RAKES vs THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC CO., G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907.

FACTS

M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were
working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car
carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are
pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails
were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move was weakened by a previous typhoon. It was
alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and
while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg
and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for
damages ($2,500).

Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be
walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards
to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman
as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having
known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere
in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his
workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and falls under civil rather than
criminal jurisprudence.

RULING:

Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have  known of the damage in the track as it was another
employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand
though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars
when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars.
His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead
reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before
us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by
law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It
has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the
offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of
articles 1092 and 1093. More than this, however, it can not be said to fall within the class of acts
unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those and growing out of
preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But were relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
1101, 1103, and 1104, of the same code. A typical application of the distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to
his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
passage. while that to that injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. This distinction is
thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article 1093.

We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two difference
senses; either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the
performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which can not be presumed to exist without the other,
and which increases the liability arising from the already exiting obligation.

Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also considered as a real
source of an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to it, it
is logical to presume that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not
extend to those provisions relating to the other species of culpa (negligence), the nature of which we will
discuss later. (Vol. 8, p. 29.)

Rationale on why the plaintiff can still recover despite his own negligence:

While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater or less extent the doctrine of comparative
negligence, allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury, provided his
negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant, and some others have accepted the theory
of proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility for the
accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes the principle in American jurisprudence
that any negligence, however slight, on the part of the person injured which is one of the causes
proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery. (English and American Encyclopedia of law, Titles
"Comparative Negligence" and Contributory Negligence.")

In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page 429) the Supreme Court of the United
States thus authoritatively states the present rule of law:

Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained
of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of
the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to
this qualification, which has grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies vs.
Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence