4. That the offender did not violate any provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
 Here, Rodrigo performed an act with evil intent to kill which would constitute
homicide, but the act was not performed because the gun has no more bullet.
There is also no showing that Rodrigo violated any provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.

2.) PO2 Kaltog stopped Zing who was riding in a motorcycle. He asked Zing for his
license. Zing took out his driver’s license from his left pocket and handed the
same to Kaltog. While Kaltog was examining the license, he sensed that Zing
was pulling out something from his back. Kaltog was alerted. Upon seeing that
Zing had pulled out a dark metal from his back, he shot Zing with his service
firearm. Zing was shot in the chest. When he realized that what the victim pulled
out from behind was just a black document cylinder, he brought him to the
hospital. Kaltog was charged of Frustrated Homicide on account of the incident.
He interposed self-defense and performance of duty during trial. He likewise
claimed that he acted under a mistake of fact. Are the defenses meritorious?

Answer:

PO2 Kaltog’s defenses of self-defense, performance duty, and mistake of fact

are not meritorious.

a) PO2 Kaltog cannot invoke self-defense.

The Supreme Court has held that the offender cannot invoke self-defense as
justifying circumstance when there is no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim or there is no actual or imminent threat to the life of the offender.

Here, mere pulling out of Zing a dark metal from his back does not constitute
unlawful aggression as there was no showing of actual or imminent threat to
the life of PO2 Kaltog.

b) PO2 Kaltog cannot interpose performance of duty during trial.

Under the Revised Penal Code, performance of duty as justifying

circumstance cannot be appreciated when the offender in performing his duty
has acted negligently. (Dapat pag nanghuhula jurisprudence ang legal basis)

Here, PO2 Kalto acted negligently in performing his duty when he

immediately shot Zing without inspecting of what the latter pulling out from his
back.

c) PO2 cannot claim that he acted under a mistake of fact.

 The Supreme Court has held that mistake of fact cannot be invoked when the
mistake was due to negligence of the offender.

Here, the mistake was due to negligence of the offender because he did not
first inspect what Zing was pulling out from his back.

Thus, PO2 Kaltog defenses are not meritorious.

3.) AAA and BBB were married in 2006. BBB started working in Singapore as a chef
in 2007 and he acquired permanent residency status there. In Singapore, he also
began an affair with a Singaporean woman with whom he is cohabiting. He was
charged in an information before the RTC of Pasig City, where AAA resides, with
the violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 (Anti-Violence against Women and their
Children Act), that is, the crime of causing mental and emotional anguish to his
wife. BBB filed a motion to quash on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction
since the illicit relation occurred or is occurring outside of the country. Should the
motion to quash be granted?

Answer:

No, the motion to quash on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction since the
illicit relation occurred or is occurring outside of the Philippines should not be
granted.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court has held that RTC has
jurisdiction over violation of Section 5(i) of RA 92629 because the said law is
considered as a continuing or transitory crime, meaning that some of the material
or essential elements thereto may be occurred in one territory and some
occurred in other territory.

Here, the illicit affair of BBB was committed in Singapore, but the effect of such
illicit affair which caused mental and emotional anguish to AAA was occurred in
the Philippines.

Thus, the motion to quash on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction since
the illicit relation occurred or is occurring outside of the Philippines should not be
granted.

4.) A filed a case for Frustrated Murder against B. During trial, B died of ulceric
cancer. (a) Can the court still rule on the civil aspect of the case in spite of the
death of the accused prior to the promulgation of the judgment? (b) Would your
answer be the same if B died while appealing his conviction instead?
 Answer:

(a) No, the court can no longer rule on the civil aspect of the Frustrated Murder
case in spite of the death of the accused prior to the promulgation of the
judgment.

Under the Criminal Laws of the Philippines, death of the accused during the
pendency of the case extinguishes both criminal and civil liability arising from
delict.

Here, B, accused, died during the pendency of the case.

Thus, the court can no longer rule on the civil aspect of the Frustrated Murder
case in spite of the death of the accused prior to the promulgation of the
judgment.

(b) Yes, my answer would be the same that the court can no longer rule on the
civil aspect of the Frustrated Murder case even if B died while appealing his
conviction.

Under the Criminal Laws of the Philippines, death of the accused before
conviction extinguishes both criminal and civil liability arising from delict.

Here, B died while he is not yet convicted since his appeal is still pending.

Thus, my answer would be the same if B died while appealing his conviction.

5.) Mr. A has a long-standing feud with Mr. B. As payback for Mr. B's numerous
transgressions against him, Mr. A planned to burn down Mr. B's rest house.
One night, Mr. A went to the rest house and started pouring gasoline on its walls.
However, just as Mr. A had lit the match for burning, he was discovered by Mr.
B's caretaker, Ms. C, and was consequently prevented from setting the rest
house on fire. Mr. A was then charged with Frustrated Arson.
(a) Is the charge of Frustrated Arson proper? Explain. (2%)
(b) Assuming that Mr. A successfully burned down Mr. B's rest house, and
as a result, Ms. C was trapped therein and was subsequently killed in the
fire, what crime/s did Mr. A commit? Explain.  (Bar 2019)

Answer:

(a) No, the charge of Frustrated Arson of Mr. A is not proper.

 Under the Revised Penal Code, a felony is not in a frustrated stage when the
felony was not produced by reason not of the causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator.

Here, the act of burning of Mr. B’s house constituting felony was not produced
because of the discovery of Ms. C, Mr. B’s caretaker, which is not of causes
independent of the will of Mr. A.

Thus, charge of Frustrated Arson is not proper.

6.) Mr. A committed Murder.

Under the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
who is committing an intentional felony although the wrongful act is different from
which is intended.

Further, under the same code, for a person be held liable for murder, the
following requisite is present:

1. That the offender kills another person;

2. That such person is died;
3. That the killing is attended with any of the qualifying circumstance,
which includes by means of fire.
4. That the killing does not constitutes parricide or infanticide, as the case
may be.
Here, Ms. C, Mr. B’s caretaker, was killed by Mr. A by means of burning the
house of Mr. B. Mr. A is committed murder, an intentional felony, although the
wrongful act constituting the killing of Ms. C is different from his intention of killing
Mr. B by burning the latter’s house.
Thus, Mr. A committed Murder.

7.) Roberto and Ricardo have had a long-standing dispute regarding conflicting
claims over the ownership of a parcel of land. One night, Roberto was so
enraged that he decided to kill Ricardo. Roberto asked his best friend, Rafael, to
lend him a gun and drive him to Ricardo's house. Rafael knew about Roberto's
plan to kill Ricardo, but agreed to lend him a gun nevertheless. Rafael also drove
Roberto to the street corner nearest the house of Ricardo. Rafael waited for him
there, until the task had been accomplished, so that he could drive Roberto to the
next town to evade arrest. Roberto also asked another friend, Ruel, to stand
guard outside Ricardo's house, for the purpose of warning him in case there was
any danger or possible witnesses, and to keep other persons away from the
vicinity. All three - Roberto, Rafael and Ruel - agreed to the plan and their
respective roles.
On the agreed date, Rafael drove Roberto and Ruel to the nearest corner near
Ricardo's house. Roberto and Ruel walked about 50 meters where Ruel took his
post as guard, and Roberto walked about five (5) meters more, aimed the gun at
Ricardo's bedroom, and peppered it with bullets. When he thought that he had
accomplished his plan, Roberto ran away, followed by Ruel, and together they
rode in Rafael's car where they drove to the next town to spend the night there. It
turned out that Ricardo was out of town when the incident happened, and no one
was in his room at the time it was peppered with bullets. Thus, no one was killed
or injured during the incident.

(a) Was a crime committed? If yes, what is/are the crime/s committed (2.5%);
and

(b) If a crime was committed, what is the degree of participation of Roberto,

Rafael, and Ruel? (2.5%) (Bar 2018)
Answer:
(a) Yes, impossible crime was committed.

The Supreme Court has held that for a person be held liable for impossible
crime, the following elements must be present:

1. The offender performed an act which would have been an offense

against person or property;
2. The performance of an act is with intent;
3. The act is not performed because of inherent impossibility of
accomplishing it;
4. That the offender does not violate any of the provisions of the RPC.

Here, Roberto performed, with evil intent to kill, the act of killing of Roberto,
which is a crime against person. But, such act did not accomplish because of
its impossibility because Ricardo was appeared not to be in his house at the
time of the commission of the act. There also no showing that Roberto
violated any provisions of the RPC.

Thus, impossible crime was committed.

(b) The degree of participation of Roberto, Rafael, and Ruel are all principal.
 The Supreme Court has held that when there is a conspiracy, all persons who
may have participated the commission of the felony are equally liable
regardless of the nature, extent, and degree of their participation.

Here, there was an agreement among Roberto, Rafael, and Ruel concerning
the act of killing Ricardo.

Thus, the degree of participation of Roberto, Rafael, and Ruel are all
principal.

8.) On the way home from work, Rica lost her necklace to a snatcher. A week later,
she saw what looked like her necklace on display in a jewelry store in Raon.
Believing that the necklace on display was the same necklace snatched from her
the week before, she surreptitiously took the necklace without the knowledge and
consent of the store owner. Later, the loss of the necklace was discovered, and
Rica was shown on the CCTV camera of the store as the culprit. Accordingly,
Rica was charged with theft of the necklace. Rica raised the defense that she
could not be guilty as charged because she was the owner of the necklace and
that the element of intent to gain was lacking.

What should be the verdict if:

(a) The necklace is proven to be owned by Rica? (2.5%)

(b) It is proven that the store acquired the necklace from another person who was
the real owner of the necklace? (2.5%)

Answer:

(a) The verdict should acquit Rica for theft.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there is no theft if the stolen property belongs
to the offender.

Here, the necklace is proven to be owned by Rica.

Thus, Rica shall be acquitted for theft.

(b) Even if it is proven that the store acquired the necklace from another person,
the verdict should still acquit Rica for theft.
The Supreme Court has held that if a person takes property of another
believing it to be his property, the presumption of intent to gain negates
criminal intent, and thus, such person shall not be held liable for theft.

Here, Rica’s belief that the necklace on display was the same necklace
snatched from her negates criminal intent to commit theft.

Thus, even if it is proven that the store acquired the necklace from another
person, the verdict should still acquit Rica for theft.