Matching Markets and Deferred Acceptance

Econ 498/598
Concordia University
Winter 2020

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Introduction

Economics studies how goods and services are exchanged or

distributed via a market.
Traditionally, markets determine allocation through prices, which
contain sufficient information to determine who gets what.
However, in some cases prices may not be enough to lead to an
allocation (e.g., university admission or internship markets).
⇒ It’s also about choosing and being chosen.
Also, market transactions or the use of prices may not be desirable,
and it may even be prohibited by law (e.g., kidney exchange).

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Introduction

Economics studies how goods and services are exchanged or

distributed via a market.
Traditionally, markets determine allocation through prices, which
contain sufficient information to determine who gets what.
However, in some cases prices may not be enough to lead to an
allocation (e.g., university admission or internship markets).
⇒ It’s also about choosing and being chosen.
Also, market transactions or the use of prices may not be desirable,
and it may even be prohibited by law (e.g., kidney exchange).

2/33
Introduction

Economics studies how goods and services are exchanged or

distributed via a market.
Traditionally, markets determine allocation through prices, which
contain sufficient information to determine who gets what.
However, in some cases prices may not be enough to lead to an
allocation (e.g., university admission or internship markets).
⇒ It’s also about choosing and being chosen.
Also, market transactions or the use of prices may not be desirable,
and it may even be prohibited by law (e.g., kidney exchange).

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Matching markets are typical examples of markets where there are
no monetary transactions (and thus no price):
I School assignment
I Medical match
I Allocation of dorm rooms
I Assignment of cadets to branches
I Organ transplants
I Allocation of subsidized/public housing, etc.

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Disclaimer

In the following we present a model that was formulated and

named symbolically (to describe an abstract mathematical model)
in the 1960s.

There is no intention to:

I promote an outdated view;
I hurt people’s feelings;
I discriminate;
I claim that the model captures the situation it describes.

While alternative labels for describing the same model may be used
(e.g., circles and squares instead of women and men), the original
symbolic names give immediate intuition about the setup.

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Marriage market

The marriage market model is the simplest matching market

model:
I There is a finite set of women: W = {w1 , w2 , . . . wn }.
I There is a finite set of men: M = {m1 , m2 , . . . mn0 }.
This model is known as a two-sided one-to-one matching model.
Other models are:
I One-sided one-to-one matching (e.g., dormitory room
assignment)
I Two-sided many-to-one matching (college admission model)
I One-sided many-to-one matching (school choice model)
I One-to-one matching without sides (roommate model)

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Marriage market

The marriage market model is the simplest matching market

model:
I There is a finite set of women: W = {w1 , w2 , . . . wn }.
I There is a finite set of men: M = {m1 , m2 , . . . mn0 }.
This model is known as a two-sided one-to-one matching model.
Other models are:
I One-sided one-to-one matching (e.g., dormitory room
assignment)
I Two-sided many-to-one matching (college admission model)
I One-sided many-to-one matching (school choice model)
I One-to-one matching without sides (roommate model)

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Preferences

I each man m has a preference ordering Pm over the women

(and the option of remaining single).
I each woman w has a preference ordering Pw over the men
(and the option of remaining single).

Example: Pm : w1 , w3 , w6 , m, w2 , w4 , . . .
I m’s most-preferred woman is w1 , w3 is the second
most-preferred woman, etc.
I m prefers staying single to being matched to w2 or w4
⇒ w2 and w4 are unacceptable for m.

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Preferences

I each man m has a preference ordering Pm over the women

(and the option of remaining single).
I each woman w has a preference ordering Pw over the men
(and the option of remaining single).

Example: Pm : w1 , w3 , w6 , m, w2 , w4 , . . .
I m’s most-preferred woman is w1 , w3 is the second
most-preferred woman, etc.
I m prefers staying single to being matched to w2 or w4
⇒ w2 and w4 are unacceptable for m.

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Preferences

I each man m has a preference ordering Pm over the women

(and the option of remaining single).
I each woman w has a preference ordering Pw over the men
(and the option of remaining single).

Example: Pm : w1 , w3 , w6 , m, w2 , w4 , . . .
I m’s most-preferred woman is w1 , w3 is the second
most-preferred woman, etc.
I m prefers staying single to being matched to w2 or w4
⇒ w2 and w4 are unacceptable for m.

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Preferences

I each man m has a preference ordering Pm over the women

(and the option of remaining single).
I each woman w has a preference ordering Pw over the men
(and the option of remaining single).

Example: Pm : w1 , w3 , w6 , m, w2 , w4 , . . .
I m’s most-preferred woman is w1 , w3 is the second
most-preferred woman, etc.
I m prefers staying single to being matched to w2 or w4
⇒ w2 and w4 are unacceptable for m.

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Preferences are assumed to be strict: no agent (man or woman) is
indifferent between two different potential mates, or between a
potential mate or staying single.

Other ways to represent preferences:

I Read from left to right:

w1 Pm w3

Man m (strictly) prefers w1 to w3 .

I Read from top to bottom:
Pm
w1
w3
w6

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Preferences are assumed to be strict: no agent (man or woman) is
indifferent between two different potential mates, or between a
potential mate or staying single.

Other ways to represent preferences:

I Read from left to right:

w1 Pm w3

Man m (strictly) prefers w1 to w3 .

I Read from top to bottom:
Pm
w1
w3
w6

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Preferences are assumed to be strict: no agent (man or woman) is
indifferent between two different potential mates, or between a
potential mate or staying single.

Other ways to represent preferences:

I Read from left to right:

w1 Pm w3

Man m (strictly) prefers w1 to w3 .

I Read from top to bottom:
Pm
w1
w3
w6

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Preferences are assumed to be strict: no agent (man or woman) is
indifferent between two different potential mates, or between a
potential mate or staying single.

Other ways to represent preferences:

I Read from left to right:

w1 Pm w3

Man m (strictly) prefers w1 to w3 .

I Read from top to bottom:
Pm
w1
w3
w6

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Matching

A matching is a mapping µ that says who is matched to whom:

I µ(m) is the partner of m under the matching µ
I µ(w ) is the partner of w under the matching µ
Any matching µ must satisfy the following properties:
I For each man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}
A man m is matched to a woman or himself (but not to other
men).
I For each woman w , µ(w ) ∈ M ∪ {w }
A woman w is matched to a man or herself (but not to other
women).
I µ(m) = w ⇔ µ(w ) = m .
A man is matched to a woman if, and only if, this woman is
matched to this man.

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Matching

A matching is a mapping µ that says who is matched to whom:

I µ(m) is the partner of m under the matching µ
I µ(w ) is the partner of w under the matching µ
Any matching µ must satisfy the following properties:
I For each man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}
A man m is matched to a woman or himself (but not to other
men).
I For each woman w , µ(w ) ∈ M ∪ {w }
A woman w is matched to a man or herself (but not to other
women).
I µ(m) = w ⇔ µ(w ) = m .
A man is matched to a woman if, and only if, this woman is
matched to this man.

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Matching

A matching is a mapping µ that says who is matched to whom:

I µ(m) is the partner of m under the matching µ
I µ(w ) is the partner of w under the matching µ
Any matching µ must satisfy the following properties:
I For each man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}
A man m is matched to a woman or himself (but not to other
men).
I For each woman w , µ(w ) ∈ M ∪ {w }
A woman w is matched to a man or herself (but not to other
women).
I µ(m) = w ⇔ µ(w ) = m .
A man is matched to a woman if, and only if, this woman is
matched to this man.

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Matching

A matching is a mapping µ that says who is matched to whom:

I µ(m) is the partner of m under the matching µ
I µ(w ) is the partner of w under the matching µ
Any matching µ must satisfy the following properties:
I For each man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}
A man m is matched to a woman or himself (but not to other
men).
I For each woman w , µ(w ) ∈ M ∪ {w }
A woman w is matched to a man or herself (but not to other
women).
I µ(m) = w ⇔ µ(w ) = m .
A man is matched to a woman if, and only if, this woman is
matched to this man.

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Matching

A matching is a mapping µ that says who is matched to whom:

I µ(m) is the partner of m under the matching µ
I µ(w ) is the partner of w under the matching µ
Any matching µ must satisfy the following properties:
I For each man m, µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}
A man m is matched to a woman or himself (but not to other
men).
I For each woman w , µ(w ) ∈ M ∪ {w }
A woman w is matched to a man or herself (but not to other
women).
I µ(m) = w ⇔ µ(w ) = m .
A man is matched to a woman if, and only if, this woman is
matched to this man.

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Stability
There is no price in a matching problem, so we can’t talk about a
price equilibrium.
The relevant solution concept is stability (related to the concept of
the core from cooperative game theory). It is a conjunction of two
requirements: individual rationality and the absence of blocking
pairs.

Definition
A matching µ is individually rational if for each individual
v ∈ M ∪ W,
µ(v ) Rv v
Rv is the weak preference relation “(strictly) preferred or
indifferent to.”

In words, a matching is individually rational if no agent would

strictly prefer to remain single to staying with the partner assigned
by the matching.
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Stability
There is no price in a matching problem, so we can’t talk about a
price equilibrium.
The relevant solution concept is stability (related to the concept of
the core from cooperative game theory). It is a conjunction of two
requirements: individual rationality and the absence of blocking
pairs.

Definition
A matching µ is individually rational if for each individual
v ∈ M ∪ W,
µ(v ) Rv v
Rv is the weak preference relation “(strictly) preferred or
indifferent to.”

In words, a matching is individually rational if no agent would

strictly prefer to remain single to staying with the partner assigned
by the matching.
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Definition
A pair (m, w ) blocks a matching µ if
I µ(m) 6= w m and w are not matched under µ
I w Pm µ(m) m prefers w to his match
I m Pw µ(w ) w prefers m to her match

Definition
A matching µ is stable if
I it is individually rational
I there is no man-woman pair that blocks µ

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Definition
A pair (m, w ) blocks a matching µ if
I µ(m) 6= w m and w are not matched under µ
I w Pm µ(m) m prefers w to his match
I m Pw µ(w ) w prefers m to her match

Definition
A matching µ is stable if
I it is individually rational
I there is no man-woman pair that blocks µ

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Definition
A pair (m, w ) blocks a matching µ if
I µ(m) 6= w m and w are not matched under µ
I w Pm µ(m) m prefers w to his match
I m Pw µ(w ) w prefers m to her match

Definition
A matching µ is stable if
I it is individually rational
I there is no man-woman pair that blocks µ

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Definition
A pair (m, w ) blocks a matching µ if
I µ(m) 6= w m and w are not matched under µ
I w Pm µ(m) m prefers w to his match
I m Pw µ(w ) w prefers m to her match

Definition
A matching µ is stable if
I it is individually rational
I there is no man-woman pair that blocks µ

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Example:

Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2

w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

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Example:

Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2

w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

Consider the matching µ(m1 ) = w2 and µ(m2 ) = w1 .

This matching is not stable: the pair (m1 , w1 ) blocks µ:
I m1 prefers w1 to his match, µ(m1 ) = w2
I w1 prefers m1 to her match, µ(w1 ) = m2 .

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Example:

Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2

w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

Consider the matching µ0 (m1 ) = w1 and µ0 (m2 ) = w2 . Matching

µ0 is stable:
I m2 would like to block with w1 but w1 prefers µ0 (w1 ) = m1 to
him.
I w2 would like to block with m1 but m1 prefers µ0 (m1 ) = w1 to
her.
I w1 and m1 do not want to block: they are matched to their
most preferred partners.

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Matching Mechanisms

Definition
A matching mechanism (algorithm, rule) is a function which
assigns a matching to each preference profile of the agents.

Definition
A matching mechanism is stable if it assigns a stable matching to
each preference profile.

Definition
A matching mechanism is Pareto efficient if it assigns a Pareto
efficient matching to each preference profile.

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Matching Mechanisms

Definition
A matching mechanism (algorithm, rule) is a function which
assigns a matching to each preference profile of the agents.

Definition
A matching mechanism is stable if it assigns a stable matching to
each preference profile.

Definition
A matching mechanism is Pareto efficient if it assigns a Pareto
efficient matching to each preference profile.

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Matching Mechanisms

Definition
A matching mechanism (algorithm, rule) is a function which
assigns a matching to each preference profile of the agents.

Definition
A matching mechanism is stable if it assigns a stable matching to
each preference profile.

Definition
A matching mechanism is Pareto efficient if it assigns a Pareto
efficient matching to each preference profile.

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Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms: Informal Description

We will study the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, which

is a cornerstone matching mechanism in matching market design.

I Men propose to women in the order of their preferences:

I Each man starts proposing to his most-preferred woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his second most-preferred
woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his third most-preferred woman,
etc.

I Each woman always keeps the best man (according to her

preferences) among the man proposing to her (if any), and
rejects the others.
I The algorithm stops when there is no more rejection.

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Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms: Informal Description

We will study the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, which

is a cornerstone matching mechanism in matching market design.

I Men propose to women in the order of their preferences:

I Each man starts proposing to his most-preferred woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his second most-preferred
woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his third most-preferred woman,
etc.

I Each woman always keeps the best man (according to her

preferences) among the man proposing to her (if any), and
rejects the others.
I The algorithm stops when there is no more rejection.

13/33
Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms: Informal Description

We will study the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, which

is a cornerstone matching mechanism in matching market design.

I Men propose to women in the order of their preferences:

I Each man starts proposing to his most-preferred woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his second most-preferred
woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his third most-preferred woman,
etc.

I Each woman always keeps the best man (according to her

preferences) among the man proposing to her (if any), and
rejects the others.
I The algorithm stops when there is no more rejection.

13/33
Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms: Informal Description

We will study the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, which

is a cornerstone matching mechanism in matching market design.

I Men propose to women in the order of their preferences:

I Each man starts proposing to his most-preferred woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his second most-preferred
woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his third most-preferred woman,
etc.

I Each woman always keeps the best man (according to her

preferences) among the man proposing to her (if any), and
rejects the others.
I The algorithm stops when there is no more rejection.

13/33
Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms: Informal Description

We will study the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, which

is a cornerstone matching mechanism in matching market design.

I Men propose to women in the order of their preferences:

I Each man starts proposing to his most-preferred woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his second most-preferred
woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his third most-preferred woman,
etc.

I Each woman always keeps the best man (according to her

preferences) among the man proposing to her (if any), and
rejects the others.
I The algorithm stops when there is no more rejection.

13/33
Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms: Informal Description

We will study the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, which

is a cornerstone matching mechanism in matching market design.

I Men propose to women in the order of their preferences:

I Each man starts proposing to his most-preferred woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his second most-preferred
woman
I If rejected, a man proposes to his third most-preferred woman,
etc.

I Each woman always keeps the best man (according to her

preferences) among the man proposing to her (if any), and
rejects the others.
I The algorithm stops when there is no more rejection.

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 Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2
w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

I Step 1: Men m1 and m2 both propose to w1 .

I Woman w1 picks her best choice, m1 , and rejects m2 .
I Woman w2 does nothing.
I Step 2: Man m2 now proposes to w2 .
I Women w1 is still with m1 .
I Woman w2 accepts m2 ’s proposal.
I There are no rejections, so the algorithm stops.
Final matching: µ(m1 ) = w1 and µ(m2 ) = w2 .

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 Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2
w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

I Step 1: Men m1 and m2 both propose to w1 .

I Woman w1 picks her best choice, m1 , and rejects m2 .
I Woman w2 does nothing.
I Step 2: Man m2 now proposes to w2 .
I Women w1 is still with m1 .
I Woman w2 accepts m2 ’s proposal.
I There are no rejections, so the algorithm stops.
Final matching: µ(m1 ) = w1 and µ(m2 ) = w2 .

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 Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2
w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

I Step 1: Men m1 and m2 both propose to w1 .

I Woman w1 picks her best choice, m1 , and rejects m2 .
I Woman w2 does nothing.
I Step 2: Man m2 now proposes to w2 .
I Women w1 is still with m1 .
I Woman w2 accepts m2 ’s proposal.
I There are no rejections, so the algorithm stops.
Final matching: µ(m1 ) = w1 and µ(m2 ) = w2 .

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 Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2
w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

I Step 1: Men m1 and m2 both propose to w1 .

I Woman w1 picks her best choice, m1 , and rejects m2 .
I Woman w2 does nothing.
I Step 2: Man m2 now proposes to w2 .
I Women w1 is still with m1 .
I Woman w2 accepts m2 ’s proposal.
I There are no rejections, so the algorithm stops.
Final matching: µ(m1 ) = w1 and µ(m2 ) = w2 .

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 Pm1 Pm2 Pw1 P w2
w1 w1 m1 m1
w2 w2 m2 m2
m1 m2 w1 w2

I Step 1: Men m1 and m2 both propose to w1 .

I Woman w1 picks her best choice, m1 , and rejects m2 .
I Woman w2 does nothing.
I Step 2: Man m2 now proposes to w2 .
I Women w1 is still with m1 .
I Woman w2 accepts m2 ’s proposal.
I There are no rejections, so the algorithm stops.
Final matching: µ(m1 ) = w1 and µ(m2 ) = w2 .

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Which side proposes?

I Only one side makes the proposals in the Deferred Acceptance

algorithm, while the other side accepts or rejects the
proposals.

I Women could also be proposing in the Deferred Acceptance

algorithm, while the men would accept or reject the proposals.
(Think of hospital-intern or school-student pairings, with one
vacancy at each hospital or one seat at each school, which
would also be one-to-one matching markets.)

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Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: A More Formal
Definition

Step 1

Each man proposes to his most preferred acceptable woman

(if a man finds all women unacceptable he remains single).
Each woman who received at least one offer
I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among those who proposed to her and are acceptable
I rejects all other offers (if there are any)

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Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: A More Formal
Definition

Step 1

Each man proposes to his most preferred acceptable woman

(if a man finds all women unacceptable he remains single).
Each woman who received at least one offer
I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among those who proposed to her and are acceptable
I rejects all other offers (if there are any)

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Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: A More Formal
Definition

Step 1

Each man proposes to his most preferred acceptable woman

(if a man finds all women unacceptable he remains single).
Each woman who received at least one offer
I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among those who proposed to her and are acceptable
I rejects all other offers (if there are any)

16/33
Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: A More Formal
Definition

Step 1

Each man proposes to his most preferred acceptable woman

(if a man finds all women unacceptable he remains single).
Each woman who received at least one offer
I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among those who proposed to her and are acceptable
I rejects all other offers (if there are any)

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Step k (k ≥ 2)

Each man whose offer has been rejected in the previous step
proposes to his most preferred woman among the acceptable
women he has not yet proposed to.
(If there is no such woman he remains single.)

Each woman who received at least one offer in this step

I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among
I those men who proposed to her in this step and are acceptable
to her
I and the man she held temporarily from the previous step (if
any);

I rejects all other offers (if there are any).

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Step k (k ≥ 2)

Each man whose offer has been rejected in the previous step
proposes to his most preferred woman among the acceptable
women he has not yet proposed to.
(If there is no such woman he remains single.)

Each woman who received at least one offer in this step

I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among
I those men who proposed to her in this step and are acceptable
to her
I and the man she held temporarily from the previous step (if
any);

I rejects all other offers (if there are any).

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Step k (k ≥ 2)

Each man whose offer has been rejected in the previous step
proposes to his most preferred woman among the acceptable
women he has not yet proposed to.
(If there is no such woman he remains single.)

Each woman who received at least one offer in this step

I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among
I those men who proposed to her in this step and are acceptable
to her
I and the man she held temporarily from the previous step (if
any);

I rejects all other offers (if there are any).

17/33
Step k (k ≥ 2)

Each man whose offer has been rejected in the previous step
proposes to his most preferred woman among the acceptable
women he has not yet proposed to.
(If there is no such woman he remains single.)

Each woman who received at least one offer in this step

I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among
I those men who proposed to her in this step and are acceptable
to her
I and the man she held temporarily from the previous step (if
any);

I rejects all other offers (if there are any).

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Step k (k ≥ 2)

Each man whose offer has been rejected in the previous step
proposes to his most preferred woman among the acceptable
women he has not yet proposed to.
(If there is no such woman he remains single.)

Each woman who received at least one offer in this step

I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among
I those men who proposed to her in this step and are acceptable
to her
I and the man she held temporarily from the previous step (if
any);

I rejects all other offers (if there are any).

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Step k (k ≥ 2)

Each man whose offer has been rejected in the previous step
proposes to his most preferred woman among the acceptable
women he has not yet proposed to.
(If there is no such woman he remains single.)

Each woman who received at least one offer in this step

I temporarily holds the offer from the most preferred man
among
I those men who proposed to her in this step and are acceptable
to her
I and the man she held temporarily from the previous step (if
any);

I rejects all other offers (if there are any).

17/33
End: The algorithm stops when there is no man whose offer is
rejected in a given step.

Final matching:
I Each woman is matched to the man whose offer she was
holding temporarily when the algorithm stopped (if any).
Note: The final acceptance was deferred.

I Thus, each man is matched to the woman he was temporarily

matched to when the algorithm stopped (if any).

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w2 w1 w1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m2 , m3 m1 w1 rejects m2
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w2 w1 w1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m2 , m3 m1 men propose
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w2 w
1 w1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2 , m3 m1 w1 rejects m2
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w2 w
1 w1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2 , m3 m1 w1 rejects m2
m2 m2 → w2
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2 , m3 m
1 w1 rejects m2
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2 , m3 m
1 w1 rejects m2
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 m1 → w1
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w
1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2, 
m m
3 1 w1 rejects m2
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w
1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2, 
m m
3 1 w1 rejects m2
m2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 m3 → w2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w
1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w
2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2, 
m m
3  1 w1 rejects m2
m
2
 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no men is rejected
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w
1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w
2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2, 
m
3 m
 1 w1 rejects m2
m
2
 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 m2 → w3
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w
1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w
2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2, 
m
3 m
 1 w1 rejects m2
m
2
 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no rejection
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Deferred Acceptance example

Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 P w1 P w2 Pw3

w
2 w
1 w
1 m1 m3 m1
w1 w
2 w2 m3 m2 m3
w3 w3 w3 m2 m1 m2

w1 w2 w3
m
2, 
m
3 m
1 w1 rejects m2
m
2 w2 rejects m1
m1 w1 rejects m3
m3 w2 rejects m2
m2 no rejection
m1 m3 m2 Final matching

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Take-away

I In a two-sided one-to-one matching model each side has strict

preferences over partners from the other side.
I If agent x prefers staying single to being matched to agent y ,
we say that y is unacceptable for x.
I A matching is a function that determines who is matched to
whom.

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Take-away

I A matching is individually rational if nobody is matched to an

unacceptable partner.
I A pair (m, w ) blocks a matching µ if they both prefer each
other to their partner under µ.
I A matching is stable if it is
I individually rational.
I not blocked by any pair.

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Take-away

I A matching mechanism is a function that assigns a matching

to each preference profile.
I The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism produces a
matching for each preference profile. It is an iterated
procedure which is based on agents’ preferences on both sides
of the market.
I There are two alternative DA mechanisms: either the men
propose or the women propose. The two mechanisms are
symmetric in the two sides of a one-to-one matching market.

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