II

Jurisprudence Applicable: Santos v. Llamas

(a)

The defense of Atty. Celis is untenable.

In accordance with Rule 139-A Sec 9 and Sec 10, Atty Celis can engage in the practice of law
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.

(b)

As held in the case of Santos v. Llamas, the misrepresentation of IBP O.R. Number in the
pleadings violates the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

III
Jurisprudence Applicable: Malvar v. Kraft Foods

(a)

Yes. In numerous cases decided by the supreme court, it has been held that a contingent fee
agreement is valid in this jurisdiction, provided the fees therein fixed were reasonable.

(b)

Yes. In the case of Malvar v. Kraft Foods Inc., the court held that a lawyer may intervene on
considerations of equity and fairness, the Court disapproves of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court grants
the Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting
the Intervenor’s right to its stipulated professional fees that would be denied under the
compromise agreement. The Court does so in the interest of protecting the rights of the
practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.
 (c)

No. As held in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunication

Philippines, Inc., a client who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm; hence, the
resignation, retirement or separation from the law firm of the handling lawyer does not terminate
the relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a replacement.

(d)

It depends. The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Carina in
the execution of the compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its
attorney’s fees. Thereby, they would be solidarily liable with her for the attorney’s fees as
stipulated in the written agreement under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered
with the Intervenor’s professional relationship with Carina.

(e)

IV

(a)

Yes. As held in Cayetano v. Monsod, Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Verily, Atty, Carbon’s engagements falls within the ambit of practice of law.

(b)

Yes. BP 129 Sec 15 No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and for at least ten years, has been
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
Atty. Carbon satisfies all the qualifications for a judge of RTC. As gleaned on the facts, Atty.
Carbon is 36 years of age and has been in the practice of law for 10 years, hence he is qualified
to be a Regional Trial Court Judge.

V
Jurisprudence Applicable: Garrido v. Garrido

Both defenses of Atty. Carlos are untenable.

On the first defense, in Zaguirre v. Castillo, the court had the occasion to rule that the possession
of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.
Hence, a disbarment complaint may prosper against Atty. Carlos even if the acts complained of
took place before he became a lawyer.

On the second defense, in Garrido v. Garrido, the court held that the claim that his marriage to
complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although
the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains
that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.

VI
Jurisprudence Applicable: Orcino v. Gaspar

Yes, Atty. Colorado may be sanctioned by the court.

Sec 26 of Rule 138 provides that a lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding with the written consent of his client.
In the instant case, Mrs. Conchu did not give her written consent to Atty. Colorado's withdrawal.
Granting that Atty. Colorado's motion without complainant's consent was an application for
withdrawal with the court, the grounds are insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case.
Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the grounds
when a lawyer may withdraw his services. The instant case does not fall under any of the
grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered analogous to the grounds enumerated.

VII

The withdrawal of the disbarment complaint against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the
jurisdiction of the IBP and of the Supreme Court to continue the present administrative
proceeding against a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, the court held that an affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case
allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. xxx. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
xxx.

VIII
Jurisprudence Applicable: Dionisio v. Escano

The Code of Judicial Ethics provides in so far as pertinent:

Canon II
Rule 2.00 A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Canon V

Rule 5.02. A Judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities,
or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should
so manage investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases giving
grounds for disqualification, and if necessary, divest such investments and interests. Divestments
shall be made within one year from the effectivity of this Code or from appointment, as the case
may be.

Rule 5.03. Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as a officer, director, advisor, or employee of any business
except as director, or non-legal consultant of a family business.

IX
Jurisprudence Applicable: Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan Peralta v. Sandiganbayan

No.
This Court has acknowledged the right of a judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying
his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he
presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the
right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it
as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these
limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the
prosecution in proving the case when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross-
examinations supplementing those made by Prosecutor and far exceeding the latters questions in
length. The cold neutrality of an impartial judge requirement of due process was certainly denied
to the accused when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and
advocate. The questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that
common standard of fairness and impartiality.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Supreme Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in
this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.”
In the instant case, Atty. Corpuz is the lawyer who prepared the Deed of Sale for Connie which
is the same deed which his client Constancia wants to annul. Hence, Atty Corpuz labors
conflicting interest.

XI

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an
attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign
courts action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
Violation of AMLA is within the enumerations above, hence Atty. Cortez can be disbarred in the
Philippines but she must still be accorded due process.

XII

The defense of Atty. Calumpang is untenable. In Heck v. Santos, the SC declared that a
complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed
from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.

XIII
Jurisprudence Applicable: Belo v. Atty. Guevarra

In a similar case, the case of Belo Medical Group v. Atty. Guevarra, the court only suspended the
lawyer for his inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and
undermining the reputation of complainant through his Facebook posts. The court reasoned that
the lawyer disregarded the fact that he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in
his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an
officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and
rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning reputations.

XIV
Jurisprudence Applicable: Tormis v. Paredes

In the discussion of a previously decided case:

The charge of Cacai will not prosper. Only cases that are not yet decided cannot be the subject of
discussion for it will be a violation of the sub-judice rule. Once a case has been decided, it is
open for discussions or criticisms.

In the discussion of an ongoing case:

Cacai is correct that Judge Conde violated the sub-judice rule. The sub-judice rule restricts
comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. Notably, when Judge
Conde discussed the marriage scams, the case had not yet been concluded. Hence, commenting
on the marriage scams was in contravention of the sub-judice rule.

Judge Conde’s contentions are untenable.

On his right of expression, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary urged
members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. Section 6 which states that
"Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner
as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary." The way how Judge Conde discussed the case violates the above rule.

On the publicity of the marriage scams, the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge
Conde unrestrained license to discuss the case. The publicity given to the investigation of the
said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical
opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Conde to "rub salt to the wound”.

The position that he could not be held administratively liable for his comments as these were
uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial functions is likewise rejected.
Jurisprudence, as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, requires that he conduct himself
beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other
professional endeavors and everyday activities.

XV
Jurisprudence Applicable: Miranda v. Carpio

Both of the defenses of Atty. Compostela are untenable.

The agreement between the parties only shows that Atty. Compostela will be paid the acceptance
fee and the appearance fees, which he has duly received. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for
attorney's fees that would entitle Atty. Compostela to retain his client's property. Hence, Atty.
Compostela could not validly withhold the title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.

Atty. Compostela's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional

professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit,
meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional
fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." In the present case, the
parties had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus,
the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the Atty. Compostela is
already compensated by such agreement.