Republic vs.

Villasor, 54 SCRA 83
TOPIC: STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
Section 3, Article XVI. “The state may not be sued without its consent.”

Republic of the Philippines

vs.
Hon. Guillermo Villasor
G.R. No. L-30671
FACTS: 
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed the petition for certiorari challenging an order issued by
Judge Guilllermo Villasor of the CFI of Cebu which made final and executory its earlier decision and
Alias Writ of Execution against the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The writ of execution stemmed from a decision rendered on July 3, 1961 in Special Proceedings No.
2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.

On June 24, 1969, Judge Villasor made the decision final and executory and directed the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the said decision and the corresponding Alias Writ of
Execution. This prompted Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to subsequently serve notices of garnishment with
several Banks, especially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits,
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution’. The funds sought to be garnished
are public funds specifically for the payment of pensions, allowances, and for the maintenance and
operations of the AFP.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the Alias Writ of Execution against the public funds of the AFP is valid.
HOLDING:
No. The writ of Execution is invalid following the Constitutional postulate that the state may not be sued
without its consent. The Court held that from the concept, public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged.Quoting its decision in Director of Commerce and Industry vs. Concepcion, the Court held said
the “State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization
by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly.”