VILLANUEVA VS.

DOMINGO
G.R No. 144274, September 20, 2004

Facts:

In 1991, a collision was made by a green Mitsubishi lancer owned by Ocfemia

against a silver Mitsubishi lancer driven by Leandro Domingo and owned by petitioner
Priscilla Domingo. The incident caused the car of Domingo bumped another two parked
vehicles. A charged was filed against Ocfemia and the owner Villanueva. Villanueva
claimed that he must not be held liable for the incident because he is no longer the
owner of the car, that it was already swapped to another car. However, the trial court
ordered the petitioner to pay the damages incurred by the silver Mitsubishi lancer car.

Issue:

Whether the owner Villanueva be held liable for the mishap.

Ruling:

Under the Motor Vehicle law, it was declared that the registered owner of any
vehicle is primary land directly liable for any injury it incurs while it is being operated.
Thus, even the petitioner claimed that he was no longer the present owner of the car,
still the registry was under his name, thus it is presumed that he still possesses the car
and that the damages caused by the car be charge against him being the registered
owner. The primary function of Motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that
if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 122039, May 31, 2000

Facts:

Eliza Sunga was a passenger of a jeepney owned and operated by the petitioner
Calalas. Private respondent Sunga sat in the rear portion of the jeepney where the
conductor gave Sunga an extension seat. When the jeep stopped, Sunga gave way to a
passenger going outside the jeep. However, an Isuzu Truck driven by Verene and
owned by Salva, accidentally hit Sunga causing the latter to suffer physical injuries
where the attending physician ordered a three months of rest. Sunga filed an action for
damages against the petitioner for breach of contract of common carriage by the
petitioner.

On the other hand, the petitioner Calalas filed an action against Salva, being the
owner of the truck. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner, thus the truck owner
is liable for the damage to the jeep of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether the petitionerr is liable.

Ruling:

Yes. The petitioner is liable for the injury suffered by Sunga. Under Article 1756
of the New Civil Code, it provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

In this case, the law presumes that any injury suffered by a passenger of the jeep
is deemed to be due to the negligence of the driver. This is a case on Culpa Contractual
where there was pre-existing obligations and that the fault is incidental to the
performance of the obligation. Thus, it was clearly observed that the petitioner has
negligence in the conduct of his duty when he allowed Sunga to seat in the rear portion
of the jeep which is prone to accident.
LUDO AND LUYM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125483, FEBRUARY 1, 2001

Facts:

Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in copra

processing. Private Respondent Gabisan Shipping Lines was the registered owner and
operator of the motor vessel MV Miguela, while the other private respondent, Anselmo
Olasiman, was its captain. On May 21, 1990, while MV Miguela was docking at
petitioner’s wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. Ireneo Naval,
petitioner’s employee, guided the vessel to its docking place. After the small rope was
thrown from the vessel and while the petitioner’s security guard was pulling the big rope
to be tied to the bolar, MV Miguela did not slow down. The crew did not release the
vessel’s anchor. Naval shouted “Reverse” to the vessel’s crew, but it was too late when
the latter responded, for the vessel already rammed the pile cluster. Petitioner
demanded for damages but private respondents denied the incident and the damage.
Their witnesses claimed that the damage, if any, must have occurred prior to their
arrival and caused by another vessel or by ordinary wear and tear.

Issue:

Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to this case?

RULING:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor provides that where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. In this case, all the requisites for
this doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela was under the exclusive control of its officers and
crew. Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the cluster pile,
private respondent did not show persuasively other possible causes of the damage.
There exists a presumption of negligence against private respondents which they failed
to overcome. Additionally, petitioner presented proof that demonstrated private
respondents’ negligence. As testified by Capt. Olasiman, from command of “slow
ahead” to “stop engine”, the vessel will still travel 100 meters before it finally stops.
However, he ordered “stop engine” when the vessel was only 50 meters from the pier.
Further, he testified that before the vessel is put to slow astern, the engine has to be
restarted. However, Olasiman can not estimate how long it takes before the engine
goes to slow astern after the engine is restarted. From these declarations, the
conclusion is that it was already too late when the captain ordered reverse. By then, the
vessel was only 4 meters from the pier, and thus rammed it.
Respondent company’s negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man
its vessel. As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan
did not have a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere elementary
graduate while the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience in navigation was
only as a watchman and a quartermaster, respectively. Gabisan Shipping Lines and the
ship captain are held jointly and severally liable for damages caused to the petitioner.
THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED vs. LEONORA NAVAL
G.R. No. 131541, OCTOBER 20, 2000

FACTS:

Eduardo Edem was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario,
Pasig, going towards Cainta. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the
same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling
along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The point
of impact was so great that the taxicab was hit in the middle portion and was pushed
sideward, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then
dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said
tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the
incident."

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner,
Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver,
petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent
and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE:

What are the liabilities of both parties?

RULING:

The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of
the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. It is established that Castro was driving
at a speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it was a downhill slope. But as he
allegedly stepped on the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left
and consequently hit the taxicab. Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event.
Between the owner and his driver, on the one hand, and third parties such as
commuters, drivers and pedestrians, on the other, the former is presumed to know
about the conditions of his vehicle and is duty bound to take care thereof with the
diligence of a good father of the family. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoid
the streets. As petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed
down since a downhill drive would naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover,
the record shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision
occurred.

The taxi driver is contributorily liable since he took a U-turn where it is not
generally advisable. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully
made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles
coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of
foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Considering the contributory
negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the
repair of the taxi, should be reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted
for lack of merit.
AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219, MARCH 15, 1918

FACTS:

The plaintiff, riding on his pony was half way across the Carlatan bridge when the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his
course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of
the road. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, thinking that he has no sufficient time to go to the other side of the road, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. The defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the
horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the
hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell
and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the
horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge he clearly saw that this would not be done; and he must in a
moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of
the moving vehicle. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing
that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.

The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But it was the defendant
who had the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and when he failed to do so,
he is deemed negligent, thus liable to pay damages in favor of the plaintiff.
JACINTO TANGUILIG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE HERCE JR.
G.R. No. 117190, JANUARY 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Jacinto M. Tanguilig proposed to respondent Vicente Herce Jr. to

construct a windmill system for him. After some negotiations they agreed on the
construction of the windmill for a consideration of P60,000.00. On 14 March 1988, due
to the refusal and failure of respondent to pay the balance, petitioner filed a complaint to
collect the amount. Respondent denied the claim saying that he had already paid this
amount to the San Pedro General Merchandising Inc. (SPGMI) which constructed the
deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected. According to respondent,
since the deep well formed part of the system the payment he tendered to SPGMI
should be credited to his account by petitioner. Moreover, assuming that he owed
petitioner a balance of P15,000.00, this should be offset by the defects in the windmill
system which caused the structure to collapse after a strong wind hit their place.

Petitioner denied that the construction of a deep well was included in the
agreement to build the windmill system, for the contract price of P60,000.00 was solely
for the windmill assembly and its installation. He also disowned any obligation to repair
or reconstruct the system since its collapse was attributable to a typhoon, a force
majeure, which relieved him of any liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the payment for the deep well is part of the contract price.
Whether or not Tanguilig is liable to reconstruct the damaged windmill considering that
its collapse is due to a typhoon.

RULING:

There is absolutely no mention in the two (2) documents that a deep well pump is
a component of the proposed windmill system. The contract prices fixed in both
proposals cover only the features specifically described therein and no other.
Respondent is directed to pay petitioner Tanguilig the balance of P15,000.00 plus legal
interest.

Regarding the second issue, the Supreme Court has consistently held that in
order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art.
1174 of the Civil Code four (4) requisites must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and, (d) the debtor must be free
from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Petitioner failed to
show that the collapse of the windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event. Petitioner
merely stated that there was a "strong wind." But a strong wind in this case cannot be
fortuitous. On the contrary, a strong wind should be present in places where windmills
are constructed. Petitioner is ordered to "reconstruct subject defective windmill system,
in accordance with the one-year guaranty".
LEGASPI OIL CO., INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96505, JULY 1, 1993

FACTS:

Bernard Oseraos had several transactions with Legaspi Oil Co. for the sale of
copra to the latter. The price at which appellant sells the copra varies from time to time,
depending on the prevailing market price when the contract is entered into. On February
16, 1976, appellant's agent Jose Llover signed contract No. 3804 for the sale of 100
tons of copra at P82.00 per 100 kilos with delivery terms of 20 days effective March 8,
1976. After the period to deliver had lapsed, appellant sold only 46,334 kilos of copra
thus leaving a balance of 53,666 kilos. Accordingly, demands were made upon
appellant to deliver the balance with a final warning that failure to deliver will mean
cancellation of the contract, the balance to be purchased at open market and the price
differential to be charged against appellant. On October 22, 1976, since there was still
no compliance, appellee exercised its option under the contract and purchased the
undelivered balance from the open market at the prevailing price of P168.00 per 100
kilos, or a price differential of P86.00 per 100 kilos, a net loss of P46,152.76 chargeable
against appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is guilty of breach of contact.

RULING:

Private respondent is guilty of fraud in the performance of his obligation under

the sales contract whereunder he bound himself to deliver to petitioner 100 metric tons
of copra. However within the delivery period, Oseraos delivered only 46,334 kilograms
of copra to petitioner. Petitioner made repeated demands upon private respondent to
deliver the balance of 53,666 kilograms but private respondent ignored the same.
Petitioner made a final demand with a warning that, should private respondent fail to
complete delivery of the balance of 53,666 kilograms of copra, petitioner would
purchase the balance at the open market and charge the price differential to private
respondent. Still private respondent failed to fulfill his contractual obligation to deliver
the remaining 53,666 kilograms of copra and since there was still no compliance by
private respondent, petitioner exercised its right under the contract and purchased
53,666 kilograms of copra, the undelivered balance, at the open market at the then
prevailing price of P168.00 per 100 kilograms, a price differential of P46,152.76.

The conduct of private respondent clearly manifests his deliberate fraudulent

intent to evade his contractual obligation for the price of copra had in the meantime
more than doubled from P82.00 to P168 per 100 kilograms. Under Article 1170 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. Pursuant to said article, private respondent is liable for
damages.
IGNACIO BARZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELITO ALVIAR
G.R. No. 115129, FEBRUARY 12, 1997

FACTS:

Barzaga went to the hardware store of respondent Alviar to inquire about the
availability of certain materials to be used in the construction of a niche for his wife. The
following morning, Barzaga went back to the store and told the employees that the
materials he was buying would have to be delivered at the Memorial Cemetery by eight
o'clock that morning since his hired workers were already at the burial site and time was
of the essence. A store employee agreed to deliver the items at the designated time,
date and place. With this assurance, Barzaga purchased the materials and paid in full.
The construction materials did not arrive at eight o'clock as promised. After follow-ups
and several hours later, when there was yet no delivery made, Barzaga went back to
the store. He saw the delivery truck but the things he purchased were not yet ready for
loading. Distressed by the seeming lack of concern on the store’s part, Barzaga decided
to cancel his transaction with the store and buy from another store.

Not being able to fulfill the scheduled burial of his wife, Barzaga demanded
damages from Alviar but the latter refused claiming that he is not liable for damages
considering that he did not incur legal delay since there was no specific time of delivery
agreed upon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent incurred delay in the performance of his
obligation.

RULING:

Respondent Angelito Alviar was negligent and incurred in delay in the

performance of his contractual obligation. The niche had to be constructed at the very
least on the twenty-second of December considering that it would take about two (2)
days to finish the job if the interment was to take place on the twenty-fourth of the
month. Respondent's delay in the delivery of the construction materials wasted so
much time that construction of the tomb could start only on the twenty-third. It could not
be ready for the scheduled burial of petitioner's wife.

This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. In their

contract of purchase and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what was
required of him as purchaser, i.e., the payment of the purchase price of P2,110.00. It
was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods
otherwise delay would attach.
RCBC vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133107, March 25, 1999

FACTS:

Private respondent Atty. Felipe Lustre purchased a car from Toyota Shaw, Inc.
for which he made a down payment, the balance of which is to be paid in 24 equal
monthly installments. He then issued 24 postdated checks in the amount due for every
month. To secure the balance, private respondent executed a promissory note and a
contract of Chattle Mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Toyota Shaw. The contract of
Chattle Mortgage provided for an acceleration clause stating that if there be default on
the part of the mortgagor to pay any of the installments, the whole amount remaining
shall become due.

Toyota Shaw then assigned all its rights and interest in the Chattle Mortgage to
petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The problem arose when one
check was not signed by the private respondent. On the theory that the respondent
defaulted in his payments, petitioner demanded the payment of the debt including
liquidated damages. Atty. Lustre refused, prompting RCBC to file an action for replevin
and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent, and
held that he was not in default. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent should be held in default.

HELD:

Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that “those who in the performance of
their obligation are guilty of delay are liable for damages.” The delay in the performance
must be malicious or negligent. There was no imputation, much less evidence, that
private respondent acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the check. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that such omission was mere
inadvertence on the part of private respondent.
LEAÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129018, NOVEMBER 15, 2001

FACTS:

Hermogenes Fernando, as vendor and Carmelita Leaño, as vendee executed a

contract to sell involving a piece of land. In the contract, Leaño bound herself to pay
Fernando P10,775.00 at the signing of the contract with the balance of P96,975.00 to
be paid within a period of TEN (10) years at a monthly amortization of P1,747.30. The
contract also provided for a grace period of one month within which to make payments,
together with the one corresponding to the month of grace. Should the month of grace
expire without the installments for both months having been satisfied, an interest of 18%
per annum will be charged on the unpaid installments.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was in delay in the payment of the monthly amortizations.

RULING:

On the issue of whether petitioner Leaño was in delay in paying the

amortizations, we rule that while the contract provided that the total purchase price was
payable within a ten-year period, the same contract specified that the purchase price
shall be paid in monthly installments for which the corresponding penalty shall be
imposed in case of default. Petitioner Leaño cannot ignore the provision on the
payment of monthly installments by claiming that the ten-year period within which to pay
has not elapsed.

Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides that in reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner
with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his
obligation, delay by the other begins. In the case at bar, respondent Fernando
performed his part of the obligation by allowing petitioner Leaño to continue in
possession and use of the property. Clearly, when petitioner Leaño did not pay the
monthly amortizations in accordance with the terms of the contract, she was in delay
and liable for damages. However, we agree with the trial court that the default
committed by petitioner Leaño in respect of the obligation could be compensated by the
interest and surcharges imposed upon her under the contract in question.
YAMBAO vs. ZUÑIGA
G.R. No. 146173 DECEMBER 11, 2003

FACTS:

The bus owned by the petitioner being driven Ceferino G. Venturina, suddenly,
bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga, a pedestrian. Such was the force of the impact that the
left side of the front windshield of the bus was cracked. Zuñiga was rushed to the
Hospital where he was given medical attention, but due to the massive injuries
sustained, he succumbed shortly thereafter.

Private respondents, heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint against petitioner and
her driver, Venturina, for damages. The complaint alleged that Venturina drove the bus
in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner, in violation of traffic rules and
regulations, without due regard to public safety, thus resulting in the victim’s premature
death. In her Answer, the petitioner denied the allegations of the complaint, trying to
shift the blame to the victim, theorizing that Herminigildo bumped into her bus, while
avoiding an unidentified woman who was chasing him. She further alleged that she was
not liable for any damages because as an employer, she exercised the proper diligence
of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of her bus driver.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of her employees, thus absolving her from any liability.

RULING:

Petitioner claimed that she exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her driver, Venturina. Her allegation that before she hired Venturina she
required him to submit his driver’s license and clearances is worthless, in view of her
failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. The
petitioner’s own admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not exercise due
diligence in the selection of her bus driver.

In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and
clearances when he applied with petitioner in January 1992, the latter still fails the test
of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Petitioner failed to present convincing
proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturina’s qualifications, safety record,
and driving history. Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over
Venturina after his selection. For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did
not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and
guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any showing
that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic
efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the
recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
RCPI vs. VERCHEZ
G.R. No. 164349. JANUARY 31, 2006

FACTS:

Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined in the hospital due to an ailment.
Her daughter Grace immediately went to the Sorsogon Branch of RCPI whose services
she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida. As three days after RCPI was
engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response was received from her, Grace
sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not
sending any financial aid. Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along
with her husband left for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having
received any telegram.

The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later. On inquiry from
RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, RCPI claimed that delivery was not immediately
effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the control and
foresight of RCPI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RCPI is negligent in the performance of its obligation.

RULING:

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. In culpa contractual, the mere
proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.

Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual obligation to
transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are
delivered to the persons at the given address and should provide a system whereby in
cases of undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages
sent by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than those
which can wait for the mail. RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in
the delivery of the telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages.
RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears
repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the presumption is that it was at
fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this presumption. For breach of contract
then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages. RCPI’s liability as an employer could of
course be avoided if it could prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

LRTA vs. NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. FEBRUARY 6, 2003

FACTS:

Nicanor Navidad who was drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station. While Navidad
was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell,
an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for
the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and
a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards.

ISSUE:
Who, if any, is liable for damages in relation to the death of Navidad?

RULING:

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Regrettably for LRTA, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the
late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that “there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Navidad, for the reason that
the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. There being,
similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
CEREZO VS. TUAZON
GR No. 141538 March 23, 2004

FACTS:

Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon
filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her
husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda.

After considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court
ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability
because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not hold Atty.
Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the
family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo
solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs.
Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is solidarily liable.

RULING:

The court held that, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. The responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is
no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other
is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect
damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has
himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This
is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary
capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable
directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in
selecting and supervising his employee. However, the present action is clearly for the
quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda. Thus, the petition was
denied ordering the defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the plaintiff.
NOGALES VS. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
GR No. 45641 December 19, 2006

FACTS:

Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales was under the exclusive
prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. Dr. Enriquez, an anesthesiologist, was notified of
Corazon’s admission. Subsequently he asked if Dr. Estrada needed his service but the
latter refused. Corazon’s water bag ruptured spontaneously and started to experience
convulsions. Dr. Estrada ordered the injectionof ten grams of magnesium sulfate.
However, Dr. Villaflor, who is assisting Dr. Estrada, administered only 2.5 grams of
magnesium sulfate. The baby came out in a weak and injured condition and
consequently had to be intubated and resuscitated. Corazon began to manifest
moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse and eventually Corazon died.
Petitioners filed a case against CMC personnel and physicians on the ground that they
were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon’s condition and charged
CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and
hospital staff. After more than 11 years the Trial Court rendered its judgment finding Dr.
Estrada solely liable for damages.

ISSUE:
Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.

RULING:
Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable
for the negligent act of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether
the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have
known, that the physician is an independent contractor. The doctrine of apparent
authority involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent contractor-
physician. First factor focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
responsible person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was
an employee or agent of the hospital. The second factor focuses on the patient’s
reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in
reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
In this case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff.
Wherefore the court finds respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada.
SERVICES VS. AGANA
GR No. 126467 February 11, 2008

FACTS:

Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital because of
difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be
suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid”. Thus, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of
Medical City, performed a surgery upon her. During the surgery, he found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary, necessitating the removal
of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband to
permit Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy upon Natividad. Dr. Fuentes performed and
completed the hysterectomy. Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation
and closed the incision. The operation, however, appeared to be flawed as the
attending nurses entered in the corresponding Record of Operation that there were 2
lacking sponge and announced that it was searched by the surgeon but to no avail.
Natividad’s daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina.
Natividad sought the treatment of Polymedic General Hospital thereat Dr. Gutierrez
detected a foreign object in her vagina - a foul-smelling gauze which infected her
vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organ which forced
stool to excrete in her vagina. Spouses Agana filed a complaint against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. The Trial Court found the respondents jointly
and severally liable. The CA affirmed said decision with modification that Dr. Fuentes
was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.

RULING:

It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation
of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy
when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her
left ovary. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation.
Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In
other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident
from his following conduct. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which
caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. Here, the negligence
was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
SICAM v. JORGE
G.R. NO. 159617, August 8, 2007

FACTS:

On different dates from September to October 1987, Lulu V. Jorge pawned several
pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam to secure a loan in the total amount of
P59, 500.00. On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took
away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. Petitioner
Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter dated October 19, 1987 informing her of the loss of
her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then
requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November
6, 1987 but petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry.

Respondent Lulu joined by her husband, Cesar Jorge, filed a complaint against
petitioner Sicam with the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking indemnification for the
loss of pawned jewelry and payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney's fees. However, petitioner Sicam contends that he is not the real party-in-
interest as the pawnshop was incorporated on April 20, 1987 and known as Agencia de
R.C. Sicam, Inc; that petitioner corporation had exercised due care and diligence in the
safekeeping of the articles pledged with it and could not be made liable for an event that
is fortuitous. After trial ,the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’
complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim. The RTC held that robbery is a fortuitous
event which exempts the victim from liability for the loss and under Art. 1174 of the Civil
Code. It further held that the corresponding diligence required of a pawnshop is that it
should take steps to secure and protect the pledged items and should take steps to
insure itself against the loss of articles which are entrusted to its custody as it derives
earnings from the pawnshop trade which petitioners failed to do and that robberies and
hold-ups are foreseeable risks in that those engaged in the pawnshop business are
expected to foresee.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their
possession.

RULING:
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from
any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not
foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. The presentation
of the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery committed based on
the report of petitioners' employees is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report
also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. Also, the robbery in this case took
place in 1987 when robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already
foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping.
Thus, petitioners are negligent in securing their pawnshop.

Dioquino v. Laureano
G.R. No. L-25906, May 28, 1970

FACTS:

Atty. Dioquino met patrol officer Federico Laureano in the MVO office in
Masbate to register his car. Laureano helped Dioquino in the facilitation of the
registration of his car. Thereby, Atty. Dioquino lent Laureano his car on a commodatum
basis but the car’s windshield was broken due to a stone thrown by some mischievous
boys. No satisfactory arrangements were made about the damage caused on the
windshield. Laureano believed that the stone-throwing was merely accidental so he
refused to file any charges against the stone-thrower or the parents; and he also
believed that he is not liable for any damages because the incident was a force
majeure.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether or not the breaking of the car’s windshield due to the stone-
throwing is a force majeure and thereby exculpating defendant from civil liability in favor
of Atty. Dioquino.

HELD:

YES, because Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that “Except in cases
expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.” The stone-throwing that yielded to the breaking of the windshield was
clearly unforeseeable and inevitable. Hence, Laureano cannot be compelled to pay the
damages caused on Atty. Dioquino’s car windshield.
VASQUEZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-42926 1985 Sep 13

FACTS:

MV 'Pioneer Cebu' was owned and operated by the defendant and used in the
transportation of goods and passengers in the interisland shipping. It had a passenger
capacity of three hundred twenty-two including the crew. It undertook the said voyage
on a special permit issued by the Collector of Customs in as much as, upon inspection,
it was found to be without an emergency electrical power system. The special permit
authorized the vessel to carry only two hundred sixty passengers due to the said
deficiency and for lack of safety devices for 322 passengers. A headcount was made of
the passengers on board, resulting on the tallying of 168 adults and 20 minors, although
the passengers manifest only listed 106 passengers. It has been admitted, however,
that the headcount is not reliable. When the vessel left Manila, its officers were already
aware of the typhoon Klaring building up somewhere in Mindanao. Plaintiffs seek the
recovery of damages due to the loss of Alfonso Vasquez, Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario
Marlon Vasquez during said voyage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent would be exempt from responsibility due to its
defense of fortuitous event.

RULING:

To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is

necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence
must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and
that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The event must have been impossible to foresee, or if it could be foreseen,
must have been impossible to avoid. There must be an entire exclusion of human
agency from the cause of injury or loss.

Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable

occurrence, yet, having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather
bulletins at intervals of six hours, the captain and crew were well aware of the risk they
were taking as they hopped from island to island from Romblon up to Tanguingui. They
held frequent conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence required of very
cautious persons, they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to
observe that extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of
the passengers transported by them with due regard for all circumstances and
unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to
overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or
injuries to passengers.

With regard to the contention that the total loss of the vessel extinguished
its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the Code of Commerce, it was held that the liability
of a shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon. Despite
the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the damages that a
shipowner or agent may be held liable for by reason of the death of its passengers.

YOBIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113003 1997 Oct 17

FACTS:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children named
Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound
for Davao City. The left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around
three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident resulted in the death of 28-
year-old Tito Tumboy, and physical injuries to other passengers. On November 21,
1988, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees was
filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and
Cresencio Yobido, its driver, before the Regional Trial Court. The plaintiffs asserted that
violation of the contract of carriage between them and the defendants was brought
about by the driver's failure to exercise the diligence required of the carrier in
transporting passengers safely to their place of destination. On the other hand, the
defendants raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners should be exempt from liability because the tire blowout
was a fortuitous event.

RULING:

As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks

incidental to the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the
safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them
safely and without injury. However, when a passenger is injured or dies, while traveling,
the law presumes that the common carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides
under Article 1755 that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Accordingly, in culpa contractual,
once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733,
1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to
a fortuitous event. Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by the
passenger.

It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability
for damages.

Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when
bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when
breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a passenger, as in this case.
Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or correction for the public good
when moral damages are awarded, may likewise be recovered in contractual
obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. Because petitioners failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of a common carrier, which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy, it is deemed
to have acted recklessly. As such, private respondents shall be entitled to exemplary
damages.

MINDEX RESOURCES v. MORILLO

G.R. No. 138123 2002 Mar 12

FACTS:

On February 1991, a verbal agreement was entered into between Ephraim Morillo
and Mindex Resources Corporation for the lease of the former’s 6 x 6 ten-wheeler cargo
truck for use in MINDEX’s mining operations at the stipulated rental of ‘P300.00 per
hour for a minimum of eight hours a day or a total of P2,400.00 daily.’ MINDEX had
been paying the rentals until April 10, 1991. Unknown to Morillo, on April 11, 1991, the
truck was burned by unidentified persons while it was parked unattended due to
mechanical trouble. Upon learning of the burning incident, Morillo offered to sell the
truck to MINDEX but the latter refused. Instead, it replaced the vehicle’s burned tires
and had it towed to a shop for repair and overhauling.

On April 15, 1991, Morillo sent a letter to Mr. Arni Isberg, the Finance Manager of
MINDEX, thru Mr. Ramoncito Gozar, Project Manager, proposing that he is entrusting to
MINDEX the said vehicle in the amount of P275,000.00 which is its cost price, in four
monthly installments. Morillo then promised to relinquish all the necessary documents
upon full payment of said account. On the other hand, MINDEX expressed thier
reservations and made counter offers that it will pay the truck in the amount of P76,000,
that the repair and overhaul will be on their expense, and that they wll return it in a good
running condition after repair. Morillo replied 1 that he will relinquish to MINDEX the
damaged truck, that he is amenable to receive the rental in the amount of P76,000.00,
and that MINDEX will pay fifty thousand pesos monthly until the balance of
P275,000.00 is fully paid. On August 1991, Morillo pulled out the truck from the repair
shop of MINDEX and had it repaired elsewhere for which he spent the total amount of
P132,750.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence against it considering that the facts show that
the burning of the truck was a fortuitous event.
RULING:

Both the RTC and the CA found petitioner negligent and thus liable for the loss or
destruction of the leased truck. Both parties may have suffered from the burning of the
truck; however, as found by both lower courts, the negligence of petitioner makes it
responsible for the loss. In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.

The records clearly shows that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
Petitioner fell short of ordinary diligence in safeguarding the leased truck against the
accident. Petitioner failed to employ reasonable foresight, diligence and care that would
have exempted it from liability resulting from the burning of the truck.